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The Double "Daimōn" in Euclides the SocraticAuthor(s): Aldo BrancacciSource: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 38, No. 2, Socrates'Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy (June 2005), pp. 143-154Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40914001 .Accessed: 02/08/2011 18:14

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The Double Daimon in Euclides the Socratic Aldo Brancacci

According to Diogenes Laertius, Euclides of Megara wrote six dialogues: Lamprias, Aeschines, Phoenix, Criton, Alcibiades, and Erotikos.1 That they were Socratic dialogues as can clearly be seen from the titles,2 is con- firmed by Panaetius, in a passage worth quoting at the outset: 'Panaetius thinks that of all the Socratic dialogues, those by Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aeschines, are genuine (aïëtheis); he is in doubt about those ascribed to Phaedo and Euclides; but he rejects the others one and all'.3

It may be worthwhile starting out from this passage, over whose exact meaning there has been much discussion, noting how Euclides is sepa- rated, together with Phaedo, from the group of major Socratics, whose dialogues Panaetius considered genuine, and therefore authentic, which I believe is the correct interpretation of his opinion. It may well be that the investigation undertaken in this paper could contribute to shedding light on some of the possible reasons for the Stoic philosopher's doubts. An important fragment from one of Euclides' dialogues is quoted by Stobaeus in Chapter 6 (Peri akolasias) of Book III of the Anthologium. It is

1 Cf. DL II 108 (= SSR II A 10). The ancient sources concerning Euclides and the Socratics are quoted in this paper from the edition SSR by Giannantoni 1990.

2 Cf.Hirzell895,I110n3.

3 DL II 64 (= Panaetius fr 126 van Straaten)

144 Aldo Brancacci

a literal quotation from Euclides which deserves close reading: 'Sleep is a dairriõn with a youthful, childlike look (néõteros kai meirakwdes dairriõn), easily convinced and fleeting; the other {ho heteros houtos) is white-haired and old, dwelling especially among old people, difficult to convince and avoid. Once this dairriõn has appeared, it is difficult lo escape from him. He takes no notice of words, [neither can he generally hear anything] because he is deaf, and you cannot clarify anything for him, by showing it to him, because he is blind/4

Attribution of the fragment to the Erotikos proposed by Meineke and accepted by Nestle,5 can only be based on the representation of Sleep as néõteros kai meirakwdes dairriõn, which could refer to the context of a discussion on eros; but the basis for this attribution is too weak, and the hypothesis must be rejected, for other reasons too, as we shall see.6 It should however be noted that the whole text refers to the theme of persuasion, listening and reception of what is expressed in the logos, which is a particularly Socratic theme. Delight in image elaboration and use of myths or mythical figures for the illustration of ethical themes are also typically Socratic.7 The connection between Sleep and Death goes right back to the origins of Greek literature. It appears twice in the Iliad, where Sleep and Death are described as brothers (XIV 231), actually twins (XVI 682; cf. 672). Their function also comes out as that of 'swift conveyers' (XVI 672, 682). But, perhaps more important for our purpose, is their representation in Hesiod, which appears to have been the model for the sweeter, more human one in Euclides. See the following passage from the Theogony:

4 Stob III 6 63 s. lem Eukleidou (= SSR II A 11)

5 Cf. Meineke 1867, IV 260, who argued that the first daimon was to be identified with Eros and he was followed by Nestle 1922, 171.

6 This is rejected without further discussion by Hirzel (1895), 1 110 n 3; Döring 1972, 80; Montoneri 1984, 45 n 12.

7 Cf. von Fritz 1931, col 708. Müller 1985, 101 accepts this opinion, though without coming to the automatic conclusion that Euclides had nothing to do with the Eleatic School; Giannantoni 1990, IV 39 (cf. 55-60) accepts it without reservations, coming to this conclusion.

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And there the children of dark Night have their dwellings, Sleep and Death, awful gods. The glowing Sun never looks upon them with his beams, neither as he goes up into heaven, nor as he comes down from heaven. And the former of them roams peacefully over the earth and the sea's broad back and is kindly to men; but the other has a heart of iron, and his spirit within him is pitiless as bronze: Whomever of men he has once seized he holds fast, and he is hateful even to the deathless gods. (Theog 758-66)

In his representation of Sleep Euclides appears to have taken over from Hesiod the sweet, light, almost enchanting features in a blandly erotic sense, and to have transfigured the depressing, negative connota- tion of Death into a vision aiming at making it acceptable and bearable, both thanks to its physical representation as a white-haired old man, and to its moral characterisation, replacing the hateful, cruel and terrible image of the child of the Night with that of an old, blind and deaf man, who, only for this reason, cannot listen to explanations or take special cases into account. Considering the fact that the fragment comes from a Socratic dialogue, Natorp's remark that there is no confirmation of a question-answer structure8 only implies that we have the fragment of a logos, in conformity with a literary model of which numerous examples are to be found in the Socratic works of Xenophon and Plato, and which we know was also particularly favoured by Antisthenes.9 But a logos on death, whose aim was to sweeten its face, can only have been pro- nounced by Socrates when he himself was about to die; and if it is hardly necessary to recall that we have a great deal on this in Plato's Apology of Socrates and Phaedo, it is worth noting that there was also a dialogue of Antisthenes (now lost) on the subject, of which only a few fragments survive.10 All this leads to the conclusion that the passage preserved by Stobaeus provides a few crumbs of a speech of consolation made by Euclides' dying Socrates, very probably in his dialogue entitled Crito. It

8 Cf. Natorp 1907 col 1001.

9 When DL VI 1 (= SSR VAII) stated that Antisthenes introduced 'rhetorical style' into philosophical dialogues, taken over from Gorgias, he also meant, in my view, that lengthy speeches by Socrates (and possibly other participants in the dialogues) were frequent in Antisthenes' dialogues.

10 Cf. Brancacci 2003, 259-78.

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is highly likely that Socrates' closest friend was his interlocutor, both in the Platonic dialogue of the same name, and in a dialogue of Euclides' situated in the same context. The expression 'this other one' {ho heleros houtos), introducing the description of the daimõn of Death - who as has already been pointed out, is not actually named as such11 - shows that this daimõn was indicated by one of the two speakers to the other one: i.e., by Socrates to Crito. This could mean that the description of the daimõn was sparked off by pictorial representation. An entirely similar case is the description of Achilles and the Centaur Chiron in a fragment of Antisthenes' Heracles.12 This concordance between Euclides and Antis- thenes is significant because it could provide evidence for further affinity in the literary expression of the Socratics' dialogues. We know that Sleep and Night were frequently associated in both literature and in painting and sculpture.13

Taking into account the existence of this dialogue by Euclides, and the terms in which the association between the daimones Sleep and Death is developed, the conclusion of the Apology of Socrates can be better under- stood as can the way in which Plato constructed it. I am referring to the well-known section dealing with Socrates' two hypotheses on death. The first - which I believe is very close to the historical Socrates - is based

11 Regarding the expression heteros houïos, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1919, 23 n 2, points out that it recalls the way in which, in a trial, the adversary present at the trial was usually referred to. In the view of Müller 1985, 188 n 69, this Voudrait dire que la Mort est bien présente aux côtés de chacun de nous, comme le dit le fr. 20 (adpositum) du couple de démons'. But Müller does not explain how Death and Sleep can be considered present for the two speakers. See the different explanation I offer in this paper.

12 Cf. Gnom Vat 743 n° 11 (= SSR v A 95), and, on this fragment, see Brancacci 1997, 115-17.

13 For some points cf. Dübner 1902, 2111-12; Guerrini 1961; Paribeni 1966; Mainoldi 1987. Among the best known representations of Sleep and Death are: Neck black figure amphora (500 - 490 BC), Collection Piot, 1876. Département des Antiquités grecques, étrusques et romaines, Musée du Louvre (Paris); Etruscan sculpture (4th century BC), Sleep and Death carry away the dead Sarpedon, Cleveland Museum of Art, USA; Amphora (c 500 BC), attributed to a Diosphos Painter, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (Judy and Michael H. Steinhardt Gallery); Lekythos with red figures on a white background (450-425 BC), attributed to the Thanatos Painter, British Museum, London (J.D. Beazley; Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, Oxford 19632, 1228 12; Beazley Archive Database Number: 216353).

The Double Daimon in Euclides the Socratic 147

on the assumption that dying 'is like being nothing anymore' (Ap 40c5-6), while the second - where Plato lets his own point of view creep in, which was to be further developed in the Phaedo - starts out from the assumption of Orphic-Pythagorean origin that dying is, 'as people say, a kind of change and migration of the soul from this place down here to another place' (Ap 40c7-9). It should be noted that, in the first hypothesis, the close parallelism between Sleep and Death returns and its origins may well have lain in Euclides' dialogue, and that, in any case, on the basis of the Euclides fragment, we have a further reason for considering it close to the position of the historical Socrates, or at least 'Socratic' (in the sense of being advanced by Socratic philosophers). At this point I should like to quote a part of this well known passage:

Now, if dying is having no sensation, and it is like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain. [ . . . ] So if such is the nature of death, I count it a gain; for in that case, all time seems to be no longer than one night. (Ap 40c9-d2, 40e2-4)

It is now worth examining an important passage in Censorinus: 'Euclides the Socratic says that each of us without distinction has been assigned a double genius, which can be learnt from Lucilius in Book XVI of the Satires'.™

There is no doubt that the Latin word genius corresponded to the Greek daimon. Thus Euclides' statement becomes surprising, not only because in Xenophon and Plato the demon or divine sign mentioned by Socrates, actually in a different way in the two Socratics, is called to daimonion, not daimon}5 but especially because to daimonion is, both in Xenophon and Plato, single, while it is double in Euclides. Actually, it is

14 Censorin de die natali 3,3 (= SSR II A 11): Euclides autem Socraticus duplicem omnibus omnino nobis genium dicit adpositum, quant rem apud Lucilium in libro XVI satyrarum [= fr 518 Marx] licet cognoscere.

15 The neuter to daimonion denotes a more abstract, conceptualised sphere in respect of the noun daimõn, which has a wide range of meanings. In Xenophon to daimonion means Socrates' demon, giving him advice (heautõ semainein): but the use of to daimonion, instead of the traditional term daimõn, confers a more general, wider character than the latter term would have allowed. In Plato this conceptualisation and thus intériorisation process is even more elevated since to daimonion is an indication of the daimonic sign or voice made manifest to Socrates rather than a personal daimõn.

148 Aldo Brancacci

in the Apology that Plato's Socrates also speaks of daimones in the plural and declares that he believes in daimones.16 This passage is especially important, because Socrates is discussing the charges with Meletus, i.e., that he does not recognise the gods recognised by the city. Now, he argues, the recognition of the existence of daimones implies the recogni- tion of the existence of the gods, because either the daimones are gods themselves or the offspring of the gods. The line of argument is based on the fact that Socrates believes in daimones; otherwise, in one way or other, he would be basing himself on a play on words. The connection between the 'new divinities' (kaina daimonia) Socrates was alleged to have introduced in the place of the gods recognised by the polis, and Socrates' daimonion, occurs, in a structural position, at the beginning of Book I of Xenophon's Memorabilia, and is particularly important, both in itself and owing to the parallel which it allows to be set up with Plato's Apology (cf. Xen Mem 1 1-2). Just because the passage from the Apology is not perfectly in line (and this is the least that can be said) with those where Plato speaks of the inside divine voice that Socrates heard, it appears to show that Plato, when positing his portrait of Socrates, took into account the one elaborated by the other Socratics incorporating it into his own, albeit (and this was obviously a deliberate decision) marginally, in a subordinate background. To this should be added that belief in daimones was quite normal in fifth-century Greek culture and could well have been a trait of the historical Socrates, who would thus have followed a line of thought coming down from Homer and Hesiod, by way of tragedy and present in Plato himself.17 It should

16 Cf. PI Ap 27 b-c. Socrates' argument runs as follows: according to the prosecution Socrates teaches people not to recognise the acknowledged gods of the city but believe in new ones. Now, if Socrates believes in dairrwn related things (daimonia pragmata), he absolutely must believe that daimones exist. Daimones are either gods or their offspring. But what man can believe there are children of gods and non-gods?

17 In Plato the term daimon is used both in the singular and plural for lower-rank gods in the Greek pantheon. It occurs in mythical narrations (the myth of the other world in Phaedo, the myth of Er, that of the winged chariot, that of Theuth, that of Cronus in the Politicus and Leges) or is used metaphorically, as an image or in rhetorical contexts. The attitude of sincere respect emerging from Platonic usage of daimõn is well represented in Ti 40d, where the daimones are presented as divine entities in whom it is impossible not to believe, not owing to the solidity of the arguments in favour of their existence as much as for respect due to tradition (cf. Lg 738b).

The Double Daimon in Euclides the Socratic 149

also be noted that while Xenophon and Plato referred to the daimonion only in connection with Socrates, who was the only one to hear the voice of that personal god or divine sign he addressed,18 Euclides stated that two daimones had been assigned to all men without distinction. These two extraordinary statements concerning one of the most characteristic and significant themes in the representation of Socrates could, perhaps, offer an example of the reasons behind Panaetius' doubts on the authen- ticity of Euclides' picture of Socrates, and, seeing that the Stoic's phi- lological interests cannot be doubted, on that of Euclides' very dialogues.

The problem posed by the Censorinus passage is whether the double genius assigned to each of us should be identified with the Sleep-Death pair mentioned in the fragment preserved by Stobaeus or whether this statement is of a more general nature. In short: are Sleep and Death the two daimones assigned to each of us, or, as Censorinus restricts himself to saying, are we all, without distinction, protected by a double daitriõn? The first answer is undoubtedly the simpler and less problematic, per-

Reference should be made to Smp 202dl3, where Diotima proclaims that Eros is a great daimõn (cf. Xen Smp VIII 1), adding: 'Everything daimonic (pan to daimonion) falls between god and human7. To daimonion appears here to constitute a general sphere also including the daimõn; and the intermediate rank between the human and divine of the daimõn appears to qualify him for this reason as an accessible dimension for men of value (for the link between daimonion and daimõn on the basis of the value of man cf. the whole passage from the Symposium, as far as 204; cf. also R 469al-bl). The passage in Cratylus concerning the etymology of the term daimõn confirms the connection in Plato between daimõn and a man of value (the reasonable man is correctly called daimõn, when alive as well as dead, inasmuch as he bears the originary value of Hesiod's "golden generation": cf. 397e-8c). Proximity to the Socratic daimonion can be noted in the passages where Plato foregrounds the figure of the daimõn the individual's escort and protector, not only in the other world (cf. Phd 107d6; R 617el-19c5 and 620d8; Ti 90a3; Lg 732c4-5; 877a3). This conception certainly had ancient roots (cf. Lg 804a2, where, in a quotation from Homer, reference is made to the daimõn escorting Telemachus).

18 It should be recalled that in the pseudo-Platonic Theages there is a situation that is only partially different: here the influence of the sign of the daimõn extends not only to the person of Socrates but also to that of his friends, whose behaviour Socrates himself tries to direct. Cf. [PI] Thg 128 d5-7. Xen Mem 1 1, 4 is even more explicit in this sense: "he [i.e., Socrates] was able to predict what many of those who frequented him were to do and not to do in accordance with the warning of the daimõn. And those who obeyed him received advantages, while those who did not had reason to regret it/

150 Aldo Brancacci

haps even the most likely one, but is not as obvious as it might seem at first sight; besides, we shall see that it implies a general consequence of some importance, which, up to now, has passed totally unnoticed. The first point is that Censorinus writes of a double genius in general: Why should he not have mentioned the 'brothers' Hypnos and Thanatos, who belonged to a long tradition, if he was referring only to them? This omission, if it is the case of an omission, would be especially unusual, since he was following Lucilius, an ancient source, to whom he was able to refer back, whether he had read him directly or had indirect informa- tion.19 If he offers no details, this might only mean that he found the information in his source that Euclides wrote in general about a double daimõn assigned to every man. If the fragment preserved by Stobaeus is compared with the De die natali, certain discrepancies should be noted, which also do not consider the resolution of the double genius in the two daimones, Sleep and Death. The fragment actually states that the latter daimõn 'dwells especially among old people' and that once it 'has ap- peared' it is difficult to avoid it. These expressions appear to be in contrast with Censorinus' 'adpositum! , which leads one to think of a permanent assignment rather than an appearance at a particular time. If these considerations are right, Zeller's thesis comes again to the fore; he believed that the two daimones in Censorinus were to be identified with Discernment and Stupidity {Einsicht, Torheit)™ which would reproduce the opposition phronesis and aphrosune so characteristic of the Socratics; this is also the case with that of Boyancé, who believed that the two daimones mentioned by Censorinus were to be identified with the good and bad daimõn, in accordance with Pythagorean teaching.21 Neverthe- less, one could also make the further objection that, even if Sleep and Death 'appear', the former on certain occasions, the latter on one particu- lar occasion, in life, both can be said to be 'adscriptï without distinction, since they are constituted for every man. Besides, the small linguistic discrepancies mentioned could depend on slight linguistic inexactitude in Censorinus, or disappear in the face of more detailed documentation.

19 Boyancé 1935, 200 n 1, argues that the direct source of Censorinus was 'Granius Flaccus et son livre sur les Indigitamenta: il est mentionné deux lignes plus haut; et il est encore question d' indigitamenta quelques lignes plus loin/

20 Cf.Zellerl9225,260n2.

21 Cf. Boyancé 1935, 189-202. On the Pythagorean conception cf. Détienne 1963.

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Thus no absolutely certain conclusion can be reached. The only certain thing is that Euclides argued for two theses: (1) every man, without distinction, is assigned a double daimõn; (2) Sleep and Death are two daitnones that appear (we must add, unavoidably) to men. If the double genius is to be identified with the two daimones, then (1) is resolved in (2); if the double genius is not to be identified with the two daimones, then Sleep and Death must be understood as an extension of Euclides' general thesis, and, presumably, have some kind of relationship with it. This, together with our previous interpretation of the situation in which Euclides' Socrates could have used the words preserved by Stobaeus, and of their soothing meaning, would lead us to reject both Zeller's and Boyancé's theses. Actually one cannot accept Zeller's view of Einsicht and Torheit as constitutive features of each individual, because this thesis clearly clashes with the fundamental principle of Euclides' ethics. He argued that 'good is one' {hen to agathon), and 'rejected everything that was contrary to the good, saying that it was without reality'.22 It should be added that Antisthenes, who was the Socratic who most charac- teristically foregrounded the opposition between phronésis and aphro- suriè, was careful not to consider it constitutive of man, i.e., of the very individual - with which Socratic philosophy would explode and dis- solve - but projects this distinction on that between spoudaioi and phauloi, considering phronésis proper to the virtuous and aphrosuné proper to the senseless.23 If Euclides had admitted that the double genius contains a double nature, referable to the phronésis I aphrosuné antithesis, he then would have had to support this initial assumption with explicit arguments, some traces of which would have had to remain in the tradition, and with great difficulty. For these very reasons the idea that the double daimõn is to be identified with the good and bad daimõn cannot be accepted, because this thesis too would have introduced an irresolv- able conflict into Euclides' ethics - even though, with reference to Boyancé's thesis, it would still be true, on the basis of the fragment preserved by Stobaeus, that the Pythagorean teaching constitutes a real precedent for Euclides' thesis on the double personal daimõn) just as one

22 DL II 106 (= SSR II A 30). On these passages cf. von Fritz 1931, col 709; Guthrie 1971, 180-5; Döring 1972, 82-9; Müller 1985, 101-3; Giannantoni 1990, IV 55-7.

23 For documentation cf. Brancacci 1990, 89-97 and 114-17 (cf. Brancacci 2005, 80-7 and 101-4).

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cannot doubt Socrates' knowledge of Pythagorean philosophy, and his first hand knowledge of Pythagorean circles.

Having made these considerations and detailed comments, let us now return to Euclides' two theses examined up to now, so as to see if it is possible to further develop our interpretation and reach some more weighty results. With regard to (1), we have said that it is either an elliptical or autonomous thesis. If it is elliptical, then it is reduced to (2): but this means - and this point has not been noted so far by those scholars who identify the double genius with the daimones, Sleep and Death - that the notion of dairriõn in Euclides does not have the same meaning as to daimonion in the other Socratics. If, on the other hand, it is an autonomous thesis, and if, thus, the notion of dairriõn has the same basic meaning as the daimonion in the major Socratics, then the problem is to posit an interpretation that is not contradictory in the face of Euclides' ethical teaching. Now, we know that the character proper to the daimonion in Xenophon is that it turns Socrates positively towards action and choice. Plato, on the other hand, posits a more refined inter- pretation, for which the divine sign prevents Socrates from acting and does not turn him to action.24 The contrast between the two interpreta- tions could not be more obvious, and it cannot be dismissed simply by saying that Xenophon was stupid and Plato intelligent (the latter is, of course, true whereas the former is surely false). Could this contrast be originary? And could not Euclides, who is the only Socratic for whom there is evidence of the concept of 'double daimõn', have argued in favour of a double function of the daimõn, which on occasion prevents action, when it is a question of doing something evil or an action contrary to reason, or even an incongruous, defective or disadventageous one, and on other occasions turns men to action positively, when this action is good, right, opportune or even advantageous? It should also be noticed that, in Xenophon and Plato the daimonion, or daimonic sign, does not represent a concept (wisdom, for example, or good), but a function, where the interpretation is expressed that Socrates offered of the vision

24 Cf. for example Ap 31c7-d5, where it is stated that the voice (phone) heard by Socrates, that divine or daimonic sign addressing him, always distracts him from action, and never makes him act. Cf. also Tht 151a3-5, where the daimonion prevents Socrates from subjecting some of those wishing to frequent him to his maieutic art; Phdr 242cl, where the daimonic sign always holds Socrates back when he is about to do something. Cf. also R 496c. Cf. McPherran 1996, 175-208.

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of the daimon as a minor god, a friend of man, already proper to tragedy. If in Euclides too the term daimõn expresses a requirement or imperative, or command, of this type, the double daimõn can be, logically, none other than a double requirement or function in the sense meant above. This is only a hypothesis, obviously, and will probably remain so. It is, however, a hypothesis that is coherent, and outside the contradictions surround- ing the theses of Zeller and Boyancé, and it agrees with the expression used by Censorinus, 'dwplicem genium', which makes one think less of two separate daimones {duos genios', 'genios geminos' , would have been more appropriate in this case) than the same daimõn, i.e., the same requirement expressed in two forms: once pushing people to act and on other occasions preventing them from doing so.25 It is also coherent with the conception of Socrates' daimõn common to the other Socratics. Ad- mittedly, this does not mean much, since, from a more rigorous point of view, this coherence is what needs to be demonstrated. Nevertheless, assigning a double function to the daimõn could have been, for Euclides, a coherent way of reconciling the tradition of the two personal daimones with the more advanced concept of the daimõn, or daimonic sign, main- tained by Socrates and revived, in the Socratic sphere, by Antisthenes, Xenophon, and Plato.

With regard to the daimonic pair Sleep-Death, to which, it is worth repeating, the whole of Euclides' position on the double daimõn could be reduced, in my view the essential term in the pair is the second one, and it refers back to the effect, philosophically speaking, of Socrates' death on his circle. This was a highly traumatic event, as can be seen, not only from the famous initial words of the Phaedo and the rest of the Phaedo itself, but from the growth, in the Socratic sphere, of a consolatory, eschatological literature, of which the two works by Antisthenes, On Dying and On all the Things of Hades are an expression26; the Phaedo (and its eschatological conclusion), as well as the last part of Plato's Apology of Socrates; Euclides' dialogue from which the fragment preserved by

25 It should be noted that in the already quoted passage from the Memorabilia Xeno- phon states that Socrates was able to predict for many of his followers 'what they should and should not do, according to the warning of the daimõn' (Mem 1 1, 4). Here the daimõn certainly has two functions, a persuasive and dissuasive one, which are then put into practice by Socrates. On Plato's Apology 40a-c, see Joyal 1997, 53-5.

26 For these writings cf. DL VI 17 and, above, note 9.

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Stobaeus comes, most probably the Crito; and, as far as we know, how many other lost logoi Sokratikoi. Conferring the status and image of a dairnõn on death, not a childlike, sweet one like that representing sleep, into whose arms we surrender ourselves, but still not a fearful, terrible one like the old white-haired deaf, blind man who 'dwells especially among old people', and assigning this dairnõn, like sleep, to all men, Euclides' Socrates meant to affirm that death belongs to a body of necessary, natural things, which are, thus, not terrible, and, in this way, underline the fact that it is not evil, which Plato's Socrates in the Apology never tired of repeating. Even the statement that this dairnõn 'dwells especially among old people' draws our attention: It is further evidence of the importance Socrates attributed to old age as motivation for his behaviour at his trial and, as a consequence, of the need for him not to avoid being sentenced. Again the motif already probably present in Euclides would be returned to by Plato and Xenophon - very subtly in the former and much more markedly and explicitly in the latter.27

27 Cf. PI Ap 41d and Xen Mem IV 8, 6-8; Ap 1 and passim.