Book Reviews...British naval air power in the 1930s, Book Reviews 43 when the Fleet Air Arm prioritized multi-role naval aircraft over single-purpose ones. This resulted in aircraft

Book Reviews

Geoffrey Bennett. Freeing the Bal-tic 1918-1920. Barnsley, SouthYorks.: Pen & Sword Maritime,www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2017.263 pp., illustrations, maps, appen-dices, bibliography, index. UK£19.99, US $34.95: ISBN 978-1-147389-307-8.

This modern reprint of a bookwhich first appeared as Cowan’sWar in 1964 and then again in 2002under the present title, comes with anew preface and updates to the lastchapter and appendices by RodneyBennett, son of the author GeoffreyBennett. Otherwise the pages,maps, and photographs are directlyreproduced from the original firstedition. Geoffrey Bennett, whodied in 1983, was a serving officerin the Royal Navy known for hisprose and writings on naval history,including a considered biography ofAdmiral Charles Beresford andbooks on naval battles in each of thetwo world wars. His written workcombined the insights of a pro-fessional officer, with meticulousresearch in primary sources. Theinspiration for this little knownepisode of Royal Navy operations inthe Baltic Sea after the First WorldWar started when Geoffrey Bennettserved as the British naval attaché

in Moscow during the first decadeof the Cold War and continued uponhis return to London.

The book is essentially abiography of Rear Admiral SirWalter Cowan, as the title of thefirst edition suggests, set in thecontext of Bolshevik consolidationand military operations during theRussian civil war, lingering Germaninfluence and meddling post-armistice in the eastern territories,and the aspirations and struggles ofsmaller Baltic nations created out ofthe former Russian empire—Latvia,Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland. Cowan, described as a fightingadmiral in the best traditions of theRoyal Navy, experienced a variedcareer before and after his commandof naval forces in the Baltic, a highpoint which garnered him the titleBaronet of the Baltic. During theSecond World War, he served withthe commandos in a reduced rankand, while attached to an IndianArmy mechanized unit, was cap--tured by Rommel’s Afrika Korps(later exchanged due to his age). Given vague instructions in 1919,Cowan led a force of cruisers anddestroyers into the heavily minedBaltic Sea to assert British interests,shore up new governments in theBaltic states through demonstrations

The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, XXVIII, No. 1 Winter 2017), 39-96.

40 The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

of force and diplomatic efforts,deter substantial remaining Germanforces and their generals, and checkthe Red Navy from operating in anaggressive manner from its mainbase in Kronstadt near St. Peters-burg. It was a fragile time betweenwar and peace, when the stakeswere very high for the players onthe local scenes though a meresideshow for Great Britain andhigher political councils. Cowanand his warships operated activelyfor the rest of the year until thepolitical situation stabilized andevents allowed for their withdrawal.

The narrative presented byBennett is somewhat dated bypresent standards of historiography,reflecting a style of writing in navalhistory now fifty years on. Hisdescriptions of the Admiralty andmen who rose to command overRoyal Navy ships seem almostquaint at times, as much as Cowan’slove for the hounds and hunting. Nonetheless, Bennett was the firstto chronicle these relatively obscurenaval operations and political eventsin the Baltic, and to integrate theuse of translated Soviet historicalaccounts with personal papers andpublic records. No attempt has beenmade to list newer secondarysources in the bibliography andwhat might have been written sincein English and foreign languagesfrom the Russian Federation andpresent Baltic states belonging tothe European Union, or released byway of archival files and collect--ions. Much attention is given to thepersonalities of leading figures suchas Major General Rudigen von der

Goltz and Baron Carl GustavMannerhe im, one seen asobstructing Cowan’s efforts and theother a man of action and strengthin Finland. Of course, the book is atits best in describing the navalbattles and operations that theinferior British naval forces underCowan’s leadership conductedagainst the Red Navy. Two Russiandestroyers were captured and givento the Estonians, and motor torpedoboats launched surprise attackssinking a cruiser shelling a shorefortification and then severalbattleships and auxiliaries right inthe main Kronstadt fleet base. British naval aircraft and sub-marines also operated in the Baltic. Cowan took the initiative andachieved local command of the seathat enabled offensive actions. TheSoviet fleet, with its superiornumbers and larger naval units, keptto port and barely escapeddisbandment at Lenin’s hands dueto Trotsky’s convincing and theneed for defence against White andsupporting intervention forcesduring the civil war. Soviet sailorseventually mutinied in 1921. TheBritish faced their own unrest andmutinies among dissatisfied sailorsserving under harsh and isolatedconditions, and Bennett goes tosome length to absolve Cowan fromresponsibility for those in his ownBaltic naval force. Cowan madehigh demands on his sailors andofficers and was not known for hisaffection.

Reissuing the book, mostly inits original form with a new coverand title, makes the naval history of

Book Reviews 41

Geoffrey Bennett more widelyavailable, as older editions are outof print and fetch high prices in rarebook shops. There is not really verymuch new here for naval historiansor students of Baltic or Russianhistory. Rodney Bennett seemscontent to ride on the coat tails ofhis father instead of writing some-thing else or substantially revisingcontent.

Chris MadsenToronto, Ontario

Jill Martin Bouteillier. Sable Islandin Black and White: Images of ourPast . Halifax, NS: NimbusPublishing, www.nimbus.ca, 2016.136 pp., illustrations, maps. CDN$15.95, paper. ISBN 978-1-77108-381-2.

Sailors usually steer clear of SableIsland. That has not always beenpossible. The illustration on page28 of this book, Simon McDonald's1890 shipwreck map, annotated in1911 by Robert Jarvis Bouteillier,then the Superintendant of SableIsland, makes the point. At least350 vessels are now known to havecome to grief there since thesixteenth century. Reference to theinternet will reveal various accountsthat enlarge upon these tragedies,but what this book does, much moreeffectively than the internet, is tochronicle the experiences of afamily living permanently on theisland,

Between 1890 and 1919, whilethe Bouteillier family was growing

up, Dr. J. Dwight of the AmericanOrnithological Society came to theisland in 1898 to study bird life. Mr. Bouteillier's eldest daughter,Sarah Beatrice (Trixie) "...beggedher father to build a small darkroomfor her off the big kitchen... withjust enough room for a small table,a shelf for her chemicals, and a ropeto hang the photographs from...". She then started preserving Dr.Dwight's photographs. In 1901,Alexander Graham Bell, who firstcame to the island in 1898 searchingfor friends who had been among thevictims of the ship La Burgoyne,driven on to the shoals surroundingthe island, gave her a Browniecamera with which she preservedher own countless images andmemories. Coincidentally, W.E.Saunders of the Ornithological Soc-iety was also visiting the island thatsummer (he published an articleabout this in The Auk, the society'sjournal) and Trixie may well haveprinted some of his photographs aswell. In 1910, as she was approach-ing her thirtieth birthday, she leftSable Island for good. Her daughterJill, who would hear all Trixie'sstories about Sable Island, has nowpreserved and published a wideselection of the photographs.

Remarkable illustrations, mostof them from Trixie's own camera,are reproduced on virtually everypage of the book. The accompany-ing narrative is particularly effect-ive. A tintype studio picture ofTrixie, aged five, and her brotherDick, aged three, taken before thefamily moved to Sable Island, helpsto put the book in proper context.


Subsequent photographs bring tolife the activities of the family, thelifesaving crews under Mr.Bouteillier's direction, the manyvisitors who had enough imag-ination and confidence to ventureout to the island, and the survivorsof shipwrecks who, from time totime, found themselves guests of theBouteillier family until they couldbe transported to the mainland.

Families whose living dependsupon the sea accept danger andhardship, something that was espec-ially true in the days before radarand other modern aids to navigation. Perhaps the great virtue of this bookis that it reveals so well circum-stances of the time. Jill Bouteillierhas produced a wonderful record ofthe personalities who lay behind atruly astonishing record of life-saving. She shows how, responsibleas he was for the effective workcarried out on Sable Island duringthese years, R.J. Bouteillier was astrong, calm man of 6' 3" who filledany room he entered.

“For almost thirty years,Bouteillier acted on behalfof the Government of NovaScotia as Sable Island's doc-tor, lawmaker, dispenser ofstores, minister and, mostimportantly, head of life-saving.”Thanks to Dorothea Dix, the

American philanthropist who hadvisited the island in 1853, lifesavingmeasures had long been instituted,and they provided the foundation onwhich Robert Bouteillier was ableto build. He instituted telephonesand cables to link the lifesaving

stations, and trained the lifesavingcrews. And he established thecircumstances in which gardening,domestic life, school, hunting,famous visitors, farming, entertain-ment and leisure, meteorology,among many other activities couldthrive. Under his direction theSable Island horses not only sur-vived, but were put to good uses.

Sable Island is presented in thisbook in all its complexity. In myopinion, it is a wonderful contri-bution to maritime literature. Itdeserves a wide audience.

W.A.B. DouglasOttawa, Ontario

Angus Britts. Neglected Skies: TheDemise of British Naval Power inthe Far East, 1922-42. Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press,www.usni.org, 2017. xii+242 pp.,i l l u s t r a t i ons , maps , no tes ,bibliography, index. US $34.95,cloth; ISBN 978-1-68247-157-9. (E-book available.)

Angus Britts’ main argument isencapsulated nicely in his title. Hecontends that Admiral JamesSomerville’s decision on 8 April1942 to withdraw the Eastern Fleetfrom the Indian Ocean in the face ofAdmiral Chūichi Nagumo’s IndianOcean raid “marked the moment theRoyal Navy surrendered itssupremacy in fleet combat.”(182) Br it ts sees the seeds forSomerville’s conclusion as havingbeen sown with the decline ofBritish naval air power in the 1930s,

Book Reviews 43

when the Fleet Air Arm prioritizedmulti-role naval aircraft over single-purpose ones. This resulted inaircraft which proved woefullyinferior to the land-based aircraftthey faced during the early years ofthe war, and greatly reduced theireffectiveness.

Yet, as Britts explains, theseinadequacies did not become fullyapparent until the British confrontedJapanese forces in early 1942. Thiswas because of the nature of thenaval war in the Atlantic, whereBritish disadvantages were offset bythe limitations of their German andItalian opponents. For them, thebattleship remained the primaryweapon of surface naval warfare,with air power (land- or carrier-based) serving primarily in asupporting role. In the Mediterran-ean and Atlantic theatres, the Britishpractice of deploying aircraftcarriers singly as part of a mixedsquadron of ships was effective infighting against German and Italiannaval forces. This proved complete-ly inadequate against the Japanese,however, who deployed theircarriers in groups and used airpower as the primary means ofattacking their opponents. Thus,when the Royal Navy confrontedthe Kido Butai in April 1942, theuse of specialized attack planesdeployed in large numbers frommultiple carriers proved too muchfor the Eastern Fleet, leading to anorder that marked the end ofBritain’s ability to defend herAustralasian possessions fromJapanese assault.

Britts notes that such anoutcome was not unforeseeable,quoting from such contemporaryfigures as the German émigréstrategist Herbert Rosinsky andAustralian politicians WalterMoffitt Marks and Frederic (whosename Britts misspells as “Fred-erick”) Eggleston, whose warningsabout the Japanese threat wererealized in the early months of thewar in the Pacific. Yet Britts neverexplains why such Cassandra-likeexhortations deserved to be takenseriously at that time, especiallyconsidering the range of dire pre-dictions made by public prognos-ticators throughout the interwar era. (Marks was a particularly dubiousforecaster, considering that in 1921,the year before he issued hiswarning of the Japanese naval airthreat, he prophesized thatArmageddon would be fought inPalestine in fifteen years betweenthe British Empire and the com-bined forces of Russia, Germany,and France). Even more question-able is the author’s heavy relianceupon counterfactual analysis to sup-port his assertions. Spinningalternative strategies can be usefulin delineating the options availableto historical actors, but Britts’employment of them to play out the(unrealized) nightmarish conse-quences of British naval decline foran exposed Australia does nothingto support his central argument.

It also does not help that Britts’analysis relies on such a limitedreading of the historical literatureon his subject. Somehow, he haswritten a book about interwar


British naval development and theclashes between Britain and Japanin the Second World War thatleaves out Norman Friedman’s workon British carrier aviation, JohnLundstrom’s work on naval air com-bat in the early months of thePacific campaigns, and (most un-accountably) David Evans and MarkPeattie’s studies of the prewar dev-elopment of Japanese naval andnaval air power, among others. Amore comprehensive reading of theavailable secondary sources wouldnot only have resulted in a better-grounded study based on a widerrange of supporting material, butwould have better addressed someof the contrasting arguments alreadymade by other authors about hissubject. The timing of this book isparticularly unfortunate in thisrespect, as it prohibited him fromaddressing the arguments made byAndrew Boyd in his recent bookRoyal Navy in Eastern Waters,1935-42: Linchpin of Victory. While acknowledging Somerville’swithdrawal as a strategic defeat,Boyd stresses its temporary natureby going detailing the redeploymentof air and naval assets in the monthsafterward, which quickly reestab-lished British dominance in theIndian Ocean. Though this mayhave provided little comfort for theAustralians, Boyd credits this withachieving one of the moststrategically significant outcomes ofthe war—the maintenance of Alliedsupply routes to the Soviet Unionthrough Iran, which facilitated thedefeat of the Axis powers inEurope.

While Britts’ lack of a responseto Boyd’s analysis is understand-able, his failure to even address theRoyal Navy’s post-raid position inthe Indian Ocean is emblematic ofthe overall problems with his book. He has provided readers with atendentious study based on a limitedstudy of the literature and reliantupon a needlessly constrainedchronological approach to his topic. The result reads less as a book inwhich judgements were drawn fromthe evidence than one where theauthor reached his conclusions firstand then searched out the evidenceto support them. While those whoshare Britts’ opinions will findmuch to like in its pages, anyoneseeking an assessment of the RoyalNavy’s performance in the IndianOcean in 1942 would be betterserved turning to Boyd’s moredeeply researched and judiciouslyanalyzed study instead.

Mark KlobasPhoenix, Arizona

John Brooks. The Battle of Jutland.Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press, www.cambridge.org, 2016. xxi+567 pp., illus-trations, map, tables, notes,bibliography, index. CDN $59.95,US $49.99, cloth; ISBN 978-1-1071501-40.

Jutland, like Trafalgar, like PearlHarbor, is one of those seminalbattles with a vast literature toaccompany an equally contestedview of its conduct, outcome and

Book Reviews 45

significance. Which enjoys thegreatest outpouring of academic andlay expertise is perhaps debateable,but Jutland is certainly in the frontrank. What has John Brooks to addto the groaning bookshelves?

Quite a lot. The Battle of Jut-land earned its controversy for tworeasons. The first is that Great Brit-ain had invested huge sums in itsdreadnought fleet and wasexpecting the Royal Navy to win athumping victory over the upstartGerman High Seas Fleet. Indeed,that victory was fully expected tooccur within the opening weeks ofwar. By mid-1916 this had mani-festly not come to pass, and whenthe long awaited battle finallyoccurred, its outcome was anythingbut a ‘thumping victory’. Given thehorrors of the land war, thedisappointment and shock weresevere. The second reason is theschism within the Royal Navybetween the two British admirals,Jellicoe and Beatty, which ledadherents of each to engage invigorous and venomous disputeregarding how their ‘man’ had beenlet down by the other in one fashionor another. It is to the enduringcredit of both admirals that theydeclined to participate in the wrang-ling that dominated the interwar era. The controversy shows little sign ofany final resolution to this day.

Brooks, as with his earliervolume Dreadnought Gunnery andthe Battle of Jutland (2005), return-ed to the primary sources of thedespatches written by the command-ing officers of warships, great orsmall, as well as those of the flag

officers, involved in the battle. Ashe notes in his Preface, thesedocuments can be characterized asfresh accounts and largely free fromthe distortions involved in thecontroversies that later arose. Theysuffer, of course, from narrownessin view, as the perspective was, bydefinition, limited, and to a largedegree, from what we would nowterm a positive spin in the account. Brooks also delved into the signallogs and the navigation document-ation available in order to followprecisely the passage and conduct ofthe engagement. The labourinvolved in marrying together thecontradictory snippets of inform-ation involved in this task wasimmense and all historians canprofit from his Herculean effort. Inaddition, Brooks examined thepapers of the principals housed inThe National Archives at Kew (andelsewhere), as well as various Ger-man sources to provide corro-borating detail from that per-spective. He also took into accountthe early work on the battle by SirJulian Corbett’s Naval Operations,Vol. 3, (1939) and Arthur JMarder’s From the Dreadnought toScapa Flow, Vol. 3, (1978), alongwith a variety of others. He did not,however, explore the full histor-iography.

The book is organized intoeleven chapters, with the first threeaddressing the nature of the twofleets, the technological develop-ments in the decade prior to theoutbreak of the Great War, and theorganization of the fleets andsquadrons. The technology chapter


explores signaling and formations,which are essential background forunderstanding how the admiralsexpected to control their fleets inbattle. The next six chaptersexamine in immense detail theconduct of the battle, phase byphase. These chapters include aplethora of charts and tables that layout critical details to illuminate andaccompany the text. Indeed, thereare no less than 146 tables thatcover signals, effects of hits onvarious ships, ranges, and otheruseful matters. The assembly andanalysis of complex and oftenconfusing and contradictory datainto a coherent whole is animmensely impressive achievement.

Brook concludes his account ofthe battle with a balanced and soundassessment of its outcome on thewar at sea, as well as on the conductand performance of the principalcommanders. Here his conclusionsare judicial. In a review there is notthe space to summarize his conclu-sions, but they are fair-minded,comprehensive and reasonable. Beatty does not come out of it par-ticularly well, but the performanceof the other commanders can becharacterized as a balance of thegood and the less so in each case. This even-handedness fits therecord of the events involved withthe battle and might, perhaps, pro-vide that ‘final’ assessment thathistory always strives to achieve butperhaps never can.

This book is one of a series ofmilitary history monographs (28 todate) published by the University ofCambridge. The objective is to get

into the ‘weeds’ on variouscampaigns or military topics so as toprovide a deep analysis into the sub-ject. Brooks has clearly accom-plished this objective in his accounton Jutland. Anyone with an interestin the battle, or on the conduct ofthe war at sea during the Great War,will benefit enormously from thisaccount. I can heartily recommendit—an important book.

Ian YeatesRegina, Saskatchewan

Mike Bullock. Priestley’s Progress.The Life of Sir Raymond Priestley,Antarctic Explorer, Scientist,Soldier, Academician. Jefferson,NC: McFarland & Co. Inc., www.mcfarlandpub.com, 2017. x+ 197pp., illustrations, map, appendices,notes, bibliography, index. US$38.95, paper; ISBN 978-0-7864-7805-7.

The publication of a biography onSir Raymond Priestley is, as authorMike Bullock indicates, long over-due. Priestley supported the Ant-arctic expeditions of both Shackle-ton (on the Nimrod) and Scott (onthe Terra Nova), served heroicallyin the First World War, served asVice Chancellor for two universities(Melbourne and Birmingham),attended His Royal Highness PrincePhillip, the Duke of Edinburgh, onthe Antarctic portion of an around-the-world trip, and was knighted forhis work on higher education of thecolonies. This was in addition toserving in numerous posts for the

Book Reviews 47

Royal Geographical Society, work-ing toward the establishment of theScott Polar Research Institute atCambridge, and, at age 74, support-ing the American Deep Freeze IVexpedition. With such a list ofaccomplishments, and such a broadreach into the affairs of the HeroicAge of Antarctic Exploration,understanding Priestley’s contri-butions is akin to understanding theage itself.

The Heroic Age of AntarcticExploration (between the later partof the nineteenth century and theend of the First World War) herald-ed an international race for thepoles, extensive geographic and sci-entific exploration, and unparalleledadventure stories sprinkled withintrigue. These included RoaldAmundsen’s adventure race, inwhich he first reached the SouthPole ahead of a party led by Scott,whose team died on return fromreaching it themselves, 33 dayslater. Shackleton followed this witha heroic tale for the ages when hisship Endurance was ice bound andcrushed, yet all of his partymiraculously survived. These arethe kinds of stories, during hisharrowing experiences serving withboth Scott and Shackleton, that weexpect to find in a biography ofPriestley.

While present, they are limitedin treatment. The author outlinesPriestley’s major accomplishmentsby general category, attempting totreat them all equally. This meansthat some of the more interestingevents get short shrift, while others(less interesting to this reader) re-

ceive more space than they deserve. Occasionally, Priestley’s activitiesread like a laundry list ofadministrative and social meetings(93). In other cases, random jargonand out-of-place phrases—neverexplained—permeate the work,(e.g., “ICI,” “ragging,” and “Antarc-tic Circle Certificates”). Theauthor’s choice to divide the workinto general categories rather thansimply chronologically, makesseveral entire chapters seem out ofplace. One wonders why they werenot threaded into the work at theappropriate point in the story (e.g.Chapters 10, 11, and 15).

Priestley’s biography should,arguably, have been lengthy. Indeed, with so many accomplish-ments to enumerate, the work couldhave been far longer than the 175pages (outside of appendices, notes,and bibliography) that Bullockaccorded it. Ostensibly omitted wasany significant treatment of Priest-ley’s home life and, in particular,his relationship with his wife,though she is occasionally mention-ed in passing. The effect is one of aprofessional edifice of a man, hiscurriculum vitae, rather than a thor-ough or intimate biography.

These limitations notwithstand-ing, several portions of the workwere extremely interesting and willnaturally encourage those who wishto know more about the Heroic Ageto seek additional information. Among these, is the episode duringthe Nimrod expedition, when Priest-ley’s party found themselves out tosea when the ice floe on which theywere camped detached from the


glacial moraine. “While on thedetached ice floe, the Partyinvestigated every means ofsalvation, all of which provedimpossible until, with the turning ofthe tide, they drifted back towardsButter Point, their only realisticescape route from their perilous pre-dicament.” The entire episodeoccupied four short paragraphs,though it was one of the moreinteresting and harrowing portionsof the biography. Another except-ional section discusses themiraculous survival of the TerraNova’s northern party. After beingdropped off at Evans Cove for anexpected six-week stay with aneight-week food store, theymanaged to survive long enough toattempt a march to safety some ninemonths later. Responsible forrationing their provisions, Priestleyplayed a key role in their survival. How the men maintained their phy-sical existence, emotional comfort,and mental sanity is the most com-pelling portion of the biography.

A reader new to the historicalsubjects surrounding Priestley’s lifemay be entirely adrift in thisbiography, as the work lacks contextand is, instead, heavy in details thatmay not be entirely useful. To areader more familiar with the timesand the context, these details be-come rich primary source materialto enjoy the feel, language, temp-erament, and culture of the times.As the work is based almost entirelyon the diary of Priestley himself, itis naturally authentic and genuine. The few photographs and singlemap included improve the

experience of the work as a wholeand this reader wished that more ofboth had been included. If nothingmore, the work whetted the appetitefor more and inspired this reader toseek out the works of Priestleyhimself, as well as those of hiscontemporaries documenting theirexplorations.

Brandi CarrierPort Hueneme, California

James E. Candow. Cantwells’ Way.A Natural History of the CapeSpear Lightstation. Halifax, NS:Fernwood Publishing, www.fernwoodpublishing.ca, 2014. viii+160 pp., illustrations, maps,appendices, notes, references,index. CDN $22.95, paper; ISBN978-1-55266-672-2.

Candow, a retired Parks Canadahistorian and accomplished writerof Newfoundland history, combinesarchival materials, oral historytestimony, and personal reflectionsto produce this well-evidenced,thoughtfully written, and emotion-ally engaging account of the CapeSpear Lightstation and its Cantwellfamily dynasty of keepers on theeasternmost edge of North America. Despite its problematic organizationand surprisingly light treatment ofthe site’s history, natural orotherwise, over the past quarter-century, the book presents a rareand welcome understanding of howpeople, place and technologyinteracted at one of Canada’s most

Book Reviews 49

famous lightstations through aperiod of massive transformation.

While readers will recognize‘lighthouse’, most will not befamiliar with the moniker ‘light-station’. In fact, the latter term ismost suitable as it describes thelighthouse proper as well as thoseancillary structures in close proxim-ity to it, including the fog alarmbuilding. As Candow convincinglyargues, the story of the lighthousecannot be told in isolation from thatof the associated structures andrelated technologies, the lives ofsuccessive generations of Cantwellfamily members who cared for thelightstation between 1846 and 1997,and the broader context of New-foundland history. He delivers areasonably thorough examination ofthese multiple facets, tracing theevolution of lighthouse develop-ment in Newfoundland as the islandmoved from its original role as aseasonal fishing station topermanent settlement, and itsadministration from a fishingadmiral and naval commodore toresponsible, commission and pro-vincial governments. Overall, thestory told here is a highly interest-ing and significant one, especiallypertinent today as technology everadvances, automation continues toremove the human element fromlightstations, and tourism seeks tocapitalize on the days of yore.

There is some disappointment,however, with this book. Poororganization damages the continuityand clarity of its focus. Fivechapters contain 16, 25, 19, 44 and3 pages respectively, followed by a

five-page epilogue. Though chapterone provides a useful and logicalintroduction to the history andtechnology of lighthouses and fogalarms before moving onto chaptertwo and the origins of the CapeSpear lighthouse in 1836 and itslong line of Cantwell family keepersto 1910. Chapter three focuses on“life and labour to 1914” withoutany justification for this arbitrarytime period. It is assumed that theoutbreak of the First World War ledto a marked change in the way oflife at Cape Spear, though how orwhy is never made apparent. Further complicating matters is thecomparatively lengthy fourthchapter, “The Dying of the Light”,which seemingly suggests that thelightstation and its keepers were ontrack for an inevitable demise formost of the twentieth century. Theprevious chapters do not make acase for a ‘golden age’ experiencedprior to 1914, nor does chapter fourindicate that the forces for changeand the effects of these changeswere of a similar nature through thetumultuous period characterized bytwo world wars, the Great Depress-ion, Newfoundland’s joining Can-ada in 1949, and the replacement ofthe original lighthouse with thecurrent one in 1955.

The two latter developmentsseem obvious ones on which toanchor a concluding chapter thatalso combines an exceedingly briefchapter five and the epilogue. Thisleads to a further question regardingthe lightstat ion’s continuedsymbolic significance after it wasdestaffed on 31 March, curiously


marking the 48th anniversary ofNewfoundland joining Canada. Clearly there is nostalgia here for abygone time, which is natural givent h e m o m e n t o u s c h a n g e sexperienced since Confederation,most notably the crushing collapseof the cod fishery and themoratorium of the early 1990s. It istoo bad the author did not devotemore thought to the place of thelightstation in the Newfoundlandand Canadian public consciousnesssince then, for these images havebeen widely used by Parks Canadaand the provincial government intheir popular tourism campaigns. These problems should have beenidentified and addressed through theeditorial process, though their causeappears to have been linked to boththe author’s gradual expansion ofthe project from the original ParksCanada commission and hiseventual completion of this projectin retirement.

Readers may want to obtain asense of how other lightstationsfared during the same period, whichwill actually enhance their appre-ciation for this book. Similarstudies exist for the UnitedKingdom and the United States,though the topic has drawn verylittle in the way of scholarship onCanadian lightstations, apart fromvarious Parks Canada publications. A further achievement of this bookis its ability to interweave thehuman story of the Cantwell light-keepers and their relationship withthe natural landscape of the Cape,with the centuries-old narrative ofscientific and technological inno-

vation and adaptation. Given thatthe only staffed lightstations inCanada reside in Newfoundland,New Brunswick and British Colum-bia, it is hoped that Candow’s book,the best yet written, will help ‘light’the way for similar projects.

This reviewer fondly recallsevenings with neighbours andfriends stretched out on front lawnsin east-end St. John’s listening tothe bellow of the ‘foghorn’ orfollowing the rays across the nightsky emanating from the Cape Spear‘light’. Most of us had never beento sea and never would, but the echoof that sound and the massivespotlight crossing the sky every fewseconds were a reminder that othersdid. Of more importance to us wasthe comfort of home felt throughthat magical sound and light show. Candow’s book revived thesememories and gave them addedvalue through the perspective ofthose responsible for providing suchcomforts.

Michael F. DoveSt. Thomas, Ontario

Quentin Casey. The Sea Was inTheir Blood: The Devastating Lossof the Miss Ally’s Five-Man Crew.Halifax, NS: Nimbus Publishing,www.nimbus.ca, 2017. 249 pp.,bibliography. CDN $22.95, paper;ISBN 978-1-77108-479-6.

Casey’s The Sea Was in Their Bloodrecounts the events surrounding theloss of a fishing vessel from WoodsHarbour, Nova Scotia, which cap-

Book Reviews 51

sized in a storm on 17 February2013. Based on the book’s centraltheme, some readers might readilydraw a premature comparison toSebastian Junger’s The PerfectStorm: A True Story of Men Againstthe Sea, which discusses the loss ofthe American fishing boat AndreaGail in 1991. Casey, however,takes a more intimate look at theco l l e c t ive background andpersonalities of each of the MissAlly’s crewmen and emphases theemotions and recollections of theirsurviving families and friends. Through this manner, Casey fullyconveys to the reader the relation-ships these individuals had amongthemselves, their families, andamong the general community ofWoods Harbour.

Casey provides a compre-hensive overview of Woods Har-bour’s natural and socio-economicbackgrounds. Woods Harbour hasalways been synonymous withfishing; the industry dominates thissmall, rural community’s economyand serves as the employment basisfor most residents. Fishing in thisregion is inherently dangerous, andaccording to Casey, an average offive to six fishing-related deathsoccurs in Nova Scotia each year. The industry, however, can providequick financial stability for fisher-men when catches and prices arehigh. The loss of the Miss Ally wasnot simply a setback for the town’seconomy, but was worsened by theloss of five young fishermen whowere regarded among the commun-ity as prodigies in their field,especially Capt. Katlin Nickerson,

who at 21 years old, was WoodsHarbour’s youngest fishing boatcaptain.

The author made an exceptionaleffort to research not only WoodsHarbour’s background and thechronology of events leading theMiss Ally’s loss, but he alsoprovides emotional perceptionsfrom the family members andfriends who knew each crew-member. The viewpoints andrecalled memories from thecommunity’s residents are providedby interviews and day-to-dayinteractions that Casey had duringhis visits to the area. Some familymembers, understandably, declinedto talk to the author, as the tragedyis still comparatively recent and isstill a sensitive subject among thecommunity. Ultimately, all crew-members are profiled in their ownrespective chapters. Their personalstrengths and perceived faults arediscussed, offering an encompassingview of their personalities. Alltraits are given directly from thecrew’s family and friends, andCasey leaves readers to determinefor themselves whether the MissAlly tragedy could have beenavoided.

The book is very well written,and appropriate background inform-ation is interwoven with the eventsthat occurred between the time theMiss Ally was initially caught in the2013 storm and when the empty,overturned hull was eventuallyfound, maintaining the senses ofdistress and urgency that the crew-members’ family and friendsexperienced during that time.


Photographs of the Miss Ally’screw, the boat’s wreckage, andCasey’s interviewees, are likely tobring a strong empathetic responsefrom readers and will help themunderstand the close-knit nature ofthe Woods Harbour community. Ina few instances, the author doesexpress some personal statementsthat could be viewed as overlymelodramatic, which lose theirimpact since the reader alreadyknows the fate of the Miss Ally andits crew, but this is only a mild con-structive criticism compared to restof the book’s excellent narrative.

This book is strongly recom-mended for general audiences whoenjoy dramatic stories or areinterested in the local history ofNova Scotia’s fishing communities. The overall tone of the narrative issomewhat somber, and light ele-ments of humour are mostly usedwhen recollections are given about acrewmembers’ past behaviour, butthis in turn helps the reader closelyrelate to these individuals andunderstand how impactful their losswas to the community. Caseyexplains that several residents ofWoods Harbour not only personallyknew the Miss Ally’s crewmen whowere lost, but they also knewfishermen who were lost at seaduring previous storms. The resi-dents of the Woods Harbour areahave a uniquely strong characterand fully understand the risksassociated with the commercial fish-ing industry. Casey’s book acts as atestament to that character and as away to memorialize the Miss Ally’screw.

James D. Moore IIISterling, Virginia

J. D. Davies. Kings of the Sea:Charles II, James II and the RoyalNavy. Barnsley, S. Yorks: SeaforthPublishing, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2017. 288 pp., illustrations,notes, bibliography, index. UK30.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-84832-400-8.

Kings of the Sea is David Davies’latest non-fiction publication aboutthe Royal Navy following theRestoration and follows upon hisSamuel Pepys Prize-winningPepys’s Navy: Ships, Men andWarfare 1649-1689. Davies pre-sents a different perspective,looking at how Charles II and JamesII as individuals had a direct impacton, took control of, and developedthe Royal Navy as an instrument ofstate following the Restoration of1660.

This book presents a kind ofcategorical contradiction, a meetingplace between academic and publichistory. It appears to be designedfor the general public, rather thanacademic specialists, since it looks,feels, and reads like popular history. The format, glossy pages, numerousimages, sketches, and other illustra-tions sourced from the NationalMaritime Museum and other equallyimpressive sources all make it veryattractive. Further, this book ispublished by Seaforth, a maritimeimprint of Pen and Sword, ratherthan an academic press. To dismissthis book because it looks and feelslike popular history would be to do

Book Reviews 53

it, and readers, a great disservice. Kings of the Sea is the product ofmore than 30 years of research,writing and sharing his work withmany different audiences. What isparticularly useful is the way thatDavies uses the structure in order topresent different areas of argumentand discussion, without making anysection, or any piece of hisargument, too intimidating.

The introduction and first twochapters, entitled “The Stuarts andthe Sea I: Inheritance” and “CivilWar and Restoration” establish theimportant historiographical andhistorical foundations necessary forunderstanding the rest of the book. Davies presents the common argu-ments, but also demolishes them. For example, he presents Charles IIas a complex character, especiallyin comparison with his brother. Thenext three chapters (“His Majesty’sShips I”, “His Majesty’s Ships II”and “The Royal Yachts”) presentthree different and importantdiscussions. The first opens an in-depth discussion of the ships of theRoyal Navy as symbols of the Stuartregime and also of Charles II andJames II as individuals with differ-ent pressures, ideas, and tastes. Thesecond chapter presents a fairlydetailed discussion of the types ofships that were built and used from1660 to 1688, such as the galleyfrigates. The latter chapter bringsthe topic back to the royal brothersspecifically, through an explorationof their love of sailing and theimportance of the royal yachtsduring this period. In each case,Davies effectively highlights the

complexity of the subject, usingthese topics to shed new light on therelationship between royalty and theRoyal Navy.

The next four chapters addressspecific challenges to the establish-ed historical understanding.“Governing the Navy” examines theroles of both James II and Charles IIin directly guiding the institution,especially important given the stan-dard assumption that Samuel Pepyswas in charge. For example, Daviesquotes archival documents whichdiscuss the personal role of CharlesII directing the Navy’s operations(in particular from 1673-1679, andthat of James as Lord of HighAdmiral (prior to 1673) and as Kingfrom 1685. In “The Precursors ofHornblower” chapter, Daviesexamines the officers of the RoyalNavy during this period, building onhis monograph Gentlemen and Tar-paulins. In “Sovereignty of theSea” and “Dominion of theOceans”, he provides a cultural,political and social basis for thediscussion of Charles II and JamesII’s reasons for developing, fieldingand using the Royal Navy. In eachof these chapters, Davies provides amethodological basis for his argu-ment and analysis, for example thesocial history perspective in “ThePrecursors of Hornblower.” Throughout each chapter, Daviesalways returns to the personalinvolvement of James II and CharlesII.

The final three chapters (“War-lords”, “Inglorious Revolution” and“The Stuarts and the Sea II: The‘Jacobite Navy’”) bring this very


much to the forefront again as theyconsider James II’s role as LordHigh Admiral, the challenges of theGlorious Revolution in 1688, andthe Stuart brothers’ legacy in theyears that followed.

This book highlights Davies’ability to communicate complex,academic ideas in an easily under-standable manner. Each chapter pre-sents a topic as it is generally under-stood, then calmly challenges it oradds complexity through the add-ition of quotations from archivaldocuments. The author does notevaluate either sovereign’s personalinvolvement as good or bad, butrather, as a factor in the RoyalNavy’s development, day-to-dayactivities, and institutional identitywhich resulted in nuances andcontradictory details. Readers areexpected to be able to handle thecomplexities and contradictions thatDavies presents.

This book is highly recommend-ed. For the enthusiast, it is bothbeautiful to look at and interestingto read. For the academic, it is aconcise delivery of the most up-to-date scholarship on the Royal Navyfollowing the Restoration. Perhapsits most important potential aud-ience is future historians, for whomit could be the book that catchestheir imagination and introduces tothem to complex historical discuss-ions in a comfortable and inclusiveway.

Sam McLeanToronto, Ontario

Jonathan Dimbleby. The Battle ofthe Atlantic. How the Allies Won theWar. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univer-sity Press, www.oup.com, 2016.xxx+530 pp., illustrations, maps,notes, bibliography, index. US$34.95, cloth; ISBN 978-0-19-049585-5.

As an official historian of Canadiannaval and air force operations in theSecond World War, it interested meto find that a new account of theBattle of the Atlantic gives lipservice to only one Canadian navalhistorian of note, Marc Milner. Oneof Milner’s books, Battle of theAtlantic, (2003) is listed in thebibliography and he is thanked forsome illuminating insights, whichcan be taken to mean that there weregaps in Jonathan Dimbleby’s know-ledge. Milner, however, is nevercited, and no reference is made tohis three important books on theRoyal Canadian Navy, NorthAtlantic Run (1985), The U-boatHunters (1994), and Canada’sNavy: The First Century (1999). Apart from William Sclater`sHaida, a wonderful book that saysvery little about the Battle of theAtlantic, Dimbleby completelyignores the multitude of otherCanadian studies that shedimportant light on the campaign,such as Roger Sarty and MichaelHadley’s Tin Pots and Pirate Ships(1991), Brian Tennyson and RogerSarty’s Guardian of the Gulf:Sydney Cape Breton and theAtlantic Wars, (2000) and Sarty’sWar in the St Lawrence: The For-gotten U-Boat Battles on Canada’s

Book Reviews 55

Shores (2012). He has also over-looked James Pritchard’s A Bridgeof Ships: Canadian Shipbuildingduring the Second World War(2011). All these and many otherstudies grew out of the Canadianofficial operational histories, TheCreation of a National Air Force(1980), No Higher Purpose (2002)and A Blue Water Navy (2007).

The opinion of Captain DonaldMacintyre, that almost every convoyescorted by the Canadians inFebruary and March 1943 was a taleof disaster and sunken merchantships, is included in the book. Myown comment on these criticisms,(citing A.L.Hammond, ‘Six monthsat Sea with a U-Boat killer’, War-ship World, 7/3 (2001), 22-4)appears in A Blue Water Navy, Vol-ume II part 2 of the officialoperational history of the RCN, p.466 (n.39):

Macintyre’s criticisms ofthe RCN escort force in hismemory were particularly stinging but he appears tohave been a particularly‘pusser’officer. When hemoved to the frigateAylmer after Bickerton hadbeen torpedoed, he immed-iately ordered the bridgecrews to their cabins toshave and to change intoproper uniform even thoughthe U-boat was stillundetected in the area. Healso seemed to have some-thing against the RCN. Known to be gruff and shortof temper, he apparentlymellowed after the war, but

a colleague noted that twosubjects were still guaran-teed to set him off, the RCNand Coastal Command.The RCN, for all its short-

comings, like Coastal Commandand Canada’s Eastern Air Com-mand, (which gets never a mentionin this book), was indispensable tothe defence of convoys in the NorthAtlantic, including routes in the St.Lawrence River and on the Atlanticseaboard. An account of the Battleof the Atlantic that says so littleabout the RCN and RCAF fails totell the whole story. The safeescort, by Canadian ships and air-craft, of very large numbers ofmerchant vessels carrying vital sup-plies to their destinations in theAtlantic, the Mediterranean andnorthern Russia, however uncon-ventional and inefficient theescorting forces often were, was aremarkable achievement. IfDimbleby had consulted even aportion of the books listed in thebibliography of A Blue Water Navy,or consulted documents in the Cana-dian Department of NationalDefence and the National Archivesof Canada, he would have been ableto write a more complete account ofthis vast subject.

That said, this book is animportant addition to the literature. In the preface are some observationsthat need to be kept in mind, espec-ially by naval, air and militarypeople for whom knowledge of thepast is vital to the exercise of theirprofession. The author is on solidground when he emphasizes theimportance of Churchill, Roosevelt,


Stalin and Hitler, and their oftenwrong-headed decisions. It is worthsaying, as Dimbleby does, thatHitler, the final arbiter of Germanstrategy, made more wrong-headeddecisions than the rest. When, inJanuary 1943, Hitler replaced GrandAdmiral Erich Raeder with GrandAdmiral Karl Dönitz “the thrustingU-boat Admiral”, Dimbleby arguesthat he played into the hands ofAlbert Speer, Minister of Arma-ments. And Dönitz, although “anoutstanding leader of men who wasto pose a greater threat to the Alliesin the Second World War than anyother commander in the ThirdReich” (27), seemed at first to beexactly the man needed to win thewar at sea until the convoy battlesof May and June 1943 left himfatally handicapped. The judgementthat, after years of apparently un-stoppable success, he suddenly hadto withdraw his U-boats from theiraccustomed hunting grounds be-cause it was no longer possible towage war against convoys in theNorth Atlantic—“He had lost notonly a record number of U-boats,but the tonnage war as well.”—while hardly an originalobservation, is supported here by anoverwhelming body of evidence.

There are sound, if not alwaysconsistent, discussions of strategicissues. Dimbleby places less em-phasis on the importance of VeryLong Range aircraft than theevidence would suggest, and al-though he makes fair criticism of airforce operations against the sub-marine threat, he downplays someof the amazing accomplishments of

Long Range aircraft, before VeryLong Range Liberators appeared onthe scene. See for example, Doug-las, The Creation of a National AirForce pp 538-567, and especially onp. 540:

In December 1942 CansoA’s of 5(BR) Squadronwere joined by two similaraircraft from 162 A squad-ron based in Yarmouth. Along with the 162 (BR)detachment came EasternAir Command`s most cap-able officer and thesquadron`s new CO, Squad-ron Leader N.E.W. Small. In order to extend the rangeof the Canso’s beyond theirnormal 500 miles, 5 Squad-ron personnel, underSmall’s direction, began tostrip some aircraft of excessweight, including extraguns, ammunition, andstores. In all, about 1200lbs was removed, whichpermitted the Cansos tooperate to about 700 miles. Thus, as the officers of 5Squadron readily admitted,it was largely due to theefforts of Small that theGander-based Cansos wereable to make a series of pro-mising attacks at maximumrange during the earlyweeks of February. Trag-ically, Small was killedwhen his Canso crashedwhile taking off on 8 Jan-uary, a result of equipmentfailure.

Book Reviews 57

No mention is made of the longand fruitless negotiations withUnited States authorities to allocate Very Long Range Liberators toCanada`s Eastern Air Command,nor that finally, in 1943, the BritishCabinet Anti-U-Boat Warfare Com-mittee diverted VLR Liberators toEastern Air Command in New-foundland These delays were sig-nificant in the conduct of anti-submarine operations. (Moreeditorial comment by air historiansmight also have revealed that thewomen who played such importantparts in the anti-submarine warbelonged to the Women’s AuxiliaryAir Force (WAAF, not WRAF).)

There are, however, manyilluminating and sympatheticaccounts of experiences among theships` companies and other servingpersonnel who fought this greatbattle, and also among civilianpassengers who, for one reason oranother, found themselves exposedto the dangers of the sea in wartime. This reviewer, as an eleven-year-oldboy, sailed from Liverpool to NewYork en route to Toronto in July1940. The ship was “swarmingwith children”, so the family friendwith whom I was traveling reported. Excited to be going to sea in war-time, I was conscious of, indeedthrilled by the danger, but excitedby the thought of seeing cowboysand Indians, the Rocky Mountainsand Grey Owl. We were not fullyaware of the terrible experiences ofthose less fortunate than we. Peoplewho have survived ocean voyages inwartime need to be reminded thatthey were extraordinarily lucky. A

particularly dreadful example wasthe City of Benares, bound forCanada, torpedoed on 17 September1940. Of 407 passengers and crew147 perished; of the 90 childrenonly 13 survived. In one lifeboatwere “...six small boys, two chap-erones (a Roman Catholic Priest and[Mary] Cornish), a Polish shippingexecutive, forty British crewmembers...and thirty-two Lascars...” For seven days and nineteen hours,sometimes in dreadful weather, theboat drifted. When, after beingsighted and rescued, they arrivedsafely in Greenock the ship’s officerin charge of the boat, Fourth OfficerRonald Cooper, reported “...Ever-yone behaved very well, and a spiritof loyalty to orders and comparativecheerfulness prevailed...” (Whenreading this statement nearly eightyyears after the event, it is difficultnot to think of the contrast with experiences, more than sixty yearslater in the Mediterranean, byfamilies in a variety of overcrowdedvessels, trying to escape disasters ofa different kind.)

In March 1943, afterex t raord inary exploi ts andimprovements in anti-submarinewarfare by the Allies, wellexplained (despite some of thesurprising omissions concerningCanadian naval and airforceoperations already noted), Dönitzhad to call off U-boat operationsagainst the Atlantic convoys. It sohappened that only three monthslater this reviewer returned toEngland in the Escort AircraftCarrier HMS Pursuer, with fiveother boys, as so-called “Guests of


the Admiralty”. It must be said thatthe sailors on board that ship in July1943 still considered the U-boatmenace as great as ever. We had noidea how fortunate we were. Thewar at sea, of course, did not ceaseto be a critical factor in operations. The terrible losses endured by theconvoys to Russia, and their strat-egic importance to the Anglo-American -Russian alliance,continued to demand enormousefforts and terrible sacrifice, andthis is acknowledged, albeit briefly,towards the end of the book.

Despite the omission ofCanadian, and even of some import-ant American contributions to thedefeat of the enemy attack onshipping, this is a well written bookthat complements the Britishofficial histories of what was,undoubtedly, the single mostimportant achievement in the Allieddefeat of Germany.

W.A.B. DouglasOttawa, Ontario

David C. Evans (ed.) The JapaneseNavy in World War II: In TheWords of Former Japanese NavalOfficers. Annapolis, MD: NavalInstitute Press, www.usni.org, 2017.(Originally published 1986). xxi+568 pp., illustrations, maps,notes, bibliography, index. US$34.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-59114-568-4. (E-book available.)

“History,” it is said “is written bythe victors,” certainly the case forthe orthodox school of historical

writing. This means that the storyof the Second World War in thePacific was originally told from anexclusively American perspective,skewing our understanding ofevents. It is usually only with theadvent of revisionism that a morebalanced account emerges, one thatincludes the experience of othernations.

For this reason, books like TheJapanese Navy in World War IIrepresent a fascinating view fromthe other side of the hill. Evans hascombined a series of articles andwritings into an anthology ofJapanese naval understanding of thewar that follows the war yearschronologically and sheds light oncentral elements of the experience. Originally published in 1968, thisbook represented a solid ground-breaking moment in the histor-iography of the Second World War. The second edition (2017) rein-forces the original text withadditional articles covering gaps inthe 1968 edition.

There are 17 chapters, each onecovering a different aspect or periodof the war as written by survivingparticipants. Each chapter openswith a short introduction explainingits importance within the bookwhich spans the overall scope of theImperial Japanese participation inthe war. Starting with ShigeruFukudome’s remembrance of theHawaii operation and MitsuoFuchida’s discussion of the airattack on Pearl Harbor, the textfollows the war across the Pacific. The result is a fascinating under-standing of Japanese operations and

Book Reviews 59

the unique challenges that theyfaced while conducting them. While some of the subjects touch onobviously key moments, like thebattle for Midway, or the navalstruggle around Guadalcanal, thereal value lies in the inclusion oftopics which are often forgotten orignored. For example, ToshikazuOhmae’s discussion of Japaneseoperations in the Indian Ocean,Masataka Chihaya’s “the With-drawal from Kiska,” and AtsushiOi’s “Why Japan’s AntisubmarineWarfare Failed” are particularlyunique for shining a light on aspectsof the Pacific War that are rarelydiscussed. Japanese penetrationinto the Indian Ocean had a massiveimpact beyond the battles foughtthere. The continued operations bythe Japanese carrier forces helped todegrade and weaken their opera-tional capability prior to theMidway operation and potentiallyhelped lead to the defeat there. Thediscussion of Japanese activity inKiska, Alaska, looks at Japan’swithdrawal from its only occupiedpiece of North America. Equallyvital is the antisubmarine story. Thelongest U.S. naval campaign in itshistory, the submarine war des-troyed Japan’s ability to move andsupply their forces and led to thestarvation of the Japanese homeislands. The Japanese perspectiveon this is essential to any under-standing of the submarine war.

The story that unwinds withinthe text is remarkable, not justbecause it addresses key issues, butbecause it also reveals a very humanside of the story that is often

overlooked. Mitsuo Fuchida’s dis-cussion of Pearl Harbor is a perfectexample of this. His role is legend-ary, being the operational com-mander leading the first wave of theair attack. Often portrayed asvillainous but precise, the attack onPearl Harbor is usually seen asbeing incredibly well executed bythe best in Japanese naval aviation. Yet we forget that these peoplewere human, and therefore, subjectto the same issues as all of us. It issurprising to learn that one of hisgreatest concerns that morning wasnot executing the plan or thethought that he was leading hisnation into war. He was afraid ofnot being able to find Pearl Harbor. Odd as that sounds now, we forgetthat over-water navigation in theperiod was really an example ofseat-of-the-pants flying and hisconcern was legitimate. The readercan feel his relief upon receiving acivilian radio broadcast that finallytold him where he was and allowedhim to home in on the islands.

Unfortunately, collections likethis do come with some limitationsand risks. The accounts from theJapanese side are, of course, writtenafter the war. This leads to a fewdifferent issues that limit the valueof these accounts. As written re-cords are often lost and those thatremain are almost impossible toaccess, these accounts are difficultto verify and by their very nature,become more of a memoir. Theymust be treated carefully and usedwith caution, making every effort toback them up with other sources. Like all memoirs, the narrator’s


personal bias threatens to destroytheir credibility. This is certainlythe case with Fuchida and MasatakeOkumiya’s chapter on the Battle ofMidway. Authors of the book Mid-way: The Battle that Doomed Japan(1955, 2001), Fuchida and Oku-miya’s account has serious issuesfor historians. Their version of thebattle has been almost completelyaccepted in the United States for avariety of reasons, not the least ofwhich is it comes from actual Japan-ese participants in the events. Infact, despite shaping the foundationof much of our understanding of theBattle of Midway, their account isnow dismissed in Japan. JonathanParshall and Anthony Tully’s bookShattered Sword (2007) has demon-strated the fallacy of their version ofevents. Caution is always urgedwhen working with such memoir-like materials.

All in all, David Evans providesan incredibly valuable text thatoffers a great deal of informationand an interesting first-handperspective on the Pacific war. It ishighly recommended for anyonewith an academic or generalinterest, and will provide a greatdeal of new insight into themaelstrom of the Second WorldWar in the Pacific.

Robert DieneschWindsor, Ontario

Barry Gough. Churchill and Fisher:Titan at the Admiralty. Barnsley, S.Yorks.: Seaforth Publishing,

www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2017.600 pp., illustrations, notes,bibliography index. UK £35.00,cloth; ISBN 978-1- 5267-0356-9.

In Greek mythology, Mnemosyne,the goddess of memory, gave birthto the muse of history, Clio. Knownfor proclaiming, glorifying and cele-brating of the past, eminentmaritime historian Barry Goughcloaks himself in Clio’s mantle bychronicling two British maritimefigures from the turn of the twen-tieth century and First World Wareras, Winston Churchill andAdmiral John “Jackie” Fisher. Hisnarrative emphasizes their dispos-itions and individualities by draw-ing upon a host of originaldocuments.

Churchill and Fisher were, attimes, both close allies and ardentadversaries, exemplars of the pop-ular neologism “frenemies.” Fisherwas resourceful, self-reliant, quickto take the initiative and its accom-panying responsibility. The admiral,who often quoted the Old Test-ament, frequently became offendedand vengeful himself. Yet he wasvery popular with most fellowofficers and the men who labouredon or below decks. He ardentlybelieved that naval strength bothprotected and projected Britain’simperial power. Churchill, who be-came the First Lord of theAdmiralty, (the American equiv-alent of Secretary of the Navy) wascharacterized as not particularlyscholarly yet an appreciator of hist-ory, an outstanding writer andpersuasive speaker. Staunchly cour-

Book Reviews 61

ageous and exceedingly ambitious,Churchill had a pugnacious streakand could be reckless and bluntgiven his hard-right view of Britishpolitics and national interests. Boldand passionate in his beliefs, he wasnot afraid of ruffling a few over-bearing governmental feathers, yetboth men hobnobbed with the aris-tocracy, a political essential in thevery class-ridden society of the day.

Fisher was interested in navalarchitecture, armament, gunnery,speed at sea, and converting thenavy’s fuel from coal to oil, thetechnology of day. In time, he cameto appreciate submarines, airshipsand airplanes but always disdainedthe role of the Royal Army as aforce to maintain Britain’s place asthe world’s hegemon at the time. When he assumed the lofty positionof First Sea Lord (roughly the Chiefof Naval Operations), he was in hisearly seventies and had successfullyorchestrated the building of the for-midable dreadnoughts (First WorldWar battleships), heavy cruisers andtorpedo boat destroyers. He wel-comed the opportunity to work withhis younger friend, Churchill, inpreparing His Majesty’s fleet forwhat they both saw as a potentialclash with Germany for sovereigntyof the world’s seas and seabornecommerce.

Churchill, who served as FirstLord of the Admiralty, was a vision-ary of naval strategy as well asaffairs of state, but he craved power,approval and attention—the rewardfor successful use of authority. Attimes he could be theatrical, anattribute in a politician for whom it

was essential to project strength andresolve rather than frailty andgloom. Churchill and Fisher werelargely amicable warrior-politicianpartners in the build-up to whatseemed like an inevitable war withGermany that was finally ignited bythe 1914 assassination of Austria’sArchduke Franz Ferdinand in theBalkans. During the war’s preludeand its subsequent engagement,there came a series of challengesfrom governmental colleagues andnaval subordinates. Gough visitedthe sea battles like those at Coronel,Dogger Bank, the first Falklands,Heligoland Bight, but rather thanthe battle’s details, he the focusedon many of the Admiralty’s trials,triumphs and political machinations. He also describes Churchill’s brief,but little discussed, interlude as acombat army officer in Antwerp. Agraduate of Sandhurst, Churchillparticipated in 15 Boer War battlesand received many decorations forhis bravery,

The author introduces thereader to a vast array of characterswho both influenced, and were in-fluenced by, Churchill and Fisherincluding Kings George V andEdward VII, four Prime Ministers,Field Marshall Herbert Kitchener,Admirals David Beatty, CharlesBeresford, John Jellicoe andRichard Keyes, and politicallypowerful Reginald Esher, ReginaldMcKenna and Canadian Max Ait-ken (later, First Baron Beaver-brook). Gough uses each man’swords to propel his narrative asrobust evidence of the history ofthat time.


The two most significant navalengagements and highest toll-takingconflicts were those at the Dardan-elles and later, off Jutland. Still thesubject of analysis and debatetoday, the Dardanelles Campaignwas arguably the turning point ofboth men’s naval careers. Churchillbecame convinced that a strongseaborne offensive followed by anoverwhelming surprise amphibiousattack on this difficult terrain wouldend the war quickly. This wasreinforced by the intelligence thatthe Ottoman defenders were runningshort of ammunition. Fisher dis-agreed and resigned as First SeaLord over this dispute. The oper-ation turned out to be a strategicblunder. The British navy lost threedreadnoughts and others were heav-ily damaged along with a heavycruiser. In the mêlée, roughly 700crewmen were killed. Also lost wasa vast number of soldiers: roughly165,000 Turkish, 120,000 British,27,000 French, 28,000 Australianand 7,500 New Zealand troops, plus145,000 Ottoman combatants. Thecampaign resulted in 302,000 alliedand 250,000 Ottoman dead, wound-ed or suffering from widespreaddebilitating disease. Gough exten-sively covers the run-up and after-math of this military misadventureand its impact on the careers ofChurchill and Fisher.

The second well-known sea-battle was the Battle of Jutland (orSkagerrak), the last major sea battleinvolving capital ships. AlthoughBritain suffered the larger loss ofvessels and men, Germany’s navyretreated to its homeports and was

never a major threat after thisengagement. Neither Churchill norFisher was directly involved in thisengagement, but they advanced thecareers of Admirals Jellicoe andBeatty who led the British fleet inthis encounter. Once again, Goughdescribes the Jutland attacks, butrather than dwelling upon thebattle’s particulars, he thoroughlydebates their military and politicalimpact.

Gough’s highly detailed accountof the lives of the two main figuresis well documented through a hostof primary source materials andcarefully selected and evaluatedsecondary source documents fromthe books of Richard Ollard, Rud-dock Mackay, Geoffrey Penn andespecially, the multiple works ofArthur Jacob Marder (a first cousin,once removed, of this reviewer.) Gough is thorough in his scholar-ship, although some points are bothrepetitious and redundant. Thissubstantial 600-page book isenjoyable because of the author’serudite analysis and fluid prose. For a few brief examples: Fisher’s“endless reforming zeal stood himapart from any other Sea Lord. . . He was forward thinking even if hedid not understand the full intri-cacies of rapidly changingtechnology. [Yet] he was the last torealize his shortcomings—hastyactions, breaches of confidence, andvindictiveness toward those whostood in his way.” (492-3) Churchill“was a self-absorbed man ofdestiny. …He sought the limelightand danger. …[and] showed anearly capacity as a writer, and this

Book Reviews 63

became his principle means oflivelihood. ...Winston developedextreme ambition and a pugnaciouswill.” (147-8)

By addressing a vast range ofcomplex military and politicalissues that were dispatched by menwith strong personalities, Gough hasdone the muse Clio proud withChurchill and Fisher. This learnedsojourn is an excellent book, onethat is destined to become a classicin the literature of maritime history.

Louis Arthur Norton West Simsbury, Connecticut

David Hobbs. The Royal Navy’s AirService in the Great War. Barnsley,S. Yorks.: Seaforth Publishing,www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2017. xiii+528 pages, photos, maps,charts , bibliography, index.UK£35.00; US $44.95, cloth; ISBN978-1-84832-348-3.

Author and historian David Hobbsprovides readers with a detailedhistory of the foundation and earlyaccomplishments of the Royal NavyAir Service (RNAS). The book’spublication coincides with the cen-tenary (1918) of the British RoyalAir Force, of which the RNAS wasan important early building block. In the course of the First WorldWar, the British Royal Navy invent-ed naval air warfare with the firsteffective aircraft carriers, and by theconclusion of the war, the RoyalNavy was training for a carrier-borne attack by torpedo-bombers. Brown explains in considerable

detail the operational and technicalachievements of the RNAS and thededicated individuals who attainedthese historic accomplishments. Asearly as 1914, the RNAS had 100officers, and about 700 petty off-icers and men, in addition to 39airplanes, 52 seaplanes, and sevenairships.

The early twentieth century wit-nessed a naval technological revo-lution with the birth of dread-noughts, submarines, torpedoes,mines, and aircraft. All of theseinventions greatly increased navalpower, but at the same time, eachrepresented a serious threat to theworld’s naval fleets. The evolutionof balloons and airships before 1914played a vital role as observationplatforms and as early bombers. Admiral Sir John Fisher encouragedand supported RNAS innovations tomaintain Britain’s lead in cutting-edge naval technology. This wasthe era of “New Navalism,” with theworld’s great powers competing fora naval advantage and challenginglong-standing British naval sup-remacy. The Anglo-German navalrace was in full bloom. Germany’sairships, or Zeppelins, were a forceto be reckoned with and a continualRNAS target, along with theirhousing sheds. Though the RNAShad some success in shooting downthe Zeppelins, they were a threat notonly to naval vessels, but to Britishcities as well. (Interestingly, thefirst British airship, designed andbuilt by Vickers before the war, wasnamed His Majesty’s Rigid AirshipNumber One {R1}.)


One early advocate of airpowerwas Winston Churchill, the firstBritish cabinet minister to fly anairplane. As First Lord of theAdmiralty (1911–1915), Churchillnot only directed the RNAS butflew himself on occasion, much tothe displeasure of his wife. BecauseChurchill clearly realized the futurepower and threat of naval aviation,starting in 1912, he worked with theBritish Navy League to promote theRNAS. Like Fisher, he understoodthat planes could sink ships.

In 1913, the British NavyLeague formed the NationalAeronautical Defence Association(NADA). The RNAS had a combatrole in the ill-fated DardanellesCampaign (1915), and seaplaneswere used for the reconnaissance ofenemy Turkish forts. The resultswere less than satisfactory,however, as naval gunnery reportsusually overestimated the damagedone to the Turkish installations. Such overestimates led the Britishto mistakenly believe they couldforce a passage through theDardanelles using ships alonewithout major losses. Thecombination of mines and theTurkish land-based guns wereenough to repel the British-Frenchfleet, resulting in total defeat for theAllies. In 1916, at the Battle ofJutland off the North Sea coast ofDenmark, Britain launched aseaplane to observe enemy ships,but the effort failed due tomiscommunication with thebattlecruiser flagship HMS Lyon.

Hobbs includes interestingdetail on Great Britain’s struggle to

adapt ships as seaplane carriers thatcould hoist planes on and off ships. Britain developed the early aircraftcarrier from existing warships byremoving some guns from the deckand constructing a flat surface there.Originally, ships treated seaplanesas virtual cargo, sailing to a drop-offpoint before using a crane to lowerthe seaplanes into the water, wherethey then took off. Because war-ships had no platforms, pilotsre turn ing to convey the i rreconnaissance intelligence had toland in the water, where theseaplanes were hoisted backonboard ships—that is, if shiftingwinds and tides hadn’t caused theseaplanes to crash into the water orthe ship. The logistics made the useof seaplanes extremely dangerous,and pilots’ lives were lost. Inaddition to numerous photosshowing this complex and riskyoperation, the book is well-illustrated, with many photographsfrom the author’s large personalcollection.

No “armchair historian,” Hobbsis a retired officer of the RoyalNavy and a seasoned pilot withnumerous professional publicationsto his credit, including a publicationaward from the Australian NavyLeague. His breadth of experienceincludes stints as a museum curatorand as a lecturer on naval aviationaround the globe. His naval aviatorskills enable his careful analysis ofthe RNAS’ operational andtechnical challenges.

The book is technical, withgenerous aviation details, maps,charts, and photographs. The focus

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is on the RNAS from its formation(1914) and war service to itsmerging with the new Royal AirForce in 1918, a merger DavidHobbs laments. He agrees with theU.S. decision to maintain anindependent naval aviation arm. For historian Hobbs, “The crowningachievement of the RNAS was thedesign, commissioning, and thepreparation for operation of HMSArgus, the world’s first true flush-deck aircraft carrier capable oflaunching and recovering aircraftand the progenitor of everysubsequent carrier.”

This book is not for the generalreader, but for students of Britishmilitary history, and naval aviationin particular. A more extensiverunning commentary on domesticpolitics would have been helpful, asit was the politicians who controlledand determined the ultimate fate ofthe RNAS. Still, David Hobbs isunmatched in his field, and theRNAS has found its definitivehistorian.

W. Mark HamiltonAlexandria, Virginia

Ming-Li Hsiao. “The maritimeindustry to raise the nation and theshipping business to save thenation”: the Japanese steamshiprivalry in China: 1914-1945.Taipei: National Taiwan UniversityPress, www.press.ntu.edu.tw, 2017.ISBN 978-9-86350-252-4.

This book is a revision of Dr.Hsiao’s Ph.D. thesis, which was

awarded by the National TaiwanUniversity in 2011. The steamshipbusiness in China has been aninternational focus since 1862 andKwang-ching Liu’s 1962 classic,Anglo-American Steamship Rivalryin China, 1862-1874, made it clearthat British shipping dominated theChinese market before the FirstWorld War, after the Americansleft. Hsiao’s book addresses thesituation after the Japanese pene-trated the Chinese market, linkingbusiness, diplomacy and wartogether, all of which are allimportant components of modernChinese history.

Hsiao’s first chapter discussesearlier research on the topic, basedon archival sources consulted inChina, Japan, the United States,Great Britain and Taiwan. In thesecond chapter, he uses this richmaterial to explore the developmentof Japanese shipping in China after1914, and proves that the Japaneseexpansion in the shipping businessin the 1920s was largely the resultof the profits made during the war,rather than from the later subsidies,as suggested by some studies. Furthermore, this chapter containsan accurate summary of the ship-ping world in the China of the1920s, including a description ofvarious shipping firms and theiroperations.

Since 1927, the Nationalist gov-ernment had controlled most partsof China and the regime remainedstable before the conflicts withJapan became intense in 1937. Inchapter three, Hsiao argues force-fully that the relatively stable


political situation along with admin-istrative modernization and reformcaused the Chinese shippingindustry to expand during this time,a period sometimes called “theGolden Decade”. While the Chinesegenerally dominated trade insouthern China and the Yangtzeregion, Japanese business interestsremained influential in northernChina and Manchuria, the latter ofwhich constituted the earlier GreaterEast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Beginning in July 1937, militaryconflicts between Japan and Chinaescalated. In April 1938, Japanpassed a law ordering general mob-ilization and the government beganto monitor all industries, includingshipping, intervening further inshipping operations in 1939. Hsiaotraces how Japan mobilized ship-ping before the Pearl Harbor attack,focusing on the way shipping res-ponded to the mobilization, includ-ing the use of flags of convenience,by both the Chinese and Japaneseshipping industries during wartime.

Japan declared war on China,the United States and the UnitedKingdom in December 1941. Chap-ter five, which discusses the des-truction of Japanese shipping duringthe Pacific War, is the most interest-ing part of this book. The neglect ofiron-ore and coal shipments fromChina meant that once Japan lostcommand of the sea, shipping waslargely unable to meet the demandfor fuel under the wartime plans.With Japan’s surrender in 1945, theentire shipping forces were destroy-ed. The rich narratives in this chap-ter could fill another book.

Japanese overseas shippingexpanded after the military actiontowards Taiwan in 1874. No onedenies the relationship between warand shipping in Japan before 1945. In his case study of China, Hsiaocompletes an excellent study on therise and fall of Japanese shipping. He also offers wealth of informationon the shipping activities in Chinesewaters. It is a welcome and long-awaited book that should be read bystudents interested in East Asianhistory, especially the effect of waron shipping history.

Chih-lung LinTaiwan

Larry Jeram-Croft. The Royal NavyLynx: An Operational History.Barnsley, S. Yorks.: SeaforthPublishing, www.seaforthpublishing.com, 2017. xiii+289 pp., illus-trations, tables, appendices. UK£25.00, US $44.95, cloth; ISBN978-1-47386-251-7.

This work is a combinationtechnical/operational history andoral narrative of both the RoyalNavy’s Lynx helicopters and thecrews who flew them in both theFalklands and the Persian Gulf,compiled by 30-year Royal Navyveteran, retired Commander LarryJeram-Croft. Intended to “tell [theLynx’s] story and put the recordstraight” regarding “the mostsuccessful weapons systemdeployed by the Royal Navy since1945,” Jeram-Croft delves not onlyinto the evolution of the airframe

Book Reviews 67

itself, but also the experiences ofaircrews under combat and extremeweather conditions. This adds ahuman element to the narrative andoffers a variety of perspectives, allbased on experiences with the Lynx.(xiii) The work is set up chrono-logically, following the path of theaircraft’s origins and peacetimeservice through the Falklands Warsand into post-war improvements,concluding with the Lynx’s servicein the Gulf and the operations of thecurrent Mark 8 version. Aircrew-produced cartoons and personalphotographs are interspersed amidstofficial images throughout the text,and three appendices conclude thepiece with a glossary of terms, tech-nical specifications, and “A Dum-mies Guide to Flying a Helicopter”(284).

The sections covering the initialdevelopment of the Lynx, its laterevolution, and primary peacetimeroles are interspersed before, be-tween, and after the two primaryfirst-hand account sections dis-cussed later in this review. Withinthese chapters, Jeram-Croft coversthe origins of the Westland manu-facturing firm, the Lynx designrequirements, and the path frompaper to prototype. Unique designelements, such as the monoblocrotor head and conformal gearedgearbox, are described, showcasinghow ingenuity and risk-takinghelped craft “one of the first trulyaerobatic helicopters in the world”(8-11). The Mark 3 and Mark 8evolutions each receive their ownshort chapters, covering howlessons gained from testing and

wartime operations led to newimprovements to the craft’s sensors,armaments, and general capabilities. The final two chapters examine theLynx’s impressive history as arescue helicopter and its servicearound the world, with the formermaking use of award citations tohelp illustrate activities, while thelatter covers more unusual assign-ments, such as Antarctic expedi-tions, counter-drug operations, andpostings to Gibraltar and the IndianOcean.

Forty percent of the main text, atotal of 111 pages, is devoted torecollections of the Falklands War,provided by Lynx crews and aircraftmaintainers assigned to 13 differentships, along with accounts from 815Squadron Headquarters Flights. Accounts are divided by ship, witheach Flight member and assignedairframe noted before the account isrelayed. These sections includetalks of how crews used ingenuity toovercome unforeseen obstacles,such as repurposing parts of anoffice chair into a machine gunmount, or scavenging parts from awrecked jet to jury-rig a repairwhen there were no spares available(45-47, 103). Accounts range frommatter-of-fact to more dramatic indescription, offering a variety ofviewpoints that showcase not onlythe war the men fought in, but theversatility of the craft. Conflictingviewpoints between the personalaccounts do arise, often in regard tothe then-new Sea Skua missilesystem. One of the most interestingstories is the post-war correspond-ence and gatherings that several of


the Flight members have had withtheir former Argentinian adver-saries. Given the state of inter-national affairs regarding theArgentinians and their commonlyexpressed views surroundingBritain’s rule of the Falklands, it isinteresting to see the respect andcamaraderie Argentinian veteransseem to have for the helicoptercrews of the Royal Navy (51, 65-66,84, 86-87).

The 50-page section coveringLynx operations in the Persian Gulffrom 1980 into the present daymakes up another large percentageof the text. The arrangement issimilar to that of the Falklandschapter, with the focus being on theaccounts of three ship flights duringthe First Gulf War’s OperationGRANBY. The most detailed ofthese accounts is offered in theH M S Gl o u c e s t e r F l i g h t ’ srecollection of the 30 January 1991Battle of Bubiyan, in which theship’s operations room narrative ispaired with debriefings for aminute-by-minute account of theLynx actions (188-197). Thesection concludes with a statementregarding the Mark 8 Lynx’scontinued service in the Gulf,transcribing a 2005 articledescribing the newer challengesfaced by the heavier varianthelicopter as seen by the Flight ofHMS Argyll.

Of particular interest is chaptereight, entitled “There But For theGrace of God Go I…” andrecounting various “lucky escape”incidents with Lynx helicoptersover their service life (215). This

includes wire strikes, tail rotorfailure, formation tip strikes, slidingoff a ship, ditching, and roughweather scenarios. While theseincidents were often hair raising,Jeram-Croft points out that suchoccurrences come from a longservice life around the world and invaried conditions, and thatcompared to other naval helicopters,“the Lynx has an excellent safetyrecord, which is a tribute to itsdesign and the quality of those whohave operated it” (236).

In t e r ms o f poss ib leimprovements, there are a few thatcome to mind. The captions ofphotos and cartoons throughout thework are often written in themanner of a personal photo album. While this does convey thesentiments of the author andFalklands/Gulf contributors and arean interesting aesthetic choice, theya r e s o me t i me s l e s s t h a nexplanatory. If these captions werefollowed up by more technical oranalytical comments, particularlyrelating to the comics that weredesigned specifically to entertainRoyal Navy helicopter crews, theymight be more effective. The otherpossible improvements lie withinthe notation of the work itself,specifically the lack of footnotes,bibliography, and index. While theabsence of footnotes and abibliography is not a problem in thefirst-hand accounts due to theirnature, the historical and technicalsections of the work could benefitgreatly from their addition. Withoutsuch notations and sourcing, there isno easy way for interested readers

Book Reviews 69

to carry out research of their ownusing the same materials, orexamine other data within saidsources that may have been left outof this work. The lack of an indexreduces the reader’s ability toquickly reference the work whensearching for specific subjects, suchas certain ship crews, discussionsregarding certain systems, and thelike. By adding these features tofuture editions, Jeram-Croft couldextend his work’s accessibility andusefulness further for the scholarlycommunity.

The Royal Navy Lynx: AnOperational History is an excellentprimer on the experiences of thosewho have flown the Lynx airframeover the past four decades. Jeram-Croft’s personal experiences as anaircraft engineer and pilot of theLynx undoubtedly helped fuel hispassion for this project and gavehim access to resources used in itswriting. The firsthand accounts ofthe Falklands and Gulf conflicts areof special interest, as they offerinsight into often-overlooked partsof those military actions, and helpexplain why certain design choiceswere made in the evolution of theLynx airframe. While the inclusionof citations and an index would bedesirable, this work does stand as anexcellent compendium of Lynx heli-copter history and crew experiencesfrom the days of initial testing to thepresent.

Charles Ross Patterson IIYorktown, Virginia

Richard Larn. The Isles of Scilly inthe Great War. Barnsley, S. Yorks.:Pen & Sword Military, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2017. 176 pp.,illustrations, bibliography, index. UK £12.99, US $24.95, paper;ISBN 9788-1-4738-6766-6.

Like politics, all wars are local. Historians record the sweep ofarmies across vast plains anddeserts, chronicle strategic andtactical bombing campaigns thatwreak havoc on an enemy’s indust-rial infrastructure, and tell of vastfleet actions that determine controlof the world ocean. But beneath itall (sometimes quite literally), aremillions of more or less haplesscivilians, countless tens of thou-sands of whom were brutallyexecuted in twentieth-century warswhile others were bombed orburned to death or turned out oftheir homes. Still other relativelyfortunate ones, in physical safety farfrom battlefields, waited in trepid-ation for the ring of the doorbell andthe heartbreaking telegram.

There are relatively few studiesthat concentrate on twentieth- andtwenty-first century “peoples’wars.” Yet the fate of home frontscaught up in total war could be aspoignant as that of soldiers, sailorsand airmen. Recently, the UnitedKingdom publishing house, Pen &Sword, has set about rectifying theomission, issuing a series of shortmonographs under the overall title“Your Towns & Cities in the GreatWar.”

Throughout that 1914-18 con-flict, each British settlement, large


or small, suffered uniquely. Thevillagers on the Isles of Scilly werenever invaded nor seriouslybombed. Yet, along with half athousand other untouched fortun-ates throughout the country, “fromAugust 1914 onward the town hallon St. Mary’s was deluged withgovernment orders and instructionsregarding war aliens, Defence of theRealm Act, the possibility of airraids, travel restrictions, economyof food and coal and recruiting.”(21) After 1915, Scillonians ratherabruptly found themselves in themidst of a new and frightening formof warfare. The waters that lappedtheir shores became a torpedojunction as Germany’s U-boat cam-paign emerged and intensified. AHome Guard of “Local DefenceVolunteers” was organized, uni-formed and armed; a Coast Watchwas formed. A Royal Navy Auxil-iary Patrol fleet (RNAPS) compris-ing some 20 armed trawlers anddrifters was hastily mustered andbased on St. Mary’s Island. So, too,by mid-summer of that first full yearof war was created an “embryonic”Royal Naval Air Station that by1918 had grown to substantial pro-portions. Hotels and homes wererequisitioned for hospitals and head-quarters. Late pub openings wereforbidden.

Much wartime life was shapedby wrecked and sunken ships thatprovided a lively business in sca-venged goods. By 1917, “manyitems of cargo were now beingwashed ashore all around Scillyincluding dozens of dead horses andmules on Bryher and St. Agnes that

had to be buried.” Evading thelocal customs officials provided agreat deal of entertainment for thelocals who melted barrels of lard inpans to eliminate sand and stones,the residue then being used for avariety of purposes. “Great slabs ofexpensive candle wax measuring 18in by 18 in and 2 in thick cameashore for a time, which weremelted down and poured into candlemoulds saving the islandersmoney.” On the “off islands” theemergency lockers of wreckedships’ lifeboats were rifled andpillaged for their “sealed tins ofthick, hard ship’s biscuit, 8 in tinsof dried vegetables or a dried meatcompound known as Pemmican, allof which were welcome additions toan already lean Scillonian diet”(115). Amidst this activity theinevitable casualty announcementsappeared in ever growing numbersas the war on the Western Front lessthan a hundred miles away, steadilymounted.

The author shrewdly eschewsdry recitation in favor of copiousquotations from surprisinglydramatic distress messages andsignals as the U-boat warapproached the Scilly shores andadjacent waters from Penzance onthe nearby Cornish coast round tothe Lizard Peninsula. The author isquite good at depicting tensionsover shipping losses that mountsteadily into 1918, then ebb as theenemy is gradually subdued. Hisrelatively brief narrative, buttressedwith several score contemporaryphotos, is worth the read.

Book Reviews 71

I have only one complaint, but itis significant. In his zeal to providean immediate audience with adramatic narrative of its past, hefails the general reader in providingany kind of geographic guide. Thisreviewer, who has never been to theislands, was forced to constantlyconsult internet maps of the Scillyswhich proved unsatisfactory. Overall, however, Larn is to becongratulated in providing acompelling template of localwartime history that can be moregenerally applied as a growingnumber of scholars seek out thishitherto largely neglected corner ofsocial history.

Lisle A. RoseEdmonds, Washington

Brian Lavery. Wooden WarshipConstruction. A History in ShipModels. Barnsley, S. Yorks.:Seaforth Publishing, www.pen-and-sword.org, 2017. 128 pp., illustra-tions, appendix, bibliography. UK£25.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-47389-480-8.

Brian Lavery is one of the world’sleading naval historians. His worksare wide in scope, covering not onlyeighteenth-century warships, but theRoyal Navy in the Second WorldWar and other topics. This slimvolume is one of those dealing withRoyal Navy ships built between1715 and 1815. It is the third in aseries that uses the beautifullypreserved contemporary models inthe National Maritime Museum at

Greenwich and the Science Museumin London to illustrate, in consider-able detail, how the ships werebuilt. The previous volumes in theHistory in Ship Models series areThe Sailing Frigate and The Ship ofthe Line. This book is devoted tothe way the ships were constructed,the shipyards and the skills of theshipwrights who built them.

In seven chapters, Lavery des-cribes the phases in the constructionof a ship in the order they occurred. First, the assembly of materials, theshipwrights and other workers. This is greatly aided by photographsof models or dioramas of shipyards;especially by a model of ChathamDockyard made in 1772-74. Itshows ships in various stages ofconstruction and in drydock, timberof all kinds neatly laid out ready tobe shaped and used, and the stores,sail loft, residences and otherbuildings. These dockyards werelarge and important industrialendeavours.

Then comes chapters entitleStarting the Ship, Framing, andOutside Planking, Inside the Hulland then Fittings (steering arrange-ments, capstans, pumps, and so on)and finally the work that had to bedone after the ship was launched. They are all illustrated by photo-graphs of ship models and somepaintings. (Launches with all theshipping bedecked with flags were afavourite subject for English marineartists). Lavery does not covermasting and rigging, but there aremany books that deal with thatsubject.


Nowadays, it is possible toproduce books with superb colourillustrations at a rather reasonableprice. This is one of the best. Ifyou have the other two books in theseries, you should add this one. Itwould also interest and perhaps,inspire ship modellers as well asmaking a good addition to anynautical library.

C. Douglas MaginleyMahone Bay, Nova Scotia

John M. McManamon. Caligula’sBarges and the Renaissance Originsof Nautical Archaeology underWater. College Station, TX: TexasA & M University Press,www.tamu.press, 2016. 288 pp., illustrations, map, bibliography,index. US $65.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-62349-438-4.

The first thing a reader mustunderstand about Caligula’s Bargesand the Renaissance Origins ofNautical Archaeology under Wateris that it is not actually about Cal-igula’s barges, the ancient Romanvessels located in lago di Nemioutside of Rome. Nor is it about thescientific origins of what modernscientists think of as MaritimeArchaeology. It is about so muchmore. McManamon uses thefifteenth-century discovery andnovel investigation of the Nemishipwrecks as a cornerstone aroundwhich to explore the interconnectedsubjects of maritime transportation,naval warfare, exploration, infra-structure, naval maintenance, and

salvage. All of these forms of sea-faring and underwater interventionare analyzed the context of thehumanistic philosophical movementthat is characteristic of early mod-ern Italian scholarship.

The book opens with a dis-cussion of Battista Alberti’s ~1446attempt to salvage one of the vesselson behalf of Cardinal Prospero Col-onna, on whose family propertylago di Nemi was located. Colonnarecognized the vessel’s antiquityand sought to tie its presence to thegreater ancient Roman landscape inthe area. As with many shipwreckstoday, the vessels were discoveredby local fishermen working on thelake. This was a period of greatexperimental engineering. Albertiused his research in the study of theArs Technica to design and rig arafted hoist with which he recoveredpieces of hull and other artifacts.

This discussion of Alberti’sinitial investigative work at the siteis followed by the analysis of thesite and its materials by BiondoFlavio. Flavio was considered anexpert on ancient Roman history,and would act as a sort of local tourguide for Cardinal Colonna, who inreturn, provided Flavio access to hisextensive library. The third human-istic scholar who discussed theNemi shipwreck in his scholarlywriting is Pope Pius II. McMan-amon then contrasts the approachesof the three scholars to provide aholistic view of Renaissance scho-larship towards ancient antiquity atthat time: technical (Alberti),geographical/historical (Flavio), andsocio-religious (Pius II).

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McManamon then veers from afocus on scholarship centered on theNemi shipwrecks and the socio-technical innovations that supportedinterest in them and their study. Much of the remaining text followsseveral interwoven themes: thehistory of early modern Italianscholarship, the wealthy landown-ing elite that controlled the Romanregion, and the role of the church inboth; harbour and river infra-structure design in support of mili-tary activities; swimming and divingas a social skill and profession inboth ancient and early moderntimes; the integration of ancientGreek and Roman boatbuildingtechniques into early modern navalarchitecture; and the theoretical andexperimental efforts in engineeringbreathing apparatuses for travelingand working underwater. Extensivespace is also given to the discussionof the etymology of ancient Greekand Roman boat nomenclature. Thedepth of research undertaken onthese topics is evident, though howthey relate to the central theme ofthe book—the origin of scientificanalysis of submerged materialculture—is sometimes unclear. McManamon does occasionallypivot back to the Nemi shipwrecksindicating to this reviewer that thefunction of these shipwrecks in thisbook is primarily to provide a con-crete archaeological example ofearly modern Italian interest inhumanistic technical explorationand control of submerged spaces.

The biggest limitation of thebook, though this is by no means adenigration of it, is that it is not at

all for the casual reader or perhapseven the historian or archaeologistunfamiliar with ancient Roman orearly modern boatbuilding, mari-time engineering, and humanisticscholarship. While comprehensive,well documented, and very wellwritten, there is an assumption thatthe reader has a foundational know-ledge of ancient boatbuilding andvessel structure; early modern boat-building, engineering, and craftspecialization; Italian renaissancescholarship, writing and publishing;and a basic knowledge of the Latinand Italian languages. Consideringthe breadth of scholarship that thisvolume covers, I do not think itwould be possible for the author toapproach it otherwise.

The biggest drawback of thepublication is the lack of illus-trations. The nine providedprimarily depict lago di Nemi plus acouple additional images of free-diving apparatus designs. Much ofthe book, however, includesdetailed descriptions of technicaland/or artistic drawings of ancientand early modern boats, bridges,underwater infrastructure, andunderwater intervention machineryand personal gear. It is clear thatthe author had access to thesedocuments; but in many cases, it isvery difficult to picture what theseimages may have looked like, asthere are either no extant physicalexamples of what is depicted, or forwhich testable prototypes werenever built.

Caligula’s Barges is ameticulously researched book thatillustrates in great detail the


importance of contemporaryacademic and socio-religiousworldview for understanding thechoices that were made in earlymodern Italy for the practical,technical, literary, and philosophicalstudy of the visible, ancient Romanworld. Tangible material culture,exemplified by the Nemi ship-wrecks, provided the means throughwhich Roman ecclesiastical elites,such as Cardinal Colonna, couldlink the power of the church as wellas their own social and fiscal powerto that of the Roman Empire, andcreate a narrative that positionedthemselves as inheritors of itsauthority. Understanding theprocesses that inform how scholarschoose archaeological sites to studyand subsequently interpret providesinsight in how we conduct researchtoday. This book is highlyrecommended.

Alicia CaparaisoNew Orleans, Louisiana

Salvatore R. Mercogliano. FourthArm of Defense. Sealift and Mari-time Logistics in the Vietnam War.Washington, DC: Naval History &Heritage Command, www.history.navy.mil, 2017. 78 pp., illustra-tions, map, table, bibliography. US$19,00, paper; ISBN 798-0-945274-96-4. (Free e-version available.)

The Fourth Arm of Defense, bySalvatore R. Mercogliano, docu-ments the development of themodern marine logistics supplychain that evolved as a result of the

U.S. involvement in the VietnamWar. Despite the horrors of war,conflicts can often have positiveoutcomes in terms of technologicaland managerial improvements.World War 2 (WW2) is remem-bered as the dividing line thatushered in the industrial era knownas the Jet Age. The prosecution ofVietnam War has received lessattention. As a “limited conflict”,rather than a war of survival, it ismost noted for advancing the use ofhelicopters, napalm and peace pro-testors. Mercogliano presents avery different account of thisengagement. Through the lens of thesealift and maritime logistics herecounts the effort required tosupport 10 years of military engage-ment in a theatre of war located halfway around the world. The lessonslearned in Vietnam shaped thedevelopment of military logisticsand propelled the use of contain-erized shipping that subsequentlyrevolutionized world trade.

The maritime logistics of theVietnam War is an interesting storyon many levels. The book has fivesidebars that put a human face onthe hard facts and illustrate somesignificant events. Risk andheroism, challenge and innovation,failure and achievement are alladdressed in short vignettes. Thetext is accompanied with excellentphotographs and maps thatdocument changes in the logisticalsystem between 1965 and 1975. Thenarrative of the book is set out inchronological order from the build-up to the final withdrawal ofrefugees.

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The term “fourth arm of de-fense” is attributed to PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt as hisdescription of the merchant marineduring WW2. Mercogliano drawsattention to the pivotal role playedby these civilian sailors and thestrong leadership of the U.S. Navyin meeting the herculean taskcompleted by 6,799 voyages tosoutheast Asia.

New challenges awaited theU.S. military’s supply chain atevery turn in Vietnam. The firstissue was capacity. Some 1,500vessels were anchored in reservethanks to the building program ofWW2, but many of these ships wereobsolete by 1965. The merchantmarine was more modern, but alsohad a commercial market to serve.Once sealift capacity had beenestablished, the reality of deliveringfreight emerged as the next barrier.The “last mile problem” is a classicissue in logistics, but for the mili-tary planners in Vietnam it quicklybecame a crisis. By November1965, 122 fully loaded ships werewaiting at anchor off Saigon andnearby holding areas. Inadequateport facilities were compounded bythe lack of ground transport. Goodshad to be transhipped to WW2 tanklanding ships (LSTs) and trans-ported to beaches or rampspositioned along the coast. TheMulberry harbours, another legacyof WW2, were adapted to relievethe backlog of waiting ships.

The exigencies of war demand-ed capital investment and inno-vation to deal with the volume ofsupplies necessary to sustain

500,000 troops in the field. Newwharves were constructed, harboursdredged and mooring points estab-lished to unload petroleum productsthrough underwater hoses to tankfarms on shore. It was alsorecognized that loading ships andhoping that the right materials metthe needs in the field wasinefficient. The logistical systemwas changed from “push” to “pull”as troop demands determined whatwas loaded.

The time to unload ships at theVietnam ports became a key bottle-neck in the supply chain. MalcolmMcLean had recognized thisproblem at the U.S. ports, and in1956 he demonstrated the benefitsof containerization. In 1965,McLean went to Vietnam to con-vince the military that containerscould help in the war effort. Afterinitial resistance, the idea was em-braced and championed fromwithin. The impact of container-ization was so great that by the endof the conflict 10 percent of allfreight was carried in containers.With the $450 million that McLeanearned during this period, container-ization made it past the tippingpoint and experienced rapid growthfor the next 35 years.

In this very readable mono-graph, Mercogliano sets out a broadarray to topics and themes. This is astory about war, and there arecasualties in the merchant marine.The logistics system was recognizedby the enemy as a key target. VietCong sappers were a constant threatto anchored ships and dredges. Tugspulling barges up the rivers were


always at risk of attack from theshore. These subjects, like a mutinyand refugee evacuations, are treatedwith dispassion and respect.

For such a slim monograph, TheFourth Arm of Defense, carries alarge cargo of information andcolour for those who are interestedin military or business logistics. It ishard not to be impressed by thescale of their accomplishment, andto appreciate how lessons learned inthe Vietnam sealift continue toshape the world for decades after-ward.

Dr. Barry E. Prentice,Winnipeg, Manitoba

Malcolm Muir, Jr. End of the Saga.The Maritime Evacuation of SouthVietnam and Cambodia. Washing-ton, DC: Naval History andHeritage Command, www.history.navy.mil, 2017. 67 pp., illustra-tions, maps, bibliography. US$19.00, paper; ISBN 978-0-9452474-92-6.

The fall of Saigon was America’sDunkirk. But, whereas Britain’sevacuation of the Continent in 1940was prelude to ultimate victory, theAmerican departure from SoutheastAsia 35 years later marked the endof a failed war. The final, oftenpanic-stricken days were so trau-matic that they have received almostno attention from American journal-ists or academics. The CIA tried tosuppress, then blocked for years,much of Frank Snepp’s DecentInterval (New York: Random

House, 1977; republished in full byUniversity of Kansas Press, 2002):David Butler’s The Fall of Saigon(New York: Simon & Shuster,1985) never received the attention itdeserved.

Now in a short, workmanlikemonograph, academic militaryhistorian Malcolm Muir seeks toreconstruct the maritime aspects ofthose few somber weeks when tensof thousands of Cambodians andVietnamese fled their homelands toavoid the North Vietnamese Armyand the Khmer Rouge. In a suddenrush, American naval and air forcestaffs had to plan massive air,riverine, and sea evacuations fromPhnom Peng, Danang, Cam RanBay and Saigon. The enterprise dis-played “the disconcerting spectacleof the abandonment of allies and, ona more human level, of a host ofindividuals who had worked andfought for common aims.”(1) Nonetheless, Muir insists that“behind the undeniably tragicelements of the picture, theevacuations highlighted the skilland courage of American uniformedpersonnel. . . . Despite a tangledcommand structure and amid anatmosphere of intense crisis andextreme danger, American sailors,marines and airmen saved tens ofthousands of people with a minimalloss of life.” (1, 62)

Some evidence supports hiscontention, some does not. Atmoments of crisis, cool headednessand even sensitivity often prevailedamong those on the ground. Whenan aghast Philippine Govern-ment—confronting the prospect of

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some 70-80,000 refugees suddenlyflooding the country—initially balk-ed at allowing dis-embarkation, anadmiral on the scene not onlyconcluded that it was “an inhumanepolicy,” but also “suggested” to asuperior that Manila’s willingnessto allow the relative handful ofAmericans to transit but not themass of Vietnamese “would beconsidered a racial thing in theUnited States. . .” (45). He won hispoint despite the fact that the greatmajority of fleeing Vietnamesewere not poor farmers but “peopleof means and education.” Oneaircraft carrier sailor recalled thatmany refugees were not “inwretched condition. They werefrom Saigon, a big city, and weremostly middle class.” (37). Indeed,some came aboard their rescue shipswith shoe boxes full of gold.

But cool calculation could alsoproduce callousness. Vice AdmiralSteele, the commander of TaskForce 76 off Saigon, later remarkedthat he was “reluctant to pick up awhole lot of” those fleeing by sea“unless it was quite clear that if wedidn’t do it, they were going to die.” Having witnessed earlier maritimeevacuations from Danang and CamRan Bay, Steele, “had this feelingthat we were taking poor peoplewho were probably going to bealright, who the [incomingCommunist] regime on top wasn’tgoing to touch very much. Theywouldn’t be taken away from a lifethey knew.” (41) Having moved hisfleet further offshore to discouragerefugees, Steele had his people tellthose who still managed to reach his

ships that “if they had the means toget back to shore,” they should “gohome.” (ibid.)

And the indelible images re-main, especially of those 400 oddsouls together with the SouthKorean embassy staff who mighthave been rescued at the lastmoment, but were not. Muir admitsthat “Six more CH-53 flights couldhave rescued those individuals, butU.S. command authorities neverlearned of their existence and thus,did not order more missions.” Onerearguard marine, who was rescued,remained eternally bitter: “Thatmorning, there was [sic] kids,women, children, and ever sincethen I’ve felt like a coward becauseI ran out on them. Those peopledeserved to get out of there [but]our government had turned and runout on them.” (27)

Evacuations, even thosesuccessful operations like Hungnamin December 1950, are among thebitterest experiences of war. Cam-bodia and South Vietnam were noexceptions despite the competenceand grace under pressure frequentlydisplayed by those charged withimpossible tasks. Eventually,thousands of Vietnamese, relativelywell-housed in Guam, would reachthe United States to enrich theirlives and ours. Their ordeal was thec u l mi n a t i o n o f y e a r s o fmiscalculation on the grandest ofscales; Malcolm Muir has told thefinal chapter, as well as any authorcould, in an un-indexed 63-pagestudy. He makes a strong, if notindisputable, case that nothing so


became America’s Vietnamadventure like the leaving of it.

Lisle A. RoseEdmonds, Washington

Gary J. Ohls. American AmphibiousWarfare. The Roots of Tradition to1865. Annapolis, MD: NavalInstitute Press, www.usni.org, 2017.xxiv+274 pp., illustrations, maps,notes, bibliography, index. US$39.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-68247-088-6.

In American Amphibious WarfareThe Roots of Tradition to 1865, partof the series New Perspectives onMaritime History and NauticalArcheology, Gary J. Ohls describesand analyses major amphibiouslanding and defensive deploymentsby U.S. forces from the Revolutionto the Civil War. Employing a case-study approach, he examines theoperational and strategic signi-ficance of seven Americanamphibious actions, and assessestheir impact on U.S. traditions andplanning today. In so doing, hegives us an appreciation of theorigins of American amphibiouswarfare, and a comprehensivehistory of U.S. naval and militarymanoeuvres since 1776.

Ohls’ introduction reminds usthat amphibious warfare did notstart in early America, and providesus with a useful chronology of thesubject. He cites in particularAthens’ amphibious victory overSparta at Sphaeteria in 425 BC,Alexander’s amphibious defeat of

Persia at Tyre in 332 BC, Caesar’stwice successful amphibiousinvasions of Britain in 55-54 BC,Britain’s victorious assaults atLouisbourg in 1745 and 1758, andWolfe’s attack from the sea atQuebec followed by Britain’striumph over France in Canada in1759.

Turning to America, Ohls tellsus that in 1776 in the midst ofColonial rebellion, and in an effortto end the conflict, Britain assem-bled her largest amphibious force upto that time to seize New York City,and sever New England from therest of the continent. The “ease withwhich” the British Navy “couldoperate on the multitude of waterssurrounding New York” pleased theBritish command “as much as itdismayed General Washington”(17). Of British victory Ohlsconcludes, that “at no time in theeighteenth century did any militaryf o r ce exe c u t e a mp h i b i ousevolutions more skillfully” than theBritish did at New York (29), butAmericans learned importantlessons too. Washington lost thebattle for New York, but through his“operational agility,” he saved hisarmy and the Revolution throughhis strategy of defensive amphibiouswithdrawal and retreat.

Five years later, Washingtonachieved a complete and finalvictory over British forces at theamphibious siege of Yorktown in ajoined and combined alliedoperation involving French andAmerican armies in conjunctionwith the French fleet on the littoralsof Virginia. The most complex

Book Reviews 79

operation of the Revolution invol-ved diverse forces drawn fromwidely scattered points in NorthAmerica and the West Indies, allconverging in a timely fashion. Ohls credits the allied victory atYorktown to Washington’s superiorstrategic thinking. He recognizedthat French naval power coupledwith U.S. ground forces were thekey to American independence. “AtYorktown Washington orchestratedthe use of naval power, amphibiousevolutions, and traditional landoperations to win a tactical andoperational victory,” which became“the most important Americanoffensive amphibious operation ofthe war” (59, 60).

Moving on to the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuries Ohlsinforms us that the capture ofAmerican ships and the enslavementof their crewmen by Barbarycorsairs fueled a hue and cry inAmerica for a maritime force able toprotect U.S. commerce abroad. Inthe mid-1790s, government obligedby creating a Navy Department andlaunching several new frigates. Inthe Barbary War against Tripoli(1801-05), offensive amphibiousoperations proved a major elementin American victory as the U.S.established roots in expeditionarywarfare that have grown andexpanded into the twenty-firstcentury. Ohls details the firstAmerican expedition to foreignshores where amphibious operationsdisplayed America’s military andnaval might against an enemy insupport of U.S. diplomatic goals. The capture of the coastal city of

Derna by U.S. amphibious forcescompelled the Pasha of Tripoli toaccede to American demands in thematter of tribute, hostages, andransom for American mariners.

Discussing the War of 1812,Ohls identifies several waterborneoperations, both British and Amer-ican, but focuses on the Americanpreservation of Baltimore, in whathe calls the finest example of adefens ive r e sponse to anamphibious invasion at the time.Having already sacked Washington,British invaders set their sights onBaltimore as the “richest and mostdemocratic city in America and onethat should be ‘laid in Ashes’”(100). According to Ohls, animportant characteristic of anamphibious operation involvesintegration between naval andlanding forces, and the inability ofthe British to achieve this task atBaltimore in 1814 is the lesson to bedrawn here. U.S. leaders built theirdefenses to prevent a jointconcentration by the enemy againsttheir city. The battle of Baltimorewould provide Americans with abody of information from which tobase future defensive amphibiousactions.

In the 1840s, offensiveamphibious operations became akey part of America’s war withMexico (1846-48), and here Ohlsdescribes various patterns ofamphibious manoeuvre. In theconquest of California, smallamphibious incursions contributedto an overa l l synthesizedamphibious campaign. From SanFrancisco to Monterey, San Pedro,


and San Diego, and along the shoresof the Gulf of California and theMexican Pacific Coast, Americancommanders successfully insertedsmall amphibious forces at points ofenemy weakness, avoiding directattacks on strongly-held positions,thereby undermining Mexico’s willto resist. Thus, U.S. leaders basedtheir California campaign on theprinciple of operational manoeuvrefrom the sea, he says, long beforemodern naval and military thinkersdeveloped it as a standardizeddoctrine for amphibious warfare.

Meanwhile, and simultaneously,on the other side of the continent,the successful U.S. landing at Vera-cruz in 1847, a large-scaleamphibious operation that led tovictory in the Mexican War,“ f o r e s h a d o w e d A m e r i c a namphibious actions in World WarII…and established the U.S. as thepreeminent amphibious power in theworld” (152-53).

Ohls concludes his study ofAmerican amphibious warfare in the1860s, detailing Union attacks onConfederate-held Fort Fisher, NorthCarolina, during the Civil War.Aimed at closing the port of Wil-mington, through which Lee’s Armyof Northern Virginia obtainedforeign supplies, Yankee success insecuring Southern littorals made amajor contribution to Northernvictory in 1865, and added to theAmerican amphibious tradition inways useful to the future.

Ohls builds a strong case byclaiming that American amphibiousoperations prior to 1865 presaged,and also inform, U.S. amphibious

policies today. Moreover, hissources, inclusive of materials fromnational and military archives,published primary and secondarytexts, and military publications anddirectives, amply support his argu-ment. The battle maps are helpful,and the photo presentationembellishes Ohls’ scholarly study. In an attempt to fill what he calls agap in the historiography ofAmerica’s naval and military story,his American Amphibious WarfareThe Roots of Tradition to 1865succeeds admirably.

William L. WelchNatick, Massachusetts

Michael Pasdzior and PeterHaefcke. Europas Atlantikküste /Europe’s Atlantic Coast. Hamburg:Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, www.koehler-books.de. 2015. 236 pp.,photographs by Peter Haefcke andMichael Paszdior. EURO 49,00€,cloth; ISBN 978-3-7822-1239-7.

This fine collection of photographsis actually two coffee-table volumesin one. Perused in one directionfrom left to right, starting with thecover-page, it presents PeterHaefcke’s striking black-and-whitephotographs. Flipped over frombottom to top, then read in the usualmanner, one discovers a volume ofMichael Pasdzior’s coloured photos,together with its own distinctivebook cover. The two photographershave been travelling companions formany years, always seeking outcoastal scenery. Their contempla-

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tive volume—seascapes and sitesfrom Portugal, Spain, France,England, Scotland, Ireland andIceland—is a distillation ofhaunting, enchanting and austerebeauty.

Each half of the volume isi n t r oduced by a s epa r a t ecommentator: Britton Scholz,known in Germany for heri n t e r v i e w s o f p r o m i n e n tpersonalities from the world of artsand fashion, introduces the Pasdziorcollection of coloured photos; shedoes so in typical Q&A format,without playing the critic. By con-trast, art curator Dr. Henriette Väth-Hinz, who introduces the Haefckecollection of black-and-whitepictures, espouses the professionalart critic’s approach of reflecting onthe meaning and style of thecomplete oeuvre. Both interlocutorsare competent and perceptive, andboth approaches have theiradvantages: one triggers thoughtfulresponses to wel l -preparedq u e s t i ons , and t h e o t h e rconceptualizes an integratedmosaic. English translations ac-company the German text, thoughoccasionally in abbreviated form. For her part, Scholz drew out thetwo photographers, both of whomwere present at the Pasdziorinterview. As it turns out, neitherone of the photographers seemsparticularly keen on scholarlyinterpretations of their camera work. They are both too down-to earth forthat. As Haefcke interjected, “Myopinion is that a picture eitherappeals to you or it doesn’t.” Oragain: “my photographs are a

testimony to how I see the coast,they don’t need much explanation.” His colleague Pasdzior would agree.

Pasdzior himself follows intui-tive principles that have evolvedduring the practice of his art. Capturing atmosphere, mood, and asense of mystery are key amongthem. He finds himself drawn tophotographing people in strange,and yet quite ordinary, situations. He exploits the opportunitiesprovided by grey days for capturingthe contrasting movements of lightand shadow. He tends to look atcoastlines from a distance, and topick out traces of human life alongthe shore. By contrast, Haefckefocuses in the raw power of nature,and characteristically, as HenrietteVäth-Hinz explains, exhibits an“eye for the unspectacular in aspectacular setting.” He “gets closerto the borderline between water androck.”

The photographs in this albumare not commercial art typical oftravelogues and advertising, thoughboth of the cameramen have workedin these areas. Instead, they set offon their annual journeys in order toescape such constraints. For both ofthem, these wanderings areliberating experiences. Askedduring his interview with BrittonScholz how they go about seekingsites and scenes to photograph,Pasdzior quickly responded: “Myproven guideline is a quotation byPicasso: ‘I don’t search. I find.’” That seems a guiding principle forboth photographers on theirvagabonding along the coasts ofEurope.


Väth-Hinz’s reflections on thisseemingly undirected and un-planned approach inspired her tocite from German novelist HermannHesse’s novel Siddharta (1922) forillustration. As she doubtless wouldhave known, Siddharta is a richlypoetic expression of Indianphilosophical thought—with a tip ofthe hat to Buddhism. The novelpromoted the notion of anunfettered, sensuous apprehensionof life. In the abbreviated lines ofthe English translation from Hessewhich she chose: “To search meanshaving a goal. To find, however,means to be free, to be open, to nothave a goal.” The thought runs as acounterpoint to those of Picassowhich photographer Pasdzior hadtaken as his guiding principle. Significantly, both Siddharta andHesse’s bestselling Der Steppenwolf(1927) —from which the LosAngeles rock band took its name in1967—had played key roles in thefree-spirited Hippy movement. Hesse’s influence earned him thesobriquet of “Saint Hesse among theHippies,” especially for his impactupon student life in Californiaduring the 1960s.

This volume of photographsmakes for wonderful browsing. Each photograph tells a uniquestory; each story contains alluringsensory appeal; and each implicitstory lays itself open to theinterpretation and enjoyment ofeach individual viewer. As to whatthey ultimately mean, photographerMichael Haefcke put it in theclearest light: they are yours toponder, “they don’t need much

explanation.” In the words of artcurator Henriette Väth-Hinz: “Theyare pictures that make waves.” Andshe’s right.

Michael L. Hadley Victoria, British Columbia

David Paul. Liverpool Docks. AShort History. Oxford, UK: FonthillMedia, www.fonthillmedia.com,2016. 190 pp., illustrations, tables,bibliography. UK £16.99, US$29.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-78155-518-7. (E-book available.)

A mere hamlet on the muddy shoresof a stream called Liver Pool andthe river Mersey, the place thatbecame Liverpool had little goingfor it in the early thirteenth century. Developing slowly over time,Liverpool ushered in 200 years ofwealth and prosperity in 1790, withthe construction of the first of manylocks. The first—experimental—lock was built in the style of theday, brick by brick. Locksalongside the Mersey connectedLiverpool to world-wide tradingroutes and enable its evolution intoa major centre of the tradinguniverse. It was a tempestuousjourney. From Liverpool, textiles,rum and manufactured goods foundtheir way to Africa, from wheremore than a million African slaveswere transported to the Americas.Liverpool gained power and wealthfrom the slave trade while Americangoods like sugar, tobacco and cottonformed the main cargo for GreatBritain in this triangular trade. The

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city entered an era of unprecedentedcommercial expansion that resultedin a significant population increase.By 1815, fifty years later, thepopulation of Liverpool hadquadrupled to 100,000 people. Theabolition of slavery in 1833 put anend to a flourishing business andunimaginable human suffering.

In the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, the city profited from themass migration of people seeking abetter life in the New World and theage of luxury cruising. In all, ninemillion people sailed fromLiverpool, most bound for theUnited States and Britain’scolonies. After the First World War,the port of Liverpool sunk into aslow decline. The docks were alivewhen people did most of the work. From the start of the container era,however, automation took over;dockworkers were made redundant;docks fell into decay; and shippingcompanies moved out or wentbankrupt. Finally, the citizens ofLiverpool came to their senses andbegan redeveloping the city,sending it into another phase ofrevival.

The introduction of the shippingcontainer heralded a new era,changing the shipping industryforever. The result was more cargohandled by fewer people, auto-mated, never-ending, just-in-timedelivery. Mass transport by ever-larger container ships required morespace than the dock area had everhad. The recently developedproject, Liverpool2, promises a newera for Liverpool. The history ofLiverpool is not just about trade; the

city is now home to communitiesfrom all over the world.

Along with a fascinatinghistory, the author presentsinteresting pictures; ships, cargoesand quays, sailors, dock workers,shipbuilders, truck drivers, agents,and, of course, the spectators. Towrap nine centuries of history inless than 200 pages requires notonly skillful restraint, but alsomastery of the word.

Jacob Bart HakLeiden, The Netherlands.

Graham Pitchfork. Shot Down andin the Drink. True Stories of RAFand Commonwealth Air CrewsSaved from the Sea in World War II.London: Osprey Publishing, www.ospreypublishing.com, 2017. xii +276 pp. illustrations, bibliography,index. UK £10.99, US $15.00, CDN$20.00, paper; ISBN 978-1-4728-2727-2.

The term, “Air Force” immediatelyconjures up images of warplanesand courageous pilots. But an air-crew’s worst nightmare must surelybe to be shot down by enemy fire ordowned due to mechanical failureover water. The possibility of beinglost at sea is ever-present. In res-ponse to this danger, by the SecondWorld War, Great Britain’s RoyalAir Force (RAF) developed an air-sea rescue (ASR) system consistingof sea-going rescue launches andair-sea rescue aircraft. Shot Downand in the Drink chronicles thislittle-known and often overlooked,


but absolutely vital component ofthe RAF.

Author Graham Pitchfork, aretired RAF officer, begins hisnarrative with the background to theASR system and the need to deve-lop it. Since most British combatflights were over land, not water,during the First World War, therewas not a major need for an ASRsystem. But by 1935, with theRoyal Air Force based literallyworld-wide and the impendingSecond World War, the RAF AirStaff approved the development ofHigh Speed Launches (HSLs) thatcould quickly reach a downedaircraft and rescue its crew. (Curiously, the author does notmention the part that Airman E.Shaw, better known as T.E.Lawrence—the famous “Lawrenceof Arabia— played in developingHSLs. Shaw/Lawrence developedand tested several rescue craft forthe RAF.)

Pitchfork describes the ASRsystem’s early organization, aircrewtraining, survival equipment, andlocation aids. The balance of thebook is organized geographically:the succeeding three sections relateASR operations in NorthwestEurope, the Mediterranean andWest Africa, and India and the FarEast, respectively. An epiloguerounds out the narrative. Thesesections recount some of theincredible rescues made by the ASRsystem —landing aircraft indifficult seas, landing larger flyingboats on the sea, and the launchesrescuing aircrew near occupied

territory and rescuing men underfire.

The author writes well and hisnarrative does not lag. The biblio-graphy lists the many primary aswell as the secondary sources used,providing the narrative with a soundhistorical base. He includes enoughdetail, down to the serial numbers ofthe distressed aircraft, the rescueaircraft, and/or launches involved,to satisfy even the most meticulousreader. He also names thepersonnel involved, both rescuedand rescuers. The photographsillustrating the narrative are helpfuland well-chosen. The variousaircraft used (there were manyaircraft types throughout the SecondWorld War) and the variants of thelaunches developed are related. Thenarrative highlights the vital workof the Vickers Warwick aircraft, adevelopment of the Wellingtonb o mber , wh i ch was u se dextensively in ASR work. TheWarwick freed up other aircrafttypes for combat service and, assuch, it found its service niche. Nordoes Pitchfork overlook the RoyalNavy’s (RN) contribution to theASR work. He properly notes thatthe RN had 78 launches of varioustypes stationed at bases aroundGreat Britain and often participatedin ASR work, either on their own orin conjunction with the RAF’s ASRsystem.

Pitchfork’s book is a valuablecontribution to Second World Warliterature. It fills an important gapin our knowledge of how downedaircrews were rescued, wheneverand wherever possible. The often-

Book Reviews 85

ignored Air-Sea Rescue service wasresponsible for saving many air-crew, Allied as well as enemy; thegratitude of the saved airmen to-wards their rescuers must have beenines t imable . The book’sorganization and the storiesincluded therein mean that ShotDown and in the Drink can be readin individual sections or in astraight-line narrative. It isrecommended. A companionvolume, Shot Down and on the Run,furnishes a number of good escapestories from enemy territory, whichalso complements the many worksavailable on Second World Warprison escapes.

Robert L. ShoopColorado Springs, Colorado

Diana Preston. Paradise in Chains.The Bounty and the Founding ofAustralia. New York, NY:B l o o m s b u r y P r e s s ,www.bloomsbury.com, 2017.xii+333pp., illustrations, notes,bibliography, index. US $30.00,cloth; ISBN 978-1-63286-610-3.

“He was gone—the finest seamanunder whom I have ever had thegood fortune to sail. From thebottom of my heart I wished himGod Speed.” So ends Men Againstthe Sea (1932), the second volumeof the classic Nordhoff and Halltrilogy Mutiny on the Bounty. Thetrilogy—republished regularly invirtually every decade since its firstpublication—has not only grippedthe imaginations of generations of

readers. It has lent persuasive cur-rency to foundational myths aboutCaptain William Bligh (1754-1817)and European exploration andsettlement in southern seas. Indeed,as historian Leonard R. Guttridgehas pointed out, few episodes ofrevolt and high seas endurance havetriggered such a wealth of literatureas the Bounty affair. He cites “theintimidating bibliography” of GavinKennedy’s Bligh (1978) in supportof that view. Yet, despite a virtualindustry of works on the subject,Guttridge’s own Mutiny: A Historyof Naval Insurrection (1992) pointsout that, “ the story of the Bounty is,after more than two hundred years,what it has been all along, an authentic mystery played out amidlonely seas and upon corruptivetropic shores” (11). “If solved,” headds, “the riddle of the Bountywould long ago have lost itsattraction.”

Diana Preston’s magisterialParadise in Chains draws upon richarchival and secondary sources toweave a graphic and compellingtale. With access to both digitized,and original documentation, herdeeply textured historical writingelicits the craft of the accomplishednovelist. She blends swiftly movingnarratives with insightful charactersketches; she embeds private fatesin the broad political and socialcontext of Great Britain’s imperialambitions; she marshals fine detailsabout technology, shipping, crim-inal law, personalities, race rela-tions, and, of course, humanviolence. It was literally “inchains,” in the words of her title,


that convicts were transported toAustralia; and “in chains” thatcaptured mutineers crossed the seashomeward to face British courts. And metaphorically, it was “inchains” that the Aboriginalinhabitants of Australia forfeitedtheir ancestral lands to the violenceof Br i t i sh ambi t ions andexploitation. Preston might wellhave sub-titled her book The Bountyand the Theft of Australia. For theconvicts transported there in chains,this proved to be no paradise. Manyattempted to escape their sea-boundprison. In one gripping adventure,nine fugitive adults and twochildren took an open boat northalong the eastern seaboard ofAustralia, and through the dreadedTorres Strait to safety: 3,254nautical miles in 69 days. Thedaunting voyage challenged Bligh’sown open-boat record of 3,618nautical miles with 18 of his loyalcrew.

The ubiquitous character ofWilliam Bligh draws it all together. We read of his “tantrums” at sea,and witness his impetuous andexplosive behaviours which manyregard as the cause of the mutiny. The narrative reveals him as whatPreston calls “a blamer,” alwaysblaming others for every adversitythat befell him, however petty. Welearn of his corrupt dealings insquirreling public monies into hisown pockets both aboard ship andduring his appointment as governorof New South Wales. As Prestonnotes: “the well-documented evi-dence of the corrupt land deal [inAustralia] gives credence to some of

the allegations of financial andcommissary irregularity leveledagainst Bligh” by contemporarywitnesses. We encounter vividscenes underscoring “his reputationas a quarrelsome leader” (261). Bligh did resort to flogging, thougharguably, somewhat less frequentlythan others of his rank and station. Still, Preston’s judgement isbalanced, though the evidence shemarshals inclines more towardBligh’s vices, and downplays hisscant virtues. Certainly, he emergesas a highly competent skipper,navigator and explorer. But ininterpersonal matters, he was atartar, completely insensitive to theeffects of his excoriating language,and often erratic and unbridledtreatment of individual members ofhis crew.

Despite the splendid panoramaof the Bounty Affair which Prestonhas created, we are left with a hungjury as to precisely who was thecatalytic villain in the mutiny. Bligh himself blamed it upon “theallurements of Tahiti,” the islandparadise, which reduced his crew toa life of lassitude and lust. Yet, thekey piece of evidence will alwaysbe missing. “Since Fletcher Christ-ian, its instigator, left no knownwritten records of his thoughtseither before or after the mutiny,”Preston writes, “no one can be sureof the precise cause” (278). Yet sheconcludes both justly and grac-iously, that on the basis ofChristian’s remarks relayed orallyby witnesses, Bligh’s abuses hadput him in a disturbing state ofmental turmoil such that he could

Book Reviews 87

bear it no longer—and snapped. Inher words, the roots of the mutinylay in Fletcher Christian’s “unwill-ingness to tolerate any more of whathe considered undue abuse fromBligh” (278).

On Bligh’s return home toEngland after the mutiny, he wasthe darling of the nation. His best-selling book, A Narrative of theMutiny (1790), captured the publicimagination. An adoring media didthe rest. But by the time some thealleged mutineers had been broughtback for trial, British authorities hadscented a shift of political winds. The French Revolution was now infull course, and Thomas Paine haddefended the French “principles offreedom” in his Rights of Man(1792). Admiralty scheduled a trialsympathetic to the defendants for atime when Bligh—their key wit-ness—was once again out of thecountry.

A riveting, insightful read.

Michael L. HadleyVictoria, British Columbia

Kevin Rowlands, ed. 21st CenturyGorshkov: The Challenge of SeaPower in the Modern Era.Annapolis, MD: US Naval InstitutePress, www.usni.org, 2017. x+178pp., notes. US $21.95, paper; ISBN978-1-68247-159-3.

When it came to naval theory, mostpeople who have an interest in thesubject know the names of AlfredThayer Mahan or Sir Julian Corbett. After all, these are the authors who

really established naval theory. Mahan and Corbett, however, repre-sent the pre-Second World War eraof writing regarding the use of navalpower. They also reflect the studyof the greatest naval power of thetime, Great Britain, in an effort tounderstand how fleets are used tobuild and preserve a great empire. One name that rarely receives agreat deal of attention is that ofSergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov. Writing in the post-1945 period, herepresents a decidedly moderninterpretation of naval power. Fornearly 30 years, Gorshkov, a Sovietnaval officer whose career event-ually saw him rise to the rank ofAdmiral of the Fleet of the SovietUnion, oversaw the rebirth of theSoviet Navy from a largely coastalforce to one of the most powerfulmaritime forces that the Russiansever possessed. In the process, hemanaged to give the Soviet Unionunprecedented influence far fromSoviet shores and a power to rivalthe United States.

A prolific author, Gorshkovwrote many articles over the years,mostly published in Morskoy Sbor-nik, the Soviet/Russian NavalDigest. Rowlands’ book is anedited volume of some of the mostsignificant of Gorshkov’s writings. Broken into seven parts, each sec-tion emphasizes a specific theme ofimportance. Bracketed by anintroduction and notes, Rowlandsp r e sen t s ch a p t e r s e n t i t l e sTeamwork, Ethos, Science, Art, andlarger issues like Navies, Power,Prosperity, Sailing the GlobalCommons, and The Lessons of


History. Each of these sectionsopens with a discussion of the keyissues of the subject, followed byone or more articles by Gorshkov. The introduction plays a particularlysignificant part of the work. Gorshkov proved to be anincredibly complex individual. Hisrole as a war hero was matched byhis political role within the SovietUnion, an architect of the Sovietfleet, and strategist. It is his role asthe author that links these worldstogether. His writings were meantto help educate the Soviet Navy’spersonnel about what he saw as thekey issues affecting the fleet.

The scale of his writing is mostimpressive. Gorshkov addressed al-most every aspect of the navalexperience from the situation of thelowly sailor through to high levelstrategic thinking. Starting withsailors and the ethos of the fleet andhow this helped to build up theesprit de corps, Rowlands demon-strates the scale of Gorshkov’swritings. While the first twosections cover the basis of the fleet,its sailors, the rest of the bookfocuses on the fleet itself. Thisincludes the significance of science,strategic thinking and the art ofusing the fleet, the relationship ofthe fleet and Soviet Power as aworld-wide tool. In the process, thebreadth of Gorshkov’s thinkingmatches that of Mahan and Corbettat so many levels, but on adecidedly modern level. The role ofthe submarine, nuclear power, andpower projection is clearly balancedwith the idea of a large surface fleet.

The only notable liability of thetext is the fact that this is the“selected” writings of Gorshkov. By the very nature of the sourcesselected, the reader is guidedtowards an understanding of theman and his influence, but it alwaysleaves the reader wondering whatother work did he produce? Arethere other articles or treatises of histhat might present a slightlydifferent perspective? And, ofcourse, the question remains, willthose articles, too, see publication inthe west? This is not meant todisparage Rowlands’ work at all. The need to be selective of the textsused immediately leads tospeculation about what did notappear, and what might be evenmore valuable but still restricted bylanguage and access. Perhaps thatis one of the greatest strengths ofthe text, the fact that it encouragesour desire to look for more onGorshkov and his influence.

On the whole, this is anincredibly useful text. Its value iseven greater considering that thisrepresents Cold-War-era Sovietnaval thinking and as such,represents an incredibly rare lookinto the development of Soviettheory and doctrine and the forcesthat shaped them. It is stronglyrecommended for anyone deeplyinterested in the history of seapower during the Cold War. Infact, anyone interested in Soviethistory might want to look throughthe writings, especially Goshkov’srole as a political leader and theextent that the party and Sovietpolitical system shaped him and his

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work. All told, an incrediblyenjoyable read and one definitelyrecommended.

Robert DieneschWindsor, Ontario

Aaron Saunders. Stranded. Alaska’sWorst Maritime Disaster NearlyHappened Twice. Toronto, ON:Dundurn Press, www.dundurn.com,2015. 144 pp., illustrations, notes,bibliography, index. CDN $19.95,paper; ISBN 978-1-4597-3154-7.(PDF available.)

Next October 25 will be the onehundred anniversary of the loss withall on board of the CP coastalsteamer Princess Sophia, roughly30nm north of Juneau, Alaska. Itremains the heaviest loss of life atsea—over 343 victims—on recordon the northwest coast of NorthAmerica. Several books have al-ready been published about thismarine disaster with its poignantstory of a doomed vessel perched ona reef with rescue ships unable tohelp because of prolonged heavyweather. Aaron Saunders interlacesthe story of the Princess Sophiawith that of a P&O cruise ship, theMV Star Princess, that struck a rockin the same area on 23 June 1995;fortunately, without any casualtiesand without loss of the ship.

Saunders is a Vancouver-basedjournalist who specializes in writingabout cruise ships and itineraries. In his “Notes on Sources”, heexplains that the focus of hisnarrative about the Princess Sophiais to portray what happened on

board while passengers and crewwere hoping for rescue. Because nopaper records survived the sinking,just why the ship was off her normalsouthbound track during her night-time passage down the Lynn Canalfrom Skagway to Juneau remainsunknown. Her 61-year-old master,Captain Locke, was very familiarwith the passage. Departure fromSkagway had been delayed by threehours because a train bringingpassengers from the Yukon hadarrived late. The next scheduledport was Juneau. Visibility waslimited in snow and there werestrong northerly winds. PrincessSophia, running at an estimated 11to 12 knots with heavy winds fromastern, drove on to a ledge known asVanderbilt Reef in the darkness at0210, doing extensive damage to thehull before her momentum wasstopped. Tides can reach 15 feet inthe Lynn Canal. The subsequentC a n a d i a n o f f i c i a l i nqu i r ydetermined that the time ofstranding was close to high water in“an abnormally high tide arisingfrom various causes.” The reef,which is extensive and in placesdries to 12 feet at low water, wassubmerged at the time of grounding. At that time, it was marked only bya small unlighted buoy. Sophiawould remain on the reef for nearly40 hours while the continued highwinds and surf were judged toosevere for various vesselssummoned promptly by radio toattempt rescue. Eventually, whilethe rescue craft sheltered in theevening darkness during a newblizzard, another high tide and very


strong northerly winds liftedPrincess Sophia clear and twistedher almost 180 degrees off the reefand into deeper water where shefoundered.

Groundings along the indentedcoastline were not uncommon inthose pre-radar days. PrincessSophia had gone aground in 1913not far from Vanderbilt Reef, andon her northbound voyage daysearlier, had been diverted to assistanother passenger ship that hadstranded south of Prince Rupert. The subsequent Canadian officialinquiry did not speculate on whatled to the grounding. The inquirydid conclude, from the evidence ofthe rescue craft, that the weatherhad moderated until the afternoon ofthe first day the ship was agroundand that passengers could have beentranshipped “without very much, ifany risk to life.” It balanced thisopinion, however, with anobservation that the passengers onboard included large contingent ofcaptains, crews and officers ofYukon River steamers along withmen familiar with travelling bycoastal steamer and that their views“would prevail” in making adecision about attempting to landpassengers that fateful forenoon. The inquiry ruled that, in thecircumstances, the decisions of theMaster not to attempt rescues couldnot be faulted; “the ship was lostthrough peril of the sea.” AaronSaunders cites the admirably clearnotices about exercising “extremecare” in “thick weather” issued tothe captains of the CP coastalservice (55). None of the books

about the disaster —including thisone—have probed the extent towhich the company’s ships, in fact,slowed in poor visibility in familiarwaters. Saunders does re-cyclespeculation that echoes from theship’s whistle might have been inuse to determine location in achannel (59) but does not addresswhether this technique would havebeen valid in falling snow. Hespeculates that Captain Locke andhis Chief Officer might have wantedto press on smartly down the LynnCanal despite restricted visibilitybecause this was to be their lastvoyage south for the season. (27) Infact, a further voyage had beenscheduled to call at Skagway on 3November (Coates and Morrison,The Sinking of the Princess Sophia(1990), (195). As for ‘gremlins’ inthe narrative, no less an authoritythan Salmon Rushdie recently told aCBC Victoria radio interviewer thatcritics seemed to read his books farmore carefully than editors orpublishers. Stranded gives thenumber of people lost in PrincessSophia as 353 (41) and 343 (112); italso places Sidney on VancouverIsland as southeast instead of northof Victoria (52).

Saunders provides a finedescription of how the 63,000 tonStar Princess grazed a marked rocksouth of Vanderbilt Reef in “Mid-night Sun” dark twilight at 0142 on23 June 1995, 77 years after theSophia disaster, resulting in twolong underwater gashes and 7million dollars’ worth of repairsplus 20 million in lost revenuewhile under repair in Portland. The

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ship’s captain took charge promptlyand all 1,568 passengers were sub-sequently landed safely. Thisnarrative is based on a US NationalTransportation Safety Board Reportwhich found the pilot to be a fault,but also pointed to the failings in“bridge resource management”because the ship’s officers on watchdid not work effectively with thepilot. They had, in fact, plotted afix 12 minutes prior to thegrounding that put them on thedangerous side of their plannedtrack. More seriously, they failed toproject their track forward, whichwould have shown that they weresteering directly for an obstructionand did not remonstrate with thepilot. It’s interesting that accordingto the Safety Board Report, CaptainRobert Nerup, the 57-year-old piloton watch was an Annapolis grad-uate with 24 years of naval service. He had then spent 15 years as aState of Alaska marine pilot. Hehad apparently done 300 to 400transits of the Lynn Canal as a pilotand was well familiar with StarPrincess, having navigated her forsome 10 trips. The ship’s officerswere Italian; the well-qualifiedSecond and Third officers were onthe bridge monitoring her progressbut did not question the pilot’sactions because as one told theTransportation Safety Board, “he isa professional…he knows where weshould be.” (126) Captain Neruphad been using a medication calledEffexor for three years to deal withdepression following a collisionwhich had resulted in his losing hislicence as a pilot for six months. He

hadn’t told the pilots’ associationabout his medication use. He hadbeen off duty for 16 hours beforetaking over the watch, but it wasdetermined that he suffered from asleep disorder that might havecaused fatigue; the Safety Boardconcluded that Effexor use did notcontribute to the accident. As sofrequently happens, several factorsresulted in Star Princess standinginto danger, including how the pilotapparently became distracted whilemanaging a passing situation with anorthbound cruise ship. The otherliner passed abeam just as StarPrincess struck the underwater rock. The Safety Board ruled that he “wasnot adequately responsive to thethreat of grounding”. (Safety BoardReport, p. 31).

Dundurn has produced thisbook in an attractive soft cover for-mat. Very few photographs exist ofPrincess Sophia because CPapparently suppressed them afterthe disaster but Stranded isillustrated with several goodpictures of her sister ship and othercon temp o r a r y ve s s e l s , a l lreproduced in a large format. Strangely, it is bereft of anyphotographs of Star Princess, awell-known cruise ship that hascontinued to operate under severalnames, and was most recentlyrenamed Columbus in 2017 andcurrently sails under the UK flag. There is a useful diagram of Prin-cess Sophia, but the book lacks asingle map. This seriously detractsfrom the reader’s understanding ofthe stories of these two groundings. In fact, they happened so close to


each other that a single map wouldhave sufficed.

Stranded is a fluid telling of thestories of two passenger shipgroundings in Alaskan coastalwaters. The account of the sinkingof the Princess Sophia in 1918 isnot as comprehensive as that foundin other books about the tragedy,and, frankly, offers nothing new.The story of how Star Princess, awell-found, modern cruise shipcame to grief in the same areaalmost 80 years later, is on the otherhand, well told and includesinteresting insights into therelationship between a marine pilotand the ship’s officers.

Jan Drent Victoria, British Columbia

Charles Stephenson. The Siege ofTsingtau. The German-JapaneseWar 1914. Barnsley, S. Yorks: Pen& Sword Military, www.pen-and-sword.co.uk, 2017. 256 pp.,illustrations, notes, bibliography,index. UK £39.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-52670-292-0.

Prior to the First World War,Imperial Germany acquired coloniesin Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Allof those colonies were sites ofcombat in that war. The conflict forImperial Germany’s Africancolonies has been written about; butlittle about the First World War inAsia or the Pacific. Stephenson’sThe Siege of Tsingtau. The German-Japanese War 1914 i s a

comprehensive look at this little-known aspect of The Great War.

Beginning in the 1880s andcontinuing into the first decade ofthe twentieth century—the Pacificbecame a theatre of competinginterests. Imperial Germany underKaiser Wilhelm II acquired coloniesin the Pacific such as Samoa, theCaroline Islands, the MarshallIslands, the Marianas, Palau, part ofthe Solomon Islands, the BismarckArchipelago, and forced China togrant Germany the territory knownas Tsingtau. Imperial Japanemerged from isolation, defeatedChina in the 1894-95 Sino-JapaneseWar, defeated Imperial Russia inthe 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War,and asserted its new-found strength. The United States of Americadefeated Spain in the 1898 Spanish-American War and acquired Pacificterritories such as Guam and thePhilippine Islands. As well, GreatBritain had established a Pacificpresence through its possession ofHong Kong, Malaya, various islandsand its newly independent formercolonies, Australia and New Zea-land. When the First World Warbroke out in August, 1914, it wasinevitable that the Pacific would beinvolved. While the German islandcolonies were quickly overrun byAustralian and New Zealand forces,two German forces had to bereckoned with: the German EastAsiatic Cruiser squadron under Grafvon Spee, and the German colony atTsingtau.

Stephenson begins his accountwith the German acquisition of thevarious Pacific islands and Tsingtau

Book Reviews 93

and then relates political andmilitary background of the variouscountries involved, and how theyinteracted with each other prior tothe war. It is noteworthy that, dur-ing the American Navy’s blockadeof Manila Bay in the 1898 Spanish-American War, a German navalforce at first refused to honour thatblockade and caused a minorinternational incident.

Stephenson completes theBritish side of the story by showinghow Australia and New Zealand—literally across the globe from themother country, viewed theemergence of Imperial Japan as athreat and the plans that Britain,Australia, and New Zealand, madefor defence of those countries.

The heart of the book comes inthree chapters: one describing thedefenses of Tsingtau, the weaponryfortifications therein, the initialJapanese attacks on Tsingtau. Interestingly, both the Japanese andGermans made early use of aerialreconnaissance and bombing: theJapanese had four airplanes used forthose purposes, and the Germanshad one lonely aircraft and pilotwhich performed the same functionsfor the defenders.

Following that is a chapter onthe activities of the German EastAsiatic Cruiser squadron under vonSpee. This force represented athreat to Australia and New Zealandand had to be dealt with. OneGerman raider, the Emden, detachedfrom the squadron and conducted asuccessful raid on British shippingand ports in the Indian Ocean. Themain body of von Spee’s squadron

met a Royal Navy force at Coroneloff eastern South America and sankthree British ships. (A fuller ac-count of Coronel, and von Spee’sultimate defeat at the FalklandIslands can be found in RobertMassie’s book, Castles of Steel.)

The chapter following theaccount of von Spee deals with theactual siege of Tsingtau. The Ger-man forces there, augmented by theAustro-Hungarian cruiser, KaiserinElizabeth, were heavily outnumber-ed by an Anglo-Japanese force. Though the German garrisonresisted to the fullest, the outcomewas never in doubt. The siege andbattles lasted a week before theGerman Governor, Meyer-Waldeck,surrendered. In contrast to its treat-ment of prisoners of war in theSecond World War, the German andAustrian prisoners of Tsingtau seemto have been reasonably well-treated.

The book ends with aninterpretive chapter describing themeaning of the brief German-Japanese portion of the First WorldWar. He rightly notes that this con-flict was a mere sideshow to themain conflict in Europe, and theoutcome of the Pacific conflict wasof very little consequence. Its realsignificance came in the next war:the Japanese took possession ofmany of the former German islandcolonies. Though the Japanese didnot start to fortify those islands until1940, the familiarity with thoseislands gained by the Japanese inthe 1920s and 1930s gave theJapanese an edge in the next war.


Stephenson is an excellent writ-er; the narrative rarely flags. Heshows mastery of the many primarysources he used—many in Germanand Japanese, and some dating backa long time. He has included goodorganization charts of thecombatants, relevant maps andcharts, and the photographs showmuch of the fighting. In fact, atleas t one of the Germanfortifications still exists and a recentphotograph of same is included.

In recent years, the long-vanished German colonies have re-ceived attention from writers. Thestruggle for Imperial Germany’sAfrican colonies was well-chronicled in Byron Farwell’s 1987book, The Great War in Africa. That work was joined in 2017 byRobert Gaudi’s African Kaiser. Further, Osprey Publishing’s Men-at-Arms # 490: Imperial GermanColonial and Overseas Troops1885-1918 (2013) is an overview ofall of Imperial Germany’s colonies. The Siege of Tsingtau complementsthose books in that it fills in anoften-overlooked portion of theFirst World War and thus,completes the historical picture. The expert or the reader unfamiliarwith this topic will learn much fromthis work. It is recommended.

Robert L. ShoopColorado Springs, Colorado

Joseph A. Williams. The SunkenGold: A Story of World War 1Espionage and the GreatestTreasure Salvage in History.

Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press,www. chicagoreviewpress.com,2017. ix+ 326 pp., illustrations,maps, notes, bibliography, index.US $26.99, cloth; ISBN 978-1-61373-758-3.

On 25 January 1917, HMSLaurentic struck German mines offthe coast of Ireland, and sank withthe loss of 354 lives, and 44 tons ingold destined for a still-neutralAmerica to purchase arms andsupplies as Britain struggled to winvictory in the Great War of 1914-1918. Williams’ The Sunken Gold:A Story of World War I Espionageand the Greatest Treasure Salvagein History is the first full account ofLaurentic’s sinking, the heroiceight-year ordeal to recover hertreasure and the revolution in deep-sea diving techniques that made thesalvaging of Laurentic’s bullionpossible.

Built in 1908 for the White StarLine, Williams calls Laurentic a“Titanic in miniature”.(5) Thoughone-third Titanic’s size, Laurenticlacked nothing by comparison interms of luxury and grace, inclusiveof all the amenities, appointments,and innovations, and in generalopulence. A popular vessel in WhiteStar’s fleet, Laurentic crossed theAtlantic regularly, connectingLiverpool with Montreal andQuebec City. With the outbreak ofwar in Europe in 1914, however, theRoyal Navy impressed her intomilitary service and refitted her asan armed merchant cruiser.

By 1915, with the land war inEurope at a stalemate, to challenge

Book Reviews 95

Britain’s superiority at sea,Germany focused on sinkingAlbion’s merchant ships in a cam-paign of unrestricted submarinewarfare. Based on notions ofsurprise attack and ambush, victimsof submarine warfare, belligerentsas well as neutrals, complained thatGerman policy violated thetraditional rules of war, allowingenemy merchant ships to bedetained and searched, and theirpersonnel disembarked to places ofsafety, before a prize wasdispatched. But, as Laurenticdeparted Liverpool for NorthAmerica with her cargo of gold inJanuary 1917, Germany was alreadydetermined to intensify herunderwater naval campaign.

When Laurentic was sunk offIreland, Britain’s Sea Lords focusedon recovering her cargo, but theyhad to keep salvaging operationsquiet, since they feared alerting theGermans to the presence of thegold. To begin with, any salvageteam would be exposed to the fullrun of North Atlantic weather,winds, currents, and tides, so theSea Lords chose their mostexperienced officer to head the riskymission, Lieutenant CommanderGuybon Damant. Damant requesteda command vessel, not overly large,and seaworthy enough to keep agood position over the wreck. “Ihad had enough experience ofdiving in the open sea to realize themost important thing is to be able tohold your ship vertical over thewreck, the smaller the ship theeasier she is to hold.” (105) Hisvessel needed flexibility too, as she

would be heavily anchored and usedas a platform for his divers and thederricks needed to haul up debrisfrom below. Damant chose themooring lighter Volunteer at 135feet, calling her a “bug trap.” Withher single, squat funnel and spiderymast, she was indeed, less thanbeautiful. Volunteer was crowdedas well with a crew of 35 officersand men, plus diving equipment,dresses, boots, helmets, air pipes, asteam-driven air compressor, and arecompression chamber.

Williams details the problemsfaced by Damant in accessingLaurentic’s gold. His divers wereclad in canvas diving dress, withheavy boots, and huge metalhelmets, tethered by lifelines and airpipes, often tangled, to Volunteer atsurface. Too often divers contracted“the bends,” or decompressionsickness, which was why Damant, arenowned expert in the recompress-ion process, was assigned to headthe mission. At sea bottom, thewreck of Laurentic was compactedaccordion-like due to storms andshifting waters. Tons of her platingand bulkheads had to be explodedand removed to locate her gold,with the whole operation constantlyexposed to lurking German U-boats.Then, with only a portion of thegold recovered, in late 1917, theAdmiralty abruptly suspendedsalvaging operations.

With the Laurentic missionhalted, Damant was transferred toEngland on “special service.” Brit-ain was suffering tremendousshipping losses from Germany’srelentless U-boat attacks. First Sea


Lord Jellicoe called it “the greatestperil which ever threatened thiscountry and the Empire.” (145) British Naval Intelligence had work-ed tirelessly throughout the war togather strategic information on themovement of German U-boats. Butwithout inside knowledge, itbecame impossible to effect a suc-cessful antisubmarine plan. Directaccess to submarine cipher keys,code and signal books, minefieldschematics, and other secretdocuments was vital. Thesematerials could be found inside thewrecks of sunken German U-boatsthat littered the English Channel. Ifdivers could obtain this material, itwould assist British codebreakers,and win the war. In 1917-18Damant and his Laurentic team,with their diving expertise, providedthis “special service.” By war’send, Williams estimates, thatDamant’s divers had surveyed orexplored at least 15 different U-boatwrecks and gathered secretmaterials which, according toBritish Naval Intelligence, was ofthe “highest caliber” (176, 192),contributing significantly to Alliedvictory in the First World War.

With the Great War ended,Damant lobbied the Navy to resumethe salvaging of Laurentic, and in1919 his diving team returned to thesite of the wreck. Despite variousobstacles, by 1924, after eight yearsand seven salvaging seasons, hisdivers had recovered 99 percent ofLaurentic’s gold, thought to be lostto the sea. In recognition of hisservices to the nation, Damant was

made a Commander of the Order ofthe British Empire (CBE).

Williams tells one of the greatsea stories of the First World War,involving U-boats, lost treasure,tenacious divers, and the recoveryof gold bullion, a story of humanpersistence, bravery, and patriotism. He also deals with behind-the-scenes British politics, as well asscientific advancements in divingtechnology. His research is metic-ulous. He has combed the NationalArchives and the National MaritimeMuseum in London and theMuseum of the Royal Navy inPortsmouth, UK for his sources. Hediscovered an unpublished memoirwritten by Damant, and he inter-viewed Damant descendents.Pictures, photos, diving diagrams,and maps further enhance his study. Students of the Great War,historical technology buffs, andRoyal Navy aficionados will findthis book a rewarding read.

William L. WelchNatick, Massachusetts

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Book Reviews...British naval air power in the 1930s, Book Reviews 43 when the Fleet Air Arm prioritized multi-role naval aircraft over single-purpose ones. This resulted in aircraft