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BOOK REVIEW Mind Myths: Exploring popular assumptions about the mind and the brain. Edited by Sergio Della Sala, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. ISBN 0-471-98303-9. What little thinking about scientific writing I have done amounts to this: When am I ever going to find the time to write a popular science book in the style of Steve Pinker? Reading Della Sala’s edited collection has forced me into thinking about science writing for the first time in many years, and I’m both inspired and discouraged by the conclusions I come to: inspired when the evidence for how well many scientists write is before my eyes; discouraged when I feel the overwhelming appeal to “common sense” that camouflages so much of the “anti-science” competition. A central theme running through Mind Myths is a vigorous (and at times vitriolic) attack on “pseudoscience” – a loosely-defined collection of claims and remedies, dressed up in such a fashion to appear scientifically credible, designed to seduce lay-people out of their hard-earned money. These so-called treatments dress themselves up as legitimate through clever use of jargon, as well as with appeals to common sense (“that sounds like it shoud work”). Chapters in the book attack psychic fraud, the “after-death” experience, false memory syndrome, and even that oh-so popular notion that “we only use 10% of our brains”. In fact, that particular chapter (by Berrystein) was my favourite, of many that were extremely good. As a lecturer in Biological Psychology I have often wondered from a scientific point of view just what was meant by using 10% of our brains. Ten percent at any one time? I would be impressed if the average university undergraduate achieved double figures. Berrystein traces the origins of this myth, as well as something even more interesting: he links it to the various commercial enterprises which have appeared throughout the century to tap that dormant 90%. He notes “The concept of a trusty ‘cerebral spare tyre’ continues to nourish the clientele of ‘pop psychologists’ and their many recycling self-improvement schemes. As a metaphor for the fact that few of us fully exploit our talents, who could deny it? As a spur to hope and a source of solace, it’s probably done more good than harm, but comfort afforded is not truth implied.” (p. 23). Not all of the prose in Mind Myths reads itself quite so easily, but many of the chapters are extremely engaging. For example, the reader is reminded of the power of the placebo, the subject of an engaging chapter by Ernst and Abbot. Their arguments does more than show us the power of placebo effects and how we have to rule them out when examining grandiose claims of the latest pop cure. It goes further by reviewing the scientific and medical reasons why understanding the mechanisms underlying placebo effects are so important. The reasons are now quite obvious to me, but my thoughts about placebos were largely related to the former point – how do you discont them when looking for treatment effects? Unlike me, medical practitioners are perfectly aware of how these effects can be used as part of patient care. The domain of the placebo is an obvious example of the rather understudied intersection of clinical application and pure science. Scientific reasoning leads to my next point, and is an important underlying theme throughout the chapters of Mind Myths. How do people evaluate a claim for some act of magic or psychic phenomenon? The answer to this question is, sadly, that as non-scientists we usually do it poorly. We rely on our eyes and are easily beguiled by the spoon-bending charlatan. We rely on our hearts and choose to believe that a lost loved one has travelled through a tunnel of light to reside in a benevolent place much more desirable than the planet they have left behind (the subject of a rather challenging, somewhat schizophrenic chapter by Persinger). One of the hardest lessons for students at university to learn is that common sense is often nonsense. Psychologists have argued for the better part of a century that introspection is a poor method for understanding the Psyche. Yet we rely on our own biased experience to decide on whether or not we believe that women “shouldn’t park the car’ because as a group their mental rotation skills are a standard deviation worse than men 1 . How you react to such a story in the popular press probably says more about your group membership than your reasoning skills about rules of evidence and the perils of generalising from group level-paper-and-pencil tests to “real world” behaviour. Other entries in Mind Myths are, to be frank, simply fun the read. James Randi warns Cortex, (2000) 36, 753-754

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BOOK REVIEW

Mind Myths: Exploring popular assumptions about the mind and the brain. Edited by SergioDella Sala, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. ISBN 0-471-98303-9.

What little thinking about scientific writing I have done amounts to this: When am Iever going to find the time to write a popular science book in the style of Steve Pinker?Reading Della Sala’s edited collection has forced me into thinking about science writingfor the first time in many years, and I’m both inspired and discouraged by the conclusionsI come to: inspired when the evidence for how well many scientists write is before myeyes; discouraged when I feel the overwhelming appeal to “common sense” thatcamouflages so much of the “anti-science” competition.

A central theme running through Mind Mythsis a vigorous (and at times vitriolic) attackon “pseudoscience” – a loosely-defined collection of claims and remedies, dressed up insuch a fashion to appear scientifically credible, designed to seduce lay-people out of theirhard-earned money. These so-called treatments dress themselves up as legitimate throughclever use of jargon, as well as with appeals to common sense (“that sounds like it shoudwork”). Chapters in the book attack psychic fraud, the “after-death” experience, falsememory syndrome, and even that oh-so popular notion that “we only use 10% of ourbrains”. In fact, that particular chapter (by Berrystein) was my favourite, of many that wereextremely good. As a lecturer in Biological Psychology I have often wondered from ascientific point of view just what was meant by using 10% of our brains. Ten percent atany one time? I would be impressed if the average university undergraduate achieved doublefigures. Berrystein traces the origins of this myth, as well as something even moreinteresting: he links it to the various commercial enterprises which have appearedthroughout the century to tap that dormant 90%. He notes “The concept of a trusty ‘cerebralspare tyre’ continues to nourish the clientele of ‘pop psychologists’ and their many recyclingself-improvement schemes. As a metaphor for the fact that few of us fully exploit ourtalents, who could deny it? As a spur to hope and a source of solace, it’s probably donemore good than harm, but comfort afforded is not truth implied.” (p. 23).

Not all of the prose in Mind Mythsreads itself quite so easily, but many of the chaptersare extremely engaging. For example, the reader is reminded of the power of the placebo,the subject of an engaging chapter by Ernst and Abbot. Their arguments does more thanshow us the power of placebo effects and how we have to rule them out when examininggrandiose claims of the latest pop cure. It goes further by reviewing the scientific andmedical reasons why understanding the mechanisms underlying placebo effects are soimportant. The reasons are now quite obvious to me, but my thoughts about placebos werelargely related to the former point – how do you discont them when looking for treatmenteffects? Unlike me, medical practitioners are perfectly aware of how these effects can beused as part of patient care. The domain of the placebo is an obvious example of the ratherunderstudied intersection of clinical application and pure science.

Scientific reasoning leads to my next point, and is an important underlying themethroughout the chapters of Mind Myths. How do people evaluate a claim for some act ofmagic or psychic phenomenon? The answer to this question is, sadly, that as non-scientistswe usually do it poorly. We rely on our eyes and are easily beguiled by the spoon-bendingcharlatan. We rely on our hearts and choose to believe that a lost loved one has travelledthrough a tunnel of light to reside in a benevolent place much more desirable than theplanet they have left behind (the subject of a rather challenging, somewhat schizophrenicchapter by Persinger). One of the hardest lessons for students at university to learn is thatcommon sense is often nonsense. Psychologists have argued for the better part of a centurythat introspection is a poor method for understanding the Psyche. Yet we rely on our ownbiased experience to decide on whether or not we believe that women “shouldn’t park thecar’ because as a group their mental rotation skills are a standard deviation worse thanmen1. How you react to such a story in the popular press probably says more about yourgroup membership than your reasoning skills about rules of evidence and the perils ofgeneralising from group level-paper-and-pencil tests to “real world” behaviour.

Other entries in Mind Mythsare, to be frank, simply fun the read. James Randi warns

Cortex, (2000) 36, 753-754

us about the consequences of reading his chapter on “The Magician’s best-kept secrets”: isthe reader certain that they really want to know how David Copperfield accomplishes hisillusions? Probably not-temporarily suspending scepticism to enjoy a conjurer’s tricks (orprofessional wrestling for that matter) costs remarkably little. Unfortunately, theconsequences of other brands of pseudoscience can be much more serious than parting witha few pounds or dollars for the latest self-help book.

Mind Mythsis a very good book. Some of the chapter do not fit so easily with the maintheme but there is much of value even in some of the treatments aimed more at specialists.For example, Corballis’s chapter on the dual brain nicely reviewed some of the sciencebehind hemispheric specialisation (a subject I am quite interested in professionally). But itdid more. It exposed me to a huge pseudoscientific “literature” about the dual brain whichranged from sexual stereotyping the hemispheres (American affirmative action fans are “allleft hemisphere and never right”2) to business “gobbledegook” about managing with half ahead. It is somewhat disheartening to consider the task that scientists face: debunking claimsthat are so easy to believe and so seductive. Nevertheless much of the writing about sciencein this book sacrifices little in the way of accuracy for accessibility. Mind Myths isworthwhile reading for scientists and clinicians even if all it accomplishes is to remind usof our duty to be vigilant as well as responsible on behalf of non-scientists. The scientific“literacy” of even the most educated members of the public may be at its worst today.Scientists share the responsibility for this state of affairs and Mind Mythsis a nice exampleof something concrete that the community can do about it.

David P. CareyUniversity of Aberdeen

754 Book Review

1 I kid you not: from a headline in a prominent Toronto newspaper after a Society for Neuroscience symposium on sexdifferences in cognition, organised by my former colleagues Elisabeth Hampson and Doreen Kimura from theUniversity of Western Ontario.2 Thanks due to Sandra Witelson, author of “Developmental dyslexia: Two right hemispheres and none left” (Science,195: 309-311, 1977).

ERRATA CORRIGE

In the paper “Intermanual coordination in relation to handedness, familial sinistralityand lateral preferences” by I. Gorynia and D. Egenter (Cortex, 2000, 36, N° 1, pages 1-18) the formulae reported in page 5 are misprinted. The correct formulae are:

and

The publishers regret their error.

IMC = × =126 100101 5

100 24 14.

– . .

IMC = ×alternating tapping (right + left) 100mean right- and left -hand taps in control sessions (1+ 3)

– 100