Boltzmannstr. 1 D-14195 Berlin www.desiguALdades.net
[email protected] Is Microinsurance Different?
Microinsurance PPPs from a Social and Political Science Perspective
Tabea Goldboom, Freie Universitt Berlin 12 April 2012 Slide 2
VidaAgrcola microinsurance scheme Introduction Agricultural
Insurance Goods InsuranceLife Insurance Bolivian Insurance Firms
Fundacin Profin Government of Tarija (Departamento) PPP Slide 3
Research problem and objective Research question: In which ways do
the perspectives and arguments that social and political scientists
have developed with regard to PPPs facilitate research about the
institutional processes and outcomes of microinsurance PPPs? Basic
assumption: Microinsurance PPPs are not so different from other
PPPs. Relevance: Understand under which circumstances PPP setups in
the field of microinsurance are helpful/ problematic, and in which
ways they influence the outcomes of projects. Slide 4 Content
Research material Microinsurance PPPs a brief typology PPPs four
central themes of discussion Analysis of the VidaAgrcola scheme
Conclusion Three discussion points Slide 5 Research material
Qualitative data: Expert interviews, participant observation,
individual and group interviews with the target groups Fieldwork:
in La Paz and Tarija (Bolivia) 2010-2012, total of eight months
Participant observation in detail: e.g. meetings between project
partners, market research, discussions with target groups Slide 6
Microinsurance PPPs a brief typology based on primary actors/scope
of activity Private institutionsPublic institutions 1) Partnerships
involving donors (Ramm 2011) Different possible actors, e.g.
insurance company Intergovernmental organization, bilateral donor
2) Partnerships involving government institutions (Ramm 2011)
Different actors possible, e.g. insurance company State actor (in
the respective country) 3) Transnational multistakeholder PPP:
Microinsurance Network Insurance companies, research institutions,
associations ILO, IADB, GIZ, IFAD Definition PPP: continuous and
relatively institutionalized () interactions between public and
private actors that formally strive for the provision of collective
goods, whereas private actors can be for- profit and/ or civil
society organizations. (Schferhoff et al 2009:10) Slide 7 PPPs four
central themes of discussion 1) Reasons for creation of PPPs 2)
Effectiveness of PPPs (Output Outcome Impact) - Rational choice
arguments: e.g. expectation of mutual benefits - Constructivist
explanation: interests shaped by norms (Ruggie 2004) -
Institutional design: degree of institutionalization, capacity
building, process management - Interests/ organizational cultures
(Beisheim et al. 2008) With regard to microinsurance PPPs: Ramm
2011; Rohregger et al. 2010 With regard to microinsurance PPPs:
Rohregger et al. 2010 3) Legitimacy of PPPs4) Unintended effects of
PPPs - Input legitimacy (inclusiveness, transparency,
accountability): often limited (Schferhoff et al. 2009) - Output
legitimacy: few studies - Induce abandonment of state duties
(Bckstrand 2006) - Create control problems (Hring 03) - Unequal
gains favour private partners (Miraftab 2004) Slide 8 VidaAgrcola
microinsurance scheme Agricultural Insurance Goods InsuranceLife
Insurance Indexed yield insurance covers investment costs: Maize:
Up to 2500 Bs./ ha Potatoes: Up to 6000 Bs./ ha Slide 9 PPPs some
central lines of discussion 1) Reasons for creation of PPPs 2)
Effectiveness of PPPs (Output Outcome Impact) - Rational choice
arguments: e.g. expectation of mutual benefits - Constructivist
explanation: interests shaped by norms (Ruggie 2004) -
Institutional design: degree of institutionalization, capacity
building, process management - Interests/ organizational cultures
(Beisheim et al. 2008) With regard to microinsurance PPPs: Ramm
2011; Rohregger et al. 2010 With regard to microinsurance PPPs:
Rohregger et al. 2010 3) Legitimacy of PPPs4) Unintended effects of
PPPs - Input legitimacy (inclusiveness, transparency,
accountability): often limited (Schferhoff et al. 2009) - Output
legitimacy: few studies - Induce abandonment of state duties
(Bckstrand 2006) - Create control problems (Hring 03) - Unequal
gains favour private partners (Miraftab 2004) Slide 10 Reasons for
the creation/ work division Specific interests of the private
actors: Seek political support of the farmers union Seek support
with regard to commercialization Specific interests of the public
actors: Want to claim a political success in an overall difficult
situation Under conditions of low resources Responsibilities of the
public actor (Sedag): Supports commercialization through its
decentralized structure Supports the evaluation of agricultural
(yield) losses Slide 11 PPPs some central lines of discussion 1)
Reasons for creation of PPPs 2) Effectiveness of PPPs (Output
Outcome Impact) - Rational choice arguments: e.g. expectation of
mutual benefits - Constructivist explanation: interests shaped by
norms (Ruggie 2004) - Institutional design: degree of
institutionalization, capacity building, process management -
Interests/ organizational cultures (Beisheim et al. 2008) With
regard to microinsurance PPPs: Ramm 2011; Rohregger et al. 2010
With regard to microinsurance PPPs: Rohregger et al. 2010 3)
Legitimacy of PPPs4) Unintended effects of PPPs - Input legitimacy
(inclusiveness, transparency, accountability): often limited
(Schferhoff et al. 2009) - Output legitimacy: few studies - Induce
abandonment of state duties (Bckstrand 2006) - Create control
problems (Hring 03) - Unequal gains favour private partners
(Miraftab 2004) Slide 12 Effectiveness of this PPP to date
Strengths: Facilitation of regulatory approval Facilitation of
commercialization through Sedag () Weaknesses: Commercialization
could have received stronger support Weak role of Sedag with regard
to the evaluation of yield losses Overall a mixed record. But Slide
13 PPPs some central lines of discussion 1) Reasons for creation of
PPPs 2) Effectiveness of PPPs (Output Outcome Impact) - Rational
choice arguments: e.g. expectation of mutual benefits -
Constructivist explanation: interests shaped by norms (Ruggie 2004)
- Institutional design: degree of institutionalization, capacity
building, process management - Interests/ organizational cultures
(Beisheim et al. 2008) With regard to microinsurance PPPs: Ramm
2011; Rohregger et al. 2010 With regard to microinsurance PPPs:
Rohregger et al. 2010 3) Legitimacy of PPPs4) Unintended effects of
PPPs - Input legitimacy (inclusiveness, transparency,
accountability): often limited (Schferhoff et al. 2009) - Output
legitimacy: few studies - Induce abandonment of state duties
(Bckstrand 2006) - Create control problems (Hring 03) - Unequal
gains favour private partners (Miraftab 2004) Slide 14
Relationships within the PPP and legitimacy Unequal relationships
within the PPP: You have to talk in the way the client wants you to
talk to him. [At least] if you want to use marketing techniques ().
I dont want you to speak in those very technical terms, dont come
with your watch, at least not your Rolex; come with your local
watch. And dont talk over the shoulder of Elvio [the representative
of the farmers union]. You have to look into his eyes, even though
he is small. Dont talk with this self-sufficiency of a professional
who believes he is superior because he is professional.
(representative of the Sedag, November 2011; own translation) Slide
15 Relationships within the PPP and legitimacy This PPP is marked
by inequalities on several levels: Unequal possibilities to
influence decision making (low degree of input legitimacy) Resource
differences Unequal responsibilities Perceived status differences
Diverging interests? Slide 16 Conclusion: VidaAgrcola scheme The
specific ways in which inequalities within partnerships are
generated and sustained merit close attention: they can put project
success at risk. Input legitimacy can be decisive for the output.
It is not only interests and organizational cultures that should
not differ too strongly within a PPP. A look that goes beyond goal
attainment (in the narrow sense) helps to explain the success of
PPPs. The overall social and political context matters as it
impacts on the workings of the PPP. Slide 17 Conclusion:
microinsurance PPPs Social and political science perspectives can
also be applied to other microinsurance PPPs: Structure and
systematize case studies Raise questions that are currently not
addressed in microinsurance research Two aspects have received
relatively little attention in microinsurance research so far:
Legitimacy of PPPs Unintended effects of PPPs Slide 18 Thank you
very much for your attention! Slide 19 Three discussion points Do
these findings mirror some kind of experience that other
participants have made in the context of PPPs? Which aspects of
microinsurance PPPs seem to be most relevant from a practical point
of view and should be studied in more detail? (motives of creation,
effectiveness, unintended effects, legitimacy) Are there important
aspects of microinsurance PPPs that are not mirrored at all by the
four strands of social and political science research exposed here?
Slide 20 Institutional setup Insurance Firms: Navi, Latina Seguros
Fundacin Profin Channels = microfinance institutions (sell the
microinsurance product) Departmental Agro and Livestock Service:
Servicio Departamental Agropecuario (Sedag) Tarija Farmers` Union:
Federacin Sindical nica de Comunidades Campesinas de Tarija
(FSUCCT) ILO (Microinsurance Innovation Facility) Tarija La Paz
Maize and Potato Farmers in Tarija (are supposed to buy
microinsurance) Departm. Govern- ment of Tarija Public
institutionPrivate institution with commercial objectives Legend -
specific actors: National Government (plans to introduce national
agricultural insurance) Lobbying PPP Who should take responsibility
and for what? Institutional structure of the VidaAgrcola project
(Tarija, Bolivia) at the end of 2011 APS: Insurance Regulator
