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Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B Jean-Paul Carvalho Lecture 10. Stochastic Dynamics 1 / 31

Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

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Page 1: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Evolution & Learning in GamesEcon 243B

Jean-Paul Carvalho

Lecture 10.Stochastic Dynamics

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The Stochastic Evolutionary Process

I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionarydynamic rather than its deterministic approximation.

I Let the population be large but finite, with N members.

I The set of feasible social states is then a discrete gridembedded in X:

XN = X⋂

1N Zn = {x ∈ X : Nx ∈ Zn}.

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Page 3: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Markov PropertySuppose choices depend only on current state x and currentpayoff vector π.

Then the stochastic evolutionary process {XNt } is a

continuous-time Markov process on the finite state space XN.

I The process is fully characterized by its transitionprobabilities {PN

xy}x,y∈XN .

I PNxy(t) is the probability of transiting from state x to y in

exactly one revision.

I If PNxy(t) is independent of t, then the Markov process is

time homogenous, and we write PNxy. This is the case we will

be dealing with.

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Transition Matrix

I PN is a |XN| × |XN|matrix, called the transition matrix,whose elements are the transition probabilities.

I For all x, ∑y∈XN PNxy = 1.

I This means that PN is a row stochastic matrix, i.e. its rowelements sum to one.

I For example, consider the following transition matrix for atwo-state Markov process:

PN =

( 12

12

14

34

).

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Representation

Another way to describe this process is via a graph:

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Population Game Version

In the standard population game we have focussed on, strategyrevisions are determined by independent rate 1 Poisson clocksand the learning protocol ρ:

I When an agent playing i ∈ S receives a revisionopportunity, it switches to j with probability ρij.

I The probability that the next revision involves a switchfrom strategy i to j is then xiρij.

I The transition involves one less agent playing i and onemore agent playing j, i.e. the state is shifted by 1

N (ej − ei).

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Population Game Markov Process

Definition. A population game F, a revision protocol ρ, arevision opportunity arrival rate of one, and a population sizeN define a Markov process {XN

t } on the state space XN.This process is described by some initial state XN

0 = xN0 and the

transition probabilities:

PNx,x+z =

xiρij

(F(x), x

)if z = 1

N (ej − ei), i, j ∈ S, i 6= j1−∑i∈S ∑j 6=i xiρij

(F(x), x

)if z = 0

0 otherwise

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Limiting Behavior

I Over finite-horizons, the focus is on the mean dynamic.

I In the long run, however, the object of interest is thestationary distribution µ of the process {Xt} (we are nowdropping the N superscript).

I The stationary distribution tells us the frequencydistribution of visits to each state as t→ ∞, i.e. almostsurely the process spends proportion µ(x) of the time instate x.

I Before analyzing stationary distributions, let us introducesome definitions.

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CommunicationI State y is accessible from x if there exists a positive

probability path from x to y, i.e. a sequence of statesbeginning in x and ending in y in which each one steptransition between states has positive probability under P.

I States x and y communicate if they are each accessiblefrom the other.

I A set of states E is closed if the process cannot leave it, i.e.for all x ∈ E and y /∈ E, Pxy = 0.

I An absorbing state is a singleton closed set.

I Every state in X is either transient or recurrent; and a stateis recurrent if and only if it is a member of a closedcommunication class.

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Recurrence

Theorem 9.1. Let {Xt} be a Markov Process on a finite set X .

Then starting from any state x0, the frequency distribution ofvisits to states converges to a stationary distribution µ, whichsolves µP = µ. In such a vector, µ(x) = 0 for all transient states.

I This is why closed communication classes are commonlycalled recurrence classes.

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Stationary Distributions

I FACT: every non-negative row stochastic matrix has atleast one left eigenvector with eigenvalue one, i.e. thereexists a µ such that µP = µ.

I In other words there exists at least one stationarydistribution.

Theorem 9.2.(i) If a stationary distribution µ is unique, it is the long runfrequency distribution independent of the initial state.

(ii) If there are multiple stationary distributions, then the longrun frequency distribution is among these, and can be any oneof them.

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Stationary DistributionsI In our previous example, µ = ( 1

3 ,23 ) (check by showing

that µ solves µP = µ).

I Consider the following Markov process:

I The solutions to the stationarity equation are:

µ1 = ( 13 ,

23 , 0, 0), µ2 = (0, 0, 0, 1),

or any convex combination of µ1 and µ2.12 / 31

Page 13: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Irreduciblity

I A Markov Process is irreducible if there is a positiveprobability path from each state to every other, i.e. if allstates in X communicate, or equivalently if X forms asingle recurrent class.

Theorem 9.3. If the Markov process {Xt} is irreducible then ithas a unique stationary distribution, and this stationarydistribution is independent of the initial state.

In this case, we say that the process {Xt} is ergodic, itslong-run behavior does not depend on initial conditions.

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k-Step Ahead ProbabilitiesI We may not only want to know the proportion of time the

process spends in each state (given by µ), but also theprobability of being in a given state at some future point intime.

I Recall that P(X1 = y|X0 = x) = Pxy is a one step transitionprobability.

I Two step transition probabilities are computed bymultiplying P by itself:

P(X2 = y|X0 = x) = ∑z∈X

P(X2 = y,X1 = z|X0 = x)

= ∑z∈X

P(X1 = z|X0 = x)P(X2 = y|X1 = z,X0 = x)

= ∑z∈X

PxzPzy

=(P2)

xy.

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AperiodicityI By induction, the t-step transition probabilities are given

by the entries of the tth power of the transition matrix:

P(Xt = y|X0 = x) =(Pt)

xy.

I Let Tx be the set of all positive integers T such that there isa positive probability of moving from x to x in exactly Tperiods.

I The process is aperiodic if for every x ∈ X , the greatestcommon denominator of Tx is 1.

This holds whenever the probability of remaining in each stateis positive, i.e. Pxx > 0 for all x ∈ X .

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Aperiodicity

I If {Xt} is irreducible and aperiodic, then with probabilityone:

for all x0, x ∈ X limt→∞

(Pt)

x0x = µ(x).

I Therefore, from any initial state x0 both the proportion oftime the process spends in each state up through time tand the probability of being in each state at time t convergeto the stationary distribution µ.

I Hence the stationary distribution provides a lot ofinformation about the long run behavior of the process.

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Full Support Revision Protocols

I Irreducibility and aperiodicity are desirable properties of aMarkov process.

I They are both generated by full support revision protocols,i.e. revision protocols in which all strategies are chosenwith positive probability.

I Let us consider two examples which are extensions of bestresponse protocols.

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Full Support Revision Protocols

I Best response with mutations:

I A revising agent switches to its current best response withprobability 1− ε, and chooses a strategy uniformly(mutates) with probability ε > 0.

I Let us refer to this protocol as BRM(ε).

I In case of best response ties, it is often assumed that anon-mutating agent sticks with its current strategy if it is abest response; otherwise it chooses at random among fromthe set of best responses.

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Full Support Revision ProtocolsI Logit Choice:

ρij(π) =exp(η−1πj)

∑k∈S exp(η−1πk).

I We can define ε−1 = exp(η−1), where ε is an increasingfunction of η. As η → 0, ε→ 0.

I In this way, we can rewrite the revision protocol as follows:

ρij(π) =ε−πj

∑k∈S ε−πk.

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Stationary Distributions

I There are two problems:

I It may not be possible to compute the stationarydistribution explicitly,

I Even if it is possible to do so, the stationary distributionmay spread weight widely over the state space.

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Analyzing Large-Dimensional Markov Processes

I In this lecture:

I We shall study a class of reversible Markov processeswhose stationary distributions are easy to compute;

I In the next lecture, we shall:

I Introduce the concept of stochastic stability, which candrastically reduce the number of states which attractpositive weight in the stationary distribution.

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Reversible Markov Processes

I Reversible Markov processes permit easy computation ofµ even if the state space X , and hence the |X | × |X |transition matrix P, is large.

I A process {Xt} is reversible if it admits a reversibledistribution, i.e. a probability distribution µ on X thatsatisfies the following detailed balance conditions:

µxPxy = µyPyx for all x, y ∈ X. (1)

I Such a process is reversible in the sense that it looks thesame whether time is run forward or backward.

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Page 23: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Reversible Markov ProcessesI Recall that a stationary distribution µ satisfies:

∑x∈X

µxPxy = µy for all y ∈ X. (2)

I Summing (1) over x we get:

∑x∈X

µxPxy = ∑x∈X

µyPyx

= µy ∑x∈X

Pyx

= µy.

(3)

I Therefore, a reversible distribution is also a stationarydistribution.

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Page 24: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Reversible Markov Processes

I There are two contexts in which the stochasticevolutionary process {Xt} is known to be reversible:

1. two-strategy games (under arbitrary revision protocols),

2. potential games under exponential protocols.

I We shall now study the first and leave the second to later.

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Page 25: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Two-Strategy Games

I Let F : X→ R2 be a two strategy game, with strategy set{0, 1}, full support revision protocol ρ : R2 ×X→ R2×2,and finite population size N.

I This defines an irreducible and aperiodic Markov Process{Xt} on the state space XN.

I For this class of games, let x ≡ x1. The state of the processis fully described by x.

I Therefore, the state space is XN = {0, 1N , . . . , 1}, a

uniformly spaced grid embedded in the unit interval.

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Birth and Death Processes

I Because revision opportunities arrive independently incontinuous time, agents switch strategies sequentially.

I This means that transitions are always between adjacentstates.

I If in addition the state space is linearly ordered (which it isin a two-strategy game), then we refer to the Markovprocess as a birth and death process.

I We shall now show that a stationary distribution for suchprocesses can be calculated in a straightforward way.

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Page 27: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Birth and Death Processes

I In a birth and death process, there are vectors p, q ∈ R|X |

with p1 = q0 = 0 such that the transition matrix takes thefollowing form:

Pxy ≡

px if y = x + 1

N ,

qx if y = x− 1N ,

1− px − qx if y = x,0 otherwise

I The process is irreducible if px > 0 for all x < 1 and qx > 0for all x > 0, which is what we shall assume.

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Page 28: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Birth and Death ProcessesI Because of the “local” structure of transitions, the

reversibility condition reduces to:

µxqx = µx−1/Npx−1/N

for all x > 0.I Applying the formula inductively, we have:

µxqxqx−1/N . . . q1/N = µ0p0p1/Np2/N . . . px−1/N.

I That is, the process running ‘down’ from state x to zeroshould look like the process running ‘up’ from zero to statex.

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Page 29: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Stationary DistributionI Rearranging, we see that the stationary distribution

satisfies:

µx

µ0=

Nx

∏j=1

p(j−1)/N

qj/Nfor all x ∈ { 1

N , . . . , 1}. (4)

I For a full support revision protocol ρ, the upward anddownward probabilities are given by:

px = (1− x)ρ01(F(x), x

)qx = xρ10

(F(x), x

).

(5)

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Page 30: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Stationary Distribution

I Substituting the expressions in (5) into (4) yields:

µx

µ0=

Nx

∏j=1

p(j−1)/N

qj/N=

Nx

∏j=1

1− j−1N

jN

.ρ01

(F(

j−1N

),

j−1N

)ρ10

(F(

jN

),

jN

) (6)

for all x ∈ { 1N , . . . , 1}.

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Page 31: Blue Evolution & Learning in Games Econ 243B · Stochastic Dynamics 1/31. The Stochastic Evolutionary Process I Now we shall directly analyze the stochastic evolutionary ... processes

Stationary Distribution

Simplifying, we have the following result:

Theorem 9.4. Suppose that a population of N agents plays thetwo-strategy game F using the full support revision protocol ρ.Then the stationary distribution for the evolutionary process{XN

t } on XN is given by:

µx

µ0=

Nx

∏j=1

N− j + 1j

.ρ01(F( j−1

N ), j−1N

)ρ10(F( j

N ), jN

) for x ∈ { 1N , . . . , 1}, (7)

with µ0 determined by the requirement that ∑x∈X µx = 1.

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