Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
This article was downloaded by: [Cornell University Library]On: 11 November 2014, At: 14:03Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK
DemocratizationPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20
Blind spots indemocratization:Sub‐national politics asa constraint on Mexico'stransitionWayne A. Cornelius aa Professor of Political Science and Directorof Research , Centre for US‐Mexican Studies,University of California , San DiegoPublished online: 26 Sep 2007.
To cite this article: Wayne A. Cornelius (2000) Blind spots in democratization:Sub‐national politics as a constraint on Mexico's transition, Democratization,7:3, 117-132, DOI: 10.1080/13510340008403674
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403674
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions andviews of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor& Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information.
Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
Blind Spots in Democratization:Sub-national Politics as a Constraint on
Mexico's Transition
WAYNE A. CORNELIUS
This article argues that Mexico, after nearly seven decades of highly centralized,presidentialist rule, is moving toward a political system in which power is contestedactively and continuously between centre and periphery. State governors and othersub-national political actors have become more assertive in national politics, and theyhave greater financial resources under their control, due to fiscal decentralization.Now operating in an increasingly competitive electoral environment, the InstitutionalRevolutionary Party (PRI) has switched to a primary system for selecting itspresidential candidate that inevitably rewards the state and local PRI machines thatdeliver the vote for the winning candidate. Under these circumstances, the verydifferent sub-national political regimes that coexist inside Mexico may function moreas obstacles to the completion of the democratic transition than as breeding groundsfor further democratizing advances, as the 'periphery' is often viewed in thecontemporary Mexican politics literature. Drawing on evidence from five types ofcentre-periphery confrontations during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo, it is arguedthat the re-emergence in the 1990s of strong, sub-national political regimes that areresistant to control by the President and other central political actors is likely toprolong Mexico's democratic transition and increase its unevenness.
Introduction: The Re-emergence of Sub-national Political Regimes
The struggle between central and local authority has been a constantfeature of Mexico's history as an independent nation. The main argumentof this article is that Mexico, after nearly seven decades of highlycentralized, presidentialist rule, has moved toward a political system inwhich power is contested actively and continuously between centre andperiphery, with uncertain but potentially adverse consequences for thecompletion of Mexico's democratic transition. State governors and othersub-national political actors become more assertive in national politics, and
Wayne Cornelius is Gildred Professor of Political Science and Director of Research, Centre forUS-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego. The author is grateful to ReynaldoYunuen Ortega Ortiz, Federico Estevez, Chappell Lawson and Todd Eisenstadt for their helpfulcomments on an earlier version of this article.
Democratization, Vol.7, No.3, Autumn 2000, pp.117-132PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
118 DEMOCRATIZATION
they have greater financial resources under their control, due to fiscaldecentralization since the 1980s. The Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI), which controlled the presidency and the federal Senate from 1929until 2000, has switched to a primary system for selecting its presidentialcandidate - a system that inevitably rewards the state and local PRImachines that deliver the vote for the winning candidate. Under thesecircumstances, the very different sub-national political regimes' thatcoexist inside Mexico may function more as obstacles to the completion ofthe democratic transition than as breeding grounds for furtherdemocratizing advances, as the 'periphery' is often viewed in thecontemporary Mexican politics literature.2
The article argues that the re-emergence in the 1990s of strong, sub-national political regimes that are resistant to control by the president andother central political actors is likely to prolong Mexico's democratictransition and increase its unevenness. Such 'feudos politicos' (politicalfiefdoms) may not become sources of political instability at the nationallevel, nor should they prevent the deepening of electoral system reforms andother institutional reforms launched during the early stages ofdemocratization in Mexico. However, at least in the short-to-medium term,hardened sub-national political regimes may impede the implementation ofmuch-needed social, electoral, and judicial reforms within their domains.
The growing importance of sub-national political dynamics isunderscored by the fact that, for the first time in several decades, all of theserious contenders for the Mexican presidency in the 2000 elections,irrespective of political party, were either incumbent or former stategovernors.3 Not since the late 1930s have politicians with state-levelgoverning experience and personal power bases played such a prominentrole in national-level politics, including presidential politics. This was longbefore the advent of technocratic governments in Mexico, which effectivelymarginalized state governors who had followed the 'electoral track' ofupward mobility within the PRI-government apparatus.4
Presidential politics aside, increasingly it is at the state-government levelwhere the big discretionary money is to be found in the Mexican politicalsystem. That has been the trend since the sexenio of Miguel de la Madrid,accelerating under Ernesto Zedillo, and even more so under the dividedgovernment that has existed at the national level since the elections of July1997. The Chamber of Deputies, controlled by a loose coalition of fouropposition parties, has insisted on much larger transfers of funds from thefederal to the state and municipal treasuries. In the 1998 federal budget, aUS$15 billion devolution was approved. Equally important, state governorsare the political actors who have been strengthened most by recent changes
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
SUB-NATIONAL POLITICS AND MEXICO'S TRANSITION 119
in the federal revenue-sharing formula. The power to determine how thenew resources being transferred from the federal government would be usedfell into the hands of the state governors. The same generalization applies tofederal funds designated for regional and social development through the'Ramo 26' (now 'Ramo 33') federal budget line. The lion's share of thesefederal social-welfare programme funds has come under the control of thestate governments.
This shift began under President Salinas and his first Secretary of SocialDevelopment, Luis Donaldo Colosio. Some analysts have speculated that,in his pursuit of the PRFs 1994 presidential nomination, Colosio had amajor incentive to avoid conflict with influential state governors and otherstate-level officials. Beginning in 1992, with the creation of the Ministry ofSocial Development (SEDESOL) with Colosio at its head, large amounts ofSolidarity funds were channelled through the state governments instead ofdirectly to the municipios, as the Solidarity program had done during its firstthree years. Whatever the real reason, Solidarity, which started out as aquintessential^ centralizing, presidentialist programme5 ended up being amajor vehicle for decentralization, especially the kind that transfers powerto the state level.
Only in states governed by the PAN, since 1989, have the municipalgovernments (municipios) gained any real discretionary authority. Thus, thenew federal pact that is emerging from the decentralization of publicfunctions like education and health care under de la Madrid, Salinas, andZedillo tilts much more toward the states rather than to municipalities.6
Decentralization of these programmes down to the municipio level wouldrequire the state governors to relinquish a major portion of their newly-enhanced political power - something that most of them would stronglyresist.
Some hard-line PRIista governors have succumbed to the temptation touse their discretionary power over a greatly enlarged pot of federal funds toreward political allies and local economic interests bound to the PRI's state-level machines. This was happening on a grand scale in some states, evenbefore the promulgation of Presdident Zedillo's so-called 'new federalism'doctrine. For example, during the Salinas sexenio, Chiapas was by far thelargest beneficiary of the National Solidarity Program, the Salinasgovernment's main social welfare/small-scale urban infrastructureprogramme. The state received a total of 2,232,600,000 in new pesos fromthe federal government from 1989-94 - 6.5 per cent of total federalexpenditures for the Solidarity Program.7 The fact that the infusion of morethan $192 million in federal 'anti-poverty' funds into Chiapas during 1993alone failed to prevent the outbreak of the Zapatista rebellion has much to
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
120 DEMOCRATIZATION
do with the way in which PRI Governor Patrocinio Gonzalez misdirectedthese funds for his own political purposes, using them systematically toreward his allies, punish dissidents, and ignore marginalized groups like theindigenous communities that eventually supported the Zapatista NationalLiberation Army (EZLN).8
It is not surprising that even a massive infusion of federal funds couldnot offset the anger and frustration generated by the abuses of authority,electoral fraud, and ethnic discrimination against the state's Indianpopulation that have been endemic in Chiapas for generations. What isnoteworthy is that President Salinas chose to keep 'hands off PatrocinioGonzalez's fiefdom in Chiapas, despite mounting evidence during the twoyears preceding the EZLN rebellion that social tensions were building todangerous levels. That there was reportedly a close personal relationshipbetween Salinas and don Patrocinio is not a sufficient explanation given thevery high stakes involved, including the possibility of derailing the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the US Congress. Theeruption of an open rebellion in Chiapas and its violent repression by themilitary in early January 1994 refocused attention on the persistence of sub-national authoritarian enclaves in Mexico.
Conceptualizing Centre-Periphery Relations in Mexican Politics
Centre-periphery relations are a crucial component of democratization thathas been generally overlooked by theorists of democratization and democraticconsolidation in Latin America. Apart from a fleeting reference in GuillermoO'Donnell's work to what he calls 'blind spots' in the democratizationprocess,10 one searches in vain for attempts to explicitly integratecentre-periphery relations into conceptual schemes in this literature.
One of the first attempts to conceptualize the centre-periphery dynamicin modern Mexican politics was that of Manuel Camacho, who was passedover by President Salinas when he chose the PRI's 1994 presidentialcandidate and later served as Salinas's peace negotiator in Chiapas. In hismuch earlier incarnation as an academic political scientist, Camachopublished an article warning that the hegemony of the central state wasbeing challenged by a wide range of 'feudos' - fiefdoms maintained byfinancial, industrial, commercial, organized labour, mass media, andregional and local elites.10 Camacho argued that political developments inthe 1959-68 period had strengthened these fiefdoms and 'immobilized' thecentral state. Power had become too dispersed. 'Los feudos' had becomeincreasingly impervious to influence by the national political class, whichwas losing its capacity to mediate conflicts within feudos and to protect
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
SUB-NATIONAL POLITICS AND MEXICO'S TRANSITION 121
marginalized groups inside them.11 The time had come, Camacho argued,when the central state must negotiate with and ally itself with at least someof the feudos, in hopes of undermining the power of the others. If thisdivide-and-rule tactic were not pursued vigorously, the diverse feudoswould unite against the central state, whose role would be reduced todefending the interests of the feudos.
The conventional model of centre-periphery relations found in the USliterature on Mexican politics was developed in the 1960s, mainly throughfieldwork at the municipal level, in places like Jalapa, Veracruz, the site ofa pioneering case study of local government and intergovernmentalrelations in Mexico.'2 That model stresses that, the 1917 Constitutionnotwithstanding, federalism in Mexico has been a thin institutional gloss ona system of tight, centralized, top-down control, exercised mainly throughthe presidency. Political actors at the state and local levels were dependablytied to the centre, through clientelistic and family ties, economic incentives,party loyalties, and coercion. Under this traditional system of politicalcontrol, there was a credible threat that any highly visible scandal or breachof discipline would be severely and summarily punished, effectively endinga politician's career. Even state governors were kept on a short leash by thepresident, who could remove them at his pleasure.
Historians have reminded us that the centralized, top-down controlswere never really as tight, nor as uniform throughout the country, as theconventional model of centre-periphery relations in Mexico would lead usto believe. Rather, a 'Swiss-cheese' conception of political control inMexico is more consistent with the historical evidence.13 It is true that somestates and localities have had considerably more autonomy vis-a-vis thePresident and other central authorities than others, at least during certainhistorical periods. Sub-national caudillos like Francisco Mugica inMichoacan, Jose" Guadalupe Zuno in Jalisco, Saturnino Cedillo in San LuisPotosi, and Gonzalo Santos in the Huasteca region - to name only a fewwho held power at the state or regional level in the post-1930 period -clearly had the capacity to chart their own course. But these cases were stillexceptions to the larger post-revolutionary picture of subordination toMexico City.
Today, it is evident that centralized presidential control is breakingdown, in a much more generalized way. The breakdown actually beganunder President de la Madrid in the early 1980s. The proximate causes werethe growing competitiveness of elections at the local level and a nationaleconomic crisis that forced the federal government to make major changesin the way in which public services were provided. In 1983, the NationalAction Party (PAN) started winning competitive municipal elections in the
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
122 DEMOCRATIZATION
northern states - opposition victories that De la Madrid at first chose torecognize until a backlash within the PRI forced him to retrench. Thoseopposition takeovers of major cities in the north were the first cracks in thestructure of centralized, top-down control.
Even under Carlos Salinas - a much stronger president than de laMadrid, who used all of the Mexican president's traditional meta-constitutional powers, and who was very much the leader of his ownpolitical party - centralized political controls continued to weaken. Lower-echelon leaders within the PRI apparatus itself were no longer aligningthemselves automatically with dictates from the centre. During the firstthree years of Salinas's term, he was openly challenged by the state-levelPRI organizations in Baja California (in 1989), Guanajuato (in 1991), andSan Luis Potosi (also in 1991). The PRI organizations in those states hadbeen defeated or suffered major reverses in gubernatorial elections, and theywere determined do whatever it took to prevent an opposition-partytakeover of the state government.
Salinas was able to snuff out these challenges through various tactics -including the forced resignations of the newly-elected PRIista stategovernors in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi. Salinas won extensive praisein international media, financial, and governmental circles for his'democratizing' actions; but these direct presidential interventions indisputed elections actually signaled that the cracks in the edifice ofcentralized control were growing wider.
In 1994. Salinas' successor, Ernesto Zedillo, adopted a policy of strictnon-intervention in state and local electoral disputes, as a central element ofhis strategy of maintaining a 'sana distancia' (healthy distance) between hisgovernment and the PRI apparatus. To some observers, this abdication ofthe president's traditional role as final arbiter and negotiator of electionresults was just a reflection of Zedillo's personal distaste for, andinexperience in, partisan politics. Others saw it as a tactic for makingquicker progress in the multi-party talks on electoral system reform that hadresumed early in Zedillo's term, by preserving his neutrality. Zedillo alsocommitted himself to what he called a 'new federalism' project - a renewedeffort to breathe life into Mexico's federal system, by (1) further increasingfederal revenue-sharing allocations to the state governments; (2) expandingthe states' powers to raise revenue locally, through various forms of non-property taxation; (3) strengthening the administrative capacity ofmunicipalities; and (4) further decentralizing governmental functions,especially in the area of health care.
Zedillo's commitment to reinvigorating federalism was probably onepart personal conviction and one part necessity, both fiscal and political.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
SUB-NATIONAL POLITICS AND MEXICO'S TRANSITION 123
The 1994-95 economic crisis put great pressure on him to deepen thedecentralization project he had inherited from his predecessors. Indeed,some analysts have argued that he had no real alternative but to carry out ade facto redistribution of political and fiscal power during his term.14 But theobvious risk posed by Zedillo's 'new federalism' project was that state andlocal-level PRI politicians who did not share his political reform objectiveswould take him at his word.
Challenges from the Periphery: Five Cases
The Zedillo sexenio has, in fact, been marked by a succession ofextraordinary centre-periphery conflicts, involving, in some cases, opendefiance of the President by state and local political actors. The followingare among the most serious challenges to Zedillo from the periphery.
Tabasco: Campaign Spending Violations under Governor RobertoMadrazo
The successful rebellion of Governor Roberto Madrazo of Tabasco againstPresident Zedillo was supported by the entire PRI bloc in the Tabasco statelegislature.15 Zedillo had made a widely reported agreement with theDemocratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), Mexico's principal leftistopposition party, to force Madrazo out of office, in return for the PRD'sfuture co-operation with the government in Congress on a variety ofsensitive issues. According to documents that surfaced several months afterhis election, Governor Madrazo had spent about $65 million on hiscampaign - more than ten times the legal limit — in a state with a populationof 1.3 million people. Nevertheless, Madrazo was able to convince somepowerful allies in the national PRI leadership to support his cause, and hislocal supporters threatened to block any opposition-party takeover of theTabasco government.
After a stand-off that lasted nearly two months, Zedillo gave way. Courtchallenges by the PRD in Tabasco failed to remove Madrazo from office, asdid an attempt by the PAN in 1998 to initiate impeachment proceedingsagainst him in the federal Congress (the impeachment initiative wasblocked by the PRI delegation). For the first time since the 1930s, a sittingstate governor had openly defied the President and remained in office. Infact, Madrazo became one of the leading contenders for the PRFs 2000presidential nomination, using state government funds to fund a massivetelevision advertising campaign to burnish his image as a crime-fighter andarchitect of economic growth. Madrazo has positioned himself to remain akey power broker at both the state and national levels.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
124 DEMOCRATIZATION
Guerrero: Official Violence under Governor Ruben Figueroa
Another kind of challenge to Zedillo was posed by the PRI Governor ofGuerrero, Ruben Figueroa. For three years, Figueroa presided over asystematic, brutal, highly visible repression of dissident campesinos and PRDmilitants in his state, including the premeditated massacre of 17 unarmedpeasants near a small town called Aguas Blancas in 1995. The autonomousNational Human Rights Commission investigated the Aguas Blancasmassacre and issued a scathing condemnation of Figueroa, but a state-levelspecial prosecutor, whose actions were totally controlled by the governor,absolved the Governor of all responsibility.
Eventually, Figueroa was forced to take a 'leave of absence' from thegovernorship (a fig-leaf for resignation). But this happened only after a huge'smoking gun' was handed to Zedillo: a videotape that surfaced on nationaland international television, after it became apparent that Figueroa would beexonerated by state-level authorities. The video showed in detail how theAguas Blancas massacre actually occurred, with apparently unarmed peasantsriding in a flatbed truck absorbing a fusillade of automatic weapon fire fromagents of the state police. Up to that point, Zedillo had insisted that his 'newfederalism' doctrine precluded any kind of presidential intervention in theGuerrero situation. Within a week after the broadcast of the videotape, Zedilloasked the federal Supreme Court to conduct its own investigation of theAguas Blancas massacre. The Court determined that Figueroa had falsifiedevidence in order to cover up the massacre, even though the Justices couldfind no direct evidence that he had ordered it. Their report was deliveredseveral weeks after Figueroa's negotiated departure from the governorship.
Ruben Figueroa remains an influential figure in Guerrero state politics.Neither he nor his top aides were ever indicted in the Aguas Blancas case. Inhis negotiations with the federal Interior Minister, Figueroa was permitted toveto four contenders for the PRI's gubernatorial nomination in Guerrero in the1999 elections. His preferred successor was designated as the PRI's nomineeand won, although by a razor-thin margin.
Quintana Roo: Drug Trafficking under Governor Mario Villanueva
Still another type of challenge from the provinces is exemplified by MarioVillanueva, governor of Quintana Roo from 1993 to 1999. In recent yearsQuintana Roo has become one of the key transshipment points for cocainedestined for the United States. Various federal government investigationsfound Villanueva to be deeply implicated in the drug-smuggling operations inhis state. He ruled Quintana Roo almost as a caricature of the old-styleauthoritarian PRIista governor, keeping the state legislature, the lawenforcement system, and the local media under extremely tight control.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
SUB-NATIONAL POLITICS AND MEXICO'S TRANSITION 125
In the 'golden' era of Mexican presidencialismo, a state governoraccused of criminal activity of a non-political nature that was potentiallyembarrassing to the regime was likely to be forced quickly from office bythe President. But Governor Villanueva launched a counter-offensive,demanding that federal authorities produce the evidence they had gatheredagainst him and accusing national PRI leaders of fomenting opposition tohim in Quintana Roo. President Zedillo could have lent his support to aneffort by opposition members of the Chamber of Deputies to impeachVillanueva, thereby paving the way for criminal charges to be filed againsthim, but he declined to do so. Instead, while his Attorney General continuedto pursue a criminal investigation of Villanueva's involvement in the drugtrade, Zedillo allowed him to serve out the remainder of his term.Anticipating his indictment on charges of drug trafficking, moneylaundering, and illicit enrichment, Villanueva fled the state capital and wentinto hiding in March 1999, a few days before his term ended. At the time ofwriting, one year after his sudden disappearance, he remains a fugitive fromjustice, although he has given interviews to journalists insisting that he is aninnocent victim of political persecution by central PRI leaders.16 There maybe more such cases of defiance in the future, as 'narco-politicos' and otherstate and local politicians with ties to organized crime test the resolve andcapacity of federal officials to bring them to justice.
Puebla: Election Rigging and Political Manipulation of Federal Revenue-Sharing Funds under Governor Manuel Bartlett
In many ways, Manuel Bartlett, governor of the state of Puebla from 1993 to1999, was the most consistently effective and politically ingeniouschallenger to central authority during the Zedillo sexenio. Bartlett is aprominent leader of the PRI's old guard and a former hard-line InteriorMinister under President Miguel de la Madrid. In the latter role, he gained areputation as a master manipulator of election results. In November 1995, asGovernor of Puebla, Bartlett orchestrated the reversal of local election resultsin a small but economically strategic municipality called Huejotzingo. Theoriginal election result favored the PAN by 907 votes, but after the stateelectoral court - dominated by Governor Bartlett - reviewed the count, thePRI was declared the winner by 28 votes. This seemingly minor case of old-style 'electoral alchemy' became important because the national-levelleadership of the PAN decided to use it as a pretext for abandoning themultiparty talks on further political reforms, which the PAN proceeded toboycott for nearly four months. It returned to the negotiating table only whenthe PRIsta mayor of Huejotzingo was forced to resign, apparently underpressure from President Zedillo, and was replaced by a PANista.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
126 DEMOCRATIZATION
Bartlett's shenanigans had clearly caused major political problems forPresident Zedillo, but he never seemed to be in danger of losing his job. Inlate 1997, he publicly declared that he wanted to be the PRI's nextpresidential nominee and spent the next two years campaigning actively forthe nomination throughout the country, thereby issuing another directchallenge to Zedillo and the technocratic wing of the party. In 1998, tostrengthen his PRI machine in Puebla for upcoming elections (and indirectly,to boost his losing 2000 presidential bid), Bartlett crafted a state law enablinghim to divert the lion's share of increased revenue-sharing funds approved byCongress in the 1998 federal budget from cities controlled by the PAN torural areas where the PRI is stronger. The federal treasury ministry initiallycriticized 'Bartlett's Law' as a perversion of Zedillo's 'new federalism'doctrine, but it soon reversed course and reaffirmed the constitutionality ofthe law. It remains available as a legal mechanism for shoring up the PRI'sbase, pending the outcome of a Supreme Court challenge lodged by the PAN.This type of state-level legislation not only penalizes opposition party-controlled governments in urban areas; it gives state governors greater powerover tax revenues collected by the federal government.
Chihuahua: Fiscal Rebellion under Governor Patricio Martinez
The banner of sub-national activism in fiscal matters has also been pickedup by Chihuahua Governor Patricio Martinez, elected as a PRIista in 1998after positioning himself as a maverick in the open primary that was used toselect the PRI's gubernatorial nominee in that state. Martinez has taken thefederal Finance Ministry to court for depriving his state of resources thatwould have been raised by a new state fee for legalizing vehicles smuggledfrom the United States. Some two million such cars and trucks wereestimated to be in Chihuahua in 1999, many of them owned by Mexico-based temporary migrants to the United States. The Finance Ministryrefused to recognize the state's new licensing procedure and continued toconfiscate the chuecos (smuggled vehicles). The Treasury and Tradesecretaries threatened to withhold federal revenue-sharing funds destinedfor Chihuahua and any other states that register illegally imported cars, onthe grounds that licensing such vehicles would damage Mexico's ownautomobile manufacturing industry.
While some state and local officials have previously insisted on theirright to raise or use revenues collected within their jurisdictions in ways notauthorized by the federal government (for example, the mayor of CiudadJuarez, Chihuahua, who was briefly imprisoned in 1995 for refusing to turnover to the federal government the tolls collected from people crossing theinternational bridge in his city), Martinez's challenge has resonated more
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
SUB-NATIONAL POLITICS AND MEXICO'S TRANSITION 127
broadly. It emboldened Ricardo Monreal, a PRI defector elected governorof Zacatecas in 1998 on the PRD ticket, to form a lobbying organization torepresent himself and ten other state governors in dealing with the federalauthorities.
The federal government responded by amending the Ley deCoordination Fiscal to increase the funds distributed to state governmentsfrom federal taxes on alcohol and tobacco sales; but it also cancelled aspecial programme that assisted state governments in paying off some oftheir debts. This debt relief programme was very important to the states,which in recent years have found it necessary to borrow heavily to balancetheir budgets and maintain public service levels. The total debt owed byMexico's 32 states rose by 80 per cent from 1995 to 1998. This sets thestage for growing tension between state and federal authorities overrevenue-sharing and the still highly centralized taxation system. Despitesignificant fiscal decentralization under Mexico's three most recentpresidents, 74 per cent of total public revenues remain under federal control.
Three tentative generalizations can be derived from these cases ofcentre-periphery conflict in the Zedillo sexenio. First, the Zedillogovernment was extremely reluctant to take any action that wouldundermine key state-level PRI leaders, so long as they retain their personalpower base within their fiefdoms. Only when abuses of power became toosensational to ignore has remedial action been taken. Second, there has beenno consistent presidential strategy for dealing with cases of defiance by sub-national political figures. During the first half of Zedillo's term, hispreference was to dump the mess into the Supreme Court. Sometimes thatstrategy has backfired, as recalcitrant state governors or legislatures haveignored Supreme Court rulings, failing to implement them.17 Third, thetimid and inconsistent way in which major conflicts of interest between thecentral government and sub-national political actors have been handledunder Zedillo is a measure of the loss of presidential control over the stategovernors and the state-level PRI apparatus. Zedillo's grip on the levers ofpower was loose from the very beginning of his presidency. Unlike hispredecessors - especially Salinas - Zedillo lacked the power to removestrong PRI governors, at least for purely political reasons. Consequently,state governors no longer served at the pleasure of the President - afundamental change in centre-periphery relations.
In each of the cases of centre-periphery conflict discussed above, there isevidence that central authorities maintained some leverage in their dealingswith sub-national political leaders. For example, while Roberto Madrazoclearly defied the President's efforts to remove him as governor, he was ableto survive not only because of support from Tabasco's PRIistas but because
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
128 DEMOCRATIZATION
he had some key allies within the federal government and the national PRIleadership. In fact, it was the PRI delegation in the federal Chamber ofDeputies that blocked opposition-party efforts to remove Madrazo throughimpeachment proceedings. Similarly, Ruben Figueroa has continued to wieldsignificant influence in Guerrero state politics because of his close ties withPresident Zedillo, who relieved him of his gubernatorial duties with apparentreluctance. In this and other cases cited (for example, Manuel Bartlett'smanipulation of federal revenue-sharing funds to strengthen the PRI's basein Puebla), it should not necessarily be assumed that the basic interests of thepresident and of the 'rebellious' PRI state governors were in conflict.Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence suggests that the erosion of highlycentralized, presidentialist rule since 1994 has emboldened state governorsand other sub-national actors to pursue courses of action that carried a highrisk of provoking confrontations with central authorities, and thatcountervailing pressures are now relatively weak.
Conclusion: Sub-national Politics as a Constraint on Democratization
In practice, Zedillo's 'healthy distance' doctrine was taken as an invitationby PRI leaders at the state and local levels to pursue their own politicalagendas and interests. Carlos Salinas once said, 'decentralize no es crearpequefias republicas' (decentralization does not mean creating mini-republics), but that is what has happened in some parts of the country. Undera President preoccupied with macro-economic policy, and who seemedincreasingly less capable of controlling what happens in state and localpolitical spaces (even if he had the will to do so), sub-national political actorshave been exercising greater autonomy within their domains than at perhapsany time since the 1920s and early 1930s. Some of these political actors haveclear democratic proclivities, others are frankly authoritarian in their designs,and the democratizing credentials of still others are ambiguous.
The worst-case scenario emerging from the dispersion of power nowunderway in Mexico is that, rather than establishing the bases of a broad andirreversible democratic transition at all levels, the end result will be afragmentation of the traditional, centralized, presidentialist system into a'crazy quilt' consisting of increasingly competitive, pluralistic politicalspaces where pro-democracy forces have consolidated themselves,juxtaposed with hardened authoritarian enclaves in which the surviving'dinosaurios' of the PRI-government apparatus are able to resist both localand supra-local pressures for democratization.
The PRFs recently instituted 'open primary' system for selecting itspresidential candidate - with the candidate winning a majority of the votes
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
SUB-NATIONAL POLITICS AND MEXICO'S TRANSITION 129
in the largest number of the country's 300 electoral districts taking thepresidential nomination - makes this scenario more likely. This system willinevitably operate to strengthen elites in the provinces, who will be courtedby both committed democrats and autocrats aspiring to the PRI'snomination to deliver the electoral districts that they control. The PRI'spower structure will be territorialized, to an extent that even the most ardentadvocates of 'descorporativizacion' (de-emphasizing the party's sectoralorganizations of peasants, urban labour, and so on, in favour of territorially-based political organizations) would not have dreamed.
Both the PAN and the PRD continue to push for much larger transfers offunds from the federal to the state and municipal treasuries. Federalrevenue-sharing formulas are changed almost annually. But in the currentcontext of greatly weakened presidential rule and disintegrating PRIdiscipline, the dark side of the fiscal decentralization coin is increasinglyevident. What will be the ultimate consequences of placing significantlygreater federal resources, and the authority to raise more revenues locally,in the hands of politicians whose links and whose perceived obligations tothe centre are increasingly tenuous?
This points up a true dilemma for would-be democratizers in Mexico:how to engineer a further deconcentration of political power and a deeperfiscal decentralization that do not have the consequence of strengtheningauthoritarian elites in the periphery? In Mexico, as elsewhere in the ThirdWorld, it has been found that a supportive socio-political context isnecessary for decentralization to yield improvements in governmentalresponsiveness and accountability.18 At minimum, a fortified sub-nationalauthoritarian archipelago in Mexico would frustrate efforts to reduceinequality in the distribution of wealth (both inter-regionally andinterpersonally), which looms as the most fundamental obstacle to theconsolidation of democracy in Mexico.
It would be tempting to view sub-national authoritarian enclaves as atemporary phenomenon, much like the bastions of racial segregation andeconomic marginalization in the US South during the 1950s and 1960s thatwere swept away by the civil rights movement. But the historical analogy isflawed, not least because three consecutive US presidents - Eisenhower,Kennedy and Johnson - were willing and able to strike decisive blowsagainst retrograde state governors and local guardians of the old order,through executive orders, court orders, and sweeping civil rights legislationpassed at President Johnson's behest.
In Mexico, too, it will take strong, sustained intervention by centralpolitical actors to weaken the capacity of sub-national authoritarian regimesto frustrate democratizing and redistributive reforms. Grass-roots pro-
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
130 DEMOCRATIZATION
democracy activists cannot realistically be expected to undermine suchregimes without external support and protection. Indeed, the US analogyhighlights the unresolved issue of how presidential rule in Mexico must berecast to meet the needs of a more pluralistic, democratic system as well asthe challenges of democratic consolidation.
The issues should be joined most dramatically under an 'opposition'government led by PANista president-elect Vicente Fox. Some of thepragmatic, so-called neo-Panistas (as contrasted with the moreideologically pure, old-guard leaders who control the PAN's national-levelapparatus) associated with Fox blame the increasing significance of sub-national 'feudos' during Zedillo's term on the decline in presidencialismoand related political controls. With a weak presidency, they argue, there isno deterrent to sub-national actors; so they are free-lancing - filling thepolitical vacuum left by a reticent president.
His own party's anti-centralist rhetoric notwithstanding, Fox seemspredisposed to reasserting strong presidential rule. That stance would puthim on a collision course with some PRIista state governors who wouldremain in power at least during the first part of Fox's term. Tensions wouldrun high between state governors whose primary interest is in maintainingcontrol within their feudos and a President whose agenda includes radicallychanging Mexico's public education system, breaking the ties between thepolitical class and the judiciary through popular election of judges, anddoing other things that would upset longstanding political arrangements atthe state and local levels. The results could be fascinating.
NOTES
1. The term 'sub-national' is used in this article mainly to refer to state-level politicalregimes. With few exceptions (such as the indigenous government of Juchitán in Oaxacastate and municipalities controlled by a party different from the party in power at the statelevel) local and regional political regimes in Mexico today can be treated as extensionsof state-level political organizations controlled by incumbent or former state governors.
2. See, for example, Yemile Mizrahi, 'Pressuring the Centre: Opposition Governments andFederalism in Mexico', Cen t rO de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División deEstudios Políticos, Documentos de Trabajo, 71, 1997.
3. They include Vicente Fox, ex-Governor of Guanajuato, presidential candidate of thecentre-right National Action Party (PAN); Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, former head of theFederal District, which includes Mexico City (this position being the functionalequivalent of a state governorship) as well as ex-Governor of the state of Michoacán,presidential candidate of the centre-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD); andthree politicians who campaigned actively for the presidential nomination of the
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
SUB-NATIONAL POLITICS AND MEXICO'S TRANSITION 131
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI): Manuel Bartlett, ex-Governor of Puebla; RobertoMadrazo, the incumbent governor of Tabasco; and Francisco Labastida, former governorof Sinaloa and Interior Minister under President Zedillo. Labastida won the PRInomination handily in an open primary election held in November 1999, before losing bya six-point margin in the general election to Fox.
4. The displacement of state governors and other career politicians by 'técnicos' at thehighest levels of government in Mexico from the 1970s to the 1990s is well-documentedand explained in Miguel A. Centeno, Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolutionin Mexico (2nd edn., University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
5. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig, and Jonathan Fox (eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy (La Jolla, CA: Centre forUS-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, 1994).
6. Victoria E. Rodriguez, Decentralization in Mexico: From Reforma Municipal toSolidaridad to Nuevo Federalismo (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and Peter M.Ward and Victoria E. Rodríguez, Bringing the States Back In: New Federalism and StateGovernment in Mexico (Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs,University of Texas-Austin, US-Mexico Policy Studies Monograph Series, 2000).
7. SEDESOL (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, México), Solidaridad: seis años de trabajo(México, DF: SEDESOL, 1994), p.27.
8. See Neil Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
9. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes', inScott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues inDemocratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in ComparativePerspective (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 17-56.
10. Manuel Camacho, 'El poder: estados o "feudos" políticos', in Centro de EstudíosInternacionales, La vida político en México, 1970-1973 (México, DF: El Colegio deMéxico, 1974), pp.77-99.
11. This is actually a rather good and certainly prophetic analysis of what occurred in Chiapassince the late 1980s, when neo-liberal economic policies began to damage the interests ofsmall agricultural producers. See Harvey, op.cit.
12. See Richard R. Fagen amd William S. Tuohy, Power and Privilege in a Mexican City(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972).
13. Lorenzo Meyer, 'Un tema añejo siempre actual', in Blanca Torres (ed.),Descentralización y democracia en México (México, DF: El Colegio de México, 1986);Alan Knight, 'Historical Continuities in Social Movements', in Joe Foweraker and AnnL. Craig (eds.), Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico (Boulder, CO: LynneRienner, 1990), pp.78-102; Jeffrey W. Rubin, 'Popular Mobilization and the Myth ofState Corporatism', in Foweraker and Craig (eds.), op.cit., pp.247-67; and Jeffrey W.Rubin, Decentreing the Regime: Ethnicity, Radicalism, and Democracy in Juchitán,Mexico (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).
14. Ward and Rodríguez, op.cit.15. See Todd A. Eisenstadt, 'Electoral Federalism or Abdication of Authority?—
Confrontation between the President and the PRI over Tabasco's Governorship', inWayne A. Cornelius, Todd A. Eisenstadt and Jane Hindley (eds.), Sub-national Politicsand Democratization in Mexico (La Jolla, CA: Centre for US-Mexican Studies,University of California-San Diego, 1999).
16. For example, Isabel Arvide, 'Una noche en el aviario con Mario', Milenio (Mexico, DF),13 Feb. 2000.
17. See Sara Schatz, 'A Neo-Weberian Approach to Constitutional Courts in the Transitionfrom Authoritarian Rule: The Mexican Case, 1994-1997', International Journal of theSociology of Law, Vol.26 (1998), pp.217-44.
18. For evidence from Mexico, Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
132 DEMOCRATIZATION
Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal FundsProgram (La Jolla, CA: Centre for US-Mexican Studies, University of California-SanDiego, 1996). For comparative evidence from India, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Ivory Coast,see Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South Asiaand West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
4:03
11
Nov
embe
r 20
14
