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Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team, BindView Corporation

Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

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Page 1: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Black Hat Briefings 2000:Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks

Simple Nomad

Hacker

Nomad Mobile Research Centre

Occam Theorist

RAZOR Security Team, BindView Corporation

Page 2: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

About Myself

http://www.nmrc.org/ Currently Sr. Security Analyst for

BindView’s RAZOR Team, http://razor.bindview.com/

Page 3: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

About This Presentation

Assume basics– Understand IP addressing– Understand basic system administration

Tools– Where to find them– Basic usage

Terminology A “Network” point of view

Page 4: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Background

Originally developed during 1999 Concepts first discussed last October Many concepts can be found in DDOS

software today

Page 5: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Attack Recognition Basics

Pattern Recognition– Examples:

• Byte sequence in RAM

• Packet content in a network transmission

• Half opens against a server within a certain time frame

– Considered “real-time”

Page 6: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Attack Recognition Basics Cont.

Effect Recognition– Examples

• Unscheduled server restart in logs

• Unexplainable CPU utilization

• System binaries altered

– Considered “non” real-time

Page 7: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Attack Recognition Problems

Blended “pattern” and “effect” attacks Sniffing attacks Decoys and false identification of attack

source

Page 8: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Attack Recognition Problems Cont. Current solutions are usually “pattern” or

“effect”, no real-time global solutions Existing large scale solutions can easily be

defeated

Page 9: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Common Thwarting Techniques

Rule-based systems can be tricked Log watchers can be deceived Time-based rules can be bypassed

Page 10: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

What is Needed

The “Overall Behavior Network/Host Monitoring Tool” (which doesn’t exist)

Page 11: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

What Do We Do?

“Trickle Down Security”– Solutions for distributed attacks will introduce

good security overall

Off-the-shelf is not enough Learn about attack types Defensive techniques

Page 12: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Changing Attack Patterns

More large-scale attacks Better enumeration and assessment of the

target by the attacker

Page 13: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Two Basic Distributed Attack Models Attacks that do not require direct

observation of the results Attacks that require the attacker to directly

observe the results

Page 14: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Basic Model

Server AgentClient

Issuecommands

Processescommandsto agents

Carriesout

commands

Page 15: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

More Advanced Model

TargetAttacker

Forged ICMPTimestamp Requests

ICMP TimestampReplies

SniffedReplies

Page 16: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Firewall

Page 17: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Page 18: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Master Node

Page 19: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Master Node

Page 20: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Replies

Master Node

Page 21: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

SniffedReplies

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Replies

Master Node

Page 22: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

SniffedReplies

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Replies

Master Node

Page 23: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

ICMP

Sweeping a network with Echo Typical alternates to ping

– Timestamp– Info Request

Page 24: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Fun with ICMP

Advanced ICMP enumeration

Page 25: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Host Enumeration# ./icmpenum -i 2 -c xxx.xx.218.0

xxx.xx.218.23 is up

xxx.xx.218.26 is up

xxx.xx.218.52 is up

xxx.xx.218.53 is up

xxx.xx.218.58 is up

xxx.xx.218.63 is up

xxx.xx.218.82 is up

xxx.xx.218.90 is up

xxx.xx.218.92 is up

xxx.xx.218.96 is up

xxx.xx.218.118 is up

xxx.xx.218.123 is up

xxx.xx.218.126 is up

xxx.xx.218.130 is up

xxx.xx.218.187 is up

xxx.xx.218.189 is up

xxx.xx.218.215 is up

xxx.xx.218.253 is up

Page 26: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Nmap

Ping sweeps Port scanning TCP fingerprinting

Page 27: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Fun with Nmap

Additional features

Page 28: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Addition Probes

Possible security devices Sweep for promiscuous devices

Page 29: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

Determine network layout Traceroute

Page 30: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

cw

swb

Internet Routers

Page 31: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

cw

swb

Internet Routers

Page 32: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

Firewall

DMZ

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Page 33: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

Firewall

DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Page 34: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

Firewall

DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Page 35: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

Sun

LinuxFirewall

NT

Hosts Inside DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Page 36: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Network Mapping

Sun

LinuxFirewall

NT

Hosts Inside DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Linux 2.0.38xxx.xx.48.2

AIX 4.2.1xxx.xx.48.1

Checkpoint Firewall-1Solaris 2.7xxx.xx.49.17

Checkpoint Firewall-1Nortel Extranetxxx.xx.22. 7

Cisco 7206204.70.xxx.xxx

Nortel CVX1800151.164.x.xxx

IDS?

Page 37: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Defensive Techniques

Good security policy Split DNS

– All public systems in one DNS server located in DMZ

– All internal systems using private addresses with separate DNS server internally

Drop/reject packets with a TTL of 1 or 0

Page 38: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Defensive Techniques Cont.

Minimal ports open Stateful inspection firewalls Modified kernels/IDS to look for fingerprint

packets

Page 39: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Defensive Techniques Cont.

Limit ICMP inbound to host/destination unreachable

Limit outbound ICMP

Page 40: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

DMZ Server Recommendations

Split services between servers Current patches Use trusted paths, anti-buffer overflow

settings and kernel patches Use any built-in firewalling software Make use of built-in state tables

Page 41: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Firewall Rules

Limit inbound to only necessary services Limit outbound via proxies to help control

access Block all outbound to only necessary traffic

Page 42: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Intrusion Detection Systems

Use only IDS’s that can be customized IDS should be capable of handling

fragmented packet reassembly IDS should handle high speeds

Page 43: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Spoofed Packet Defenses

Get TTL of suspected spoofed packet Probe the source address in the packet Compare the probe reply’s TTL to the

suspected spoofed packet

Page 44: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Questions, etc.

For followup:– http://razor.bindview.com/– [email protected]

References:– David Dittrich’s web site http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/ – "Network Cat and Mouse", SANS Network Security '99, New Orleans; security presentation,

http://www.sans.org – "The Paranoid Network", SANS 2000, Orlando; security presentation, http://www.sans.org – NMap, http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ – Icmpenum, http://razor.bindview.com/tools/ – Martin Roesch’s web site http://www.clark.net/~roesch/security.html – “Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks”,

http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/strategies.html – “Distributed Denial of Service Defense Tactics”,

http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/DDSA_Defense.html

Page 45: Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team,

Late Breaking News

HackerShield RapidFire Update 208– With SANS Top Ten checks, including comprehensive CGI scanner– http://www.bindview.com/products/hackershield/index.html

VLAD the Scanner– Freeware open-source security scanner, including same CGI checks as

HackerShield– Focuses only on SANS Top Ten– http://razor.bindview.com/tools/index.shtml

Despoof– Detects possible spoofed packets through active queries against suspected

spoofed IP address– http://razor.bindview.com/tools/index.shtml