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Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa Email: [email protected] + Department of Political Science, Laurentian University Email: [email protected]

Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

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Page 1: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy

Daniel Shapiro* and Sidney Shapiro+ *School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Email: [email protected]+Department of Political Science, Laurentian University

Email: [email protected]

Page 2: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Overview

1. Prescription of Controlled Substances2. Trends in Google Searches, News, Regions3. Spam and Other Marketing4. Biometric Prescriptions: Practical, Political,

and Privacy Issues5. The Impact of Technology6. Conclusions

Page 3: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Prescription of Controlled Substances

• The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has announced the implementation of the use of both computerized and biometric security protocols in the electronic prescription of controlled substances.

• Electronic prescriptions which were up until this point not allowed to be prescribed by electronic means will now be easier for physicians and the DEA to monitor and prescribe.

Page 4: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

USA Google Searches 2004-2010

Raw Data with ±5% Error

Jan 4 2004Jun 27 2004Dec 19 2004Jun 12 2005Dec 4 2005M

ay 28 2006Nov 19 2006M

ay 13 2007Nov 4 2007Apr 27 2008O

ct 19 2008Apr 12 2009O

ct 4 2009M

ar 28 2010Sep 19 2010

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

privacyprescriptionpharmacy

Sear

ch V

olum

e

Trends• Pharmacy searches ↑• Prescription, privacy searches

↓• Implication is ↑ use of illegal

online pharmacies in the USA• In 2004, ¼ of Americans had

looked online for drug information, and four percent purchased drugs online [Fox04]

Page 5: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Breakdown by Region

Page 6: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

News Coverage in USA

Raw Data with ±5% Error Trends• News coverage of privacy

and prescriptions is ↑ • News coverage of pharmacy

is ↑ too• “Prescription drugs online”

2004 indicates ↑ use of online pharmacies [Fox04]

pharmacy prescription privacy

    

Page 7: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Spam and Other Marketing

Page 8: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Biometric Prescriptions: Practical, political, and privacy issues

Practical Biometrics Issues:• Non-repudiation • Improved accountability• Delegation prevention• Possible increased cost• Possible information security

concerns• False acceptance and false

rejection cases• Possible serious medical

consequences when a drug cannot be obtained due to failed biometric authentication.

Political / Privacy Biometrics Issues:

• RiteAid installs fingerprint scanners in their pharmacies 2004

• Less privacy (summarizing data)

• Policy issues (HIPAA/ETP/PIPEDA/others)

• Legal issues (selling prescription data)

• Human factors (fear, misconceptions)

Page 9: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

The Impact of Technology

Cryptography and Systems• Service interruptions due to

power failures or DDoS.• Biometrics systems would be

unable to function without access to communication and information unless the data was stored locally, negating the usefulness of a large scale distributed system.

• PKI is slow but secure.

Biometrics• Degraded biometric• Combination of several

biometrics in order to improve accuracy

• A certificate authority cannot reissue a biometric.

• Fingerprint scanners can identify fake fingerprint attempts using sensors to observe the finger temperature, pulse, oxygenation, blood pressure, movement, and electrical resistance.

Page 10: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

The Impact of Technology

Cryptography and Systems• Certificates are preferred over scans

due to data size.• Digital signatures disallowed in many

jurisdictions.• Risk-based approach for data

encryption.• Clearly a prescription for a controlled

substance would fall under the category of a high-risk, and would be heavily encrypted.

• Hardware failure in any component in the system including cameras, fingerprint scanners, barcode readers, and computers.

Biometrics• Hackers could begin harvesting

biometric information from poorly secured e-health system.

• Setting up a fake service with the express purpose of aggregating biometric information.

• Sometimes it is cheaper to pay off the bad guys.

• Biometric software failure due to a bug in the implementation.

Page 11: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

The Impact of Technology

Cryptography and Systems• DEA says you need 2 IDs +

biometric.• This is like saying you need

a biometric + password… • Then why use the

biometric?• As we said earlier,

combining certificates reduces false accept/reject.

Biometrics• A replay attack is a case where a biometric

has been copied by a third party and is being used (fraudulently) to authenticate.

• Picture of a doctor's face in the parking lot, and then displaying the photo to a biometric face scanner.

• Secure authentication, secure data transmission, cost-effective security, and fast execution of security mechanisms are all highly desirable when implementing biometrics and electronic prescriptions on a large scale.

Page 12: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

The Impact of TechnologyImpact of Artificial "Gummy" Fingers on Fingerprint Systems Tsutomu Matsumoto, Hiroyuki Matsumoto, Koji Yamada, Satoshi HoshinoGraduate School of Environment and Information Sciences, Yokohama National University 79-7 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya, Yokohama 240-8501, Japan, email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT Potential threats caused by something like real fingers, which are called fake or artificial fingers, should be

crucial for authentication based on fingerprint systems. Security evaluation against attacks using such artificial fingers has been rarely disclosed. Only in patent literature, measures, such as "live and well" detection, against fake fingers have been proposed. However, the providers of fingerprint systems usually do not mention whether or not these measures are actually implmented in emerging fingerprint systems for PCs or smart cards or portable terminals, which are expected to enhance the grade of personal authentication necessary for digital transactions. As researchers who are pursuing secure systems, we would like to discuss attacks using artificial fingers and conduct experimental research to clarify the reality. This paper reports that gummy fingers, namely artificial fingers that are easily made of cheap and readily available gelatin, were accepted by extremely high rates by particular fingerprint devices with optical or capacitive sensors. We have used the molds, which we made by pressing our live fingers against them or by processing fingerprint images from prints on glass surfaces, etc. We describe how to make the molds, and then show that the gummy fingers, which are made with these molds, can fool the fingerprint devices.

Page 13: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Conclusions

• Online pharmacy popularity ↑ using legal prescriptions

• Practical, political, and privacy concerns must be addressed in tandem.

• Market acceptance is possible (RiteAid)• Biometric, hardware, cryptographic

mechanisms for securing prescriptions are complex

Page 14: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

Questions?

Page 15: Biometrics in Pharma: Politics and Privacy Daniel Shapiro * and Sidney Shapiro + * School of Information Technology and Engineering, University of Ottawa

References

• Background image: http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/11/28/eprescriptions/#