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7/26/2019 Benn, Alfred_The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern Thought. 2_Mind, 7, 26_1882_231-254
1/25
Mind ssociation
The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern ThoughtAuthor(s): Alfred W. BennSource: Mind, Vol. 7, No. 26 (Apr., 1882), pp. 231-254Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Mind Association
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2/25
I. -THE RELATION OF GlPEEK PHILOSOPHY TO
MODERN
THOUGHT.
II.
THE autlhor
f
the
Leviathan
as
sometimes
een
represented
as one
who
carried
he
Baconian
Method
ntopolitics
nd
pre-
pared the
way
for ts
more
thorough
pplication
o psychology
by Locke.
But this
view,
which
regards
he
threegreat
eaders
of Englishphilosophyn the seventeenthenturys successive
links
n
a connected
eries,
s a misapprehension
fhistory hich
could
only
have
arisen hroug,h
eaving
ouit
f
account
he
con-
temporary
evelopment
f
Continental peculation,
nd
through
the nveterate
abit
f ooking
n the
modern
istinction
etween
empiricism
nd
transcendentalism
s
a fundamental
ntithesis
dividing
the philosophers
f
every
epoch
into
two opposing
schools.
The
truth
s that,
f the
threewriters
ust
mentioned
agree
n deriving
knowledge
olelyfrom xperience,hey
gree
in nothing lse;
and
thattheir
unanimity
n this
one point
does
notamount o much,will be evidentfwe considerwhateach
understood
y thenotion
n question.
With Bacon,
xperience
was
the
negation
f
mere
uthority,
hetheraking
heform
f
natural
prejudice,
f
individual
repossession,
f
hollow
phrases,
or of established
ystems.
The question
how we come
by
that
knowledge
which
all
agree
to
be the
most
ertain,
s
left
un-
touched
n
his ogic;
either
f the
current
nswers
would
have
suited
his
systemequally
well; nor
is
there
any
reason
for
believing hat
he
would have
sided
with
Mill
rather
han
with
Kant respecting he originof mathematical xioms. With
Locke, experience
meant
he
analysis
f
notions nd
judg,ments
into the
simple
data of sense
and self-consciousness;
nid
the
experientialists
f
the
present
day
arebeyond
ll doubt
his
dis-
ciples;
but the parentage
of his philosophy,
o
far as it
is
simiply
denial
of innate
ideas,
must
be
sought,
not
in
the
Novutm
Organum,
or
n any
other
modern
work,
ut
n the
old
Orgsanon
f
Aristotle,
r
n
the
comments
f
the
Schoolmen
who
followed
Aristotle
n protesting
gainst
he
Platonism
of
their
time,ust as Lockeprotestedgainst hePlatonism f Descartes
and Malebranche.
The experience
f
Hobbes
differs
oth
in
origin nd
application
from
ither
f
these.
With
him, enisible
impressions
re not
a.court
of appeal
against
traditional
udg-
ments,
or
yet
are
they
the
ultimate
lements
nto which
all
ideas
may
be
analysed;
they are the
channels
through
which
pulsating
movements
re
conveyed
nto
the
mind,
and
these
movements,
gain,
represent
he
action
of nmechanical
orces
r
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3/25
232
The Relation
f Greek hilosophy
o
Afodern
hought.
the will
ofa paramount
uthority.
Andhe
holds this
doctrine,
partly s a logical consequence f his materialism,artly s a
safeguard
against
the
theological
pretensions
which,
in his
opinion,
re
a
constant
hreat o social
order.
The authority f
the political
sovereign
s menaced
onithe one
hand
by
Papal
infallibility,
nd on
the other yrebellious
ubjects
putting
for-
warda claim
to
supernatural
nspiration.
To
the
Pope,
Hlobbes
says:
You
are
violating
he law of nature
by professing
o
derive
fromGod
what is
really
given
onlyby
the
consentof
men,
nd
can only be given by
them o
their temporal
head-
theright o impose particular eligion. To the Puritan he
says:
Your inward
lluminations a superstitious ream, nd
you
have
no
right
o use
it
as
a
pretext
for
breaking
he
king's
peace.
Religion
has reallynothing
o do withthesupernatural;
it
is only particular
way
of
nculcating
bedience
o
the
natural
coinditions
f
social
union.
Again,
Hobbes
differs
holly
from
Bacon
in
the deductive
character
f
his
method.
His
logic
s the old
syllogistic
ystemn
reorganised
n the
model
of
mathematical
nalysis. Like all
the
great
thinkers
f his
time,
he
was a
geometrician
nd a
mechanicalphysicist,easoning romgeneraltoparticular ro-
positions
nd
descending
rom
auses
to
effects.' His
famous
theory
f
a
social
contract
s
a
rational
construction,
ot a
his-
torical
narrative.
But
though
mathematician;
e shows no
traces
of
Platonic
influenCe.
He
is
therefore
ll the more
governed
y
Atomist nd
Stoic
modes
of
thought.
He treats
human
nature,
ingle
nd
associated,
s Galileo
and
Descartes
had
treated
motion
nd
space.
Like
them, oo,
he finds
imself
n
constant
ntagonism
o Aristotle. The
description
f man as a
social animal is disdainfully ejected, nd the politicalunion
resolved
nto
an
equilibrium
f
manyopposing
wills maintained
by
violent
pressure
froin
without.
In
ethics,
no less
than
in
physics,
we
find attractive
orces
replaced by
mechanical
m-
pacts.
While
th%
nalysis
of
Hobbes
goes
much
deeper
than
Aris-
totle's,
he
grasp
of his reconstructive
ynthesis
s wider
and
stronger
n at least
an
equal proportion.
Recognising
he
good
of
the
whole
as
the
supreme
ule of
conduct,
e
gives
a new
in-
terpretationotheparticular irtues,anddisposes f thetheory
which
made
them
mepn
between
wo extremes o
less
effectu-
ally
than
his
contemporaries
ad
disposed
f the
same
theory
n
its application
o
the
elementary
onstitution
f
matter.
And
just
as
they
were
ided
in
their
revolt
against
Aristotle
y
the
1
This
s well
brought
ut n
a
remarkableeries f
rticles
n
the
Philo-
sophy
f
Hobbesrecentlyublished
yT6nnies
n the
Vierte1jahrsschrift
iir
wissenschaftliche
hitosopliie.
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4/25
The Relation
f Greek tilosophy
o Modern
Thought.
233
revival
of otherGreek
ystems,
o
also was he.
The
identifica-
tionof usticewithpublic nterest,hough ommonly ttributed
to
Epicurus
lone,was, ike materialism,
n
idea sharedby
him
with
Stoicism,
nd was
probably mpressed
n
modern
hought
by the weight f their
nited uthority.
Andwhenwe
find he
philosopherf Malmesbury
making
ublic happiness
consist n
orderand
tranquillity,
e cannot
but think that this
was a
generalisation
rom
the
Stoic
and
Epicurean
conceptions
of
individual
happiness;
forboth embrace he same
ideal of
pas-
sionless
repose.
On the other and, hissubstitutionf the social for he per-sonal ntegernvolves correspondinghange nthevaluation f
personal
eelingss such.
What the
passions-
ad
been
to
later
Greekphilosophy,hat
the
ndividual
soul
becamie o
Hobbes,
something,ssentially
nfinitend insatiable,
whose
desires row
as
they
re
gratified,
hosehappiness,
f
such
t can
be called,
s
not a condition
f stablereposebut
of perpetual
movementnd
unrest. Here, again,
he analogy
betweenphysics
and ethics
obtains. In boththere
was an
originalopposition
etweenihe
idea of a
limit nd the dea of
infinite xpansion.
In
both
the
conflict as bequeathed y ancientto modern hought. Those
who embraced
oth tudieshave
always
had a
certain endency
to
take the
same side
in each;
but this tendency
as been more
distinctly
marked
n modern
han
n
ancient
ystems.
The suc-
cessors f
Aristotle,
hile
fallingback
on an older
cosmology,
had retained
is
limitingmethod
n their
speculations
n
man.
If he and Plato before
him
had
imprisoned
he
formless
nd
turbulent
errestrial lements
within
a uniform
nd eternal
sphere
f
crystal,
hey mposed
similar estraint
n the desires
and emotions, onfininghemwithin barrier f reasonwhich,
when onceerected, ould
never
be broken hrough.
And
if,
be-
fore he Athenian chool rose,
here
had
been
a
physicalphilo-
sophy
of the nfinite r, s
its
impugners
alled
it,
he
ndefinite,
therewas, corresponding
o
it,
a
philosophy
f
the
infinite r
indefinite
n
ethics,
represented, ot indeed
by professional
mioralists,
ut
by
rhetoricians
nd
men
of the world. Their
ideal was
not the contentedman,
but the popular
orator r
the
despot
who revels n the consciousness
f
power-the
ability
o
satisfy isdesires,whateverheymaybe. And theextreme on-
sequence
of this
principle
s drawn
by
Plato's
Callicles
when
he
declares hat
true
happiness
onsists
n
nursing
ne's
desires
up
to the
highest oint
t
which
hey
an be
freely
ndulged;
while
his ideal
of character s
the
superior
ndividual
who
sets
at
naught
whateverrestraints
ave
been
devised by
a
weak
and
timid
majority
o
protect
hemselves
gainst
him.
The Greek
love
of
balanced
antithesis
nd
circumscribing
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5/25
234
TheRelation
fGreek hilosophy
o Modern
T7hought.
form riumphed
ver
the
infinite
n bothfields; and
altlhoug,h
thegroundwon n physicswas lost againfor time throtugh
revival
ofold
theories,
his
was
because
true
Hellenisin
found
its
only
congenial
phere
n
ethics,
nd there
the
philosophy
f
P'lato
continued
o
reigil
supreme.
With Christianity,
here
camea
certain
nversion
fparts.
The
external
universe
gain
becamle
ubjected
to narrow imitations,
nd
the
flammantia
menia
mundi
beyond
which
Epicurus
had
dared
to
penetrate,
were
raised
up once
more nd
guiarded
y
new
terrors
s an
inm-
passable barriero thought.
But infinity
ook
refuge
itlhin
he
soul; and,while
n
this ife
a
sterner
elf-control
han even
that
of Stoicismwas
enjoined,
perspectives f illimitable elight n
another
ife
were
disclosed.
Finally,
at
theRenaissance
every
barrier
was
sihmultaneously
verthrown,
nd
the
accumulated
,energies
fwestern
ivilisation
xpatiated'
ver
fieldwhich,
f
it
was vast
n
reality,
was
absolutely
nbounded n
imaginiation.
Great
as were
the
achievements
f
that
age,
ts
dreams
were
greater
till;
andwhat
most xeites
our wondern the
works
f
its
heroes
is
but
the
fragment
f
an
unfinished
hole.
The
ideal
of ife
set
up by
Aristotle
was,
like
his conception
f
the
world, ontradicted,n every articular; nd the relativeposi-
tions ssigned
byhim
to
act and
power
were
precisely
eversed.
It
has been
shown
how
Shakespeare
reflected
he Platonism
f
his
contemporaries:
e
reflected'also
he
fierce
utburst
f
their
ambition,
nd in
describing
what
they
would
dare,
o possess
solely
overeigni
ower
nd
rnasterdom
rwear
without
orrival
all
the
dignities
f honour,
e
borrowed
lmost
he
very
words
nised
byEuripides
of
xpress
the feelinigs
ncouraged
y some
teachers
f
his time.
The
same
spirit
s exhibited
generation
later in the diamas of Calderon and Corneille, eforetheir
tlioughts
wereforced'
nto
a different
hannel
by
the stress
of
the Catholic
reaction;
while its
last
and
highest
manifestation
is
the
sentiment
f
Milton's
ruined'
rchangel
hat' o reign
n
liell
is better
han
to serve
in heaven.
Thus,
w-hen
Hobbes
reduces
ll
the
passions
to modes
of'the fundamental
esire
for
power,
e does
butgive
the scientific
heory
f that
which
tands
proclaimied
n
more
hrilliing
ccents
by
the
noblest
oetry
f
his
age.
Whereno danger oulddeterfrom he pursuitof power, o
balancing
f
pain
with
pleasure
vailed'
to quench
the
ardour
f
desire.
With
full
knowledge
hat
violenit elights
have
violent
ends
and
in
their
riumph
ie,
hefateful
ondition as
accepted.
Not
only
did Giordano
Bruno,
n conscious
arallelism
with
his
theory
f matter,
eclare
that
without
mutation,
ariety
nd
vicissitude
nothingwould
be agreeable,
nothinggood,
nothing
delightful,
hat enjoyment
onsists
solely
in
transition nd
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6/25
She
Relation
f
Greek
hilosophy
o
Modern
hought.
235
movement, nd that all pleasure lies midway between the
painful onging f fresh ppetite nd the sadnessof its satiation
and extinction; but the sedaterwisdomof Bacon,
n
touching
on
the controversy etween Callicles and Socrates,
eems to
incline owards he side of the former; nd in all
cases
warns
men not o make too muchof the
inconvenieinces
ttendanit
n
pleasure,
ut so to
proGure
erenity s they destroy
ot
mag-
nanimity .2
These, hen,were the principal lements f the philosophical
Reniaissance. First, herewas a certain urvival
f
Aristotelian-
ism as a method of comprehensivend logical arrangement.Then therewas the new Platonism,
ringing.
longwithit a
revival of either Alexandrian
or
mediaeval pantheism,
nd
closely ssociatedwith
geomnetrical
tudies; Thirdly,
here
was
the old GreekAtomism,s originally et forth yDemocritus
r
as re-editedcy Epicurus, raditionallynfavourable
o
theologry,
potent like fordecompositionnld econstruction,
onfirmed
y
the new astronomy,nd lendino ts method o the reformation
of
matlhematics; ext the later Greek ethical systems;
and
finally he formless dea of infinite owerwhich ll
Greek
ys-
temiisad, ss uch, onspired o suppress, ut which, evertheless,
bad
played a greatpart n theearlier tages f Greek peculation
both
physical nd moral.
On
thesefoundations
he
ofty difice
f
Spinozism
was
reared;
ouitof
these materials ts composite tructurewas built;
and
without
previous tudy fthem t cannotbe understood.
WhetherSpinoza ever read Plato is doubtful. One hardly
sees
whyhe
should
have
neglected
writerwhose
works were
easily accessible,
nd at that time
verypopular
with thinkingu
minds. Butwhether e was acquaintedwiththe Dialogues at
first
hand
or not,Plato will help us to understand pinoza,for
it
was through he doorof
geometry
hathe entered hilosophy,
and
under
the
guidance of one who
was
saturatedwith the
Platonic
spirit; so far as Christianitynfluenced im, t was
throug,h lementsderivedfroinPlato; and hlis metaphysIical
methodwas one
which,
more than any other,would
lhave
been
welcomedwith elight ythe uthor f heJenoand the
Bepublic,
as
an
attempt
o
realisehis own dialectical deal. For Spinozism
is,onthe faceof it, an application f geometrical easoning o
philosophy,
nd especially o ethics. It is also an attempt o
prove transcendentally hat geometricians nly assume-the
necessity
f
space. Now, Plato looked on geomietricalemon-
stration s
the
great typeof certainty,he scientificompletion
1'
Spaccio
della
Bestica rionfante,
ub in.
2
Jdvancermentf
Learning, llis &
Spedding,
II.,
428.
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7/25
236
The
Reltation
f
Greek
hilosophyo
Modern
Thought.
of
what
Socrateshad
begunby
his
interrogative
ethod,he
one
means ofcarryingrrefragableonvictionntoeverydepartment
of
knowledge,nd
more
articularly
nto
the
study f
our
highest
good.
On
the
other
hand
he
saw that
geometricians
ssume
what
tself
requires o be
demonstrated;
nd
he
confidently
x-
pected hat
he
deficiency
ould
be
supplied
by
his
own
projected
method f
transcenidentalialectics.
Such
at
least
seems
to
be
the
drift f
the
following
assage:
CC
When
speak of
the
divi-
sion of
the
nitellectual,
olu
will also
understand
me to
speak of
that
knowledge
which
reason herself
ttains
by the
powerof
dialectic,
singthe
hypotheses
ot as
first rinciples,ut onlyas hypotheses-that s to say as steps and pointsof departure
into a-
egion
which s
above
hypotheses,
n
orderthat
she
may
soar
beyond
hem o
the
first
rinciple
f the
whole;
and
clinging
to
this
and then
to
that
which
dependson
this,
by
successive
stepsshe
descends
again
without he
aid
ofany
sensible
object,
beginning
nd
ending
n
ideas .
The
problem,
hen,
which
Spinoza set
himself
was,
first,
o
account
or he
fundamental
ssumptionsf all
science, nd
more
particularly
f
geometry,
y
deducing hemfrom
single self-
evident rinciple; nd thentousethatprinciple or he solution
of
whatever
roblems
eemed
o
stand
most n
need of
ts
appli-
cation.
And,
s
usually
happensn
such adventurous
nterprises,
the
supposed
nswer f
pure
reason
was
obtainedby
combining
or
expanding
onceptions
orrowed
ithout
riticism
rom
pre-
existing
ystems f
philosophy.
Descarteshad
already
ccomplished great
simplification
f
the
speculative
roblem
y
summing p
all
existence
nder the
two
heads of
extension
nd
thought.
t
remained
o
account
for
these, nd to reducetheni o a single dea. As we have seen,
theywere
derived
rom
Greek
philosophy,
nd
the bondwhich
was to
unite
hem
mustbe
sought
or n
the same direction.
It
will
be
rememberedhat
the
systems
f
Plato
andAristotle ere
bounded t
either
extremity
y a
determinate
nd
by
an
inde-
terminate
rinciple.
With
the
one,
existence
ranged
between
the
Idea of
Good
at the
upper
ndof
the
scale and
empty
pace
at
the
lower;
with
the
other, etween absolute
Thought
nd
First
Matter.
It
was
by
combining
he two definite
erms,pace
and thouight,hatDescarteshad constructed is system;and
after
ubtracting
hese
the two
ndefinite
erms
remained.
In
one
respect hey
were
even more
opposed to each
other
than
were
the terms
with
which
heyhad
been
respectively
ssociated.
The
Idea
of
Good
represented
nity,
dentity,
nd
constancy,
s
against
lurality,
ifference,
nd
change;
whileAristotle's
atter
1
Republic I. 511, n Jowett's rans. II. 398.
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8/25
The Relationof Greek hilosophy
o
Modern
Thought. 237
was
by
its
very
definition
multiform,
luctuating,
nd
indeter-
minate. Nevertheless,herewere equally important nalogies
traceable etween hem. No
very lear account
ould be given
of either, nd
bothwerecustomarily
escribed y negatives. If
Matterfell hort
f
complete xistence,
he Good transcendedll
existence.
If the
one
was a universalcapacity
for assuming
Forms,
he
otherwas the source
whence all Forms proceeded.
Whenthe
distinctiveharacteristics
f n
individualwere hought
away,
the
question
might
wellbe mooted
nto
which
principle
it
would
return. The ambiguous
se
of
the word Powercontri-
buted still further o their identification,or it was not less
applicable
o
the receptive
han
o
the
productive
aculty. Now,
we have
ust
seen nto what
mportancehe dea of Power sud-
denly prang t the Renaissance:
with Bruno it was
the only
abiding reality f nature; with
Hobbes it
was the only object
of human
desire.
Another
erm ccuipyingveryargeplace
n
Aristotle's hilo-
sophy
was well
adapted
to
mediate
between
and
eventually
o
unite
the
two speculative xtremes. This
was Substance;
in
logic
the
subject
of
predication,
n metaphysics
he substratum
of qualities, he
ovicoia
or Being of the Ten Categories. Now,
First
Matter
might airly laim the position
f
a
universal
ub-
ject
or
ubstance,ince
t
was
investedwith very
ensible uality
in
turn;
nd
even,
s
the common
lement
f all Forms,with
every
hinkable
uality
s
well.
Aristotle
himselfhad
finally
pronounced
or he ndividual
ompound f Form
and Matter s
the
true
ubstance. Yet he also speaks s
if the essential
efini-
tion
of a
thing onstitutedhe
thing tself;
in
which
case Forrm
alone
could be the true subject; and a similar
laim
mightbe
put forwardn behalf f the PlotinianOne.
Such
werethe
a
priori
elements
which
historical
ynthesis
had
prepared
o
satisfy
he want
of a
metaphysical
Absolute.
Let
us now
see what
result
would
follow
wlhen he
newly-
recovered
dea
of space
was
subjected
o
a metaphysicalnalysis.
Extension
s both
one
and
infinite.
No
particular
rea can be
conceived
part
from
he
wholewhich
both ontains
nd
explains
it.
Again,
extension
s
absolutelyhomogeneous;
o
whatever
distance
we
may
ravel
n
imaginationhere
will
still
be
the ame
repetitionfsimilar arts. But space,with he Cartesians, eant
more
han a
simple uxtaposition
f parts; having
een made
the
essence
of
matter,
t
*as
invested
with
mechanical
s
well
as
with
geometrical
roperties.
The bodies into
which
t
resolved
itself
were
conceived s moving, nd as communicating
heir
movement
o
one another hrouglh
n
unbroken
hain of
causa-
tion in
which each constituted single link,
determining
nd
determined
y
the
rest; so that,
ere
lso,
ach
part
was
explained
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9/25
238 The Relation
f Greek hilosophy
o
Modern
ThougAt.
by
reference
o an infinite hole,
epro(lucingT
ts essence,
while
exempt romhe condition f circumscribedxistence. We can
understand,
hen, that when'
the necessity
of accounting
for
extension tself
nce becamefelt,
he
natural olution
would
be
to conceive t
as holding he
samne
elation
o
somegreater
hole
which its own
subdivisions
eld
to their
sum total; in
other
words
t shouldbe
at once
a part, n
emnianation,
nd an image
oftheultimate
eality,
hich
n
turn ould
be only conceived
s
its
inultiplicationi
d
infinitum.
The
direction
n which
a method
for
explaining
Thought
would mostreadily uggesttself,was givenbothin the properformfthinlking,nd in its presumed arallelisin ith xtension.
Speakinaphilosophically,
o
think
was
to
reason,
nd to
reason
was to
subsume
lower
under
higheror
more ulniversal
on-
cept,
o
resolve
ll
subjectsnto
a
single
predicate,
r
to
connect
all
predicates
with
a
single
subject;
and owing
o
Aristotle's
confusion
f
formalwith efficient
auses,
his process
was
con-
sidered
denitical
ith
hat
by
which
we rise
to
the knowledge
of
determininig
ntecedents
n the
external
world.
Spinoza
gathered
p
all
the
threads
f speculation
husmade
readyforhis grasp,whenhe defined od as a substancecon-
sisting
f
nfinite
ttributes,
ach
of which
xpresses
iis
nfinite
and
eternal
ssence;
subsequently
dding
hat
the essence
here
spokeni
f
s
Power,
nd
that two of the
infinite ttributes
re
.Extension
nd
Thought,
hereof
he
particular
hings
known o
us are nodes. If, now,
we
ask why
there
should be
such
an
existence
s
space,
he
answer
s
because existence,
eing
in-
finite,
must
niecessarily
nclude
every
conceivable
hing.
The
argument
s
strikingly
ike
a
principle
f
the
Epicurean
philo-
sophy, ndmaywellhave beensuggested y t. Accordinigo
Lucretius,
he
appearance
f
design
n our world
need not
be
attributed
o
creative
ntelligence,
ecause
nfinite
toms
moving
in
infinitemanners
hrough
nfilnite
ime,
must
at
length
rrive,
after comprehensive
eries f
experiments,
t the
present
rame
of
things';
and the same
principle
s
invoked
n
a
smaller
cale
to
accountfor he
origin
f
organised
eings,
f
memory,
nd
of
civil
society.2
In both
systems
nfinite
pace
is the
root-con-
ception;
but
what
Lucretius
had
legitimately
sed to
explain
becoming, pinoza illegitimatelypplies to the elucidationof
beinig.
At one stroke
ll
empirical
knowledge
s
placed
on
an
-
Quia
multimodis,
uLltis,mutata,
er
omne
Ex infinito
exantur
ercita
lagis,
Omne
genus
motus,
t cetus
experiundo,
Tandemdeveniunt
n
taleis
disposituras,
QualibuLs
aec
rebus onsistit
uiuma
reata.-I.,
1023-7.
2
V.
853,
V. 780-800,
. 1025.
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10/25
The
Relationof
Greek
hilosophy
o Modern
Thotught. 39
a
priori founldation.
By assuming nlimited redit t the bank
of the universewe entitle urselves o draw a cheque foraniy
particular mount. Thus the idea
of
infinite
ttributes s no
nmereollateral
peculation,
ut
forms
n
essenltial lement of
Spinozism. The knownvarieties f existence
re,
o
to speak,
surrounded,upported,
nd
fixed
n
their places by the endless
multitude
f
the
unknown. And this
conceptioni
f
being as
absolutely lifinite,s another
proof
of
Spinoza's Platonic teii-
dencies,
or t involves he realisation
f an
abstract
dea, hat s
to
say,
of
Being,,
which the
philosopher reats
as
something
more comprehensive
han
the facts
of
consciousness hence tis derived.
The
relation
f
Spinoza's
Substance to its
attributes s am-
biguous.
It is at once their
cause,
their
totality,
nd
their
unity. The highly
elastic
and
indefinite
erm Power
helped
these various
aspects
to
play
inlto
and
replace
one
another
according o the
requirements
f
the
system.
It is
associated
withthe subjective
possibility
f
multiplyingmaginary xist-
ences
to
any amount;
with the- ausal
energy
n
which
exis-
tenceoriginates;
nd
with
he
expansiveness haracteristiclike
of Extension nd of Thought. For the two knownattributes
of
the
universal
substalice are not
simply related
to it
as
co-predicates
f a
common
ubject; they everally xpress
ts
essential
Power,
and
are,
to
that
extent,
dentical
with
one
another. But
whenwe
ask,
How do
they
xpress
Power? the
same
ambiguity
ecurs.
Substance
s
revealed hrougLhts attri-
butes as
a cause through
ts
effects;
s an
aggregate
hrough
ts
constituents;
nd as an
abstractnotion
throug,h
ts
concrete
embodiments.
Thus
Extension and
Thought
are
identical
through-theirerydifferences,ilnce heseillustrate he versa-
tility
f their
ommon
ource. nd
at the
same
time
ointly
on-
tribute
o the
realisation
f
ts
perfection. But,
for
ll
practical
purposes, pinoza
deals
only
with
the
parallelism
nd
resem-
blance
ofthe
attributes.
We have
to
see
how
he establishes
t,
anldhow
far he was
helped
in
so
doing by
the traditions
f
Greek
philosophy.
It has
been
already
shown how
Extension,having
become
identified
itlhmatter,
ook on
its mechanical
ualities,
nd
was
conceived s a connected eriesof causes or lodes of motion.
The
parallel
found
by Spinoza
for
this series
is the chain of
reasons
and
conseque-nts
orming
demonstrative
rgument;
and
here he
is
obviously
following
Aristotle,
who
although
ostensibly
istinauishing
etween formal nd efficient
auses,
hopelessly
onfouiids hem
n
the
second book
of
his
Posterior
Analytics.
We
are said to understand thing
when
we
bring
it
under general
rule,
and
when we
discoverthe mechanical
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11/25
240
TheBelation
f
Greek
hilosophy
o
ModernThought.
agency
which
produces
t. For
instance,
we may know
that
a
particularman will die,eitherfrom he fact that all men are
mortal,
r from he
fact that he has
received
a
fatal
wound.
The general
ule,
however,
s
not the cause
of whatwill
happen,
but
only
the
cause
of our knowing
hat
it
will
happen;
and
knowledge
f
the rule by
no means carries
with it
a
knowledge
of the efficient
ause,
s we see
in the
case of
gravitation
nd
other
natural
forceswhose
modus
perandi
s
still
a complete
mystery.
What
deceived
Aristotle
was
partly
his
false
analysis
of the syllogism
which
he
interpreted
s the connexion
of two
terms y the nterpositionfa middle answering
o the
causal
nexusoftwophenomena; ndpartlyhis conceptionf the uni-
verse s a series
of concentric
pheres
through
which
movement
is
transmitted
rom
without,
hus
combining he two
ideas of
notional
omprehension
nd
inechanical
ausation. Be this
as
it
may, pinoza
takesup
the
Aristotelian
dentification
f ogical
with
dynamical
onnexion,
nd
gives
it
the widest possible
de-
velopment.
For
the
Stagirite
would
not,
at any rate,
have
dreamed f
attributing
ny
but
a
subjective
xistence
o
the
de-
monstrative
eries,
or of extending
t
beyond
the
limits f our
actual knowledge. Spinoza,on the otherhand,assumes that
the
whole
nfinite
hain
of
materialcauses
is
represented
y
a
corresponding
hain
of eternal deas;
and this chain he calls
the
nfinite ntellect
of God. Here,
besides
the
necessities
f
;systematisation,
he
influence
f
mediaeval
realislm
s
plainly
evident. For,
when
the absolute elf-existence
f Plato's
Ideas
had been
surrendered
n deference
o
Aristotle's riticism,
home
was still
found or
hem
by
Plotinus
n
the
eternal
Nous,
and
by
the Christian
choolmen
n the mindof
God;
nor
did
sucha belief resent nydifficultieso long as the divineper-
sonality
was respected.
The
pantheism,
f
Spinoza,
however,
was absolute,
nd excluded
he
notion
of any
but
a finite
ub-
jectivity.
Thus the
nfinite
ntellect
f
God
is
an
unsupported
chain
of ideas recalling
he
theory
t one
time
imaginedby
Plato.'
Or its existence
may be
merelywhat
Aristotle
would
have called
potential;
n
other
words,
pinoza
may
mean that
reasons
will
go
on evolving
hemselves
o
long
as
we
choose o
study
he dialectic
f
existence,
lways
n strict
arallelism
with
thenatural eriesofmaterialmovements onstitutinghe ex-
ternal
universe;
and ust
as
this
is determinedhrough
ll
its
parts
by
the totality
-f
xtension,
r
of all
matter
whether
moving
r
motionless)
akentogether,
o
also at
the
sulmimit
f
the
ogical
series
tands he
dea
of
God,
fromwhose
definition
the demonstration
f
every
esser
idea necessarily
ollows.
It
1
See
the
assage
rom
he
Republic
uoted
bove.
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12/25
T[he
Relationof
Greek
hilosophy
o
Modern
Thought.
241
is true
hat n a
chain
of connected
nergies
he antecedent,s
such, muist e
always
precisely
qual
to the
consequent;but
apparently hisdifficultyid not present tselfto Spinoza, nor
ineedwe be
surprised;
or
Kant,
comincg
centuryater,
was
still
so
imbuedwith
Aristotelian
raditionss,
similarly,o
derive he
category
fCause and
Effect
rom he relation
between
Reason
and
Consequent
n
hypothetical
ropositions.'
Meanwhilethe
parallelism
betweenThought
nd
Extension
was not
exhausted y the
dentification
ust
analysed. Exten-
sion
was
not
only a seriesof
movements; t still remained n
expressionfor
coexistence nd
adjacency.
Spinoza,
therefore,
felthimself bliged o supplyThoughtwith a correspondingly
continuous
uality. It
is here
that his chief
origirnalityies,
here that he has
been
most losely
followedby
the philosophy
of our own time.
Mind,
he
declai'es, s an
attribute
verywhere
accompanying
matter,
o-extensive nd co-infinite ith
space.
Our own
animation s the sum or the
resultant
f an
animation
clinging
o
everyparticle hat
enters
nto thecomposition
f our
bodies. When
our
thoughts re
affectedy an
external
mpulse,
to suppose hat
this
inpulseproceeds roni
nything
mnaterials
a delusion; it is producedbythe mindbelonging o the body
which
acts on
our body; or
rather he
twoactions are
onlydif-
ferent
spectsof
a singleprocess.
Spinoza
has clearly
xplained
the
doctrine fanimal
automatisin,nd shown t to
be
perfectly
conceivable; but
he has
entirely mitted
to
explain
how
the
parallel
nfluence f one
thoughtor
feeling)
n another s to
be
understood;for
lthough
his
too s spokenof as a causal
rela-
tion, t
seemsto
be quite
differentrom
he ogicalconcatenation
described s the
infinite
ntellect f God; and to
suppose
that
idea followsfrom dea like movement rommovementwould
amount
o
a
completematerialisation
f
inind;
while
our
philo-
sopher
would
ertainly
ave repudiated
Mr.
Shadworth
odgson's
theory hat
statesof
consciousness re
only
connected
hrough
their
xtended
ubstratums the
segments f a mosaic
picture
are
heldtogether
y the
underlying
urface f
masonry.
The
analogy
between
Thought nd
Extension under the two
aspectsof
necessary
onnexion
nd
mere
contingent
elation
n
coexistence r succession
was,
n
truth,more
nteresting
o its
authoras a basis
for his
etlhical
han as a
development
f his
metaphysicalpeculation.Thetwo orders frelations epresenlt,
in
their
istinction,he
opposition
f science o
opinion
r
magi-
nation,
he opposition f
dutiful
onviction o blind
or
selfish
I
The
tendency
f
ogicians
s
now,
ontrariwise,
o
force
easoning
nto
parallelisnm
ith
mathenmatical
hysics
by
ilnterpreting
he
proposition
s
an
equation
etween
ubject
nd
predicate.
16
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13/25
242 The
Relation,f Greek
hilosophy
o Modern
Thought.
impulse.
Spinoza borrows rom
he Stoics their
dentification
of volitioni ithbelief;but n working ut the consequences f
this principle
t
is
of Plato
rather
han of the Stoics
that
he
reminds s.
The passions
re
in his
system
what
ense, magina-
tion and opinionwere
n
that of the Athenian
dealist;
and his
ethics may almost be
called the
metaphysics
f
the
Republic
turned utside
n. Joy,
rief nd
desire are more
or less
im-
perfect
orceptions
f reality-a realitynot belonging
o the
external
world but
to
the
conscious
subject
itself.
When
Spinoza
traces hem o
a consciousness
r
expectation
f
raised
or loweredpower,we recognise he influence f Hobbes; but
when,hereas elsewhere,
e identifies
owerwithexistence,we
detect return
o Greekforms f thought.
The
great
conflict
between
llusion nd
reality
s fought ut once more; only
this
time
t
is about our own
essence hatwe are
first
eceived
nd
thenenlightened.
If the nature
and
origin
f
outward hings
are
half
revealed,
alf concealed by sense
and
imagination,
ur
emotions
re
n
like manner he
obscuring
nd
distorting
edium
through hich
we apprehend ur
inmost selves, and
whatever
adds to
or
takes away
from he plenitude
f
our
existence;
and
whatscience s to theone,moralityndreligion re tothe other.
It
is remarkable
hat
while Spinoza
was giving new appli-
cationto the
Platonic
method, nother
Cartesian,Malebranche,
was
working
t out
more
trictly
n
theold lines
of speculative
research. The Becherche
e
la/VJrite
f
this unjustlyneglected
thinker s
a
methodical
ccount
of the various subjectiveob-
stacles
which mpedeour apprehension
f
things
as
they
really
exist, nd
of
the means
by which
it
may be facilitated.Here
also, attention
s concentrated
n the subjective side
of philo-
sophy; and if the mentalprocesses electedforstudyare of
theoretical ather han
practical nterest,
e may probably t-
tribute
his to
the
circumstancehat
every thicalquestionwas
alreadydecided
forMalebranche y the
Churchwhose
orders e
had assumed. But it was
notmerelyn
thewritings fprofessed
philosopher?
hat
the
new aspect
of Platonismfound expres-
sion.
All great rt embodies
n
one
form r another he
eading
conceptions
f its
age;
and the latter half of the seventeenth
century ound
uch a manifestationn the
comedies f
Moli6re.
If theseworks tand at thehead of French iterature,heyowe
their ositionnot more o
their uthor's
rilliantwit thanto his
profound hilosophy
f
ife;
or
rather
we should say
that with
him wit and philosophy
re one. The comic power
of Shake-
speare
was
shown
by
resolving heoutward ppearances
of this
world
into
a
series of dissolving
llusions.
Like Spinoza and
Malebranche,Moli6re
urns
the illusion
in, showingwhat per-
verted
opinions
men
formof thenmselves
nd others,hrough
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14/25
The
Relation f
Greek
hilosophy o Modern
Thought.
243
misconceptionsnd passions ither f spontaneous rowth r se-
dulously ostered y designing ands. Society,withhim, eems
almost entirelymade up of pretenders nd their dupes, both
characters eingnot unfrequentlyombined n the same person,
who s made a victim hrough is desire o pass forwhathe is not
and cannotbe. And this s what essentially istinguishes he
art of
Moli6re
rom he New Comedy f Athens,whichhe,. ike
other moderns, ad at first elt nclined to imitate until the
success of
the Pre'cieuses
idicules
showed him
where
his
true
opportunitiesay. For the New Comedywas Aristotelian
lhere
it was not simplyhumanist; that s tosav, t was an exhibitionoftypes ike those ketched y Aristotle's isciple, heophrastus,
and alreadyprefiguredn the master's wn Ethics. These were
the perennialforms n a world
of
infinite
nd
perishing
n-
dividualexistences, ot concealedbehindphenomena, ut ncor-
porated
n
them nd constitutingheir ssential ruth. The Old
Comedy s something ifferentgain;
it is
prae-philosophic,
nd
may be characteriseds
an
attempt o describegreat political
interests nd tendencies hrough he medium of myths and
fables and familiardomesticities,ust as the old theoriesof
nature, he old lessons of practicalwisdom, nd the firstgreat
national chronicleshad been thrown nto the same homely
form.'
The
purely ntellectual
iew of human
nature,
he
definiition
of mind n termsof
cognition,
s one more
fallacy
from
which
Aristotle's eaching, ad it
not fallen
ntoneglect
or
contempt,
mighthave guardedSpinoza. Nevertheless,
is
parallelism
e-
tween
passion
nd
sensuous
perception
aves him
from
heworst
extravagances
f
his
Greek
predecessors.
For the
senses,
how-
ever muchtheymightbe maligned, ever were nor could be
altogether
ejected;
while
the
passions
met with
little
mercy
from lato and withnone
from he
Stoics,
who considered
hem
not
onlyunnecessary
ut
even
unnatural.
Spinoza
more
wisely
sees
in
them ssertions,
owever
obscure
and
confused,
f the
will to be and
grow
which constitutes
ndividual
existence.
And he sees
that
they
an no morebe
removed
by pointing
ut
their
vil
consequences
han
sense-impressions
an be
abolished
by proving
their fallaciousness.
On the other
hand,
when
Spinoza speaksas if one emotion ould onlybe conqueredor
expelled by
another
motion,
e must not
allow
his
peculiar
phraseology
o conceal
from
s the
purely
ntellectual
haracter
of his whole ethical
system.
What
he
really
holds
is
that
emotion an
be overcome
by
reason or better
knowledge,
e-
1
Greek
ragedy
s
ust
the
reverse-an
expansion
f he old
patriarchal
relationsnto
mould
itted
o receive he
highest hought
nd
feeling
f
civilised
ge.
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15/25
244 TheRelation f
Greek
hilosophyoModerinhought.
cause it is itself
an
imperfect ognition.
Point
by
point, n
analogy-or somethingmiorehanan analogy--is made out be-
tweenthe errors
f
sensuous perceptionoined to
imagination,
and the errors f our spont,aneousffortsfter appiness r self-
realisation. Bothare iinposed n us fromwithout, nd
neither
can be
got
rid
of
by
a
simple
ct of
volition.
Both are affected
by illusions f perspective:
he
nearer objectof desire,ike the
nearer bjectof perception,ssuming disproportionate
lace in
the
field
of
view.
In
both,
ccidental
ontiguity
s habitually
confounded ith causation;
while
in
both the assignment
f
causes to effects,nstead fbeingtracedbackthroughn infinite
series
of
antecedents,tops
hortwiththe
antecedent earest
o
ourselves. If objects
re
classified
ccording
o
their uperficial
resemblancesr the
usages
of common
anguage, o also are
the
-desires ustained
nd
intensified y imitation
nd
rivalry. By
parity
f
reasoniing,
oral
ducation
must be
conducted n
the
same
lines
as
intellectual
ducation.
First,
t
is
shownhow
our
individual existence, epending
s
it
does
on
forces nfinitely
exceeding
ur
own,
s
to be
maintained. This s
chiefly
one
by
cultivatingfriendly
elations
with other
men; probably,
l-
thoug,hpinozadoes not hiinselfmake the comparison,n the
same
principle
s that observed
n
the mutual
assistance
and
rectificationf the senses, ogether ith their preservation
y
means
of
verbal igns.
The
misleading assions
re to
be
over-
iome
y discovering
heir
rigin; by referring
he
pleasures
nd
pains
which
produce
them to the
rightcauses; -by
alling
in
thought
o
redress
he
balance
of
imagination; y
dividing
he
attention
mong an infinite
umber
of
causes; finally,y
de-
monstratinghe
absolute
necessity f whatever ctions
excite
them, nd classifying,hem according o their relations,n the
same
way
thatthe
phenomena
f
the materialworld are dealt
withwhen
subjected
o scientific
nalysis.-
So far
Spinoza,following
he
example
of
Stoicism,
as only
studied
the means
by
which
reason
conquers passion.
He
now
proceed5
o
show,
in
the
spirit
of Plato or
of
Platonic
Christianity,
ow
far
superior
o
the
pleasures
of sense and
opinion
re
those
fforded
y
true
religion-by
the love of God
and the
possession
of
eternal ife.
But,
here
also,
as
in
the
Greek ystem,ogic does dutyfor emotion. The love of God
means
no more han
viewingourselves s filling place
in
the
infinite
rameworkf
existence, nd as determined
o be what
we are
by
the
totality
f
forces omposingt.
And eternal ife
is
merely
he
adjustment
f
our thoughts
o
the
ogical order
y
which
all
modes
of
existence re
deducible
from
he idea of
infinite
ower.
Thus,
while
Spinoza draws
to
a head all
the
tendencies
n-
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16/25
tEhe
elation
f
Greek
hilosophy
o
Modern
Thought.
245
herited from Greek philosophy, orrowing rom the early
physicists heirnecessarianism; rom he Atomists, heirexclu-
sion
of
finalcauses, heir denial of the supernatural,nd their
infinite orlds; from he Athenian chool, heir distinction e-
tween mind and body, nd between reason and sense; from
Aristotle, is
parallelism etween ausation nd syllogism; rom
the Epicureans,heir indication fpleasure; nd from heStoics,
their dentificationfbeliefwith ction, heir onquest f passion
and their
devotion o humanity;-it is to the dominant la-
tonism
of
the seventeenth entury hat his systemowes its
foundation,ts development,nd its crown; for he begins byrealising he abstract onception f being, nd infersts absolute
infinity rom he nlisleading nalogy f space which s not an
'abstraction
t
all; deduceshis conclusions ccording o the geo-
metricalmethodrecommended y Plato; and ends like Plato,
by translating ialecticformulas nto the emotionalanguage
f
religious aith.
From this grand synthesis, owever, single element was
omitted; and, like the uninvitedguest of fairy tradition,
t
proved strongenough singlyto destroywhat had been con-
structedbythe united efforts f all the rest. This was the
sceptical
principle,
he critical analysis of ideas,first xercised
by Protagoras,made
a new
starting-pointy Socrates, arried
o
perfection y Plato, supplementingxperiencewith Aristotle,
and
finally roclaimed
n
its purity s the sole function f philo-
sophyby
an
entire
chool
of
Greek hougllt.
Notwithstanding
he
sterility ommonlyssociated
with
mere
negation,
t
was
this which, f all the later Greek schools, os-
sessed
the
greatest owers
f
growth. Besides passing through
more hanonestageofdevelopment n its own account, cep-
ticism
mposed
erious
modificationsn Stoicism, ave
birth
o
Eclecticism,
nd
contribuited
o the establishmentf
Neo-Pla-
tonism.
The
explanation
s not' ar
o seek.
The
more
highly
organised system s, the moreresistance oes t offero change,
the
moredoes its
transmission
end o assume rigidly
cholastic
form.
To
'such
dogmatism
he Sceptics were.
on
principle,
opposed;
and
by keeping he problems
f
philosophy
pen,
hey
facilitated he
task of
all
who had a
new
solution
o
offer;
while
mindand its activities eing, o someextent,afefromheuni-
versal doubt,
he
scepticalprinciple pontaneously
hrew
back
thought
n a
subjective
nstead of
an
objective ynthesis
f
knowledge-in
other
words,
n
that psychological
dealism
he
pregnancy
nd
comprehensivenessf
which are
every day
be-
coming
more
clearly ecognised.
And
we
shall
now see how
the
same
fertilising owerof criticism as been
manifested
n
modern
itnes
s
well.
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17/25
246 The
Relation f Greec hilosophy o
ModernThought.
The sceptical
philosophy, lready
advocated
n
the
Middle
Ages by John f Salisbury, as, ike every ther orm f ancient
thought,
evived at the Renaissance, ut
onlyunder the very
superficial orm
which nfers rom he coexistence fmany
di-
vergent
opinions that none of them can
be true. Even so,
however,t led
Montaigne o soundernotionsof tolerationnd
humanity han
were entertained y any of
his contemporaries.
With
Bacon,
nd
still morewithDescartes, t also
appears
s the
necessary
reparation or a remodelling f all
belief; but.the
greatdogmatic ystems till exercised uch
a potent
nfluence
on boththosethinkers hat their professed emandfor
new
methodmerely eadsup to an alteredstatementf the oldun-
proved
ssumptioins.
Meanwhile
the
old
principle
of universal
doubt could
no
longer e maintainedn presence f the certainties
lreadywon
by modern
cience. Man,
n
the time
of
Newton, ad,
as
Pope
tersely uts t, toomuchknowledge or he
sceptic
ide .
The
problemwas not
howto establish hereality,
ut howto ascertain
the origin nd
possible xtent
f
that
knowledge.
The first
o
perceive his, he
first
o evolve criticism ut of
scepticism,nd
thereforehe real founder f modernphilosQphy,as Locke.
Nevertheless, ven with
him,
the advantage of
studying he
more
recent
n
close connexion
with he earlier
evelopments
f
thought
oes not
cease;
it
onlyenters
on a new
phase.
If he
cannot, ike
his
predecessors,
e
directly
ffiliated o
one or
moreof
the
Greek chools,
is
position
can
be
illustrated
y
a
parallel derivedfrom the historyof those
schools.
What
Arcesilaus and
Carneades had been
to
Socrates
and his
suc-
cessors,
hat
Locke was
in a
large
measure
to
Bacon
and the
Cartesians. He wentbacktothe nitialdoubtwhichwiththem
had
been
overborne y the dogmatic eaction,
nd
insistedon
making t a
reality. The spiritof the
Apologia
s
absent
from
Plato's
later
dialogues, nly
to
reappear
witheven more han ts
original ower
n
the
teaching
of the
New
Academy. And,
n
like
manner,
escartes' ntrospective ethod,
ith ts demand
or
clear
deas;
becomes,
n
theEssay
concerning
wbman nderstand-
ing, n
irresistibleolvent or he psychology
nd
physics
f
its
first ropounder.The doctrine f nnate
deas, hedoctrine hat
extensions theessence fmatter,hedoctrine hat houghtsthe
essenceof
mind,
he
moregeneraldoctrine,
eld also
by Bacon,
that
hings ave
a
diseoverable ssence
whence
ll
their
roperties
may
be
deduced
by
a
process nalogous
o
mathematical eason-
ing,-all collapsed whenbrought
o
the
test of definite
nd
concrete
experience.
We have
here,
ndeed, something
om-
parable
not
only
to
the
scepticism
f the New
Academy,
ut
also to the
Aristotelian riticism
f
Plato's
metaphysics;
nd at
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18/25
-The elation
f Greek
hilosophy
o
Modern
Thought.
247
first
ight
t might seem
as if
the Peripatetic
philosophy
was
destined ncemore o regain he positiontaken from tby the
resuscitation
f ts
ancient
foe. But
Locke
was not nclined
o
substitute
ne form
f
scholasticisin
or another.
By applying
the
analytical
method of Atomism
to knowledge
itself,
he
created weapon
equally
fatal to the
two
competing
ystems.
Under his
dissection he
concrete
ndividual
substance
of the
one
vanished
no
less completely
han
the universal
deas
of the
other. Nothingr
emained
but
a bundle of
qualities
held to-
gether
y
a subjective ond.
Similarly,n political cience he analyticalmethod f assum-ino civilgovernmentoresultfrom concurrencef individual
Wills,
which
with
Hobbes had
served
onlyto destroy-
cclesi-
astical
authority,
hile
leaving intact
and
even strengthening
the
authority f
secular
rulers,was reinterpreted
yLocke
as a
negation
f all absolutism
whatever.
It is interesting
o observe
how,
here also,
he positive
cience
of
the age
had
a large share
in determining
ts
philosophic
character.
Founded
on
the discovery
f the
earth'strue
shape,
Aristotle's
metaphysics
ad been
overthrown
y the
discovery
ofthe earth'smotion. And nowthe claimsof Cartesianismo
havefurnished
n
exact
knowledge f
matter
nd a definition
f
it
whence
ll the
facts f observation
ouldbe deduced
priori,
were
summarily efutedl
y the
discovery
f universal
gravita-
tion. The Cartesians
complained
hat
Newton
was bringingr
back
the
occultqualitiesof the
Schoolmen;
but
the tendency f
bodies
to
move towards
ne
another roved
s certain
as it
was
iniexplicably
ysterious.
For
a time, he study
of causes was
superseded
by the study
of laws;
and
the new
method
of
physical science moved in perfectharmonywith the phe-
nomenism
f
Locke.
One
most mportant
onsequence
of this
revolution
was to
place
the
new Critical hilosophy
n
a
footing
quite
differentrom
hat occupied
bythe ancient
ceptics.
Both
restricted
ertainknowledge
o
our own states
of consciousness;
but
it now
appeared
hat his
might e
done
without
mpeaching
the
value
of
accepted
scientific onclusions,
which
was
more
than the
Academic
philosophy
would
have
admitted.
In other
words,
granting hat
we
were
limited
to
phenomena,
t
was
shown that science consisted n ascertaining he relations f
these
phenomena
to one another nstead
of to
a
problematic
reality
ying
behind hem;
while,
hat
uchrelations
xisted nd
were,
n
fact, art
of
the
phenomena
hemselves,
as
what
no
sceptic
ould
easily
deny.
Nevertheless
n
each case subjective
dealism
had theeffect
f
concentrating
peculation,
properly
o
called,
on
ethical and
practical
interests.
Locke
struck
the
keynote
of
eighteenth
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19/25
248
The Relation
f GPeek
hilosophyo Modern
Thoutght.
century hilosophy
when he pronounced
mnorality
o be
the
proper cience nd business f mankind n
general ''
And no
soonerhad morality ometo
the front
han
the significance
f
ancient
hought
gain made itself pparent.
Whether
hrough
conscious mitation,r because the same
causes brought bout
the same effects,thical
inquiries
moved
along
the lines orioi-
nally laid down in the schools of Athens.
When
rules
of
conduct were not directlyreferred
o
a
divine
revelation,
theywerebased eitheron a supposed
aw
of
nature,
r
on
the
necessities f human
happiness,
r on some
combination
f the
-two. Nothing s more haracteristicf the eighteenth entuirythan ts worship f nature. Even the theology f the age is
deeplycoloured y it; and with the majority
f thosewho re-
jected theologyt became a new religion. But
this
sentiment
is demonstrablyf Greek
origin, nd found ts
most elaborate,
thoughnot ts most bsolute xpressionn
Stoicism.
The
Stoics
had
inheritedt from he
Cynics,who held the
faith n
greater
purity; and these, gain, o far s we can judge,
from
certain
Sophistic chool, omefragmentsf whose teaching
have
been
preservedby Xenophon
and Plato; while the
firstwho gave
wide currencyo thisfamous bstraction as, n all probability,
Heracleitus. To the Stoics,however,
s
due
that intimBate
sso-
ciation
of
naturalism
ithteleology
hich- eets
s
again
n the
philosophy f the ast century,nd even
now wherever he
doc-
trine of
evolutionhas
not been thoroughlyccepted. It
was
assumed,
n
the teeth
of
all evidence,
hat
nature
bears the
marks f a uniformlyeneficentesign, hat evil
is exclusively
of
humanorigin,nd that
ven humannature s essentially ood
when unspoiled y artificial
estrictions.
Yet if teleologywas, n some respects, falling-offrom he
rigidmechanicism irst
aught y the prae-Socratic chools nd
thenagain
by the Cartesian
chool, n at least
one respect t
marked
comparative
rogress. For the first ttempts
made
both
by ancient nd modernphilosophy o explain
vital
phe-
nomenaon purelymechanical rincipleswerealtogether
rema-
ture; and tfhemmense xtension
f
biological
knowledge
hich
took
place subsequently
o both, ould
not but bring
about
an
irresistiblemovement
n the opposite direction.
The first
o
revive teleologywas Leibniz,who furnished transition rom
the
seventeentho the
eighteenth entury y his
monadology.
In
this,Atomism s combined
withAristotelian
deas just as it
had
previously een combined
withPlatonic deas by Descartes.
The
movement f the atoms is explained by their
aspiration
after more perfect tate instead
of
by mechanical
pressure.
1
Essay,
Bk. iv. ch.
12.
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20/25
The
JRelation
f Greek hilosophy
o
MIodern hought.
249
But while Leibniz
still relies on the ontological rgument
f
Descartesto prove he existenceof God, this was soon aban-
doned, long with
the cosmological rgument,
or the argument
from esign,whichwas also that used
by the Stoics; while
n
ethics he fitness
f thingswas substituted or the
more me-
chanical law of
self-preservation,s the
rule of conduct; and
the subjection
of
all impulse to reason
was
replaced by the
milderprinciple
f a control xercisedby the benievolent
ver
the malevolent nstincts. This was
a verydistinctdeparture
from he Stoic method, et thosewho made
t were mnore
aithful
to teleologyhau Stoicismhad been; forto condemnhuman
feeling ltogether
as
immplicitly
o
condemn he work
f
nature
or of
God.
The other reat thicalmethod f the
eighteenth entury,
ts
hedonism,
as
closely
onnected
with
the
sceptical
movement
in
speculative hilosophy,nd like that
received n
entirely
ew
significancey becoming
ssociatedwith he
dea
of aw. Those
who isolate
man from
he universe re
necessarily
ed to seek in
his interests s
such the sole regulator
fhis actions,nd
their
sole
sanction
n
the opinion
of
his fellows. Protagoras
went
already o far,notwithstandingis unwillingness o recognise
pleasure s
the
supreme
nd; and
in the system
f
his
true
uc-
cessor,
Aristippus,
he nmost xtremehedonism
went
hand in
hand
with the
most
extrenmedealism;
while
with
Epicurus,
again,
both re
tempered y
the
nfluence
f naturalism
mpos-
ing on him ts
conceptions fobjective aw alike
in
science
nd
in
practice.
Still his system eaned heavily o
the
side
of self-
gratificationure
and
simple; and
it
was
reserved or
modern
thought o establish
complete equilibriumbetween
the two
competingendencies f Greek ethics. This has been effected
in
Utilitarianism;
nd those critics re entirelymistakenl
ho,
like M.
Guyau,
egard t as a mere eproductionf Epicureanismii.
It
mightwith
full
as
muchreason
be called
a modern ersion
f
Stoicism.
The
idea
of
humanity
s
essentially toic;
to
work
for
he good
of humanitywas
a
Stoic precept; and
to
sacrifice
one'sown pleasure
for
hathigher ood
s
a
virtue
which would
have
satistied he
most
rigorousdemands
of
a
Cleanthes,
n
Epictetus,
r an
Aurelius.
Utilitarianismgreeswitlh he ancient hedonism n holding
pleasure
o
be
the sole good
and
pain the sole evil. Its
ad-
herents
lso,
for
he7most art,
dmit hat
the
desire
of the one
and
the
dread
of
the
other
re
the
sole motives
o action;
but,
while
making
he
end
absolutely
niversal nd
impersonal,
hey
make
the
motive
nto
a
momentary
mpulse
without
any
ne-
cessary
elation
o the
future
happiness
of the
agent
himself.
The
good
man
does
his
duty
because
doing
t
gives
him
pleasure,
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 13:34:23 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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21/25
250
The
Relation
f
Greek
hilosophy
o ModernThought.
or
because the
failure to
do it would
give
him pain, at the
moment;although e knows that a contraryoursewould