BACK TO THE FUTURE? Policy directions for humanitarian entry in Australia

Thane Bourne November, 2016

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary 2

Explanatory Note 3

List of Figures 4

List of Tables 4

Abbreviations 5

Research report: Back to the Future? Policy directions for humanitarian entry in Australia 7

Introduction: A global trend 7

Historical experiences of private sponsorship resettlement programs 9

The Australian Experience 9

The Canadian Experience 19

Current structure of private sponsorship programs in Australia and Canada 26

Australia: The Community Proposal Pilot 26

Canada: Government Assisted Refugees & Privately Sponsored Refugees 29

Key differences 34

Opportunities 38

Challenges 41

Conclusion 43

Bibliography 45

Appendix 1: Full Community Sponsorship 48

2

Executive Summary

This report investigates an apparent policy trend towards greater private sector

involvement and its implications for humanitarian migration and settlement in

Australia. A comparison is made of the Community Proposal Pilot in Australia and the

Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program in Canada.

Five key differences were identified between the CPP and PSRP:

1. The size of the Canadian private volunteer sector is much larger than

Australia, despite the countries’ similar demographic and economic profiles;

2. Expectations of volunteers and their level of engagement with settlement

programs in Canada is much higher than Australia;

3. Different arrangements for financial support of refugees during the

sponsorship period may contribute to greater investment of time and

resources among Canadian volunteer sponsors;

4. The level of co-ordination among private sponsoring organisations appears to

be higher and frameworks for consultation with government more robust in

Canada than in Australia;

5. The current tone of public debate in Canada regarding refugee issues is far

clearer and conducive to mobilising host community support for refugees

than in Australia.

The report concludes private sponsorship can function as a mechanism allowing

support for humanitarian principles to be expressed through action, while

simultaneously reducing the cost of providing settlement services and social

assistance during the initial stages of settlement. To do this effectively in an

Australian context requires action from government and approved proposing

organisations. Humanitarian entrants through the CPP should be accounted for in

addition to other Humanitarian Programme entrants, rather than as part of the same

cohort as they are presently. Maintenance of a pool of ‘pre-approved’ candidates for

humanitarian entry would also facilitate greater mainstream community involvement.

Proposing organisations will need to conduct outreach and training programs to

encourage the formation of volunteer groups and ensure the level of settlement

service delivery they provide is consistent across the sector.

3

Explanatory Notes

Terminology

In relation to the migration and settlement aspects of this report, it is important to clearly specify

the meaning of the following terms:

Citizenship and Immigration Canada/Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada: the

government department responsible for administering the Canadian private sponsorship program.

The department was renamed in 2015 by the incoming Liberal government. References in the

report to documents and policy changes use the departmental name as it was at the time of

publication/change.

Community: may refer to an ethno-specific community or the wider, ‘mainstream’ community. In

the report, reference to a “supporting community” should be understood as an ethnic community

supporting a CPP/CSP applicant.

Proposer: a term specific to Australian migration law. Refers to a person or approved proposing

organisation who nominates an applicant for a Global Special Humanitarian subclass visa.

Sponsorship: holds different legal meanings in the migration systems of Australia and Canada.

Refers in this report to the process of providing settlement assistance to humanitarian entrants.

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Humanitarian entrants in the SHP and SAC streams. 12

Figure 2: Family stream application “pipeline” and annual new applications. 15

Figure 3: Canada PSR and GAR intake, 1980-2016. 19

Figure 4: Economic and Humanitarian Migrants as Proportion of Canada’s Immigration

Program, 1980-2016. 21

Figure 5: Employed refugees by entry class with annual employment rate, 1991 cohort. 24

Figure 6: Organisational structure of the CPP. 27

Figure 7: SHP and CPP visa grant rates. 28

Figure 8: Organisational chart for the Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program. 30

Figure 9: IRCC Refugee Application Processing Times by Source Country of Application. 33

List of Tables

Table 1: SHP applications, visa grants and proportional grant rate. 14

Table 2: Estimate of Sponsorship Cost for the PSR program. 32

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Abbreviations

Australia

ANAO Australian National Audit Office

APO Approved Proposing Organisation

CPP Community Proposal Pilot

CSR Community Support for Refugees

CRSS Community Refugee Settlement Scheme

CSP Community Support Program

DIAC Department of Immigration and Citizenship

DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protection

DIEA Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

DIMA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

DIMIA Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

DSS Department of Social Services

EPAS Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers

HSS Humanitarian Settlement Services

IHSS Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy

NES Non-English speaking

OAA On-Arrival Accommodation

SAC Special Assistance Category

SCO Supporting Community Organisation

SHP Special Humanitarian Program

VAC Visa Application Charge

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Canada

BVOR Blended Visa Office Referral

CIC Citizenship and Immigration Canada

CG Constituent Group

GAR Government-Assisted Refugee

IFHP Interim Federal Health Program

IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada

JAS Joint Assistance Sponsorship

PSR Privately Sponsored Refugee

RAP Resettlement Assistance Program

RSTP Refugee Sponsorship Training Program

SAH Sponsorship Agreement Holder

VOR Visa Office Referral

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Back to the Future? Policy directions for humanitarian entry in

Australia

Introduction: A global trend

In the face of spiralling numbers of refugees and internally displaced people around the world,

political leaders have acknowledged the need for greater cooperation between public and private

sector organisations to alleviate the current situation1. The need for identifying means of

broadening third-country resettlement pathways has been raised in addition to providing increased

humanitarian aid and support to stabilise source countries of refugees. Private sponsorship of

refugees is one of a range of ideas for boosting the engagement of non-government sector

organisations in international resettlement efforts2. Increasingly, national governments are

instituting policy frameworks that make allowances for non-government actors including church

groups, ethno-specific community organisations or individuals, to nominate refugee families for

resettlement and to take responsibility for immediate post-arrival settlement assistance.

Although the broad international trend towards increasing acceptance of private sponsorship as a

policy option is clear, no single program model has received universal acceptance. Canada’s long-

running private sponsorship system often forms the basis for policy discussions in the field3.

Australia also has lengthy historical experience of private sponsorship, although the role of volunteer

sponsors declined for some time from the 1990s and has only just begun the process of regaining its

previous status. This report aims to identify and analyse differences in the historical experience of

national private sponsorship programs in Australia and Canada and their current structures. The

report will also outline existing challenges and possible opportunities for private sponsorship of

refugees in an Australian policy context.

1 “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,” United Nations, accessed 9 November, 2016, http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.1&referer=/zh/&Lang=E, 15. 2 “Analysis: How the Private Sector Can Help Tackle the Refugee Crisis,” Daniel Howden, News Deeply, last modified 3 October, 2016, https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2016/10/03/analysis-how-the-private-sector-can-help-tackle-the-refugee-crisis?utm_campaign=c6564e02ad-Refugees_Deeply_Weekly_Update_10_0710_6_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Refugees+Deeply&utm_term=0_8b056c90e2-c6564e02ad-117464529. 3 See Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, “Hospitality and Sovereignty: What Can We Learn From the Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program?” International Journal of Refugee Law, 24, 3 (2012): 579-602; “Welcoming Engagement: How Private Sponsorship Can Strengthen Refugee Resettlement in the European Union,” Judith Kumin, Migration Policy Institute Europe, accessed 20 August, 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Asylum-PrivateSponsorship-Kumin-FINAL.pdf, 3.

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The report is structured as follows: Section One forms the introduction and lays out the research

methodology. Section Two examines the historical experience and drivers of private sponsorship in

Australia and Canada. Section Three outlines current program structures in Australia and Canada,

and the differences that exist between national contexts. Section Four then identifies potential

opportunities and challenges for sponsoring organisations and settlement service providers in an

Australian policy context. The report concludes private sponsorship has the potential to facilitate

the integration of moral imperatives regarding humanitarian migration with economic drivers that

currently dominate settlement policy in Australia. To realise this potential, the program structure of

Australia’s humanitarian intake will require reform, while adequate provisions will also need to be

made for educating and training volunteer settlement groups to ensure consistent levels of service

provision to humanitarian entrants. Finally, an outline of the UK model for private sector refugee

sponsorship is included as an appendix for reference purposes.

Methodology

Research was conducted while on placement at AMES Australia. The report includes qualitative

analysis of a wide range of sources including academic journal articles, conference papers, statistical

migration data, departmental program reviews, private correspondence, resources from the

Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Training Program and research reports and internal documents from

AMES Australia.

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Historical experiences of private sponsorship resettlement programs

Few countries have historically maintained a consistent commitment to third country resettlement

programs. Among the countries of primary importance in this respect are Canada and Australia.

Despite superficial similarities in Canada and Australia’s total humanitarian intake levels, the

historical experience and structure of private sponsorship resettlement programs differ significantly

between the two nations.

The Australian experience

Prior to 1977, Australia accepted humanitarian migrants on an ad hoc basis by reacting to

international crises as they occurred. In 1977, the government announced its intention to

implement a planned resettlement policy response to the ongoing international situation of refugees

The possibility of refugee sponsorship by voluntary agencies was raised by Minister for Immigration

and Ethnic Affairs Michael MacKellar4. This was followed by the establishment of the CRSS which

drew on widespread community sympathy for refugees by allowing voluntary agencies, groups and

individuals to provide settlement support and orientation5. As part of their application to participate

in the scheme, sponsoring organisations were expected to:

Receive the refugees on arrival in the settlement locality;

Source suitable accommodation close to sponsors and other members of the refugee

family’s ethnic community;

Make a commitment to sponsor at least 16 individual refugees, or four refugee families if

the appropriate ethnic community was not already established in the settlement locality;

Make arrangements for English language tuition as necessary;

Make arrangements to enrol eligible dependent children in school;

Help refugees to register with the DSS;

Assist refugees in finding employment;

Make refugees aware of and facilitate access to health and welfare services.

4 “Ministerial Statement: Speech,” Michael MacKellar, Australian Parliamentary Library, accessed 3 August, 2016, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1977-05-24/0126/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. 5 Community Refugee Settlement Scheme (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 1983), 2nd edition.

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Refugee sponsors were expected to provide these services for a “reasonable minimum period” of six

months6. Sponsors were responsible for initial household establishment costs, including furniture,

bedding and food, however these costs were ameliorated by a system of grants provided by the

DIEA. Income support for refugees was provided by the DSS in the form of Special Benefit,

unemployment benefit and education allowance for refugees enrolled in full-time language training.

In 1981, the establishment of the SHP humanitarian migration category marked the beginning of

community-proposed resettlement in Australia7. As the program allowed for Australian residents

and citizens to propose applicants for resettlement, the SHP formed an alternative pathway for

humanitarian entry into Australia8. In the first years of the CRSS, resettled refugees were identified

by consular officers at post and placed into a resettlement “pool” to wait for a suitable sponsor9.

Although nominating “named” refugees was an option under the CRSS, the program was initially

conceived as being made available on a needs basis for refugees without existing family or cultural

links in host communities. By the late 1980s, the DIEA was actively encouraging sponsors to refer

relatives and friends of potential applicants to lodge applications through the SHP to ensure people

in need had access to the CRSS10. A departmental report at the time found that although the

settlement experiences of entrants under the CRSS scheme were similar to those of government

sponsored refugees, CRSS refugees regarded the scheme in an overwhelmingly positive light11.

As communities of refugees became established in Australia, the SHP became a “split-family”

program, in which only immediate members of the proposer’s nuclear family unit were considered

for entry. Over time, regulations regarding the eligibility of proposers have also been tightened. The

DIBP now only considers applications sponsored by immediate family members12 already settled in

6 ibid, 2-3. 7 “Special Humanitarian Program Ministerial Statement,” Ian McPhee, Australian Parliamentary Library, accessed 4 October, 2016, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1981-11-18%2F0167%22. 8 “Australia’s Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program: Current Issues and Future Directions,” Refugee Council of Australia, accessed 9 November, 2016, http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/docs/resources/submissions/2006-07_intakesub.pdf, 21. 9 Community Refugee Settlement Scheme, 4. 10 The Community Refugee Settlement Scheme: A Handbook for Support Groups (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 1987) 3rd edition, 3. 11 “Proposed Pilot of a Private/Community Refugee Sponsorship Program,” Department of Immigration and Citizenship, accessed 9 November, 2016, https://www.ames.net.au/documents/policy-responses/diac-proposed-pilot-of-a-private-community-refugee-sponsorship-program, 9. 12 The DIBP defines “immediate family members” as: spouse or de facto partner, dependent children and parents.

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Australia who did not arrive by boat after 13 August 201213. Applications to the SHP are not subject

to fees for processing or medical checks, although proposers or applicants are expected to pay travel

costs and proposers are expected to take full responsibility for the costs of providing the same

settlement assistance as under the CRSS14. Other humanitarian resettlement pathways have also

been explored in Australia. In 1991 the SAC was established in response to concerns regarding the

outlook for populations “in real need, [who] have a special need to settle in Australia but who do not

fit the United Nations definition of a refugee or our traditional programs.”15 The SAC provided a

settlement pathway for people in refugee-like situations in specified countries of origin with family

or ethnic community support in Australia to provide settlement assistance. The number of

humanitarian entrants under the SAC outstripped the SHP between 1992-93 and 1995-96, as shown

in Figure 1. In order to gain refuge, SAC applicants required a written assurance from proposers in

Australia undertaking to provide the same initial settlement services as the CRSS16. This undertaking

of support was not legally binding17, however, leaving some humanitarian entrants without social

networks beyond their families with nowhere to go in the event settlement undertakings failed.

By the mid-1990s, there was growing dissatisfaction with the settlement outcomes delivered by the

Humanitarian Programme. Where the CRSS had brought refugees together with members of the

wider community, the settlement service model under the SAC left many refugees without sufficient

support, hindering their integration and sometimes creating new conflict with sponsors and

members of their communities18. Some academics blamed the failure of settlement policies for

“ghetto[s] complete with criminal gangs,” high-unemployment in some non-English speaking ethnic

communities and the use of “ethnic issues to distort the political debate”19.

The election of the Howard government in 1996 resulted in a change of emphasis in settlement

service planning. From 1996, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Philip Ruddock

13“The Special Humanitarian Program (SHP),” Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed November 9, 2016, https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Refu/Offs/The-Special-Humanitarian-Programme-(SHP). 14 ibid. 15 “House Hansard (Question No. 1035),” Gerard Hand, Australian Parliamentary Library, accessed 5 September, 2016, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1992-09-10%2F0202%22. 16 Barry York, Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2003), 64. 17 M. Mitchell, “Post-Arrival Settlement Service Restrictions,” in Third National Immigration and Population Outlook Conference Volume 2, (Adelaide: Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, 1995). 18 J. Bajraktarevic, “Bosnian Refugee: The Personal Perspective on Refugee Movements,” in Third National Immigration and Population Outlook Conference Volume 2, (Adelaide: Bureau of Immigration Multicultural and Population Research, 1995). 19 H. Hughes, “Appropriate Targeting? A Critique of the Australian Immigration Program,” in Third National Immigration and Population Outlook Conference Volume 1, (Adelaide: Bureau of Immigration Multicultural and Population Research, 1995).

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wound back allocations under the SACs until they were eventually abolished in 2002-03. In 1997,

the government introduced the IHSS. The IHSS marked the beginning of a process emphasising a

purchaser-provider model of contracted service provision over the previous grant-based funding for

settlement service providers20. The early years of the new model proved problematic. A review of

settlement services by the ANAO in 1998-99 recommended greater training for staff and better

oversight of contractors and CRSS groups was needed21. By 2003, the CRSS had been abolished due

to ongoing concerns that humanitarian entrants served by the scheme were receiving levels of

assistance that varied according to the resources and size of volunteer groups.

Figure 1: Humanitarian entrants in the SHP and SAC streams22.

Some CRSS groups with better human and financial resources continued to work with DIMA and

contract service providers in the new CRS. The role of volunteer groups changed under the CRS to

20 Report on the Review of Settlement Services for Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants (Canberra: Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 2003), 35. 21 “Provision of Migrant Settlement Services by DIMA,” Australian National Audit Office, accessed 20 October, 2016, https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net616/f/anao_report_1998-99_29.pdf. 22 Data compiled from “Historical Migration Data,” Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed 9 September, 2016, http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/historical-migration-statistics.xls.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02

SHP SAC

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one of secondary importance behind specialist service providers and SHP proposers. This led to

tension and uncertainty regarding the viability of ongoing involvement by volunteer groups in

refugee settlement, with some groups indicating the changes had caused loss of motivation among

group members23.

Service providers including AMES Australia continue to mobilise and make use of volunteers,

particularly in language training programs24. However, broad-based host community volunteer

groups are no longer responsible for the full range of HSS, nor do they constitute the point of first

contact for humanitarian arrivals as they did under the CRSS.

Australia’s immigration policy regime has progressively hardened since the early 1990s. In 2001,

Prime Minister Howard explicitly linked the issues of border control and national sovereignty to

international crises of displaced populations25. Howard instituted the ‘Pacific Solution’ to control the

number of people seeking asylum in Australia by boat. The attempt to wind back the Pacific Solution

by the Labor government in 2007 coincided with a spike in boat arrivals. In response to heavy

domestic political pressure to “stop the boats”, Prime Minister Julia Gillard commissioned the

Houston Report from the EPAS in June, 2012. The findings of the report, while strongly reflective of

the prevailing securitised refugee policy paradigm, also noted that frustration at processing backlogs

of SHP applications was a motivating factor encouraging people to make their own way to Australia

by boat. Among the report’s recommendations were suggested changes to proposer eligibility

criteria to transfer visa applications away from the SHP towards the family stream of the migration

program26.

Visa grant rates for applications through the SHP have been very low during the past decade: Table 1

shows the annual SHP grant rate averaged just over nine percent of total applications between the

2006-07 and 2013-14 financial years. Figure 2 indicates new application lodgements and the

application pipeline in the Family migration stream did trend upwards from the 2012-13 year, but

whether this is due to applicants moving from the SHP to the Family stream is unclear.

23 Report of the Review of Settlement Services for Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants, 186-190. 24 “Volunteer Training,” AMES Australia, accessed 8 November, 2016, https://www.ames.net.au/services/volunteer-training. 25 “Australia’s Pacific Solution”, BBC, accessed 4 October, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/2279330.stm. 26“Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers,” Angus Houston, Paris Aristotle & Michael L’Estrange, Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, accessed 4 October, 2016, http://web.archive.org/web/20140221061416/http:/expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_full_report.pdf, 135-136.

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Year 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14

SHP

applications

60,005 34,259 35,657 34,045 24,448 22,915 21,995 37,006

SHP visa

grants

5,157 4,721 4,471 3,234 2,973 714 503 4,515

Grant rate (%) 8.6 13.8 12.5 9.5 12.2 3.1 2.3 12.2

Table 1: SHP applications, visa grants and proportional grant rate27.

At the same time as the EPAS was conducting its inquiry, the DIAC released a discussion paper

seeking submissions on the potential structure of a community sponsorship pilot program28. The

recommendations of the Houston report were accepted in their entirety by the government in

August, 201229. The establishment of an additional private proposal trial program, to be known as

the CPP and to sit within the SHP, was then announced by Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Brendan O’Connor’s office in May, 201330.

The CPP has represented incremental change in the structure of the humanitarian intake. As a trial

program, it has not been allocated the same level of priority as the SACs or SHP. 500 visa places per

year have been made available for five APOs, of which AMES Australia is one, to propose people in

humanitarian situations outside of Australia for resettlement31. Although official notices from the

DIBP indicate an expectation broad-based community and volunteer groups would become involved

in providing settlement support along the lines of the CRSS32, in practice this has only happened in a

27 Data compiled from “Historical Migration Data,” Department of Immigration and Border Control. 28 “Proposed Pilot of a Private/Community Refugee Sponsorship Program,” Department of Immigration and Citizenship, accessed 9 November, 2016, https://www.ames.net.au/files/file/Policy/Discussion%20Paper%20Private_Community%20Refugee%20Sponsorship%20Program.pdf. 29 “Joint Press Conference on Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers,” Julia Gillard & Chris Bowen, Australian Parliamentary Library, accessed 4 October, 2016, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/2280021/upload_binary/2280021.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/2280021%22. 30 “Media Release: Australia continues to meet its commitment to world’s most vulnerable people,” Brendan O’Connor, Australian Parliamentary Library, accessed 4 October, 2016, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/2445882/upload_binary/2445882.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22community%20proposal%20pilot%22. 31 “Community Proposal Pilot,” Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed 3 November, 2016, http://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Refu/Offs/Community-proposal-pilot. 32 ibid.

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few instances. Greater detail regarding the current structure of the CPP will be laid out in

subsequent sections of this report.

Figure 2: Family stream application “pipeline” and annual new applications33.

In June 2015, the DIBP issued a discussion paper calling for submissions regarding plans to change

the CPP into a fully-fledged program34. The discussion paper noted a review of the CPP was being

conducted with a view to establishing the program as a fully-fledged sponsorship model. AMES

Australia made a submission at that time, recommending:

Visa places under the new program be in addition to existing planned arrival numbers under

the humanitarian program;

All applicants for humanitarian visas, whether through the regular Humanitarian Programme

or under the extended CPP, be assessed according to objective legislative criteria;

33 Data compiled from “Report on Migration Programme,” Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.border.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics/statistics/live-in-australia/migration-programme. 34 “Community Support Program Discussion Paper,” Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed 3 November, 2016, http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/discussion-papers/cps-consultation.pdf#search=community%20support%20program%20discussion%20paper17.pdf#search=Australia%E2%80%99s%20Humanitarian%20Programme%202016%2D17%20Discussion%20Paper.

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

180000

2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16

Pipeline (as at end of financialyear)

New applications

16

Visa application charges currently in place as part of the CPP need not be replaced by an

Assurance of Support funding model;

The DIBP should identify suitable organisations in each state to take on the role of Approved

Proposing Organisation35.

In July 2016, the DIBP called for applications for the 2016-17 CPP program year above the 500 places

previously allocated to the program, suggesting internal decisions had been taken to extend the

program but not announced. On 21 September 2016, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Minister for

Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Peter Dutton issued

a joint media release stating their intention to establish the CSP, under which communities and

businesses will be able to sponsor applications for refugee status and provide settlement

assistance36. Few details of how the program will operate have been released, presumably pending

departmental consideration of policy submissions from stakeholders.

Australian Settlement Outcomes

The focus on federal government control of Australia’s immigration program and a paucity of

comprehensive data37 has meant relatively few quantitative, empirical studies have been conducted

of humanitarian settlement outcomes in instances where private sector volunteer organisations

have been involved. Instead, research has generally focussed on qualitative reviews of settlement

service programs, with a theoretical focus on how services are provided and what role volunteer

community groups might play in providing settlement assistance. The heyday of the CRSS during the

1980s was the time to conduct longitudinal research into the outcomes delivered by volunteer

groups. Unfortunately from a research perspective, the small size, limited reporting capabilities of

many groups and lack of professional contacts within the sector at the time38 appears to have left a

dearth of research differentiating between the settlement outcomes of entrants accessing different

types of services. Instead, studies focus on humanitarian entrants as a single body39, divided by

ethnic background or by area of settlement. Large service providers such as AMES Australia are now

35 Response to Community Support Program Discussion Paper (Melbourne: AMES Australia, 2015.) 36 “Joint Media Release: Leaders’ Summit on Refugees,” Malcolm Turnbull, Julie Bishop & Peter Dutton, Australian Parliamentary Library, accessed 3 November, 2016, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/4830778/upload_binary/4830778.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22Community%20Support%20Program%22. 37 Report on the Review of Settlement Services for Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants, 84. 38 Mitchell, “Post-Arrival Settlement Service Restrictions.” 39 “Settlement Indicators and Benchmarks,” Siew-Ean Khoo & Peter McDonald, Australian Parliament House, accessed 4 November 2016, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_committees?url=mig/skillmig/subs/app20i.pdf.

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attempting to make up some of the missed research opportunities of the past40. It seems likely the

lack of cohesiveness among volunteer settlement groups limited capacity for conducting and sharing

research, thereby resulting in a relative inability to advocate effectively to government. The

historical dominance of settlement service discourse by the federal government41 may also have

been a contributing factor in the sidelining of many volunteer community groups in the early 2000s.

Despite the general lack of academic research into private sector contributions to refugee

settlement, program reviews carried out since the 1980s contain important considerations for plans

to engage private sector organisations. One study carried out in the late 1980s found a tendency

among CRSS groups in Sydney towards two models of service delivery: one in which ‘on call’ support

was provided to link refugees with specialist settlement services, and the other in which groups

relied on their own resources to facilitate refugee participation in social and educational activities42.

The variance between models of service provision is reflected in the “desperate need” for training

among CRSS volunteers in the 1990s, many of whom failed to understand the ongoing settlement

needs of refugees that would extend beyond the sponsorship period43. Mitchell noted in 1995 that

although the settlement needs of refugees arriving into the CRSS, SAC or government-administered

OAA service programs were “almost the same”, the differences in service provision standards

between the programs were “massive”44.

Jupp argued an “ethnic specific” approach to providing community groups funding under the Grant-

in-Aid program during the 1990s had resulted in the factionalisation of migrant and refugee

communities, as well as failing to ensure requisite levels of information and service provision at

migrant resource centres and other community organisations45. Leoncini has argued changing

government definitions of the term “settlement period” and overemphasis in service programs on

40 See AMES Australia’s Research and Policy webpage, https://www.ames.net.au/research-and-policy/research. AMES Australia is also currently conducting a preliminary research project exploring the employment outcomes of humanitarian entrants through the CPP. This is the first latitudinal research project of which the author is aware, anywhere in Australia, that focusses on entry through the CPP as the control variable. 41 M. Lanphier & O. Lukomskyj, “Settlement Policy in Australia and Canada,” in Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared Volume II, eds. Howard Adelman, Allan Borowski, Meyer Burstein & Lois Foster (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994), 350. 42 Rhonda Ansiewicz, Australian Council of Churches Community Refugee Settlement Scheme Survey 1989 (Sydney: Australian Council of Churches, 1989), 3-4. 43 Mitchell, “Post-Arrival Settlement Service Restrictions.” 44 ibid. 45 J. Jupp, “Australia’s Settlement Service Provision: An Overview,” in Third National Immigration and Population Outlook Conference Volume 2 (Adelaide: Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, 1995).

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the initial years of settlement negatively affected the access to services of subgroups within

Australia’s migration program, such as women and refugees46.

Patterns of settlement location have also been considered as part of public policy reviews. The 2003

DIMIA Report of the Review of Settlement Services for Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants

identified the potential for “unlinked” refugees to be settled in regional areas to then act as

proposers for others to build communities47. McDonald-Wilmsen et al considered several

settlement case studies in regional Victoria and concluded regional resettlement can produce

positive outcomes for refugee and host communities, provided a well-integrated, whole of

government approach is taken to settlement planning48. An AMES Australia study on regional

resettlement strategies concluded leadership in settling and host communities, meaningful

economic participation and developing a “critical mass” within settling ethno-cultural groups,

allowing them to become self-sustaining, were key considerations for future regional initiatives49.

All of the research cited here is distinctive for its theoretical conceptual focus. Research that seeks

to objectively measure the refugee settlement experience in a quantitative manner is generally

lacking in the Australian context, although some efforts are now being made to address this shortfall.

This is perhaps a reflection of the “paternalistic understanding” of Australian society and its

“generous” approach to migrants and refugees50. It seems clear the role of government, sometimes

intentional and sometimes unwittingly, has been to prioritise policy implementation and control of

settlement programs in framing discussions of humanitarian settlement in Australia, leaving

settlement volunteers, service providers and researchers to play catch up.

46 B. Leoncini, “The Implications of the Tightening Definition of “Settlement Period,” in Third National Immigration and Population Outlook Conference Volume 2 (Adelaide: Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, 1995). 47 Report of the Review of Settlement Services for Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants, 322-323. 48 Brooke McDonald-Wilmsen et al., “Resettling Refugees in Rural and Regional Australia: Learning from Recent Policy and Program Initiatives,” The Australian Journal of Public Administration 68, no. 1, (2009): 108-109. 49 “Regional Settlement: An analysis of four settlement locations in Victoria,” AMES Australia, accessed 4 November, 2016, https://www.ames.net.au/files/file/Research/Regional_Settlement_Report_2011.pdf, pp. 38-39. 50 Clemence Due & Damien Riggs, “Moving Beyond English as a Requirement to “Fit In”: Considering Refugee and Migrant Education in South Australia,” Refuge, 26, no. 2 (2009): 56.

19

The Canadian experience

Canada’s experience with private sponsorship began with the enacting of the Immigration Act (1976),

which formally established a humanitarian immigration class in Canada’s immigration program51.

Refugees accepted for resettlement are divided into two primary categories in IRCC statistics:

government-assisted refugees (GAR) and privately sponsored refugees (PSR).

Figure 3: Canada PSR and GAR intake, 1980-201652.

The key principle of “additionality” underpinned the relationship between the GAR and PSR

categories. This principle dictated privately sponsored refugees were granted residency in Canada in

addition to the Canadian government’s own planned commitment to support resettled refugees53.

Additionality continues to inform the PSR program today, as it is explicitly included as one of the

51 “ARCHIVED – Forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizenship and Immigration, 1900-1977,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, last modified 1 July, 2006, http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/resources/publications/legacy/chap-6.asp#chap6-8. 52 Data compiled from “Canada – Permanent residents by immigration category, 1980 – Q1 2016,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, accessed 5 September, 2016, http://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/ad975a26-df23-456a-8ada-756191a23695. The 2016 annual intake is a projection based on data for Q1 2016. 53 “Sponsoring Refugees: Facts for Canadian Groups and Organizations,” Employment and Immigration Canada, accessed 9 November, 2016, http://cihs-shic.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Sponsoring-Refugees-Facts-for-Canadian-Groups-and-Organizations.pdf, p. 2.

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

PSR GAR

20

guiding principles of the Sponsor Agreement committed to by sponsoring organisations and IRCC54.

Large flows of people fleeing Indochina in the late 1970s provided an immediate opportunity for

non-government sponsoring groups to demonstrate their support for the system. The Canadian

government at the time affirmed the principle of additionality, indicating the GAR program would

match the PSR intake one-for-one. In this sense, additionality was originally conceived as a

humanitarian principle informing the overall size of Canada’s resettlement program.

Linking additionality and humanitarian motivations has resulted in periodic spikes of demand from

private sector organisations for increases in the Canadian government’s planned intake of PSR.

Awareness of refugee issues and willingness to become involved in supporting their settlement

needs in wider Canadian society appears to have been driven by periods of international crisis. The

1980s saw increasing numbers of applications for refugee status from a wide range of source

countries55, eventually resulting in an application backlog that reached 70,000 in 198856. The

conservative government of the day instituted the Backlog Clearance Program in 1989, along with

new refugee determination procedures despite concerns from refugee advocacy groups57. Figure 3

shows the distortion of data for the PSR program caused by the clearance of the backlog between

1989 and 1993, with the PSR intake reaching levels three to four times higher than surrounding

program years58.

Despite the Canadian government’s publicly-stated support for additionality, in practice sponsoring

groups have been forced to consistently resist attempts to undermine its implementation. Some

commentators have noted a shift in policy emphasis during the prime ministership of Jean Chrétien

in the 1990s towards skilled migration and neoliberal economic policy59. Figure 4 indicates there

was a marked rise in the proportion of skilled migrants in Canada’s immigration program starting in

the early 1990s.

54 “Sponsor Agreement,” Citizenship and Immigration Canada, accessed 6 November 2012 at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip03-appC-ann6-eng.pdf, p. 2. 55 “Privately Sponsored Refugees: Findings from the Longitudinal Immigration Database,” Citizenship and Immigration Canada, accessed 11 October 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/imdb/PSR_3.pdf. 56 “December 14, 1988,” Sergio Marchi, Linked Parliamentary Data Project, accessed 2 October, 2016, http://www.lipad.ca/full/1988/12/14/7/#3765372. 57 “Resolving the Backlog: An Analysis of Canada’s Refugee Backlog Clearance Program,” Sheikh N. Azaad, York University, accessed 11 October 2016, http://repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:742. 58 “Canada - Permanent Residents by immigration category 1980-Q1 2016,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. 59 Y. Abu-Laban, “Jean Chrétien’s Immigration Legacy: Continuity and Transformation,” in The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada, eds. Lois Harder & Steve Patten (McGill, ON: Queen’s University Press, 2006), 145.

21

The change in philosophy by government resulted in an incremental trend away from the

humanitarian focus of the past to placing greater store in the importance of economic factors in

determining policy. Although hard data is not available, by 2003 the PSR program appears to have

changed in nature from a society-wide network of volunteer groups supporting refugee settlement

to a family reunification program. Estimates placed the proportion of “family-linked” sponsorships,

in which relatives already settled in Canada sponsored extended family members or friends, at 95

percent of all private sector sponsorships in some areas of the country60. Frustration among

sponsors at lengthy application processing times and the decline of the financial resources of church-

based groups were among the factors blamed for lower interest in private sponsorship by broad-

based community organisations during this period61.

Figure 4: Economic and Humanitarian Migrants as Proportion of Canada’s Immigration Program,

1980-201662.

60 Tom Denton, “Understanding Private Refugee Sponsorship in Manitoba,” Journal of International Migration and Integration, 4, no. 2 (2003): 258. 61 Denton, “Understanding Private Refugee Sponsorship,” 259-260. 62 Data compiled from “Canada - Permanent Residents by immigration category 1980-Q1 2016,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Pro

po

rtio

n o

f to

tal i

mm

igra

tio

n in

take

(%

)

Economic Humanitarian

22

Additionality became a particularly contentious issue during the period between 2004 and 2015:

repeated pledges by Prime Minister Stephen Harper for increases in Canada’s humanitarian

resettlement intake were underpinned by the assumption settlement responsibility for most new

arrivals would be borne by the private sector. In addition to expecting private sector organisations

to do more, the Harper government also imposed procedural restrictions on the PSR program’s

operability. New humanitarian entrance categories such as the BVOR were introduced, in which

private sector sponsors provided settlement support while refugee income support was funded by

the federal government, cuts were made to the IFHP in 2012, which provides medical coverage for

humanitarian entrants not yet covered by provincial health insurance programs63, application limits

were placed on sponsoring organisations and processing caps were enforced at Canadian consular

posts, limiting the scope for family-linked sponsorships from particular regions64. These measures

were seen by some members of the resettlement sector as a serious threat to the ongoing viability

of private sponsorship in Canada65.

During the 2015 election campaign, the Liberal Party used the refugee issue as grounds for

differentiating itself from Harper’s Progressive Conservative government, promising 25,000 Syrian

refugees would be accepted by the end of 2015. After winning government, processing delays

meant the quota was filled by the end of February, 2016. Since coming to power, new Prime

Minister Justin Trudeau has effected an apparent return to the humanitarian principles of the 1970s

and 80s. Figure 3 indicates in the first quarter of 2016, PSR numbers are on track to reach levels not

seen since the early 1990s. The cuts to IFHP health coverage made under the Harper government

have also been repealed by Trudeau. Finally, Figure 4 demonstrates the proportion of Canada’s

migration intake made up of humanitarian entrants appears to be approaching a level last seen

during the earliest years of the PSR program.

63 “Interim Federal Health Program: Summary of coverage,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, accessed 9 November, 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/outside/summary-ifhp.asp. 64 “Private Sponsorship and Public Policy: Political barriers to church-connected refugee resettlement in Canada,” Ashley Chapman, Citizens for Public Justice, accessed 9 November, 2016, https://www.cpj.ca/sites/default/files/docs/files/PrivateSponsorshipandPublicPolicyReport.pdf, 8-9. 65 Shauna Labman, “Private Sponsorship: Complementary or Conflicting Interests?” Refuge, 32, no. 2 (2016): 67-80.

23

PSR settlement outcomes

Determining levels of societal integration among resettled refugees is problematic due to the range

of indicators available to researchers66. In addition, many studies consolidate the different classes of

refugees in Canada (GAR, PSR and “Landed in Canada Refugees”) into a single humanitarian category,

making the benefits or drawbacks of private sponsorship impossible to determine. A brief review of

the Canadian settlement literature follows, focussing primarily on employment outcomes, income

levels and social capital.

Research into employment levels among PSR has returned mixed conclusions. DeVoretz, Pivnenko

and Beiser conducted a longitudinal study on the employment and income levels of several refugee

cohorts after seven years in Canada67. With particular regard to PSR, their analysis concludes that

private sponsorship appears to result in a higher chance of finding employment, possibly due to

leveraging the social capital of sponsors, in addition to slightly higher incomes compared to GAR for

those refugees who are successful in finding work.

Yu, Ouellet & Warmington’s research on income from employment supports the earlier findings,

with PSR experiencing an advantage in the short-term (one year after arrival) over GAR. After five

years, however, GAR employment income levels indicate convergence with those of PSR68. However,

the analysis of Yu et al is based on data from different refugee cohorts and should therefore be

treated with care. Dhital’s examination of income disparity between different refugee classes is also

limited by its analysis of a single refugee cohort (1991)69. Dhital’s findings provide further support

for the thesis short-term employment and income data tend to advantage PSR. However, data

included in the study also indicates the long-term employment rate for refugees arriving in 1991

favour GAR, as shown in Figure 5. The size of the 1991 PSR cohort was abnormally large,

undoubtedly affecting the employment rate results, even as greater absolute numbers of PSR

managed to find employment. Analysis of other refugee cohorts would be necessary to confirm the

employment rate trend in favour of GAR.

66 Soojin Yu, Estelle Ouellet, & Angelyn Warmington, “Refugee Integration in Canada: A Survey of Empirical Evidence and Existing Services,” Refuge, 24, no. 2 (2007): 18. 67 “The Economic Experiences of Refugees in Canada,” Don DeVoretz, Sergiy Pivnenko & Morton Beiser, Institute for the Study of Labor, accessed 29 October, 2016, http://ssrn.com/abstract=526022. 68 Yu, Ouellet, & Warmington, “Refugee Integration in Canada,” 21. 69 “The Economic Outcomes of Government Assisted Refugees, Privately Sponsored Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Canada,” Dikshya Dhital, University of Ottawa, accessed 30 October, 2016, https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj5wJSkxprQAhVCkJQKHc2iA9QQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ruor.uottawa.ca%2Fbitstream%2F10393%2F32311%2F1%2FDIKSHYA%2C%2520Dikshya%252020151.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHkPvru99crfDfSa9vA72dFaCb9TQ.

24

Social capital, as opposed to financial or human capital, plays a central role in determining

settlement outcomes70. Lamba and Krahn have identified the relationship between problems faced

by refugees and the nature of the social networks (familial and extra-familial) they utilise to resolve

them. Specifically, employment and health issues were found to be areas where refugees tended to

rely on extra-familial relationships, such as religious and community leaders, sponsors, host

volunteers and/or specialist service providers to resolve the problem71.

Figure 5: Employed refugees by entry class with annual employment rate, 1991 cohort72.

Despite indications refugee sponsors have a role to play in facilitating employment outcomes, Lamba

and Krahn’s survey also found sponsors are the social group with whom refugees maintain least

frequent contact73, suggesting private sponsorship in many cases takes on a primarily task-related

form. Uncertainty among PSR regarding the expected nature of their relationship with sponsors may

70 Navjot Lamba, & Harvey Krahn, “Social Capital and Refugee Resettlement: The Social Networks of Refugees in Canada,” Journal of International Migration & Integration, 4, no. 3 (2003): 356. 71 ibid, 350. 72 Data compiled from “The Economic Outcomes of Government Assisted Refugees, Privately Sponsored Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Canada,” Dikshya Dhital, and “Canada – Permanent residents by immigration category,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. 73 Lamba & Krahn, “Social Capital and Refugee Resettlement,” 349.

25.5

22.7 22.4 22.4 22.3 22.7 23.223.8 24.1 24.6 24.5 24.9 25.1 25.2 25.2 25.4 25.4

24.7

20.824.4 26.4

28.9 29.833.0

35.437.8 40.1 42.3 43.5 44.6 45.7 47.6 48.4 49.3 50.2 48.4

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

10000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Peo

ple

in e

mp

loym

ent

PSR GAR

25

be a contributing factor in this situation74, as might unwillingness among some sponsors to interact

with other sources of support from the refugee’s ethnic community75.

Overall, the literature paints an uncertain picture regarding the benefits of private sponsorship. The

theoretical advantages, such as those outlined by Lanphier (bonding between sponsors and refugees,

building of refugees’ social capital in the Canadian context, bridge-building between refugees and

host communities, and improving awareness and coverage of refugee issues in the media)76 appear

relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. However, in some cases they may also betray a bias

on the part of sponsorship and refugee advocates for promoting the humanitarian virtues of the

program without granting sufficient weight to potential difficulties in facilitating successful

settlement. Objective surveys of refugees regarding their perceptions of settlement services and

their own integration outcomes demonstrate comparisons between the GAR and PSR programs are

far less clear cut77.

74 Michael Lanphier, “Sponsorship: Organizational, Sponsor, and Refugee Perspectives,” Journal of International Migration and Integration, 4, no. 2 (2003): 243. 75 Morton Beiser, “Sponsorship and Resettlement Success,” Journal of International Migration & Integration, 4, no. 2 (2003): 213. 76 Lanphier, “Sponsorship,” 245-248. 77 Beiser, “Sponsorship and Resettlement Success,” 213.

26

Current structure of private sponsorship programs in Australia and Canada

Humanitarian immigration programs in Australia and Canada display considerable difference in the

level of flexibility built into the resettlement systems in each country. This has resulted in divergent

outcomes in the number of refugees accepted during times of international crisis. This section will

outline specific differences in the governance structure of the Community Proposal Pilot (CPP) in

Australia and the PSR programme in Canada.

Australia: The Community Proposal Pilot

People who are successfully proposed for entry to Australia through the CPP are granted a Global

Special Humanitarian visa (subclass 202). The 202 subclass is also allocated to people seeking

asylum under the SHP. To be eligible, applicants must be:

Outside Australia at the time of lodging their application;

Living outside their home country;

Subject to substantial discrimination, amounting to a gross violation of their human rights, in

their home country;

Proposed by a person or organisation in Australia78.

The CPP differs from the SHP in several important respects. First, CPP applications must be lodged

with the DIBP by an APO on behalf of the SCO or individual supporting community member, rather

than direct lodging with the department. The five APOs currently participating in the CPP have

signed a Deed of Agreement with the DIBP under which the proposing organisation is ultimately

responsible for the settlement outcomes of clients79. Figure 6 provides an overview of the

organisational structure of the CPP. Arrowheads indicate responsibility for program administration:

APOs are responsible to the department for monitoring and reporting on settlement outcomes,

while SCOs and supporting community members are responsible for their undertakings to APOs to

provide direct settlement assistance to CPP entrants. APOs are also responsible to SCOs and

community members for conducting the lodging of applications and sometimes acting as the initial

point of contact with the department on behalf of clients. Although provisions for SCO involvement

have been made in the Deed of Agreement, the small size of the pilot has meant CPP applicants to

date have generally been supported by individuals. The role of APOs is complex, as it involves

78 “Global Special Humanitarian visa (subclass 202),” Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed 5 November, 2016, https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/202-. 79 Deed of Agreement in Relation to the Community Proposal Pilot (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2013).

27

managing and reconciling the expectations of community members and organisations with

responsibility for implementing policy determined by the department.

Figure 6: Organisational structure of the CPP.

Solid arrows indicate compulsory responsibilities between organisational levels, with arrowheads indicating

direction of reporting/oversight. Dashed arrows indicate optional relationships (ie. Supporting community

members are not obliged to work in partnership with an SCO to support a CPP entrant).

Second, applicants through the CPP or the proposer are liable for a VAC in addition to other costs

associated with the application. AMES Australia estimates the total costs involved for a single

applicant at around $30,000, with $5,000 added for each additional applicant80. SHP applications are

not subject to a VAC, which makes up around half of the costs involved with the CPP. Successful

application rates are much higher and processing of CPP applications is conducted within a

considerably shorter timeline than regular SHP applications81.

Although comparisons of program years are difficult due to delayed processing times for regular SHP

applications82, in the three program years of the CPP to date, applications lodged by AMES Australia

80 Buchanan & Iachelini, AMES Australia Community Proposal Pilot Summary Report, 1. 81 ibid, 4; “Community Support Programme Discussion Paper,” Department of Immigration and Border Protection, accessed 9 November, 2016, https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/discussion-papers/cps-consultation.pdf. 82 “Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers,” Angus Houston, Paris Aristotle & Michael L’Estrange, http://web.archive.org/web/20140221061416/http:/expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_full_report.pdf, 135-136.

Department of Immigration

and Border Protection

Supporting

Community

Organisation Supporting

Community

Member

(individual)

Approved

Proposing

Organisation

28

have averaged an 83 percent approval rate83, compared to an average SHP approval rate of nine

percent between 2006-07 and 2013-1484. Figure 7 provides an overview of the difference in

successful application rates. The capping of visa places under the CPP may be a factor influencing

the CPP grant rate, as the chances of a successful application could have a role in the decision

making of AMES Australia staff when selecting applicants for the program. Data for other APOs was

not available at the time of writing.

Figure 7: SHP and CPP visa grant rates85.

CPP data only available from AMES Australia starting from 2013-14; SHP data only available from DIBP to

2013-14.

Finally, humanitarian entrants resettled through the SHP have access to HSS, but CPP entrants do

not. AMES Australia staff maintain intermittent contact with and oversight of CPP entrants but only

intervene in exceptional cases. People serviced through the CPP exit the program once they achieve

83 Buchanan & Iachelini, AMES Australia Community Proposal Pilot Summary Report, 4. 84 Compiled from Department of Immigration and Citizenship and Department of Immigration and Border Protection statistical reports, available from http://www.border.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics. 85 Data compiled from Laura Buchanan & Rosemarie Iachelini, AMES Australia Community Proposal Pilot Summary Report (Melbourne: AMES Australia, 2016) and “Historical Migration Data,” http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/historical-migration-statistics.xls.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16

Vis

a gr

ant

rate

(%

)

SHP and CPP visa grant rates

AMES Australia CPP grant rate SHP grant rate

29

a set of settlement outcomes86. In the experience of AMES Australia, clients often achieve these

outcomes prior to the expiry of the 12 month period87.

An ongoing point of contention since the CPP began is the linkage between places in the CPP and the

overall size of Australia’s Humanitarian Programme88. 500 places have been allocated annually to

the CPP, at the loss of places in other streams of the offshore and onshore processing programs.

AMES Australia has previously adopted the position places in the CPP or future CSP should not

reduce the number of “non-paying” places elsewhere in the Humanitarian Programme89. To some

extent, this reflects ongoing tension in Australia between the moral, humanitarian aspects of third-

country resettlement and economic arguments concerning the need to maintain control and offset

the cost of settlement service delivery.

Canada: Government-Assisted Refugees and Privately Sponsored Refugees

The structure of the private sponsorship system in Canada in some ways provides the model for the

CPP. Figure 8 describes the monitoring and governance responsibilities of the system. Broadly

speaking, the PSR system and the CPP are arranged into similar governance structures – the roles of

SAHs and CGs provide the conceptual basis for APOs and SCOs in Australia. SAHs form a buffer

between IRCC and the several thousand CGs spread across Canada90 in a similar role to that played

by APOs. The responsibilities of SAHs as outlined in Sponsor Agreements concluded with IRCC

include:

Conducting preliminary assessment as to whether applicants meet refugee eligibility criteria;

Ensuring settlement plans are developed for every sponsorship undertaking;

Ensuring CGs have sufficient resources to deliver the settlement plan;

Making alternative arrangements in the event of a sponsorship breakdown91.

Resettlement programs in Canada are categorised according to the body responsible for post-arrival

settlement outcomes. The RAP provides on-arrival accommodation, household establishment and

orientation programs for GAR. PSR sponsors are responsible for providing these services using their

86 “Humanitarian Settlement Services (HSS),” Department of Social Services, accessed 5 November, 2016, https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-affairs/programs-policy/settlement-services/humanitarian-settlement-services-hss. 87 Buchanan & Iachelini, AMES Australia Community Proposal Pilot Summary Report, 8. 88 “Disappointment over refugee sponsorship scheme,” Phillippa Carisbrooke, Special Broadcasting Service, accessed 5 October, 2016, http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2012/12/27/disappointment-over-refugee-sponsorship-scheme. 89 Response to Community Support Programme Discussion Paper (Melbourne: AMES Australia, 2015), 3. 90 Estimate provided by Ellen Woolaver, email correspondence, 27 October, 2016. 91 “Sponsorship Agreement,” Citizenship and Immigration Canada, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip03-appC-ann6-eng.pdf.

30

own financial resources. Both GAR and PSR have access to medical coverage through the IFHP while

they wait to qualify for insurance cover under provincial government health plans. At the end of the

sponsorship period, PSR can access provincial income support and welfare programs as required92.

Sponsoring organisations can nominate an individual or family of refugees, similar to proposing CPP

applicants, or they can apply to sponsor refugees referred through the VOR. Under this program,

sponsors can request to view profiles of refugees pre-approved for resettlement from IRCC

databases. Arrival times in Canada can be reduced to between one and four months rather than the

one and a half to two years often required for applications that require post-lodgement processing

at overseas diplomatic posts93.

Figure 8: Organisational chart for the Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program.

Dashed lines represent the SAH Association does not have a legislated role in the sponsoring of refugees. It

acts instead as a representative advocacy body on behalf of SAHs.

92 “Month 13 Planning – FAQs,” Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Month-13-FAQs.pdf. 93 “Visa Office Referrals (VOR),” Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Visa-Office-Referrals-VOR-Fact-Sheet-1.pdf.

Constituent Groups

Immigration, Refugees and

Citizenship Canada

SAH Association

SAH Council SAH

Community

Sponsor

(incorporated

organisations)

Groups of 5

(individuals)

31

Additional programs in this space include the BVOR and JAS. BVOR sponsorships involve an

agreement between SAHs or their CGs and IRCC whereby income support for part of the sponsorship

period (up to six months) is provided by IRCC while settlement support and initial household

establishment costs are delivered by the sponsors94. These sponsorships are also sometimes known

as “3-9” or “4-8” sponsorships, referring to the period of government funding.

A JAS is similarly a joint sponsoring arrangement between the sponsoring organisation and IRCC. JAS

cases are generally initiated by IRCC, as the “admissibility” of refugees settled under this program as

determined by IRCC requires extra settlement assistance due to trauma, unusual family

configuration or medical conditions requiring special treatment. JAS cases receive sponsor support

for at least 24 and up to 36 months95.

The Canadian government requires sponsors to provide a year’s worth of financial support at the

same level as social assistance in the intended province of settlement, in addition to providing

arrangements for housing, language training, access to health and settlement services and social

engagement. Table 2 displays estimates for required financial support by sponsors. IRCC allows for

“in kind” deductions of financial support undertakings by sponsors when goods or accommodation

have been donated96. In some cases, refugee families may receive different levels of direct income

payments from sponsors. This is due to sponsors deducting in kind donations from the usual level of

assistance. The general principle is that sponsors are responsible for providing income support at a

level that matches the social assistance rate of the settlement province97. Sponsors are also able to

reduce the level of financial assistance they provide if refugees refuse a reasonable offer of paid

work.

94 “Blended Visa Office-Referred Program – Sponsoring Refugees,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/sponsor/vor.asp. 95 “Joint Assistance Sponsorships,” Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Joint-Assistance-Sponsorship-JAS-Fact-Sheet-1.pdf. 96 “Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) Application Guide (IMM5413),” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/applications/guides/5413ETOC.asp#appa. 97 “The Rights of Privately Sponsored Refugees,” Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, accessed 7 November, 2016, http://www.rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Final-Rights-of-PSRs-Oct-14-2016-generic-revised-1.pdf, p. 2.

32

Family Size 12 Months of Income

Support

Start-up Costs Estimated Total

Annual Settlement

Cost

1 C$9,800 (A$9,520) C$2,800 (A$2,720) C$12,600 (A$12,250)

2 C$16,800 (A$16,335) C$4,400 (A$4,280) C$21,200 (A$20,615)

3 C$17,700 (A$17,210) C$5,300 (A$5,150) C$23,000 (A$22,365)

4 C$20,000 (A$19,450) C$7,000 (A$6,805) C$27,000 (A$26,255)

5 C$22,500 (A$21,880) C$7,200 (A$7,000) C$29,700 (A$28,880)

6 C$24,500 (A$23,825) C$8,000 (A$7,780) C$32,500 (A$31,600)

Per additional family

member

C$1,550 (A$1,505) C$1,000 (A$970) C$2,500 (A$2,430)

Table 2: Estimate of Sponsorship Cost for the PSR program98.

Despite the trend towards emphasising the humanitarian aspects of resettlement policy since late

2015, the massive increase in refugee arrivals brings with it a different set of challenges regarding

the administration and composition of the program. Concerns within the SAH community appear to

have changed from resisting encroachments on additionality to managing frustration at processing

delays in visa posts due to the sudden increase in applications since the end of 201599. IRCC have

deployed 40 extra staff to visa posts in the Middle East as the department attempts to ensure

privately sponsored applications of Syrian refugees submitted prior to the end of March 2016 will be

finalised by the end of this year100. Figure 9 shows the expected visa processing times for

applications lodged by important refugee countries of first asylum. While processing times are

remarkably short in primary countries of asylum for refugees from Syria, the redeployment of IRCC

staff in response to demand among sponsors appears to have caused a blowout in waiting times for

PSR applications from other regions.

98 “Sponsorship Cost Table,” Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Sponsorship-Cost-Table-Fact-Sheet-1.pdf. 99 Woolaver, email. 100 “#WelcomeRefugees: The road ahead,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, accessed 6 November, 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/overview.asp.

33

Figure 9: IRCC Refugee Application Processing Times by Source Country of Application101.

101 Data sourced from “Check application processing times,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, accessed 27 October, 2016, at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/times/index.asp#.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Afghanistan

DRC

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kenya

Lebanon

Pakistan

Somalia

South Sudan

Sudan

Syria

Turkey

Uganda

Processing time (months)

GAR PSR

34

Key differences

Although the CPP and PSR programs outlined above demonstrate some broad similarities, there are

also key differences that will influence the nature of resettlement outcomes in each case.

Breadth and depth of private sector engagement in refugee sponsorship. The scale of engagement

by private sector organisations in Canada far outstrips the current level in Australia. The IRCC

currently lists 105 SAHs on its register102. Although SAHs do not make public with how many CGs

they work, informed estimates suggest there are several thousand CGs currently active across

Canada103. The majority of SAHs are ‘mainstream’ faith-based organisations (77 out of 105). Of the

remaining 28, half are ethnic community organisations and the other half secular non-government

organisations. Canada’s private refugee sponsorship sector is around 20 times larger than

Australia’s at the SAH/APO level when Canada’s population and GDP are only 1.5 and 1.3 times

larger.

Building additionality into the private sponsorship system in Canada is part of the explanation for

this. As a humanitarian principle, additionality promotes the engagement of private citizens and

organisations with resettlement issues as it provides the opportunity for groups to ‘show what they

can do’. In times of well publicise humanitarian crisis, such as the flight of people from Syria,

individuals and groups in Canada have a formal pathway for getting involved with international

humanitarian causes. The PSR program and additionality allow the people of Canada to make their

views regarding third-country resettlement known to the government through action. As it stands,

the CPP has a built-in mechanism for promoting engagement between APOs and SCOs, but it is

constricted by the control of program numbers. Demand for the 500 places currently allocated to

the CPP is oversubscribed by expressions of interest from family and supporting community

members. It is uncertain whether the planned expansion to 1000 places under the CSP will

sufficiently alleviate the level of demand to allow permit greater involvement by SCOs, particularly if

the extra places come at the expense of the SHP.

Role of volunteers. PSR sponsors are volunteers – they are not allowed to ask for, or accept

payment from refugees for providing settlement assistance104. Volunteers continue to play a role in

migrant and refugee settlement in Australia also, although the nature of their involvement in 2016 is

102 “Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program – Sponsorship Agreement Holders,” Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, accessed 9 November, 2016, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/sponsor/list-sponsors.asp. 103 Woolaver, email. 104 “The Rights of Privately Sponsored Refugees,” Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, accessed 7 November, 2016, http://www.rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Final-Rights-of-PSRs-Oct-14-2016-generic-revised-1.pdf, 4.

35

very different to what it was in the 1980s under the CRSS. Private sponsorship in Canada requires

volunteers to make themselves available as the first point of contact for the refugees in their care,

implying a degree of responsibility, trust and ownership of settlement outcomes not present for

volunteers in the Australian system. The establishment of the CRS transferred most of the

responsibility for refugee settlement outcomes in Australia to service providers, causing the

demotivation of many volunteers who had worked under the CRSS, a system much closer to the PSR

program in conception and delivery.

Financial support arrangements for refugees/humanitarian entrants. The structure of financial

support for CPP entrants and PSR also demonstrates difference. Under the PSR program, funds

raised to provide income and settlement support for refugees are administered by sponsors.

Sponsors’ financial responsibility towards refugees is another example of the pivotal role they play in

the Canadian settlement system. In contrast, the Australian system allows CPP entrants access to

income support from the DSS during the sponsorship period if required. The initial cost to CPP

proposers consists of the two-stage VAC paid to the DIBP, administration fees paid to the APO and a

$5,000 bond deposited with the APO and refundable on the applicant’s exit from the program105.

As a program seeking to capture involvement from organisations across Canadian society, the

financial arrangements of the PSR allow sponsors to be involved in multiple undertakings at the

same time, provided their financial resources are adequate. Retaining control of sponsorship funds

encourages sponsors to remain emotionally invested throughout the sponsorship period. On the

other hand, the CPP model ensures the cost to supporting community members is frontloaded and

clear. This would appear to suit a program in which proposals are generally along extended or direct

family lines. Upfront charges can ease the administrative burden for individual proposers,

particularly if they are from NES backgrounds. Clear understanding of the CPP fee schedule also

facilitates communication between supporting community members and APOs.

Co-ordination of private sector organisations and policy advocacy. The size of the private

settlement sector in Canada ensures SAHs have historically had considerable potential leverage in

advocating to IRCC. The NGO-Government Committee, established in 1994, provides a forum for

SAHs to express their positions to IRCC several times each year106. The further establishment of the

SAH Association in 2010 was promoted by CIC to facilitate government consultation with the

sector107. The SAH Association represents most SAHs with a mandate that includes:

105 Community Proposal Pilot: Process Description (Melbourne: AMES Australia, 2013). 106 Woolaver, email. 107 ibid.

36

Building cohesiveness and collective approaches among the members and within the

refugee sponsoring community;

Supporting the training of members in the work of refugee sponsorship and resettlement;

Promoting awareness of the private sponsoring of refugees;

Developing and enhance the PSR program to maximise its potential;

Monitoring decisions and practices of governments and organisations to ensure the well-

being of sponsored refugees;

Working with CIC/IRCC to further the goals of the PSR program108.

SAHs have clearly moved beyond facilitating sponsorship undertakings to stake a claim in

determining how the PSR program should operate. Australia currently lacks a body to represent, co-

ordinate and promote the interests of APOs. Communications with the DIBP are conducted in an

irregular and sometimes piecemeal fashion, particularly in instances where APOs initiate

communication to question or express concern at departmental policy. Lack of clear communication

between the DIBP, APOs and supporting communities is possibly also a factor in the relative lack of

engagement from SCOs.

Nature of public debate. The current political climate in Australia and Canada also influences

developments in the refugee settlement policy space. The Australian government has adopted a

dissonant approach to humanitarian migration policy. Official praise from the Prime Minister and

other members of the government for Australia’s resettlement program109 is contradicted by

restrictive policy developments against asylum seekers arriving by boat110. The contradiction

between humanitarian principles and operational policy settings has also spilled over into

settlement policy. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Peter Dutton is on the public

record claiming refugees “take Australian jobs” while at the same time also “languishing on

welfare”111. Dutton received public support from Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull during the

controversy following the comments112. In contrast, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau has positively

108 “Mandate,” Sponsorship Agreement Holders Association, accessed 8 November, 2016, http://www.sahassociation.com/about/mandate/. 109 “Joint Media Release: Leaders’ Summit on Refugees,” Malcolm Turnbull, Julie Bishop & Peter Dutton, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/4830778/upload_binary/4830778.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22Community%20Support%20Program%22. 110 “Transcript: Radio Interview with Michael Brissenden,” Malcolm Turnbull, accessed 8 November, 2016, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/4921188/upload_binary/4921188.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22turnbull%22. 111 “Interview on Paul Murray Live,” Peter Dutton, Sky News, accessed 8 November, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNlchEdzL8Y. 112 “Election 2016: Malcolm Turnbull backs “outstanding” Peter Dutton over “illiterate” refugee claims,” Michael Koziol & Mark Kenny, accessed 8 November, 2016,

37

promoted the idea of Canada’s humanitarian responsibility towards refugees since his election last

year. Canadian Liberal Party policy emphasises the need for collaboration between government

agencies and private sector organisations to fulfil Canada’s resettlement responsibility113. Trudeau

has reinforced the government’s policy by publicly greeting people on arrival in Canada114.

Political leaders are not solely responsible for the tenor of public discourse. However, they clearly

also have a predominant role in setting the parameters of public policy discussion. Prime Minister

Trudeau has sent a clear message via speech and action that refugees are welcome in Canada, and

by doing so has empowered Canadian citizens and settlement organisations to stake out a larger role

for themselves in the country’s resettlement program. The ambivalent and sometimes hostile

language used by current political leaders in Australia has the opposite effect, disheartening and

demotivating members of the ‘mainstream’ community who might otherwise wish to be involved as

volunteer providers of settlement assistance.

http://www.theage.com.au.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2016/election-2016-malcolm-turnbull-backs-outstanding-peter-dutton-over-illiterate-refugee-claims-20160517-goxk6c.html. 113 “Syrian Refugees,” Canadian Liberal Party, accessed 8 November 2016 at https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/syrian-refugees/. 114 “Justin Trudeau to Syrian refugees: ‘Welcome home,’” MacLeans, accessed 8 November, 2016, at http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/justin-trudeau-to-syrian-refugees-welcome-home/.

38

This section identifies opportunities and challenges for the future of private sponsorship in Australia.

Opportunities

Private sponsorship represents a potential means for realising the following opportunities:

Increasing awareness and sensitivity towards refugee issues in Australian society. As Lanphier has

pointed out in the Canadian context, creating links between refugees and host communities can

improve the level of mainstream media coverage of examples of successful refugee settlement.115

This is particularly pertinent in Australia. There is a clear and pressing need to shift public debate

away from the aggressive and divisive rhetoric surrounding refugee migration towards measured

discussion of settlement outcomes and achievements of integration by refugees. Increased

exposure of host communities to the presence of refugees, particularly in regional areas or localities

lacking culturally-diverse populations, could help to reduce stereotypical characterisations of

refugees as lazy, helpless, unscrupulous or undeserving of help in mainstream discourse.

Broadening of the volunteer settlement support base for refugees. Suitable demand for places in

the 2016-17 CPP program year outstripped AMES Australia’s place allocation by a ratio of around

7:1116. Potential to expand the program clearly exists. It should be noted that unlike the Canadian

VOR program, there is currently no provision in the CPP for applicants to be referred to sponsors by

the DIBP. This means the current level of demand is constituted only by “named” applicants -

refugees who are already known to supporting communities or who are making a split-family

application. The structure of the CPP as it currently stands therefore limits sponsorship

opportunities to members of specific refugee communities and immediate relatives of applicants.

Future expansion could look to open a sponsorship stream modelled on the VOR. This would

provide increased opportunities for engagement with other broad-based community organisations

and service providers looking to become involved in refugee resettlement but who may have

previously lacked necessary contacts within ethnic communities. These organisations may include

groups formerly involved in resettlement under the CRSS, current CRS-registered volunteers, faith-

based groups, or other volunteer community groups involved in charitable projects, such as local

Lions and Rotary clubs.

115 Lanphier, M 2003, ‘Sponsorship,’ pp. 245-248. 116 Buchanan & Iachelini, AMES Australia Community Proposal Pilot Summary Report, 3.

39

Opening new opportunities for research and advocacy. The apparent trend towards a private

sponsorship model based on Canada’s opens new areas for research into humanitarian resettlement

outcomes in Australia. Increased involvement of private sector volunteer groups would grant

researchers the opportunity to test the levels of refugee integration achieved under the HSS against

the potential for greater investment of social capital by volunteer sponsors. AMES Australia and the

other APOs, together with advocacy groups such as the Refugee Council of Australia and Settlement

Council of Australia, have a role to play in conducting joint research projects that range across the

settlement sector.

As the peak bodies in the private sponsorship sector, APOs also have an implied role as advocates on

behalf of supporting community members and SCOs. Growth in the number of supporting

organisations and humanitarian entrants under the CPP/CSP will mean APOs have greater potential

credibility and leverage in discussions with the DIBP. The five APOs have joined together in the past

to make their concerns regarding application processing times known to the department. With

apparent departmental plans for growth in the sector, an opportunity exists in the medium-term to

form a representative advocacy body along the lines of the SAH Association in Canada.

The global trend towards establishing community sponsorship of refugees as a recognised

alternative to government resettlement programs also raises opportunities for knowledge sharing

and capacity building activities between settlement service providers in different national contexts.

As private sponsorship programs become better established in the global context, further

opportunities will exist for detailed qualitative analysis of different programs. Grasping these

opportunities has the potential to play a key role in informing advocacy efforts in Australia well into

the future.

Driving improved integration of settlement services. The APOs involved in the CPP are also actively

engaged in providing settlement service programs. They therefore hold a unique position in

Australia at the nexus of direct operational involvement in humanitarian migration and settlement

service provision. APOs could leverage this position to provide training workshops and information

sessions for community volunteer groups already working in settlement services or mainstream

organisations from outside the settlement sector to become involved in supporting CPP applicants.

Volunteer training programs could include topics such as:

Expectations of on-arrival settlement service provision;

40

Cultural awareness;

Responsiveness to settlement issues, including sensitivity to the effects of torture and

trauma, and identifying cases requiring grief counselling or domestic violence intervention;

Requirements for establishing SCOs, with emphasis placed on governance requirements and

expected levels of human and financial resources.

The AMES Australia Strategic Plan 2016-2019 outlines key areas of activity117. Volunteer training

programs offered by AMES Australia in conjunction with ongoing involvement in the CPP/CSP would

facilitate the achievement of organisational ambitions in these areas, including improving client

outcomes by increasing the provision of an integrated service approach and extending the

opportunities for volunteers across AMES Australia services. Utilising the CPP/CSP as a pathway for

deepening volunteer engagement therefore represents an opportunity for AMES Australia to

reaffirm its position as a leader in the settlement services sector.

117 Strategic Plan 2016 – 2019 (Melbourne: AMES Australia, 2016).

41

Challenges

Despite the possibilities private sponsorship could deliver to humanitarian resettlement in Australia,

significant challenges stand in the way of realising those opportunities.

Re-catalysing mainstream community support for volunteer involvement in humanitarian

settlement. Viewed in long-term historical context, the role of volunteers in the humanitarian

settlement sector is much degraded compared to the 1980s and early to mid-1990s. Levels of

capacity and motivation among current settlement volunteers to make greater investments of their

time, energy and finances have not been widely tested since the CPP began operation in 2013-14.

Enlisting assistance from community groups outside the settlement sector is even less certain. To

this point, the CPP has apparently been overshadowed by other policy priorities within the DIBP and

the government, resulting in limited promotion of the pilot. It is unclear whether that is likely to

change significantly once the CSP commences. Ignorance of the CSP among potential host

communities may hinder engagement with the program. Should APOs aim to include broad-based

volunteer groups in the CSP, extensive outreach work may be necessary to educate host

communities and motivate potential volunteer groups.

Avoiding the inconsistency of service level delivered under the CRSS. Experience of volunteer

service delivery under the CRSS appears to be informing the current structure of the CPP.

Authorisation of APOs has added a layer in the organisational structure of the program, alleviating

potential difficulty for the DIBP in program monitoring while facilitating administrative procedures

for SCOs and community members. Currently, responsibility for the smooth operation of the

CPP/CSP lies largely with the APOs. Expansion of the private sponsorship settlement model and

growth in the number of SCOs will increase operating demands on the resources of APOs,

particularly in program reporting and monitoring of SCOs. Arrangements for education and training

programs will need to be made to avoid inconsistent service delivery by supporting community

organisations or members.

Establishing and maintaining clear structures for consultation between stakeholders at different

levels of the program. Communication between AMES Australia and the DIBP currently takes place

in an ad hoc fashion. The lack of formal arrangements for APO and DIBP representatives to meet

regularly to discuss issues regarding the CPP/CSP is possibly a reflection of relatively low

departmental priority compared to other programs. Avenues of communication between AMES

42

Australia, SCOs and supporting community members are better established, as AMES Australia staff

expend considerable effort to ensure ethnic communities are kept informed regarding program

costs, administration and their obligations in supporting humanitarian applicants.

Expansion of the SCO/supporting community member population will increase the demands on the

time of APO staff, both in communicating with the DIBP and with supporting organisations.

Establishing and maintaining streamlined communication channels in both directions along the lines

of the Canadian model may assist in avoiding future problems. The RSTP website is a valuable first

point of reference for existing and prospective sponsors, while the SAH Association and its role in

the NGO-Government Committee assists in presenting a unified position to government on program-

specific issues.

Determining a balance between humanitarian, settlement planning and operational concerns. The

Canadian experience indicates the historical role of private sponsorship in humanitarian settlement

has been to act as a mechanism for allowing popular support for refugees to be expressed via action.

During the lengthy periods of regular demand, this has not produced tension with settlement

programs or planning. However, times of peak demand have seen sudden spikes in program

numbers, placing settlement agencies and government under pressure to maintain service levels.

The Australian system as it stands privileges government control of settlement planning and

program numbers. However, there are strong moral arguments that the increase in places

announced for the CSP should not come at the expense of refugees, the SHP or on-shore processing.

AMES Australia has argued the position the CSP should be separated from the SHP to provide a fair

and equitable application process based on humanitarian need rather than the ability to pay for

entry. The challenge for APOs as the CSP comes online will be to maintain a balance in their

advocacy between considerations of natural justice and economic and program realities.

43

Conclusion

To realise the benefits of the opportunities outlined above, there is a clear and pressing need to

change the framing of the immigration debate in Australia. A greater role for private sponsorship in

Australia’s offshore humanitarian migration program could help to drive a change in mainstream

community attitudes towards refugees and people seeking asylum. Humanitarian resettlement

programs are inherently composed of two priorities: the humanitarian desire to provide relief and

sanctuary to people who have been attacked or are in danger, and the necessarily economic

consideration of how resources are to be allocated to care for and support the integration of

humanitarian entrants following their arrival in host communities. Tension exists between these

two priorities, but private sponsorship and community volunteering of time and financial resources

can potentially reduce economic costs during the initial settlement period and simultaneously

promote humanitarian outcomes.

The Canadian model demonstrates private sponsorship need not be contained within ethno-specific

communities. Members of the wider Australian community also are capable of supporting refugee

settlement and have done so in the past. For them to do so again, however, incentivised program

pathways are needed - the scale of the CPP as it currently exists effectively acts as a disincentive for

community, charity or church groups to become involved in refugee sponsorship. However, the

trend in policy development appears to be in favour of a greater role for private sponsorship in the

humanitarian settlement sector, leaving open the possibility of further gradual engagement with

volunteer groups by APOs.

The federal government has historically dominated migration and settlement policy settings in

Australia, and it will continue to be central in any move towards unleashing the humanitarian

potential of private sponsorship. Two policy levers are of crucial importance in this space: the first is

the inclusion of additionality in the Humanitarian Programme. In the short-term, additionality need

not take on all the connotations of its use in Canada, where in the current political climate it could

be understood as a shorthand term for sponsor-generated market demand for refugee resettlement.

In the Australian context, additionality could be catered for simply by separating the 1,000 places

allocated to the CSP out of the SHP allocation into an additional offshore settlement category.

Moving into the medium and long-term future, the principle could then be reinforced by increasing

the allocation of CSP places as volunteer settlement groups and supporting communities grew in

both size and service delivery capability.

The second policy lever is the need for a DIBP process for pre-approving resettlement candidates.

Being able to support the settlement of refugees from a pre-approved pool would facilitate the

44

engagement of volunteer groups from the mainstream community who may lack family and

friendship links to originating countries of displaced populations. Pre-approval would also shorten

waiting times between the lodging of sponsorship applications and refugee arrival, helping to

maintain the motivation of sponsors.

In the short-term, neither of these policy changes appear likely to be realised. To promote improved

humanitarian outcomes, APOs will need first to build private sector settlement capacity by

conducting CSP-specific outreach, education and training programs for existing SCO partners,

supporting communities and mainstream volunteer groups. With an established baseload of private

sector capacity, APOs will have demonstrated their centrality to and successful custodianship of the

CSP. Linked to the adoption of a unified APO position on policy issues, this may lead to increased

leverage in discussions with the DIBP regarding future program developments. The ongoing

challenge for AMES Australia and other organisations in the settlement sector is therefore to be

prepared when the opportunity for lasting change presents itself.

45

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Appendix 1: Full Community Sponsorship model (UK)

In July 2016, the UK Home Office launched its own private sponsorship program, known as Full

Community Sponsorship (FCS). FCS is a fully-fledged program pledged to resettle 20,000 Syrian

refugees before the next general election in 2020118. This resettlement pledge is in addition to the

UK government’s ‘Gateway’ resettlement program (750 places annually)119. It is not clear whether

the UK government will undertake to resettle any of the 20,000 not sponsored by community

organisations, although the UK does currently grant asylum to tens of thousands of people annually,

suggesting public sector settlement services are well developed. However, unlike PSR and CPP

refugees, entrants to the UK through FCS will not automatically receive permanent resident status,

but will have to reapply for residency when their humanitarian visas expire after five years120.

The range of acceptable sponsoring organisations has been limited by the UK government,

compared to the CPP and private sponsorship in Canada. Sponsoring groups must be either a

registered charity or Community Interest Company (not-for-profit social enterprise). Sponsors

cannot identify specific refugees for resettlement, removing the possibility of using FCS as a split

family entry program. Instead, government agencies will match refugees to sponsors, similar to the

VOR scheme in Canada. Sponsors must seek separate approval for each refugee family sponsored121.

As part of the Home Office approval process, sponsors are also required to gain the written

agreement of the local government authority in the area of intended settlement to ensure access to

government services is available122.

The financial requirements for FCS sponsors are considerably lower than either the Canadian or

Australian schemes: sponsors are required to demonstrate they have access to £4,500 (A$7,800) per

adult applicant123. Like Canada, sponsors hold these funds in trust, rather than paying them to

government agencies. The low financial obligation placed on sponsors is offset by refugees’ full

118 “Full Community Sponsorship: Guidance for prospective sponsors,” UK Home Office, accessed 15 September, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/554048/2016-09-16_Full_Community_Sponsorship_Guidance_-_for_govuk.pdf, p. 5. 119 “Syrian Vulnerable Person Resettlement (VPR) Programme: Guidance for local authorities and partners,” UK Home Office, accessed 15 September, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/472020/Syrian_Resettlement_Fact_Sheet_gov_uk.pdf, p. 4. 120 ibid, p. 3. 121 “Full Community Sponsorship Guidance for Prospective Sponsors,” UK Home Office, p. 8. 122 ibid, p. 10 123 Ibid, p. 9.

49

access to social welfare payments and the National Health Service. Access to these services is

funded out of the UK overseas aid budget124.

The trend direction for the development of refugee policy in the UK remains unclear due to the very

recent establishment of the FCS. However, some underlying motives can be discerned from the

timing and context in which the plan was announced. In his announcement to the House of

Commons, Prime Minister David Cameron made clear refugees accepted under the program would

come directly from refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon and Syria as a means of discouraging people

from traveling across Europe to seek asylum in the UK125. This form of policy approach contains

strong parallels with the recommendations of the Houston Report in Australia, suggesting border

control and security were important considerations in determining the form of the UK commitment.

The central role of immigration, freedom of movement and people seeking asylum in the Brexit

referendum in 2016 reinforces the view of the FCS as a humanitarian program strongly tempered by

security concerns. Commentary from some political figures in the UK has been uncomplimentary,

arguing the removal of Minister for Refugees Richard Harrington indicates the FCS is being “set up to

fail.”126

The current political climate in the UK offers a third perspective on refugee issues and immigration

generally. As noted previously, the FCS program was instituted by former Prime Minister David

Cameron. Cameron has since announced his intention to resign from the UK parliament after his

role in the Brexit referendum earlier this year127. One of the key political conflicts leading up to the

referendum was the tension between retaining British sovereign control of immigration and the

country’s international obligations. New Prime Minister Theresa May has so far supported

Cameron’s refugee policy, but the current political instability in the UK makes the outlook for the

FCS beyond the end of the current parliament in 2020 very difficult to predict.

124 “Syrian Vulnerable Person Resettlement (VPR) Programme,” UK Home Office, p. 3. 125 “Syria: Refugees and Counter-terrorism,” David Cameron, UK Parliament, accessed 16 October, 2016, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-09-07/debates/1509074000002/SyriaRefugeesAndCounter-Terrorism#contribution-1509074000180. 126 “Scrapping the Minister for Refugees Shows Theresa May’s Government Is Shrinking Away From Its Role in Solving The Refugee Crisis,” Tim Farron, Huffington Post, accessed 16 September, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/refugee-crisis-minister_b_11179044. 127 “David Cameron: Former British prime minister to resign from Parliament,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, accessed 16 September, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-13/former-british-pm-david-cameron-to-resign-from-parliament/7837492.