RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access

The humanitarian-development nexus:humanitarian principles, practice, andpragmaticsJon Harald Sande Lie

Abstract

The humanitarian–development nexus is increasingly being cast as the solution to humanitarian concerns, new andprotracted crises, and to manage complex war-to-peace transitions. Despite widely endorsed amongst policymakers,this nexus presents some challenges to those implementing it. Humanitarian action and development assistancerepresent two distinct discursive and institutional segments of the international system that are hard to juxtapose.Humanitarianism’s apolitical and imminent needs-based approaches building on established humanitarian principles arefundamentally different from the more long-term, political, rights-based approaches of development. As they rubshoulders, as intentionally instigated by the nexus, they affect and challenge each other. These challenges are moreacute to the humanitarian domain given the constitutive status of the humanitarian principles, which, when challenged,may cause changes to the humanitarian space and a mission-cum-ethics creep. This article explores the formation andeffects of the humanitarian–development nexus as rendered both at the top, amongst policymakers, and from thebottom. The latter explores the discursive transition from conflict to reconstruction in Northern Uganda. Humanitarianorganisations’ different response to the transition demonstrate more pragmatic approaches to the humanitarianprinciples and thus how the nexus itself is also formed bottom up and further exacerbates the mission creep.

Keywords: Development, Humanitarian, Humanitarian–development nexus, Mission creep, Uganda

IntroductionThe humanitarian–development nexus is a hot topic andhas been so for a whilst, creating expectations as well asproblems to policymakers and practitioners of humani-tarian action and development assistance alike (Eade andVaux 2007; Hilhorst 2018; IDS 2018)1. Basically, thenexus refers to “the transition or overlap between the

delivery of humanitarian assistance and the provision oflong-term development assistance” (Strand 2020: 104).The nexus’ rationale is fairly straightforward: as the war-to-peace transition is understood in terms of a con-tinuum, one should not compartmentalise but motivatedistinct actors to cooperate regardless how the situationis defined. This has, however, proven easier said thandone. Not only are the discursive segments of humani-tarianism and development distinct to each other, butthe segments themselves are characterised by great in-ternal diversity—and these differences become amplifiedby the nexus itself. The nexus seeks to merge well-established discursive, institutional and attitudinal differ-ences that are hard to reconcile, especially as seen fromthe perspective of humanitarian actors. Despite their dif-ferences, actors belonging to the humanitarian segmentshare a more principled approach to policy and practical

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1I am indebted to Hannah Dönges, Benjamin de Carvalho and the twoanonymous reviewers for their comments and feedback on earlierversions of this article. This research was supported by the ResearchCouncil of Norway via NUPI’s SIS Research Program (grant no.304516), and the projects ‘Protection of Civilians: from principle topractice’ and ‘Developmentality and the anthropology of partnership’(grant no. 262524).

Correspondence: jon.lie@nupi.noNorwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI – www.nupi.no), PO Box7034, St Olavs Plass, 0130 Oslo, Norway

Journal of International Humanitarian Action

Lie Journal of International Humanitarian Action (2020) 5:18 https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-020-00086-0

work as compared to what more pragmatic and politicaldevelopment actors do. The humanitarian principles ofhumanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence pro-vide the foundations for humanitarian action. Theseprinciples are important in constituting humanitarianactors’ identity and legitimacy, they govern humanitarianpractice and they are central in constructing the concep-tual and physical humanitarian space in which humani-tarian actors operate. The humanitarian principles are,however, not blueprints or a straitjacket, but proposi-tions and values that guide action, set standards andprovide benchmarks against which practice aspires andis later measured. This makes the principles subject tocontextual interpretation and application, by differentactors in different settings, something which affect theformation of a humanitarian–development nexus—which is the scope of this article.First, the article outlines central policy features and

challenges related to the humanitarian–developmentnexus. Second, these aspects are put into historical con-text by giving attention first to the how this nexusemerged in the wake of the need to unpack the civiliandimension of the erstwhile security–development nexus,and then to the discursive origins of humanitarianismand development respectively. The empirical third sec-tion first provides some vignette cases concerning thehumanitarian–development nexus at the top-levels ofpolicy and planning, before a more bottom-up approachis given. This section explores the discursive transitionfrom humanitarianism to development in NorthernUganda, which triggered different and pragmatic inter-pretations of the humanitarian principles. The casesdemonstrate how various analytical approaches producedifferent renderings and dynamics of the humanitarian–development nexus. Moreover, the two approaches dem-onstrate that the nexus itself is not only driven forwardby headquarters’ policies but also by actors’ pragmaticstance vis-à-vis the humanitarian principles. Notwith-standing these different dynamics, important practicaland conceptual challenges are maintained—which is thescope of the final coda section.

Intentional policy interface of humanitarianismand developmentThe humanitarian–development nexus receivedrenewed, global attention with the World HumanitarianSummit in 2016. In recognising that humanitarian assist-ance alone is insufficient to adequately address the needsof the world’s most vulnerable, this UN summit calledfor new humanitarian approaches transcending the hu-manitarian realm: first, humanitarians were now to en-gage in conflict prevention and address its root causes,which are activities not only typically designated the de-velopment segment but also activities taking place before

the humanitarian crisis occur, thus infringing on the no-tion of the humanitarian present. Second, it called forincreased humanitarian emphasis on political diplomacyand conflict resolution, being typical peacebuilding activ-ities and infringing on humanitarianism’s apolitical prin-ciples. Third, and corollary, this requires bringingtogether humanitarian, development and peacebuildingefforts, into what got known as the triple nexus, to har-monise different, diverging and potential conflicting ac-tors, activities and objectives. Notwithstanding the wideacclamation of the humanitarian summit—attended bymore than 9000 representatives of states, governments,civil society, private sector, international and non-governmental organisations—the nexus remains widelydebated, poorly adopted and highly contested. To illus-trate, whilst revising this manuscript I attended twowebinars concerning the nexus2. Bringing together prac-titioners and researchers, the seminars revealed a formof structural flagellantism when dealing with the challen-ging scope and practices pertaining to the nexus: uncer-tain policies, conflicting mandates and lack ofleadership; limited funding, competition over resourcesand siloed funding streams; need to collaborate and co-ordinate more. This article, however, moves beyondthese immediate practical concerns to engage the morediscursive and institutional aspects relating to the hu-manitarian–development nexus as primarily seen fromthe humanitarian side, which illustrates how the nexusboth drives and reflects changes in the humanitarianrealm by expanding and contracting the humanitarianspace.The bold ambitions of the humanitarian–development

nexus demonstrate that the instituted order of humani-tarianism is both changing and challenged. Shifting cir-cumstances in the areas where humanitarian actorsoperate and the responses these call for demonstratehow external and internal factors affect the domain ofhumanitarianism. This also point to an anachronism—humanitarianism’s governing principles were conceivedof in a time and in response to concerns different tocontemporary ones: current environmental concerns andclimate change affect conflict patters; armed conflicts in-creasingly take place within and not between states,which makes it tricky to manage host state’s consent;not only are civilians increasingly targeted but state ac-tors may also be amongst the adversaries; geopolitical

2One was the “Triple nexus in practice – what about peace?” organisedby the Centre for Humanitarian Action 26-27 October 2020 – seehttps://www.chaberlin.org/en/event/cha-conference-on-the-triple-nexus-october-2020. The other was “Make or break: the implicationsof Covid-19 for crisis financing”, organised by International Associ-ation of Professionals in Humanitarian Action and Protection (PHAP)15. September 2020 – see https://phap.org/PHAP/Events/OEV2020/OEV200915.aspx

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shifts affect conflict formations and humanitarian prac-tice; external funding agencies push for more inter-agency cooperation spanning the civil–military divide af-fects humanitarian practice. Despite this humanitariananachronism between old principles and new concerns,the principles remain important in constructing the con-ceptual and physical humanitarian space in which hu-manitarian actors operate and which provides for theidentity, protection and legitimacy of humanitarian ac-tors and action. Yet, as these new and external factorsimpinge on the realisation of the humanitarian princi-ples, it is regularly argued that the humanitarian ethosand rationale are challenged, that the humanitarianspace is shrinking (Brassard-Boudreau and Hubert2010).This article, however, draws attention to how changes

internal to the humanitarian domain work in the oppos-ite direction but with the same effects, that is, the hu-manitarian scope is intentionally expanding, whichcauses a depletion of its principles and space. The for-mation of the humanitarian–development nexus both il-lustrates and propels these processes. They demonstratethat humanitarianism is intentionally changing fromwithin, reorienting itself beyond the humanitarianpresent and its apolitical fundaments. These processesreflect what Barnett (2011) called the ‘humanitarian mis-sion creep’: as the seminal humanitarian scope and ethosas constituted by the humanitarian principles are putunder pressure and stretched, the conceptual and phys-ical humanitarian space in which humanitarian actorsoperate are gradually truncated. For instance, the notionof the humanitarian present—i.e. the idea that humani-tarian action is about the here and now, not what occursbefore or after the crisis—is being undermined by hu-manitarian involvement in prevention and reconstruc-tion activities. These are activities which temporalityoccurs before and after the humanitarian present andwhich traditionally has been the scope of developmentaid—but ‘as humanitarians began imagining how tobuild peace after [or before] war, they slipped into build-ing states’ (ibid.: 3), which undeniably verges on politicsand thus has a poor fit with the apolitical humanitarianprinciples.Greater cooperation across segments drive the mission

creep and thus changes to the instituted order of hu-manitarianism and how the principles, and thus legitim-acy, of humanitarian action, is challenged. This callsforth institutional boundary work, where the humanitar-ian segment not only needs to wrestle with the securitysegment, but increasingly with other civilian componentsof the international system. The humanitarian missioncreep thus reflects the ongoing nexus between humani-tarian action and development aid. The encounter ofthese knowledge fields constitute what Long describes as

situations of interface, defined as ‘a critical point ofintersection or linkage between different social systems,fields or levels of social order where structural discon-tinuities, based upon differences of normative value andsocial interests, are more likely to be found’ (Long 1989:1–2). The notion of interface implies a shift in analyticalfocus from different discourses or systems of knowledgetowards the various situations where these meet andwhere differences become articulated, and draws atten-tion to various forms of battlefields of knowledge (Hil-horst and Jansen 2010; Lie 2012; Long and Long 1992).The two discursive fields of development and humani-tarianism represent two such distinct knowledge andpractice fields of the international system—yet, they areinvariably treated as one common, civilian segment ofthe international apparatus, particularly when contrastedwith the military segment.

Unpacking the civilian dimension of the security–development nexusThe means and mechanisms of the international systemare traditionally described as and compartmentalisedinto the three distinct segments of defence, diplomacyand development. Defence or security, and diplomacyare seen to trump other concerns by virtue of protectingand promoting states’ national interests. Conversely, thedevelopment segment aims, at least nominally, to assistin promoting the interests of others, i.e. the aid recipi-ents. There is thus an innate hierarchy between thesesegments, where the soft power of development isdwarfed by the hard power and realpolitik of the othersegments (Leira 2019; McNeish and Lie 2010). Since 9/11 2001, however, these three segments have become in-creasingly and intentionally intertwined, merged into 3Dor whole-of-government approaches. This merger bothdrives and reflects how donor countries’ national inter-ests impact international development in general andhow the politics of western aid is being securitised, espe-cially in areas considered conflict hot-spots (Fisher andAnderson 2015). The instrumentalization of western aidhas not only affected development aid’s core purpose offighting global poverty but also collapsed the practicaland conceptual distinction between security and devel-opment (Woods 2005).The international experience with the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan from the early 2000s and the internationalintervention in Darfur were seminal in advancing the se-curity–development nexus (Buur et al., 2007; Chandler2007; Contessi 2010). Here, policymakers and securityactors included the civilian development component intomilitary operations in order to win the local populations’hearts and minds (Gusterson 2011; González 2010).Whereas the diplomacy and defence segments representdifferent state entities with established protocols or rules

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of engagements, the development segment is oftenunderstood as more diverse and unruly by virtue of con-sisting of a multitude of civilian, non-state actors havingtheir distinct mandate. Yet, those orchestrating the se-curity–development nexus often fail to see these differ-ences and thus largely treat the civilian component asone homogenous entity, thus undermining important in-ternal differences amongst actors and, notably, betweenhumanitarian action and development assistance (Car-others and de Gramont 2013). The development seg-ment includes bi- and multilateral actors in addition tothe vast NGO-sector. Despite most of these actors are ina triple bind in the sense that they receive policy guide-lines from their funding agency, have their own institu-tional scope and mandate to attend to whilst also needto align their policies with those of their recipient. Aidactors are, however, fairly autonomous in brokering andjuxtaposing these potentially conflicting interests. Un-derstanding these dynamics are crucial not only tounderstand the development segment itself but also tograsp the problems and opportunities that lie in theinterface between various actors and segments of theinternational system. Seeing the civilian component ofthe international apparatus as a homogenous develop-ment segment not only reduces the complexity of civil-ian engagement. It also undermines the distinct natureand role of its two main sectors of development assist-ance and humanitarian action, and the important differ-ences that exist between them. Whilst these differencesmay appear opaque from an outsiders’ perspective, theyare central to the individual sectors’ identity, legitimacyand boundary work vis-à-vis other institutions.Despite these differences, calls are being made for

greater coherence, cooperation and harmonisationwithin the civilian segment. Whereas the security–devel-opment nexus sought to combine military and civilianefforts, these calls proposed a new way to manage thecomplex war-to-peace transition by proposing a newworkflow between civilian actors in what would be iden-tified as a humanitarian–development nexus (Acuto2014; Lie 2017; Yamashita 2015; Eade and Vaux 2007;Chandler 2014; Barnett and Weiss 2008). This nexus isdriven forward by not only external impulses and polit-ical intentions, but equally by changes internal to thesegment itself and its immanent responses to new con-flict formations and humanitarian concerns. Under-standing the war-to-peace transition as representing acontinuum and not distinct and sequenced phases desig-nated military, humanitarian and development actorshas been pivotal to foster this new nexus (Duffield2012). The nexus fosters the intentional, but challenginginterface of humanitarian action and development assist-ance, and it brings humanitarianism into the develop-ment domain of prevention and reconstruction.

Consequently, it widens the humanitarian space througha more contextual and pragmatic application of the hu-manitarian principles. As the nexus touches on the veryidentity and leitmotif of both humanitarianism and de-velopment, these interfaces require a great deal ofboundary work between erstwhile distinct segments ofthe international system. However, to explore these in-terfaces one first needs to understand the segments.

Humanitarianism and developmentThe fields of humanitarian action and development aid rep-resent two different segments of the international systemwith distinct discursive origins and institutional trajectories(Hilhorst 2018; Dudaite 2018). The origin of humanitarian-ism typically pivots around Henry Dunant and his experienceat the Battle of Solverino in 1859. Originally on a businesstravel, Dunant accidentally witnessed a carnage betweenAustro-Hungarian and French troops outside the Italian vil-lage of Solferino, which made him join the local townspeopleto provide the relief he could. Dunant had ‘left Geneva as aman seeking riches and returned home as a man who wasabout to dedicate his life to higher calling’ (Barnett 2011: 1).After publishing his memoirs, which became a Europeanbestseller, Dunant launched a call to alms and a campaign toestablish a permanent relief agency for humanitarian aid inwar, and a government treaty recognising the neutrality ofthis agency in order for it to operate in a war zone. Followinga broad grassroots movement, this led to the establishmentof the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) andthe Geneva Conventions, which constructed the humanitar-ian discourse around a set of guiding principles that still epit-omise and shape humanitarian action today, despite beingrevised and reaffirmed in 1949 to account for the lessons oftwo World Wars and the establishment of the United Na-tions (Fassin 2012; Terry 2002). Later, these principles havebecome formally enshrined in two UN General Assemblyresolutions. The principles of humanity (that human suffer-ing must be addressed when and wherever it is found), neu-trality (humanitarian actors must not take side) andimpartiality (aid should be based on needs alone) wereadopted in 1991 in a pivotal resolution marking the (re-)cre-ation of the humanitarian system and the international com-munity’s collective commitment to help the world’s mostvulnerable when they need it most3. The principle of inde-pendence (that humanitarian action must be autonomous toany other concerns, such as political, military and economicobjectives) was added in 20044, and can be seen as a re-sponse to the incipient security–development nexus. Theseprinciples guide humanitarian action, which implies they

3See Resolution 46/182 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 19December 1991.4See Resolution 58/114 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 17December 2003.

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may be subject to different interpretations and context-specific usage. They are nevertheless important for the hu-manitarian identity and in constituting the humanitarianspace, the humanitarian present and humanitarianism asapolitical.The institutional development apparatus has a more

intentional and political origin. Emerging in the wake ofthe Second World War and the ensuing geopoliticalstruggles, aid and economic support were seen as meansto establish and secure political interests. Inspired byand extending beyond the Eurocentric Marshall plan,scholars usually associate President Truman’s 1949 in-augural speech as the inception of ‘development’, mark-ing the start of a particular historical period—the era ofdevelopment (Sachs 1992). Point Four of the TrumanDoctrine established lasting master metaphors in statingthat ‘We must embark on a bold and new programmefor making the benefits of our scientific advances and in-dustrial progress available for the improvement andgrowth of underdeveloped areas’ (Porter 1995: 66). It or-dered the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ by creating a con-ceptual division between the ‘developed’ and‘underdeveloped’, where the latter is defined by lackingwhat constitutes the former, i.e. development (Nustad2001). This stipulates not only what development is, butalso that development is something to be actively con-veyed ‘them’ by ‘us’. This undercuts the idea of develop-ment as an immanent process unfolding over time toadvance a perspective that development requires an ac-tive and guided societal intervention—as later mani-fested by the modernisation theory drawing on Rostow’sguide to unilineal progress in different qualitative stageswith the USA as the beacon on the hill, showing wayand calling every nation to follow in its footsteps (Cowenand Shenton 1996; Escobar 1995). Development assist-ance today is highly diverse, ranging from small NGOsto huge multilateral institutions working in partnershipwith recipient institutions no projects spanning local de-velopment and social development to good governance,economic reform, infrastructure development and statebuilding. Development work is political both in scopeand organisation and draws on a rights-based discourse.At the operational level, development aid builds on cer-tain partnership principles where participatory ap-proaches aim to instal recipient ownership anddecisiveness to externally funded programmes. Thesepartnership principles are, however, rarely realised inpractice and donor countries still use aid for politicalpurposes.The different discursive origins of humanitarianism

and development have produced and reproduced twodistinct civilian segments of the international system thatoften appear to be at odds with each other: humanitari-anism’s apolitical and imminent needs-based approaches

building on the principles of neutrality, impartiality andindependence are fundamentally different from the morelong-term, political, and rights-based approaches of de-velopment. Humanitarian action is mainly exogenous,meaning that interventions, ideas and funding comefrom outside of the affected country, building on univer-sal principles and often in response to the host state’slack of will or capacity to sufficiently cater for its owncitizens. Contrary, development aid is organised aroundcertain governing partnership principles, meaning thatboth donor and recipient institutions—be it NGOs, stateor multilateral institutions—are supposed to jointlyprogramme and implement projects and that externalactors should underpin the policies and priorities of therecipient. In such efforts, the ambition is that those onthe receiving end should have ‘ownership’ to externallyfunded processes and policies, and the donor agenciesshould align their approaches and policies with those ofthe recipient.The segments of humanitarianism and development

differ in both structure and content regarding how aid isprovided and what type of aid is given. These practicesare shaped by and keep reproducing the segments’ for-mal distinctiveness, historical trajectories and institu-tional orders. Yet, against such a formalistic notion it isimportant to underline that each segment consists of amyriad of different actors, from civil society to multilat-eral organisations, operating in very different contexts,which provide different practical and pragmatic interpre-tations of the governing principles of humanitarian ac-tion and development aid. As such, the renderings ofthese segments and their governing principles are notonly contextual. The principles governing humanitarianand development practices are of a more philosophicalconcern taking place in the conference rooms at theheadquarters level (Slim 2006), whereas the imperativeto help prevails in field operations regardless of princi-ples and segments. Indeed, the beneficiaries and those atthe receiving tend not to tell apart the various actorsand their principles regardless whether they are de-scribed as belonging to either of the humanitarian or de-velopment domains (Lie 2017). Yet, these differencesmatter: both for how and what aid is provided, and forthe institutional cooperation in the field and at head-quarters level. The empirical cases below first attend tothe problematic interface of development and humani-tarianism at the headquarters level, illustrating the philo-sophical quandaries of implementing the humanitarian–development nexus. Moving from the empirical vi-gnettes, the case from Northern Uganda takes a bottom-up approach to the nexus. It demonstrates the interfaceof the different discursive segments in practise and howthe nexus is being propelled not by top-driven policyguidelines but as an effect of how actors in the field are

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more pragmatic about the principles to maintain rele-vance as the government recasts the humanitarian crisissituation as one of recovery.

Vignette cases on the interface of developmentand humanitarianismWhen I attended the launch of a joint UNHCR–WorldBank report—‘Forcibly Displaced Towards a develop-ment approach supporting refugees, the internally dis-placed, and their hosts’—the authors, and in particularthe one representing UNHCR, stressed the hardship thathad been put into having two different organisationswith distinct mandates speak together5. Amongst the ra-tionales of these two multilateral agencies joining forceswas to put together their distinct datasets, to monitorand predict migration patterns in order to intervene be-fore people start migrating. The cooperation draws onthe notion that development interventions could providepreventive measures by helping displaced and host com-munities before they migrate. This interface not only re-flects the humanitarian–development nexus, but alsohow aid is being politicised and installed with other in-terests than held by the two segments themselves as thecooperation was arguably pushed for by donor countries’aiming to limit migration to the global north. These pol-itical considerations never surfaced during the report’spresentation and discussion, and indeed the substance ofthe report itself received little attention. Rather, both theWorld Bank and UNHCR representatives stressed thenovelty and problems in working together, reiteratingtheir organisation’s mandate and distinctiveness andthus the interface challenges in having the various unitsin DC and Geneva operate together.Similarly, when UN and World Bank staff facilitated

various regional, consultative meetings in preparation oftheir joint flagship study ‘Making Development Workfor the Prevention of Violent Conflict’ (UN and WorldBank 2018)6, a seemingly disproportionally amount oftime and focus were devoted to how one could have theUN in New York and the Washington-based WorldBank speak together at the institutional level. Here, thestaff said they were personally committed to this workand to working together, but again: finding a commonground and joining the mandates of the different organi-sations had been challenging at the institutional leveland arguably amongst the more serious concerns pre-venting collaboration.

In early 2014, UN OCHA launched its policy initiativeSaving Lives Today and Tomorrow (SLTT), being yet an-other flagship report that calls for a fundamental shift inthe way humanitarian and development actors operate7.OCHA, itself a gatekeeper of the humanitarian princi-ples, initiated the report and policy initiative. As the titleindicates, the report calls for an expansion of the hu-manitarian present into future crises through preventivemeasures to also save lives tomorrow. The policy initia-tive calls upon the funding agencies to shift fromresponding to crises in a purely reactive manner to in-stead adopt a proactive approach to anticipate and pre-vent crisis through risk management initiatives. Realisingthat existing structures are not sufficient, the SLTT pol-icy initiative seeks to overcome institutional hurdles tofoster greater cooperation between different actors to in-vest in risk mitigation and crisis management. The SLLTpolicy states that to ‘overcome this challenge, humani-tarian, development and government actors must worktogether to identify risks and align planning cycles, in-crease aid effectiveness, build the resilience of affectedpopulations and, where possible, focus on preventing di-sasters’8. As reported by several UN and World Bank,this initiative fast gained momentum outside OCHA.Representatives of other UN entities—such as DPKO,UNDP and DPA—all held that they saw this as a signthat OCHA was opening up its humanitarian gatekeep-ing role and what they saw as a strict interpretation ofthe humanitarian principles. Turbulence soon surfacedwithin OCHA as not all were convinced with this policyinitiative and the problems bound to occur when ‘align-ing planning cycles’ with complex development actorsexternal (World Bank) and internal to the UN (UNDP).OCHA was, moreover, concerned how both the UN en-tities of DPKO and DPA also got on board the SLTTpolicy initiative, thus sparking critique within the hu-manitarian segment about aligning its cycles not onlywith UN’s political affairs unit but also its military arm(i.e. DPKO). Many in OCHA saw this as a bridge too far,reportedly causing OCHA to effectively (but not nomin-ally) withdraw its support for the SLTT-initiative to theextent that all practical momentum was lost.The humanitarian discourse may also be adopted by

those external to it, as a means to gain legitimacy toown operations. When the DPKO from 2009 inceptedits New Horizon-initiative to chart out new roles andfunctions of UN peacekeeping operations9, it includedthe Protection of Civilians (PoC) as an integral and cen-tral part to future peacekeeping operations (Lie and de

5Report launch at NORAD (Norwegian Agency for DevelopmentCooperation), 26 September 2016.6Meeting: “Nordic Consultation on United Nations and World Bankstudy on development and conflict prevention: open meeting” at PRIOin Oslo, jointly organised by the UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre andand the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 20 October 2016.

7https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/OCHA%20SLTT%20Web%20Final%20Single.PDF8https://www.unocha.org/legacy/what-we-do/policy/resources/saving-lives-today-and-tomorrow9http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf

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Carvalho 2009). The reference to PoC would no longeronly be in the mandate, with the many uncertainties thatentailed when translated into practice (de Carvalho andLie 2011). A strategic challenge to peacekeeping opera-tions as identified and to be ameliorated by the NewHorizons-agenda, was how modern peacekeeping strug-gles to come up against the reality of insufficient instru-ments to address political issues in the areas ofoperations. This concern was propelled due to two inter-connected facts. Firstly, that conflicts and peacekeepingoperations now take place within states and not betweenthem, which was the case when the DPKO was formed.Secondly, the mandate of peacekeeping operations needsto be negotiated and approved by the host government,which tends to refute any references made to politics,thus tying the hands of DPKO and DPA to work politic-ally with what they regard as the root causes of the con-flict. Here, the humanitarian discourse and, in particular,the domain of PoC served as a Trojan horse to workpolitically through a seemingly apolitical missionmandate. As the mandate of UN missions merely refersto PoC as ‘to protect civilians under imminent threats ofphysical violence’, without further telling what this actu-ally entailed, it became up to the force commander orothers within specific missions to interpret the PoCagenda and put it to action. So, whilst PoC up until theNew Horizons agenda was merely seen as a bothersomehumanitarian mandate requirement, it now gained newmomentum—although not always for the reasons ini-tially envisaged by the humanitarian proponents.The vignette cases illustrate different expressions of

the humanitarian mission creep, driven forward by boldpolicy headquarters ambitions pertaining to the humani-tarian–development nexus. The cases render the differ-ent interfaces between the discursive realms ofhumanitarian action and development aid, illustratingcontentious knowledge battles at the institutional andpolicy levels that also may also undermine the headquar-ters’ policy ambitions. These interfaces bring togetherdifferent principles and institutionalised mandates, dem-onstrating how the nexus itself is both produced by andcontested at the top. Below, however, a more ground-upperspective is offered to the formation of the humanitar-ian–development nexus. Drawing on fieldwork exploringcivilian protection in Northern Uganda (Lie 2012, 2017),the case offers a different perspective to the nexus for-mation. The case illustrates how the mission creep andnexus are driven forward not by central policies but as aresult of changing crisis context and humanitarian ac-tors’ pragmatic use of the principles when operating in avolatile environment. Indeed, by the stroke of the pen,the Ugandan government recasted the situation inNorthern Uganda from being one of crisis and thus thescope of humanitarian action, into one of recovery,

which is the domain of development aid. Redefining thesituation as one of recovery produced obstacles to hu-manitarian actors and their ability to pay heed to the hu-manitarian principles. Whereas some withdrew, otherstook a more pragmatic stance to this recast and the hu-manitarian principles under the auspice of the impera-tive to help the civilians regardless of how the situationwas being (re)defined.

Northern Uganda: conflict to recovery -humanitarianism to development?In 2005, at the peak of the civil war between the Gov-ernment of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army(LRA) there were roughly 1.8 million internally displacedpeople (IDPs) living in 251 different ‘protected camps’across 11 districts in Northern Uganda. The roots of theconflict dates back to 1986 when current PresidentYoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army(MRA) overthrew former president Tito Okello, whocame from the northern Acholi tribe. Museveni came topower promising to restore stability, security and respectfor human rights. People from the northern parts were,however, antagonistic to a government led by a personfrom the south. Museveni’s policies of downplaying eth-nicity as a political, organising principle were seen as away to undermine the political voices of the north, creat-ing further trepidation in the north, causing rebel groupsto emerge. Multiple insurgencies emerged from Acholi-land, of which the Joseph Kony-led LRA would eventu-ally rise as the most enduring and destructive rebelmovement.In response, the government in 1996 escalated its fight

against the LRA through its scorched-earth policy. Thisincluded ordering all Acholis to vacate their homes in48 h, forcing them to resettle in ‘protected camps’, thusswiftly turning the citizens into internally displacedpeople (IDPs). The rationale was to separate civiliansand combatants in order for the Ugandan People’s De-fence Force (UPDF) to identify and target the combat-ants. The government invoked a humanitarian reasoningfor the encampment process, arguing the camps wouldenable the UPDF to better offer physical protection. See-ing the political aspects of the insurgency, however, al-lows analysing the encampment and recasting thecivilians as IDPs deprived of their civil rights as a way tocontrol and quell political opposition from arising in thenorth, thus being instrumental in the Kampala-basedstate formation process.The so-called ‘protected camps’ did not receive suffi-

cient physical protection as the UPDF used its limitedresources to focus on fighting the LRA and not protect-ing the civilians. This left the camp borders porous,allowing the LRA to hide and attack within the camps.The civilians, moreover, were forced to move outside the

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camps to maintain agricultural production, collect fire-wood, go to the markets and so on, as there was a crit-ical lack of services and provisions within the camp.Leaving the camps to sustain their livelihood, the civil-ians feared not only being attacked by the LRA but alsobeing associated with the LRA and consequently repri-manded by the UPDP since the government’s policycriminalised out-of-camp activities. Together, the LRAatrocities, the UPDP’s response to the LRA and the gov-ernment’s encampment policies and poor camp manage-ment produced a massive humanitarian crisis (Branch2011).International humanitarian assistance was gradually

phased in to help respond to the ensuing humanitariancrisis. In response, the government reallocated its campfunding into the UPDF, making the humanitarian in-volvement at least partly complicit in sustaining the con-flict as it allowed the government to focus on a militaryand not political solution to the conflict, whilst inter-national humanitarian actors assumed responsibility formanaging the camps. Meanwhile, most state buildingand development activities in the north were lying fallowwith neither funding nor focus from the governmentand international actors.Northern Uganda experienced a dramatic expansion of

externally funded, humanitarian civil society organisa-tions from the late 1990. The intervening humanitarianregime had its primary function in administrating camppopulations, causing civilians to be self-disciplined intonon-political forms of organisation rather than empow-ered to pursue their own aspiration. The massive influxof humanitarian actors proliferated after the head of UNOCHA, Jan Egeland, in 2003, brought attention to theconflict, describing it as the worst forgotten humanitar-ian crisis on earth, followed by pledges and appeals tobeef up relief operations. The ensuing CNN-effect madehumanitarian funding skyrocket, from $34 million in2002 to its 2008 peak of $238 million, causing NorthernUganda, in the words of an informant, to suffer fromNGO-obesity, creating an aid-based civil society and aneconomy almost entirely contingent on external funding.The peak of the external involvement in 2008 also

marked the beginning of the end of the humanitariancrisis—at least nominally—as the government started aprocess of recasting the situation from being one of hu-manitarian crisis to one of recovery and development inorder to reclaim its sovereignty in Northern Uganda. In-strumental in this move was the government’s closure ofthe ‘protected camps’, thus forcing the internally dis-placed population to return to their ancestral fieldswhich had been lying fallow for over a decade. The gov-ernment’s discursive recast of the situation happenedpartly in response to how the humanitarian actorsundermined the state through their comprehensive

operations and antagonising advocacy work, and partlybecause the UPDF had pushed the LRA out of Uganda.The government took the Kampala-based donors to thenorth, showing them that people were returning home,that the camps were being closed and that the conflictwas over as the LRA had been pushed into the neigh-bouring countries. Only seeing the surface of the situ-ation, the donors were persuaded that the crisis was overand to move their funding from humanitarian activitiesinto development aid, notably in the form of budget sup-port to the government’s own recovery and reconstruc-tion plans in the north.The transition happened in spite of the persistent hu-

manitarian sufferings and needs in the post-conflictperiod. The recast had detrimental effects for ongoingactivities—‘too many NGOs withdrew too soon with toomuch unfinished business’ was the general story told byinformants, arguably leaving a humanitarian vacuum forthe many civilians who after years in the protectedcamps were forced to leave, returning to their home-lands and districts which in the meantime had receivedminimal government and donor attention regarding so-cial and infrastructure development.Admittedly, representatives of local authorities, hu-

manitarian and development NGOs and communityleaders all expressed that there no longer was an on-going crisis per se given that the armed conflict hadended, which warranted a move into recovery and devel-opment. Yet, they held there were numerous concernswith the immediate camp closure and the depleting hu-manitarian funding. Although the LRA had been pushedout of Uganda, it still waged attacks but with plummet-ing frequency from neighbouring DRC and South Sudan.The sudden decommissioning of the IDP-camps

undermined the sustainability of the humanitarian’swork. The process of replacement was, moreover, full oftensions as the IDPs themselves were never consultedabout their repatriation as stated by the principles ofDurable Solutions for IDPs. Formally, the governmentsubscribed to these principles. In practice, however, theauthorities wanted the displaced people to return totheir rural homes as quickly as possible, arguably as away to reclaim its humanitarian sovereignty and as atoken of stability and the transition to recovery.The returning IDPs, however, were faced with a col-

lapsed state apparatus that had received little attentionfrom both donors and the central state during the de-cades of armed conflict, during which the many NGOsin effect had replaced the state in terms of service deliv-ery and protection efforts. The humanitarian activitiesduring the crisis had, moreover, addressed the immedi-ate and present concerns, but in so doing the interven-ing actors neglected foreseeing the future, post-conflictneeds and concerns. Land rights, in particular, became a

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critical hotspot causing for violent conflict. Many fam-ilies saw their land they were forced to move from ap-propriated when returning from the camps, causing forlegal disputes erupting into violent conflict due to thelack of formalised tenure and a penal system to settlethe conflicts.The camp closure not only degraded the livelihood

fundament and basic services provided by the humani-tarian actors. The ensuing forced resettlement also dis-mantled the social fabric that had been establishedwithin the camps. Together, this exacerbated the hu-manitarian concerns and needs in the post-camp, recov-ery phase despite the conflict had formally been calledoff. These concerns were further exacerbated as the hu-manitarian actors started to phase out after losing theirrationale and operational consent when the governmentdid recast the crisis situation as one of recovery. In theareas recovering from decades of armed conflict, civil so-ciety and local authorities reported about concerns re-lated to children’s rights, sexual and gender-basedviolence, poverty, unemployment, food insecurity, vio-lence, conflict over access and rights to land, unexplodedordinances and weapons, illiteracy and a general lack ofbasic services such as health, social protection, educationand water.

Responding to the transition—principles and pragmaticsAre these concerns of a humanitarian or developmentcharacter? Within which realm do they Uganda. Indeed,perhaps with the exemption of the contentious landrights, all other issues are found throughout the countrywhere they are addressed by development actors. Themain difference, however, is the magnitude and com-plexity of these issues caused by decades of conflict.These issues, moreover, became exacerbated due to lim-ited attention given to infrastructure development andstate building during the conflict, together giving theseconcerns both a temporal and spatial diffusion outreach-ing any other national context.Generally, the humanitarian actors’ response to the

government’s situation recast can be grouped into threecategories: those who withdrew with reference to theirhumanitarian mandate; those who relocated their opera-tions and those who maintained presence but refocusingand reorganising their aid activities. Of the first category,one finds the UNHCR, the ICRC and the MSF. TheUNHCR had to withdraw as it is dependent on both thegovernment’s consent and donor funding to operate.The ICRC and MSF—being actors that well beyond thisspecific case are renowned for their strict and verbatimunderstanding of the humanitarian principles—withdrewwith reference to their humanitarian mandate as thesituation moved into recovery and development. Theyacknowledged the critical situation and the persistent

needs but feared breaching humanitarian principles, ex-plicitly invoking a hierarchy by holding humanitarianprinciples over pragmatic approaches. The second cat-egory involved several larger, international NGOs thatsought to pay heed to the humanitarian principles whilstsimultaneously remaining operational in Uganda due tofunding requirements. This was enabled by relocatingoperations to the north-eastern Karamoja-region wherethe indigenous pastoralists’ cattle raiding dynamics, cli-mate change, land scarcity and nomadic transbordermovement now emerged as a humanitarian hotspot re-quiring intervention. The third category involves organi-sations that took a more pragmatic stance to thediscursive recast of the situation in the north and itsconsent and funding implications. Disagreeing about theunderpinning assessment and recognising the persistentconcerns, some actors reframed their programmes intodevelopment aid, which warranted both operational le-gitimacy and external, financial support. Despite scalingdown their activities due to the plummeting of funds,these organisations gradually aligned themselves withregular development activities, such as building schools,education, reproductive health, vocational and livelihoodtraining, agricultural extension programmes and reinte-gration projects.These organisations, in disagreeing about the govern-

ment’s assessment to warrant the discursive recast of thesituation, took a more pragmatic stance regarding thehumanitarian principles. Humanitarian actors that tooka more pragmatic stance, argued that the government’srhetorical recast of the situation was unsubstantiated,did not reflect real changes on the ground and was moti-vated by having external organisations to withdraw. Asargued above, the discursive recast did not eliminate hu-manitarian concerns. Some were even exacerbated whenpeople had to migrate as the camps closed. Moreover,the organisations were concerned that their donors didnot realise the persistent humanitarian needs and thatthe resettlement of civilians, which persuaded donorsabout the discursive recast, in fact was a forced onecaused by the government’s closure of the camps.Against this backdrop, several organisations maintainedtheir operational activities, arguing that their commit-ment to the civilians and those suffering in the post-conflict period trumps the government’s rendering ofthe situation as well as the sanctity of the humanitarianprinciples. ‘We are committed to helping people in need,not to maintain some abstract principles’, one informantheld. Reflecting similar sentiments, several organisationsreoriented and redefined their support, moving from ex-plicit humanitarian assistance into development aid ‘butwith a significant humanitarian touch’, I was told. Forinstance, the Norwegian Refugee Council, despite signifi-cantly scaling down its activities, moved into

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infrastructure development by building schools. For hu-manitarian purposes, this was inscribed as part of theeducation in emergencies discourse, although there wasno emergency and even those doing the work perceivedit as a typical development activity (Lie 2017). Initiativesfrom, amongst others, the Justice and ReconciliationProject, Save the Children, and Refugee Law Project allreceived less humanitarian funding, yet they aspired tomaintain their activities with reference to persistentneeds. Whilst some of these organisations are so-calleddual-mandate organisations, meaning they attend toboth humanitarian and development situations, theirfunding streams and operational consent are usually tiedto either of the segments.To transcend segments involved boundary work,

downplaying the unilateral relief and advocacy workbased on the humanitarian principles, to advance greaterpartnership with the local communities and their partici-pation in, and ownership of, development policies thatwere also required to be aligned with the government’snational development strategy. This meant that policiesand activities nominally had to conform to those of thegovernment, such as infrastructure capacity building,education, health services, vocational and livelihoodtraining and farming activities. When recasting theirwork in terms of development, less attention was givento issues of human rights, gender-based violence, childprotection, legal aid and reproductive health, althoughmost organisations started to address these issues indir-ectly and as part of less controversial topics.Throughout, informants held that the transition from

humanitarianism to recovery happened too fast, and thatneither donors nor implementing agencies were suffi-ciently prepared for this shift. Their work and strategieswere planned for emergency responses and humanitar-ian funding, not development and rehabilitation. ‘Thoseorganisations that did not alter their practices accordingto the new rendering of the situation would eventuallyhave to withdraw’, one informant stated, adding thatperhaps the most critical aspect was the lack of an exitstrategy to ease the transition, to prevent abandoning alot of incomplete work, and mitigate the impact the sud-den transition would have for the beneficiaries. Conse-quently, against this backdrop and the persistenthumanitarian issues still lingering in the area, a numberof organisations reoriented their support as develop-ment, both as a way to ease the transition, complete on-going work, and phase out activities in a somewhat moresustainable manner, but also as a way to continue ad-dress the persistent humanitarian needs.This pragmatic stance in transitioning from humani-

tarianism to development was less controversial to thedonor community and the national authorities than tothe humanitarian agencies. The donors admittedly

struggled to find new partners to receive the fundingalready allocated to their budget for activities in Uganda.National and local authorities were satisfied, not only be-cause the humanitarian crisis was formally over but alsothat donors would commit themselves financially to as-sist in the government’s state-building and recovery ac-tivities now planned to take place in the north. Theorganisations that withdrew or moved into developmentactivities were antagonistic as they did not see the transi-tion being warranted by any substantial improvementsof the civilian’s needs—yet they were compelled to relateto the transition, although in different ways.Amongst those organisations withdrawing according

to their humanitarian mandate, this pragmatic ‘thirdway’ response was seen as somewhat controversial and ahollowing of the humanitarian space and principles, as itconnected erstwhile humanitarian actors not only to thepolitics of aid but also to the government’s state buildingand recovery programme. In the words of an informantresponding to this critique, ‘we are committed to helppeople in need, not to maintain some abstract princi-ples’. The different responses to the discursively recastedsituation remind us not only about the heterogeneity ofhumanitarianism but also the malleability and its consti-tutive principles: multiple and diverse organisations op-erate under the same humanitarian umbrella and lendlegitimacy from its morally charged principles andvalues, regardless whether organisations share the sameinterpretation and understanding of what these princi-ples mean and entail in practice. The malleability of thehumanitarian principles and concepts make for a know-ledge battlefield where different actors representing dif-ferent organisational cultures and mandates vie overhumanitarianism’s meaning, interpretation and applica-tion in practice. This malleability is to some seen as away to be pragmatic about humanitarian challenges andprinciples by enabling more diverse and context sensitiveoperational action—meaning that the end justifies themean. Conversely, others see the malleability as under-mining the humanitarian principles and the legitimacythey provide for, thus curtailing room to manoeuvre onthe basis of humanitarianism.

Coda: The compartmentalisation ofhumanitarianism and developmentThe discourses of humanitarian action and developmentaid are often understood as representing different arche-types (Ferme 2013), megarhetorics (Dingo and Scott2012) or communities of international aid (DeChaine2005). Increasingly, these segments of the internationalsystem rub shoulders—as tectonic plates—affecting,overlapping and challenging each other. Their interfaceillustrates an incipient humanitarian–developmentnexus. Regardless whether this nexus is produced by

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intention or as an effect of how actors pragmatically em-ploy the humanitarian principles in practice—as illus-trated by the vignette cases and the Northern Ugandacase respectively—it nevertheless reflects an ongoing hu-manitarian mission creep (Barnett 2005, 2011). This maypotentially undermine the humanitarian principles andthus the humanitarian space and legitimacy so central tothe conceptual and physical humanitarian practice inwhich humanitarian actors operate (Acuto 2014). In itsstrictest sense, humanitarian action is understood as theunconditional help to people in need, when in need.Corollary, when needy people are not offered assistanceor if assistance is provided before needs arise, this nom-inal version is undermined. As the cases illustrate, thisnominal version is being stretched both through prac-tices emerging from the bottom and by top-driven policyinitiatives: practitioners increasingly engage aspects out-side of the humanitarian present, see the war-to-peacetransition as a continuum, and thus decompartmentalisehow various actors operate in distinct (temporal) phasesof the crisis. This, however, reflects back on the seminalhumanitarian scope. To return to Barnett’s quote in thebeginning: ‘as humanitarians began imagining how tobuild peace after war, they slipped into building states’(Barnett 2011: 3), being not only the domain of develop-ment but also an inherently political activity taking placebefore needs arise. The obvious question that begs itselfis whether this really matter—should principles or prag-matics prevail and guide action? Or is this conceptualand philosophical concerns merely relevant in the con-ference rooms and at the headquarters levels? Do thehumanitarian ethics become tainted when humanitarianagencies take on practices outside its remit? Is there ahierarchy, or contradiction, between the humanitariandeontology and pragmatic approaches to save lives andprotect civilians?The cases above show different dynamics and consid-

erations regarding these questions. The vignette cases alldemonstrate the troublesome practical interface of thetwo distinct discourses of humanitarianism and develop-ment at the level of planning, despite actors’ own policyambitions of enhancing the nexus. This discrepancy be-tween policy and practice is largely due to the discursiveformation of the two segments and the governing role ofthe humanitarian principles. However, the formative roleof the humanitarian principles appears somewhat differ-ent when approached analytically bottom up. As the casefrom Northern Uganda shows the principles serve to an-chor, not govern, practice. In response to the discursiverecast of the crisis, different humanitarian organisationsinterpret their mandate and response differently, thusshowing the principle’s context-specific malleability. Thetransition from humanitarian action to development aidin Northern Uganda illustrates the ambiguities of

principles and pragmatics by drawing attention to im-portant humanitarian changes and challenges that givemomentum to what has been described as an ongoinghumanitarian mission creep causing for a general debateabout the nature and future of humanitarianism. As thecase demonstrates, this mission creep is driven by inter-related factors both external and internal to the humani-tarian field. Externally, the recast of the situation intoone of recovery impinged on the government’s consentand donors’ funding of the humanitarian activities. In-ternally, realising the lingering and persistent effects ofthe Civil War several humanitarian organisations reor-iented their support in terms of development in order tocontinue to assist the civilian population, thus taking apragmatic stance favouring the civilians’ needs and notthe humanitarian principles.The case of the humanitarian changes and challenges

in Northern Uganda correspond to more general obser-vations pertaining to the evolving humanitarian missioncreep, i.e. that the humanitarian–development nexus isdriven not only by central policy prescriptions but alsoby how actors in pragmatically and in practice respondto changing and complex contexts demanding new ap-proaches (Duffield 2007; Kaldor 2007; Terry 2002). Inresponse to these changing circumstances and new con-flict formations, humanitarian actors have expandedtheir scope beyond their seminal temporal and concep-tual remit so important for the humanitarian principlesand thus actors’ legitimacy. On the temporal side, itquestions humanitarianism’s inherent presentist stance(Reid-Henry 2013; Weizman 2012), that is, the insistenceon assisting people in need when in need. The increasedhumanitarian focus on prevention and reconstruction isnot only commonly seen as falling within the temporalscope of development but also overlapping its thematicarea of operations.Whilst beneficiaries of international aid tend to be

neglectful or unaware of the differences between hu-manitarianism and development aid, their distinctivenessmatter for practitioners and operational activities. In-creasingly these segments of the international systemrub shoulders, sometimes even overlapping and challen-ging each other. The realms of humanitarianism and de-velopment draw on distinct rationales involving differentactors with their particular mandates: humanitarianism’simminent needs-based approaches building on the prin-ciples of neutrality, impartiality and independence—to-gether providing for the physical and conceptual‘humanitarian space’ in which humanitarian actors oper-ate—are as such fundamentally different from the morelong-term, political, rights-based development ap-proaches. Central here is the notion of politics. There isno novelty in stating that both humanitarian and devel-opment aid produce political effects (Yamashita 2015).

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What we see now, however, is that political intent, mo-tives and actors increasingly become part in shaping anddefining the apolitical humanitarian realm in practice.Humanitarianism and development may appear alike

to those outside their institutional boundaries. Thebeneficiaries of international aid are not concerned withthe institutional boundaries between humanitarianismand development. But who and how aid is delivered haveimportant bearings and effects for the beneficiaries. Yet,and nominally, humanitarianism and development aredistinct sectors in many ways, involving particular ratio-nales, actors funding mechanisms and, importantly, theirrelationship to both politics and the host government inthe country which they operate. Humanitarian practiceis based on an apolitical and impartial rationale, oftenbypassing the state. Development aid is explicitly polit-ical and works with and through state authorities. Theseorganisational and institutional differences have effects,creating great philosophical disputes in the conferencerooms about the nature and future of both developmentand humanitarianism. In practice, however, lines are abit more blurred. The typical humanitarian practice wasconcerned with providing food and blankets, which hasexpanded into managing refugee camps, food distribu-tion, provide clean water and offer public health care.Other recent but less typical humanitarian practices nowinclude ‘cash transfers, protection programming, shelter,family reunification, agricultural recovery, business con-tinuity and humanitarian advocacy’ (Slim 2015: 13–14).Such topics overlap and replicate much of what the de-velopment sector had been alone in addressing for along time, thus illustrating the humanitarian missioncreep by moving attention from what Arendt called zoëto bios. Zoë refers to the zoological life, or the simplefact of biological life. Bios, by contrast, refers to the bio-graphical life: ‘life that is properly formed through eventssuch that it can be narrated as a story’ (Redfield 2005:340). This expansion of the humanitarian scope intonew forms of relief concerned with the biographical lifeand societal resilience has led some critical theoristsdrawing on the works of Foucault and Agamben to ana-lyse humanitarianism as a form of bio-political govern-ance (Agamben 2005; Foucault 1991). Whilst this is acommon approach to and critique of the institutionaldevelopment apparatus, seeing humanitarianism as apowerful instrument and a way to govern individualbodies is thus also, indirectly, a token of changes to thehumanitarian field and its nexus with development.

AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Hannah Dönges and Benjamin de Carvalhofor comments on a previous version. The usual caveats apply, and allremaining shortcomings are the author’s alone.

Author’s contributionsThis is a single-authored manuscript, with Dr. Lie as the sole author. The au-thor read and approved the final manuscript.

Author’s informationJon Harald Sande Lie is Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs (NUPI) and co-editor of the Forum for DevelopmentStudies journal. He holds a PhD in social anthropology from the University ofBergen (2011).Focusing on governance, power and resistance, his research interests includedevelopment aid, humanitarianism and postcolonial state formation inEastern Africa. His research has appeared in, amongst others, Third WorldQuarterly, Social Analysis, Millennium, and African Security. His monographon ‘Developmentality: An Ethnography of the World Bank–UgandaPartnership’ was published with Berghahn Books in 2015. He currently leadsthe research project on “Developmentality and the anthropology ofpartnership”.

FundingThe Norwegian Research Council. The research draws on work undertaken aspart of the projects ‘Developmentality and the anthropology of partnership’,‘Protection of Civilians. From principle to practice’ and NUPI’s SIS Researchprogram funded by the Research Council of Norway.

Availability of data and materialsNot applicable

Competing interestsThe author declares that he has no competing interests.

Received: 18 October 2019 Accepted: 30 November 2020

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