Avey (1937), 'Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape

8/2/2019 Avey (1937), 'Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape'

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MORAL SKEPTICISM AND THEWAY OF ESCAPEA. E. AVEY

IKEPTICISM is the characteristicmarkof the thinking

of the present age on moral questions. Whatever preten-sions are made to the validity of the criticism of humanconduct, it still remains that these are pretensions. In practice

we find fault with one another, accuse our fellows of living on alow level of existence, and berate the social standards of the day.Yet when we undertake deliberately and seriously to point outthe objective principles of conduct which we are presupposing inour judgments, and to demonstrate why they are objective andapplicable to the person criticized, we begin to hedge and tocompromise, making fatal concession to the skeptic and admit-ting that after all it is a matter of custom, of personal convic-tion, or of some other merely individual standard. On the partof the common man there is no more expressive representationof this skepticism than the challenge so often heard in the faceof criticism: "That's what you think." If we turn to literaryauthority, we find the word of Shakespeare: "There's nothingeither good or bad but thinking makes it so." Or, if we seekmore orthodox authority, we may quote even Paul's liberaladvice to the Corinthians: "If one of them that believe notbiddeth you to a feast, and ye are disposed to go; whatever isset before you, eat, asking no question for conscience' sake"(I Cor. IO: 27). In the detailed study of the history of morals wehave Westermarck's well-known account. And nearer home,from the collaboration of a group of philosophers a few yearsago, this statement:

To the arguments f the completemoral keptic, t mustbe admitted,there can be made no conclusiveandirrefutableeply.But neithercan45'


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452 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSany conclusive eplybe madeto the skeptic n any field,not even to theman who assailsthat vast edificeof observation nd inferencewe callscientific ruth.... The skepticis right in maintaining hat at somepoint all ourknowledge, f sense act, ofmathematicalruth,of inference,of values,restsupon unproved ssumptions.If this is the final word on the situation, then there is no senseeither in mutual criticism or in self-estimate. There is no sensein the further statement of the same writers:

Whenall hasbeensaid n favorof skepticism,t remains lear hat menmust act, that some acts are betterthan others,and that some basis ofdiscrimination must be used. . . . . It is obviously the part of reason tomaketheseassumptionss fundamentalspossible, o choose hosethatappear heleastuncertain, ndtointroducehemonlywhenreflection asreached ts limits. To maintain hat, becauseultimately t is a matterofpreference hat wantontakingof human ife is bad,we shouldslay theman next door,wouldbe as foolishandimpossible s to maintain hat,becausemen ie and thesensesdeceive,everystatements asgoodandastrue as anyother.'Here is vacillation indeed; it is as uncertain as the Kantianantinomies. There is no standard for judgment; yet there mustbe one. Theoretically, one position is valid; practically, theopposite. But according to the doctrine itself there is no groundor principle for determining which of the two should be taken.We cannot justify the selection of the practical point of view, forjustification is theoretical; and theoretically there are no stand-ards, ultimately.

No, it remains precisely not clear that, when all has been saidin favor of skepticism, some acts are better than others, and somebasis of discrimination must be used. When all has been saidin favor of skepticism, no acts are better than others. Nor canany basis of discrimination be used; for there are no bases. It isnot "obviously the part of reason to make its assumptions asfundamental as possible" because there is no way to tell whatis fundamental and what is not, nor what is more and what lessso. For similar reason it is not possible "to choose those that

I Introduction o ReflectiveThinking ColumbiaAssociates n Philosophy),p. 246.


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MORAL SKEPTICISM AND THE WAY OF ESCAPE 453appear the least uncertain."All are equally uncertain. If it isas foolishwantonly to slaythe man nextdooras it is to maintainthat every statement s as good and true as any other, this is notto say that the wholecomparisons not foolish.I say that, if this is thefinalwordon the situation,then we areconfinednecessarilyto descriptivenarrationof conduct. Forevery person criticized can escape every accusation by de-claring, "I do not accept the standardby which you judge."And, according o the above-statedskepticism, hereis nothingto compelhim to accept it. In our study of conduct, then, weare reduced o barehistory. But ourhistoryis not, then, a his-tory of values; it is a historyof facts. There is no measureofvalues; hence no values. Any given fact will have as manyplacesin a scale of values as there are standardsapplied to it.And, as there are an infinite numberof possible standards, hepossible assignmentsof position are infinite. That is, axiologi-cally, the fact ordeedhas just no particularpositionwhatever.The teachingof ethics becomesmeaningless. Suchteachersmayas well fold up their tents and move on, making place for thehistoriansand naturalscientists.

II-Thecauseof this skepticalsituationis the inappropriatenessofthemethodapplied o moralproblems.Theattempthas beento applythe methodof the natural,descriptivesciences and, onthe basis of observation, analysis, and induction,to establishuniversalprinciplesof valuation. But this procedure nvolvesthe fallacyof factualism. No amountof mere observationof theactualbehaviorof humanitycantell how men oughtto behave.Observationand inductive summation can tell only how theyhave and typically do. But this is not normativeevaluation.Observationplays an important part in the determinationofwhethermen arebehavingas they ought. But it alone cannottell how they ought. The result of such inductiveattemptshasbeen, in the firstplace,failureto revealany universalmodesof


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454 INTERNATIONAL OURNALOF ETHICSbehavior.These vary fromplace to place over the world andfrom age to age through history. It has revealed no sensescommunes on moral standards.Nor could it; for observationgivesfacts,not estimates. It is strict empiricism tselfwhichhasproducedskepticism.

IIIEscapefrom this situationmust rest uponthe discoveryandapplicationof a differentmethod. It may include observation.

But it must involve somethingelse orit willremain utile. And,if no such method can be found, then skepticismremains in-evitable,and ethics cannotbecome a science, as a field n whichthere is real fact and principle,objectiveand valid for all whowill approach t. IVA noninductivemethodwhich has been tried historically isof course that of arbitraryauthority. It has occurred n theform of religiouscommand, egislativemandate,andpressureofcustom. It escapesthe fallacyof factualism. But it suffers romarbitrariness.For when an inquiringmind asks, "WhymustIfollowthese mandates?" thoughone asks not merelyas a sub-terfugeandescapefromdisagreeable bligation,but withhonest

desireto understand he natureof authority), it has no reply.And, when various policies of life appeal equally to arbitraryauthority, these demands become as lackingin objectivity asthe attempt at induction. Thus, while possessingnormativecharacter,arbitraryauthorityremainssubjective.V

The desired method, in order to be satisfactory, must befactual in the sense of being concernedwith the conditionsofreallife. It must be objective;that is, universalnits validityforall. It must be normativeand authoritative,not merelyinduc-tive in a descriptivesense. Finally, it must be inescapable.There must be no choiceas to whether it will be acceptedorrejected. It must benecessarilynvolved n theprocessof actionand in the evaluation of action.


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MORAL SKEPTICISM AND THE WAY OF ESCAPE 455If it is not factualin its relationto life, it will remaina mere

fictionor hypothesis,suspended n the realmof neutralentities.If it is not universal n its validity, it will fail to effectthe escapefrom skepticismwhichwe desire. If it is not involved,of neces-sity, in the very processesof actionand evaluation,it will stillremainaccidentaland arbitrary.The only way of escapefromthe possibilityof skepticism s by a methodso compelling hatanyonewhoopenshis mouthto raise questionabout it by thatvery act commitshimselfto it. The dilemma t must presentisthat of acceptanceorsilence;eitheragree orwithdraw romthefield of discussion.Clearlysuch a methodmust rest not uponthe acceptanceof some view specific n its content. It must be-ginwithindifferenceo contentand findits strengthin the veryprocessof discussion tself. Sucha methodmustbe formal,notmaterial.Like the methodof the mathematician, t must findits powerin its very formalismand its implications,not in theexistenceof somespecifictype of case. 'For,since the attempttofind universallyapprovedcontent for behavior or choice hasfailed, objectivity must be found in form or nowhere. Onlyformalnecessitycan offerus a way of escapefromsubjectivity.

VINow thereis a methodwhichhas appeared n the historyofthoughtfromtime to time, and whichis very usefulin this con-nection,but which has not received sufficientexplicitrecogni-tion andexploitation. It appearsat certainpointsin the think-ing of Plato, Epictetus, Augustine,Descartes, Kant, Royce,Joad, and others. It is the so-called"reflective"or "reflexive"methodandis first clearlyrecognizedn the well-knownpassageof Plato'sRepublic,Bookvi, where,in the designationof levelsof knowledgeby the segments of a line, Plato recognizesthehypotheticalcharacterof the results of specialdisciplinesandlooksbeyondthem for a presuppositionlessevel of knowledge,attainednot by observationor by deduction,but by dialectic.He applies the method in the Theaetetuswhen he reduces the

Heraclitean lux philosophyto absurdity, f taken on all fours,


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456 INTERNATIONAL OURNALOF ETHICSby showingthat if universallyapplied t underminestself,sinceit couldnot state its owncasebecauseof the instabilityof mean-ing in the very wordsit triedto utter. It has played its part atvariouspointsin the thinkingof the othermenmentioned.The methodconsistsin revealingthe tacit presuppositions fthinking, as contrasted,on the one hand, with indicatingitscontent, individualor general(historicalor inductive),and, onthe other hand, deducing the implications of a supposition(mathematicaland deductive). It is concernednot with whatone is thinkingabout,but with thepreconditionson the basisofwhich the thinking operates. It looks not forwardto conse-quencesand details,but backto presuppositions ndprinciples.

VIISucha method s the kindwe need. If therearenecessarypre-suppositions egardingvalue involvedin any attemptwhateverat evaluation,no matter what the specificcontent of a givencase, thenin thesecommonpresuppositionsmust lie the clue toa universallyvalid, necessaryprincipleor set of principlesforthe estimation of conduct. Such presuppositionsmust signifycommunityof intent, not of description.Can such universallynecessarypresuppositionsbe shown?

VIIILet us begin our analysis with a minimum of consent regard-ing any standardof value. Let us present the bald challengewith whichskepticismmeets all positiveinjunctions-the ques-tion "Why?"Now the question"Why?"eitherhas meaningor it hasnone.

If it hasnone,thenit offersno opposition o thepositiveinjunc-tion against which we supposed it directed. For logical theorymaintains that the null propositionis consistent with everyproposition.If it has meaning, it is as a demandfor a rationalinterpretationof the forceof the injunctionproposed.As a demandfor a rational nterpretationt becomessubject


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MORALSKEPTICISMAND THE WAY OF ESCAPE 457to the condition of significance, which, positively, is coherence;negatively, is freedom from contradiction. It is true that at-tempts have been made recently, by Korzybsky, Brouwer,Ruark, and Reiser, to construct significant systems which do notconform to the traditional laws of thought. These attemptshave not yet succeeded, however. Nor do we see how they cansucceed, for they presuppose the very principles they are tryingto undermine. And it is an accepted theorem of logic that, if thenegative of a proposition implies the proposition, then theproposition is true.2 Not until an instance in which this does nothold can be exhibited will the possibility of such a differentsystem be established. When a skeptic raises the question"Why?" then he is committing himself to being rational, andto whatever this involves.

IxAn objection which our theory has to meet lies in the questionoften proposed: "Who is to be the judge as to whether any

thought or act is rational?" The question, however, is basedupon a misconception, a misunderstanding of the nature ofthinking. It tries to prejudice the case by assuming that think-ing is a personal and subjective process. And from this inter-pretation of thought it draws the conclusion that it leaves usstill in the skeptical position which we described as the char-acteristic attitude of the age. The reply to the challenge is: Thethinking process itself is the judge and determiner of what isrational, formally and materially.

The objection is based upon a failure to appreciate the lessonof the history of thought from the Sophists to Plato. It was theconviction of the Sophists, whether of the empirical or ration-alistic schools, that the activity of thinking was an individual-istic and subjective one. From this point of view skepticism wasinevitable; for every effort at mental activity simply bogged thethinker more deeply in the quicksands of his own self. There

2 Principiamath. *2.i8.


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458 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSwas no way in which the individual could transcend himself,attain to any degree of objectivity, and so reach what hesought as knowledge. So the problem stood until Socrates madethe knowledge situation pragmatic, inductive, and objective,and Plato carried the ideational interpretation of action to alarger ontological view.

Plato made a distinction between opinion and idea-a distinc-tion which needs to be carefully and thoroughly revived. If theBritish psychologists from Hobbes through Hume had read theirPlato with more understanding minds, they would not haveobscured for us the meaning of an "idea." To Plato an idea wasof all things the least subjective.

The verb "to opine" has fallen out of common use in recenttimes. Yet it is the more correct term to express what mostpeople mean when they use the word "think." The distinctionmade by Plato between opinion and thought centered in thedifferencebetween a process which was admittedly personal andwhose results were private and another which was, in itself andits results, neither. When the present pert youth declares,"That's what you think!" what he means is: *"That is youropinion." He does not believe there exists what Plato meant bythought and idea. Modern conviction is deeply sophistical. Itis not rational and objective. It does not believe anything itholds has objective validity; nor does it believe anybody else hasanything better. It admits it does not think and does not be-lieve anyone else does. Yet paradoxically, as skepticism whenpublicly expressed must always be paradoxical, and even self-contradictory, it states its disbelief in propositions which claimobjective validity.

Sophistry is right in acknowledging the individual perspectiveinvolved in each person's knowledge. But it is deficient infailing to see the outward reach of active mind. It is right inholding that for finite thinkers the activity of interpretation isnever finished. But it fails to comprehend the meaning and


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MORAL SKEPTICISM AND THE WAY OF ESCAPE 459structure of mental activity in overlooking the existence ofactive imagination, and the fact that by it different individualsbuild increasingly a mind realm which is superindividual, inwhich each perspective plays a contributing part, and which isthe same objective realm for all in spite of each one's personallimitations. But this same objective world in which we say weall live and move is not present in the actual perceptual observa-tion of any finite individual. It is a construct built up out of theraw material offeredby direct observation, retained by memory,and woven into a whole to which other observers are makingtheir contributions also, the various individual contributionsbeing worked together by that process of interchange whichcommon sense calls conversation, Plato called dialectic, andRoyce termed interpretation. Thought in this sense is the proc-ess whereby the individual consciously transcends himself. Itis his escape from subjectivity.

If it be objected further that, even though we accept thisrationalistic analysis, we must still admit that it is the type ofanalysis characteristic'only of occidental ethics, and to whichthe Orient directly opposes its passivism and negative valuationof life, the reply is that oriental ethics has not carried throughits analysis to a necessary conclusion. And the whole trend oforiental thought, increasingly toward the adoption of the occi-dental attitude and the positive valuation of life, is practicalevidence of the superior convincingness of the Western doctrine.

If still further objection is raised on mystical grounds to theintent that the standard of value is superrational and henceabove reason, we can only say that in order to get above reasonone must at least go through reason. One cannot reach thehigher rungs of a ladder without passing the lower. If this werenot so, the mystic would be unable to argue his own case withany meaning. The valid feature of mysticism's criticism con-sists in an objection to bare formalism, not' to legitimate, con-crete rationalism.


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460 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSX

Our conclusion is this: Everyone who opens his lips to discussa question either utters sense or he does not. Sense is a construc-tive, coherent system of experiences, positive in character andsuperindividual in status. It is expressed not merely in formalpropositions but in practical activities and feelings. Theoreticalanalysis is just one phase of life. It is not finally isolated. Itmust be integrated into the whole of life in order to have realmeaning. But anyone who raises questions about moral valuescommits himself to the principles of positive meaning and there-by also to the further embodiment of meaning in practice as wellas in theory.

There is an answer to the skeptic, namely, the implications ofhis own participation in discussion. It is not true that "to thearguments of the complete moral skeptic, it must be admitted,there can be made no conclusive and irrefutable reply." At cer-tain points in all our knowledge we reach presuppositions whichwe cannot help making if we are to think and to discuss at all.This is the reason why "it remains clear that men must act, thatsome acts are better than others, and that some basis of dis-crimination must be used." By these presuppositions it becomespossible to choose those principles that appear the least uncer-tain and to hold that every statement is not as good and true asevery other. These principles are assumed as the basis of allpractical ethical judgments. True, they are not self-enforcing.There is nothing to compel men to act in accordance with them.Men may still be bad, as they may still be foolish and illogical.The principles of ethics are norms, not descriptions or causalforces. They do not create the existence of values, but they domeasure them. They are not merely inductions, but they areobjective.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

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Avey (1937), 'Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape