Autonomy without paradox kant self-legislation and the moral

volume19,no.6 february2019

Autonomy Without Paradox:

Kant, Self-Legislation and

the Moral Law

Pauline Kleingeld & Marcus WillaschekUniversity of Groningen & Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

© 2019 PaulineKleingeld&MarcusWillaschekThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019006/>

Introduction

The notion of autonomy—for which the term “self-legislation”1 isalso used—is central both to Kant’s ethics and to most contempo-raryversionsofKantianethics.Accordingtoawidespreadview,Kantclaims thatautonomyconsists in theself-legislation of theprincipleofmorality,theMoral Law.2TheMoralLaw(andthustheCategoricalImperative)3isnotgiventousheteronomously,bysomeauthorityex-ternaltoourwillsuchasGod,nature,ortradition.Rather,wegivetheMoralLawtoourselves.Moreprecisely,onthislineofinterpretation,Kantclaims thatour willgives theMoralLaw to itself.This standardreadingissharedby“constructivist”and“realist”readersofKantalike.Ithas inspired recentphilosophicaldefensesofKantian constructiv-ism,accordingtowhichmoralrequirementsaretheoutcomeof(actualorcounterfactual)deliberativeproceduresinternaltopracticalreason(see,e.g.,Rawls1980;Korsgaard1996;O’Neill1989,2004;Reath1994,2013).LeadingdefendersofrealistinterpretationsofKant’sethicsre-sisttheideathatmoralobligationdependsonavolitionalactonthepartoftheagent,buttheytooassumethatKantexplicitly claims thattheMoralLawisself-legislatedinsome(perhapsmerelymetaphori-cal)sense(e.g.,Ameriks2000;Guyer2007;Schönecker1999;Stern2012;Wood2008).

Tobesure,mostcommentatorsregardKant’sconceptionofmoralautonomyasrequiringatleastcarefulqualification,andmanyviewit

1. “Autonomy” derives from the Greekwords for “self” and “law”. Thewordαὐτόνομοςmeans“livingunderone’sownlaws”or“independent”.Incurrentusage,autonomyisoftenunderstoodas“self-determination”,butthisisnotpartofKant’sunderstandingoftheterm,aswillbecomeclearinthediscus-siontofollow.

2. We use capitalizationwhen referring to the highestmoral principle in or-dertodistinguishtheoneMoralLawfromthemanysubstantivemorallaws(lowercase).Wedonotimposethistypographicaldistinctiononquotations,however.

3. TheCategoricalImperativeistheprescriptiveexpressionoftheMoralLaw(singular).KantarguesthatwhiletheMoralLawholdsforallrationalbeings(includingGod),theCategoricalImperativeaddressesonlysensiblebeingswithinclinationsthatcantemptthemtoactcontrarytotheMoralLaw(seeG4:413,454–5).

paulinekleingeld&marcuswillaschek Autonomy Without Paradox

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.19,no.6(february2019)

Insection1,weintroducethestandardinterpretationaccordingtowhichKantclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislated,andwediscussthephilosophicaldifficultiesassociatedwithKant’sallegedthesis.Insection2,weoutlineouralternative interpretationonthebasisofadiscussionofpassagesthatareusuallyregardedasevidencefor thestandardview.Insection3,wediscusspossibleobjectionstoourread-ingbeforeconsidering,insection4,Kant’sconceptionoftheapriorityoftheMoralLawandhowthisbearsonthedebateconcerningrealistandconstructivistinterpretationsofKant’smoraltheory.

1. The “Kantian Paradox”

1.1. Current interpretations and associated difficultiesLeadinginterpretersdescribeKantasclaimingthattheMoralLawisself-legislated. Jerome Schneewindwrites: “[Kant] held thatwe areself-governingbecauseweareautonomous.Bythishemeantthatweourselveslegislatethemorallaw”(Schneewind1998,6).AccordingtoAllenWood,Kant’sideaofautonomyincludesboththeideaofmoral-ityasobjectivelybindingandtheideaof“therationalbeing’swillasauthoror legislatorof themoral law”(Wood2008,106).Thissetofquotationscouldbeextended,4butevenbetterproofofthepervasive-nessofthisinterpretationisthefactthatitisnotamatteroflivedebate.CommentatorsdisagreeonhowtounderstandKant’sclaimbutnotonwhetherhemadeit.

Many interpreters hold thatKant’s conceptionof theMoral Lawasself-legislatedservestoaccountforitsunconditionalanduniversalobligatoryforce.5Ontheirinterpretation,whatKantmeanswhenhewritesthat“autonomyofthewillisthehighestprincipleofmorality”(G4:440)isthatitisthesourceofmoralobligation.OliverSensen,forexample,writes that “Kantsees thesignificanceofautonomy in the

4. Also including, forexample,Allison1990,237;Engstrom2009, 149;Reath2006,92.

5. SomeauthorsalsotakeittoaccountforourmotivationtoobeytheMoralLaw:Klemme2013,193;Schneewind1998,483.

ashighlyproblematic.Thisisbecause,onthestandardreading,thereissomethingdeeplyparadoxicalaboutit.IftheobligatoryforceoftheMoralLawdependsonanactofself-legislation, thisseems tobelietheveryunconditionalityandnecessitythatKantregardsasthehall-markofmorality.Notsurprisingly,similarcriticismsarefrequentlydi-rectedagainstcontemporarydefensesofKantianconstructivism.KantscholarsandKantianshavedevelopedawidevarietyofresponsestothesecharges,buttheyhavenotquestionedtheirsharedunderlyingpremise. It is takenforgrantedthatKantsaysthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.

Inthispaper,wewouldliketochallengethisstandardreadingonboth textualandphilosophicalgrounds.Weargue for the followingtheses: (i) Kant never explicitly and unequivocally claims that theprincipleofmorality, theMoralLaw, isself-legislated(noteveninamerelymetaphoricalsense),and(ii)heisnotphilosophicallycommit-tedtosuchaclaimbyhisoverallconceptionofmorality.Inparticular,KantdoesnotclaimthatthebindingforceoftheMoralLawdependsonitsbeingself-legislated.Instead,weargue(iii),inKant’sviewtheideaofmoralautonomyconcernsonlysubstantivemorallaws(intheplural),suchasthelawthatoneoughtnottolie(G4:389)or“thelawtopromotethehappinessofothers”(KpV5:34).Inaddition(iv),whenKantwritesthattheprincipleofmoralityisthe“principle of autonomy”,this phrase indicates not that theMoral Law itself is self-legislatedbutratherthatthehighestmoralprinciple“commands”autonomy(G4:440).Moreover(v),Kant’sclaimhereisthatweshouldact“as if”weweregivinguniversallawsthroughourmaxims.Heneverwritesthatwe,humanbeingsassuch,actuallygivesubstantivemorallaws;rath-er,theselawshavetheirsourceinpracticalreason.Finally(vi),Kantprovidesneitherarealistnoraconstructivist“grounding”ofmorality.Instead,hedefendsa thirdpositionthatcomes intoviewonlyoncewemovepasttheideathattheMoralLawisself-legislated.ThisisthepositionthattheMoralLawisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreasonthatisnotgroundedinanythingmorefundamental.



begroundedinotherprocedures(onpainofinfiniteregressorviciouscircularity).7

Inresponse to thesedifficulties,commentatorshaveemphasizedtheimportanceofseveralqualificationswithrespecttotheclaimthatKantviewedtheMoralLawasself-legislated.First,somehavepointedout that thisdoesnot imply that the contentof theMoralLaw is amatterofchoice(see,e.g.,Kain2004,266)sinceKantdistinguishesbetweentheauthor(Urheber)of thecontentofa lawandtheauthorofitsobligatory force(MdS6:227).ThisdistinctionmakesitpossibletoavoidsaddlingKantwiththeviewthatthecontentoftheMoralLawisuptouswhilepreservingasenseinwhichself-legislationappliestothelaw’sobligatoryforce.

Furthermore,severalauthorshaveemphasizedthatthe“self”thatlegislates theMoralLaw isnotapersonalor individual self.Rather,whatKantmeansisaformofimpersonallawgivingthatisgroundedinpracticalreasonassuch.Itisself-legislationbythewillquapracticalreason,notquawillofaparticularindividual(Ameriks2000,13–5;Hill1992,88;O’Neill2013,286).AsAndrewsReathputsit,theMoralLawis“thelawthattherationalwillgivestoitself”(Reath2006,112).

Despitethesequalifications,however,itisdifficulttogivecoherentsensetoKant’sallegedclaimthatthewillorpracticalreasonitselfissomehowactivelyinvolvedingeneratingtheobligatoryforceoftheMoralLaw.Themoreoneemphasizestheimpersonal,apriori,time-less character of autonomy, theharder it is tomake literal senseofself-legislationasanactoractivity ofthewill.AllenWoodarticulatesaviewheldbymanywhenhewritesthatthereisa“serioustensionin the ideaofKantian autonomy”because the idea that rationalbe-ingsarethemselveslegislatorsoftheMoralLawandtheideathattheMoralLaw isobjectivelybindingpull inoppositedirections (Wood2008,106).

In their attempt tomake sense of Kant’s discussion ofmoral au-tonomy, some commentators have proposed different ways of

7. See,e.g.,Enoch2006andLarmore2012fordifferentversionsofthisobjection.

conclusionthatitalonecangeneratemoralobligation”(Sensen2013,11,270).6

Onthefaceofit,however,thenotionofself-legislationseemsillsuitedtothistask.Ifanactofself-legislationservesto“generate”moralobligation,thisostensiblycontradictsKant’sthesisoftheuncondition-alvalidityoftheMoralLaw,foritsuggeststhatthereisaconditionforitsvalidityafterall:thewill’sactoractivityofself-legislation.Equallyproblematically,ifmoralobligationdependsonanactofone’swill,itseemsthatonecanreleaseoneselffrommoralobligationbyabolish-ingtheMoralLawinasecondact.Itisclear,however,thatthistypeofvoluntarismisabsolutelycontrarytoKant’sview.Alternatively,iftheactofself-legislationistobenon-arbitrary,itneedstobeguidedbyanormthatprecedesit—inwhichcase,however,themostfundamentalprincipleisnot self-legislated.Thesedifficultieshaveledphilosopherswho are critical of Kant’s account of morality—particularly thoseworking in theHegelian tradition—to speakof a “Kantianparadox”(e.g.,Pinkard2002;Stern2012;seealsoKhurana2013;Pippin2000).AsTerryPinkardputsit:

TheparadoxarisesfromKant’sdemandthat,ifwearetoimposeaprinciple(amaxim,themorallaw)onourselves,thenpresumablywemusthaveareasontodoso;but,iftherewas anantecedent reason to adopt thatprinciple,thenthatreasonwouldnotbeself-imposed;yetforittobebindingonus,ithadtobe[…]self-imposed.(Pinkard2002,59)

NotethatthisallegedKantianparadoxisstructurallysimilartoawell-known objection against present-dayKantian constructivism to theeffectthatnotallnormativerequirementscanbegroundedindelib-erativeprocedures(sinceanysuchprocedureneedstobenormativelyguidedifitistoavoidbeingarbitrary),andthatnotallprocedurescan

6. Forsimilarclaims,seee.g.Klemme2013,193;Reath2013,36;Schneewind1998,6.



What each of these three interpretive proposals preserves is theideathatreasonis thesourceofboththecontentandtheobligatoryforceof theMoralLaw. Importantly,however,Kantcanexpress this ideawithouthavingtodescribetheoriginofthevalidityoftheMoralLawintermsofself-legislation.Indeed,weshallarguethatKantdoesnotinfactclaimthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.

1.2. Neither autonomy nor heteronomy of the Moral LawAnoften-mentionedphilosophical rationaleforwhyKantmustdescribetheMoralLawasself-legislatedisthatthisisnecessarytoaccountforthepossibilityofunconditionalmoralobligation.ThethoughtisthattheMoralLawmustbeconceivedasself-legislatedbecauseotherwiseitwouldbe (orwouldhave tobe regarded as) an alien (“heterono-mous”)impositionbysomeexternalauthority,inwhichcaseitsbind-ingforcewouldbeconditionalonourhavinganinterestinobeyingtherelevantauthority(say,inlightoftheprospectofrewardorpunish-ment)(seeAllison1990,237;Hill1992,76–96;Kain2004,288;Tim-mermann2007,104;Wood2008,117).

What is overlookedon this lineof reasoning is that thebindingforceof theMoral Law canbenon-heteronomous inoriginwithout being the result of self-legislation.The thirdoption,which is apos-sibilitytowhichReath’sandWood’snon-literalreadingsactuallypoint,isthattheMoralLawisneitherself-legislatednorimposedfromwith-out,sinceitisafundamentala prioriprincipleofpracticalreason(or,sinceKant identifies thewillwithpractical reason,a fundamentalaprioriprincipleof thewill). If theMoralLawisanaprioriprincipleof practical reason itself, the obligatory force ofwhichwe come toacknowledgeinpracticaldeliberation,thissufficestoaccountforits

example, interpretsKant’snotionof autonomyas an individual and socialgoaltoberealizedthroughadherencetotheCategoricalImperative,namelyasaconditioninwhichindividualandcollectivefreedomispossibletothegreatest extent (Guyer 2007, 10, 68). Karl Ameriks views Kant’s theory ofautonomyasametaphysicaltheoryaboutourstatusasuncausedcauses(atheorywhich,inhisview,suffersfromtheproblemsconnectedwithKant’sdefenseoffreewill;seeAmeriks2000,17).

understandingthenotionofself-legislation.Afirststrategythatsug-gests itself is that of interpreting self-legislation in a nonreflexivesense.An“automobile”is“self-moving”inthesensethatitmovesby itself,andan“autograph”isself-written;byanalogy,onemightwanttoarguethatmoral“autonomy”simplymeansthattheMoralLawisgivenbyoneself,inthesensethatitisone’s own legislation.8Thiscon-ceptionofautonomyavoidsmanyofthedifficultiesmentionedabove,but it retains the problematic element of activity that seems to runcountertotheunconditionalityoftheMoralLaw.

Manyinterpretersinsteadchoosetoweakenthesenseinwhichthewillself-legislates.AndrewsReath,forexample,interpretsthealleged“self-legislation”oftheMoralLawasmeaning“thatthenatureofratio-nalvolition(orpractical reason)supplies itsown internalor formalprinciple”(i.e.,theCategoricalImperative).The“elementofactivity”,of“givinglaw”,headds,amountstothefactthat“subjectsengagedincertain formsof rationalactivityunderstandthemselves tohavecer-tainformalaimsandarenormativelyguidedbytheirself-conscious-nessoftheseformalaims”(Reath2013,47).Here“giving”theMoralLawtooneselfisunderstoodasrecognizingthatitoriginatesinone’sownwillandbeingguidedbyitinone’srationalactivity.

A thirdstrategy is topointout that thereareseveralpassages inwhichKantwritesthatweshould“view”or“regard”ourselvesasself-legislating.Onthisbasis,AllenWoodsuggeststhatwedobesttotreatKant’s language of self-legislation as “just away of considering or re-garding”theMoralLaw,andthatwhatKant“really”meansisthatitscontentandauthorityare“independentofanypossiblevolitionalactwemightperform”(Wood2008,110).Inotherwords,WoodmaintainsthatwhileKantdescribestheMoralLawasself-legislated,thisisbestinterpretednon-literally,merelyasamannerofspeaking.9

8. Sensenmentionsanotherpossiblenon-reflexivereadingof“self-legislation”,namely as a law-giving “of its ownkind”,which,he argues, expresses thattheCategoricalImperativeis“unconditionedbyforeigndeterminants”(2013,269–70).

9. Some of those who read Kant as defending a realist position also de-em-phasize the “legislation”aspect in thenotionofautonomy.PaulGuyer, for



Lawas self-legislated.There are three sets of passages that are cru-cialforanyunderstandingofKant’sconceptionofautonomyandfordeterminingwhetherhearguesthattheMoralLawisself-legislated:Kant’sdiscussionoftheso-calledFormulaofAutonomy(G4:431–6),alongwithhissubsequentdiscussionof“autonomyofthewillasthesupreme principle of morality” (G 4:440), all in Groundwork II; hisidentificationoffreedomofthewillandautonomyatthebeginningofGroundwork III(G4:447);andhisclaim,intheCritique of Practical Rea-son,thatreasongiveshumanbeingstheMoralLaw(KpV5:32),alongwiththeensuingdiscussionofautonomyofthewill(KpV5:33).Inad-dition,wewillconsiderseveralrelevantisolatedformulations.

2. An Alternative Reading of Kant’s Conception of Moral Autonomy

2.1. Kant’s introduction of autonomy in Groundwork IIIn the Groundwork, Kant introduces the notion of autonomy afterdiscussing theFormulaofUniversalLaw (FUL)and theFormulaofHumanity(FH),andrightaftermentioningathirdformulationoftheCategorical Imperative,which he initially expresses in terms of the“ideaofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasauniversallylaw-givingwill”(G4:431).Headdsthatthis“idea”—whichhecallsthe“thirdpracticalprincipleofthewill”—istobeunderstoodintermsofthewill’sbeing“viewed”or“regardedas”self-legislating:

Inaccordancewith this [third]principleallmaximsarerejectedthatcannotcoexistwiththewill’sownuniversallegislation.Thewillisthusnotmerelysubjecttothelawbutsubjectinsuchawaythatitmustalsobeviewedasself-legislating10 [selbstgesetzgebend] andprecisely for thatreasonsubjecttothelawinthefirstplace(ofwhichitcanregarditselfasauthor).(G4:431,orig.emphasis)

10. SomeEnglishtranslatorsgive“legislatingtoitself”or“givingthelawtoitself”(e.g.,AllenWoodandMaryGregor).“Self-legislating”isclosertotheGermanoriginalandpreservestheconnotationthatthelegislatingisdoneby theself,withoutsuggestingthattheselfistheprimaryaddresseeofthelaw.Formorediscussion,seeKleingeld2018,172–4.

universality,unconditionality, andnon-heteronomousorigin.And ifitsnormativevalidityissomethingwecometoacknowledgeinpracti-caldeliberation,wedonotfirstestablishitthroughanactofthewill,andthusitsvalidityisnotconditionalonanythingelse.

Inotherwords, the assumption that theoriginof thenormativeauthorityoftheprincipleofmoralitylieseitherinautonomyorinhet-eronomyisbasedonthedisputablepresuppositionthattheobligatoryforceof theMoralLawmustbegrounded in somethingmore funda-mental (be itavalue,asmanyrealistsassert,oraprincipleoractiv-ityrelatedtoagency,asconstructivistsassert).Beyondtheautonomy/heteronomydichotomy liesa third,overlookedpossibility—namelythat Kant’sMoral Law, as themost fundamental practical principle,doesnothaveadeeper“ground”.Thatistosay,whatremainsopenisthepossibility that theMoralLawisneitherself-legislatednor legis-latedbysomeone(orsomething)else.

Consequently,ifitturnsoutthatKantdoesnotactuallystatethattheMoralLawisself-legislated,thisdoesnotnecessarilycommithimtoa“heteronomous”conceptionofmorality.IfwecanshowthatKantviewstheMoralLawasanaprioriandfoundationalprincipleofrea-son, thisatoncegets ridof thedifficultiesassociatedwith thepara-doxical idea that theprincipleofmorality isself-legislated. (Wewillreturn toKant’saccountof theoriginandbindingnessof theMoralLawinsection4.)

Butwhat,then,istheimportofKant’snotionofmoralautonomy,andhowdoes itrelatetotheMoralLaw?Whatdoes itmeantosay,asKantdoes,thatautonomyisthehighestprincipleofmorality?AndhowshouldweinterpretthetextsthatareusuallytakentoshowthatKantclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislated?Inthenextsection,wearguethatKantusestheideaofmoralautonomytoarticulatetheprocedure for determining themoral permissibility of maxims andthusforderivingsubstantivemorallaws;autonomydoesnotconcerntheoriginandbindingforceoftheMoralLaw.

WeshallpresentouralternativeaccountonthebasisoftextsthatareusuallycitedinsupportoftheclaimthatKantdescribestheMoral



is:Actasifyourmaximweretoserveatthesametimeasauniversallaw(forallrationalbeings).11(G4:438)

Fourth,itisimportanttonotethatKantintroducestheideaofau-tonomycounterfactually:hestatesnotthatthelawtowhichherefersis actually self-legislatedbut that itmust beviewed as self-legislated,thatonemustregardoneselfasitsauthor,andthatonemustactas if oneweregivinguniversallaw.Asmentionedabove,Wood(2008,111)alsodraws attention to these expressions.He interprets them,how-ever,asreferringtoawayofconsideringtheMoral Law.Bycontrast,ontheinterpretationweproposethecounterfactualideaofself-legis-lationconcernssubstantivemoral laws exclusively.

Insum,intheverypassageinwhichKantintroducesthenotionofautonomy,thelawthatispresentedasself-legislatedisnottheMoralLaworCategoricalImperativeitselfbutratherthesubstantiveuniver-sallawmentioned init.Moreover,theideaofthewillasself-legislatingisintroducedasprovidingawayof“viewing”or“regarding”thewill,notasreferringtoagenuineactoflegislation.12

Asecondpassagethatmightbeseentoprovidesupport forthethe-sis that theMoralLaw is self-legislated is the followingdescription

11. Since“alllawshemayeverpossiblybesubjectto”(inthefirstsentenceofthequotedpassage)arehereviewedasstemmingfromone’sownuniversalleg-islation,andsinceoneissubjecttotheMoralLaw,thispassagemightseemtosuggestthattheMoralLawshouldalsobeviewedasself-legislated.Theref-erencetomaximsandthewidercontextmakeclear,however,thatitmakesmuchmoresensetoreadthequotedpassageasaddressingonlyuniversallegislationthroughone’smaxims,andhenceonlymoral laws in theplural.AnotherconsiderationagainstassumingthattheuniversallawsmentionedinthequotedpassagesincludetheMoralLawitselfisthefactthatKantmen-tionstheMoralLawseparatelyasthe“formalprincipleofthesemaxims”.

12. NotealsothatwhileKantusestheterm“autonomy”(Autonomie)25timesintheGroundwork,hedoesnotspeakof“self-legislation”(Selbstgesetzgebung)atallanduses“self-legislating”(selbstgesetzgebend)onlyonce(inthepassageatG4:431discussedabove).Instead,Kantgenerallyspeaksof“universallegisla-tion”(e.g.G4:432),atermthatimpliesthattherelevantlawsareself-legislat-edinthesenseindicatedabove,namelyinthesenseofbeinggivenbyoneselftoallandhenceasalsoapplyingtooneself.

IfthelawthatKantmentionshereweretheMoralLaw,Kantwouldbeclaimingthattheprincipleofmoralityisself-legislatedbythewill.Ifwelookmoreclosely,however,weseethatthisisnotinfactwhatheisclaiming.First,thereisnoexplicitindicationthatthelawinquestionistheMoralLaw.Kantdoesnotrefertotheprincipleofmoralityatallintheprecedingpassages.Hencetheexpression“thelaw”inthispas-sagecouldalsorefertoanysubstantivemorallaw.

Second,Kantexplainswhathemeansby“thewill’sownuniversallegislation”by restating the thirdpracticalprincipleas the “principle ofeveryhumanwillas a will that is universally legislating through all its maxims”(G4:432,orig.emphasis),andhelaterreferstothisprincipleas“theprincipleofautonomy”(G4:433).ThefactthatKantformulatestheprincipleofautonomyintermsof(self-)legislating through one’s max-imssuggeststhatthelawthatisregardedasself-legislatedisnottheCategoricalImperativeitselfbutrathertheuniversallawmentioned in it.Afterall,theCategoricalImperativerequiresthatthemaximofouractionbeabletoholdsimultaneouslyasuniversal law,or,inanalter-native formulation, thatwe regardourselves as givinguniversal law “throughallmaxims”ofourwill (seeG4:433,4:436–7).

Third, because this law is conceived as universal, it includes theagentinitsscope.Thusthislawmustbeviewedasself-legislatedinatwofoldsense:asgivenbyoneselfand,becauseitincludesoneselfinitsscope,asalsoaddressingoneself.ThefactthatImustregardmyselfasauthorofthemorallawstowhichIamsubjectsayssomethingim-portantaboutmyrelationtothoselaws,namelythattheyarenotalienimpositionsbutexpressionsofmyownwill.Kantstressesthisideainmanyotherpassagesaswell,forexamplewhenhewritesthat:

everyrationalbeing,asanendinitself,mustbeabletoregard itself at the same time as universally law-givingwithrespecttoalllawshemayeverpossiblybesubjectto.[…][E]veryrationalbeingmustactasifhewerethroughhismaximsatalltimesalawgivingmemberoftheuniver-salrealmofends.Theformalprincipleofthesemaxims



Furthermore,whenKant calls theMoralLaw theprincipleof au-tonomy(G4:440),hepresentsitascommandingautonomy,notasre-sulting from it.Sinceourwill isaffectedbysensible inclinationsthattemptustoactonmaximsthatfailtomeetthemoralrequirement,theprincipleofautonomy takesaprescriptive form forus.Hence,Kantwrites,theprincipleofautonomy,asthesupremeprincipleofmoral-ity,isa“categoricalimperative”that“commandsneithermorenorlessthanthisautonomy”(G4:440).NothinginthewordingofthepassageunderconsiderationsuggeststhateitherthecontentortheobligatoryforceoftheMoralLawistheresultoftheautonomy(understoodasself-legislation)ofthewill.

Insum,althoughthesepassagesmightseematfirsttosuggestthatKantarguesthattheMoralLawisself-legislated,noneofthemactu-allyestablishesthis.Rather,Kantusestheideaofmoralautonomytodescribeacounterfactualcriterionfordeterminingthemoralpermis-sibilityofmaximsandtoindicatethatsubstantivemorallawsmustbeviewedasthewill’sownlaws.

2.2. The one Moral Law and the many moral lawsThe passages discussed so far indicate that there are two levels atwhichKantspeaksofmorallaw.14First,Kantusestheexpression“mor-allaw”torefertotheprincipleofmorality;thesearethecasesinwhichwecapitalizeitas“MoralLaw”.TheMoralLaw,whichforhumanbe-ingstakestheformoftheCategoricalImperative,formulatesthenor-mativecriterionthatoughttoguideouradoptionofmaxims.Whatittellsustodoistoconceiveofourselvesasmorallegislatorswhogiveuniversal laws through theirmaxims—laws towhich, because theyareuniversal,weourselvesare subject—and toactonlyonmaxims

Hence,evenifKantwereherereferringtotheMoralLaw,thiswouldindicateonlythatitisapriori,notthatitisself-legislated.

14. Othercommentatorshavealsoemphasizedtheimportanceofdistinguishingbetweenthesetwolevelsofmorallegislation(e.g.,Kain2004;Reath2006),yettheytendtoassociateKant’sconceptionofautonomywithboth.Ontheinterpretationwepropose,bycontrast,Kantspeaksofautonomyonlyatthelevelofsubstantivemorallaws,notattheleveloftheMoralLaw.

ofwhatismeantby“autonomyofthewill”,alongwiththecanonicalarticulationoftheFormulaofAutonomy:

Autonomyofthewillisthepropertyofthewillbywhichitis[…]alawtoitself.Hencetheprincipleofautonomyis:nottochooseinanyotherwaythanthus,thatthemax-imsof[thewill’s]choicearecomprehended(mit begriffen)inthesamevolitionasuniversallaws.(G4:440)

Again,however,thispassagedoesnotstateexplicitlythattheprincipleofmoralityitselfisself-legislated.Kantexplainswhatitmeanstosaythatautonomyconsists in thewill’sbeing“a lawto itself”bysayingthattheprincipleofautonomyrequiresacertainwayofchoosing one’s maxims.Oneoughttoactonlyonmaximsthatonecansimultaneouslywill(“comprehendinthesamevolition”)asuniversallawsforallratio-nalbeings,includingoneself.TheuniversallawsofwhichKantspeaksherearethosethatareformulatedbyuniversalizingourmaxims.ThisisconfirmedbyanotherpassagewhereKantidentifies“autonomy”ofthewillwiththewill’spropertyof“beingalawtoitself”andexplainsthisexpressionasfollows:

[T]heproposition,thewillisinallitsactionsalawtoit-self,indicatesonlytheprincipletoactonnoothermaximthanthatwhichcanalsohaveasobjectitselfasauniver-sallaw.(G4:447)

Here,too,Kantfirstcharacterizesautonomyasthewill’sbeingalawtoitselfandthenexplicatesthisintermsoftheprincipleofactingonlyonmaximsthatonecanalsowillasuniversallaws.Again,thereisnomentionofself-legislationoftheMoralLaw.13

13. Even if the law referred to in these twopassageswere theMoralLaw, thephrase “being a law to itself”wouldnot necessarily imply that this law isself-legislated.Thisphrase,whichwaswidelyusedinphilosophypriortoKant,echoesPaul,who saysof certainheathens that they are “a lawunto them-selves”(Romans2.14),meaningroughlythattheyfindthedivinecommand-mentswithin theirheartswithouthavingbeen instructedbydivine revela-tion(thankstoStefanoBacinformakingusawareofthis,seeBacin2013,61).



[T]hereisindeednosublimityin[thepersonwhofulfillsallhisduties]insofarasheissubject tothemorallaw[dem moralischen Gesetz unterworfen], but there certainly is in-sofarasheisatthesametimelawgiving with respecttoitandonlyforthatreasonsubordinatedtoit.(G4:440,orig.emphasis)

It isunclearfromthissentence,whenreadinisolation,whetherthephrase“themorallaw”referstotheMoralLaworwhetheritshouldbeunderstoodasagenericsingular,meaning“anymorallaw”andthusreferringtosubstantivemorallawsingeneral.Also,itmayseemthat“lawgiving”ismeanthereinaliteralsense.

Thecontextmakesclear,however, thatthispassagefitswithourinterpretationofthepassagesdiscussedabove.First,thesentenceim-mediatelyprecedingthequotationshowsthatKantisdescribingnotagenuineactoflawgivingbytheagentbutawayofrepresentingthatagent:hestatesthatundertheconceptofdutywenotonly“think”ofsubjectionunderthelawbutalso“represent”acertainsublimityanddignity(G4:439–40).Thisallowsforthepossibilitythatthe“lawgiv-ing”mentionedinthequotedsentencealsohasthestatusofathoughtorrepresentationinthesensethatthemoralagentregardshimselfas legislating.

Second,KantdoesnotmentiontheMoralLaw(orthe“principleofmorality”)atallinthepageleadinguptothequotedpassage,whereashedoesmention“lawsofautonomy”intheplural(G4:439)anduni-versallegislationthrough our maxims(G4:439,440).Thisisindeedthethemewithwhichhe continues in the remainderof the samepara-graph(“apossiblegivingofuniversallawthrough[thewill’s]maxims”,G4:440).Inshort,whenreadincontext,thesentenceunderconsider-ationdoesnotshowthatKantarguesthattheMoralLawis(orshouldbe regarded as) self-legislated, let alone that self-legislation of theMoralLawistheconditionofitsuniversalandunconditionalvalidity.

Inseveralpassages intheGroundwork,Kantdiscussesthefeelingofrespect.Someof thesepassagesmightalsoseemto lendsupport

thatwecansimultaneouslywillasuniversallaws.Inotherwords,theMoralLawinthesingularisameta-principlethatdemandsthatwere-gardourselvesaslegislating,andself-legislating,universallawsintheplural.Itisaformalprincipleinthatitabstractsfromallempiricalmat-terofthewill(i.e.,fromdesires,inclinations,etc.)andthusdeterminesspecificmoralobligationsonlywhenappliedtoparticularmaxims.Ifamaximfailstomeetthisnormativecriterion,itisimpermissibletoactonit,andinthiswaythemoralcriterionleadstotheformulationofsubstantivemorallaws—morallawsatasecondlevel.Accordingly,whendiscussingautonomyKant typically speaksof “moral laws” intheplural.Forexample,hewrites: “Theautonomyof thewill is thesoleprincipleofallmoral lawsandtheduties thatcorrespondwiththem” (KpV5:33).Kantmentionsexamples suchas “the law topro-motethehappinessofothers”(KpV5:34), the“ethical lawofperfec-tion:loveyourneighborasyourself”(MdS6:450;seealsoKpV5:83),and“the[law]ofintegrity”(G4:401n.).Whenarguingthatalawcancountasamorallawonlyifitisabsolutelynecessary,heillustratesthiswith“thecommand:thoushaltnotlie”andadds“andsowithallothermorallawsproperlysocalled”(G4:389).

Thus,theapplicationoftheformalMoral Law(CategoricalImpera-tive,principleofmorality)toparticularmaximsresultsintheformula-tionofsubstantivemoral laws(moralcommands),suchas“oneoughtnevertolie”,“oneoughttopromotethehappinessofothers”,andsoon.If,inlightoftheMoralLaw,acertainmaximturnsouttobemorallyimpermissible,thenthemaximisimpermissiblenotjustformebutforallrationalbeings(includingmyself),whichmeansthatitisamoraldutynottoactonit.Conversely,ifacandidatemaximturnsouttobemorallypermissible,itispermissibleforeveryone.

2.3. Self-legislation and subjection to the lawWecannowturntofurtherGroundwork passagesthatdonotmentionautonomyexplicitlybutthatmightbetakentoindicatethatKantde-fendsthethesisthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.Kantwrites:



2.4. Reason’s Grundgesetz for human beingsThusfar,wehaveconsideredtherelevantpassagesfromtheGround-work, but there are also important passages in theCritique of Practi-cal Reason thatcanbetakentosuggestthatKantgroundsthebindingforceoftheMoralLawinitsbeingself-legislated.ThesearepassagesinwhichKantarguesthatpurereasongivestheMoralLawtohumansandinwhichhediscussestheemergenceoftheconsciousnessofmor-alobligationandthefeelingofrespectforthelaw.

IntheAnalyticofthesecondCritique,havingestablishedthe“Fun-damentalLaw[Grundgesetz]ofPurePracticalReason”,Kantformulatesthefollowing“Corollary”(Folgerung,conclusion):

Purereason ispracticalof itselfaloneandgives (to thehumanbeing)auniversallawwhichwecallthemoral law.(KpV5:31,orig.emphasis)

ForthepurposesofourdiscussionweshallassumethatKantherere-ferstotheMoralLaw,ratherthantothelegislationofsubstantivemor-allaws.15Nevertheless,thereisgoodreasontodoubtthatthispassageprovides support for the standard interpretation.Kant does not sayherethatthevalidityofthislawdependsonanactofself-legislation.Infact,hedoesnotidentifythelegislatorofthelawwiththesubjectofthelaw,sothereisno“self”thatisbothlegislatorandaddresseeofthelaw.Rather,byaddingtheparentheticalremarkKantclarifiesthatpure practical reason givesthis“morallaw”to the human beingasabeingthathasarationalandsensiblenature.

TheCorollaryconcernsthequestionofhowwecanbecome aware ofaMoralLawthatissupposedtodetermineourwillindependentlyofanysensiblemotives.Kant’sansweristhatthisawarenessresultsnotfromanyempiricaldatabutfromourownreason:“Consciousnessofthisfundamentallawmaybecalledafact[Factum] ofreason”(KpV5:31).Theprimarymeaningoftheterm“Factum”inKant’serawasstill“deed” or “product”, not “matter of fact” (Willaschek 1992, Kleingeld

15. Eveninthispassagethereisacertainambiguity,anditisnotimpossibletoread“themorallaw”asagenericsingular,referringtosubstantivemorallaws.

totheviewthatKantclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislated.Hewrites,forinstance,that“[t]heobject ofrespectisthereforesimplythelaw, andindeedthelawthatweimposeuponourselves andyetasnec-essaryinitself”(G4:401n.).

Asintheotherpassagesdiscussedabove,Kantdoesnotexplicitlystate that it is theMoralLawthatwe “imposeuponourselves”.Thephrase“thelaw”canalsobereadasagenericsingular, inthesenseof“anymorallawassuch”or“thesubstantivemorallawinquestion”.ThatthisisindeedthebetterreadingissupportedbythefactthatKantthenaddsthat“[a]nyrespectforapersonisproperlyonlyrespectforthe law (of integrity and so forth), ofwhich [theperson]givesus theexample”(G4:401n.;emphasisadded).Kant’sparentheticalexplana-tionofwhathemeansby“thelaw”—namelythelaw“ofintegrityandsoforth”—showsthatheisreferringnottotheMoralLawbuttosub-stantivemorallawsingeneral.Thesearethelawsthatwearesaidtoimposeonourselvesaswesubjectourselvestothem.

Finally,atG4:444Kantagainsays that thewillofevery rationalbeing “imposes [a law] upon itself”, and here he seems to be refer-ring to theMoral Law. Kant is not using the vocabulary of “legisla-tion”inthispassage,however.“Imposinguponitself”isnotthesameas“self-legislating”,anditmaywellbeunderstoodasavariantofthelanguageof “subjecting”oneself to theMoralLaw,whichKantusesinotherpassages(e.g.,G 4:449).Inthequotewithwhichwestartedthis subsection (G 4:440), Kant explicitly distinguishes subjection to a law from legislation.Therefore, ifKant isasserting thatwe imposetheMoralLawuponourselves(or,equivalently,subjectourselvestoit) in thepassageunder consideration, this doesnot imply thatweself-legislateit.Instead,Kant’sassertionisprobablybestunderstoodasindicatingthathumansacknowledgetheauthorityoftheMoralLaw,notthattheyestablish itsbindingforcebyanactofwill.Thisideaisexpressedmoreclearlyinthefinalpairoftextsweshallconsider,towhichwenowturn.



ThereisonefinalpassagefromtheCritique of Practical Reason thatmeritsdiscussion,namelythe(ratherdense)passagefromthesecondchapterwhereKantmentions “reason’s representation” of a “lawoffreedomthatreasongivestoitself”(KpV5:65).Ifby“lawoffreedom”heheremeanstheMoralLaw,thenthispassagecould indicatethatKantconsiderstheMoralLawtobeself-legislatedbyreason.Oncloserinspection,however,thisdoesnotappeartobethecase.Kantgener-allyusestheexpression“lawsoffreedom”torefertoethicalandjuridi-callaws,asdistinctfromlawsofnature.16InthepassageatissueKantmentionsthisdistinctionbetweenlawsofnatureandlawsoffreedom,andlaterinthesamechapterhearguesthat“alawofnature”servesasthe“type”of“alawoffreedom”(KpV5:70).Heexplainsthisbysayingthatinordertoassessthemoralpossibilityofone’smaximofaction,oneoughtto“test”themaximinlightoftheformofalawofnature(KpV5:69–70),toestablishwhetheronecansimultaneouslywillthemaximasauniversallaw(i.e.,asamorallawwiththeuniversalityofalawofnature).Asaresult,by“lawoffreedom”inthepassageatissue,Kantseems tomeanasubstantivemoral law, rather than theMoralLaw(supremeprincipleofmorality).ThepassagethereforedoesnotshowthatKantdescribestheMoralLawasself-legislated.

Takingstock,webelievethattheoverallpicturestronglysuggeststhatKantdoesnotclaimthattheprincipleofmoralityis(orshouldbere-garded as) self-legislated. Although there are passages that, on thefaceofit,couldbereadassayingthattheMoralLawisself-legislated,noneofthesepassagesmust bereadthisway.Moreimportantly,giventheimmediatecontextofthepassages,ouralternativereadingseemsmorenaturalandmakesbetterphilosophicalsenseofthetext.17

16. Thus,hewritesintheMetaphysics of Morals: “Theselawsoffreedomarecalledmorallaws,todistinguishthemfromlawsofnature.Totheextenttowhichtheyconcernmerelyexternalactionsand their conformity to law theyarecalledjuridicallaws;butiftheyalsodemandthatthey(thelaws)themselvesbethedetermininggroundsoftheactions,thentheyareethicallaws”(MdS6:214).

17. Thus,wedonotclaimtohaveruledoutanonliteralreadingof“self-legislation”

2010).SotheideaKantexpressesintheCorollaryissimplythatourconsciousness ofmoral obligation stems from reason, not fromem-piricalsources.

Notethatthe“giving”ofthelawtowhichKantrefersherecanbereadeitherinthesenseof“legislation”(lawgiving)orinthesenseofthe law’s being made cognitively available or being “presented” tous—thatis,inthesenseinwhichKantsaysinthefirstCritique thatob-jectsare“given”tousinintuition.Perhapsthesetwowaysofreadingtheexpressionrepresenttwosidesofthesamecoin.Ontheonehand,iftheMoralLawisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreason,thenhumans,byvirtueoftheirrationalnature,areindeedpre-sentedwiththisprinciple.KantsaysimmediatelybeforetheCorollarythatourconsciousnessoftheMoralLawcanbecalleda“factofreason”becauseit“forcesitselfuponus”withoutbeing“basedonanyintuition,eitherpureorempirical”(KpV5:31).Ontheotherhand,iftheMoralLawisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreason,thenitpresentsitselftohumansasalawwithrationallybindingforce,insofarashumans,duetotheirsensiblenature,donotnecessarilyactinac-cordancewithrationalprinciples:

[I]nordertoavoidmisinterpretationinregardingthislawasgiven, itmustbenotedcarefully that it isnotanem-piricalfactbutthesolefactofpurereason,which,byit,announcesitselfasoriginallylawgiving(sic volo, sic jubeo).(KpV5:31,orig.emphasis)

Fromthisthe“Corollary”indeedfollows:theMoralLawisgiventous(humanbeings)bypurepracticalreason.Wecanleaveitundecidedwhetheroneshouldread“gives”intheCorollaryinthesenseofpurereason’s“presenting”humanswiththeMoralLaworinthesenseofpurereason’s“legislating”theMoralLaw(orboth).Eitherway,KantisnotstatingthatpurereasongivestheMoralLawtopurereason,orthatthehumanbeinggivesittothehumanbeing.Thus,KantdoesnotclaiminthispassagethattheMoralLawis“self-legislated”,letalonethatitsbindingforcedependsonthis.



reconciledwithitsbeingself-legislated,thenitwouldseemthatthisisequallyproblematicinthecaseofmorallaws.

There are two reasons,however, to think that theproblems con-nectedwiththethesisthattheMoralLawisself-legislateddonotaf-fectKant’sconceptionofautonomyasweunderstandit.First,itisim-portanttoemphasizethatalmostallofthepassagesdiscussedintheprevioussectionssuggestthattheideaofself-legislationispartofaprocessof counterfactual reasoning, or a thought experiment. In thepassages discussed above,Kantwrites thatwe should regard or con-siderthewillasself-legislating,orregardourselvesasgivinguniversallaw(G4:431,433,434,438),andthatweshouldproceedas ifwewerelegislatingmembersofarealmofends(G4:438).Hedoesnotclaimthathumansinfactgivemorallaws;rather,wearetocounterfactuallyassumethatwearelegislatinguniversallawthroughourmaximandthenaskwhetheritisstillpossible,onthisassumption,towilltoactonthatmaximwithoutself-contradiction.Ifso,theactionispermitted;ifnot,theactionisforbidden(G4:439).Thus,theideaofautonomyservestoarticulateacriterioninlightofwhichwearetodeterminethemoralpermissibilityofourmaxims.Thisuseoftheideaofautonomydoesnotcomewiththeproblematicimplicationthattheuncondition-alvalidityofmorallawsdependsonanyrealact ofself-bindingonthepartofhumanagents.

Second,thisaccountalsoexplainswhywearenotatlibertytoabol-ishoursubstantivemoralduties.Thebindingforceofmorallawsde-rivesfromthecriterionarticulatedintheMoralLaw,notfromanactofwill.Asmoralsubjects,Kantmaintains,weareboundbytheMoralLaw,sowehavenomoralalternativebuttoactonmaximsthatmeetthe criterion it articulates. At the same time, our account captureswhatmanyhavefoundattractiveaboutKant’saccountofmoralauton-omy,namely that itavoidscharacterizingmoralobligationsasalienimpositions.IftheMoralLawisafundamentalprincipleofpureprac-tical reason—apossibilityweexplore inmoredetailbelow—morallawsthatderivefromitarenotexternalimpositions.Rather,theycan

If the argument of this section is convincing, it invalidates thepremiseunderlyingmuchofthedebateoverthealleged“paradoxical”featuresofKant’smoraltheoryandthealleged“deeptensions”inhistheoryofautonomy.Histheoryofautonomy,ontheinterpretationwepropose,doesnotcontainanelementofproblematicvoluntarismthatrunscountertotheunconditionalityofmoralobligation.Rather,withthe ideaof autonomyKant formulatesa counterfactual criterion fordeterminingwhethermaxims aremorally permissible and, throughthis,forarticulatingsubstantivemorallaws.Sincethiscriterionisanaprioriprincipleofreason,thesemorallawsaregroundedinreasonitself. In section 4,we spell out the implications of this reading forthequestionofwhetherKant’smoral theory isbest interpretedasaversionof realismor constructivism.Beforewedo so,however,weconsider several possible problems associated with our alternativeaccount.

3. Problems and Objections

SincewearearguingforanalternativetoadeeplyentrenchedreadingofacentralclaimofKant’sethics,ourreadingofhisconceptionofau-tonomyislikelytogiverisetoseveralworriesandobjections.Inthissection,wewilladdressthreepossibleconcerns.

3.1. Moral autonomy without paradoxFirst,onemightwonderatthispointhowmuchisgained,philosoph-ically,bydenying thatKantdescribes theMoralLaw itself asbeingself-legislated.Itmightseemthatwiththeinterpretationweproposetheparadoxicalfeaturesoftheideaofmoralself-legislationsimplyre-emergeattheleveloftheself-legislationofsubstantivemorallaws.Af-terall,Kantpresentssubstantivemorallawsasunconditionallyvalidtoo.If,ascriticshavealleged,alaw’sunconditionalvaliditycannotbe

oftheMoralLaw(asdeveloped,forinstance,byReath2013).Rather,onourview discussing such a reading is unnecessary because Kant nowhere un-equivocallyclaimsthattheMoralLawisself-legislatedinthefirstplace.



statenewobligationsin addition totheobligationtoactinaccordancewiththeMoralLaw;rather,theyareitsconcreteinstantiations.

3.3. Law without a legislator? 19 OurclaimthattheMoralLaw,accordingtoKant,isafundamentalaprioriprincipleofreason,thenormativeforceofwhichderivesneitherfromitsbeingself-legislatednorfromitsbeinglegislatedbyanyoneor anything else, raises thequestionofwhetherKant can allow fora lawwithout a legislator.On traditional conceptions, both lawsofnatureandmoral lawsareconceivedofas legislatedbyGod.WhileKant turnedawayfromthis tradition,hemaystillhaveretainedtheideathatalllawsneedtobelegislatedbysomeoneorsomething.Forinstance,hewritesthatthelawsofnaturearelegislatedbytheunder-standingandthemorallawsbypracticalreason(seeKrVA840/B868;KU5:174–5),whichmightbetakentoimplythattheMoralLawmustlikewisebelegislatedandhavealegislator.Thisdoesnotfollow,how-ever.First,comparethecaseoftheprinciplesoflogic,whichKantre-peatedlyreferstoas“laws”(e.g.,L9:15).Nothingsuggeststhatheheldthatthelawsoflogichavealegislator,soheseemstohaveallowedforthepossibilityof lawswithouta legislator.Second,whenKantdoesdiscussalegislatorofmorallaws,thislegislatorisGod(seeKpV5:129;Rel6:99;MdS6:227).Kantmakes itveryclear,however, thatmorallawsdonotowetheirbindingforcetotheirbeinglegislatedbyGod.Hispointisthatit ispossible(andperhapsevenmorallynecessary)to “consider” or “think of” them as given by God. Importantly, thethoughtofGodas legislator isnotsupposedtoaccount for thecon-tentorthenormativevalidityofmorallaws.AsKantputsit,Godmustbeconceivedaslegislatingonly“genuineduties”—thatis,dutiesthathold independentlyof his legislation (Rel 6:99).Kant argues in thePowalskiLecturesonPracticalPhilosophythatboththe“principleofmorality”andthemorallawsare“original”and“existinandofthem-selves”; theydonotdependonGod’s legislationbut theotherway

19.ThankstoEricWatkinsandananonymousreviewerforpressingthisissue.

beregardedasself-legislated(inthesensespecifiedabove)inaccor-dancewithafundamentalprinciplethatisnotself-legislatedbutvalidapriori.

3.2. One obligation too many?Second,thereistheworrythatourreadingleadstowhatwemightcall“oneobligation toomany”.18On theaccountwedefend in thisessay,oneismorallyobligatedtoactinaccordancenotonlywiththeMoralLawbutalsowithmorallawsintheplural.Doesn’tthismeanthatin additiontotheobligation,say,nottolie,oneisalsoobligatedtoactinaccordancewiththeMoralLaw?Itseemsthatoneofthesetwoobliga-tionsmustbeemptyandthussuperfluous.

Inreply,wewouldliketopointout,first,thatifthisreallyisaprob-lem,itarisesforanyreadingofKant’sethics,sincethedistinctionbe-tweentheMoralLaw(orCategoricalImperative)andmorallaws(orduties) isastructural featureofKant’sethicsquiteindependentlyofwhethertheMoralLawisself-legislated.

But,second,fromthisfeatureitdoesnotfollowthattherearetwodistinctobligationshere;thereisonlyone,describedatdifferentlev-elsofgenerality.AsKantpointsout, there isasenseinwhichthereisonly“asingle”Categorical Imperative(G4:421),but thisdoesnotpreventhimfromspeakingofspecificcategorical imperatives intheplural(e.g.G4:425),suchastheimperativestodevelopone’stalentsandtohelppeopleinneed(G4:422–3).Infact,Kantsuggeststhatallmoralcommands(“allimperativesofduty”)canbe“derivedfrom”theCategorical Imperative as their “principle” (G 4:421). There is there-foreasenseinwhichweonlyhaveonemoralobligation,namelytoactinaccordancewiththeMoralLaw.ButactinginaccordancewiththeMoralLawrequiresustoactonmaximsthatmeetthecriterionitarticulates,suchasthemaximtodevelopone’stalentsorthemaximtohelpothersinneed.Thesesubstantivemoralrequirementsdonot

18.WethankEricWatkinsforraisingthisworry.



A priori fundamental principles (Grundsätze) bear thisnamenotmerelybecausetheycontaininthemselvesthegrounds of other judgments, but also because they arenotthemselvesgrounded(gegründet)inhigherandmoregeneralcognitions.(KrVA148/B188)

Such fundamental a priori principles cannot be proven by appealtomore general principles that serve as their grounds.Kant argues,however,thatitisneverthelesspossibletodefendsuchprinciplesintermsofthe“subjectivesourcesofthepossibility”(KrVA149/B188)ofspecifictypesofjudgments.ThatiswhatKantproceedstodoforthetwo“supreme”principlesjustmentioned,byshowingthattheyserveassufficientconditionsofthetruthofanalyticandsyntheticapriorijudgments,respectively(KrVA150/B189–A158/B197).AndwhileKantclaims that “the lawofnature” is “legislated”byhumanreason(e.g.,KrVA840/B868),thereisnoindicationthatheconceivesofthetwo“supreme”principlesaslegislatedbyanythingoranyone.IntermsoftheGroundwork’sautonomy/heteronomydistinction,theseprinciplesareneitherheteronomousimpositionsnortheresultofself-legislation(norare they tobe “regarded”as such).Kantdescribes theseprinci-plesasbeingvalidaprioriandaimstoestablishthisbyprovidingatranscendentalargumenttotheeffectthattheymakepossiblespecifictypesofjudgments.

KantsimilarlycharacterizestheMoralLawasafundamentalorsu-premeprinciplethatisvalidapriori.IntheGroundwork, hegenerallyreferstoitastheapriori“principleofmorality”(Prinzip der Moralität, G4:392;Prinzip der Sittlichkeit,G4:410,426,432,436,440,441,445,447,453;Prinzip aller Pflicht, G4:425).IntheCritique of Practical Reason KantcallstheMoralLawanaprioriGrundgesetz —namely,the“fundamen-tallawofpurepracticalreason”(KpV5:30),andhealsoreferstoitasthe“supreme”principleofpracticalreasonandmorality(KpV5:46,83,91,93), suggesting that it grounds specificmoral lawswithout itselfbeinggroundedinanymoregeneralpracticalprinciple.

around(27:135–6).Thus,eveninpassageswhereKantdiscussestheideaofGodasamorallegislator,thecontentandnormativevalidityofthemoralprinciple(theMoralLaw)andmorallaws(intheplural)arepresupposedandviewedasguidingGod’sassumed legislativeactivityratherthanbeingdependentonit.Insum,KantindeedsuggeststhattheMoralLawisalawindependentlyofanylegislator.

4. Beyond Realist and Constructivist Interpretations

4.1. The apriority of the Moral LawAbove,wepointedoutthatanaccountoftheMoralLawasnon-heter-onomousdoesnotentailtheviewthatitisself-legislated.Weclaimedthatthereisanoverlookedthirdpossibility,namelythattheprincipleofmoralityisafundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreasonandthatitsauthoritydoesnotderivefromanythingmorefundamen-talatall.Still,withoutanyfurtherdescriptionofthestatusoftheMoralLaw,this thirdpossibilityremainssomewhatmysterious. Inthissec-tion,weexplainwhatitwouldmeanfortheMoralLawtobeafunda-mentalaprioriprinciplethatisnotgroundedinanythingelseandwepresenttextualevidencethatKantindeeddescribesitassuch.

It is instructive to start by looking at other principles in Kant’sphilosophicalsystemthathavethestatusoffundamental,underivedaprioriprinciples,suchasthe“supremeprincipleofallanalyticjudg-ments” (KrVA150/B189; that is, the principle of non-contradiction),and the “supreme principle of all synthetic judgments”, accordingtowhich“everyobjectstandsunderthenecessaryconditionsofthesyntheticunityof themanifoldof intuitioninapossibleexperience”(KrVA158/B197).Kantreferstotheseapriori“supreme”principlesas “Grundsätze” sincetheyserveastheground(Grund)forotherjudgmentsandderivativeprinciples,butarenotthemselvesgrounded inotherapriori judgmentsorprinciples.Kantexplainsthestatusofsuchprin-ciplesasfollows:



beingsbecome“immediatelyaware”oftheauthorityoftheMoralLawinpracticaldeliberation,“assoonaswedrawupmaximsofthewillforourselves”(KpV5:29).Thisconsciousnessofmoralobligation(ourimmediateawarenessoftheMoralLaw’svalidity)isa“fact”(deedorproduct)ofreasonthatcannotbederivedfromany“antecedentdataof reason” (KpV5:31). In short, theMoral Lawneither requiresnoradmits of any further grounding: it is valid a priori. Kant character-izesonlysubstantivemorallawsas“grounded”,namelyasgroundedinpracticalreason(G4:452).

OuraiminthissectionismerelytoindicatehowKantdescribesthestatusof theprincipleofmorality,namelyasa fundamentalaprioriprincipleofpurepracticalreason(andnotas“self-legislated”).Giventhisaim,weshallnotengageindetailedcomparisonoftheargumentsintheGroundwork andthesecondCritiqueorindiscussionoftherela-tionbetweentheoreticalandpracticalprinciples. Itshouldbenoted,however, thatKantrepeatedlyemphasizes thestructuralsimilaritiesbetweentherolesoftheoreticalandpracticalprinciples(e.g.,G4:454;KpV5:30,5:42–6).Kantwritesthatthepureunderstandinglegislatestheapriorilawsofnature(Prol4:319–20)andthatpurepracticalrea-soncanbe regardedas legislating theapriorimoral laws,with theMoralLaw functioningas theirbasicprinciple—that is, as the “fun-damentallaw(Grundgesetz)ofasupersensiblenature”(KpV5:42–6).

4.2. Is this a realist or a constructivist reading of Kant’s ethics (or neither)? Intheprevioussections,wearguedagainstthewidespreadviewthatKant’stheoryofautonomyconcernstheoriginoftheauthorityoftheprincipleofmorality(theMoralLaw).OurreadingdoesawaywiththepremiseunderlyingthedebateovertheallegedlyparadoxicalfeaturesofKant’sgroundingoftheMoralLaw,namelythepremisethatitmustbeeitherself-legislatedorlegislatedbyanother.Wenowwanttofur-therclarify theresultingconceptionof theMoralLawby locating itwithrespecttothecurrentdebatebetween“realist”and“constructiv-ist”interpretationsofKant,wheretheformertendtoemphasizetheindependenceofmoralobligations fromhuman reasonandhuman

Indeed,Kantarguesthatthebindingforceofthisfundamentallawcannotbe“explained”or“justified”(G4:459–62)inanyway.Heasks,inthethirdpartoftheGroundwork,“HowisaCategoricalImperativepossible?”(G4:453).Sincean“explanation”(Erklärung)ofthisfunda-mentalprincipleisimpossible,Kant’sanswerproceedsintermsofthesubjectivesourcesofthepossibilityofthevalidityofsuchaprinciple,namelytheinterestthatwetakeintheprinciple(G4:461).Heasserts:

Thismuchonlyiscertain:thatitisnotbecause the law in-terests usthatithasvalidityforus(…),butthatitinterestsbecauseitisvalidforusashumanbeings,sinceithasitssourceinourwillasintelligenceandsoinourproperself.(G4:460–1,orig.emphasis)

Importantly,Kant’sargumentheredoesnotappealtotheideathattheMoralLawis(orshouldberegardedas)“self-legislated”. IfKantdidthinkthatthebindingforceoftheCategoricalImperativederivedfromanactof self-legislation, the thirdpartof theGroundwork wouldbetheplaceforhimtosayso.Afterall,asheexplicitlynotes,thesecondpartoftheGroundwork, whereheintroducesthenotionofautonomy,isnotconcernedwiththevalidityorbindingforceoftheMoralLaw(G4:440,445);rather,itelaboratesthecontentoftheprincipleofmo-ralitywhile abstracting entirely fromquestions regarding its obliga-tory force (ibid.).WhenKantfinally turns to thesequestions in thethirdpart,however,henowheresuggeststhatthebindingforceoftheMoralLawisduetoitsbeing“self-legislated”.Rather,hedescribestheMoralLawasaprincipleofpracticalreasonthatwetakeaninterestin“becauseitisvalidforus”(G4:461).

IntheCritique of Practical Reason, moreover,Kantwriteswithrefer-encetotheMoralLawthatany“justificationofitsobjectiveanduni-versalvalidity”isimpossible(KpV5:46,47).TheMoralLawisthe“fun-damentallawofpurepracticalreason”itself,anditisimpossibletoex-plainorjustify“fundamentalpowers”(Grundvermögen).ButtheMoralLaw “does not need any justifying grounds”, he continues, becauseweare“aprioriconscious”of it (KpV5:47).Kantclaimsthathuman



saidtopaintanadequatepictureoftheserealistinterpretations.Evenwithoutfurtherdetail,however,itshouldbeclearthatourreadingofKantianautonomy isnotcommitted to realism ineithersense.First,onourinterpretation,thebindingnessoftheMoralLawisnotground-edinsomevalue,foritisnot“grounded”atall.Asmentionedabove,Kantdescribesitasa“fundamental”law(Grundgesetz)thatisnotitself“grounded”.Second,denyingthattheMoralLawisself-legislateddoesnotcommitone to theviewthatwereceptivelybecomeawareof itinanintuitiveorquasi-intuitiveway.Indeed,Kantsaysthatweare“aprioriconscious”of theMoralLaw(KpV5:47)since it isanapriorifundamentalprincipleofpurepracticalreason,andwhenheassertsthatweare“immediately”awareofit,headds“assoonaswedrawupmaximsofthewillforourselves”(KpV5:29).Thisindicatesthat,ratherthanbeingreceptive,ourawarenessoftheMoralLawarisesimmedi-atelyinpracticaldeliberation,ratherthanbymeansofintuition.

Next,letusturntoconstructivistreadingsofKant’sethics.Again,thesecomeindifferentvarieties.First, thereisJohnRawls’sKantianconstructivism,accordingtowhichmoralobligationsaretheoutcomeof a hypothetical deliberative procedure definedby theCategoricalImperative(the“CIprocedure”,Rawls1980).ThisisaclaimnotaboutwhatgroundsthebindingnessoftheMoralLawbutabouthowtoes-tablishparticularmoralobligations.AccordingtoRawls,theCIproce-dureisnotamereepistemictoolbywhichwediscoverwhatismorallyright.Rather,onhisview,moralobligationsaretheoutcomeofthisprocedure.(NotethatthiskindofconstructivismissilentonthestatusoftheCategoricalImperativeandtheMoralLawitself,sinceitneitherclaims nor denies that theMoral Law is self-legislated.)Others de-fendversionsofKantianconstructivismaccordingtowhichthebind-ingnessoftheMoralLawitselfistheresultof“construction”ofsomekind,whichtheyexplainbyappealingtothenotionofautonomy(e.g.,Korsgaard1996;O’Neill2004;Reath2006).Morerecently,ChristineKorsgaardhasarguedthatthenormativeauthorityoftheMoralLawshould be explained in terms of its necessary role in unifying and

cognitiveactivity ingeneralandthelattercharacterizemoralobliga-tionasbeinggroundedinfactsabouthumanreasonandagency.20Inrecentyears,variousauthorshavedefendedrealistreadingsofKant’sethics(e.g.,Ameriks2003;Guyer2000;Kain2004;Schönecker2013;Stern2010;Wood1999),mostinexplicitoppositiontoconstructivistreadings(e.g.,thoseofferedbyHill1989;Korsgaard1996;O’Neill1989;Rawls1980;Reath1994;Sensen2011).21Inthissection,webrief-lyexplainhowourreadingdiffers frombothtypicalrealistandtypi-calconstructivistinterpretationsofKant’sethics(aswellasrealistandconstructivistversionsofKantianethics),sincewerejectanassump-tionsharedbymostonbothsidesofthedivide.

LetusfirstturntorealistreadingsofKant’sethics,whichcomeintwomainvarieties.Ontheonehand,therearerealistreadingsofKant’sethicsthatholdthattheMoralLaw,andmoralobligationingeneral,isgrounded inoneormoreobjectivevalues thatare independentofanyvolitionalact.AccordingtoPaulGuyer,forexample,theauthor-ityoftheMoralLawisgroundedinthevalueoffreedom;accordingtoAllenWood,itisgroundedinthevalueofhumanity(Guyer2000;Wood2008,109;seealsoStern2012,90).Ontheotherhand,therearewhatwemightcall“intuitionist”readings(e.g.,Kain2010;Schönecker2013),accordingtowhichourcognitiveaccesstotheMoralLaw(andthustomoralobligationsingeneral)isintuitiveorquasi-intuitiveand,althoughofcoursenon-sensible,isthusunderstoodonthemodelofsenseperception.Onthiskindofreading,ourawarenessofmoralob-ligationistheresultofreceptivelytakinginaprinciplethatholdsin-dependentlyofourreceptiveaccesstoit.Muchmorewouldhavetobe

20.Sincetheredoesnotseemtobeagenerallyacceptedwayofdistinguishingbetweenethical realismandconstructivism,werestcontentwith thisverygeneraldescriptionandrestrictourdiscussiontospecificpositionsthatarecommonlythoughtofasbeingeitherrealistorconstructivist.ForadefinitionofKantianconstructivismastheviewthatreasonsare“groundedin”aratio-nallyconstrainedpracticalpointofview,seeSchafer2015.

21. For extended discussions of the debate between realist and constructivistreadingsofKant’sethics,seeStern2012(fromamorerealistperspective)andRauscher2015(fromamoreconstructivistperspective).



pointofKant’sthesisoftheautonomyofthewillisnottogroundtheauthorityoftheMoralLawbuttoindicatethatallsubstantivemorallaws arebased inour ownwill or practical reason.This alternativepositiononlybecomesapparent,however,onceweacknowledgethatKantdidnotregardautonomyasconsistingintheself-legislationoftheMoralLaw.23

Works Cited

ReferencestoKant’sworksaretoKant’s gesammelte Schriften, editedbythePreussische(laterDeutsche)AkademiederWissenschaften(Ber-lin:GeorgReimer,subsequentlyWalterdeGruyter,1900–).Referenc-es includeanabbreviated titleand theAkademievolumeandpagenumber(s).TheonlyexceptionistheCritique of Pure Reason, forwhichthepagenumbersofthefirst(A)andsecond(B)editionsareprovided.Translationsareourown,butwehavemadeuseof the translationsavailableintheCambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992–2016).

Abbreviations:G=Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals;KpV=Cri-tique of Practical Reason;KrV=Critique of Pure Reason;KU=Critique of the Power of Judgment;L=Logic;MdS=Metaphysics of Morals;Rel=Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.

Allison, Henry E. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cam-bridgeUniversityPress.

Ameriks,Karl.2000.Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Ap-propriation of the Critical Philosophy. Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress.

23. Thispapergrewoutofdiscussions in a researchgroupon theemergenceof theKantianconceptionofautonomy(seeBacin/Sensen2018).Forhelp-fulcomments,wewouldliketothankthemembersofthatresearchgroup,audiencesattheTwelfthInternationalKantCongressinVienna,theUniver-sityofAmsterdam, andKeeleUniversity, aswell as JoelAnderson,Alyssa Bernstein,StefanoBertea,JochenBojanowski,andtwoanonymousrefereesforthisjournal.

“constituting” the agent, given the fact thatwemust act (Korsgaard2009).22

OnourreadingofKant’saccountofautonomy,Kantisnotacon-structivist or constitutivist in these senses. Denying that theMoralLawisaheteronomousimpositiondoesnotcommithimtoviewingitsbindingnessasgrounded initsrelationtoourwillorinthenecessaryconditionsofagency.Afterall,thefactthatwebecomeawareoftheMoralLawinpracticaldeliberationdoesnotimplythatitsnormativevalidityisgroundedinourbeingagentsorpracticaldeliberators,orintherequirementsofagency.Asmentionedabove,Kantindeeddeniesthatitisgroundedinanythingmorefundamentalatall.

Insum,denyingthattheMoralLawisself-legislateddoesnotcom-mitone toa realist interpretationofKant’sethics,anddenying thattheMoralLawislegislatedbyanythingelsedoesnotcommitonetoa constructivist or constitutivist interpretation ofKant’s position onthebindingnessoftheMoralLaw.Theformsofrealismandconstruc-tivismwehaveconsideredsharetheassumptionthattheremustbesomethinginwhichtheMoralLawisgrounded.Onthereadingwepro-poseinthisessay,bycontrast,Kantdefendsanalternativetobothre-alismandconstructivism.ThisistheviewthattheMoralLawisnotgroundedinanything,sinceitisabasicaprioriprinciple,asbasicaspurepractical reason itself—that is,asbasicas itgets in the lineofrationalargumentationaboutaction.KantcanmaintainthattheMoralLawisnotgroundedinanythingmore fundamentalwithouthavingtoclaimthattheMoralLawisself-legislated—aclaimwhich,aswehavesuggested,hedoesnotactuallymake.Wehavearguedthatthe

22.Asmentionedabove,theseapproachescanavoidinterpretingtheauthorityoftheMoralLawvoluntaristically(e.g.,asresultingfromarbitraryenactmentorendorsement)byclaimingthattheMoralLawistheprincipleofself-con-stitution(Korsgaard2009,xiii,213–4),orbyemphasizingthatwhatbindstheagentisnotthemerefactthatsheplaysanactiveroleinmorallegislationbutthefactthatthelegislationis“properlyenacted”,whereanecessaryconditionofitsbeingproperlyenactedisthattheagentplaysanactiveroleinthelegis-lativeprocess(Reath2006,95).Theyretaintheidea,however,thattheMoralLawisself-legislatedinthesensethatitsnormativevalidityisgroundedintheroleitplaysinagency.



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