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AUTHORITYAGO D/A ltr, 24 Mar 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 24Mar 1976

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. TUE TRANSMISSION 0- THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in anyway supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is no.tto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensingthe holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention thatmay in any way be related thereto.

t CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THL ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. DC 20310

AGDA-A (M) (20 1an 71 FOR OT UT 703146 3 F,.bruary lTl

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, AmericalDivision, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

S SEE DISTRIBUTIONn

7, EB 23 1?

l. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in Li: .LD accordance with pare 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insurethat lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefitof future operations and may be adapted for use in developing trainingmaterial.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluationshould be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,ATTN: FOR 0T UT within QO days of receipt of th', le'ter.

4. The Flame Fuel Dropp Rack discussed on pages 68 and 71 of the in-

closed report has been tested by ACTIV. Test results were forwarded toDepartment of the Army on 20 November 1970. Pending further study of the

ACTIV test results by the US Army Combat Developments Command, Army-wideuse of the rack is not recommended.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

SIncl KENNETH G. WICK]CAMas Major General, USA

The Adjutant GeneralDISTRI BUTION:Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command -M eoh VWAI1 I1 FORWATIOR RA"FETT THE WTM,.-.-

US Army Combat Developments Command ")EFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES W'TKIN THE MEANING OF ThE

USPIONAG LAWS, TITLE 19, U. S. C., SECTION 793 AW 714.US Army Materiel Command .JS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS M

Comandants 4NY MANWWR TO AN UNAUTtOI-D PERSON I PMI3 IT iAW."US Army War College

US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Armor SchoolUS Army Aviation School Regraded unclassified when separated

from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Chemical SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance SchoolUS Army Electronic Warfare SchoolLS Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Field Artillery SchoolUS Army Infantry School

US Army Institute for Military AssisLanceUS Army Missile and MuniLions SchoolUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Southeastern Signal SchoolUS Army Transportation School

Lopies furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, US ArmyDepuOy Chiefs of Staff

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2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE NRMY

Headquarters, Americal DivisionAPO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-HL 10 August !970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division. PeriodEnding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

- Location: Chu Lai Base (BT 555035), RVN.

Reporting Officer: Major General Albert E. Milloy

Prepared 1y: Captain William It. Offutt, Jr., 3d Military History Detachment.-lap References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets: 6538 1; 6539 I, II,III, IV; 6638 1, IV; 6639 I, 11, 111, IV; 6640 1, 11, 11, TV; 6738 1, II, I1,IV; 6739 I, 11, III, IV; 6740 III; 6838 Il1, IV.

1. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Conr.aiid.

( ) Background. The Americal Division continued to conduct combat

operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Operation (TAOI) duringthe reporting period. Heaviest contact occurred in Operation Frederick Hillin the vicinity of Hiep Duc. In continual heavy action, Americal units deci-mated elements of the 1st NVA Regiment, killing 590 in a two-month span.Division cavalry units commenced Operation Pennsylvania Square on 29 June.Operation Elk Canyon was started on 12 July in the vicinity of Kham Duc, andhas resulted in little contact to date. Rice denial, pacification and jointoperations with the 2d ARVN Division continued successfully.

2. (U) Command Cianges.

a. General Oft-cers.

Brigadier General E. L. Powell, ADC (M), departed the command on28 July 1970 and was replaced as ADC (M) by Brigadier General T. C.Mataxis.

b. B5rigade Comanders.

(1) LTC (P) E. L. Kennedy assumed command of the 196th Inf Bde onI May 1970 from Colonel J. M. Lee.

(2) Colonel W. B. Richardson assumed command of the 198th Inf Bde on12 July 1970 from Colonel J. Clemons.

FOR OT (!T70F3R146 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEA INTIRVALS;

Inclour LASU AJFT1I3 12 YUIAS.703146 oreCONFIDENTIAL MoL W A2.10

CONFIDENTIAL

AVD?-.L 10 g.sSUBJECT; Operaticmal Report-Lessons Lear d Amern al lvis'--., P- -

hdtng 31 July 1970, RCS CSFoR-65 (R2) (U)

c. Colonels.

(1) Colonel J. L, Insani became the. C i f of Staff :r, !x-- --replacing Colonel (P) A. G. Hume.

(2) Colonel B. S. Silver assdmed comand cf the it.1h Cz'bb AWrGroup on 8 June 1970 from Colonel D. L. Tr.wnsend.

d. Battalion Changes.

(1) d 3n, 1st Inf. LTC A. H. C:leman assumed cmap-d fr- LTC F. ANerone on 10 May 1970.

(2) 5th Bb, 46th Inf. LTC H. J. Wereszynsi assumec uu .z :-,: tH. C. Snyder on 10 Kay 1970.

(3) 4th 3n, 3d Inf. LTC P. D. Gimm assumed commanQ 1'r- 1-7 S. V.Wielga on 12 May 1970.

(4) 4th Ba, 31st Inf. LTC T. A. Breen assumed command froa LIC K. 1.Skaer on 14 June 19'70.

(5) ist hn, 6th . LTC F. F. Woerner assumed .axc fr M ITV f. YSchwarzkopf on 7 July 197o.

(6) 1st Eh, 20Oth Inf. LTC G. P. Lynch assumed command £fr o LTO A. F.Fischer on 9 July 1970.

(7) 3d Bn, 21st Inf. LTC C. P. Saint assumed command fr.t LTC .. M.Miseh on 10 July 1970,

(8) 4th Bn, 21st Inf. LTC R. A. Witter assumed coamant-:, . .Harpr on 21 Ju.ly 1970*

(9) 1st Sqdn, 1st Cay. LTC C. E. Saint assumed command t.-m LTC F. G.Graves on 12 July 1970.

(10) 3d Bn, 82d Arty. LTC F. M. Zabcik assumed - mmw.d :r' LTC 1". 1 .°Faulkner on 29 May 1970.

(II) 1st Bh, 82d Arty. LTC . F. James assumed coumand 'r... tLT C R. 1.Garcia on 10 June 1970.

(12) 3d Ba, 18th Arty. LTC A. . Foster assumed command n.,o VIC .Hayden on 14 June 1970.

F\CL 2

CONFIDENTIAL

SIBJZCTz Operational Jkport-LeA&onx Learned, Amria 10isn Period197

Ending 31 JUlyT 19701 ICS CS -- 6 (R2) (U) iaol Ni

(13) 3d Bi, 16th Arty, LTC To G. Lightner asaumed comaad from LTC G. A.Wasse an 22 July 1970.

(14) 3db Ba 1th Arty. LTCLR Co Selmdtassumed comand ,M LTC A. R-Poster an 22 July 1970.

(15 14th Cobt Ayn B. LTC Do G. Boyle assumed comd from LTC K Lo

(16) 123d Chbt Avn Eka, LTC Jo 0, Orr aaaumd comiand trom LTC J. 10.B im nan15 Jun~e 1970.

(17) 523d Sig Bn LTC J. Sbwmy asamedcmamdfrom LTC LBartos an 12 July 1970.

a. XKU (P) K. No Moreland became ACofS# G4, on 13 XaY 1970, replaoingLTC P. Do arimm.

be LTC Re I* Perrin became the Pruoot Xarshal on 26 Xay 1970, rep acingLTC Re K. Cornell.

ce IMC L A. Kiekorian became tbe D~iiion 3argeoh on 24 Jne 197Qreplacing LM V. B. Wilson, who departed the command on 27 Way 1970.

do XMJ (P) F. Jo Casey became the AWoS, G1, on 7 June 1970, rplaedngLTC Re No Fernandez,

a, LTC Re S. Holms became the A~ofS# G2, on 14 June 19",0, rsplaa.stgLTC H. 1. Knight.

f. LTC He L. Xflflr became the Staff Jddge Advocate on 24 J=o 190,repladzig LTC To H. Davis.

go LTC W. 3. Henschel became the A~ofS, G1, on 1 July 1970, rp:&-iixgLTC F. Jo Carey*

h. LTC C. A. McGee became the ACotS, G34, on 2 July 1970, ri!.-.KUj (?) Re 3. Moorsland.

i. KLT W. F, Cabella. became the Information Officer on 16 July 1icn,replacing MW J. T. Pauli, who departed the command on 18 June 1970.

J. LTC T. Re Pope became the m.,ision Chaplain 0on IS July 1970,replacing LTC J. So Shave

Ic. LTC J. He Gasper became the Division Finance Officer on 23 Jtlj 70replacing LTC W. F. Cate.

INCL 3

AFF-.L 10 Aust 19'*CSUJECT: Operatiomal bport-Lesone Learned, Americal Division, lerido

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSKo--65 (2) (U)

4. (U) R~dtinaUasd Xiaitocs,.

MG Woolwino CG, ist LOG Command, USARV 9 MalCOL Lindsay 11 mayCOL Dietrich 11 mayBG Schrader CG, 18th ngrI Bde, USAVR 11 MayUP Dick3on Congressional Committee 13 iKvHON Halleck Congressional Committee 13 MayAV Gubser Congressional Committee 13 MayREP Stratton Congressional Committee 13 MaY

l. S2atinshek Congressional Comnittee 13 MayMr. Reddan Congressional Committee 13 MayW . Lally Congressional Committee 13 I-4yRAW Chrisman Congressional Committee 13 mayCOL Cotmn Congressional ComiIttee 13 layMr. Lushin Congressional Committee 13 MayLTC Powell Congressional Committee 13 MayMAJ Krasmes Congressional Conmittee 13 May)AJ McLaughlin Congressional Committee 13 MaYOPT Brady Congressional Committee 13 FayBG Toan CG, 2D ARVN Div 15 MayBG Hunter USAF Sup Cmdr, Qui hon 15 ayBG Henion HQ, USMACV 15 MayCOL Sherriff 16 MayCOL Vame PK, XXI, Corps 19 MayC(L Fern Dep Own Off, USAW 19 MayNGRenzi GG, lst Sig Bde 19 MayXG Widdecem GG, lst Mar Div 19 ayCCL Saith 0C, DNG Spt Gmd 19 MayLTG Zais GO, AIN Corps 20 MayLTG Las m, I Corps 20 MayBG Mller DSA, I Corps 20 NaLTG lMidren DOG, USARW 21 MayBG Miller ADC, 1 Mar Div 23 MayBG Shedd Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps 23 MayCML Insani incoming Chief of Staff, 25 May

Americal DivCOL MbCoid 00, ACTIV 25 MayM Fraser CG, Australian Forces, 26 May

VietnamBG Conley AW, ist MAW 26 MayMr. Carniglia Dir, American Red Cross 28 MayBG Thomas CG, USAIDCCMV 30 MayLTG Zais CG, XXIV Corps 30 MayBG MiAler DSA, I Corps 30 May

AYW -4L 10 AU6Ust 1970SUBJECT Operational 1port-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSMR-65 (R2) (U)

POSITION FLIUOD

BO Gorits Advisor, I Corps 5 JuneBG Jackson Dap Chief CrSINFO 5 JuneMG Sutherland incoming CG, XXIV Corps S JureBG Dulacki Chief of Staff, 7II MAP 9 JuneLTG lsin CG, XXIV Corps 11 JuneBG 1Ler DSA, I Corps 12 JuneOM ielan CO, Qui Nhon Support 15 JuneLTG Mildren DOG, USAW 16 June80 Than CG, 2D ANN Div 16 JuneCOL Smith Da Nang Support Cormnd 16 JuneGEN Abrams COMUSHAC" 18 JuneM3 Bowen DCG, XXIV Corps 22 JuneBG Doehler outgoing ADO, lst )Lr Div 22 JuneBG Simona incoming ADO, ist Mar Div 22 JuneCONOBESSIONAL DELEGATION 24 JuneMr. Firfer I Corps, CORDS 26 JuneLTG Sutherland CG, XXlIV Corps 26 JuneLTG McCaffrey DCC, USARV 26 JuneCCL Cam Chief of Staff, 2D AWN Div 27 JuneBG Toan CG, 2D ARVN iv 27 JuneLTG Sutherland CO, XXIV Corps 29 JuneLTG Lem CG, I Corps 29 JuneBG Toan CG, 2D AWVN Div 29 JuneBG Jackson Sr Advisor, I Corps 29 JuneCOL Weaver MACV SJA 2 JulyCIL Newman USARV SJA 2 JulyLTO Stherland CG, XXIV Corps 2 JulyIG Baldwin DCG, XXIV Corps 4 July)C Foster CC, USASTRATCOM - PAC 7 JulyIG Baldwin DCG, XXIV Corps 7 JulyMG Shira Assistant Surgeon General (Dent) 7 JulyCOL Richardson CO, 198th Inf Bde 8 JulyGEN fosson DCG, USKACV 9 July00L Howell Dep Dir I DASC Office 10 July)G Noble &W Comdr US4ACV 10 JulyCCL Sullivan LOG CKD USAW Avn Off 10 JulyCCL Bergner 00, 34th Gen Supply 10 JulyGEN Westmreland Army Chief of Staff 1. JulyLTG Sutherland CG, XXIV Corps 17 JulyCOL Hockaday Chief, Surface Opns MACV 18 JulyBG Shedd Chief of Staff, XYM Corps 19 JulyWz Cowles ACofS, Operations, J-3, USMACV 20 JulyIG Latta GG, USASTRATCON 22 JulyM Thomas (British) Chief of Staff and 0, British 23 July

Far Eastland Forces

5

AVW-R 1o Auggwt 1970SWJBCTs Opratioml bPport-Lasons Learrd, Mrikal Division, Period

SoiN3L July 1970, ACS CSO,--65 (N2 (o)

LIC Anderon (British) Q1sf & sgr, HQ, BF'LF 23 JulyOM (kaha4lell (British) OW ArW Arn, Singapore 23 July0m B. J. Comh Deense Attache for British 23 July

?fr.Ffrf&r asasy, SaigonMr. Firfor C0 200DS 23 July90 0W@*, CO, USA Djpot, Qui Nhon 24 JujlyBG Co11 DCG, USASA 24 July

NIM Morris 00, Support Comand, Da Nang 25 JulyML Bowen USAV Seuropayhiatrist 26 July

SHart Military Ju4ge 28 JulyB G ..iwse Dep ACofS, Opns, MACV, J-3 31 JulyCM i16th NP Group Commnder 31 July

6

SU]TS 0peational Rkeport--Lsesons Learned #jserical Division. Pe:LUd-NA 31 JuJy lf9V, RWZ CSFMV-.65 tR ) (Vz)

3. (U) Personel,

le (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. W±ring the periods Military Justioe/MW.Utary Affairr otr.-comprise the Largest activity area. During the quarter May-Jul 70, thiscomand tried 1 ! general courts-martial, 19 special courts-4sar, -al& in wb!.-ia bad condubct diascharge was authorized, and received 147 special =rs.-

inr &M a 3 suway courts-4iartial for supervisory review from ibordina--commands* Irk addition, 1,340 Article 15, UOW( proceedings were receiv-.d forsupervisory review and forwarding to USAPSSO, Fort Benjamin Harisn.~ LndianatHilitary Affairs actions duiring this quarter include 27 Line of Duty dettr-minations; 48 Article 15, UGHJ appeals for advice; 1We Reports of Surar94 Reports of Izvestigation; 52 elimination proceedings; 38 Coagressictialinquiries; and 2 Collateral Inrvestigations forwarded to DL.

Quarterly rates per thousand for general, special (SOD), special, and su~arycourtso-martial during this period were .48, .84, 6.59, and 0.18 respectively.

b. Legal Assistance Section processed 2t130 cases dur~ig the quarter,including but not Limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wiLls, p-)wersof attorney, income tax, citizenship, and general counsling and aftic'!.

c. Th1s 'nffice contiues to provide instruction on the Gorieva Cznvsr' crwith strong emhasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to eaech grup rt,replacements processed throagb the Asirical i.vision Combat Conter; &adc to tx-e:Axeical Combat Center Leadership Course. Instruction is also givaw or-teMitlitary Justice Act- of 1968. In addition, unit Instruction is prcvlided ox anon-call basis to officers and senior NCOs. 0

do Daring the quarter 152 claims were received for payment for loss~damage of servicemen's property. Foreign clisare monitored at this head-quarters for substansive and procadnral compistawus and forwarded to theFor"~ Cla Office for adjudication.

2. (U) Information Office.

a. In July the ivision Information Office was corcerned iel.ih %h,anntiemenA of the Mu Duec operation. According to press rulbsg-rAMACV Office of Information (KAOOI) is the sole releasing authority anlallied operations. A civiliazs correspondent visiting in the AO at 11htime happened to hber about the operation. go was escorted to Diem Dv!and poparahed the Americal portion on the operation. Upon "retnrgto Saigon after a three-day visit to [ham 1Dac, he. queried MA00L v-hi-.hthen formally released information about the operation.

7

AVDF-L 10 Auigtit 1970SEfCT Operational Report-L-wsons Lwxamd Americal Division, Period

Ing 31 July 1970, RM CSKR-65 (R2) (U)

?xess inteorest in the operation was moderate. All correspondents req-nesting i ;o out with the ARM were referred to the 2d ARVN Divisionflaformati. Office at Q0ang Ngai. The Division Information Office and

the 196th :nfantry Birgade Infomation Office escorted members of thepress to am Dc to view the imerIcal per of the operation. Allvisits by the press to Khan Duc were coordinted with the 196th InfantryBigade and the 00, 2/1 Infantry.

b. In July, the Americal lvision History was completed and taken toTokyo for Pjulicato by the project officer, iLT LWland K. Smith. TheD .vision RLstO17 %VIX be a 104-page soft owrer book with copy and both-black "d id ite and coleor photographs. Each battalion and separatecompean-sised elment has a history of the unit included. The hist=yuM be completed in September and distributed free of charge to allmembers of the division.

3. (U) Division s&rgeon.

a. The following figares represent th, malaria statistics for theAmerical Mvision during the period 1 Nay trou&x 31 July 1970.

month!aes Rate MNalaria* Rae ivX

184 91.3 44.8

June 147 77.0 32.3

July 138 69.0 32.5*Cases per 100D men per year.

b. galatia and v Avax rates have decreased some what fro a peak a-n

May. Judging from pevias years' experience these rates should con-time to decline until September or October whenmosquito breadinginwreases slightly at the belnnin of the monsoon season.

CONFIDENTIAL- A10 Augmst 1970

SUBJC: Operational Report-Lesion. Learned, Americal Division, Period

Iing 31 July 1970, RCS CsFOR-65 (Ze) (U)

C. Inte.ligence

1. (C) Intelligence Sumiry

a. Quan Tin (p)

(1) During the first week of Msy, the level of eneW Activityin Q=ang Tin (P) continued to increase over that of April. LZ S3beria,LZ West, Tien Phuoc, Chu Lai and Tam Ky received several attacks by fire.The focal point of this increase in activity being the Hiep Due area.In this area, the enexy had forces equivalent to two regiments p.Lussupport elements of the 2d NVA Division. The second week of MAy sawa decrease in the level of enemy activity, especially in the Hiep Vearea. The Chu Lai and Tam Ky areas continued to receive light attacks byfire. The focal point of enen7 activity switched to the Tien PhuocC=D/t Camp area. Durimg the third week in fty, the enezq activitylevel remained about the saie but the focal point switched back to theHiep Due area. LZ West, LZ Siberia, Chu Lai Base and Tam Xy continued

to receive attacks b fire. The 409th W Sapper Bn was identified in anattack on Que Zon (D) HQ but the majority of the battalion remained inthe Chu lai Front. The last week in May saw a significant decrease inenaW activity. The enemy continued to maintain pressure on the Hiep Ducarea with both LZ Siberia and LZ Vest receiving attacks by fire. Theenew also conducted insignificant attacks by fire on Tam Ky ard Chu Lai.

(2) Oni May, F/8 engaged an UNW vic AT 9124 resulting in 46 WA KILo1/5 ARM, vic AT 9124, engaged an U18E resulting in 44 IA RA, 12 3Cand 2 C . Also on 1 Mby, LZ West received 4 separate attacks con-sisting of 9 82= mortar round (2 with CS agent). On 2 May, 1/5 ARVN,vic AT 912246, found 15 NVA killed by AM fire. In the same area, vie iAT 911249, 1/5 AMN engaged an estimated SO NVA, resulting in 18 NULKIA, 14 -m and 60 ChiCom H/Grens and 2000 rounds of S Amumnitiondestroyed. On 3 My, LZ Siberia received 5 separate attacks tot lling13 82 mortar rounds and 3 unknown type RR :ounds. That saw day, 3/5ARVN engaged an UMW vie AT 9426 resulting i -5 NVA M and I NVA CIA(from lot Bn, 3d MA Regt). D/1-1 Cay, vie . 10250, engaged an USMresulting in 14 NU K A. 4 My was characterized by attacks by fire:LZ West received a total of 14 82m artar rounds; LZ Siberia received10 82mm rounds and 5 unknown type RR rounds; 1/5 AEN, vic AT 916244,received 15-20 rounds of S2mm mortar fire; the Chu Lai Base received57 122- rockets. On 5 iby, 60 VC/NVA attacked and over-ran Duong UUiOP, vie BT 148122. Chu Lai Combat Base received 24 122mm rockets.

(3) On 8 hay, 3/5 AM, vie AT 925269, received 8k fire and At,unmown aneunt of Sm mortar rounds, followed by a ground attackc, froman DR=; this action resulted in 12 N7A KA, 2 IN and 2 CSW CIA.That sm day, Tam Ky received 200 rounds of 82mm mortar fire

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVW-L 10 A-g us 1970SUBJECT: Oerational Report-Leesons Learned, Amrical Divisive, Pei;.'d

ndiMn 31 July 1970, CS CFOR-65 () (U)

and a ground attack, causing heavy civilian casualties. Hswk Hillreceived 2 122-m rockets. LZ Bayonet received 20 60mm mnrtar re-andsand a ground attack from an UNW. On 10 May, F/17 Ca-, vie BT298333, received 15 RPG rounds from in UNSEF; fire was raturred re-sulting in 14 WA ILTA, 4 WVA CIA 9 -C ad miscellaneous euw;-puXAdestroyed. A/4-31 Inf, vic AT 868239, rocelxed 40-45 r-u:adrs cf 8Zmmmortar fire from an UNW. 3/4 ARVN AV accounted for 12 VC KIA in acontact with an LRIS vie BT 300320. On 12 May, Tam 4 (D), vicBT 311215, 293328 and 291229, received 3 122mm rocket rounds froman UNSU. Tien Phuoc 0ZM/IUSF, vic BT 1215, received 50 82mmmortar rounds and an unknown number of EPO rounds from an UNSEF. Also,f? #118, vie BT 253216, received 25 rounds of mixed 60/82mm mortarfire and DG rounds, followed by a heavy ground attack from anUW. On 13 fty, Chu LAi Combat Base received 5 122=m rockets,Later that day, C/2-1 Inf, vic AT 877244, received 15 rounds cf60mm mortar fire. B/1-46 Inf, vic BT231074, engaged an eatua.tedNVA platoon resulting in 9 NVA KIA and 2 MC. On 16 May, 2/5 ARVNvic AT 880263, received 25 82mm mortar rounds and 15 rounds ofunkmown type R fire from an UNW.

(4) On 17 May, A/4-31 !nf, vic AT 960250, received 20 82mmmortar rounds from an UNSEF. 2/5 A.N, vic AT 894276, r-aceLved18 82mm, mortar rounds plus HPG, Ra.and L& fire from an UNW. 4/6ARYN engaged an UNSW vic AT 904268 resulting in 10 NVA KIA.Nearby, 2/5 ARVN, vie AT 902257, AT 904269, received an unknownnumber of 75am BR, 82m mortar an4 60mm mortar rounds, followed by aground attack from an UMS. Fire was returned resulting In 8 NVAKU. Attacks by fire characterized 18 May: Tam Ay (D).. vic BT 3221,received 5 122mm rockets; 4/6 ARVEN, vic AT 902268, received 20 82mmmortar rounds and LZ Center received 6 8?mm zmrtar rounds. Thefollowing day, 19 May, also had several attacks ly fire. W.ep Du.(D), vic 903267, received 30 82mm mortar rounds, 3 75mm RR r':'-dsfrom an UNW; Q? 1-1-7, vic BT 273254, received 10 60= mm arounds, 5 82rmm mprtar rounds and 2 EPG rounds; 2/5 ARVXN vic AT902272, received 2-3 rounds of 120mm mortar fire; 3/6 RVN., viecAT 904250, received 20 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSW. On 20 &,y,Thang Binh (D), vic BT 1741, received an estimated 20 rounds of107mm rocket .fire from an UNW. 1Z Siberia received 9 82= mr, rarrounds, 8 of which contained a CS agent. C/1-1 Car, vic AT -46262,received 15 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. A/1-l Gay, with D]1,4.Inf, vic AT 942272, received an uakn~wr amcurt of .PG, Ai ar-d $a frefrom an UNSW; fire was returned resa.tirtg in 10 NVA CIA and I ME.On 21 May, LZ Siberia received 15 2n m .-tAr rounds axnd 7 unknowntype RR rounds from an UNWSB. ChL Lai Combat Base received 8 .42mmrocket rounds.

IC

CONFI7DENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL 10 August _9'0SUBJUCT: Operational Report-Lessona Learned, Americal Divisi.' Perz-.d

Ending 31 July 1970, RC CUR-65 (a2) (U)

(5) On 23 M6y, 2/b AEVN, vie AT 903259, engaged an UNSEF resu4lingin 20 NVA KIA, 6 IS, I CSC and 6 VN detained, LZ Center received10 82im mrtar rounds from an UNSEF. 4/6 ARVN, vic AT 9002b0, e-Y~gged10 NVA resulting in 10 NVA &A. On 2 Xiy LZ West received 7 Lttacksby fire, totalling 22 60m mortar rounds and 1 e m..rt.ar rurnd. On27 May, LZ Went received 3 atta-a by fixe consisting a1 a total of13 82rm mortar rounds. On 2ts Yay B/4-31. Irf, vic AT M27Z17, receved15 6Oiw mortar rounds from an UNSEF, Taen Phuot CIW&/US forcea, vicBT Oll!.4, found 20 VC KBK. On 31 Iay, LZ Siberia received 6 attacxsby fire consisting of 52 &mm mortar rounds and 2 6Omm mortar rounds,

(b) During the month of M*y, Amerial forces accountec for 6L2VC/NVA JIA. The enen expended bv 60/2m rortar rounds &r.d 109ixed 107/122mm rockets. The lst W Regt ard the 3d NVA Regt, %icng

with some of the support battalions --f the 2d NVA Divisacn, weredeployed in the Hiep Duc area. .th the r-cepti.n of the element c'..the 409th Mi Sapper Bn that attacked the Qua &;n (D) HQ, MF &-.d LFbattalions operated in their norml A02s. Diring the repcrlinrgperiod, all LF companies operated izi theaer normkl AC;s.

(7) In the first week of June, triere was a substantial incre.-ein activity, with LZ's Siberia and Weat being the focal point ofactivity. Both of these Ul's received several attacks by fire ear-hday. The second week of June evidenced a conf iaued increase in enenactivity. While activity in the Hiep Duc area reached its righestlevel since the campaign beganr the enemy conducted attacks by fire izthe coastal plains of Thang Binh and Tmm Ky (D), By the begi-naingof the third week of June, activity had alm=,st ceased in I hEA Hip Du:area indicating the withdrawal of enemy for:.es, There were mc-rt4:and rocket attacks in the eastezn pcrti r. :f the province, The finalweek of June saw further reductoins in the level vf enea 4.w..ityoIndications were that enewj units hu4 withdrawn to their b&ae areaesto regroup and resupply. There wee no major attacks by fixe orground attacks during this week.

(8) On 1 June, 3/6 ARVN, vic AT 923247, found 10 VC KIA, 6 EVAKBA/S. On 3 June, 2/6 hARV, vic AT 912298, received 34, AW fire froman UW; an A/S was processed resulting in 21 NVA KA. On that sameday, there were two significant attacks by fire: 4/5 AhVE, vic.AT 897256, received 75 82m mortar rounds from an MWSEF; Hawk Hillreceived 6 122- rockets and 12 82mm nortar rounds. On 6 June, B/4-3-1Inf, vie AT 88215, received 30 60mm mcrtar rounds from an URSVF.On 7 June, elements of the 409th IF Sspper Bn conducted an attackagainst Thang Binh (D) Fs, vic BT 1.,5416. This attack resulted ia18 VC Ku, 3 VC CIA and miscellaneoua milita&ry equ.pment CIA. Reports

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL 10 Awu.. 19783BJT: Operational Repo.. Less Lea.rneu. Aer-.-1 Divion, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, = CFOR-,t - . ,U)

indicated that the attacks i- the Hiep Duc %ea %ere divareionArj;their intention being to draw fraex-dly I)rces ;ff ths coast._ i-so that the enemy could operate &gainst the GVN pa Ttis px-grn

(9) On 8 June, Thang Ba-h PF;s, vic PT 175475, rec.-ved 22 8Z,=mortar rounds and Zi 60mm mrrk.r rounds fr.'m -N:- UNR Th'-- foil -wday, vic BT ±85347, Thang Bind. PFs received 20 82me rounds, h-unknown nunber of HIG rounds, Ad fa-e -,d h grou-d ,ttack fr-.,: IU resulting in 2 VC I&. PF #5 H.;T 149334, 2e0gree 20 zomwmortar rounds. Also on 9 June, Thx1z B:-e PF's, v.Lc BT 245375 --

75 82- mmrtar rounds, and a ground alt'.-k f:.m an U1SF. LZ bex-Areceived 32 82me mortar rounds and 3 75mm RR rounds. On 10 Jun he.-were 4 significant attacks by fire: LZ Siberia received 24 8Umm i-;, a.rounds; A&C/1-46 Inf, vic AT 949244, re,'eived 30 82mm n ':t&Z ,B/I-46 Inf, vic AT 960254, received 35 82mm m.-tr rowidso Or U1 Jline2/6 ARVN, vic AT 900260, received !00 uriknown type RR rounds, 30 60mmmortar rounds and an unknown number 82me mztar rounds fr.)m a- JS.LZ Siberia received 69 82m moztar rou.ds from an UNW , LZreceived 39 82me mortar rounds, 15 cf which :-ntained s C/S &ge.On 12 June, LZ Siberia received 25 60e mz., a7 rounds and 42 82mmmortar rounds in 5 separate attacrks by f.e, On the saw dy, .Inf, vic AT 965246, received 79 82mm. :.rta,'ir~d 10 6mm n.heavy M-79 fire, and AM/Sh fire f -cm an UNSE. FLre wes :'.resulting in 29 NVA EIA, 5 IWC and I CSIZ. Also ra, 2.2 TLre. (i- 6Inf, received 45 82mm mortar .rounds e.nd 4./5 ARVN received 40 &mnmortar rounds, vic AT 959249 and AT 08-259 respect±vey,. ,-qst Avn.engaged an eatimated 40 NVA, vic 933C, in supp'rt of Q'.- Inf;71st Ava accounted for 10 NVA _A in thie &ation. A.'3-2. L.f, viec

AT 913238, received 15 75mm RR r unaaq and 10 82mm m-'ar ronr dfrom an UNEF. On 13 June LZ S.iberj., eceivYd 25 aim mortat r-.,aand 10 75mm RR rounds.

(iO) The week of 15 - 22. June ic' ,.d th activity ievrl in uuanz T-.-:(P) substantially decreasea, On 16 June, .3/5 ARVN,. vic BT 200161b,received an unknown aiount of 82tom mrrtar fire, RPO round& --rd Sh .irefrom an ULM. On 19 June, Ch: L-.-i C.:zst Base received 3 122m rocks sFrom this time until the en= of June there were no major ground attackaor attacks by fire in Quang Tin (P). On 26 June, 2 UH-H' s were loitas a result of combined .30 cal fire and RPG !ire vic AT 64L4o

(11) During the month of June, fcica. .rc~s u ir.g in i4,-.gTin (P) accounted for 487 VC/WVA f11. T'#.e enewy e:pemded 794 mi-e u- .:r ruvw-,3and 14 122m rockets during the m:rth. Duyzuig the firti tw- wenics -fthe let W legt and the 3d NVA RP.g-. -ml.-d in th-, H.. D..c area, . t-'by subordinate battaiions of tUe 2d NVA Di-¢si.-n, These , -.r thrqwto their base areas during the enr. of thb aer-:.ad wok ,f Jur.e, Loc.l For--and )bin Force battalions and aL Loc- F-rce co&nitij epe: ,l'. ,i iln theirnormal AO's throughout the rmnth,

-.2CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDI-H 0

V~yl UBJZT:* Operational Report-Lesrr~ Learn~ed AW11C&OL D1,14-1-Xnding 31. July 1970, RCS C&WOR-.b5 (Re4) ',U)

(1)The lowi level of ftct. tity tha, fleg in --r -e miad..e cf 'x,-continued into and throughout the mr -, r July,. W-.i th? r ' iwereneaV initiatea incidenits decr.c-seci I K-e numbrer cf f rle.'CL1Y -s :''Incidents increased. This was cLa, to rcen'i 3 rort~icrmin the enenW'1 a ar b.~se aire arowu Knarn Duc - L-.dic-,tionf ix,that the Allied operat.zn 3x. *:re. caught the FnwW cnff ~

(13) On I July, A/5415E 1af, vic elk ,&Ludz, en~gaged ba est'nmlte-d 0~piatoon resulting in 5 VC ZIA, 5 VN dttiied alad 1 IC 01~ 2r *-t!3/2-1 Irnf, vie BT 170470, engosged sr, UNS& in S-uPP.')rt Of PR #88resulting in 6 VC KTA and 1 1WO B.' -46 inC. in two sepa-a..e _-,tticksvie BT 285065 and BT 294062, naceived a . cf 12-14 6= zwr-trounds and 30-50 Oiio m H/Grens £i,..'m e-ra NS . O LJuly, T M X F s

an estimated 40 VC resulting an 15 VC CA1 ;vd 3 W.C,. O 6 July.,v V~#195, vie BT 260169, engaged an sti 'd30 VG resutipin~ r 12 VCIU and 1 3WC.

(14) On 12 July,. 1/6 AHFN ~i-YC q88O09L. rece.vsd 4r. aik--cflionof 60mm mortar rounds frcm an UN.W~. D,2~J -I ± L it a ZO 014%0- 4. rir edan unknowin numb*er' of 60=mm i-rt1--r ris-Vim ar JNSE.F. C13-2. -L-f,BT 165170, received 12 82mm iwi. .r ::-.vds, 5 RPG rcunds 4Lnd Si :an UILSE. Tam Ky if's. vic BT 2.1716.9 re'-eived 75 60mm wmrt.: rounde anda ground attack from an UW, tku.~crts resulted in 5 VG KIA. T~invic BT 292238, received 2 '122nm x-.e~A

(15) On 15 July, C/5-46 InV, --jc BT '1, 36 -~~ie 10 6QinanirLaLuri'from an UWW. On 16 July BF' 178 Bi.T 2301,60 erngsged an TMIWf~'~;.in 9VC XZA,4MC and 2 CSC. D/>V-.:h1,1, i.-T 294013, fijurd .z

destroyed 22 structuxrsa ard 22 b.L).ee. waLh 2 4-1ur-els, AI? 1- via BT100231, received 45 roux~s ,f 81mm m- tar t.-from cur MVa. O& 17 ThJ. ,R/3-21 Inf, vie ST 095238,.rci 19 8,.xnm inetr :-urda frim an UWOn 18 July, Tien Phuoc CGfl forcee, AT q80117:, engaged Au es-,ici'ed

7 VC platoon resulting in 5 VC KCIA 1.d 2 MMC. On 1Q July, D12-1 :LA, uri'.ZB 029990, found an abandoned 1i8 Pred dl~pepaary with 5 str4.rea ,W 2bunkers. On 21 July, D/2-1 In!, ~.ZB 0Q96- roreied ZO Q~d60= mortar fire from an MISF,

rounds, 5 82L mortar r.;rnds. at. ainn -. y'pe RR -un -irA A -rocket from an UNW~. On. 25 Juay, ls6 ARVN , v--c YB 389": --.rdVC dead over 24 hoiurs, 0/3-21 Lif fou&d a rGC8Utly, used bm-a~e c& r v..BT 132268 consisting of 8? structuraa6.k~ i4~t~~On 26 July, R/2 ARMN, vic YC 952Z056, feond aen destxr 'Yed 30 s' ru~taeand found and evacuated 38 bicycl.ea and miscellaneouS ',dVnnCG. AI-4-6Inf, vic AS 900958, was pined d-:,wn by an' estinscled NVA 'An~.-several hoius. On 27 41ly, 14, AIRVN vttV 0403,: f,)md &tO e-rcuiled

CON FlDEINTAL

CONFi DENThAL

SUBgJETi Operational Raport-Leso:s Learned, Aierica2 D-a'.Si P .dIMrng 3l. July 1.97U, BPS CSCR-65 (BA) (U)

12 122- rockets, 82 RPG rounds and mlscellane-us auTiipmen 0,4/6 ARVN, vic YB 835986, received bn unknown number of 60/qimm m,. t..rrounds from an WSW. On 30 Jaly,. act ivy ii the Eham Duc 'W "*eIa marked increase. 4/6 ARVN, vic YB W. 986, received 15 82m a ra,rounds. 1/2-1 Inf, vi- ZC 00"72, received 6 S2= wrtn -.

31 JulV, 3/6 ARm, vic YC 89o0j_ re; , d 12 ;i-,e1. A," -.vic IC 833022, received 40 60am ounds fr.rn ax' UNSEF.

(17) During the month of July, Lierica. Forces uted .. J/IVC/NVA KA. The enemy e.~ended 283 60/82mm m rt-r rounds zA!t.US installations and NDP's aloiV with 4 122m rickets. Durlr g t ile

first part of the month, the lzt 1* Regt ard the 3d NVA fegt c czlet.edtheir moveant into the western por i:r. :f Quang Tin (P). They .?,varemained out of contact probably tv refit and resupply, M ar FT.-Tand Local Force battalions as well as LF ccqpaniss have rewinea ar,.their normal AO's throughout the 'rntb,

b. Quang Ngai (P)

(1) Enem activity in Quang Ngai (P)- ii.e fellwing bs'.Athe same pattern as that in Quang Tin (P), never reached the he.ignt.nor intensity that activity did in Qi&rg Tn (P). Enemy t.-it 1was somewhat delayed by Allied expluitatin of the CO, 23d SpperGo, 21st NVA Regt, and the APO 70th Bn .Lst NVA Regt. Theirinformation concerning original ad alternate sttack pl.ns of the21st Regt against Nghia Hanh (D) HQ were irt:-umental t'; the Ali-sdpre-emptive operations in this arw. The light t. .dez%.o- -.which existed thzoughout the latt.er ja:, of April ont.:uA ix,..- t:.beginning of May, but with at. increase Ln -tta.-ks by tir5.

(2) On 4 MaY,; C/5--46 ISf, vic ES 7 foud an! .,-cua. 4,3122mm rockets. On the same day H & D/4. 21 Inf, ei' BS 84.-, fou-nland evacuated 5000 lbs. of xice. J/ 4 ARVN., vi BS 662."54, f..:-.d .-VC killed by SAF, dead less tna~n 24 h..:ira. D/3--l Inf vie BS539732, FSB 411, engaged an UEF resulting in i0 VC JCrA. Acompany PC from the 2d Co 406th LF Spppe: Bn was captured -.), 7 aajand identified elements of the 406th Sapper Bn as having taker prin the attack on FSB 411.

(3) On 8 May, WAP 1-3-2, vi- BS 55489.2, receivwA 25 RPG r:'i ds50 unknown type mortar ro _nds, sat-.hal ,ges. SA fire a:'d a g."-.attack from an estimated 100 VC i. tll, reulti :ntz . C.0 -3-'accounted for 27 VC KIA, CAP 1-3-2 vic LS 666978 ed .mortar rounds 18 82mm mor.ar rounds. 15 RPG r."', da ai4 ., g.'.attack from an UNE. Also on 8 )fif. MACV Tm #13. B ES '3-35received 25-30 zinm mortar rcunds, 12- RPG r,'a.ds 2. 1 = P 'from an UNW. 2/o ARVN, vac BS 72589'. -..'ived 30 ri'i-ds -- lf t, .

14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTALAVDF-HL 2J- ACst 2970SUBJECT: Operational Aepcrt-Lesszns Learned, Antrical Div-.a.z)n, Priod

nd ing 31 J u34 19 70, H.i CSFOR 6 5 (B;, 1 (U)

mortar fire from an = . B/1-82 Art'. r. LZ Snoopy -'ec -aved 20-30rounds of unkaown type =rta'f , fr-.. ar. UIN . 6, Tc C1IL furceen,vic BS 556355, engaged an UNSW resultiig 1A 15 VO K.A. Cm 1Z MLy,A$4-21 la/, vic BS 4Q0298, £orad dL evacuated 15,000 lbs of rice.1/6 ARVN, vic BS 659919., received 20 rQuws~ of 6a wrtar E.Lr !rom anUNWF. On 13 May, PF's -L OP #:., v-. uS 575780, r&*e:-ed Sh fLre irotu anUNW Fir~e wias retur.-od reult-~ - ' 13 "C XUL id .3 HL. ~*the same day, vic BS 580650, 3/4 ARVN ei'gaged .i U 1 F reSUILLIIA.CVC ICA. B/123d Avn, in support of 3,/41 ARVN, v. BS 595605, .for ;40 NVA LU. On 14 May, A/4-21 Lnf, vic BS 8430, f.und and ev-.v .ftd28,000 lbs of rice. 3/4 ARVN, vi.c B 597593, C. uad 2 ' NVA KB 5A f.-I'.

(t#) EneW activity fcr th; week ,-V -1.'-23 Ny da-rb'ieed aid ,njeteqnainly of sporadic attacks by fire. On 18 May A/4-ZL Inf vic 38847316, found and evacuated 5,000 lbs 2f rice. c/36 Eng', v ¢ 3 7751)found and destroyed 20 bunkers, O 23 May, Ha Tnnn CIG foroes, vic3 471665, engaged an UUNF resulting iUn 10 VC KIA.

(5) On 26 May, PF J35, vic B8 6.L?9., recelTed 20 60nm c=rta.- iondsfrom an UNSEF. 3/4 ARVN, vic BS 635553, fou ad &nd evacuY ed 7000 lbs of.rice. D/1-20 Inf, vic BS 738572, found and earcua&.ea 15,C.C lb- rice.On 29 &ay, RF #489, vic B3 722943, engaged 21 VC resUi.ti.g In 3 V Kand 8 VN detainees.

(6) During the month of May, Americal forces accounted for 257 VC/NVAKIA. The enemy expended 212 60/82mm mortar rounds and a total of 5 122rmmrockets. In the beginning of the month, the 21st Regt HQ and the 60th Bnmoved from Base Area 128 to the northern portion of the Song Ve Valley totake part in the attacks in Nghia Hanh (D); the 70th Bn moved form thelower Song Ve while the 80th Bn moved to Nghia Hanh (D) from Minh Long (D).They maintained this deployment for approximately two weeks, after whichthe HQ and 60th Bn withdrew to the southern Song Ve Valley. The 403d NVASapper Bn remained in Base Area 124. The 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn remainednear Base Area 121 but with an element deployed with the 48th LF Bn, westof the Batangan Penisula. The majority of the 406th LF Sapper Bn deployedin the Nui Da Ne area, with elements conducting operations as far east asFSB 411. The 38th LF Bn and the 120th LF Montagnard Bn, as well as all LF

companies, operated in their normal AOts throughout the month.

(7) The month of June commenced with a sizeable increase in enemyinitiated activity. The enemy utilized the dark phase of the moon toinitiate several attacks throughout Quang Ngai (P) in the first few days.After this offensive period, enemy units withdrew and started a longperiod of reorganization and resupply. This logistical activitycontinued throughout the rest of the month and prevented any large scale

offensive moves. This lack of enemy offensive activity indicated that theenemy logistical activity was hampered by Allied operations in major

CONF.DENTIAL

! " I

CONFI DENITIALAVDF-L 10 A,:g : 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Repcrt-Lessoni Learned, Ataienzal Divasiv-,, PtrxodEnin j J,1,190.= SR6' a t'U

logistical areas.

(8) The week ending 6 June was cr Anc'erized by &, £Z .4% inactivity. The first week of June was 1-h fcva! poirr :,f tn s .s 17s '.:for eaen initiated activity. The weiR -tsrted si.<wiy wi.rh t. :-rticLVand caches being fouid.WO On 2 June B i-2 ri' S-- 5 918,36, receiv1! 4rounds of 60= mortar fire from an =. On the -ame iy, 2-4 ARVW, viIBS 594468, found and evacuated 40 82m mrta. r.unrs nad 4/,4 LRVN. .-.I-

BS 578208, engaged an estimatod NVA sq iud resciting in . WNIA KIA, 1 .1Wand 2 CSC. Also on 2 June, A/'-20 Inf vic B3 745.57; tinl and ,rz'A*.20,000 lbs of rice. On 4 June. the eneiW iA:icned e. tsathroughout the province. 1/1-52 Inf at LZ St.Lnson received r.0 x,.;z'do ciS2mm mortar fire from an UNW. BF #495- 'Tic B b4Z935, :,erevAd 12 VLMMmortar rounds from an 1Ut3W. Dan Qu ig Refugee Canp, vic BS 7.5718 a "rPF #71, received 10 rounds of 60mm nr.it.a fi.-e and a ground '-!estimated VC Co. B/3-1 Inf, FSB 1i4 received 10-12 rounds .,f 2mmi ortaxfire from an UNW. D/3-1 Inf, "* BS 434774, fouid &,d evacuatd 6000lbs of rice and ;000 lba of potatoes. 1?4th Avn, in supp rt if 1/4 LAR-N.vic BS 635643, engaged an USW' resultiag In 15 NVA XIA. B/6 .L Art-y, -::support of Z/4 ARVN, vic BS 610480.. -ngsged an UISE resuit,-". in .'.L VCKIA. 5 June was the last day of numerous ettacks. C!--52 I'n! .rLc ES595837, received 80 rounds of L0/&8GmU rortar fire fr,)i e r tN T .. !ZStinson received 15 rounds of 82r=n rrtr fire from ax. UNSEF 14 A.VLvic BS 635644, received 30 rounds f- 82m mortar fire frm UnSE.C/3-18 Arty, vic BS 605497, in suppo.-t of 2/4 ARVN engaged -n UWresulting in 15 V KIa. The week'ended w en Bink Son (D) and 3d CaCO HQvic BS 6090, received 8O rounds of 82mm mortar f7ire. 7 BPG rcund! %nd Ufire from an UN.M . ±74th £vn, vic BS 608588, engaged an UN&'- in zuplortof 314 ANVN resulting in 15 NVA KIA.

(9) During the week r.f 7-13 June there was & considerab.e decrtasin ae W activity. On 8 June, C/1-S2 Inf, v-ie BS 7094333 veceivea 15 e2inmortar rounds, I0 HPG rounds Sn h A fira from an UNW 9/4 ATW ' vic BS355612, engaged an MW resulting .; 15 VC RKA -n 1. Jun.-. In conwnctiunwith this contact, a weapons and :memi .he was 12xd - Total I;'-5captured were: 4 l.m rockets, IQ0 -4:., and B-41 r,'rd$s, 120 82xnn l ' utarrounds, 70 d~n R rounds, ;e .L2mm r-r w,..- beads, 20 AK-4716 and 50AK-47 magazines.

(10) The following week of 14-2') iTue; .sgain ,hwf'a a docreas-. iineneW activity. A.Lthough the total number ol' KIA' . (47) was aver.ge fora typical week, they were obtained z%2nlv through ,umeXx..ia. contacts.The onl4 two significant incidents were oni .l June. C/1-52 ]I ,599832, received 14-20 rounds of 8?m = ,irtar fire fre.m an LS with L.rand 3/4 AM, vic BS 619554 fond anI evaci ,.6d 6OOO P.-? of rice.

CONFIDENTIAL

CON F1 DE.NTIALAVW-&IL 2'AU*;Us 19SUBJWTt Operational flapc.:t-Lessja9ins rr,"d . Ame-'ics- D e1on eriod

Anding 31 Ju1Y 1970, 823 CSF0E-4-5 (&L) MU

(11.) From 22. June to the end of tne mwe, atve-'aa. cachs wor*- fourkiand there were two signiticAnt %ILmcka by fitce. Oin Z June, Rl/4 &RM3N.vie B3S 282645, found and evacu~ted 25Q R1+0 r-;cketc. .30 6Omm mortar rds,30 82mm mortar rounds and tw oii- ,* r-,41. brter.ea, 4.-4 rIBS 691839, on 20 and 22. Jue f - I A. -, zaod toti2. .f 12,'?5 lbof rice. The first attAck by fixe '2 r 3 Jixrit wric.r. BF #23i. v -B3 725895, received 32 82= m .rtkr :-t.8from. &n 1.TE' Th', scodattack by fire cam the fe11'-wing d .~v wh<+Y C/4-P- Im, B5 88:,49received 1.0 82= mortar rounds P.r.- ar. IN wi+h NUP Or ?. une,B/1-6 Inf, vic BS 684824, found and e"~U'.'teci a ctche wl~bcor :.i -i15,000 Ibis of rice. The lt- carl : f a~nth was f:- nd ar c JSai'whan C/1-20 in.C, vic BS 746439 £':'und and evacuated I.0.000 2Xb '

(12) During the menth movemnf w.. -neins!~ fzr met unite qperat2.gin Quang Ngai (P) with +.he exccept. ,-n i'.. ng t'je 2le-, NVA Regt. 'thebeginning of the mnth fauz4 tre 4'1 t Regt d"'plxed 1bot'n -L the Sau-L WEValley area of southern NgbiA 11-rh 1.0' ;'r4d ;,h the R.. B %FP AVr4a L-1A 128. In the first week of Jurr- ttt reerit made i ~- ~.-A~.j ndisposition. A1l elemen'.* - ngeg,4+-ad t:- tnr- 3 -thwetat .f Ngh . i i$IS for a planned attack of size&Ute p,-Tpr-r i,na, The %tt%.-.5 w4 re: notcarried out to their full tditt v-nd %ftAX- t1R a4 jCJ(c !h- ,rtxre .1jg :_i:again retired to their norT:kJ. Ar.1 p e~g; k- ?_r Lg' 1 ae 3.-t-rpreviously stated. All) othez r XA scmi IF 1wits sfayged in -. '-ae p-a~i..to their be *a areas for refittiz4g "Ai tra.t"ing thr-i"xlT, the e, t vi: im*Any mvement wa~s usually for two Y'~~ *Soil si1r-,ment s R nga,-d '.logistical activity or, the unat wag t-..ri t- av.'i4 w. ..hforces.

(13) America]. Forces accou~ntedj fi-.r 2 V' ' NVA KU& Jiw.The enemy eapnded a total of ?..4xrno (.t~c 60>r i 'A2= r I nd 3

rounds of 192-a rocket fire, TherFL s~ 9iAin d-XtA dur-i7 thW-reporting period with only 2 -1r %. eift j. Or lur. U.H-E2 fromp174th Avn, vie BS 331?83, re~~e -e- .- ~ 3~~e .~zcl.fire with an unlaowcn nu4miar -f ir F 7The ox-Aa.r.d V710 .

recoverable.

(14) The low 1ev.L of activi t y thi,.t prev .led ii, tY.e end c.4 Junecarried over into the beginning Qf Ju.2y. iLRnzqr dinp 5sit.-w w_3 g-n6.a1I-ly sttc with only mino r nrwe s + -, .voi.43 A3.U. ed ipn -a I in-:-, Th- 21 ZRNVA Rogt HQ remained in Base ar. 228 The Ree,~ ne on.!.- E- deployed insouthern )ixnh Long (D) an-2 ,r.* Ba doplujed in ncvthern Mirh .%, n~.D)i thethird Bn operated in the &)nF ye vL' Trne 403d NVA - ?pper Bn wa&unlocated in the southern pvuTt-.ar of the proyinc -. T-ie ltC7th 1414% HWlyWpas Bn operated just east of Bh 1Z1 T-A oth-'"F~. BN'- preraL-*d :intheir normal. A013 throue~.',A t.h,: rwntb a,! dd *4.~1-? F .lge~ltreports ind.icated axi upsfwiig 11, -VnW' ~tvtrw-. s ' to coancidewith the dark phase ;,f thie in~r, !nowve-, the- ecien ft.-;d~ to uti]2-

CONFIDENWTIAL.

CONFI DENTIALAVW-I-,L C¢ A L .-A 1970SUBJEMT: Operstional Report-Lessr.3 Lia-'ed, AmerJ-Al D:-',islon, Foria

3nding 31 July 1970. 30S N'VOR &) (U)

this period to conduct any significnt, offe;,sive ,.'.tie .majority of ground activity involved n f,,r;.

(15) On 2 July, 4/4 ARVN, vi BS 471tk4. ,cwunted 5e' '. 'C KIA An('10 structures destroyed. On 4 July, PF #i'3, vic 3, 7 % 747 along .ith PF07l6 received fire from aa UNW. Fire w&s reta.rned resulti.tg " VIUA and I MM. On 5 July, PF #188, vic id 883306, reuaved iC x1Qmrtar rounds from an . ,S. 3/b ARVN a >zsoued f r 6 VA KU .-.'- 2 .II'.following an engagement of aa UNW" "" -S 282806. Or. 8 JuLl. PF 0.,vic E 574972, received heavy Sh fi-rG 7 M3G rounds ±rr = ei:i-st:. eVC platoon. Fire was returned resut.vIig in 5 VG IA. OP PL re#e.:_fLdattacks by fire of 12 nwrtar rounds each, .ue cn 8 Jaly. the atne- an10 July. Duyen Phuoc (11), vic B5 .51778 at the base ol OP #l rceaved25 HPG rounds and SA fire from iii UNSU A/3-i Inf. f,Lnd ail eYAcutea total of 8,800 lbs of rice vic BS 5077. 13 4977, BS 50'1, EG 49751 d13 4875.

(16) Activity for the third week of July remained at the same lowlevel as the previous weeks. Most enemy activity consisted of smallattacks by fire directed against RF/PF units. Most ground activity wasfriendly initiated. Reports were received that the enemy planned an

increase in activity to coincide with the anniversary of the signing

of the 1945 Geneva Accords on 20 July, however; this highpoint failed tomaterialize. On 12 July PF n240 in Binh Toy (V) vic BS 609952, received30 60r mortar rounds and heavy SA fire from an UNSEF. There werenegative enemy casuai:Les reported; sixty structures were destroyed.A/3-1 Inf, vic BS 525780, found and evacuated 10 tons of rice. On 14July, Quang Ngai City received 2 140mm rockets; one impacted near the 2dARVN Division Training area and the other hit near the 4th CAB Squad HQ.On 15 July, a Returnee led elements of 1/4 ARVN to a wepons cache, vicBS 506674, consisting of 90 TW's and 10 CSWts. The only significantincident on 20 July was friendly initiated. Forces from lia Thang CIDG/USSF Camp aSsaulted 2 NVA platoons, defending a base area vic BS 3461.The attack resulted in 18 NVA KIA.

(17) A third reported period J.m r-.4 e ,,,@" occun- Iu .

the end of July as the dark pnaae c.f the nr± Apr: J-hed. On 22 Ju3y,PF #108, vic B3 604626, received ai) 'Uam -mortar rounds. Or 24 July,BF #963, vic B5 733894, received 3-' O/32M =Arar rounds frr. %n NSEFOn 26 July, RF #934, v-_Z BS 5G37r5, eijeaced an Ui.SW' retmltua* in 5 VCXli and 3 D. On 28 July, PF #1.60, a., E& 74866, rete.ved 10O roun s oi82A mortar fire.

(18) During the month, th- : w,.- JCNVW A KU by Ame.rxeal Forees-There were 31 60/82m mortar rournds ii-ected against US -1-La.laLior,and NWD's. This amount of moriar i Lr i is iad.Lat iv,- of the 1*eve. ofactivity for the month.

CONFIDE NT IAL

I

CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1970IM]i Operationai, Report-Lessons Learud, &marical Divi4on, Period

&Aiug 31 J,1Y 1970, RGS c,.OR-65 (2) (U)

2. (C) G2 Sactionz oSUMM1 f ,iZfcant Activitie=

A. &e of 31 JU1Y 1970, the Americal Division Duffle Bag project has

a personnel tr4e 6i of six (6) officers and sixty-seven (67) enlisted men.They operate the division sensor detachment, three brigade sensor zinage-ment teams, eleven ground monitoring stations, and one organic lowair monitoring station. A three man team provides technical assistance andinintensue of line sensors buried along the Ghu Lai oomplex perimter. A

total of 241 radio-inked and 54 line sensors are being monitored in the AO.Preparations are under way to train all personnel in phase In equipment.This training is scheduled to start on 26 August 1970 for hmrical and 2ndA£II Division personnel. As pacified areas expand there has been a markedincrease in the lack of political clearances for reactions to sensoractivations. The division continues to react to sensor activations with

-11 arms, artillery, air strikes, and combat assaults.

b. The G2 Air sections reomansissance misaioxu continue to obtaintimly infomtion of onem location and infiltration routes. During thereporting pe4od 572 Infrared missions, 132 SLAR missions, 81 APD missions,361 missions, and 896 VR missions were flown. The IR and SLAR missionsproduced a total of 2,742 targets of these 1,136 were engaged by artilleryfire.

3. (C) ilitary Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities

a. Counterintelligence Section

(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidentsof kaow sabotage, subversion, or oepionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a markedincrease during this quarter as compared to last quarter. Duting the reportingperiod this office conducted 50 investigations, as compared to 6 reported iastquaKer. Of this number 13 involved separate investigations of prostitutes,apprehended for unlawful entry into Chu Lai Base.

(3) This office provided the foilowing CI services:

Announced CI Inspections 45

Unannounced CI Inspections 9

Courtesy C1 Inspections 24

DMAssists 40

Miscellaneous Inve stigations 58

PFE 12

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAIW-HL 1U August 1970SU&CTE Operational Roport-Lessons Learned, AmericA& Division, Period

InAing 31 July 1970, =S CSFMR-65 (02) (U)

(4) During the reporting period the CI Section Case Officers con-ducted 192 Source beLinga and turned in 542 Infoxnatin Ruporta. During theprevious quarter there wre 155 Source Meetings and 476 Informetion.Report sprepared.

brxth Informtin Rvaluation

Rat~n 12 346 yrtgjT ot al,

NA 0 30 132 5 2 3 l1 188

JUN 0 45 122 12 4 2 200

JIL p 140 99 7 2 1 154

S 0 ?Q1.2 65.1 ... 4=4 1.1 4.4 10

(5) Volunteer Informant Program (VIE')

(a) 7,- emphasis ws correctly placed on obtaining intelligence information,rather than obtaining ordnance, by M&GV Directive 381-2; WARV Regulation 381-6,8 May 1970; and Letter, HQ, Americal Division, AVI-GB, subject: Volunteer infox-mant Prograa, 22 April 1970.

(b) The last quarter of FY 70, ending 30 Jtue 1970, showed a narked increasein expendtures under the VIP.

(c) It appears that awards, not tailored to the social and economic condi-tiona of the area, uill only invite trouble by encouraging persons to set booby-traps to safegnard ordnance to be sold to US troops or to delJar one or two itemsat a time from a cache of ammunition instead of telling the US troops where tcfind the whole cache. It is inperative that each purchase be bargained for im theamount of the award and for additional infornation.

(d) The constant change-over of VIP officers without clearing the accountcaubec funds to be tied up and unavailable for full utilization. It is mndatory '

that each VIP officer clears his account before being tranafeared out of tnat p- sa-tion. The VIP functions :mre smoothly and efficiently when the VIP officer isassigned for a period of not less than six months or, preferably, langer.

(e) With each budget cut there is a aye considerable confunion. The bestproven way to solve this problem is to advance thn VIO officer an amount of100006 and reimburse him on the basis of vouchers turned in. This reduces tnerisk of a large amou of money being lost and makes =ore money available tothose who have a need

20

CONFIDENTIAL"-W-

CONFIDENTIAL£VI1-HL 10 August 1970SUBj . operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Endin 31 Jul 197, R CSFU-65 02) (U).

b. Interrogation Section

(i) During the reporting period, the IN' Section interrogated andclassified 1,11 detainees. The brAkdown of detainees by classificationcoupared to the previous period illustrates that the significant propcr-tional changes in dstainee levels are in the categories VC/PW, CivilDefendant and Innocent Civilians.

Fg ~ ~ ~ ~ 1~ 70 -&r_0Mx_ -Jul 70

HVA/PW 48 50

GiV .,.eendnt 815 698:'nouent CiLviin 379 234

Uncl&Lsifed 4 14

Returnee 29 39

(2) Fifty (50) man days were spent in support of tactical, cordon and

search, screening operations and other actions in which interrogation teamsworked directly with units I he field.

(3) Informstio* from 109 interrogations resulted in responses bytactical units. The breakdown by classification of detainees providingiuch inforzation is as follows;

Returnee 19

PW 18

CD or IC 72

Tactical units reacted to such information as location of food and weaponscaches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemybase areas.

c. Imagery Interpretation Section

(1) During the reporting period, the Imgery Interpretation Secticnmoved its operation to the Chu Lai West Airfield, co-locating with the directmApport Mohawks aircraft. This move greatly facilitated the processing ofphotography and i4fra-red missions, resulting in more rapid response to unit

21 .

CONFIDENTIAL

A

CONFIDENTIA LAVI-HL 10 August 1970SUNJWT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

nding 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (W) (U)

requests. The section also continued to update its trail studiesthroughout the Americal Division TAOR, making a major contributionto Order of Battle' s Rice Study.

d. Order of Battle Section

(1) During the reporting period the importance of PWs/fTNs as asource of intelligence was Lpressed on the order of battle section.Timely PWs from the ist W4 Segt, 3d NVA Regt and 21st NVA Regt madeit possible for this section toake accurate estimates of enemy intentionswith regards to the two focal points of activity, HISP DUC and NGHIA HANH,for this period. The composition of the order of battle section wasaltered to better facilitate the handling of the Division's intelligencerequirements. The majority of the section, along with an ZV and flrepresenative, established a Combinec Intelligence Center at the DTOC

for inmediate response capability to the requirement of both G2 and G3.A Projects section reiained at the Section's previous location. Thissection isq co-located with G2 Plans and is tasked with the long rangeintelligeuce requirement of the Division.

(2) During the xonth of July the OB Section was tasked through the G-2by order of the Commanding General to work up a detailed study concerningrice s.roduction, rice transportation areas where vcNVA obtain their rice.The sources used and the data obtained are as followa:

(a) l of Hoi Chanhs, Detainees and Kit Carson Scoutstudents

(b) CI aeX2e at 7 DI0CC, s and 2 PIOCC' s

(c) 0 (Past 6 months) obtained from intsums, agent reports,1 PW report, field information reports and ARVN summaries.

(d) 11 Dato Bap provided trail, waterways and infiltration routes..also cultivated areas used by the GVN and the enemy.

(.) Liaison visits with:

CICV SaigonG-2, MLIV CorpsG-2, 2d ARVN Div

The information obtained was plotted on a series of overlays which whencozbined depicted priority areas for future operations in a rice denialprogram. The results of the study wexe then presented to the following:

22

C 3 t'JF7EI,TIA L

CONFIDENTIALAVw-L 10 August 1970US5J=: OpratixnAl R port-LesonB Learned, Americal Division, Period

sidig 31. JUl 1970, RMCSFOR4.5 () (U)

I= Corps O. and 0-2, OG Americal Div. and general staff, all Bde and BnCO's1 01 1/lst Cav, and hCV advisor teams at Quang Ngai and Tam Xy Cities.The rice denIal program of the Americal Division was based on the conpletedstudy.

e. lit Carson Scout Section

(1) Wh the appointmnt of a Division Scout and a pay raise

retroactive to I Mny 70 the overallftS progrm has been improvingat an increasing rate.

rtr(;a) The cntinuingIproem of draft deferments has caused anydiffiuties for the Ahzrical =5 program. No single form can be foundto present an acceptable certificate of valid draft deferment. Therefore,the Americal =5 program continues to carry the original draft deferment.The lose, destruction and possible sale of these draft defermentscontimnus to coplicate the problems of GVN detention. The issuance of a

hCV D and draft deferment will simplify this problem.

23CONFMENTIAL

6..O4FI DET IA LAYDr-BC~L10 August 197oSUBJ=- Operational Report-Lessons Learned, A-trical Division, Period

&xding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 42) (U)

D. Operations.

1. (C) Ouerations Summary:

a. General: Aerical Division Forces continued to conduct combatoperations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during theperiod 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970, aith contact ranging from light toheavy in Operation Frederick Hill and light throughout the rest of theAmerical Division's AD. The main area of enemy activity was in theFrederick Hill area of operations. Operation Frederick Hill, GenevaPark, Nantucket Beach, and Iron Mountain continued throughout theperiod. In addition, Operations Pennsylvania Square and Elk Canyonwere initiated. All operations were conducted in conjunction and closecoordination with the 2d AR~VN Division.

b. ajor Ingagements: During the three month reporting period,Americal forces were included in two major engagements with enemy forces.One was reactive in nature and took place in the Hiep Due area of Opera-tion Freddrick Hill during May 1970. Americal and 2d ARVN Divisionforces combined to drive back a large scale enemy attack on the govern-meat's pacification program and inflict heavy casualties on the enemyforces. The second was pre-emptive in nature and was conducted in theNghia Hanh area of Operation Iron Mountain from 11 May to 14 May 1970to thwart a planned enemy attack on the Nghia Hanh resettlement center.

c. Operations by AD:

(1) Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigadein clese cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, con-tinued throughout the reporting period. Emphasis was on combat operationsto increase the level of security of pacification operations near thecoastal area an the destruction of Main Force and NVA units in the westernportion of the combined TAOR. Contact was heavy at the beginning of May1970, but action lessened towards the end of the month and remained lightthereafter. The enemy opened an offensive in the Hiep Due area with agroimd attack against C/4-31st Inf, in the vicinity of AT933227, early onthe morning of I May. The enemy lost 5 NVA KII and one individual weaponat a coat of 1 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). Throughout the rest of the daythe enemy conducted attacks by fire against various American units. D/i-letCav suffered 5 US WIA(E) at BT253190, D/-31st Inf had 14 US WIA(E) atAT910268, and A/3-21st Inf lost 19 US WIA(E) in the vicinity of AT896250.Aaerical Aviation struck back that evening as F/Sth Cav killed 46 NVA froman umknown sized enemy force in the vicinity of AT9124. Gunships from

the 71st Ava Co added 4 more NVA KIA in the same area. The action con-tinued on 2 May, with an enemy attack on A/3-21st Inf and R/4-31st lnf atAT896250. A/3-21st Inf had 9 US WIA(E) and 4'-31st Inf lost 4 US WIA(E).D/1-let Cay killed 5 NVA of a 15 man force at AT903245. D/4-31et Inf

CONF IENTIAL

CN F FIV T71 ALAVIV-aL 10ioNg 1 A 9!t 0SUB= : Operational Leport--Lessona Learned, Americal Diviion, Perio

Moding 31 July 1970, ICS CS1OI--65 (12) (U)

received ffre at AT912263 and lost 6 tS VA . 123d Avn engaged aen 'n-knows sized enemy force at AT912246 ani killed 15 NVA. B,'4-31 lostUS KA and 2 US 'IA(E) in a fire fight at AT69223M. The vett day #,SCaw found 5 WVA ZIA at AT940228. 1j . , had 3 US VIA(Z' in an engage-ment that cost the VC b KIA, 1 IWC and 2 oC-. D/Il- Cay .Kll.5A lia VAfrom a force of unknown lize at AT929248. On 4 May 1/1-46 Mnf detonatedan $1 mortar round boobytrap resulting in 16 US 1IMA(E) at V.250107o On6 May C/4-31 Inf, searching in the vicinity of AT895253, found 22 WfA IMAfrom previous fighting. The u day :2 Siberia received enemy mortarfire resulting in 2 US KIA and 12 S WA(E) from C/3-82d Arty. On 8 Maythe artillery struck back as A13-82 Arty caught an NVA Company in theopen and killed 25 of the enemy before they could scatter. The enemy re-plied with a mortar attack on /4-31 Iaf In which there were 5 US WYA E'and 1 US UZACK). Two days later, F'17 azv was attaked and a total of15 RG round@ in the vicinity of V2198333. Results of the engagementwere 14 WA XA and 9 IVC with no frisadly casualties. Later Thaz afte-'-noon the WA launched a heavy mortr at!ack on Aj4-31 Inf at AT68'9,US losses were 5 UIA(E) and 5 IA M)o The WA lost 3 KIA in the abortiweground probe that followed. US artillery et-uck back on 11 Uay as A/3-8iengaged targets at 1T275360 and BT29!340 simltaneously, killing 14V Yat the first location and adding 9 more at the second. On 13 way 1,.146'I engaged 25 to 30 WA at 1T231074, killing 9 WA and cap.turing 2 in-dividual weapons without loss to thousalves On 14 May C.A1-l ,vay if

fered 5 US 'IA(1) in a fire fight at "&Vi50. Enemy losses vee Un.know at the time, but the next day A Company found 6 WA MRA wt the amlocation. On 16 May 1/17 Cay engaged 20 to 30 VA in the vli tnity of1T09362. Results were 8 MA KIA, 5 detainees and 4 ITWC with no Z5,casualties. On 17 May 1/2-1 muf ktlled WA n sutuAh at 32084%1o.Boobytraps continuad to take their toll as AJ3.21 Inf had 6 IDS W.CwT;) cm18 ay at 1TO95225. Action flarel on 20 May as C1-I Cam killed I',"and captured 1 individual weapon at AT9L-262 US caoualties ware 5 SUIU ). That afternoon C/ll Cay and elcwnts from LI.'b4b .nf teme un-

der heavy enemy fire and sustained 4 US CIA and 12 US WMA {1) at A,.-+2.A/1-1 Cav with elements from D/1-46 mi reacted, killing 10 WVA and cp-turing I individual weapon in the same ara. There were o 3casualties. Two days later R/2-1 engaged 15 VC at BT29814 sad killed7 of tha enemy and captured 2 individual Wespous without friendly I-v$&o

Two days after that B/1-46 lnf found 15 en..mry individual weapons atZT276107. On 25 May C/3-21 Ilnf ha 7 Vi ,W E) and I V$ XIA in an an-8agemant at AT958229. Enemy lostas were unkneg. A short time lattvat 1T033209 R/3-21 mnf engaged an -'nv-n siwed enamy fe rea at AT9W ' ,killing 8 WA utile suffering 1 US M.A anA 3 US U-A(E). in a 7 hour -gegemeut at AT987278,D/1-46 lost 2 S XiLI& I VS kCA, I V USA"1 an- \US UIA(Q). Enemy losses were again unkun. On 27 May D/V-21 inr re-ceived mortar and heavy snall arm fire at A7955228 and smiferea i.

CON F/ENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAWN-EHL 10 Augi&Lst 1970S03=r Operationmal Reot--L.eosoaa Learned, Amrical Divisioa, Pazl.od

Fnding 31 July 1910, RCS CSFORl-65 '32) (U)

KUA, 4 US MMA and 7 US WLA() . A/1- 1 C" lost 3 VS 17A and 4 Ul VUA tosmall arims fire and RPG round& at h_ 973213 On 28 May B3316 Artypounded 2 VC companies in the !-.:zinity "if 37011126, killing 20 of theenm. On 29 May A and D/3-11 inf feunda the brAie& of 5 US W~A at

I' ~AT955230. At almost the same 1oa~C 15 129., Sf3=21 Muf fotmnd ilike numbr of MA MA. A/3-82 Arty k.illed 5 VC from a 15 to 20 a" enemyfore at IT135328. US fire poweT out c~ the month~a significant con-~tact* on 30 Iay. C/3-32 Arty engaged am HYA platoon at ATY900246 and killed5 of the emay, 3/3-16 added 8 lf' JA zit AZ489989, and the 71st Awn Cokilled 5 VC fro, a 20 to 30 man foz"a at K61l92bl. On 2 June 1i17 Cav- de.tozated a 155= round boobytrap with 2 VS W.iA(R) and 3 US VIA(K) at IT255159. 1/2-1 tnt lost 1 KIA and 8 E14 at 3T198181 from another booby-trapped 155m. round. R/2-1 Inf caught a ized WA-VC force in an ambushthat sam might and killed 5 WA and 7 VC at 17131272. The next ev.eningC/3-16 Arty an LZ Siberia had 9 US WrAL,,Z and 3 US VIA(X) as the resu~ltof an enemy mortar attack. A short time later B13-21 lnt engaged an uan-knowsnsixed enemy force at AT976120 and killed 4 WA. B/3-82 Arty fitredin support of the infantrymen and killed 6 more WVA. Early on the morningof 4 June A/4-31 at AT9e3217 hiad 9 IUS IrA,.E) in an enemy mortar and handgrenade attack. One e*W crew served weapon, wa" captured. A.13-82 Artyengaged a suspected enemy location at B1241221 and killed 15 VO. B/3-.21tnt suffered 5 US VIA(E) in a fire fight at hT970230. On 5 June B/221Inf eliminated a 4 man WVA patrol at WL64 .74 at a cost of 1 US W.A(E).One individual weapon was capt..irea. On 6 Z'tne A/4-31 tnt was engagedby an unknowns sised enemy force at AT963i.54. Results of the four ho=xconflict were I WA ZIA, 3 US MILA, &nd 5 US V"-A(E). At the sam time,D/4-31 lag was ened in a sharp fire fight a short distance away atAT967749. neMy losses were unk-' 't; ' losses were I KZA and 3 1I!A(E'.The next day 1/3-21 Wn suffered 1 '0S )CA and 6 US IA(l) in a day longbattle is the vicinity of AT972211, IExy losses vere 6 NVA VZA. lifls-ma from 1-"6 Wn on an observation post engaged 10 WA at STU~6114. Re-sults were 7 WA M~. A fewmniz:4tea later they engaged and killed 1 VCat IT236117. C/3-82 Arty eliminated a 7 us& VC detachment at A1894220.Later that day kll4 suffered 7 Vi WILA(E at AT934240 in an engagementwith as me~own sized *meny force -Easimy losses were unknomn. Osi 8June LZ West received recoilless -- t~sfire. US casualties from E/4-31InS were 5 WUA(Z) =W 3 VIA(M). Mortar crm from 1/2-1 enaged 8 VCat IT175355, kIlling 7. 3/1-4a laf k,-!a~d 6 WA at AT953225 and cap-tured 5 taijyidwl weepons. Fri en42 y cassaities were 5 US lr_&.1) . A.;"1-"6 Luf sgegd snother asm a., tz. t A=.4--1'146. Casualties were 4 WAIA, 2 15US M n 7 IS WIA(Z). 1/3-16 Acrcy . sught an enemy force at IT111266, resulting is 10 VC IRk. Ar{eycontinued to pound the eamythe mant day as A/3-82 Arty kil..ad sin VC at 3T185347 anid 5 micre at IT187347 in two early morning fire B!s-z. 13~-82 Arty continued theaction, adding 6 VC IMk at MT453'?O. An enemmy attack on C/1-"6 tnt at AT958243 left 2 IS U and 8 VLA(2). Enemy losses were 5 WA MU. Theenesmy attacked again that evening, this time mortaring C Co~eny at AT954245. VS losses were 1 US ]=A ad 5 'IS IMA(l). Air Force aircraftadded their fire power in an air strihe% at 37170304. The Forward AirController, Kahnz 02, counted 6 Vt- ~I"3 *in the attack. On 11, Juno

CONFIDENTIAL

O tW.ti 10 Aaust 197053JIT: Operational ,eport--Lassona Learned, Amaicl1 Division, Periodlading 31 July 1970, RCS CSOR--65 (12) (V)

A/3-21 1lf found 8 WA IRA from a previous n"iou f ired by 1/3-82 Artyat £7972227. That night A emmy strck mt dV&1 jh tbW.m-ldjW.less rifles at A£987221. Results mre I US IMA and 4 US VIA(Z). 1/1-4klnf engaged an unknown sized enemy force early on 12 June in the vicinityof AT965246. Results of this morning long contact, perhaps the most sig-nificant of the reporting period, were 1 US KIA, 15 US VIU(S), 33 WA UKI,5 IWC and 1 CSWC. C/l-4o 1nf accounted for 4 more VC JUA at AT90252. Theenemy retaliated thac afternoon -with 9 US VIA(E) in a mortar attack on CCompany at AT95929. 14tn Avn Bn gunships flying in support killed 10 WAfrom a J man enemy force in the same vicinltyo A few toure later C/1-4lost 5 more US VIA(Z) in another mor:ar attack at AT955243. 7/17 Cav on-gaged b or 7 YC at BT200204, killing 4 and detaining 2 others. An unksowntype of boobytrap cost the cavalrymen 5 US VIA(Z) later that day at ST253178. D/2-1 1nf engaged an enemy force at 3T102238 and killed 6 VC with-out a loss. On 13 June C/3-21 :nf had 1 US 33A and 16 US WUA(1) in an at-tack by fire at AT980223. The next day C!3-82 Arty caught an emy forceat AT954253 and killed 6 WA. On 16 J-.ne D!2-1 lost 5 US WA(E) to a booby-trap at BT147227. C/3-82 Arty coutLned to punish the enemy, killing 5 IVAin an artillery preparation for 11'6 ARVII near A7951240. On 17 June C/I-1Cay had 5 US WIA(E) from a large mine a. BT236210. A similar ilcident costA/1-1 Cav 5 US WA(R) and A/2-1 If 1 US A(S) at 1T210245. D/2-1 1sf wasable to kill 5 VC of the 6 VC engaged at 1T149048. On 19 June 3-1 1nf wasmoved by C-130 aircraft from Qansg 3g.ui to Tam Ky and by K-47 helicoptersfrom Tau Ky to Tien Phuoc to reinforce 196th 1uf Ida elmets. The netday C/3-1 Wsf seized hill 482 (AT875175> for the establishmut of a firesupport base for Bil-14 Arty. The rest of the battalion made a combatassault into the vicinity of £T85 7125. On 23 June 1/2-1 lsf killed 6 VCfrom an unknown sized enemy force they engaged at 1T182188. Two dayslater B/3-1 lf found a cache of 5 imnd iidual weapons at A7836130. Thecompany received mall arms fire while in the area and suffered 4 US VIA().On 26 June D/l-1 Cav inserted the atro rifle platoon at AT962017. One U-lRhelicopter received ground fire and Tashed. Casualties were 22 VS VIA(Z)and 1 US MA who was later recovered with mnor injuries. Zi the ase I-cident 7/8 Cay lost 1 US VIA(E) and a O-iE. The next day 7/8 Ca engagedan unksawn sized aevy force at 371681M3 and killed 5 WNA. Action contineat a slower pace through the month of July. On 1 July 1/3-1 Isf engagad anunknown sized enemy force at =785M089. The Gmy eceaped with enly 1 -WAZIA but left 5 individual weapons behind. On 2 July 3-1 lf returned to the11th Bde ad the Iron Mountain area cf operation. On 6 July C/1-" 1sf en-gaged and killed 3 VA at AS935989o 2 individual -eapons were capturedwhile 7 US soldiers suffered ann- it'.ries. A short tine later 1/1-46 1sfkilled 5 WA and captured 3 individual weapons at A8942988. The nxt day1/1-46 Wsf received 5 Boi Chansh in the viinity of A896198. More of theenemy surrendered two daya later to C/4-31 lnS as seven Roi Chahs ralliedwith 2 individual weapons near AT970131 and six more rallied at AT991113.On 12 July C/3-21 Inf tripped 2 boobytrapped 82m mortar rounds is thevicinity of BTlt2l79. Total US losses in the twin incidents were 4 US Ikand 12 US VIA(E). Late the unet nigrt T,48 Caw nighthawk killed 6 VC in 2

7CONFIDENTIAL

~eatOaiNF/EATIAL ic seSMIJMM Oerationl eport- -Lessons Learned1, mrclDvsoPio

Kadi 31July 191u, RCS CWIOI--65 (12) (U)

engagmnts at ZC208150. On 14 July 1/3-21 lid engaged an unknown sizedememy force at IT138228, withi 1 VC ZIA, 4 NWA ZIA, and 2 IVC. The nextevening 3/3-21 lsf received small arms fire amd M-79 fire at In148289,resuliting in 8 US WXAQO). On 26 July A/1..46 mIn engaged ant unknown sizedenemy force is a day long, contact at AT9O0958. US casualties were 4 USMIA and 8 US VIA(S). The bodies of the mis sing war* recovered the nextday with their weapons. Enemy losses were unknown. The next day R/1-461sf found 6 individual weapons at AS924992. In a. incident starting on29 July in an area east of P53 Center, vicinity DTl04294, gunships fromthe 116th Awn Co observed and engaged 0Q.15 NVA, reaulting in 3 IVA IA.A short time later, 3/3-82 Arty fired on the sa area, resulting in 2EVA UZA. Finally at about 1630 hous, 196th Ida Avn engaged the area,resultin La 4 VA UIA. Total env"y losses for the operation were re-ported as 9 MA IIA. Results for Oparation Trederick Rill for the re-

porting period vean:

47 XXA 1166 IA587 VIA(Z) 1 DIT

91 tUCK) 20 J'V/VC6 PW/WA

13 RTUEZ/VC2 RTlU/UA

188 CrV DUF10? 1M CIV270 IlIC

20 CEIC

(2) Operation Geneve Park continued throughout the reporting periodas the 198th Infantry Brtgade and the 6th AMV Regiment concentrated onthe security of major lines of comminication and the destruction of enemyforces attemting to attack Quang Ngai City or the Cho Leai base complex.Activity was light "~ Americal units searched the Rocket Pockit aroundChin Lai, targetin against elements of the 18th Han Force 3odket fln.Saturation patrolling, extensive night abush"s, preplanned ar strikes,scheduled artillery fires, and sensor devices were used to inhibit enemy

attemts to attack tba populated areas. Zarly on 4 May the enemy launcheda heavy attack by file as Chu Lai received 57 l2m rockets resulting in15 US VIA(S). Prompt reaction by C/5-46 1sf, who conducted a first lightCA to 38506976, resulted in the capture of 43 more rockets, in place andready for firing. The net morning the enemy fired 24 additional 122marockets. US casualties were 1 Ml and 5 VIA(S). Two days later 1/5-46lIn detonated en anti-tak mine at BT443036, losing 1 IA and 4 VIA(S).On 8 May LZ Stmson received bm and Blue mortar fire. There were 7US VIA(K) from C/1-52 luf and 6 US IMA(M from D/1-14 Arty. On 11 MayH117 Cay had 5 US VIA(S when an 11-!51 Sheridan detonated a 250 lbbomb rigged as a boobytrfp at BS564913- The next day A/5-46 lef had tiUS ViA(S and 3 US VIA(M) from a oooocropped artillery round at

CDP.41O~NT(28

AVD- 1C0NF AENTg s 197SUBJ CT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Inding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (12) (U)

BT377067. On tne evening of 13 May C/1-52 lat suffered 2 US KIA and 3 USWI.A(K) in an enemy mortar attack vicinity BS532898. On 17 May C/5-46found a weapons cache of 6 individual weapons at BT354047. Four days laterthe same unit suffered 7 WIU(g) from a boebytrap at ST34VO74. On 24 May117 Cav was again the victim of a boooytrap, losing 5 1IA(E) at BS520869.Mines and boobytraps continued to plague the cavalrymen as they had 1 ILAand 4 VIA(Z) on 26 May when coey detonated a 750 lb. bomb at I518887. Twodays later they were the victim of an unknown type nine at BS516855, losing1 KIA and 4 VIA(Z). *26 Engr In also had two mn wounded and evacuated inthis incident. In early June the enemy initiated several attacks by fireagainst Amrical units. Early on 4 June A/l-52 lnf on LZ Stinson received20 to 30 82in mortar rounds, sustaining casualties of 1 US KIA, 3 US VIU(R)and 2 US VI(M). The next morning the enemy fired 60 to 70 rounds of 60maand 82= mortar fire at B3599832, resulting in 3 US rlu(s). Two hours

later the enemy added 20 to 25 more rounds, resulting in 3 US VIA(Z) and 1US VIUQ. One VC was also killed in this second attack. On 10 June anambush from C/5-46 lf suffered 1 US KU and 7 US WIA(E) at BS515705. Enemylosses were unknown. Also on 10 June R/5-46 found a cache with 11 indivi-dual weapons and 1 crew served weapon at BT351064. Three days later R/1-52Inf suffered 5 US VIA(Z) when they detonated an M-16 anti-personnel Kin&at BS537857. O 2u June 1/1-52 laf detonated a i55s round boobytrap atBS487852. Results were 3 US KIA, 5 US ALk(E) and I US WA(M). The nextday A/1-1 Gav engaged an unknown sized eneny force at BT206198, killing4 NVA and capturing 3 individual weapons while suffering 2 US VIA(E). On27 June F/17 Caw ambushed an unknown sized enemy force at BT237158, killing6 WrA and capturing 3 individual weapons without friendly loss. On 7 JulyR/5-46 detonated an anti-personnel mine at BT297052, resulting in 5 US VIA(Z).On 19 July 1/17 Caw had 5 US VIA(E) when they detonated an unknown sized mineat RS512886. B/1-52 Int caught an enemy force in an ambush that evening,killing 5 VC. On 29 July, 1/1-52 detonated 2 Bouncing Betty mines tied to-gether with trip wire at 1b35 hours vicinity BS574846. This resulted in 6US WIA(S). On 30 July, C/5-46 detonated a boobytrapped 155mn round while receivingresupply in a day defensive position vicinity BT254135, resulting in 4 USKIA, 16 US VIA(Z), 1 ICS XIA, 1 VN interpreter KI, 3 VN interpreters luA(g).The results for Operation Geneva Park for the period were:

25 MA 200 ZIA241 VIA(S) 2 DST49 WIA(N) I PWNA

38 CIV DUFbu IN CIVoa IVC

'4 CSC

CONFIO) TIAL

CONFIbENTIALAVD1-91. 10 AisAsust 1970SUBJECT: Opertional laport--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Rading 31 July 1970, ICS CSMO--65 (R2) (U)

(3) Operation X"LuckALr Beach va conducted on ne Batangan Penisusisin the 198tn Infantry Brigade TAOI by elements of the 6th AMYN legimentand tee 1-6 Insantry. Constant operations were conducted troughout thereporting period in support of the GM paciticatton prosTa-,. ContactreaindiAight and scattered as numerous casualty-producing boobytrapsand mines were reported. On 5 May 1/17 Cav detonated a beobytrep atIS72082u and lost 1 US ZIA and 5 US WIA(Z). On 11 May A/1-82 Arty poundedan enemy force at 3736750, killing 8 VC. On the morning of 25 May 1/l-6lIo entered a heavily aimed area and detonated 4 mines or boobytraps be-fore they could be extracted, Total losses were 2 US KIA and 30 US WIA(E).On 11 June A/l-6 Wt ambushed an unknwn sized enemy force at D572879o,killing 6 VC with no friendly casualties. The cant day C/1-6 1af engaged6 VC at 33716836, killing 5 of the enamy and capturing 4 individual weapons.On 26 June D/I-82 Arty engaged 40 VC at 3S672"5 and killed 5 of the eney,Action reiuad sporadic for nearly a month until 21 July when 3/1-6 lIfkilled 2 VC at 15689855 while suffering 1 US VIA(2) and 2 US WIA(QO. Totalresu?.ts for Operation Nantucket Beach for the period were:

~m

9 kIA 79 Il95 WU(I) I PV/vC

I iail/C22 CIV fLU43 IN CIV19 rC

(4) Operation Iron Mountain continued throughout the reporting period,concentrating on security of major lines of commuications and supply aswell as cmat operations to increase the level of sacugity of tee pacifi-cation operations being conducted along the "at. Eamy activity con-tinued to be light throughout the reporting period as the Ilth InfantryBrigade contined its opsaptioms with th2 4th ARVE egiment. Ou 7 May llthIde Awn eliminated a 9 man WNA force at 1S6405t0. Late that evening theenesy made a determined attack on 185 411. The defending forces from D/3-1killed 10 VC sappers and detained 2 others while capturing 4 individualweapom and 2 crew served weapons. There were no US casualties. Followingthis action the enemy lauxched a mortar attack against 1S3 411 early on 10May. Total losses from D/3-1 luf and D/6-11 Arty wore 2 US VIA(E) and 4 USVIA(M). That evenng llth 3de Awn engaged and killed 5 VC at AS803185. Thenext day 1/4-3 Luf suffered 8 US XIA and 8 US VIA(E) when they detonated alarge unk~mnm type of boobytrap at BS782344. D/3-1 lnf sustained two attacksthat day losing 5 WIA(l) to small arm fire at 1S601625 and 1 IA and 4WIA(1) to enamy mortars at ZS617642. Americal Aviation fire power48mpporred3/4 hIVE as 123 Ava Ba gunships killed 1i VA at BS595005 on 13 May. 174tn-AVe sambipa killed 32 wore WA iu a day iomg action int the sam vicinity.C/3-18 Arty caugnt an unknown sized enemy force at BS351514 on lb May,

30

CDNFIbE-NTI AL

CONFIDENTIALAYDI-E. 10 Auguimt 1970

SUIJICT: Operational Raport--Lessons learned, Americal Division, Periodgding 31 July 1970, ICS CSPO--6 (12) (0)

killing 13 VC befcre they could edcape. On 26 Mey at DS646572 3/4 hIVHfound 4 WNA killed by gunships from a previous engagement. Credit was givento 174th Awn Co. Is lAeuagagement at last light that evening 174th Avn Coengaged and killed 4 more WYA at BS634584. Three days later 1/1-20 mi and1lth Bde Awn t,,vuad up to kill 6 VC at BS813412. They also detaimed I in-dividual and captured 1 individual weapon. There were no friendly casualties.On 4 June 1/6-11 Arty killed 15 VC when they caught an unknown sized tnmyforce at 1T241221. Gunsbips continued to punish the emay a the 174th AwnCo killed 15 WA is the vicinity of 3S63560 while supporting .AM~ groundtroops on the afteroon of 4 Jone through the morning of 5 Jm. C/3-18 Artyaccouatemd for 15 VC D at 15605497 on 5 June. 174th Awn Co struck again thenext day killing 15 WA at N5608588. on 8 June B/6-11 Arty wiped out a 5 nanNVA patrol at 3i743678. 1/3-1 found a weapons cache at 12513705 two dayslater and captured 7 individual wepons. Ou 19 Jum A/4-3 luf triggered 3successful mbushes in the vicinity of 36740300 which resulted in 4 WA [IAand 2 £ndilual eapous captured. On 22 Jun 31/4-21 1sf dctonated a un-known type of boobytrap at 38652381. Results were 3 US KA and 2 US VIA(Z).Boobytraps continued to take their toll as D/4-21 luf had 5 US WIA(R) at BS769313 on 26 June, On 2 July 1/1-2U luf suffered 6 US UIA(Z) and 2 US WIL(H)when they detonated 3 boobytraps in quick sccession in the vicinity of 3S710569. On 6 July an E/I ay vACA detonated an unknown type of nine at BS543774. US caalties were 1 [IA and 4 VIA((). On 12 July D/1-20 lnf on-bushed and killed 4 VC at 38746571, capturing 1 individual weapon. Thenext evening R/1-20 ambushed 5 or 6 VC at 3S776379, killing 4 VC and cap-turing 2 individual weapons. On 17 July E/1 Caw detonated a 250 lb bosnat BS513787. There were 4 US [IA and 11 US VIA(E). The next day D/4-3luf ambushed as unknoa sized enemy force at B8623522 with 3 WA [IA and3 individual weapos captured. On 22 July B/1-20 1sf suffered 4 US IZA(1)end 1 US VIAO0) in a night engagement at BS750630. Known enem losses were1 VC IA and 1 individual wear.in captured. The next day 4-21 IW! Bu'sEcon Platoon trapped and killed 5 VC at 138314. 1 individual Weapon wascaptured. Three days later 1/3-1 laf engaged end killed 3 VC at 1S510751,capturing 3 individual weapons. On 31 July 1/4-21 mif, viciity 1S908321,detonated a boobytrap consisting of 2 heand grenades resulting in 5 US rIA(E).Later, A/3-1 Li, vicinity BS447j43, was hit by a comand detonated 155mround resulting in 5 US 11r.(). Rsults for Operation Iroa Mountain duringthe reporting period were:

3 A 525 =A240 V7A(3) 96 P3o1 [IA45 111(H) 2 DZT

15 1W/VC4 1V/IIA2 KTI/VC

245 CIV DRY130 IN CIV150 'IC

31 7 Cl

CONFIDENTIAL

IVDP.-HL U1NIX-I k 0 August 125/CSUWT $Operational Raport-Lessors L w-mod, am, ical DiVision, Period

biding 32. July 19'70 j RS OMRO-65 (R2) (U)

(5) Operation Pemsylvania Square comnemced 291200 hours June 1970as 1-1 0ae, With 7/17 Gay attached, assumed responsibility for the opezterrain in the northeiatern p-rtion of the Aserical ti ivision AD, Thataft rnon A/I-i Cay engaged 8 VC at BT216246, killing 5 of th: enemand detaining one. Two individual and 1 crew served weapons were cap-tured. Ot 2 July mortars from Z/2-1 ZW, firing in ' port of PY pla-toon 135, e.liminated a 6 man VC unit at Tl0470. h's reported1 lVC. Later that morning an ACAV from F/I Cay c %tte a 250 lbbomb at BT220161. The vehicle was destroyed and tL ware 5 US KIIand I US WIA(Z). On.8 July the 71st Avn Co killed 3 . at BT210171shortly after first lighb. They returned to the area t t afternoonand accounted for 9 more NVA. A/i-I Gay captured 3 NVA wounded by 71stAvn at BTI13322. 3 individual weapons were also captured. On 15 JulyB/i-l Ca received 1 RP round and small arms fire. The cavalrymer re-turned fire, killing 2 VC and capturing 1 individual weapon and 1 crew

served weapon, US losses were 2 WIA(Ej. On 22 July A/1 Gay detonateda nitro starch mine at BT209200 and suffered 5 US IIA(9). Results forOperation Pamnnylvania Square during the reporting period wares

8 KIA 4 KIA42 UIA(I) 1 DET

initiate

6 CIV DET11 IN CIV

2 GSWC

(6) Operation Elk Canyon was initiated at 121200 hours July 1970with the mission of interdicting enemy lines of comunication and supplylines to disrupt his logistics system. The initial phases of theoperation began when the 6th ARVN Regiment and 2-1 Inf k seized the oldSpecial Forces camp at Kham Duo as a logistics and fire support base.Contact has bea light and scattered. On 18 July, B/2-1 Inf found 4 VCkilled by gunships from 71st Avn Co. The infantrymen captured 2 indivi-dual weapons and 1 crew served weapon . On 30 July 1/2-1 Inf engaged anunknown si$edneu force at 2B078998. The results of the contact were 4VC ZIA, 1 US ZIA, and 1 US WIA(E), Total results for Operation Elk Canyonfor the reporting period weres

FEND N

1 hIA 29 ElA29 WIA(Z) 17 IWC

3 WIA(M) 6 CSWC

32Co IFItx£fTIFiL

CO NFNI F IA LA'VD-HL 10 August 1970SJICT: Operational Reeort-smm Learned, Am aical Division, Period

fl.ding 31 July 1970, RCS CSRFL-65 (32) (U)

2. () Plans

a. The following operation plans and orders were in effet or wereinitiated diwng this reporting period.

(1) OPORD 1-70 and OPORD 3-70 superseded OPORD 3-69 and OPORD 5-69respectively. OPOPD 4-70 (Elk Canyon) was published on 9 July 190.

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley - Relief/Reinforeement of CIDM Camps),OPLAN 8-69 (Noncombatant Eiergency.Relocation and Evacuation), OPLAN 3.1-69OPLAN 12-69 (Golden Valley Rehearsal), OPLAN 13-69 (hapid Reaction),OPLAN 14-69, OPLAN 1-0 (Security for High Ranking Officials), OPLAN 3.-70, (Defense of Major Cities), OPLAN 7-70 (Golden Fleece), and OPIAW 20-70 remained in effect as published contingency plana. OPLAN 9-69 (NaturalDisaster Relief) was superseded by OPLAN 17-70 (Thoon/Tropical Storm Con-tingency Plan) on 31 July 1970.

(3) Numerous Fragmentary Orders applicable to Operationa FREERICK HILL,GENVA PARK, NANTUCKET BEACH, IRON MOUNTAIN and 'MSYL70TA SQUARE have beenpubli shed .

b. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Progrz7 'CUPP) continued,.mir reports were submitted to XXIV Corps as required.

3. (U) Organization

a. Effective 7 May 1970, the 3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery, pre-viously attached to the Aerical Division, was released from attachment andreturned to the control of their parent unit, Battery G, 29th Artillery.

b. Effective 29 3ue 1970, Troop F, 17th Cavalry was relieved from at-tacbment to the 196th Infantry Brigade and attached to the lot Squadron,1st Cavalry for Operation Pennsylvania Square.

4. (0) Training

a. The Anerical Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals throughthe grade of 03 who are assigned or attached to the divivion. During the

reporting period, 67 courses were completed for 4945 personnel.

b. The Americal Combat Center completed 2 Combat Leadership Coursesfor 85 students and two Support Leadership Courses for W8 students.

c. 2 tnit Reconnaissance Coursos were completed, graduating 82 per-

33

CON FI ENTI L

CoNFt~EITIAL10 August 1970SWMj: Opratioal taport-Lessone Loarse, Anrica1 DIVUun Period

Zeding 31 July 1970, RLCZ CSM0--65 (32) (V)

d. The Divisios Sniper School graduated two classes totalling 43students.

a. Training of Territorial Fores junior offleers contined. The31/PFl adasrshi mad Orientation Course wam modifiled on 10 Tms 1970to incorporate 57 hous of artillery forward observer training. Themodified course is amtitled the I Leadership and Forward Obse rCuse to reflect the changed emhasis of the course. During the re-porting period, a total of 117 31/17 junior officers completed thecours.

f. The Americal Combat Center contisioed support of a ine: adBoobytrep Mubilet Training Teom that conducted classes on counteringemnmy nines and boobytrapa for the renming units of the division thathad not received previous training.

g. The 16th Combat Aviation Group conducted C1.-47 Sling Load classesduring the mouth of July for 91 supply personnel.

ik. Instructors from the Divisiou~ Siniper School conducted markwsnshiprefresher training for elements of the 11th, 196th a"d 198th hIn 3dets andthe division's aero rifle, platoons. A total of 665 personnel received this

L.The Amrical Uupport Command continued to conduct a monthly PL1 Clerks

thsCourse rall elements of the division. A total of 119 personnel attended

J. Amrical Division Artillery conducted 3 classes in Advanced Fire Direc-

tion Techniques for Division Artillery personnel.

5. (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period 1 May through 31 July 1970, chs Americal Divisionesiployed. 794 close air support (CAS) missions and 1057 Combat Sky Spot (CSS)missions for a total of 1,851 missions using 2,226 serties. This Is & slightincrease fvoin the 2,146 aircraft sorties flown the previu quarter.

(1) CSS missions . Combat Sky Spots totaled 1,057 missions with 725 sor-tie during the reporting period as comared vith 1,264 missions using 943sorties in the previous quarter. The VWA flew 16 uissions using 13 sorties;The 1= flaw 21 missions using 13 sorties; and the VW flow 1,020 missionsusing 680 sorties in support of Amrical Division.

(2) CAB', Lane. A total of 794 close air support missions were flownusing 1,051 wrtles. This is a olLft incroeee from the previoes quarter is

CL~W1NTI34

r-

AVD-4LCONFftY7NTIiLAV- -RL10 Au gust 1970

SUBJECT: Operational bport--Lessons Learned, merical Divihion, Period&Aing 31July 970, RCSCSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

which 594 CAS mLissons using 1,023 sorties were flotn. The increase canbe attributed to the increase of USAF, Vietnamese Air Force (VNAY), andUSN missions during the quarter. The USAF flew 185 missions uain 361sorties, an increase of 105 missions. YNAF flew 34 missions using 66sorties in support of Americal Division, an increase of 22 missions. USKCaircraft flew 552 missions using 1,020 sorties.

(3) Ordnance expended. Total ordnance expended by GAS and CSS missionsduring the reporting period was 6,784 tons of bombs. This is an increaseof 1,234 tons over the last reporting period. 300 tons of rApalm and 226rockets were used, a decrease of two tons of napalm and 404 rockets. Thesharp decrease in rocket expenditures can be attributed to increased con-trol on their use by nASC.

b. Arclight strikes were placed on three target boxes using nine air-craft sorties with a total of 243 tons of bombs dropped. These strikeswere employed against enemy base camps, staging areas and logistic com-plexes to disrupt command and control, training and resupply activities.

c. Bomb damage assessments made by Forward Air Controllers (FAC's)during the period related the following: 442 structures destroyed, 115structures damaged, 155 secondary explosions, 233 secondary and sustainedfires, IL. fighting positions and spider holes destroyed, 50 tunn sdestroyed, 19 AA/AW and mortar positions destroyed, 2 caves collapsed and64 eneay killed by air strikes (KBAS).

35t CeON FItE'NTI kL

CONFID tENTIALAVDF-HI 10 August 1970SUBJEuTr: Operational Deprt-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

nding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFCR-65 (R2)

6. (C) Artillery

a. On 27 May 3x155 howitzers of B [> ry, 3d Bn, 16th Artillery weremoved from TIN PHUOC to NEW HAU Duc (BTO70062) in reaction to a buildupof enemy structures and forces in an area west-southwest of HAU DUC.Between 27 May and 3 June, a total of 1102 missions were fired, expending3195 rounds, resulting in 28 KBA's, 7 PUBA's, 2, structures destroyed, 24structures damaged, one concrete buildiag damaged, four bunkers destroyed,four bunkers damaged and four secondary explosions. On 3 Jte the opera-tion ceased to be classified an artillery raid, however, the howitzersremained to support CIDG forces operating west and northwest of HAU DUC.

b. During the period the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery remained indirect support of the 196th Infantry Brigade in the FREERICK HILL andILK CANYON areas of operation, rendering support initially from LZ HAWKHILL (BT226319). On 3 July the battalion fire direction center moved toLZ WEST (AT990250) for a more centralized location.

(1) A/3-82 initially supported from HAWK HILL. On .4 June, threehowitzers moved to LZ WEST to increase fire support available to elementsof 196th Bde in contact from HIEP DUC east. On 26 Jume, these same howit-zers moved from HAWK HILL to TAM KY (BT301188) to provide support for 1stSquadron, 1st Cay in operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE.

(2) B/3-82 remained at LZ CENTER (BT050250) providing support to 4thBn, 31st Inf. On 23 May, 3x105 howitzers were moved from LZ CENTE to LZWEST (AT990250) to provide complete coverage to the area of operations of4-31 Infantry. As contact in the area increased, on 14 Jume the battery wasconsolidated on LZ CENTER and support rendered on LZ WEST with howitzersfrom A Btry. On 18 June, three howitzers were moved to LZ PREP (ATO07148)in support of operations by 2-1 and 3-1 Inf. At present the battery remainssplit with three howitzers on LZ CENTER and three on LZ ?- P.

(3) C/3-82 continued to support the 4th Bn, 31st Inf from LZ SIBERIA(AT903232). On 23 June, one howitzer was moved to LZ PREP and temporarilyattached to B Btry for additional support. On 25 July, two howitzers weremoved to LZ MEMION (AT80(I84) in support of elements of 4-31 Inf. At pre-sent the battery remains split with three howitzers at LZ SIBERIA, two atLZ M1LC and one at LZ PREP.

(4) B/1-14 Arty remained attached to 3d Bn, 82d Arty and initiallyprovided support to ist Bn, 46th Inf from LZ PROFESSIONAL (BT173076). On20 June the battery moved to HILL 482(AT875175) in support of 3d Bn, 1stInf in operations south of HILL 482 and returned to PROFESSIONAL on 2 Julyat termination of operation. On 12 July the battery's four howitzers weremoved to KHA. DUC (ZCOC8Oe2) to suriort 2d Bn, 1st Inf and elements of Lth

36

CONFIbENTIA L

AVDF-HL 10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-essons Learned, Amrical Division, Period

Rding 31 July 1970, RCS CSF -65 (R2)

ARVN Regt, operating in extrem western portion of 19fth A0. At presentthe battery remains at KAM DUC.

c. The Ist Battalion, 14th Artillery remained in direct suppot ofthe 198th Inf Bde in the GENEVA PARK and NANTUCKET BEACH areas of opera-tion. The battalion headquarters and operations center remained at LZBAYONET (BT558003).

(1) A/1-1 4 continued to provide support to lt Bn, 6th Inf from splitpositions. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located on LZBAYONET and four howitzers were located on LZ DCTTI (BS630853).

(2) C/1-14 is located at LZ FAT CITY (BT440077) and provides supportfor 5th Bn, 46th Inf. On 20 June, two howitzers were moved to LZ PRCFESS-ICNAL.to comlete coverage of AO as elements of 3-82 Artillery moved west.These howitzers returned to FAT CITY on 2 July as 3-82 moved back to LZPRCFESSIOIIAL. On 25 June, one howitzer from FAT IYT and two howitzers ofD/1-14 moved to KY TEA (BT316089) in support of elements of 5-46 Infantryoperating west-southwest. On 3 July an additional howitzer was moved fromFAT CITY to KY TRA to replace one of the howitzers of D/1-14 which movedback to LZ STINSON. On 20 July, the D Btry howitzer was returned to LZSTINSON, and replaced by another howitzer from FAT CiTY. ftesently thebattery remains split with three howitzers at FAT CITY and three at KY TIA.

(3) D/l-14 continued to provide support for lot Bn, 52d Inf from LZSTINSCN (BS539824). On 24 May, two howitzers were moved to TA B(CG(BS343883) to support road clearing operations and provide convoy coverage.On 6 June, two additional howitzers were moved to TZA WDNG to support opera-tions of elements of 1-52 Irif south of TRA BONG. At end of operation on 14June, all four howitzers returned to LZ STINSGN. On 25 Jue, two howitzerswere moved to KY TRA (BT316089) to aid C/1-14 in support of 5-46 Inf. On3 July one of the howitzers was replaced by C Battery and returned to LZSTINSON and the last howitzer returned on 20 July. Gi 30 July, three howit-zers were moved to CHIPPEWA (B3485967) in support of operations by elemntsof 1-52 Inf. At present the battery is split with three howitzers at 1ZSTINSON and three at CHIPPEWA.

d. The 6th Bn llth Arty continued direct support to the l1th Bde from. BRONCO (BSe1239b).

(1) A/6-11 provided direct support to 4th Bn, 21st Inf from LZ DEBBIE(BS869319). Between 8 June and 28 June, two howitzers were moved to CHARLIEBR(M (BS928220) to support pacification operations in the vicinity. Atpresent the battery is split with four howitzers at DI IX and two at CHARLIEBROWN.

(2) B/6-11 remained at SAN JUAN HILL (ES634380) providing support to

37

CONFIBENTI A L

7- P

UNT

AVDF-HI.c D FL NIL 10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Ending 31 July 19-0, RCS csFai-5 (R2)

4th Bn, 3d Inf. From 28 May to 3 Jul,;t, two howitzers were moved to MINHLING in support of orerations to west southwest. On 30 June, four howit-zers were moved to LZ CADET (BS5622445 in support of elements of 4-3 infoperating south, southwest of MINH LONG. Weapons returned to SAN JUAN HILLon 6 July upon termination of operation. On 16 July, two howitzers wereagain moved to KM LCtG and supported operations until 27 July at whichtim the howitzers returned to SAN JUAN HILL.

(3) C/b-I ixov;iad tupport L 1st Bn, 20th inf from LZ BRONCO(BS812396). On 1 May, two howitzers returned to BRONCO from LZ DRACON(B8375255). From 14 May to 8 June, two howitzers returned to LZ DRAGON insupport of land clearing operations by 26th Engineers. These same howitzersmoved to 1Z SNOOP! (BS708610) on 8 June for a two-day operation by 1-20 Infin a land clearing operation. On 21 June the howitzers again moved to LZSNOOFY as land clearing operations moved north. At present the battery issplit with four howitzers at LZ BRONCO and two at LZ SNOOP!.

(4) D/6-11 provided support to 3d Bn, 1st Inf from split locationswith Hq and four howitzers at HILL 411 (BS539731) and two howitzers at NGHIAHAhH (BS618642). On 13 May support on NGHIA HANH was increased by the move-ment of an additional howitzer from HILL 411. On 26 May the three howitzersat NGHIA HANH returned to HILL 411 as enemy activity in the area decreased.On I June, four howitzers were moved to BS625275 in support of elements of3-1 Inf operating east, southeast of BA TO. Howitzers returned to HILL 41 1on 4 June as operations ended. From 2 1ly to 16 July, two howitzers againwere emplaced at NGIA HANH to support 3-1 Inf and increase fire power offorces protecting the city. At present the entire battery is located atHILL 411.

e. The Ist Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support rein-forcing fires for the southern half of the AO, IRON MOUNTAIN, NANTUCKETBEACH and a portio:. of GEEVA PARK AO's. In addition, late in the report-ing period, weapons were moved to provide reinforcing fires for ELK CANYCNAO. The battalion headquarters and operations center is located at HURRI-cANI (BT515040).

(1) A/1-82 Artillery initially reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artilleryfrom LZ DCTTIE (BS680853) with 4x155's and ARTILLET HILL (BT515040) withtwo howitzers. On 12 July the two howitzers from ARTI.I.ERY HILL and onefrom LZ DO'TIX were movd to KHJM DUC (ZC007082) reinforcing fires of B/1-14Artillery.

(2) B/1-82 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 6-11th Artillerywith 4x155 howitzers on LZ SNOOPY (BS708610) and 2x155 howitzers on LZSTINSON (BS539824).

(3) C/1-82 Artillery continue ielivery of reinforcirg fires to 6-11

38C6NF bENTIAL

AVDF-HL 10 August tPL 0SUBJECTi Operational Report-Le~ssons Learned, America! Division Period

Ending 31 July 1970, RC CSFM-65 (R2)

Atillery from LZ LIZ (BS75732) and LZ DEBBIE (BS869319).

(4) D/1-82 Artillery (8-inch) provided support to both 1-14 Artilleryand 6-11th Artillery from LZ DOTTIE (PS630853) and LZ BRONCO (BS812396).

f. 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided general support reinforcingfires in GENEVA PARK and FREDERICK AKLL AO's. In early June, C Btry wasplaced in direct supTort of Ist Squadron, ist Cavalry in ?=WYLVANIA SMUARSAO. The battalion headouarters and operations center is located at ARTILFRYHILL (BT515040).

(1) A/3-16 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 3-82 Artillery.Initially the battery headquarters and three howitzers were located at HAWKHILL (BT224311) and the remaining three howitzers on LZ WEST (AT990250). On7 July, one howitzer was moved from HAWK HILL to TAM KY (ET301188) in con-junction with move by C Btry to suprort operation by 1-1 Cay. On 24 Julythis howitzer moved to FAT CITY (BT44C077) continuing support of 1-1 Cav.At present the battery has two howitzers on HAWK HILL, three on VEST and oneon FAT CITY.

(2) B/3-16 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 3-82 Arti2.ery fromTIEN PHUOC (BT102140). At start of operation period, two howitzers werelocated at NEW HAU DUC (BT070062). They returned to TIEN PHUOC on 15 May asthe operation ended. On 27 May, three howitzers were moved back to NEW HAUDUC to conduct an artillery raid and supf.ort CIDG operations in area. On 4June, one howitzer returned to TIM PHUOC as fire support requirements werereduced. On 7 June the base was closed and all howitzers returned to TIENPHUOC. On 24 June, three howitzei s were Vgain moved to NEW HAU DUO (BT050046) reinforcing fires of B/3-82 Artillery. At present the .battery is splitwith +4-ee howitzers each at TIEN PHUOC and NEW HAU DUC.

(3) C/3-16 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 1-11 Arty from FAT

CITY (BT440077). On 15 May, two howitzers returned to FAT CITY from NEW HAUDUC as operation, which started during last reporting period, ended. On 4June, two howitzers moved to LZ SIBERIA (AT903232) to reinforce fires of C/3-82and returned to FAT CITY as operation ended on 6 June. Again on 19 June,SIBRI7A was again without 155 support as two howitzers moved to MARY ANN (BT102140) to increase support at that location. On 7 July, one howitzer wasmoved from FAT CITY to TAM KY (BT301188) with one howitzer from A Btry fordirect support of 1-1 Cav. On 24 July. one howit%r from TIEN PHUOC and onefram TAM KY (BT301188) were moved to SIBERIA reinforcing fires of C/3-82.At present the battery headquarters and two howitzers are at FAT CITY, two atSIBERIA and two at MARY ANN.

g. 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general surport fires for theAmerical TAOI, from its headquarters and operation center located at ARTILLERY

CfAc Pi/ 5NTt A L

(L)NFIDEN~TIA~LAVD?-In 20 Augut 1970S~,~U.C Operational Riport-leeeona Learned, Americal Division, feriod

Eding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (2)

HMl (BT515040).

(1) A/3-18 Artillery supported operations in the 198th Brigade AC froi;LZ CINDY (BS343882) during the period. It also provided direct suprort toStecial Forces/CIDO operations conducted in and around TRA BONG and HA THANH.

(2) B/3-18 Artillery remained at TIEN PHUOC (BTl02140) supyorting opera-Lions in the 196th Brigade AO. It also provided support to Special Forcesoperations in the TIMh PHUOC, HAU DUC areas and responded to numerous sensormissions in the area.

(3) C/3-18 Artillery continued to support the llth Brigade AO from LZCRtNCH (B534515) and provided support to Special Forces/CIDG operations inthe GIA VUC, BA TO, and KINH LONG areas.

h. Ammunition expenditures by caliber for the period 1 May to 31 July1970 were:

105m 312,960155= 130,7338-in 24,062175= 12,580

TOTAL 480,335

i. Countermortar Radar Detachment

(1) The 251st FA Detachment (CM Radar) remained located at OP 1 (BS518778) where it covered LZ STINSON and FSB 411. The detachment also parti-cipated in registration for artillery units that were within range.

(2) The 252d FA Detachment (CM Radar) remained in operation at

ARTILLERY HILL (BT51040) with primary sector of scan to the west into thenorthern rocket pocket. The radar assisted artillery units located in thearea to fire precision registrations.

J. Ground Surveillance Radar Detachment.

(1) The organic AN/TPS-25 radar continued surveillance from OP 1(BS 51c778) with primary sector of scan to the west over the SONG TRA KHUERIVER. On 30 July the radar was moved to CHIPPEWA (BS489967) where itssector of scan is to the south over the TRA BONG RIVMR.

(2) The 271st FA Detachment (Radar) remained at OP 3 (BS754421). Itsprimary sector of search was west covering the primary infiltration routesinto districts of MC DU and DUl PHO.

40

4ZONFI DENTIAL

ACONFIDENTIALAVDF-HI10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Leesons Learned, Americal Division, Feriodldina 31 July 1970, RCS CSFR-65 ,(R2)

k. Quad .50 Machineguns.

Eattery 0, 55th Artillery (IG) continues.to be deployed throughout theAiorical Division AO in support of ground defensive plans of fire bases. In

-addition the unit provide& security on all road convoys.

i. Meteorological Stations.

(i) 'During ttie period the 3-18 Artillery meteorological section remainedat ART-L-fl ILL (BS515042) where it provided metro data to the north andcentral coastal a'rea of AO. It so provided weather data to the Air Forceweather unit located at C U rAhe.A o

'(2) The meteorological station of 3-16 Artillery remained at TIEN PHUOC

(BS1O214O) providing metro data to the northwestern portion of the AO.

(3) The 2-11 Artillery meteorological station remained attached to the

6-11 ArtiZlery arn was located at DUC PHO (BSM14382) where it provided metrodata to the southern portion of the AO.

7. (U) Aviation - A separate OELL for Aviation w1.1 be submitted by the16th Combat Aviation Group on 10 August 1970.

8. (C) Chemical. During the period 1 May to 31 July 1970, the DivisionChemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachmentand the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the followir chemical activities&

a. 546 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.

b. 20 EL58 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed in conjunction withAPD missions to initiate enemy movement.

c. 71 API missions were flown.

d. 8 FSB'a were defoliated by ground spray of 1800 gallons of AgentWHITE and 1200 gallons of diesel.

e. 4 ?S's were defoliated by helicopter spray of 1000 gallons of AgentWITE.

f. Approximately 2000 acres of enemy crops were destroyed by helicopterspray of 2200 gallons of Agent BLUE.

;. 268 drums of thickened fuel were dropped on suspected enemy positionsand minefields.

41

CONFROENTIAL

• !

CONFIDENTIALAVDP-HL 10 August 1970SUB : Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Diviuion, Period

hings 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOL.-65 (2) (U)

9. () ginar

a. Activities for the quarter 1 May to 31 July 70 consisted of thedivisional engineer effort being devoted to direct combat support of thedivision, while non-divisional units devoted primary effort to the con-struction of secondary OUCts and operational support construction. Onechange in engineer troop disposition occurred during the reporting periodas MB-7 was redeployed to the United States in June.

b. LM Program. During the reporting period as QL-l neared completionthe majority of engineer effort was shifted to construction of secondaryand 'Farm to Market" roads and to road opening operations to supporttactical convoys.

(i) QL-I

(a) The 26th Mgr Bn continued to provide tactical bridge support forrestoration of QL-1 within the TAOI.

(b) The 39th Magr Bn provided expedient maintenance from the Il Corpsboumdary (B3907150) to Binh Son (BS601920). The Battalion continued con-struction of concrete headwalls on Ql-1 between Bih Son and Due Fho andis currently providing haul support to MB-10 for asphalt overpave operationssouth of Due Pho.

(a) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Seie (MCB-7) performed ex-pedient maintenance from Binh Son to vie LZ BALDY (BT145460) and continuedpaving operations from Tu My (BT213368) to the Ba Ran Bridge (BT102510) untiltheir redeployment in June.

(d) MCB-62 is currently conducting paving not completed by MCB-7. Com-pletion is scheduled for 1 Sep 70.

(e) The 9th Engr Bn (USMC) initiated base course construction of theTam Ky streets 25 Jun 70, in preparation for paving. On 19 July, the re-sponsibility for this project was assumed by MCB-5.

(f) Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 301 (CBMT 301) continued toprovide mineral products for engineer construction throughout the AmericalTAOI.

(2) Secondary LOC's

(a) Due to the increased commitment of engineer effort on the secondaryLOC's, 44 km of th,% total 256 km of road have been completed to prescribea

standw-s. Another 103 mm are under construction as of the md of this re-porting period. Of this, 72 km are to be constructed to single laue allweather, 44 km to minimum all weathe- end 143 km to dry weather standards.

cONIbENTIAL :

I

t1CONFIDENTIAL'

A TDIL-HL 10 Auut 1970

SUBJETs Operational Report-Leaons Learned, Amrioal Division, Period- - aEnding 31 July 1970, RCS OC'0B-65 (12) (U)

(b) The 39th Egr Ba continued to be the primary unIt committed toupgrade of seeondary LOCa1, with significant contributions being ade bythe 26th lgr Bn, the 103d ARVN Eagr Bn and the Ministry of Public Works,Quang Ngai Province.

a. Land Clearing.

(1) On 12 May 70 iand clearing operations began in the eastern portion.f % DLu District to deny cover and concealment to the enem and enhancepacification and subsequent agricultural development of that area. This

ea of 1,668 acres was designated as the Division's first priority. It-%a later increased by 1,O0W acres. Operations in this new area are nearlyonpleted.

I The Division's second and third priority areas were established asthe Bataagan Peninsula in Quang Ngai Province (5,100 acres) and the Pine-apple For- .. a in Quang Tin Province (6,430 acres),

(3) Clearing operations on the Ratangan commenced in 15 June with the39th Land Clearing Piatoon. This element was replaed a 9 Jutly by the59th Land 1iearing Company (,.CC), a 45th &er Gp unit. To date, 3,906 acreshave been cleared. Additional requests for clearing by Quang Ngai Provincehave significantly increased the area to be cleared.

d. Airfield Rehabilitation.

(1) Tien .huoc. This airfield was completed to Type II, C-123 standardso2 24 Jul 70. Durinig rehabilitation the requirements for upgrade were expandedtc include the establishment of a six point refuel facility.

(2) Minh Lone. On 15 Jul 70 repairs were initiated on this airfield toprevAnt clos!- "- are 12% coan]ete -so r Lhe end of this reportingperiod.

(1) SB Construction. During this reporting period seven PSs wereopened Pnd one FSB is currently in the process of being closed. NumerousFSB were upgradAd during this reporting period,

(2) Minesweep Actiities. Transfer of minesveep responsibilities toTerritorial Forces continued during this reporting period as follows:

(a) The .39th MWr n was relieved of mineaweep responsibility for thesection of QL-! from Binh Son to Due Pho by RF/PF units in that area.

(b) "iaLc :-aining programs are being conducted in Duc Pho Districtin QuAng Ngai Pro'vince and Thang Binh District in Quang Tin Province. ThetrainIng i. ' 'ni con! t!ted by the 26th Engr Rn in an attempt to expeditetransfer of this responsibility.

dON FIDG NIAL

CONFIDENTI.ALAON I -N I 10 August 1970

SUBIJT-" Operational Asport-Lessons Learned. cirioal Division, Period2iding 31 July 1970, RCS CSIOJ-65 "12) (U)

(o) Dry Weather Road Programz

i. The 26th Eagr Pn has completed 14 km of road to date. A total of20 km of road have been started but not completed due to higher prioritycommitments.

2. The following roads are currently under construction:

a. Thanh An Road (BS697633 - BS740665) (70%)

_b. New Hau Duc Road (BT111139 - BT081072) (10%)

The following roads were suspended due to higher priority com-mtaments.

j. HI 531 (BT323219 - BT335270) and (BT332:51 - BT359252)

h. Nghia Ar Dong Road (BS619718 - BS6Zl695,

1. Dong )t Road (BS695637 - BS723654)

d. Route 527, QL-1 to LZ STINSON (BS635801 - BS536825)

The following roads were completed:

, -1 to Binh Yen Nol, north of LZ GATOR (BS572973 - B$583978)

b. Hal Mon Road (BS806380 - BS832398)

a. V Trang Road, south of Due Pho (BS836333 - BS833351)

d. An Phong Road (BS719594 - BS722594)

(d) FM Construction:

1. During the reporting period seven FSBa were opened. Work coa-sisted of clearing helipads and fields of fire, digging emplacements andclearing mines and boobytraps. The majority of the clearing was ac-complished by the use of demolitions and organic airmobile dozers. Thefollowing FSBs were opened:

a. NUI P1o TINH (BS64s936)

. PLEASANTVTLL8 (BT051047) 9 Jun 70.

C. MARY AN (AS962998) 2D Ju 70.

. LZ CADET (BS5624.4) 5 Jul 70.

CONF/TENTIA L

ONF.IDENTIA L.AVDCL-HL 10 August 1970

SUBJ.TTI Operational Report-Lessons Learned, AMerical Division, Period

khding 31 July 1970, RCS CSPFOR-65 (R2) (U)

. LLA (YC98S094) 12 Jul 70.

L. DAK ROSE (YB864989) 10 Jul 70.

. WLLON (A805184) 25 ai 70.

2, FSB PROFESSIONAL (BSI 176) is presently being closed.

(e) Operation Elk Canyc

I The battalion, supp -ted by men and equipment from MX0-62, beganoperations to reopen Kham Lac Airfield in support of the above operation.Support from MB-62 consisted of the following airmobile equipment withoperators: three dump trucs, two Case 450 dozers, one asphalt dis-tributor, one vibratory roller, two front loader/backhoes, two graders andthree hand tampers. Rehabilitation of the airfield and facilities con-sisted of clearing ordnance and debris, repair of craters using soil-cementstabilization, repair of the off-load area and the building of berms toprotect fuel bladders. A "hook-out" pad was cnstructed adjacent to theoff-load area.

2. In addition to airfield rehabilitation, combat engineer supportwas provided to the 2-1st Inf Rn.

J. One Case 450 dozer was made available to ARVW personnel for theestablishment of LZ KAIA and LZ DAK ROSE.

(f) Relocation. The battalion was relocated from the old MAG 12area (BT530772) to Camp Shields (BT549059) formally occupied by MCB-7.B Company moved from FSE BAYONET to join HHC, D and E Companies in thenew area. The move began on 20 Jul 70 and was completed on 29 Jul ?0.

(g) The battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting periodwas as follows:

. HHC B Co, D Co, E Co - ChuLai.

2. A Co - FSB HAWK HILL.

. CCo -FSB BRONCO.

(2) 39th Engineer Battaliong

(a) WC Upgrade.

1. The primary efforts of the battalion were concentrated on theupgrade of LOC's. The majority of this effort was committed to LOC'.

CONFIDENTIAL I

CONFIDEN TIA.eAVDY-M 10 August 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Divison, Period11din 31 July 1970, RCS CSF0O--65 (R2) (U)

(3) Road Openig Operations. During this period HL 529 from Binh Son tofra Bang was opened for four Division convoys and HL 533 from Tam Ky to TienPhmoe was opened to support fifteen convoys.

f. Engineer operations in the Americal TAOI.

(1) 26th Egineer Battalion (Combat).

(a) Land Clearing:

;. Mo Due District, Phase I. On 14 May 70, the 26th Engineer LandClearing Platoon initiated clearing operations vic BS7653. This platoonwas composed of six DE tractors, two CEV and one M548 cargo carrier. Theoperation was completed on 6 Jul 70. The results were 1,668 acres cleared,64 mines and boobytraps destroyed, 125 bunkers destroyed, 135 linear metersof tunnel and 67 fighting positions found and destroyed. In addition, 64large caliber and 81 small caliber rounds were found. Casualties includedtwenty-four US VIA, four ARVN WIA, two US KIA end two ARVN KIA. Therewere three DE tractors destroyed by mines.

2_ Mo Due District, Phase II. On 16 Jul 70 the 26th Rgr LCP joined withthe 39th Engr LCP to form a Provisional Company to conduct clearing operations.This company consisted of eleven D7E tractors, one CEV and one M548 cargocarrier. To date 876 acres have been cleared, 17 mines and boobytraps,101 bunkers and 75 linear meters of tunnels have been found and destroyed.Casualties to date include two US WIA and two ARVN VIA. One DE tractorwas damaged by a mine.

(b) Road Openings.

i. HL 529. During this reporting period the Battalion conducted fourroad opening operations from Binh Son to Tra Bong to support Division con.-voys. During these operations, 282' of 36" CN were installed, ten fores-ere constructed or upgraded and 2.5 km of road were upgraded. One SheridanAR/AAV, one ACAV and one CEV deton-ted mines and were declared combat losses.Fifteen mines and boobytraps were found and destroyed. Casualties for theoperation included .." - ... -S

2. HL 533. The battalion opened this road for Division convoys fifteentimes during this reporting period. Results of these operations were thirty-seven mines and booby-traps found and destroyed, twelve culverts and thirteen un-passable sections of the road repaired. Three 5 ton dump trucksone ACAV, one AVLB, one 25 ton trailer and one 5 ton cargo vehicle t ...mines on the road. All the above vehicles were combat losses. Eleven USWIA r:.:-tlted from the operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL- O t a pr e n10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report -Lessons Learned, Americal Division, PeriodEnding 31 July 1970, RCS CSOR.-65 (32) (U)

on the Batangan Peninsula, HL 521, HL 523, HL 524, HL 525 and the Tien PhuoeRoad (HL 533).

A. A total of 117 kilometers were tasked to the Battalion; 30 kilometerswere completed this reporting period and another 5Z kilometers are currentlyunder construction.

(b) Maintenance and Upgrade of QL-l.

1 480' steel stringer, concrete slab bridge across the Song Ve Riverwas completed this reporting period. The bridge was officially accepted byGVN at ceremonies on 31 Jul 70.

2.. A othole repair project was completed south of Due Pho on QL-l.

a. The battalion is currently providing haul support to MB-10 for

overpave operations on QL-l between Due Pho and LZ DEBBIE.

(c) Land Clearing Operations,

j. The 39th gr Land Clearing Platoon (LCP), attached to the 9th EngrBn (USMC) Provisional Company returned from the Barrier Island II Operationon 24 May 70. A total of 10,043 acres were cleared during this Operation.

a. On 15 May 70 the 39th Engr LCP commenced clearing operations in theoriginal Batangan area. Prior to their replacement by the 59th LCG on 9Jul 70, they cleared 971 acres, found and destroyed 131 bunkers, 230linear meters of tunnel and 15 mines and boobytraps. Friendly casualtiesincluded one US KIA and seven US WIA. 1hemy casualties included one KIAand two WIA.

3 Since 9 Jul 70 the 59th LCC has cleared 2,935 acres, found anddestroyed 78 bunkers, 1,30 linear meters of tunnels and 40 mines andboobytraps. Casualties as of the end of this reporting period includeone US KIA when a dozer overturned, nine US WIA and one RF 111.

(d) Airfield and Helipad Rehabilitation.

*. The airfield at Tien Phuoc was upgraded to include reworking ofthe subgrade and the placement and anti-skid painting of new matting.

a. The airfield at Minh Long is currently being repaired to includepartial replacement of the existing matting.

3. The 176th Aviation Helipad was rehabilitated. This includedstabilization of the subgrade and placement of new matting.

(e) Vertical Construction.

CONFIDENTIAL .

AVD?-M CONFIDENTIAL 19SUEJW : Oporational Report-.Lessons Learned, Amrical Division, Period

L B44 a 31 JUly 197W, RCS C.3 5.-6 (R2) (u)

L. The battalion completed repairs for the hospital roof and began con-8tructlon of a new mesa hall for tha 23d ed B at FSB BRONCO.

. Support was provided the Americal Division with construction of gun-pads at TO8 FAT CITY, Tien Phuoc, Minh Long and Chu Lai.

(f) tinesweep Actities.

i. A/39th &!gr B mineawept OL-l from the Song Ve BrIdge (BS696635) toDue Pho (BS809378) until 1 Jul 70.

2. On 1 Jun 70, a training program was begum, with the 39th Engr Bnand RF/PF forces conducting joint operations.

.2 On 1 Jul ?0, mineswaep responsibilities from Due Pho to Mo Duc werea.mem d by territorial forces. On 27 Jul 70 minesweep responsibilities fromHo Dur to the Song Ve Bridge were asused by territorial forces.

. The 39th Eagr En presently has no minesweep responsibilities on QL-l.

(g) The battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period wasas follows.

. HHC, A Co, C Ca, 137 (LE), 522 L2B) - Chu Lal.

2. B Co - LZ DO TIE.

SD Co - Tan Ky.

59th LOC - Batangan Peninsula.

(3) Mobile Construction Battalion Seven (MCB-7).

(a) Constr iction operations during tkis period consisted of:

j. Taxiway and runway shoulder repairs at Chu Lai West.

. epair of bridge at BT226347 damaged by enemy activity on 9 May 70.

Repair of the south abutment and decking on the bridge at BS593933

on QL-l.

j, Water well installation at FSB 411 and FSB LIZ.

j. Wring of the MACV compound and PSB Detention Center in Quang NgaiCity.

". Construction of Autodin facilities at Chu Lai Airbase.

2. Constrniction of three LST ramps at the Chu Lai Sand Ramp.

(b) On 25 Jun 70 the battalion completed phased redeployment to CONUS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALV AVW-M 10 AWUst 1970

SUBJECT- Operational bPOrt-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, PeriodE.dir).. 31 July 1970, RCS CSoR--65 (R2) (U)

E. Logistics.

1. (U) General: The period 1 May 1970 - 31 July 1971- was highlighted bythe support realigrnent, increased e.mpha-ts on tactical resupply by convoyand fixed-wing aircraft, continued reductions of excesses and an improvedmairt -nance post_,re.

2. (U) Services Division: The misaions of Facilities Engineering and High

Voltage Power were assumed by contractors on I July 1970.

3. (U) Supply Uivision: a. Tactical resupply of forward units with in-creased emphasis on the use of roads and fixed-wirg aircraft in-tead ofrotary wing aircraft highlights the supply activity during the quarter.Additional truck assets have been requested and 500 gallon collapsible drumsremain a critical item in the resuprly of JP-4.

b. The US Navy iFMART terminated operations on 24+ May 1970. The

facility was reopened on I June 1970 as the Chu Lai Self-Service SupplyCenter (SSSC) operated by the 226th Supply and Service Company, 80th GeneralSupport Group, Da Nang Support Co=.and. Initial support from the SSC has beensomewhat limited. The installment of initial stockage levels has been restrictedand, to date, some items cited on the AS. are not available in the quantitiesrequired.

c. The loss of N!SAD, Chu Lai and Da Nang as a source of Class IV and asa back-up source for conmn use Class II has had a detrimental effect on supply

support. This and the resultant overload in the Da Mang Depot has causeddemand satisfaction to fall from 57 to 53 per cent and has increased the OST(Order Sip Time) for these items.

d. A review of the ASL of the 23d Lurply and Transportation Battalion wasconducted to deterrine which iteias were no lorger demand supported and toidentiy duplicate items or those for w.ich suitable substitutes are available.These itens and thos trans-ferred to the Self-Service Supply Certer were dropedfrom the ASL which reduced the number of 1ines from 1738 to 1239.

e. The reduction in nuzber of lines on the A5 and continted efforts toidentify excesses resulted in the retrograde of 524 line items valued atVL,155,308.00.

4. (U) Maintenance Division: a. As of 8 May 1970, the 1Wo iftle &chargeProgrzm was corn leted.

b. The A.eric,-I Divisia CMil Teau conducted eight courtesy and ten recrdirsections durirT the quarter. Five units received a satisfactory rating onthe second irspection. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted 677 RoadsideSpot Check Inspectiens durine the quarter.

49

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALA - 10 August 1970SU4'T: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

ftixg 31 July 1970, MS CSO R--65 (R2) (u)

C. As of 31 July 1970, the installation of M13AI Belly Armor Kitswas 90% coMpletc with 122 of 139 kits installed.

A

50

CNFIDE N TAL

CONFIDENTIAL

An-10 AA t 1970

bull 31 J1l7 1970,0 Ra" GC4105 VU (0)F. CLtl ld.ltary Opsiatims

1'. (U) Orga.ztian

ao Maj Jmuti lapbw asemd duties an Deputy 03 an 30 ft 1970, and- 1AJ Gordm V. eDlquist assum dutles " F5! officer, kusteat G05

a 0 br1970.

b. The Friendship Councils easlished by the Axw1e DivUlo G5#the 196th and 198th Infantry Bri:ades for the districts they enompca@amtinv to enhame the civil affairs/civic action program and pzovAoa focal point for discusasim of problems involvia rolatian between

1, GM agwies aind the local populaoe. A 0omwmt itelations Gum-oil was estalihed by the 11th Infantry Brigade an 23 July 1970, withthe prizary pupose of stab' ihl Friendship Goumils vithin te 11th*rJgade area of operato.

2. (U) Oprations

a. On 12 VIy 1970, civil aftairs/civic astion respnaibility for thevillages atwromdig the Chu Lsi lst-l.ation Camasx vas roa2lod toadjust for the redeploymat of certain unit, The sow civic actiap/civil.affairs resposibilitT for villages surounding Chu tal is an follws

(1) Ly Tin District

Xy KMuwg (V) - 26th US

Ky Saab (V) - /46 Int B

Ky Lien (Y) - 5/46 W nt

XY Chanh (T) - MGO 13

Xy Ha (Y) -DIVAVY and CBI4U .301

Sy Ho (V) -DIVART

An Tan Protestant Orpha - 16th CAG

(hu La i CatholU C Orpbanage - Headquarters Coindant

(2) Binh Son "isricr

Binh Th&ag (V) -1/6 Inf Ba

51

CONFIDENTIAL

?ONFIDLNTIAL,lTI-8L 10 August 1970SBTI Operatinal I eporto-am"n .adm., irical Divisiom, Period

31i~ July 1970 am 30&6 a2 ~

Blab Yghia (V) - 1/6 Inf ft

Binh Sa (T) - 1/6 laf 3m

Binh So Catholic Orpbanap - lot CAG

U, RIo* Denilt Th Amorical. Division continue to suppot theprogram to deny vItal resourars to tho onemy. During the reporting period,

405#165 The of rit wef optured.

o. Roe uge% Tft ,ees sill re esent aniaute rblem within the

Amriea Division TAOI; hower s1igniicat prores in beiag4 made I~n

resettling rofugoes as territorial u€it7 IDuring the report-ing period, the 4th, 6th and 9th A Flatoop of the 29th Civil AffairsComay in conjunction with MaCCOWS refuge advisors In Qun Ngai and

Quang Tin, continued to work toward alleviating the refuges problem inthe TAOI. The refuge population in the Amrica Division TAOI numbers

approLimtely 2$,p5 an of 20 June 1970a

db Civil Opratiosa and Rurel Dewvlopment Support (CORDS) material:This office continusd to coordinate the ahipmnt of CORDS material toQusag Igai an Quang Tin during the reporting period.

Health and odical Supplies 19 Palleta

Telphow ?olse 109

3. (a) Civil Affairs Pacification

a.Th Amrlead. Divisiocon€tinues to support the G XI Pacificationand Devlopiant Progrea throughout Qua" Nga and Quang Tin Prov:Lmmeo

b. Progress in the pacification program in the Amrical TAOI duringtereporing periods

(1) Security of populatio (as of 30 Jmo 1970 A# B# and C ststusl)s

(b) Q=4 Ugai 656,174 874

(2) VCI mutrxlis~d (a of 25 July 1970)1

(a) QuangTin 920

%ONF/DENTIAL

* CONFIDENTIALAJD1,l 10 Awgut 1970SUDJ 8Y apweim UpwtmLaame. Zmarmad, Amrisal DYivscus Perio

u .ig 31 July 197a, 05F=M&65 (22) (U)

Mb ~a~a 913

(3) Poples Self Defens ?o-ee (as of 31 July 1970)s

(a) QU3a Tia 84,452 84,135 15,918

(b) Qvag Igal 102,782 85,592 14#414

oa Te hirlcal Divisio Ia ooutinuig itt.s auport of paoifioatiaan develapomnt throu& X= IT.

(1) 196th Bde 43 14,464

(2) 198th Dde 271 10,218

(3) 11th 3. 557 14,42

(4) DrVART 226 6,696

(6) lot GAG 7 1,992

(7) )4G 13 12 29475

(8) 1-1 CAV 946

4. P TOP Activlties (may - July 70)

a, lmaflsts "pzodj by aircraft by una~aps

UAMrE MAY JUNE JULY

CbJsu Hit (Q) 445,000 20000 100$000

Gtiou Ral 6,625,000 9,412,000 16,612,000

fro-OVI 316,000 1,255,000 2p979,000

AntltV/VA (QR) 445,000

Anti-VC/NA 2#996,000 5,295#000 5,584,000

CON FIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAY.lkw 10 Avugat 1970SUI,,, qpw&eftal bptm- m4.e4 , oamod, Amric.a. Divisim Porid

bine N JuVJ7 1970, "(~ =10 (3L2) (0)

hawrds 1,002,000 2,584,000 3,810,000

Resources UeaLal 967,000 1,218,000 7o016,000

prtim IraLul 80uio 1*6029000

be Total lestlet drop masion flom by tie 9th SOS in suWort of thAorical Division.

426 485 1,362

o Total ve .Afro dist-ibutd4s

1,000 2,300 9,200

4. Aerial LUdpeaker targets durinr the periods

Aeial. tape target. 1087 1107 1331

Amril tape tim 181x28 17302 18.10

W17l vae targets 62 84 46

a.rly vowod tim U332 22s24 12s27

Helibarm targets 217 239 451

Beli&oU m tim- 42:24 47,48 90,40

e. Gm ludspeaker brtadoeta,

Mwsa.on 56 60 75

Broad~ Ft how" 15505 149,55 215.40

CONFIDE NTIAL

CONFI DENTIALAU-mU. 10 August 1970SBJUC, Opersaml bport-1sao 1-md, 4.mrzi Diisios Period

&4&4 31 JuL4 1970, 2=8 C70&45 (R2) (U)

f. Vatarbors Loudapeaker broadcast:

Missioca 1 1 2

Broadec"t tim 2:00 2130 6:00

go M'wi missimws oonated during the periods

Nrovis KisGions 2 19 16

movies shown 68 83 63

Iovi. hours 30120 39:00 380

Attndaosm 11 ,080 8,A00 139150

h. Number of Hol Canhs in the Americal Division IL0.

292 168 30

5. (C) a. Recent significant developmants

(1) During the reporting period the Amrial Division P810? program hasooatiainad to expand and emphasise the identification and tawt ing ofspeoific esy units and individuals. G5 has closely integralud the PS!OPplaing with the G2 section, threby capitalizing on eoeny vulnerabilitiesas they develop. Results of this timely exploitation are demonstrated byo@er 100 special leflet reqwsts having been originated by the Division.Ia addition, 1716 special tape broadcasts have been directed againstkown e M units or personalities.

(2) The Division ban placed increased eiphasis on organic belicaotersupport for P6IOP operatims. This organio support provides nightlybroadcasts and leaflet coverage over the entire Aamrlcal TIM. The nightPsO3 v nadlms have provided for timly exploitation of troops in contact, andlo.diate follow up on air and artille. y strikes.

(3) Continued emphasis Is being placed on Hoi Ghanh exploitation. Incoordination with the G2 a ?STOP questioemire was developed for util1sation b.the interrogation tesam now established at the Quang ga i and Qua" Tin

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL 10 August 1970SUBJECT3 Operational Report-ILssons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR=65 (R2) (U)

Provincial Chieu Hoi Center° The questionnaire is designed to detectenemy PSYOP vulnerabilities, identify Key Hoi Chanhsfl and serve as an aidfor evaluating the effectiveness of the Division's PSIOP progrm.

be New PSYOP Campaigns. During the reporting period a special PSYOPCampaign "Operation Family Reunion" was initiated, This special psychologicaloperations campaignis being conducted to persuade family membrs andfriends of the VC to make personalized appeai encouragir the VC to returnto their families and friends and live in peace. Every effort is being ex-pended to have the true relative; friend or sweei;heart record or write thepropaganda a ppeal. Coordination is made w~ith tie Vietnamese InformationService (VIS) to obtain suggested messages and timing as well as appropriatepersons of the correct age and sex for specific family member propaganda appeals.To date there have been 3,,200,000 leaflets printed in support of this campaign.These leaflets represent seven specific appeals by appropriate family members.The Brigades have initiated eight special family reunion leaflets and produced121 personalized broadcast appeals . In addition the district chief of BinhSon district in coordination with the S5 of the 198th Inf Bde, has made plansto develop and employ three Ofamily reunion teamso" The teams consist of rep-resentatives from VISv Chieu Hoi, the National Police, and US/ARVN PSYOP.The teams will be utilized in selected villages for the expressed purpose ofobtaining propagan-d appeals in support of this PSYOP campaign.

co Enemy propaganda. There was no significant increase in enemy propagandaincidents reported during the last quarter There were five enemy loudspeakerbroadcasts, all in Vietnamese and directed primarily toward local PF units.One broadcast was coordinated with a mortar attack on TRA BINH DONG (H) (BS,91837) and was directed at the Civilian population Of the enemy propagandaleaflets reported, two were directed against US Military personnel, and stressedopposition to the war at home as part of their propaganda appeals, and tenwere directed at the Vietnamese people. A chronological listing of the re=ported enemy pi-opaganda incidents is listed in paragraph 6.

6. (C) Enemw Propaganda Incidents.

a. On 142300 May 70, CAP % 3 with PF's heard an enemy loudspeakerbroadcast (BT 336173)o The broadcast was in Vietnamese and told the localFs to Join the VC or die, it also requested the night locations of theCAP teams in that area.

bo On 150430 Hay 70, CAP 3 captured enemy propaganda leafletsfrom a VC KIAo Leaflets were written in Vietnamese and directed towardthe people. Text was do not support the allies0

c. On 20 May 70, Co C, 1=1 Cavj found enemy leaflets in the vicinityof AT 955275. Leaflets were written in Vietnamese and directed at theVietnamese people0 Texts were Anti-GVNo

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDF HL 10 August 1970SUBJECTt Operational Rsport-Iesgons LearnedA orical Division, Period

Rodin 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR65 (R2) (U)

d. On 21 May 70, Co A, 2/1 Inf Bn, 196th Int Bde fomd enemy leafletsin the vicinity of BT 178178. The leaflets were written in English anddirected toward US military personnel. The texts told the US soldiers todemand an end to the war,

6. On 29 May 709 Co C, 3/21 Inf£, 196th Inf Bde, found two enemyleaflets in the vicinity of AT 956228. The leaflets were written inVietnamese and directed at the local populace. The texts were AntiPeoples Self Defense Force (PSDF)o

f. On 022225 Jun 70, 2/1 Inf Bn, at OP #83 heard an enemy loudspeakerbroadcast (BT 239226), Broadcast was in Vietnauese: theme was unknown asartillery was fired at speakers, terminating broadcasto

g. On 042015 Jun 709 PF #178 heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast(BT 209184). The broadcast was in Vietnamese and then was Anti-GVNo

h. On 042015 Jm 70, Co C, 1.2 Inf Bn, 11th Inf Bde, heard loud-speaker broadcast of VC voice*, one male and one femai! in vicinity ofBS 884304, Text of appeal was Anti-GVN telling local populace to returnto the VC.

i. On 051500 Jun 70, Co C, 196th Inf Bde, found an enemy leafletwritten in English and directed toward the US Military personel. The textwas Anti-American and directed the soldier to join the fall offensive athome.

J* On 110600 July, MACV, Duc Pho found enemy leaflets in vicinityof EBS 780437. Leaflet was written in Vietnamese. Leaflets were evacuatedto CDEC before theme co"-id be determined.

k. On 130830 July, CAP 1-4,1, with PFps heard enemy loudspeakerbroadcast (ES 591837), Broadcast was used in coordination with a mortarattack. Broadcast was in Vietnamese and warned the populace to leave thevillage.

lo On 171500 July 70, Co C, 3.1 Inf Bn, 11th Bde, found severalleaflets on a wounded VC nurse captured in action (BS 5671). All of thepropaganda material was written in Vietnamese, The following is adescription of the leaflet text:o

(1) Leaflet #1. "Don't join the PSDF, you will be a puppet of theGVN. If you join the PSDF you will soon be drafted by the GVN, becausewhen the US leaves, the ARVN will need more men,"

5 7

ON FI DEENT)IA L

IFII)ENTIAL-AVDF-4L 10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational ILport-Lessons Learned, Americal Divisirn, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Leaflet #2. "All the people are against the Americans andthe puppets".

(3) Leaflet 3. "Choo!e independence and freedom".

(4) Leaflet #4. "Remove all Americans from Vietnam".

#5) Leaflet #5. Same as #I.

(6) Leaflet #6. Biography of Ho Chi Minh.

(7) Leaflet #7. Biography of Ho Chi Minh.

(8) Leaflet #8. He Chi Minis "will".

(9) Leaflet #9. News sheet from !969.

(10) Leaflet #10. "Follow the example of Ho and defeat the Americansand the Puppets".

(11) Leaflet #11. Remember the famous Ho Chi Minh.

(12) Leaflet #12. VC rally propaganda aimed at ARVN and National Police.

(13) Leaflet #13. News sheet from 10 June 1970."VC killed 38,000 enemy in May 1970".Destroyed 400 airplanesDestroyed 700 vehicles.

(14) Leaflet #14. Liberation Newspaper.

m. 172045 July 70, 39th Eng Bn, with PF's found sigri written inVietnamese in vicinity of BS 648448. The text of the signs read "personnelfeund in this area will be beheaded."

58

C ONFI YNTIA ,-

ANDF-HL NT) AL 10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Reprt-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period&xing 31 July 1970, WS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

II. Section II Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations. Evaluaticnsand Recormendations (U).

A. Persormel. None.

B. Intelligence.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Division Combined Intelligence Center

a. Observation: There is a historical problem area within the intel-ligence community in xhich the various agencies fragment into areas ofspecial interest and work on information purely for the sake of intelligence.Much of it is not passed on to those who can exploit it.

b. Evaluation: In June 1970, an intelligence center was established inthe Americal Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC). Using the Orderof Battle Section as a nucleus, one analyst for each of the two provincesin the Division area of operations (A0) were co-located with representativesfrom the Imagery Interpretation Section, Interrogation of Prisoners of WarSection and the Sensor Detachment. Additionally, the Operations Section ofthe Division Ranger Company moved to the DTOC. This Combined IntelligenceCenter now provides:

(1) The integration of all collection efforts against the same targetsat the same time.

(2) An immediate reaction by all or any of the agencies represented torequests from DTOC personnel, and subordinate units.

(3) An awareness of the friendly and enemy situation by the differentsections of the intelligence community.

(4) A more timely dissemination of intelligence for exploitation.

(5) The rapid consolidation and organization of information at one location.

c. Recommendation: The integration of collection assets may prove use-ful at brigade level.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Americal Division G2 Intelligence Conference

a. Observation: The assignment of untrained, inexperienced personnelto intelligence positions at battalion level has adversely affected theutilization of collection assets and the timely passing of information forexploit ion.

b. Evaluation: The Americal Division G2 conducted a one-day intelli-gence conference for brigade and battalion level S-2 personnel. Opened by

59

CDW EIbENTIA L

.IL)"NFIDENTIALAVDF-HL 10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational Rsport-Lesson3 Learned, Amrical Division, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

the Division Commander, the conference emphasized a complete descriptionof the collection assets available in the Division Area of Operations andthe proper requisition and utilization of those assets. The format included30 to 50 minute presentations by the Assistant G2 Operations Officer, theOrder of Battle Section Chief, the Interrogation of Prisoners of ar SectionChief, the Iiagery Interpretation Section Chief, the Ranger Company ExecutiveOfficer, the Sensor Program OIC and a representative from a District Intelli-g-nce Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). The result was a lively ex-ci,_'nge of ideas and information amorg those present.

c. Recommendation: Division Intelligence Conferences be conductedevery six months in order to provide the same service to newly assigned S2

personnel.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Americal Division Intelligence Booklet

a. Observation: Personnel at the battalion level need a ready refer-ence which would consolidate the references normally consulted by the $2

during everyday operations in his specific Division Area of Operations.

b. Evaluation: The Division G2 published an Intelligence Booklet whichconsolidated report formats, captured materials SOP, conmmon reference dataon weapons, phonetic pronunciations of common military terms in Vietnamese,Volunteer Informant Program price list, requisition procedures for intelli-gence assets at Division level and detainee classification criteria. Much

of thi- reference data is printed on pocket-size pages for use in the field.

c. Recommendation: The Division Intelligence Booklet be reviewed everyquarter by the contributing agencies for update and inclusion of more pertinentinformation.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Americal Division G2 Support of Operation ELk Canyon

a. Observation: In July 1970 the 196th Infantry Brigade, Americal Divi-

sion, provided the US Army portion of the combined Operation ELk Canyon. Atthe same time, the remainder of the Brigade continued their long-term Oper-

ation Frederick Hill. The collection assets normally supporting the Brigade

would have been seriously dissipated supportiiig both operations.

b. Evaluation: The Division G2 provided a G2 Task Force to Operation

Elk Canyon consisting of the Assistant G2 Plans Officer in charge of four

Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, a Sensor Monitoring Team with sensor strings,

a Radio Research Unit, and representatives from the Order of Battle Section,the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section and the Imagery Interpretation

Section with its scheduled daily reconnaissance flights. This arrangementreserved the normal Brigade assets for support of Operation Frederick Hillwhile providing Operation Elk Canyon with daily visual reconaissance, both air

60

CON F IDENT) L

AD4LCONFID NT I.10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational Repot--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (,R2) (U)

and ground, an immediate photo request source, the immediate exploitation ofcaptured documents and prisoners, and a consolidated intelligence data baseof the area from the Order of Battle maps. Additionally, sensors providedintelligence and economy of force efforts against the enemy.

c. Recommendation: A G2 Task Force may be useful in support of short-

term operations which are distant from the current brigade intelligence effort.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Use of Old B52 Strike Areas as Base Areas

a. Observation: It has been observed by G2 aerial observers that VC/14VA have adopted the concept of building base camps close to, or in, oldB52 strike areas.

b. Evaluation: These old B52 strike s-eas are often not programmedas visual reconnaissance targets resulting in the enemy establishingrelatively secure bases in these areas.

c. Pecounendation: Recommend that old B52 strike areas be visuallyreconnoitered and photographed for possible enemy base areas.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Montagnard :-terpret-r

a. Observation: On several occasions there has been a need for aMntagnard interpreter.

b. Evaluation: Lack of such an intcrpreter has made interrogation ofMntagnard detainees difficult, often slowing down the ability of the inter-rogator to obtain informnation by one cr two days.

c. Recommndation: A montagnard interpreter be assigned and madeavailable to the Division IPW Section and subordinate MI teams.

7. (U) SUBJECT: E-38 Photo Lab

a. Observation: The Imagery Interpretation Section has experiencedmany problems .ith its ES-38 photo lab during the past quarter.

b. Evaluation: The problemb have been caused by equipment failures,lack of repair parts and insufficient qualified technical representatives.At present there are only two civilian technical representatives in countryq alified to work on the ES-38B, causing delays in repair work to this

critical item of equipient. The ES-38B, when shipped to Vietnam, came witha smll repair parts kit. No two kits are the same nor do any contain thenecessary parts to repair an equipment failure larger than a blown fuse.

C. Bcomrirendation: That more qualified repairmen be trained and sent toVietnam with adequate parts to cope with the maintenance problems of the majorcomponents of the ES-38B.

61

C0N P&NTI ~L

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL 10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

8. (U) SUBJECT: Unattended Ground Sensor Battery Changes (MAGID)

a. Observation: Monitoring teams have experienced difficulties inreplacing MAGID batteries while on sensor maintenance missions.

b. Evaluation: The process of replacing batteries while on a sensormaintenance mission is time consuming. TMF personnel havw found that itis easier and faster to replace senscr batteries in the rear area. ahileon missions the operators prefer to replace the eritre MAGID pickup assembly.The use of this procedure enables a normal three-man team to replace anentire sensor string (four sensors) in l! hours.

c. &commendation: That MACV J3-04 authorize using units to requisi-tion and store MAGID pickup assemblies to be used as floats for batterycharges.

9. (C) SUBJECT: ,Snsor Location

a. Observation: Americal TNF has discovered an increase in the numberof unattended ground sensors that are removed from the field by uxknown persons.

b. Evaluation: The periodic maintenance conducted on the sensor stringspermits the extension of their useful life. This extension permits tterelocation of sensor strings throughout the entire AO in response to changingpatterns of enemy movement. Since the arrival of phase ID equipment, pri-marily MINISID ID which is equipped with a self-destruct feature consistingof a piston actuator rather than pyrotechnic material, the number of lostsensors has increascd considerably. Other are found in enemy base camps.

c. Recommendation: That authority be granted to using units to booby-trap and emplace dumnay sensor strirgs for the purpose of discouragingtampering by unknown persons.

10. (C) SUBJECT: Instant Intelligence

a. Observation: Operations conducted outside the normatl TAOR often failto yield optimzi- productivity due to the lack of timely intellirence.

b. Evaluation: Because of the size of the TAOR/TAOI assigned to amaneuver battalion and the increased emphasis on operating from the temporaryfirebases, it becomes imperative that the commander and his staff be providedwith more timely intelligence. One method of doing this is to schematicallydivide an assigned TAOR/TAOI into equal sections and assign a number or letterto each of the sections. Aa intelligence is received, it is plotted by useof a color code within its respective section and file card prepared whichexplains the incident/action. Several maps are used to indicate various typesof information, i.e. separate maps reflecting (1) Mines and Booby-traps,

62

CON WI bENT I A L

C RFI DENTIALAcDF-HL 10 August 1970

SMI3JECT: Operational A-port--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, PeriodEnding 31 July 1970, R CS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Caches found, (3) Unit contacts, (4) URI's etc. Color codes areparticularly effective to indicate the monrith in which an action occurred,and numerical codes can be used for type of incident. Use of this systemgreatly reduces the time required for obtaining the intelligence of agiven area and allows the Conmander/S3 mere flexibility in planning.With the continuing change-over of personnel this system takes very littletime to learn and pass on to replacement personnel, insuring continuous"ntelligence and planning within a unit.

c. Recornend.tion: That the system of instant intelligence be used

by all maneuver bttalions in VN.

C. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Stay-Behind Sniper Posts

a. Observation: Use of sniper teams in stay-behind sniper posts haveeffectively denied VC/V7A freedom of movement along trail networks.

b. Evaluation: A sniper team consisting of five personnel was insertedinto A Company 1/46th Laf du-ing a normal resupply. The sniper team leader.is briefed concerning the terrain and tentative locations of sniper posts.Early the next morning the entire company was redeployed from the area leav-ir the sniper team in a well-concealed sniper post covering a large valley.Aproximtely 30 - 40 minutes later, a squad-sized VC force began movementthiough the valley. The sniper team held their fire until the enemy forcewas 75 - 100 meters away. The well-distributed L4 and l6 fire resulted in5 VC KIA and 3 VC WIA. Another recent similar action paid off with two NVA KIA.

c. Recomnendation: The above technique indicates that the enemy soldiersare creatures of habit and are vulnerable to ambush tactics. This stay-behindtechnique is advocated; however, sole reliance on this technique is notr ecoranended.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Night Movement

a. Observation: NVA forces have demonstrated the capability of launchingcoordinated attacks against US elements as they depart or are preparing formovement from night defensive positions.

b. Evaluation: Enemiy forces can be kept off balance by movement at night.P Aor to dawn on 12 June 1970, Company B, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry assaulteda -ell-entrenched, company size, NVA force. By use of fire and maneuver, andnight assault techniques, Company B was able to overrun the enemy position,"cill'g 33 NVA and destroying 14 bunkers while loosing one man KIA. The unit's.;,-, ficiency in night operations enab].ed the company to close within 100 meterszf the -normy positions before the NVA company was aware of their presence.

CDA/FI i&AJTIA L

AVDF-fL ~ C-CA1IDIEiNYIAL 10 August 1970SUBJECT: Operational Ra.port--Lessons Learned, Azarical Division, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

This action clearly demonstrated that US forces f-n effectively operateagainst enemy forces at night with rirked success.

Q. Reconnendation: Units should be required to move at night untilthey can gain ccnfidence and become proficient in night-fighting techniques.Effective night operations can deny the enemy the capability of resupplying.his forces, disrupt the massing of his forces to attack friendly elements,and inflict unacceptable casual]ties on him.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Effective a rll Arn Fire

a. Observation: Some personnel have considerable difficulty ineffectively engaging the enemy at small arms range. The main problem isthe inability of riflemn and machinegunners to identify the beaten zoneof their rounds.

b. Evaluation: The inability of riflemen and machinegunners to placeeffectiie fire on targets is partially attributed to a lack of observationof rounds striking the target area. Additionally, an excessive amount ofball amnunition is used to neutralize enemy targets. This deficiency canbe overcome by loading the first three - five roands in the magazine withtai.cers, then intersoersing tracer/bell ammunition on a 1:5 ratio. Throught',e use of more tracer am.munition r4flenen will be more able to adjuston target. Additionally, armed helicopters can more readily observe thelocation of friendly elements thereby affording more responsive suppressivefire.

c. Recommendation: That units stress use of tracer ammunition intraining personnel on effective techniques of fire. Units should encour-age use of tracer x: -. unition day and night in order to place rapid andeffective .'ire c-t enemy targets.

4. (C) SUBJzCT: K.,chanical Ambush Techniques

a. Observation: The enemy has developed counter-mechanical ambushtechniques.

b. Evaluation: The basic technique used by small sized enemy unitsis to follow and observe US units, especially when elements set up nightl:7K ,nive positions. Upon securing the NDP, mechanical ambushes are placed,)n likely avenues of approach or on trail networks near the ND.P. The enemyokjrves small groups of US personnel placing these devices and sets up anambush when the squad returns to retrieve the claymores.

c. Fecommendation: All US units must vary their techniques for em-placing mechanical ambushes. Company com.oanders must insure that members ofthe mechanical ambush patrol are well-briefed concerning use of stealth and

b4

CNFIbENTIAL

CONFPI DEN71 kLAVDC-HL 10 Auwust 1970SUBJRCT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period


security. Security should be well-established ir the imnudiate area toprotect individuals emplacing or retrieving machanical ambushes. Anothertechnique reccwended is to instruct squads to emplace mechanical ambushesenroute to the NDP, thereby precluding unnecessary movement out, of theestablished NDP. If mechanical ambushes are put out after a unit occupiesan NDP, these devices should be emplaced just prior to RENT.

5. (C) SUBECT- Employment of Mechanical Ambushes

a. Observation: The failure to follow the proper safety measures inemplacing the mechanical ambush has caused unnecessary casualties to theindividual soldier.

b. Evaluation The emplacement of a mechanical ambush should be well-thought out in advance. It arpears that the employment team is well-briefedand trained in the employment procedures, however, many do not follow them.

c. Recommendation: The mechanical ambush team which consists of fourmen (two emplacers, two security) must be alert to the possibility that someunknown force (static electricity, wind, etc.) might detonate the mechanical

ambush before the team has left the ambush site. Once the emplacement teamhas hooked the claymore with det-cord and trip wire to the clothes pin, theymust move to the rear of the t ip wire, followed by the security team, tothe location of the battery. All members should then be directly to therear of the man making the final connection of the battery to the claymorewire. The team should be lying down behind some form of cover should theback-blast be in their direction. By following these simple safety measuresthe possibility of an uncalled for injury is greatly minimized.

6. (C) SUBJECT: Police of Laagers

a. Observation: The VC continually search US unit day/night laagersites and resupply landing zones for items of military value and for food.In the 3-21 Infaitry's area of operations, this "police call" is usuallyconducted within three hours of the friendly unit's departure.

b. Evaluation: This check of day/night laager sites and resupplyI anding mones can be made very costly for the VC through the use of well-camouflaged, stay-behind mechanical ambushes. The concept of employment isas follows:

(1) The two or three best routes into the laager site or landing zoneare selected to be covered by mechanical ambushes. The squad which has beendesignated as the last element in the unit's order of march emplaces theambushes.

65

C gJI Ni A L

6ONFIWTDE )A TAVDF-HL 10 Auwust 1970SUBJECT: Operatioral flport-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, 1eriod


(2) The mechanical ambush is carefully camouflaged at the edge of thelaager site or landing zone. Normal activity in the site will conceal theemplacement. Note that the claymore wires are not to be connected to thebAttery until the main body has departed the area and everyone is a safedistance away. Normal safety precautions must be observed in setting upthese anbushes.

(3) After thU last squad surreptitiously completes the nechanicalambush connectisrs, it dearts the area in the same direction as the mainbody ;and travels approximately 200 meters (the distance depends on the

terrain and vegetation). The squad halts and becomes a stay-behind ambush.Snipers can also be employed as a supplement to the stay-behind mechanicalambushes. The use of snipers is dependent upon the terrain and vegetation.The last squad can provid security for the sniper team.

(4) If a mechanical ambush is detonated the squad initially fires itsgrenade launchers into the area to prevent anything from being carried away.The squad then maneuvers to the laager site or landing wne, deactivates theremaining mechanical ambushes, checks the impact area and rejoins the mainbody.

c. &commendation: That company/troop cormaanders be informed of the suc-cess which can be achieved by the emplacement of stay-behind mechanical ambushesat day/night laager sites and resupply landing zones.

7. (C) SUBJECT: Exploitation of Contact Areas

a. Observation: An OH-6 aircraft from the Brigade Aviation section, whileflying a visual reconnaissance mission, was completely destroyed when the air-craft landed to retrie: what appeared to be a bag of enemy documents.

b. Rvaluation: The LOH has sighted and engaged three enemy soldiers,killing two and wounding one. The aircraft landed and a crew member capturedthe casualty, retrieved two bags of documents and weapons. The aircraftreturned to the Fire Support Base, released the prisoner to medical personnel,turned in the weapons and documents to the 52, refueled and jroceeded back tothe same area. The pilot saw what appeared to be a third bag of documentseq.gosed. He landed and a crew immber retrieved the bag and was putting themin tha LCH when an explosion occurred, engulfing the aircraft in flames. Onecrew member was killed and one required medical evacuation from shrapnel woundsand burns received. It was not determined if the ba was booby-trapped, or ifthe crew member or prop wash triggered a booby-trap in close proximity to theLOH. However, a sufficient amount of time had elapsed from the initial enga-e-ment and the return trip for the enemy to have baited a trap in the form of abooby-trapped bag.

66

CON RDEN TIA L

i CON FI : NTIALAVDF-MU 10 August 1970- =SUBJECT:- Operational &Fort-Lessons Le .rned, America-.l Divisions Period

. &dire 31 July 1970, ACS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

~~~~c. ¢oneato:That air/caT troops, provisional VR teams, and

aviation sections be made aware that once contacts have been exploited andthe area has not been kept under continuous surveillance, the unit mustexcerci~se extreme caution in inserting acre rifle platoons, crew membersor personnel on the grcund to r,:trieve enemy- equip;;.ent, weapons, or doctzents,

8. (C) SUBJECT: Infiltration of Maneuver lenents in Coast&ul Plains

a. Observation: When orerating in the coastal plains the problem arises

of how to successfully infiltrate a unit irto a known enemy area withoutbeing detected orcoumromised by the enemy or civilian populace.

b. Evaluation: (1) Infiltration by Amphibious Assault.This technique has been employed when targeting against enemy units operatingin close proximity to the South China S&a. Previous experience nas shownthat airmobile assault and overland movement techniques many tines failed toachieve the desired surprise necessary to gain contact with the enemy. Asa reu lt, the technique of night amphibious assault was initiated. Thetechnique involves prepositionirC the maneuver element at the VictnareseNaval Junk Base located east of .,uang Ngai City. From that point the ele-ment loads on "Junk" and moves to a pre-selected beach site during the hoursof darkness. [hron reaching the beach site, the element rapidly off-loadsand moves by st,,-Ath to predetermined ambush sites. Coordination requiredfor such an oper: tion can be effected directly with the US Naval Advisory Teamserving with the Vietnamese Junk Patrol and normally requires two to threedays notifiatication prior to the operational date desired.(2) Infiltration by Vehicle. This technique has also been successfullyenployed by elements within this unit. Trucks were used, under the guiseof daily logistical traffic from battalion rear to foinvard firebases, tomove a maneuver clerent to a pre-deterained ambush position . Ambushes havebeen sprung successfully in a-eas w hee mcveient by foot or helicoptersduring dayli! ht hours proved unsuccessful.

c. FecomTendation: The infiltration techniques discussed heruin haveproven to be successful and have achieved desired surprise on the enemy.It is recommended that these techniques be disseminated to other units.

9. (C) SUBJECT: Use of Air Cavalry in Conjunction ith Ground CavalryOperations

a. Observation: Movement of ground Cavalry through an area is veryexpensive in terms of crop damage and wear and tear on equipment. Aepeatedand prolon-ed movement results in an increase in the laying of .mines by enemyforces.

b. Evaluation: Ai. Cavalry, dith its ability to cover large ammcunts ,.fterrain in a rather short period of time, and Armored Cavalry, with its

67

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALA7DF- 10 .st 197SUBJECT: Operational iWeTort--Lessons Learned, Arx.rical DiviAon, Period

Ending 31 July 1970, ,uCS CSFR-o5 (H2) (U)

ability to rapidly maneuver and provide a large amount of sustained firepower, represent a combination that can find and destroy enemy forces witha relatively low cost in friendly personnel and equipment losses.

C. deconmnendation: That whenever josoible, Armored and Air Cavalryforces operate together, radng :uimum use of the unique capahilitico ofeach, to find and destroy the enemy. this technique should result in alessening of the loss of personnel and vehiclez to mine damage, also itshould reduce the amount of time ground cavalry spends in looking for thesmall enemy groupings that are generally being encountered at the pre,,cnttime.

10. (C) SUBJECT: Equipnent and Personnel Losses from Mines Flantedin a Well-used Stream Crossing Point

a. Observation: Stream crossings at a well-used crossing point areextremely dangerous because the enemy will invariably plant rmines at thesepoints. Mines often are planted in pairs, one in tho crossing itself andone in the approach usually within 100 meters of the crossing Aite.

b. Evaluation: The use of a new crossin- sits e: ch time a streamcrossing is made should lessen the chance of a vehicle hitting a mine.Even though a new crossing site is used it should still be blown with 40lb. shaped charge and detonating cord.

c. Recoinndation: A new site be selected for each stream crossingand the site be blown using 4O lb. shaped charge to cave in the banks anddetonating cord for the approach.

11. (C) SUBJECT: Flam Fuel Dropping Rack

a. Observation: A method was desired in which flas could be employedover a large area by helicopter.

b. Evaluation: The Division Chemical Section was given the requ-re-mrnt to provide large area flame coverable. The first attempt was made usinglarge c'-rgo net-,. The CH-47 helicopter pilots objected to this method forthe following reasons: (1) when the load is released, the net trails backand strikes the aircraft causing skin damage to the aircraft; and (2) ifthe net is too long, there is a danger that the net might strike the blades.One drop was made by loading 55 gallon drums internally and rolling them outthe rear of the aircraft. Objection.: to this method were: (1) damage tothe aircraft by drums striki.- hydraulic lines; (2) the aircraft had tocomr to a hover over the t: t . a; :-x! (3) the load cculd not be jet-ti '-oned in c;se nf engine fJ.il.-e

6 A

CONFIbENTIALAVDF-HL 10 August 1570SUJECT: Operational Ujeport--Lescns Learned, Am ricai )ivision, -eriod

Ending 31 July 1970, RCS C3FC--5 (R2) (U)

The idea of -n externally slwug rack w s dov-cw ped b-y the DivisionChemical Section. The concert was ex.liined t the Division 4kigineerSection, who did the stress analysis and engineer designing of the rack.kne rzack was constructed by the NAv., Seabees. The flame rack is a steelfr-.ie const.acted of angle iron, m-asuring 1.4 feet by 7 feet by 3 feet.Loaded to its capacity of 1,4 doumz of thickened fuel, the rack weighs70X rounds, an empty it weights 1200 pounds. It has a spring loadedgate that is controlled by a larard rurning up inside the aircraft throughthe hook hole. The area coveraje pattern from 150O'A1. is apijroximately15Ore X 5Om. The rack is used solely for flame drops, and when not in useit is kept loaded and reidy for immediate employment.

c. Recommendation: That the 2 th Engineer Battalion construct twoadditional flame racks so that each brlade will have a safe, efficient,and rapidly emiloyable flame ca-Libility.

D. Organization. None.

E. Training.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Noise and Lilht Discipline

a. Obervation; The American Soldier tends to forget abod. theimportance of controlled noise and light discipline.

b. Evaluation: Continuous training of all persormel is needed to

insure that patrol movements and night defensive positions are disciplinedfrom the man's first day of conbat field duty to his last. Noise andlight discipline on patrol will alvays prDve beneficial. A lack ofdiscipline will compromise the units location and serve as a targetdirection device for enemy mortar tubes. Leaders at all levels mustcontinually emphasize the need for strist adherence to light and noisediscipline measures.

c. Recommendation: Recomrend that a class be initiated as soon as- posaible with emphasis on the imortance of noise and light discipline both

in the field and on the fire base. The instruction should be conducted byan experienced Junior Officer and enlisted man and clearly cite examples ofinstances where such things as men traking while on patrol had compromisedtheir position and given the enemy a charre to prepare himself for retaliatiorUnits could be trained at FSB's when they are in for FSB security.

F. Loiistics. None.

G. Comrunications. None

H. Materiel. None

I. Other. None.

6YN FI DENTIAL

m m m m m m m m l m m l m m ' I

AVF~CONFID ENTIAL i.o ugst 17

SSJFCT*. Operational pport-Lessofls Learned, Aerical Division, Pro

Brding 31 July 1.970, 1iES CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

1 mel JOHN~ L. fl4SANI

Arrerical Div Troop List Colonel, GiCIuef or Staff

DISTRIBU TION~:2-ci~usARPAc,, A?1'?i G1FVP-DT 1-00, H Troops 17th Cay

3-CG, USARV, ATTN:h AVHGC-DST 1-00, 123h an En

6-CG, XXIV Corps, ATTN. AVII-GO 12-W0, 3d I-Al. Hist Dbt

2-CO, l1th Inf Bde I-AWoS, 01.

2-00) 196th Wa Bde 3.O-ACof 5, G2

2-00, 198th Inf Ede 10-ACofS, G3

2-00, Americal Div Arty ).-ACofS, G4

8-COc, Amri DISCCo i-Acof s, G52-00, 16th CAG I-Chemical.

1-00, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cay 1-bhgineer

1-CC, 26th Engr En 1-Siznal

I-00, 523d Sig Bn 1-AViation

I-coo 23d VPU Co I-Provost Marshall1-00,~ A~icalDivI-Staff Jud.ge Advocate

1-00, 3d E, 1stia Div I-Inforation Officer1-00, 3td n, 3d t 1n -Inspector GeneraCL

1-cc, 4th Bn, 21st Inf I-Surgeon

1-C0, Ist En, 20th Inf 1-Chaplain

I-C0, 3d Bn, 21st Inf 1-Asjutant General1-00 4thEn,31stInfI-XXIV Corps LNO

1-0, 14th En,, 31t In 2-TACP (A1L), Amrical Div

1-00, 1st En, 46th In!1-00, 5th En, 46th Inf1-M0, 2d Bn, 1st Inf1-00, 1st En, 52d Thf1-00, 6th En, 11th Arty1-00, 1st Bn, 14th Arty1-CIO, 3d En, 82d Arty1-00, 3d Bn, 16th Arty1-00, 3d Bn, 18th Arty

1-0Ist bln, 82d Arty1-00, E Troop, I1st CaY1-00, F Troop, 17th Calf

70

C&N~ (ENT (AL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-G T (10 August 1970) lst IndSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Anerical Division, Period

Biding 31 July 1970, (RCS CSre-65 (R2)) (U)

DA, HQ, XIfV Corps, APO San Fxraciso@ 96349 1 SEP 1970

TO: Comanding General, USAW, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The OLL for the Lerical Division has been reviewed by this head-quarters in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (C) This headquarters concurs with the report v4th the following comments

a. Reference item concerning Montagpard Interpreter, page 61, paragraphII, B, 6; nonccncur. the mit has been advised that requests for interpreterassets should be submitted through personnel channels, with appropriate justi-ficaticn.

b. Reference item concerning 3-38 Photo Lab, page 61, paragraph II, B, 7;concur. However, it should be noted that difficulties often result from in-sufficient preventative maintenance. XXIV Corps has sulmitted to USAECXM alist of deficiencies and design faults of the ES-38B as well as problems inthe support system which have been experienced in Military Region 1.

c. Reference item concerning unattended Ground Sensor Battery Changes,page 62, paragraph II, B, 8; concur. Unit will be informed to subit recom-mendation with Justification through appropriate channels.

d. Reference item concerning Sensor Location, page 62, paragraph II, B, 8;nonconcur. Booby traps present substantial danger to friendly troops duringsensor recovery or service missions.

e. Reference item concerning Flame Fuel Dropping Rack, page 68, para-graph II, C, 11; concur. However, the limited welding and metal fabricationcapability that exists in a division, is normally only adequate for mainten-ance of the organic engineer battalion equipment. Complete plans and speci-ficaticns for the device will be forwarded to ACTIV for consideration andtesting. Photographs of the device are included as inclosures 2 and 3.

FOR TE CMWDEP

nc Captain, AGC2 added Asistant AdMenf General2. FKame Rack3. CH7 w/Flame Rack 71

CY:CG, Americal Division CONFIDENTIAL

AVHDO-DD (10 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUWZCT& Operational Report - Lessons Learnod, Aacrical Division, PeriodEnding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TOt Commander in Chief, United States ArMy Pacific, ATTNt GPOP-DT,APO 96558

I. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learnedfor the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, AericalDivision and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "ES-38B Photo Darkroom Group," page 61, paragraph2B(7). These difficulties ware made known to the team chief of the CONARCLiaison Training Team on his visit to RVN during the period 11 - 24 May 1970.The Trip Report of the visit recommended that the preventive maintenance

coverage in the operator's courses for tho ES-38B be reviewed for adequacy.

The CONARC Team is presently in RVN on another visit and these trainingimplications were reiterated. Action by DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDERi

/ 2

-,L W .. 's Jr.

Cy furntXXIV CorpsAmerical Div

72

GPOP-DT (10 Aug 70) 3d Ind (U)* SU6JECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HO~ Americal.

Division, for Period Ending 31 July 1 970,RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San rrancis.. 96558 21NOV 19718

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Departmentof the Army, Washington, D. C.20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

LM. C~C

CPT, AOCAsst AGJ

73

AI(ERICAL DIVL5JON TROOP LIST

(as of 31 July 1970)

1. IM=UART1=' A&A.CAL D1VISZ11

1HC, Anrical Division

lst Sqdn, 1st Cay (-)Trp F, 17th Cav

- 26th Er Bn

523d Sig BnODM4,EC COMTACT TEM #

23d WF Go146th WU Flat, 504th MP Bn

328th RR Co

635th MI Co

3d Mil Hist Det

OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USA? (-)

2. AKXRICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHB, Div Arty

6th Bn, 11th ArtyMetro Section, 2d Bn, 11th Arty

Ist Bn, 14th Arty (-)

3d Bn, 16th Arty

3d Ba, 18th Arty

1st Bn, 82d Arty

3d Bn, 82d ArtyBtry B (-), 1st Bn, 14th Arty

Btry G, 55th Arty (. 50 Cal)

251st FA Dot (Radar)

74

Inclosure 1

252d Fi. et (Radax,)

27)st FA Dot (Radar)

3. *&~iIQAL DIVISION SUPFOA C04i4AND

HHC an~d BarA

23d Mod Bn

23d S&kT Bn

723d W int En(-

23d Amin Go

Co G (Rarger'), 75th tnf

63d Inf Flat (CTT)

Americal Combat Center (PRMv)

Chu Lai Defense Comand (Pa)V)

4. 16TH OAT VIATIL)N GH)UP

HHC, 16th CAG (Cbt)

14ith Combat Ovn En71st Avn Co132d Akm Co (Asit Spt He))174th Avn Go (MAst Spt He))176th Avn Co (Mat Spt Hel)178th Aym Co (Aolt Spt Hel)534th Mod Det7 56th lid Dot

123d Avn En (Cbt) (Inf Div)Troop D, let Sqdn, 1st CayGo E, 723d Nairit BnTroop F, 8th Cav

335th Transz Co

5. 11TH DV"ITR BRMQAE

HHC, 11th laf Bde

Inclosure I

75

3d Bn, I st Inf

4th Bn, 3d Inf

ist Ba, 20th Inf

4th Bn, 21st Lif

Trp E, 1st Cay

59th W Flat (Scout Dog)

31st Public Information Det

90th Chem Det

327th Avn Det

Combat Weather Team 1

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th In! Bde

2d Bn, 1 st Inf

3d Bn, 21st Inf

4th Bn, 3Lst Inf

is Bn, 46th Inf

48th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

10th Public Informaton Det

27th Chem Det

7. 198TH If.lNTI- BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 6th Inf

5th Bn, 46th Inf

Inclosure 1

76

OY

st Bn, 52d Inf

Trp H, 17th Cay

57th Inf Flat (Scout Dog)

87th Chem Dot

8. MON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)

Dat 3, 7th Psyop Bn (DS of Div)

USASMG, ACSI, DA

Inclosure I

77

ILI

4.4

1 A7

I*1~

I

4I - K

4

79

UNCLASSIFIED~mty Clessaficalloa

DOCU5MENT CONTROL DATA.- R & D(s4cmuloy ciot, I ev,.. .f wN. be* q &i' 8.,69c Ionat Andes In amn aion - - Ied he.n the a - 1 , 0I co.- FDA If,.dI

ca*soeA TING Ac TIV. T, (C"ee*.e "w.. I. V SnACuR*l I CLAI$ CAI 10*

HQ DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310) CONFIDENTIAL ____

F b. PU

4b. *UPOR? TITLE

* Operational Report - Lessons Learned, H-Q, Americal Division

4. OKSCRIPYIVE NOTES frpo .t imepena h4w dgel# S)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations I MaY to 31 July 1970.I AU TH02AIS) (irfet Rd.. ,e t NLI 0nA.

CC;, Americal Division_________0 REPORT DATE la. TOTAL NO O PAGES or. "O.OP K

10 August 147C0 B200. CO IRMAC T ON GRAN T NO 0- ORIGINAIIRT REPONI NUMUIEP(S)

a. PROJEC T NtO 703146

N/A S.0 TmE ft RFPORT m0121 (An? ofher numnbeta UCht VOY be assignedthis topr

10 OISTRIbUTION STATEMENT

11 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES II.. SPONSORING. MILlITARY ACTIVITY

N/A j DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310

a3 ASSTRACT

* 80

FromUC A S FEDD NO 61473 _______________

Security ClasgIlcetio

5I

Documents

AUTHORITY THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED - apps.dtic.mil · t CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THL ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON. DC 20310 AGDA-A (M) (20 1an 71 FOR OT UT 703146