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 Auftrag staktik  is a German term used quite freely in our army, particularly in the armor/mech community, as a description of how we do bus ine ss. But wha t, exa ct ly, doe s thi s wor d me an? To many, it means nothing more than its rough, literal translation — “mission-type orders,” or orders giving great latitude to subordi- nate s in rega rd to miss ion acc ompl ishment. The sub ordi nat e is given a mission, and left to his own initiative in its execution and accomplishment. But a closer examination may reveal that this is an imprecise and incomplete understanding. The mos t rel ia ble source for an exp lanati on of  auftragstaktik , would be the originators of the term — the German Army. During a recent staff ride conducted with the Bundeswehr, German offi- cers gave the following explanation to a group of American offi- cers about the German concept of the term:  Auftragstaktik  is com- prised of four essential elements — obedience, proficiency, inde- pendence of action, and self-esteem. In order for  auftragstaktik  to exist, all four elements must be present. Obedience.  In the framework of  auftragstaktik , obedience refers to str ict adhe ren ce to the inte nt of the higher commander, ex- presse d in terms of purpose , metho d, and endst ate. The method will probably be the least specific of the three, giving subordinates the maximum opportun ity to exer cise initiat ive in pursui t of the endsta te. The subordinate ensures that any initia tive he exerc ises adher es to and supports the commande r’s intent. Proficiency  refe rs to techn ical and tacti cal competen ce on the part of leaders at all levels. In order for  auftragstaktik  to work, leaders must be well grounded in their profession, understanding not only their own branch’s capabilities, but also the capabilities of other branches. They must understand the application of all bat- tlefield operating systems and be able to synchronize all available comba t multipl iers. The educational syste m of the Army must fos- ter this. Training must focus on combined arms. Proficiency builds outs ide the sc hool sys tem and unit with a rigo rous progr am of professional self-development. The end result is a leader capable of taking broad guidance and exerc ising initiativ e in an intelli gent, effective manner, reflecting the intent of the higher commander. Indepen dence of action.  The four elements which compr ise auftragstaktik  are equally important, but if one element is at the “he art of the term, it would be indepe nde nce of action. The higher commander allows his subordinate a great deal of latitude in the execution of a mission, allowing the subordinate to seize the initiative as it presents itself. This necessitates leader presence for- ward, at the decisive place on the battlefield. From this vantage point, he can exercise the freedom he has been given to influence the battle, tailoring the actions of his unit to take advantage of the tactical situation he sees. Self-esteem. The subordinate leader must possess a high degree of sel f-c onfi dence , and he mus t fee l tha t his superi ors have an equal degree of confidence in his abilities. This develops through traini ng. During training exercise s, super iors encou rage the subor- dinate leader to exercise initiative in the execution of a mission, and he is not penalized if his initiative fails. He is not made to feel that he personally is a failure. Leaders analyze his actions, identify his shortcomings, and from this, a lesson is learned. Honest mis- takes are survivable and accepted as part of leader development. This is crucial if subor- dinates are expected to exercise initiative. This explanation makes it clear that  Auftrags taktik  is not simply a term describ- ing a method of operating as a unit. It is a culture. Taken in its purest form, as it was origina lly conce ived, the word describe s a cul tur e with in the profe ssi on of arms. We ca nnot wak e up one morning and decide we are going to practice mission-type orders tha t day. Cultur es deve lop over long perio ds of time, and if not practiced are soon extinct. We must practice mission-type orders every day, in everything we do as an Army. Our present educ ational syst em ful fill s the ele ments of profi- ciency and obedience. Young officers receive a thorough ground- ing in the technical aspects of their branch in the Basic Course. When they gradua te, they are reasona bly proficient in the basic skills of their trade, and additional proficiency comes with experi- ence at their first duty station. Branch advanced courses bring a greater understanding and appreciation of the commander’s intent, whi ch is add res se d as the focal point for all tac tic al and opera - tional planning. At this point, we have an officer who knows how best to employ his weapon systems to achieve the desired endstate of his superior commander. The final elements necessary to practice the culture of mission- type orders are the most difficult to develop. The desire to succeed tends to quell our willingness to allow subordinates independence of action. The old maxim — about wanting something done right and doing it ourselves — trips us up every time. We feel that by contro lling every aspect of what our subord inate s do, our intent wil l be mor e rea dily accomplis hed, but in doi ng this, we fai l to develo p our subord inate leader s. We must allow subord inate s to develo p their own meth ods to acco mplish given missions. When they fail, we must allow them to survive and learn from their mis- takes. We must continue to develop them without crushing their self-esteem and willingness to take risks.  Auftrag staktik  works , and is borne out by historical exa mpl es ranging from Napoleon’s marshals to the German storm troop de- tac hme nts of the Wor ld Wa r I. Wel l-trained sma ll uni t lea der s, accustomed to seizing the initiative and exploiting it, are the keys to successful military operations, and in the fast-paced world of armor-mechanized operations, such leaders are crucial. Given this, we must fully understa nd and correctly impleme nt the mission- type order culture that we are so quick to embrace as our way of doin g bus ine ss. We mus t pra ctice it on a dai ly bas is. We mus t discipline ourselves against the tendency to micro-manage. In our subordinate s, we mus t fost er the willi ngne ss to tak e cal cul ate d risks. Then we must take the time to evaluate their successes and mistakes, and develop them accordingly. When we do this in our regular cour se of busi nes s, the n we have truly under stood and adopted the mission-type order culture. The dividends which will follow on future battlefields will be well worth the effort. Capt ain Ronald J. Bash ista receive d his Regular Army commis- sion in Armor as a 1989 Distinguished Military Graduate of Western New England College ROTC. He served as a tank platoon leader in DESERT STORM with 1-35 Armor, 1st AD. He has also served as a scou t plato on leader, tank comp any executiv e offic er, HHC ex- ecu tiv e of fic er, and bat tal ion motor off ic er. He is a gra dua te of AOBC, BMOC, AOAC and FAOAC. While attending AOAC, he par- ticip ated in the Huertgen Fores t Staf f Ride with the Bundeswehr. He currently serves as the adjutant for 3-8 Cavalry, 1st CD. Auftragstaktik: It’s More Than Just a Word by Captain Ronald J. Bashista ARMOR — November-December 1994  19

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 Auftragstaktik   is a German term used quite freely in our army,particularly in the armor/mech community, as a description of how

we do business. But what, exactly, does this word mean? Tomany, it means nothing more than its rough, literal translation —“mission-type orders,” or orders giving great latitude to subordi-nates in regard to mission accomplishment. The subordinate isgiven a mission, and left to his own initiative in its execution andaccomplishment. But a closer examination may reveal that this isan imprecise and incomplete understanding.

The most reliable source for an explanation of   auftragstaktik ,would be the originators of the term — the German Army. Duringa recent staff ride conducted with the Bundeswehr, German offi-

cers gave the following explanation to a group of American offi-cers about the German concept of the term:   Auftragstaktik  is com-prised of four essential elements — obedience, proficiency, inde-

pendence of action, and self-esteem. In order for   auftragstaktik   toexist, all four elements must be present.

Obedience.  In the framework of   auftragstaktik , obedience refers

to strict adherence to the intent of the higher commander, ex-pressed in terms of purpose, method, and endstate. The methodwill probably be the least specific of the three, giving subordinatesthe maximum opportunity to exercise initiative in pursuit of theendstate. The subordinate ensures that any initiative he exercisesadheres to and supports the commander’s intent.

Proficiency   refers to technical and tactical competence on thepart of leaders at all levels. In order for   auftragstaktik   to work,leaders must be well grounded in their profession, understanding

not only their own branch’s capabilities, but also the capabilitiesof other branches. They must understand the application of all bat-tlefield operating systems and be able to synchronize all availablecombat multipliers. The educational system of the Army must fos-

ter this. Training must focus on combined arms. Proficiency buildsoutside the school system and unit with a rigorous program of professional self-development. The end result is a leader capable

of taking broad guidance and exercising initiative in an intelligent,effective manner, reflecting the intent of the higher commander.

Independence of action.   The four elements which comprise

auftragstaktik   are equally important, but if one element is at the“heart” of the term, it would be independence of action. Thehigher commander allows his subordinate a great deal of latitudein the execution of a mission, allowing the subordinate to seize theinitiative as it presents itself. This necessitates leader presence for-

ward, at the decisive place on the battlefield. From this vantagepoint, he can exercise the freedom he has been given to influencethe battle, tailoring the actions of his unit to take advantage of thetactical situation he sees.

Self-esteem. The subordinate leader must possess a high degree

of self-confidence, and he must feel that his superiors have anequal degree of confidence in his abilities. This develops throughtraining. During training exercises, superiors encourage the subor-

dinate leader to exercise initiative in the execution of a mission,and he is not penalized if his initiative fails. He is not made to feelthat he personally is a failure. Leaders analyze his actions, identify

his shortcomings, and from this, a lesson is learned. Honest mis-

takes are survivable and accepted as part of leader development. This is crucial if subor-

dinates are expected to exercise initiative.

This explanation makes it clear that

 Auftragstaktik   is not simply a term describ-

ing a method of operating as a unit. It is aculture. Taken in its purest form, as it wasoriginally conceived, the word describes a

culture within the profession of arms. We cannot wake up onemorning and decide we are going to practice mission-type ordersthat day. Cultures develop over long periods of time, and if notpracticed are soon extinct. We must practice mission-type ordersevery day, in everything we do as an Army.

Our present educational system fulfills the elements of profi-ciency and obedience. Young officers receive a thorough ground-

ing in the technical aspects of their branch in the Basic Course.When they graduate, they are reasonably proficient in the basicskills of their trade, and additional proficiency comes with experi-

ence at their first duty station. Branch advanced courses bring agreater understanding and appreciation of the commander’s intent,

which is addressed as the focal point for all tactical and opera-tional planning. At this point, we have an officer who knows howbest to employ his weapon systems to achieve the desired endstateof his superior commander.

The final elements necessary to practice the culture of mission-type orders are the most difficult to develop. The desire to succeedtends to quell our willingness to allow subordinates independenceof action. The old maxim — about wanting something done right

and doing it ourselves — trips us up every time. We feel that bycontrolling every aspect of what our subordinates do, our intentwill be more readily accomplished, but in doing this, we fail to

develop our subordinate leaders. We must allow subordinates todevelop their own methods to accomplish given missions. Whenthey fail, we must allow them to survive and learn from their mis-

takes. We must continue to develop them without crushing their

self-esteem and willingness to take risks. Auftragstaktik   works, and is borne out by historical examples

ranging from Napoleon’s marshals to the German storm troop de-tachments of the World War I. Well-trained small unit leaders,accustomed to seizing the initiative and exploiting it, are the keysto successful military operations, and in the fast-paced world of armor-mechanized operations, such leaders are crucial. Given this,we must fully understand and correctly implement the mission-type order culture that we are so quick to embrace as our way of doing business. We must practice it on a daily basis. We mustdiscipline ourselves against the tendency to micro-manage. In oursubordinates, we must foster the willingness to take calculated

risks. Then we must take the time to evaluate their successes andmistakes, and develop them accordingly. When we do this in ourregular course of business, then we have truly understood and

adopted the mission-type order culture. The dividends which willfollow on future battlefields will be well worth the effort.

Captain Ronald J. Bashista received his Regular Army commis- sion in Armor as a 1989 Distinguished Military Graduate of Western New England College ROTC. He served as a tank platoon leader in DESERT STORM with 1-35 Armor, 1st AD. He has also served as a scout platoon leader, tank company executive officer, HHC ex- ecutive officer, and battalion motor officer. He is a graduate of AOBC, BMOC, AOAC and FAOAC. While attending AOAC, he par- ticipated in the Huertgen Forest Staff Ride with the Bundeswehr.He currently serves as the adjutant for 3-8 Cavalry, 1st CD.

Auftragstaktik: 

It’s More Than Just a Word

by Captain Ronald J. Bashista

ARMOR —  November-December 1994    19