Atlantic Voices Vol 3. no. 1

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 1

Volume 3 - Issue 1, January 2013

Contents:

Global Pulse: NATO and Turkey’s Syria Challenge: Time to Pair Up

Niklas Anzinger and Ludwig Jung analyze the on-going Syrian crisis and its effect on Turkey

and NATO. They examine the strategic obstacles in Turkey’s approach and argue that in

order to overcome the challenges posed by Syria, Russia and Iran, a rapprochement between

Turkey and Israel and an increase in political and operational support from Europe is needed.

Dialogues, Doctrines, Disappointments: The Élysée Treaty in the

Context of Transatlantic Partnership and European Common Se-

curity and Defence Policy

Kai Peter Schönfeld examines the historical background and strategic value of the Élysée

Treaty on its 50th anniversary. He argues that the Élysée Treaty is a cornerstone Europe’s

progress towards a Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) and can be improved by

industrial cooperation, deepened dialogue and better coordination of crisis management.

50 Years of the Élysée Treaty: Its Impact on EU Foreign Policy and NATO

The 50th Anniversary of the Élysée Trea-

ty serves as a time to reflect upon Europe’s

Common Security and Defence Policy and

the struggle of establishing a secure and unit-

ed European continent.

Having represented a cornerstone mo-

ment in the history of European defence and

international relations, the value of the Fran-

co-German partnership and their engineering

of a Common Security and Defence Policy

cannot be understated.

As Europe now faces a range of threats

comprised of political, military and economic

crises, the need to review and reform the

framework established by the Élysée Treaty

has never been more vital.

The Élysée Treaty not only set in motion

the solidarity and commitment of Europe’s

Transatlantic Partnership, but serves as a

testament that historic rivalries can be over-

come when pursuing a common goal of peace

and security. Something that must be re-

membered when preparing for the kinds of

challenges the Alliance will face in coming

years.

- Jason Wiseman

Fabius, Westerwelle, Le Drian and de Maiziere visiting the Franco-German Brigade. (Photo - Kazda-Bundeswehr)


O ur aim is to analyze the role of the NATO

actors involved in the missile defense op-

eration in Turkey and its long-term conse-

quences for NATO. We argue that the crucial mid- to long

-term threat for NATO is posed by Iran´s nuclear and bal-

listic missile program. The Syrian crisis has the potential to

bring NATO and Turkey closer together and install a ro-

bust defense line along the Eastern rim of the Alliance. We

believe that if Turkey takes its inevitable leadership role

seriously, it must pursue an optimization

strategy of pooling intelligence and tech-

nological upgrades. Essential for the suc-

cess of this strategy would be a reconcili-

ation of its formerly strong security rela-

tionship with Israel.

Analysis - Turkey´s Vulnerability and the Mis-

sile Threat

In a volatile region, Turkey´s central geographic posi-

tion makes it especially vulnerable to the Eastern borders

of Iran, Iraq and Syria. As NATO plans a deployment to

secure its alliance's Eastern rim, Turkey as the directly

affected state plays a decisive role. The Turkish strategy

before the Syrian crisis entailed power-balancing in the

region in order to secure economic conduct with its neigh-

boring countries. As a result, trade with Northern Iraq,

Iran and especially Syria flourished for the benefit of devel-

oping the Eastern Anatolian region in Turkey. However,

the accompanied diplomatic rapprochement with Tehran

and Damascus along with the strategy of championing the

Arab street in order to promote the "Turkish model"

proved to be strategically unsound and not as successful as

intended.1 Following the Flotilla

incident in 2010, the diplomatic

relationship with Israel deteriorated

and Turkish PM Erdoğan adopted

strong rhetoric against Israel in or-

der to appeal to the Arab and Muslim masses. As events

unfolded during the Arab Spring, the illusionary percep-

tions of the Turkish "zero problems with our neighbors"

strategy were laid bare. Iran´s hegemonic ambitions in the

region and fervent military support of Assad in Syria illu-

minated a deep geopolitical antagonism to Turkey. The

concerns of Turkey in terms of refugee influx, retreat ba-

ses for the militant-Kurdish PKK/PYD and the alleged

obligation of protecting Sunni Muslims – not to mention

the economic impact2 – made

Erdoğan a Syria-hardliner in

rhetoric, while failing to gain

the support of a credible mil-

itary power.3 Turkey had to

reassess its lines of defense as

the Syrian ballistic missile

arsenal has become a serious

threat to its own national

interests and citizens.

Turkey had to re-

member the lessons from

1991: in the wake of the un-

raveling Gulf War, Turkey

found itself defenseless due

to NATO´s slow delivery of

NATO and Turkey’s Syria Challenge: Time To Pair Up

GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE

Turkey’s central geographic posi-tion makes it especially vulnerable

Strategic map – the deployment of Patriots along the Syrian border to Turkey (Photo: Stimme Russlands)


Patriots against Saddam Hussein´s Scud missiles. Ankara’s

efforts to procure its own missile defense systems began in

1997 in a call of military cooperation with Israel but the

economic turmoil of the early 2000s impeded the install-

ment plans. While Turkey has obtained significant up-

grades in counter-proliferation and air-defense capability,

NATO's most Eastern member still remains vulnerable

against ballistic missiles.4

As a result of the escalating situation on the Turkish-

Syrian border, the NATO Council of Foreign Ministries

decided in early December 2012

"to augment Turkey’s air defense

capabilities in order to defend

the population and territory of

Turkey and contribute to the de-

escalation of the crisis along the

Alliance’s border.5” The U.S., Germany and the Nether-

lands will deploy air-defense squadrons operating on six

Patriots in a triangular position based in the Turkish cities

of Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Adana. Each of these

Turkish cities has a high number of inhabitants allegedly

protected against ballistic missiles from Syria. NATO

members employ the most technically advanced Patriot

systems with PAC-2 and PAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles. Pa-

triot missiles provide protection against incoming missiles

in the range of 50 to 100 kilometers.

The military implications of the Patriots are tightly

circumscribed and make them unsuitable for establishing a

no-fly zone or other measures culminating in direct inter-

vention in Syria. First, their range operability-circle from

the point of their deployment along the Southern border of

Turkey hardly reaches into Syrian territory by distance.

Second, the alleged interception of Syrian airspace in order

to create safe zones for rebel forces is ruled out by the

mandates of NATO and the participating countries. It is

therefore unlikely that the purpose of "self-defense" will

be violated unless the situation changes dramatically. Yet,

the advanced Syrian ballistic missile arsenal and potential

chemical weapon capabilities pose a severe threat as long as

they are not secured - while unlikely, an “irrational end-

game” including the use of those weapons by Assad re-

mains a possibility. Nevertheless the deployment of the

Patriots may have strategic implications. For Turkey, it

signals the power of the Alliance and Turkey’s regional

importance - Ankara is once more proving that it aspires to

a political leadership role apart from its economic power.

For NATO countries, it is the cheapest way of demonstrat-

ing action.6

Collective Defence: Turkey’s Inevitable Leader-

ship

In Germany the voters are highly averse to anything

that could be seen as a bellicose act or imply military ac-

tion. Additionally, Germany has little interest in risking a

confrontation with Russia. If the presumptions are true

that Turkey might push for some

sort of NATO-led intervention in

concert with the U.S. and the Neth-

erlands, Germany will most likely

block or tame any pro-active at-

tempts. While the U.S. would have

the military means, the Obama ad-

ministration is unlikely to let itself be distracted from its

pivot-to-Asia strategy in order to engage in yet another

military adventure in a Muslim country.

No NATO state other than Turkey has shown will-

ingness to take responsibility towards Syria, certainly moti-

vated by the fact that Ankara's own national interest is en-

dangered by the collapsing order in the neighboring state.

No NATO state other than Turkey has shown willingness to take responsibil-

ity towards Syria

Pat-3 radar system in deployment (Photo: Armed International Forces)


Turkey provided retreat and weap-

ons for the Free Syrian Army and

repeatedly called on the internation-

al community and NATO for pro-

active measures. The Patriot deploy-

ment – although militarily limited –

does represent a diplomatic signal

that may not be meaningless: the

US, Germany and the Netherlands

now share concerns for their sol-

diers´ lives and are committed to the

defense of their Alliance partner.

Shared interests can motivate actors

to develop ideas and strategies not

previously thought of in the cost-

benefit calculation.

In the middle run the commit-

ment of NATO can and has to go beyond Syria because the

threat of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile program is

imminent to Turkey. The handling of Syria will challenge

NATO's crisis management.7 With Tehran aggressively

working towards a nuclear weapon, Turkey will no longer

be able to play its mediator role for Iran. As time runs out,

Turkey will have to upgrade its place in the Western de-

fense alliance-structure. At its border, Turkey has to lead

and put all possible assets for a successful operation and

prospectively longer lasting missile defenses in place. The

lack of a clear commitment and decisive action during the

Patriots´ deployment by both Turkey and the other allies

would not only put NATO personnel in danger, but would

endanger the overall success of this undertaking.

Optimization Strategy - A Turkish-Israeli Pillar

The key factors for an optimization of all assets are

intelligence pooling and technological upgrades for the

Turkish military. For Turkey, the necessity arises to re-

store the relationship with a natural ally Erdoğan negli-

gently sacrificed for questionable motives. Israel has prov-

en its advanced military and intelligence capabilities on

several occasions, e.g. during Operation Cloud Pillar in

Gaza. Israel has radar systems which were intended to co-

work with Turkish radars in the phase of their deployment.

Moreover, Turkey and Israel had contracts for the pur-

chase of military equipment8 and joint military exercises,

which deteriorated during the diplomatic stand-off - these

can and should all be brought back to the table. Israel

might be able to afford to work without Turkey for now.

In the long run it will certainly welcome the military asser-

tiveness of NATO and the regional power projection of a

strong Turkey - given clear shared interests on major issues

such as the Iranian nuclear and missile program and the

concerns of chemical weapons from the Syrian stockpile

falling into the hands of Islamists (for this reason, Israel

recently deployed Iron Dome missile defense batteries

along its Northern border).9 Intelligence and military tech-

nology from Israel has the advantage of being readily avail-

able, highly advanced and effective. Turkey cannot afford

to leave this option unexplored.

Ankara has to reconsider the options it temporarily lost

due to alienating Israel. If Turkey wanted to be a balancing

power and a credible proponent of an Israeli-Palestinian

peace settlement, the approach of engaging Hamas and

trying to isolate Israel failed. Compared to Qatar's ability

to influence politics in the Gaza Strip through the check-

book10 and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological

bond with Hamas and geographical proximity to the Gaza

strip, Turkey could neither influence Hamas nor Israel in

any significant way.

Israeli PM Netanyahu reiterated prior to the elections

that Turkish-Israeli relations would be “mutually benefi-

cial” and emphasized “the necessity of acting against Iranian

nuclear ambitions” in 2013.13 NATO, the U.S., Germany

and the Netherlands should insist on the reconciliation and

explain its benefits to Turkey. The first signs of this are

becoming apparent: while Turkey actively blocked Israeli

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen listens to Turkey’s Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz during a NATO defense ministers´ meeting at the Alliance headquarters in Brussels (Photo: Reuters)


NATO participation, it now seems to ease its reserva-

tions.14 The Turkish administration might, however, insist

on low-publicity steps or discrete intelligence cooperation

in order to conceal its miscalculation to the public and to

feed the narrative of a strong Muslim democracy that

stands up to Israel. Nevertheless, it should be clearly de-

manded that Ankara works towards an honest and publicly

acknowledged reconciliation with Jerusalem. In terms of

meeting the geostrategic goal of deterring a nuclear Iran, a

strong and publicly visible collective defense alliance built

on a Turkish-Israeli security pillar appears to be a robust

strategy. Nationalist pride or loosing face can be no excuse

for either side.

Iranian and Russian Reservations

Iran will continue its support for Assad by all means. In

the course of the Syrian crisis, Iran lost a tangible strategic

asset, making weapons deliveries to radical-Shiite Hezbol-

lah in Lebanon more difficult. As the Iranian regime is un-

der heavy pressure due to Western sanctions, which are

leading to a massively deteriorating economic situation, it

might consider drastic options or moderate its tone to fo-

cus on inner stability.

Iranian officials panicked at the deployment of the Pa-

triots. General Hassan Firouzabadi, the Iranian armed forc-

es chief, said "Each one of these Patriots is a black mark on

the world map, and is meant to cause a world war.15" Rus-

sia subsequently problematized its support for Assad and

shares Western concerns about chemical weapons falling

into the wrong hands. Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev said

in an interview that the Russians "never said that our goal

was to preserve the current political regime, or making

sure that President Assad stays in power.16"

Germany will not play an active political role in regard

to Syria, nor will the U.S. But both will not block a NATO

strategy that is well thought out and led by Turkey. Ger-

many and the Netherlands could participate in helping

Turkey deal with the problem of Syrian refugees – which

recently topped the mark of more than 700.000 - by

providing refuge to fleeing Syrians to ease the burden on

Turkey. Engaging and being led by the most important

Muslim ally would furthermore benefit the legitimacy of

the alliance in the region. In the end, Turkey could be-

come the regional power hub it seeks to be - but only if

Ankara is in organic concert with Jerusalem. This optimi-

zation strategy and the grouping of all actors in the course

of the Patriot deployment would not overstretch any of the

passive members of the alliance. A lot rests on Ankara´s

willingness and courage to correct a strategic mistake, get

things back together with Israel and lead the line of defense

as a pillar of NATO on the Eastern rim.

Niklas Anzinger works as a research assistant for the Mideast Freedom Forum Berlin and as an editorial assistant for Turkish Policy Quarterly in the course of an exchange semes-ter at the Marmara University in Istanbul.

Ludwig Jung holds a B.A. degree in Philosophy & Econom-ics from the University of Bayreuth. He is currently pursu-ing a M.Sc. degree in Foreign Service at Georgetown Uni-versity's School of Foreign Service, sponsored by the Ful-bright Program.

1. Soner Cagaptay and David Pollock. Whatever Happened to “The Turkish Model”?. January 7, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/whatever-happened-to-the-turkish-model 2. Soner Cagaptay. Syria's War Affecting Turkey in Unexpected Ways. January 29, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrias-war-affecting-turkey-in-unexpected-ways 3. Aaron Stein and Dov Friedman. Could Turkey Beat Syria?. October 10, 2012. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/could-turkey-beat-syria-7575 4. Aaron Stein. Turkey Marches toward Missile Defense. August 23, 2012. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkey-marches-toward-missile-defense-7387 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Foreign Ministers’ statement on Patriot deployment to Turkey. December 4, 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6BD09A4E-BF227793/natolive/news_92476.htm 6. Aaron Stein and Shashank Joshi. Missile Creep – Was giving Patriots a step toward war in Syria?. December 10, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/10/missile_creep?page=0,0 7. Philipp C. Bleek and Aaron Stein. Turkey and America Face Iran. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 54, no. 2, April–May 2012, pp. 27–38. 8. Isabel Kershner. Israel Cancels Military Contract With Turkey to Supply Aerial System. December 23, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/world/middleeast/israel-cancels-military-contract-with-turkey.html?_r=1& 9. Jodi Rudoren and Anne Barnard. Israel Girds for Attacks as Syria Falls Apart. January 27, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/world/middleeast/refugee-crisis-grows-as-violence-flares-across-syria.html?_r=0 10. Jodi Rudoren. Qatar’s Emir Visits Gaza, Pledging $400 Million to Hamas. October 23, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/world/middleeast/pledging-400-million-qatari-emir-makes-historic-visit-to-gaza-strip.html?_r=0 11.Today´s Zaman. Israeli PM: Positive ties between Israel and Turkey would benefit both sides. December 11, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-300801-israeli-pm-positive-ties-between-israel-and-turkey-would-benefit-both-sides.html 12. Hilary Leila Krieger. Israel to join NATO activities amidst Turkey tension. December 23, 2012. http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=297004 13. Reuters. Iran warns Turkey not to deploy Patriot missiles. December 15, 2012. http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/12/15/syria-crisis-iran-idINDEE8BE04E20121215 14. Matt Smith. Al-Assad's grip on power "slipping away," Medvedev says. January 28, 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/27/world/europe/russia-syria/index.html?hpt=hp_t3 15. Reuters. Syrian refugees top 700,000 as exodus swells: U.N. January 29, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/us-syria-crisis-refugees-idUSBRE90S0AR20130129 16. Washington Post Editorial. Consequences of U.S. inaction in Syria are clear. January 29, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/consequences-of-us-inaction-in-syria-are-clear/2013/01/28/a03dad0e-6978-11e2-95b3-272d604a10a3_story.html

About the authors


harmonization of their strategic and tactical doctrines in order

to arrive someday at mutual defence concepts. From this per-

spective, the Élysée Treaty contained highly ambitious tar-

gets. The most significant steps towards this aim were prede-

fined in the creation of French-German institutes for opera-

tional research, binational exchange programs, intercultural

and language instructions amongst the troops, joint armament

and research projects based on common financing and regular

meetings of the responsible political and military authorities.2

In fact, the Élysée Treaty as such was nothing new. It was

rather the product of a ten-year-old French-German military

rapprochement process which had already passed through

several stations. These include, for example, the collapsed

project of European Defence Community

elaborated by Pleven and Monnet, coop-

eration in the European Union and

NATO, arms deals, first approaches to-

wards nuclear cooperation and the agree-

ments of Colomb-Béchard 1956 and

Strauß-Messmer 1960.3 The majority of strategists of that

period aimed at a French-German military cooperation within

the existing frames of NATO and the WEU. However, in the

1950s and early 1960s one major aspect of European security

policy was good relations with the US. Germany and France

competed at the same time for the best position within the

US-European defence strategy against the Soviet Union. That

situation would change fundamentally during the early 1960s.

French and German Reactions to McNamara’s Flexi-

ble Response

De Gaulle and Adenauer, filled with a spirit of distrust

towards the new American president John F. Kennedy and

general McNamara’s revolutionizing concept of flexible re-

sponse, feared that European security might lose value within

US strategy.4 Was there a more independent, European alter-

native? De Gaulle, convinced of the military strength of his

G ermany and France, who have been age-old

fierce enemies and waged wars against one

another for centuries, are now each other’s

closest and most important bilateral partners in terms of

political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. Hence,

the partnership between Germany and France has been de-

clared as the main engine of European integration.1 The

Élysée Treaty, signed on January 22nd, 1963 by French Pres-

ident Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad

Adenauer, is in the collective memory and identity on ei-

ther side of the river Rhine. It continues to stand as the

most important and frequently commemorated cornerstone

of French-German cooperation along the road to a united

Europe. The main objective of the treaty

was to implement a long-term consoli-

dation and sustainable French-German

solidarity with respect to economic and

cultural development, but also with re-

spect to the security of the two peoples.

Unfortunately, the aspect of security, of bilateral strategic

doctrines, military cooperation and common defence policy

has been neglected for quite some time. The 50th anniver-

sary of the Élysée Treaty this year is an opportune moment

to recall this key element of Europe’s defence strategy and

to analyze its historical genesis. Especially today, under the

impression of contemporary crises, we ought to elucidate

the chances and risks of an enhanced pragmatic French-

German military cooperation from a bilateral, European

and transatlantic point of view.

First Steps Toward a Franco-German Military Co-

operation in the 1950s-60s

The core issues and principles of the Élysée Treaty in

the domain of defence and security policy can only be un-

derstood adequately in the historical context of the 1950s

and 1960s. Both governments pursued an assimilation and

The Élysée Treaty began with a near catastrophic start

Dialogues, Doctrines, Disappointments The Élysée Treaty in the Context of Transatlantic Partnership

and European Common Security and Defence Policy


armed forces within the force de

frappe and encouraged by French

military nuclear capability, con-

sidered a classical alliance system

instead of the former European

and transatlantic integration. He

attempted several times to con-

vince Germany of an alternative

Franco-German strategic, mili-

tary and nuclear partnership.

Bonn, for its part, sought to find

a balance between Paris and

Washington and wanted to dis-

appoint neither the European

neighbour nor the transatlantic ally. In this context, the Élysée

Treaty must be seen as an approach to find a French-German

common answer to the American concept of flexible response,

which was in that time interpreted by de Gaulle and Adenauer

as insufficient and dangerous. They wanted to set new trends

for the European and transatlantic alliance but did not suc-

ceed. In this regard the Élysée Treaty began with a near cata-

strophic start and was regarded critically across the Atlantic

Ocean and even among many German and French experts.5

From that moment on, French and German security

policy started to drift apart from each other. Due to different

strategic orientations and mentalities, the noble objectives of

mutual defence concepts embedded in the Élysée Treaty expe-

rienced a significant slowdown, if not to say a prolonged stag-

nation.6 Was the desired partnership visionary or unrealistic?

Germany had to choose between Paris or Washington. The

German government and military elite considered justifiably

and realistically that France could never be a proper alterna-

tive or substitute for the US as the protecting power against

the Soviet threat. While the Federal Republic of Germany

reinforced its transatlantic integration, de Gaulle launched a

unique national strategy in France beyond the structures of

NATO. After the affair about the preamble to the Élysée Trea-

ty, de Gaulle became increasingly disillusioned and decided in

1966 to withdraw the French military from NATO and to

shelve the ideas of a close strategic partnership with Bonn.7

Although the French-German

dialogue never came to a com-

plete end, it has never been able

to match the high expectations

of the Élysée Treaty in the do-

main of bilateral strategy and

defence policy.

Military Pragmatism In-

stead of Common Doctrines

However, one shall not

deny some specific successes of

French-German military cooper-

ation that may open up new

opportunities for future devel-

opment. The request for military interoperability between

German and French troops has experienced several sponta-

neous revitalisations since the 1980s. On the initiative of

Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, continued

later by Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand, a new kind

of rapprochement led to the creation of the Franco-German

Brigade in 1986 and the Franco-German Defence and Secu-

rity Council in 1988. Furthermore the joint commitment in

Eurocorps, where Germany and France are the most im-

portant framework nations has yielded a variety of results

that include: several approaches to naval cooperation since

1992, the German and French refusal to participate in the

war against Iraq, cooperation in NATO and EU missions,

combined joint task forces and also various armament pro-

jects like the foundation of European Aeronautic Defence

and Space Company EADS or programs like Transall, Ro-

land, Tiger, A-400 etc. Each of these shows that joint pro-

jects are still possible and capable of consensus despite cer-

tain problems.8 The Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty opened

the door for a common security and defence policy in Eu-

rope – an opportunity for Germany and France to further

solidify their strategic partnership. Moreover, after the

reintegration of France into NATO structures and the latest

announcement of the US to concentrate more on the geo-

political situation in Asia-Pacific, France and Germany

might be motivators for the reorganization and reinvention

Adenauer & de Gaulle (Photo-Die Welt)


tion of Smart Defence or pooling and sharing projects.

The successes on the tactical level and the established

routines of military cooperation are an important expres-

sion of the reconciliation between the German and the

French people. They are witness to the successful healing of

ancient rivalries and for pragmatic bilateral forms of Euro-

pean integration along the road to a common security and

defence policy. But they do not necessarily give legitimacy

to further steps towards an enhanced mutual bilateral strate-

gy. That is why an open and honest debate on the chances

and risks, on common interests and strategic necessities

must be held not only bilaterally in France and Germany,

but also in the frameworks of the EU and NATO. Is there

enough political will for such projects? The question must

be asked whether an enhanced Franco-German strategic

partnership would be profitable or

even necessary and in which de-

gree it might help to find adequate

answers to contemporary security

challenges. Where does consent or

dissent dominate? Furthermore it

is important to determine why the Franco-German partner-

ship currently remains dissatisfactory and stagnating. Where

are the problems and what possible solutions do exist? Fi-

nally it is appropriate to analyze some imaginable scenarios

and concrete spheres of an enhanced cooperation between

Germany and France. What lessons were already learned

and what suggestions and advice can be given for the future

development?

Germany and France as Peacemakers and Motiva-

tors for CSDP?

In a recent plenary sitting of the German Bundestag

on the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, Andreas

Schockenhoff, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parlia-

mentary group for foreign affairs, affairs of the European

Union and defence policy, illustrated that European Com-

mon Security and Defence Policy will not progress if Ger-

many and France did not act in concert. What does that

mean? A reform process for a common European geostrate-

gic approach is long overdue. A common position concern-

of NATO, especially in today’s situation of squeezed national

defence budgets leading to pooling, sharing and Smart De-

fence. Although the Élysée Treaty was so far not yet able to

contribute in any way to the desired formulation and conduct

of mutual Franco-German doctrines or strategies, it showed

initial signs of success below the abstract level of strategy.

Interoperability and Cooperation Underneath the Strategic Level

Ulrich de Maizière, former Chief of Federal Armed Forces

Staff, diagnosed that a further substantial deepening of the

Franco-German military cooperation required an overcome of

persisting basic disagreements in the context of security policy

and strategy. Nevertheless, scope is still left underneath the

strategic level. A further extension of personal relations, mu-

tual tactic doctrines and an improvement of interoperability

with regard to logistics and armament were, according to de

Maizière, still imaginable. That is exactly the appropriate basis

and groundwork upon which

German and French military

and political authorities may

give new impetus towards the

goals of the Élysée Treaty. As

French troops stayed in Germany until 1994 and as Germany

played a major role as mediator between France and NATO

before the reintegration of the French armed forces into

NATO structures, a regular bilateral contact between Ger-

man and French soldiers on all levels of military hierarchy

provided a solid basis of interoperability and intercultural

understanding of each other’s military traditions and mentali-

ties. Cooperation in armament projects first led to develop-

ments towards a higher degree of tactical interoperability. It

will be particularly important to work on further cooperation

projects of that kind, first and foremost in the framework of

NATO and the EU. These chances have not yet been suffi-

ciently exhausted. Differences in military mentality, historical

tradition and tactical procedures will undoubtedly continue to

exist between the German and French armed forces. Like

Ludwig Erhard said back in 1965, if there were no disagree-

ments at all, the Friendship Treaty would have never been

necessary for mutual approximations. But in the spirit of a

concept of productive opposites, each side could fertilize the

other and try to exchange tactical and technical know-how.

The gained experience could be helpful in the future realiza-

A reform process for a common European geostrategic approach is long overdue


ing geopolitics and strategy would ensure that the European

continent remains a competitive actor in today’s increasingly

uncertain geopolitical environment. As Europe is still de-

pendent on the military force of the USA, defence policy

within the EU must be complementary to NATO. And it

must react to America’s shift towards the Asia-Pacific. In this

context America’s pivot to Asia will not only weaken the

West. Positively speaking, it creates more space for European

creativity accompanied by growing obligations and responsi-

bilities. But instead of searching for a common ground, we

experience a resurgence of national grand strategies, of geo-

political diversification and uncoordinated diplomatic multi-

polarity outside the structures of CSDP and even NATO.

France’s strategic priorities lie in the European neighbor-

hood, in the Mediterranean, in North Africa, Sahel-zone, Red

Sea, Gulf of Aden and Levant – regions that are crucial for

European security but alarmingly insecure and labile. On the

other hand, Germany has great difficulty in finding clearly

stated strategic interests. Both countries have to meet each

other halfway, resume their bilateral dialogue and coordinate

their strategic agenda. In a similar manner, success was al-

ready achieved in the

economic spheres during

the euro crisis. Germany

and France acted as ac-

cepted pacemakers and

role models without

forcing their political

ideas upon the other

European partners. Thus

Germany has to take

more initiative and re-

sponsibility in the do-

main of European strate-

gic necessities and invest

the military capabilities

of the Bundeswehr,

while France has to avoid

playing a lone hand in

military and diplomatic campaigns.

How Far is Germany Able and Willing to Go in

Questions of Defence?

Germany’s hesitance and procrastination in security

and defence questions, such as the controversy about the

deployment of Tornado airplanes with reconnaissance

equipment in Afghanistan 2007 or the German rejection of

the military intervention in Libya 2011, entailed a certain

degree of distrust among the members of NATO. Some

may even sneer at Germany’s pacifistic stance in interna-

tional relations leading to a certain degree of isolation.

From the French perspective, the chances and risks of an

enhanced military and strategic partnership simply depend

on the question, how far is Germany really able and willing

to go in questions of defence? Due to the political culture,

but also with regard to manpower, equipment and expend-

itures, the military capability of the Bundeswehr – and

even more so of the German Navy – is regarded as rather

limited and below comparable countries of the European

Union such as France or the United Kingdom. As a conse-

quence France started to query whether Germany shall

really be the predestinated partner for defence coopera-

tion. Alternatives do exist. France and

the United Kingdom, for instance,

took the decision in 2011 and 2012 to

raise their defence and security coop-

eration to unprecedented levels. They

aim at expanding their cooperation in

military capabilities, industry, opera-

tions, intelligence and nuclear weap-

ons. Analysts fear that France and the

United Kingdom might turn away

completely from CSDP, although they

both signified as well that they desired

a closer cooperation with Germany. A

triangle Berlin-Paris-London, or a

reinforcement of the Weimar Trian-

gle, whether these are utopian endeav-

ours or not, they are adequate per-

spectives for a further stage in the

development from a Franco-German Merkel and Hollande in France (Photo- Epoch Times)


About the author

and reduced defence expenditures among the European

states on the other, coherence and cooperation is more

necessary than ever. The rather irregular retreat of west-

ern forces from Afghanistan and the German attitude to-

wards operation Unified Protector in Libya are two exam-

ples of inadequate cooperation. In the elaboration of Smart

Defence, Germany and France could work closer together.

In the actual crisis of Mali, Germany could set an example,

take more responsibility and support the French campaign

to a greater extent. Similarly to the spontaneous revitaliza-

tions of the Élysée Treaty in the 1980s, the Franco-

German partnership must be adapted to actual necessities

of strategy and defence policy. Thus it will maintain its

high value for Germany and France, for Europe and for the

Transatlantic Partnership.

Kai Peter Schönfeld is a German Navy officer and stu-dent of history and sociology doing his Masters at Helmut Schmidt University - University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg. Since 2012 he is blogging on “Sicherheit vernetzt” about European foreign and defence policy, transatlantic partnership and maritime security. In 2012 he spent six months in Montpellier, France as part of

an interuniversity exchange program.

1. DEMESMAY, Claire: Hat der deutsch-französische Bilateralismus Zukunft?, APuZ 1-3 2013, p. 37. 2. Text of the Franco-German Treaty signed in Paris, 22nd January 1963, in: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ASSEMBLY, GENERAL AF-

FAIRS COMMITTEE (ed.): A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe 1963,

March 1964, p. 29f. 3. GAUZY, Florence: Die Verteidigung. Von der Anpassung der Doktrinen zu gemeinsamen Konzepten?, in: DEFRANCE, Corine; PFEIL, Ulrich (ed.): Der Élysée-Vertrag und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1945 – 1963 – 2003, München 2005, p. 130-134. 4. SOUTOU, Georges-Henri: L’arrière-plan stratégique du traité de l’Elysée, in: C2SD; CEHD (ed.): Bilan et perspectives de la coopération militaire franco-allemande de 1963 à nos jours, Paris 1999, p. 108f. 5. PFEIL, Ulrich: Zur Bedeutung des Élysée-Vertrags, APuZ 1-3 2013, p. 3f. 6. SOUTOU, Georges-Henri: L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands 1954 – 1996, Paris 1996, p. 45ff. 7. CONZE, Eckart: Die gaullistische Herausforderung. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958-1963, München 1995, p. 276ff.; REYN, Sebastian: Atlantis lost. The American experience with De Gaulle 1958-1969, Amsterdam 2010, p. 249ff. 8. BOYER, Yves; LE GLOANNEC, Anne-Marie: La coopération franco-allemande en matière de défense. Jusqu’où l’Allemagne peut-elle aller?, Note de la FRS, 14 juin 2007, p. 1f.

defense partnership towards CDSP. For this objective

there must be more than political will, but rather creative

initiatives, concrete challenges and joint projects.

Initiatives and Specific Needs for the Future

Agenda of Franco-German Cooperation

For the foreseeable future, the Franco-German

declarations on European defence and security policy

signed in February 2012 and on armament cooperation

from June 2012, can be useful approaches. Progress has to

be generated in the framework of three key areas:

1) Industrial cooperation, armament and tactical interoper-

ability: As described in the latest armament declaration,

Germany and France may work together to carry on re-

search in the areas of main ground combat systems, artil-

lery, aviation and helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles,

naval systems, communication, satellite technologies and

aerospace. Furthermore a mutually satisfactory future for

EADS as a leading defence and military contractor must be

found. The cooperation amongst the France-Germany Bri-

gade and Eurocorps needs to be continued or even extend-

ed and further developed.

2) Deepened dialogues among politi-

cal, diplomatic and military authori-

ties: Besides the dominating topic of

the euro and financial crisis, the dia-

logue on foreign affairs, geopolitics

and strategy has to come back to mind. The upgrading of

the Franco-German Defence and Security Council may

provide an appropriate framework for that, prior to the

committees and institutions of NATO and the EU. Notably

Berlin has to react more strikingly to approaches and pro-

posals of defence and security cooperation. The coopera-

tion among the composition of the new French defence

white paper should be further supported and encouraged.

3) Coherent political and military reactions to current cri-

ses: In times of political deconstruction and geopolitical

uncertainty in the European neighborhood on the one hand

There must be more than political will, but rather creative initiatives


In numbers, MoNYS 2012 meant 220 participants,

77 universities involved, 5 continents and 37 countries

represented, 22 guests and speakers, 6 NATO Committees

simulated, 12 major topics debated; 6 days at the highest

diplomatic level. But for its participants, MoNYS meant so

much more: it was a week full of life changing events.

Join MoNYS 2013!

The second edition of MoNYS will be held between

the 8th and 13th of July 2013. This time the Summit will

focus on the importance of NATO’s close relations with its

Member States and Partners and the necessity of them

joining their efforts in achieving the main transatlantic ob-

jectives. All the debates during MoNYS 2013 will evolve

around next year’s central theme: “Defining NATO capabili-

ties towards 2020 - Meeting Future Global Security Challenges

through Cooperation, Collaboration and Crisis Management.”

If you have always envisioned yourself as a future

world leader and opinion maker, now is the time to apply!

MoNYS is looking for students aged between 18 and 28,

with experience and demonstrated interest in such simula-

tions, having a deep understanding of how the internation-

al political scene functions and how world changing deci-

sions are taken.

You can register as an individual delegate, as a

member of a delegation, or as a journalist. A delega-

tion must be formed of 6 people (5 delegates and one am-

bassador), all enrolled in the same university. For further

information, complete eligibility criteria and application

forms, please refer to www.natoyouthsummit.org. The

final deadline for receiving the applications is January

31st, 2013.

Start Your World Career At the

Model NATO Youth Summit

Do you know everything about NATO, or do you wish to

know more? Do you want to prove you have the skills and

the knowledge to become a senior diplomat? Do you

strongly believe you have the power to change the world?

If your answer is “Yes!” to all of the questions above, your

place is at Model NATO Youth Summit 2013!

Why Model NATO Youth Summit?

Model NATO Youth Summit (MoNYS) is the larg-

est international simulation of NATO’s decision-making

process in the world and the only one in Europe. The pro-

ject aims to raise awareness on the mission and main activi-

ties of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while cre-

ating a platform for the young generation to debate on the

major social and political issues that our society faces to-

day. MoNYS gives its young participants the means, the

time and the space to practice their skills and develop the

knowledge they acquired in universities, with the ultimate

goal of shaping them into future world leaders.

The First Big Success: MoNYS 2012

The first edition of MoNYS took place in July 2012.

Students from all over the world arrived in Brussels keen

to discover what it means to work for one of the most

powerful international institutions. For one week, they

debated on topics of great significance for the evolution of

the global society and received valuable information from

the keynote speakers and guests of MoNYS; among them,

the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,

whom the participants had the privilege to meet during

their visit to NATO Headquarters.

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,

Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37

countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,

the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially

include to the successor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues.

◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

◊ the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in

Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of

international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with

NATO.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-

able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues

of importance to the NATO Alliance.

For details of how to submit your work please see our website.

Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the

address listed below.

Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and re-main the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.

Editor: Jason Wiseman

ATA Programs

As part of its on-going Public Lecture Series, on January 23rd,

the Atlantic Council of Albania is hosting a public lecture on civil-

military relations at the state University of Tirana.

On January 25th the Slovak Atlantic Commission will present

its fifth study from the series of the Transatlantic Policy Briefs that

will center on the debate regarding the contribution of Central

European countries to glob-

al security. The piece will

be read by Tomas A. Nagy

and Peter Wagner, and will

focus on the Visegrad coun-

tries contribution to

NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.

On December 14th the Atlantic Council of Finland hosted its

Annual Autumn Meeting in Helsinki. The event featured a speech

from Heli Santala, Secretary General of the Advisory Board for

Defence Information from the Finnish Ministry of Defence.

Documents

Atlantic Voices Vol 3. no. 1