Atlantic Voices Vol. 2, no.6

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 1

Volume 2 - Issue 6, June 2012

Contents:

Global Pulse: Naval war games in the East

Joelle Westlund examines the recent developments in the Yellow Sea, where a series

of trilateral naval exercises of South Korea, Japan and the US have triggered new ten-

sions between these countries and the People’s Republic of China. Will the conflict go

beyond words?

Security in the Sahel: A forgotten conflict and why it matters

Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli examines the long-standing conflict in the Western Sahara,

where the Saharawi population is longing for independence while Morocco is claiming

ownership of the territory. She warns of the severe consequences of a resumption of

the armed conflict for the entire Sahel region.

In the shadow of the Arab Spring: THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

In the shadows of the Arab uprisings in Tu-

nisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and several other

countries, which received worldwide attention,

another region in the ‘backyard’ of the South-

ern Mediterranean is (re-)developing towards a

major political and humanitarian crisis - the

Sahel region. This region should, however, get

more attention from the international commu-

nity, above all the UN and EU. Mali is cur-

rently making headlines because of the coopera-

tion of Islamist groups and Tuareg rebels in the

north of the country. The long-standing con-

flict of the Western Sahara has the same under-

lying matter: a territorial issue - in this case

between the Polisario Front and the govern-

ment of Morocco.

Both conflicts, however, demonstrate that

we need to look beyond the northern rim of

Africa and actively facilitate solutions to the

territorial disputes and political conflicts which

threaten to gain a religious-extremist dimen-

sion. If Europe does not contribute to a sophis-

ticated conflict-settlement in the Sahel region,

the political and humanitarian crisis situation

will trigger new waves of migration or even

turn the region into a new safe haven for

Islamist terrorists. - Florian Bauernfeind

Signs on the way to the refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria (Photo: G. Pellegrini-Bettoli)

IS

SN

2294-1

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On 21 and 22 June 2012, South Korea, Japan, and the US

carried out a series of trilateral naval exercises in the southern

islands of Jeju in the Korean Peninsula. The operation was

described as being “of a humanitarian nature” by the Republic

of Korea (ROK) Defense Ministry, as it included search and

rescue practices

along with mari-

time interdiction

drills to improve

response times

and communica-

tion.

The inclusion

of the Japanese

Maritime Self-

Defense Force

troops in this co-

operative naval

maneuver is un-

precedented in

the history of Ja-

pan-South Korea relations. In previous US-ROK military

exercises, Japan has played an observatory role, but has re-

mained distant militarily due to historical legacies. The latest

drill is expected to bolster cooperation between the three

allies and “will perform as a framework in further improving

the military relationship,” stated research fellow Park Chang

Kwoun of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. How-

ever, for neighbouring states like China, the renewed engage-

ment represents an escalation of enmity in the region already

fraught with tension.

China’s response to the drill was explicit and blatant in its

opposition. The

Chinese People’s

Liberation Army

Navy admiral Yin

Zhuo claimed that

the objective of the

exercises was to

keep a watchful eye

on China, particu-

larly as a way to

monitor its military

activity. Zhuo fur-

ther remarked that

Seoul, Washington,

and Tokyo had

“taken the first

steps towards a ‘mini-NATO’ in Northeast Asia with their

joint military exercises.”

While it is true that the trilateral activities signal a shift in

the American military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region,

China’s accusations must be taken in stride. As a founding

member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),

Naval war games in the East By Joelle Westlund

The transatlantic partnership was forged in war two generations ago and maintained for decades under the looming threat of re-

newed conflict. With the Alliance now at a crossroads, its future depends on the active engagement of its members’ young citizens.

Committed to this endeavor, YATA is proud to partner with Atlantic Voices and help bring the opinions, analysis, and commentary of

young Atlanticists to the forefront of international debate. By presenting security, economic, and diplomatic issues through the eyes

of future policy and decision makers, Global Pulse aims to build a bridge between the challenges of today and the solutions of tomor-

row.

South Korean marines corps takes part in the joint military exercise on Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea (Photo: New York Times)

GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE


China has spearheaded multiple military drills in the last year

that have contributed greatly to rising tensions in the region.

An operation that took place at the end of April 2012 is

particularly noteworthy. In conjunc-

tion with Russia, China carried out a

six-day defensive exercise off the

coastal Shandong province in the sensi-

tive Yellow Sea, just west of the Ko-

rean Peninsula. The mandate of the

drill was comparable to the exercises implemented by South

Korea, Japan and the US, as it included reconnaissance,

search and rescue, and tactical air defense. Under the code

name ‘Maritime Cooperation 2012’, China and Russia com-

bined 16 Chinese warships, 13 warplanes, two submarines

and seven Russian surface ships, one of which set voyage

through the narrow Strait of Japan. The Washington Times

called this highly provocative gesture a projection of power

that “will become a vehicle of Chinese coercion in the future.”

The military drills were particularly significant because

they operated for the first time outside of the framework of

the SCO, which in recent months has focused its mandate on

combating terrorism. Inaugurated in 2001, the SCO was es-

tablished as a non-alliance, intergovernmental institution

comprised of key member states China, Kazakhstan, Kyr-

gyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The organiza-

tion’s call for peace and security in Central Asia has been

accompanied by multilateral counter-terrorism practices.

China commanded the latest exercises under the operational

name “Peace Mission 2012” that took place days after the 12th

SCO Annual Summit at the beginning of June.

April’s naval maneuver is yet another expression of Bei-

jing’s and Moscow’s strategic partnership to counter the

United States’ pivot in the region and boost bilateral rela-

tions. Speaking on Russian engagement, the Chinese Presi-

dent Hu Jintao declared: “We will strengthen our strategic

cooperation on international issues, work together for the

revitalization of both our countries, and safeguard the peace,

stability and security of the region.”

While naval drills can play an impor-

tant role in diplomatic affairs, reflect-

ing partnerships and mutual under-

standing, the rhetorical backlash they

frequently trigger is often inflamma-

tory and dramatized. When justifying the Sino-Russian mili-

tary exercises, Zhang Junshe, Deputy Director of the Naval

Military Studies Institute, claimed: “Every military needs

drills to test its armed forces through exercises, neither China

nor its neighbors are exceptions. There is no need to specu-

late about each other’s normal military activities.” If there is

indeed “no need” for speculation then there should similarly

be no need for a double standard regarding these exercises.

The consequence of such rhetoric for political relation-

ships and regional diplomacy is the fostering of tensions and

polarity. Ultimately, both the United States and China will

continue with their military exercises in cooperation with

their respective allies, and an intensified discourse surround-

ing these activities will certainly not defuse relations in the

future.

Joelle Westlund is an Asia-Pacific Policy Analyst at the Atlan-

tic Council of Canada. She is currently working towards a Mas-ter’s Degree in Political Science at the University of Toronto. Joelle holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from the University of Toronto and has studied at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic as well as the Hebrew University in Jerusa-lem.

The rhetorical backlash naval drills frequently trigger is often

inflammatory and dramatized.

Aboard the deck of the USS George Washington during the joint naval exercises in South Korea in June 2012 (Photo: epa)

Chinese officers visit a Russian vessel taking part in the China-Russia joint exercises in the Yellow Sea (Photo: China Daily)


by Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli

T he issue of security in the Sahel has gained mo-

mentum in the agenda of the European Union

resulting in the 2011 ‘EU Strategy for Security

and Development in the Sahel’. This article will focus on the

issue of Western Sahara, recently referred to by Le Monde

Diplomatique as one of Africa’s ‘marginalized conflicts’. The

analysis’ main objective is to elaborate on the present percep-

tion which considers this con-

flict as ‘marginal’ and examine

the different scenarios that

such a simplistic understand-

ing of the issue could lead to,

both for the Sahel and the EU.

To avoid putting evidence

on Procuste’s bed or claiming

Cassandran foresight, this

study will address the context

of present day Sahel and

Northern Africa, the origins

of the conflict in Western

Sahara and the possible sce-

narios resulting from a continued status quo and its repercus-

sions (if any) on the wider region, the potential implications

for the EU, and a caveat on the importance of interpreting

factual evidence (or admit lack of it) in this complex region

with the nuanced attention it deserves and requires. Ulti-

mately, consideration will be given on how to frame the defi-

nition of ‘conflict on the margins’ and the dangers of failing to

identify in it the seeds for ‘full-blown’ conflicts.

This study does not claim to provide answers to the com-

plexities of the region but to draw attention to the wave of

discontent among the young Saharawi generation who was

born in refugee camps and where this discontent could lead to

if a solution to the dead-lock of negotiations is not reached.

Northern Africa and the Sahel

This study will refer to the Sahel region as defined by the

European Union in a narrow approach to include Mauritania

in the west through Mali, Niger, northern Burkina Faso, Chad

and southern Algeria (although most studies do not consider

southern Algeria as belonging to the Sahel). However, the

region has to be analyzed, in the past and even more so today,

within the context of its interdependence with Northern Af-

rica: Algeria and Libya in particular, and to a lesser extent

Morocco. What characterizes these three nations, at least

prior to the Arab Spring and the resulting state of uncertainty

after the demise of Qadhafy, is the presence of state authority

which means high invest-

ments devoted to the defense

sector. The core of the Sahel

region, north and northwest

of Mauritania, north of Mali

and Niger, in contrast is char-

acterized by an only nominal

central government authority

and comparably low invest-

ment in defense.

Populating the region are

Arab, Toubou, Peul, oasis

communities of Songhai, Housa

and Kanuri as well as Tuareg.

They have a nomadic lifestyle and are found most prevalently

in northern parts of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, but also in

southern Algeria and Libya. The largest Tamasheq speaking

populations are in Niger and Algeria and levels of integration

vary considerably. In Mali in particular Tuareg communities

were progressively alienated from the national self-definition in

the 20th century and have sought autonomy numerous times in

the past. However this process has not been linear nor has it

equally affected all Tamasheq speaking communities. The Arab

Spring in Northern Africa has had a direct effect both on the

security issues in the Sahel and Europe’s interaction with the

region. Part of the dilemma for Europe has been how to pro-

mote security in cooperation with the sovereign governments

in the region. Strong economic interests tie the EU to North-

ern Africa but also single bilateral agreements play an impor-

tant role in single member states’ interests. The ousting of

Qadhafi has had its most blatant consequences, resulting in

Security in the Sahel - a forgotten conflict and why it matters

February 27 March, the day of the proclamation of the SADR, a tribute that takes place every year (All photos: G. Pellegrini-Bettoli)


Western Sahara

In the backdrop of these geographic boundaries and ethnic

and tribal diversities, the last African colonial issue lies semi-

forgotten: the disputed territory of Western Sahara con-

tended between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario

Front, a Saharawi national liberation movement pursuing the

independence of the region from Morocco. Western Sahara is

a sparsely-populated area located on the Atlantic coast of

north western Africa. Its natural resources are phosphates and

the stretch of sea is rich in fish. The area

was traditionally inhabited by nomadic

Arab tribes, collectively known as Sa-

harawis, notorious for their long history

of resistance to outside domination.

Western Sahara was under Spanish colo-

nial domination since 1884.

Morocco’s Claim

The position of Morocco is that this territory is an integral

part of its kingdom, and it is therefore willing to grant a de-

gree of autonomy to the region but refuses any referendum

on independence as it would undermine the integrity of the

Moroccan state. Morocco’s claim on the territory is based on

the fact that the Western Sahara is part of the Greater

Maghreb which was historically allied with the Moroccan

Sultanate and fought as part of the Moroccan Liberation Army

against Spain. According to the Moroccan monarchy, histori-

cal, economic, religious, and military ties between the Mo-

roccan sultan and the Saharawi tribal councils prove that Mo-

rocco always exercised authority on Western Sahara. The

International Court of Justice acknowledged such ties but

considered them not sufficient to prove Moroccan sover-

eignty over the territory.

Additionally, there are numerous cultural and historic

bonds between the people of southern Morocco and the peo-

ple of the Western Sahara, emphasized by the Moroccans to

strengthen their territorial claims. There are now hundreds of

thousands (numbers vary according to sources) of Moroccans

living in the Western Sahara, many of whom have lived there

for a generation.

Polisario Front’s Claim

The Polisario Front was founded in 1973, born from a Sa-

harawi student movement in Morocco in 1971 with the aim,

further destabilization of the entire Sahel. Libya played a vital

economic and political role for many in the region, one that

now needs to be filled.

Both Libya and Algeria played a mitigating role in the past

in the Sahel, for example mediating in the numerous Tuareg

rebellions. The Tuareg who used to serve under Qadhafi re-

turning to northern Mali after his demise, have allegedly

taken with them armaments which have been used to rekindle

the rebellion. While Polisario Front Minister of Foreign Af-

fairs, Ould Salek, expresses concern

for land-to-air missiles that used to

belong to Colonel Qadhafi circulating

in the region, other experts instead

fear the smaller weapons, leading to a

general increase in criminality1. The

falling of the regimes in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt undeniably

have had an effect on countries such as Algeria and Morocco

as well, resulting in them paying close attention to their own

country’s internal state of affairs. Should either of these coun-

tries experience an Arab Spring, chaos in the region would

increase even further.

The Sahel has also become an increasingly important tran-

sit area for drug trafficking and kidnapping and is home to Al

Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which is involved in both

activities. Lastly, the current food crisis in the region risks

pushing the already delicate equilibrium to a full blown politi-

cal crisis. A recent study on the effectiveness of the EU Strat-

egy in the Sahel identifies the security threat in the Sahel as

‘endemic’ and an opportunity for the EU to assert itself as an

international development actor.

The Polisario front defines itself not as a government but as a liberation movement.


at the time, of militarily forcing the end of Spanish coloniza-

tion in Western Sahara. Worthy of note is the fact that the

Polisario Front (Pour la liberation de la Seguiet el-Hamra et

du Rio de Oro) defines itself not as a government but as a

liberation movement. In 1975, a special UN mission engaged

in an investigation in Western Sahara and its findings were

that the vast majority of Saharawis sup-

ported independence under the leader-

ship of the Polisario, not integration

with Morocco or Mauritania.

When Spain withdrew from the

territory in 1976, in application of the

Madrid Accords, Morocco took over Saguia El Hamra while

Mauritania took control of Rio De Oro. The Polisario Front,

with Algerian backing, proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democ-

ratic Republic (SADR) on February 27, 1976 and redirected

its guerrilla war against both Morocco and Mauritania. The

International Court of Justice (ICJ) had issued its non-binding

advisory opinion on the matter which was interpreted by each

side as confirming its rights to the disputed territories (ICJ

Reports 1975).2 The Polisario continued the guerrilla war

while it simultaneously helped to guard the columns of Sa-

harawi refugees fleeing from Western Sahara into refugee

camps in southern Algeria in Tindouf. According to the Poli-

sario Minister of Culture Khadija Hamdi Abdalahi, during this

flight the civil population was bombed by the Moroccan Air

Force with napalm and white phosphorous.3 In 1979, Mauri-

tania, outnumbered and beaten by the

guerrilla warfare waged by the Polisa-

rio, renounced its claims to the territo-

ry.

In 1979, the UN recognized the Poli-

sario Front as the representative of the

people of Western Sahara.4 A cease-fire has been in place

under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUR-

SO since 6 September 1991. According to some sources, by

agreeing to have the issue of sovereignty conducted under the

auspices of the UN, Morocco has effectively recognized befo-

re the international community that it does not hold sove-

reignty over the territory. MINURSO’s mission of holding a

referendum for self-determination the following year never

translated into reality. The Saharawi population is now living

In 1979, the UN recognized the Polisario Front as the representative of

Western Sahara.

February 27 March


Western Sahara and to increase communication with the

growing civil rights activism in the territory.6

In 2004, an anti-Abdelaziz (Polisario President) and anti-

ceasefire opposition known as the Front Polisario Khat al-

Shahid announced its existence. Furthermore, defections in

the hierarchy including former head of Security Services Ah-

mend Moulay M’Hamed, a Polisario

founding member Ould Suleim, to cite

a few, have shown a level of disconnect

or discontent within the movement.

Different scenarios resulting

from action and inaction

Peripeteia in ancient Greek signifies ‘a sudden or unexpected

reversal of circumstances’. After 21 years of negotiations, a

breakthrough in the deadlock of negotiations in Western Sa-

hara could hardly be considered ‘sudden’. The focus of this

study is to highlight the possibility of an ‘unexpected’ rever-

sal. Failing to consider the present level of dissatisfaction

among the young generation who have only known life in the

refugee camps, coupled with the Arab Spring movement

sweeping the North African continent, might result in a su-

perficial and imprecise understanding of the current situation.

There are two fundamental questions we should address:

Could the stalemate break into a renewed armed conflict?

How, if at all, would this impact on the Sahel region and ulti-

mately on European interests?

An interview with Ahmed Lehib Abdi, Secretary General

of UJSARIO, was revealing. According to him the reason

why a peaceful movement will never work in Western Sa-

hara, as was attempted in Gdeim Izik in Western Sahara in

2010, is that, while in Egypt and Tunisia the movement was

in what the Polisario defines as the ‘occupied territories’ of

Western Sahara. The ‘liberated territory’, with its ‘center’ in

Tifariti, east of the Berm wall built by Morocco, is a stretch

of land the Polisario won back with its guerilla warfare. This

area however is poor in natural resources and almost comple-

tely uninhabited. The rest of the Saharawi population lives in

south-western Algeria, in the refugee camps near the city of

Tindouf. The total population census varies according to the

sources, ranging from a total of 200,000 to 400,000.5

The Polisario Front: Internal Structure and Chal-lenges

While the potential consequences of this 21-year stalemate

will be analyzed in detail in the following paragraphs, some

further clarification on how the SADR is organized will yield

a dimension of the level of internal organization, pressures

and conflicts it faces. While some defections and discontent

will be addressed here below, it is difficult to assess their real

impact on the internal stability of the

Polisario. The Saharawi National Coun-

cil (SNC) is the legislative branch of the

government in exile, its parliament. It

has 101 members which are elected at

the General Popular Congresses, held

biannually. The last one (the xiii), held in December 2011,

was attended by delegates from the refugee camps of Tin-

douf, representatives of the Saharawi’s People Liberation

Army and the ‘popular organizations’ UJSARIO (students)

UNMS (women’s organization) and UGTSARIO (labour un-

ion).

Between congresses the supreme decision-making body is

the National Secretariat (NS) which is divided in committees

handling defense, diplomatic affairs, culture, etc. An interest-

ing shift in internal policy, which reflects the need for an in-

creased level of cooperation and communication between the

free zone, the camps and the ‘occupied territories’/Western

Sahara, is the new composition of the NS since 2003. Before

this date, political appointments were solely for diaspora Sa-

harawis, due to fear of infiltration and complications in com-

munications with those in the occupied territories. Twelve of

these 41 members are now from the ‘occupied territories’ in

Western Sahara. This strategy, as explained by Prime Minis-

ter Abdelkader Taleb Omar, is two-fold: to strengthen the

movement’s underground network in Moroccan-controlled

Could the stalemate break into a renewed armed conflict? How, if at all, would this impact on the Sahel region and ultimately on European interests?

A woman at the February 27 March, holding a sign requesting the liberation of political prisoners held in Morocco


centralized around the capitals, in Western Sahara the capital

is not El-Ayoun but Rabat. According to Mr Abdi, Morocco

is buying time in the negotiations, the only way to bring Mo-

rocco to the negotiating table with

serious intentions will be to inflict eco-

nomic losses on it via a resumption of

the armed struggle.7

This argument begs the question:

with what armaments? As far as open

source intelligence indicates, the outdated arms the Polisario

Front receives from Algeria are hand-me-downs from the

Russian arsenal (old tanks T-55s, T-62s and BM-21s rocket

launchers, and it does not dispose of an air force), outdated

and unreliable. The Saharawi People’s Liberation Army

(SPLA) is considered to have manpower capabilities of 6,000

to 7,000 active soldiers — very few compared to its war

years when some

sources quote figures

of 20,000 active men.

However, those num-

bers rise exponen-

tially when we con-

sider that both male

and female refugees in

the camps undergo

military training at

18. Furthermore, the

role of women, par-

tially due to the cul-

tural Berber heritage,

was crucial in the

past, forming auxil-

iary units protecting

the camps during war years.

Whether the present generation that has never experi-

enced guerilla warfare would be able to repeat the gestures of

the older generation remains to be tested. What should not

be dismissed is that, cornered into a situation with no future,

the disillusionment over 20 years of negotiations falling on

deaf ears, a generation of highly educated Saharawis might

well be tempted to try the armed struggle.

Not all youth favours resumption of an armed conflict.

Showing an opposite view from the UJSARIO leader, an

Afapredesa (the Saharawi human rights organization) repre-

sentative who was tortured in Moroccan prisons for graffiti-

writing in El-Ayoun in Western Sahara, is clearly against vio-

lence.8 The two men are roughly the same age, both have

received higher education in Libya and

Algeria yet their outlook is radically

different. The one differentiating factor

in their background is that while the

UJSARIO youth was brought up in the

Tindouf camps, the Afapredesa advoca-

te grew up in Western Sahara where most of the resistance

(peaceful and violent) has recently played out.

Status quo and repercussions on the region

Historically Algeria has backed the Polisario Front for the

following reasons: to establish its strong commitment to anti-

colonialism (due to its history with France), and to act as the

main player in the

region, with a view to

enclose Morocco.

France has been

blocking the Security

Council vote for

MINURSO’s mission:

refusing to include

human rights moni-

toring as part of its

mandate. France’s

position is linked both

to its economic inter-

ests and its colonial

past with Algeria. The

UN ‘Baker Plan’ II

endorsed by the UN

Security Council in 2003, envisioned Saharawi self-rule under

a Western Sahara Authority for a period of five years, with a

referendum on independence to follow. However, Morocco

refused to agree to a referendum that included independence

as an option.

Algeria’s efforts at present are focused on dealing with its

own internal tensions, which have existed for years (also

among the different generations of generals). Protests, albeit

fragmented, have taken place even if they have not resulted in

an Algerian Arab Spring (the reasons for this are not the remit

of this study). For these reasons, despite the superior defense

The economic interests explain Europe’s view for the need for an improvement in the security and

stability of the region.

A graffiti wall at Afapredesa, the Saharawi human rights organization, in memory of political prisoners who have disappeared


drawn to the issue following numerous kidnappings of Euro-

peans, as well as the increased drug-trafficking of cocaine and

hashish. Running parallel to these activities was the rise of Al

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and, more recently,

the appearance of new splinter groups, such as the Movement

for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Boko

Haram in northern Nigeria.

Drug trafficking

Related to the increased insecurity in the region is the grow-

ing drug-trafficking. The Sahel and its underbelly via Guinea

Bissau have been the gateway for drugs coming in from Latin

America (cocaine). The Sahel has also been the route for

hashish of which Morocco is the world’s number one pro-

ducer. What changed are the routes: a process of diversifica-

tion has taken place in the past decade. And no reliable data

exist on the total amount of hashish traveling through the

region. Heightened security has also led to a different cocaine

route mainly via Guinea Bissau, and via Ghana and Benin.

From there it proceeds to the European markets via the key

market of Mauritania. The drug-trafficking is closely related

to a proliferation of weapons and community conflicts to com-

pete for access to the drug market. Recent studies have at

times tried to implicate the drug-trafficking with the disen-

chanted Saharawi youth but while the link is easy to make on

paper, there exists no significant evidence to substantiate this

claim.

Implications of inaction in Western Sahara

Recent events in May 2012, when Morocco refused to recog-

nize UN special envoy Christopher Ross in his role as media-

tor, would appear to confirm the position expressed by the

Saharawi USJARIO youth: Morocco is doing everything to

buy time in the process. The new round of negotiations

scheduled for May and June has now been delayed indefi-

nitely. While the older generation of the Polisario Front in-

sists on a referendum that includes the option of total inde-

pendence, which Morocco refuses, the Saharawi leadership

advocates peaceful negotiations as the only way to get there.9

In the past there have been threats of resumption of conflict,

however Polisario now seems to be more concentrated on

containing these passions from its youth. Part of this could be

due to the realization that an armed struggle would be detri-

mental to the Saharawis. There might also be political calcula-

capacities of Algeria, and its massive investments in defense

spending, we are unlikely to see military action outside its

borders. While this general approach on Algeria’s part is true

for most of Sahel, given the direct interest and geopolitical

antagonism against Morocco, Algeria has hosted and backed

the Polisario since 1975.

European Economic Interests

A recent study requested by the European Parliament's Com-

mittee on Development provides a snapshot of the current

economic interests that tie the EU to the Sahel region. These

economic interests explain Europe’s view for the need for an

improvement in the security and stability of the region. The

ties are both on a bilateral basis for the different member

states and for the EU as a whole, notably the fishing agree-

ments with Morocco linked to the resources of Western Sa-

hara; Mauritania is an important source of iron and vital for

European steel industry; Niger provides 12% of the EU’s

uranium consumption; the Sahel is a critical transit for the

Russian Trans Sahara Gas Pipeline project, which should

bring Nigerian gas into Europe (although this project seems to

be at a standstill since a few years, there are other schemes such

as the Cameroon/Tchad pipeline into Niger). As witnessed

even prior to the Arab Spring uprisings, the security situation

in the Sahel region was shifting from one that local govern-

ments considered nuisance, to one of threat. It was during the

French Presidency of the EU in 2008 that attention was

Little girl in the Tindouf camps going to school


About the author

Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli

Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli holds a Master’s Degree in Eco-

nomic History from the London School of Economics. She

authored a reportage in Algeria on the October kidnap-

pings in Tindouf. She has published articles on foreign pol-

icy issues in Corriere della Sera and France24 Observers. Previ-

ously, she worked at the European Commission.

General assembly UN, 21-11-1979 (accessed 16 June, 2012). 5 Polisario Front Minister of Culture Khadija Hamdi Abdalahi,

interview with author, 28 February 2012.

6 Polisario Front Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Omar, inter-

view with author, 27 February 2012. 7 Secretary General Saharawi Student Union, UJSARIO, Ahmed

Lehbib Abdi, interview with author, 27 February 2012.

8 Afapredesa representative, interview with author, 28 February

2012. 9 Polisario Front Representative in Italy Omar Mih, interview

with author, 1 March 2012.

10 UJSARIO Ahmed Lehbib Abdi, interview with author, 27

February 2012.

11 Polisario Front Minister Foreign Affairs Mohamed Salem Ould

Salek, interview with author, 27 February 2012.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They

do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association,

its members, affiliates or staff.

This study is dedicated to Rossella Urru and her

family, an inspiration in courage. In the hope

that she, together with Ainhoa Fernandez and

Enric Gonyalons may return home soon.

tions as most of the protests are now taking place in the in

Western Sahara. In either case, to dismiss the possibility that

events will not take a different route simply because they

have not for 21 years, would seem near-sited, particularly at a

time when the entire region is being swept by dramatic chan-

ges. Particularly among the youth, some view failure to act

now as a missed opportunity.10

Interestingly, when asked if the current situation would

harm the negotiation process by pushing Europe to focus on

maintaining security by endorsing a status quo in the region,

the Polisario Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that this would

be a dangerous miscalculation for the EU which ultimately

will make the situation worse.11

Conclusion

This study has highlighted the fragmented and, at times, con-

tradictory information presently available. In a rapidly chang-

ing geopolitical scenario, with different players and interests,

an a priori characterization of the issue of Western Sahara as a

frozen or marginal conflict might not be correct or at least

not complete. Sufficient evidence does exist that a growing

number of the population both in the Western Sahara and in

the camps in Tindouf, is losing confidence in the UN and the

EU, and that the negotiation process is growing thin. Al-

though this forgotten conflict is not considered of prime con-

cern today, should an armed confrontation in the form of

guerrilla warfare resume, it would exponentially increase the

already existing chaos and insecurity in the Sahel region with

repercussions on European economic interests. While a clear

understanding of the region is difficult because of the conflict-

ing or at times non-existing evidence, sweeping the dirt un-

der the carpet could be counterproductive in the long-run for

all players at stake.

1 Polisario Front Minister Foreign Affairs Mohamed Salem

Ould Salek, interview with author, 27 February 2012. 2 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?

p1=3&p2=4&k=69&case=61&code=sa&p3=5 (ICJ 16 Oct.

1975, summary advisory opinion, accessed 16 June 2012). 3 Polisario Front Minister of Culture Khadija Hamdi Abdalahi,

interview with author, 28 February 2012. 4 Point 7, Res. 34/37 -Question of Western Sahara- 34th


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Documents

Atlantic Voices Vol. 2, no.6