Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security (2002) 10344

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SUMMARY

Assessment of Technologies Deployed toImprove Aviation Security

Second Report: Progress Toward Objectives

Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to ImproveAviation Security

National Materials Advisory BoardDivision on Engineering and Physical Sciences

National Research Council

Publication NMAB-503NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS

Washington, D.C.

Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Summary -- Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: Second Report: Progress Toward Objectiveshttp://www.nap.edu/catalog/10344.html

http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10344.html

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the GoverningBoard of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils ofthe National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and theInstitute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report werechosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This study by the National Materials Advisory Board was conducted under Contractno. DTF-A03-99-C00006 from the Federal Aviation Administration. Any opinions,findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of theauthors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies thatprovided support for the project.

Copyright 2002 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.Printed in the United States of America




The

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The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of theNational Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It isautonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with theNational Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government.The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed atmeeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superiorachievements of engineers. Dr. Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy ofEngineering.

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciencesto secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examinationof policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under theresponsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter tobe an advisor to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues ofmedical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute ofMedicine.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy'spurposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning inaccordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has becomethe principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and theNational Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public,and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly byboth Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce Alberts and Dr. Wm. A. Wulfare chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.




iv

COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES DEPLOYED TOIMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY

THOMAS S. HARTWICK, Consultant, Seattle, Washington, ChairSANDRA L. HYLAND, Tokyo Electron Massachusetts, Manassas, Virginia, Vice ChairROBERT BERKEBILE, Consultant, Leesburg, FloridaCHERYL A. BITNER, AAI Corporation, Baltimore, MarylandBARRY D. CRANE, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VirginiaCOLIN DRURY, University at Buffalo, The State University of New YorkPATRICK GRIFFIN,* Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New MexicoJIRI (ART) JANATA,* Georgia Institute of Technology, AtlantaLEN LIMMER, Consultant, Oak Point, TexasHARRY E. MARTZ, JR., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore,

CaliforniaJAMES F. O’BRYON, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. (retired)ERIC R. SCHWARTZ, The Boeing Company, Seattle, WashingtonELIZABETH H. SLATE, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston MICHAEL STORY, Los Gatos, California

National Materials Advisory Board Liaison

SHEILA F. KIA, General Motors, Warren, Michigan

Staff

ARUL MOZHI, Study Director (from July 2001)PAT WILLIAMS, Project Assistant (from July 2001)JANICE M. PRISCO, Project Assistant (until July 2001)TONI MARECHAUX, Director

_____________________________________*Committee member since September 7, 2001.




v

NATIONAL MATERIALS ADVISORY BOARD

EDGAR A. STARKE, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, ChairEDWARD C. DOWLING, Cleveland Cliffs, Inc., Cleveland, OhioTHOMAS EAGAR, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, CambridgeHAMISH FRASER, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OhioALASTAIR M. GLASS, Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill,

New JerseyMARTIN E. GLICKSMAN, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New YorkJOHN A.S. GREEN, The Aluminum Association, Washington, D.C.THOMAS HARTWICK, TRW (retired), Snohomish, WashingtonALLAN J. JACOBSON, University of Houston, Houston, TexasMICHAEL JAFFE, New Jersey Center for Biomaterials and Medical Devices,

Piscataway, New JerseySYLVIA M. JOHNSON, NASA-Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CaliforniaFRANK E. KARASZ, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MassachusettsSHEILA F. KIA, General Motors Research and Development, Warren, MichiganHARRY A. LIPSITT, Wright State University, Dayton, OhioALAN G. MILLER, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Seattle, WashingtonROBERT C. PFAHL, Motorola, Schaumberg, IllinoisJULIA PHILLIPS, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New MexicoHENRY RACK, Clemson University, Clemson, South CarolinaKENNETH L. REIFSNIDER, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,

BlacksburgT.S. SUDARSHAN, Modification, Inc., Fairfax, VirginiaJULIA WEERTMAN, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

Staff

TONI MARECHAUX, DirectorARUL MOZHI, Associate Director




vi




vii

Preface

The risks to aviation safety from mechanical failures, weather, or human error aregenerally known. These risks, as for any form of transportation, can be assessed andquantified. Millions of passengers accept them and fly on a regular basis. The risksassociated with deliberate and premeditated actions from terrorists, however, are far moredifficult to quantify and to predict, and are therefore far more frightening. An array ofstrategies must be devised to address this type of risk, ranging from intelligence gatheringthrough threat detection and deterrence to hardening aircraft against takeover, explosions,and fire. A critical element of this overall strategy is the deployment of technologies(i.e., equipment and procedures) to warn, detect, deter, and mitigate the threat.Congressional funding for airport security and deployment of security technologies bythe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have been primarily incident driven; forexample, metal detectors were installed in the 1970s in response to a series of hijackings,and access control and a limited number of bomb detection systems were deployed atselected airports as a result of the downing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988.

Until September 11, 2001, the FAA’s research and development programs focused onthe detection of explosives, because terrorists historically used that method to attack civilaviation. Accordingly, the original focus of the congressionally directed scope of workfor the Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve AviationSecurity was technologies deployed to detect explosives. The committee’s overall taskwas to assess the following: (1) the deployment of explosive-detection technologies, (2)the effectiveness of the system configuration for deployment, (3) the use of hardenedcargo and baggage containers, and (4) the possible future role of emerging technologies(see Appendix A for a complete statement of task). The committee started in 1997 to helpthe FAA determine the effectiveness of laboratory-developed explosives-detectiontechnologies deployed in airports and the effectiveness of hardened containers. Thecommittee’s first report,1 issued in 1999, recommends objectives for the deployment ofsuch technologies. The current report, the committee’s second, evaluates progress madetoward implementation of the recommendations made in the first report on deployment oftechnologies to detect explosives. This second report also describes anticipated futurecommittee work on assessment of technologies to improve aviation security.

The primary role of the committee prior to September 11, 2001, was to report on theprogress of the congressionally mandated deployment of detection equipment andprocedures at selected airports. The September 11 events suggest a much broader scope 1National Research Council. 1999. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: FirstReport. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.




viii

of consideration for the breadth of the problem and recommendations meant to ensuresuccess of the security program. Two new organizations, the Office of HomelandDefense and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have been created andtasked with playing a role in securing the safety of our citizenry. The scope of the TSAincludes all forms of transportation, including aviation.2 The extraordinary events ofSeptember 11, 2001, have shown past security efforts to be inadequate and shortsighted.

This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverseperspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by theNational Research Council’s (NRC’s) Report Review Committee. The purpose of thisindependent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist theinstitution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that thereport meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to thestudy charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protectthe integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals fortheir participation in the review of this report: Jon Amy, Consultant; Michael Ellenbogen,Perkin Elmer Detection Systems; Arthur Fries, Institute for Defense Analyses; ValerieGawron, Calspan; James K. Gran, Poulter Laboratory; Sidney J. Green, TerraTek, Inc.;Melvin F. Kanninen, MFK Consulting Services; Douglas R. Laird, BGI InternationalConsulting Services; John L. McLucas, Aerospace Consultant; Daniel Morgan,Congressional Research Service; Robert Schafrik, GE Aircraft Engines; Eugene Sevin,Consultant; and Edward M. Weinstein, Galaxy Scientific Corporation.

Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments andsuggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor didthey see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report wasoverseen by Hyla Napadensky, Napadensky Energetics, Inc. (retired). Appointed by theNational Research Council, she was responsible for making certain that an independentexamination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures andthat all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final contentof this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

The committee would like to acknowledge all the speakers from the Federal AviationAdministration and other organizations who provided presentations at the committeemeetings. The committee is appreciative of the insights provided by Lyle Malotky,Federal Aviation Administration, and John Daly, U.S. Department of Transportation. It isalso grateful for the contributions and support of the FAA contracting office technicalrepresentatives, Paul Jankowski and Wagih Makky.

2The aviation security functions of the FAA are being transferred to the TSA. Since the committee assessedthe work of the FAA before the TSA was created, this report refers to the committee’s work on aviationsecurity for the FAA.




ix

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

The contents of the full report,from which this summary is extracted,

are listed below. The full report contains sensitive security information that is controlled under 14 CFR Part 191.

___________________________

1 INTRODUCTION 9

2 STATUS OF SECURITY SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT 11Bulk Explosives Detection, 11Trace Explosives Detection, 14Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening and Positive Passenger Bag Match, 15Deployment, 16Operators, 17Total Architecture for Aviation Security, 19Security Enhancement Factor, 20Five-Year Plan, 20Hardened Unit Load Devices, 21Additional Remarks, 21

3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 23Systematic Assessment of Facilities Risk, 25Security Enhancement Factor, 26Deterrence, 28

4 HUMAN FACTORS 33The Case for the Human in Aviation Security, 35Human Factors Issues and Status, 36Certification of Screening Companies, 37Threat Image Projection System, 37Job Design, 39Equipment Design, 40Human Factors Program Management, 40Conclusions, 42




x

5 HARDENED UNIT LOAD DEVICES 43Certified HULDs Available to Airlines, 44HULD Operational Evaluations, 44HULD Blast Tests After Operational Exposure, 45Future R&D on HULDs, 46HULD Implementation Plan, 47Additional Remarks, 47

6 CONCLUSIONS 49Post-September 11 Directions for the Committee, 50

APPENDICES

A STATEMENT OF TASK 53B BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 55C ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 59




1

Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

Aviation security is one of the most important issues confronting our society today.The disastrous hijackings of September 11, 2001, when four commercial aircraft weretaken over and used as weapons, and the resulting loss of life and property damageeclipse the impact of all previous terrorist attacks against commercial aviation. Theevents also dramatically expand the boundaries of the kinds of action that might beemployed against civil aviation. The need to ensure public safety and instill confidencewill require deploying the very best airport security systems using the combinations oftechnology and personnel called for by the best intelligence available.

A key responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and theTransportation Security Administration (TSA) is to guard our nation’s civil aviationsystem against terrorism and all other threats.1 Fulfillment of this responsibility isunquestionably difficult and complex. The balance among passenger safety, operationalcapability of existing technology, burden on commercial industries, and efficientutilization of both personnel and financial resources is very complex. Although thisbalance may change in the coming months and years, it is clear that the commercialaviation industry, the FAA, the TSA, and the U.S. Congress must continue to considerwhat constitutes a reasonable delay and cost to the passenger while ensuring thatadequate security is in place.

As an example, hand searches of baggage have rarely been used because they areexpensive and time-consuming. Instead, alternative technologies have beenimplemented, including x-ray scans of carry-on baggage and computed tomography ofchecked bags. All these methods remain subject to technology limitations as well as toprocedural and operator error. This complexity leads to the need for a total systemsapproach to aviation security, whereby the individual screening and security componentscombine to create an overall security greater than that provided by the individualcomponents.

Although an impervious defense against every threat is impossible to achieve,available security resources can be optimized using a systems approach. A system-of-systems architecture embraces the sequence and manner of deployment of variouselements of aviation security technology described in Table ES-1. Figure ES-1 illustrates

1The aviation security functions of the FAA is being transferred to the TSA. Since the committee assessedthe work of the FAA before the TSA was created, this report refers to the FAA for the committee’s work onaviation security.




2 Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: Second Report

the paths by which people, baggage, and equipment board a plane.2 This report considersonly the aviation security systems listed in Table ES-1 and only some of the threatvectors illustrated in Figure ES-1 and focuses on bombs as the threat objects. Theelements of an aviation security system include the following:

� Those designed to identify or deter potential passenger threats, such as thecomputer-assisted passenger prescreening system (CAPPS) and positivepassenger bag matching (PPBM);

� Those designed to inspect passenger baggage, such as bulk explosives detectionsystems (EDSs)3 and explosives-detection equipment (EDE) that check theinterior of a bag for explosives and trace explosive detection devices (TEDDs)that check for residual explosive material on the surface of an object beingsampled; and

� Those designed to contain an explosive blast inside an aircraft cargo hold, suchas hardened unit loading devices (HULDs).

TABLE ES-1 Selected Aviation Security Equipment and Procedures Technology Description

CAPPS Computer-assisted passenger prescreening system utilizes a passenger’s reservation recordand other databases to identify passengers who will receive further scrutiny.

PPBM Positive passenger bag match is a security procedure that matches the passenger’s checkedbaggage with the passenger to ensure that baggage is not loaded aboard an airplane unlessthe passenger also boards.

EDSs Explosives-detection systems are bulk explosive detection devices that have passed FAAcertification tests. To date, these systems use x-ray computed tomography, mainly for thescreening of selected checked baggage.

EDD An explosives-detection device includes any bulk explosives detection equipment thatmeets certification for at least one of the FAA explosives.

EDE Explosives-detection equipment includes any explosives-detection device or system thatnonintrusively senses some physical or chemical property of an object under investigationto determine if it is an explosive.

TEDDs Trace explosives detection devices collect particles or vapor to determine if traceexplosives are present; they are used, when called for, to screen both carry-on andchecked baggage.

HULDs Hardened unit load devices are special containers for checked baggage that can containthe effects of an in-flight explosion involving an explosive mass of a given size or less.

2National Research Council. 1999. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: FirstReport. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Page 11, Figure 2-1.3The following terminology is used throughout this report. An “explosives-detection system (EDS)” is a self-contained unit composed of one or more integrated devices that has passed the FAA's certification test. An“explosives-detection device (EDD)” is an instrument that incorporates a single detection method to detectone or more explosive material categories. “Explosives-detection equipment (EDE)” is any equipment,certified or otherwise, that can be used to detect explosives. “Bulk explosives” include bulk and sheetexplosives as distinct from trace explosives.




Executive Summary 3

FIGURE ES-1 Threat vectors: the paths by which people, baggage, and equipment board a planeare also the paths by which threats may board a plane. Source: National Research Council. 1999.Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security, National Academy Press,Washington, D.C., p. 11.

THE COMMITTEE’S WORK AND FINDINGS

The committee issued its first report in 1999.4 This second report reviews the

progress the FAA has made toward implementing the recommendations of that firstreport. The reader is referred to the first report for basic background material and moredetailed information on the rationale for these recommendations. This second report alsodescribes anticipated future committee work on assessment of technologies to improveaviation security.

Although progress is being made by the FAA to resolve the issues addressed in the1999 recommendations, they are yet to be fully resolved. After reevaluation of the 1999recommendations, the committee concluded that the recommendations made in its firstreport continue to have merit and that the FAA should commit adequate funding andpersonnel to the achievement of those goals. While the terrorist hijacking incidents ofSeptember 11, 2001, highlight the need to address new types of threat, the threats

4National Research Council. 1999. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: FirstReport. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.





considered by the FAA, which have been the focus of its work until now, continue torequire attention. The committee’s recommendations from its 1999 report aresummarized in Table ES-2, along with its assessment of progress in implementation ofthese recommendations.

A number of factors, primarily related to management and resources, have affectedthe rate of progress in the critical areas outlined in Table ES-2. The FAA has beenresponsive to the committee’s recommendations, but work is proceeding at a very slowpace in most areas. The complex array of participants in aviation security, including theFAA, the air carriers, the airports, and the passengers, complicates the ability of the FAAto set its own schedule. For example, a task such as deploying EDS in an airport requirescoordination with the local airport teams, which might include the following participants:

� Airport operators (airport authority, city government, state government) and the

air carriers, to determine the best equipment placement for the flow ofpassengers;

� Air carriers and third-party security companies, to train employees in use of thenew equipment;

� Local law enforcement to coordinate response to alarms from the new equipment,and

� Local construction companies to construct space and install the new EDSs.

It is nearly impossible for the FAA to make a decision and schedule deployment ofequipment without first getting the commitment of all the local participants. In thecommittee’s opinion, this difficulty of coordination has slowed the deployment effort.

Red-team testing of the CAPPS system needs to be more comprehensive. Testingagainst historical threats indicated that, once the criteria are understood, the CAPPSsystem can be effective. However, recent tragic events show that additional action mustbe taken to make CAPPS more effective in identifying passengers who should undergoadditional screening before being allowed on the airplane. They also show that theprocedures that follow identification by CAPPS may not be adequate to prevent suchtragedies.

Equipment deployment has proceeded through the FAA’s Security EquipmentIntegrated Product Team (SEIPT), which selects vendors, purchases equipment, andprovides coordination between the air carriers, airports, and local law enforcementagencies for installation of the equipment. In concert with the air carriers, SEIPT hasinstituted advanced planning to facilitate deployment of the security equipment. SEIPThas taken the initiative of bringing all stakeholders into its planning process and providesa good model for the other sectors to follow.




Executive Summary 5

TABLE ES-2 Status of Implementation of Recommendations Made in the Committee’sFirst Report Issue Recommendation Current Status

Bulk explosives The FAA should measure true andfalse detection rates duringcertification testing, and the equipmentshould better assist operators toidentify false alarms.

True and false detection rates aremeasured during certificationtesting, but alarm resolution andfrequency of false alarms needimprovement.

Trace explosives The FAA should develop andimplement a program to evaluate theeffectiveness of TEDDs.

A dry transfer standard technique forseveral explosives has beendeveloped. The same technologyneeds to be used to producestandards for daily machine setup.This would allow measurement ofmachine and operator effectiveness.

Passenger screening Use of CAPPS and PPBM shouldcontinue, and their effectivenessshould be tested.

These systems are operational;however, red teama testing of theCAPPS system needs to be morecomprehensive.

Technology deployment Congress should continue to supportdeployment of aviation securitydetection systems.

Funding has continued butdeployment schedules have not beenmaintained.

Operator effectiveness The FAA should ensure that theoperator and detection systemcombination meets performancerequirements.

For radiographic x-ray equipment,but not all EDSs, the threat imageprojection system (TIPS) is beingimplemented and could be used tomonitor performance, but TIPS dataon individual operators are notcurrently being saved.

Total architecture foraviation security(TAAS)

The FAA should develop a TAAS andoperational performance measures.

A system framework is beingdeveloped by an FAA analysisteam.b The TAAS development ismoving too slowly for it to be aneffective planning tool.

Security enhancementfactor (SEF)

An SEF should be formulated tomeasure TAAS performance.

A relative risk description is in use,and the analysis team also uses SEF.

Five-year plan A 5-year plan should be developed incooperation with all stakeholders.

A plan outline consisting of tensubplans is in development withonly two subplans having beencompleted so far.

Hardened unit loaddevices (HULDs)

Research and development on HULDsshould continue.

Some research and development isproceeding, but HULDs are not inthe 5- year plan.

aThe FAA red team performs testing of the security system without the operators being aware that they arebeing tested.bFAA. 2001. Total Architecture for Aviation Security Office of the Associate Administrator for CivilAviation Security, Washington, D.C., June.





Despite all the planning, however, the deployment schedules have not been

maintained. Deployment of InVision’s CTX 5000 machines has proceeded more slowlythan scheduled but has been accomplished. The L3 3DX 6000,5 conversely, althoughpurchased by the FAA at the direction of Congress, has not been fully deployed inairports. The L3 3DX 6000 has demonstrated certification-level detection, false alarm,and bag throughput rates, but the machines themselves are considered too unreliable todeploy in airports, where downtime for unplanned maintenance can wreak havoc withflight schedules.

The development of a TAAS is also proceeding too slowly to allow its use as aplanning tool. This tool could help the FAA identify the appropriate mix of technologiesand procedures to address aviation security, but at TAAS’s current pace, machines willbe deployed in airports before the information from TAAS can be digested andimplemented. Costly retrofits and changes in airport architecture may then be required.Additionally, the TAAS methodology must be expanded to include deterrence conceptsas a formal element of systems analysis. Deterrence is an extremely important yetunquantified element of aviation security and cries out for inclusion, measurement, andmanagement.

A framework for a deeper understanding and evaluation of human factors andtraining is also a critical part of the aviation security system. The FAA has takenaggressive action to improve and extend the human factors capability. The use of HULDsis another important area for expanded research and development. Finally, a 5-year planis in preparation but is incomplete at this time. The largest deficiency in deployment liesin advance planning and the system analyses that guide that planning. Deficiencies inthese areas account for the bulk of the observed delays in implementation.

On November 19, 2001, a new aviation security bill was signed by President GeorgeW. Bush. The bill mandates a new agency, the Transportation Security Administration(TSA), which will guarantee the security of all modes of travel—air, ground, and sea.The agency will take over from FAA the security rule-making authority, and Congresshas given the new undersecretary power to issue directives to make immediate fixes insecurity. The new agency is expected to pull from the FAA all of its aviation securityresponsibilities, including monitoring security from the baggage checkpoints to the rampareas. The law requires that by January 18, 2002, all checked baggage must be screenedfor bombs. A variety of methods can be used, including explosive-detection devices,bomb-sniffing dogs, and matching of all checked luggage to passengers on board. Bagsalso can be searched manually. The new law requires that by the end of 2002, all checkedluggage be screened using explosive-detection systems. That would require 2000machines at an estimated cost of $5 billion (installed). The law requires the governmentto set standards for new screeners by December 19, 2001, develop a system to trainemployees by January 18, 2002, and transfer all private security contracts to the federalgovernment by February 17, 2002. The law provides for a private security company pilotprogram starting November 19, 2002. Then after 2 years, the airport operators may electto continue with private screening companies. The law authorizes the government to levya passenger fee of up to $10 per round trip. Airlines would contribute about $700 milliona year to help finance the new agency. 5The L3 3DX 6000 system is a bulk explosive detection system built by L3 Communications, Clearwater,Florida.




Executive Summary 7

Certain risks are associated with air travel as they are with any form of transportation,and these risks can be assessed and quantified. In addition to the terrorist threat, naturalphenomena, materials and manufacturing issues, operational procedures, and humanfactors all affect aviation safety. Although passengers have an inherent right to much ofthe information surrounding these risks, the release of certain information might reducethe effectiveness of security methods designed to prevent adverse actions. Otherinformation might violate privacy protocols. Passengers cannot, for example, know theflight history of all their fellow passengers. In the end, individual air passengers andcrew must rely on the entire aviation security architecture, including detectiontechnologies and security personnel, for their safety.




Documents

Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security (2002) 10344