Asia Pivot Disadvantage - JDI 2013

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    ****Asia Pivot DA

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    **1NC

    Asia is focus of foreign policy pivot now but doubts are growing about the US

    commitment to rebalancing

    Lobe 13Jim, chief of the Washington bureau of Inter Press Service, J.D Berkley, U.S. Rebalancing to Asia/Pacific Still aPriority, March-3, http://www.lobelog.com/u-s-rebalancing-to-asiapacific-still-a-priority/ ///cmf

    Amidst growing tensions with North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China, the White House Monday insistedthat its re-balancing toward the Asia/Pacific remained on track and that Washington is

    fully committed to its allies there,especially Japan and South Korea. In a major policy address to the Asia

    Society in New York City,National Security AdviserThomas Donilon offered an overview of U.S. strategy in theregion, stressing that there-balancing sometimes referred to as the pivot will be comprehensive,

    focusing at least as much attention on Washingtonseconomic role there as its

    military posture. While much of the speech echoed previous administration policy statements, Donilon, PresidentBarack Obamas closest foreign policy aide, also announced new U.S. sanctions against the Foreign Trade Bank of NorthKorea, a step that some analysts said could make trade by third countries with Pyongyang more difficult. But he suggested inthe clearest terms to date that Washington would respond to any aggressive move by Pyongyang with military force. North

    Koreas claims may be hyperbolic but as to the policy of the United States, there should be no doubt: we will draw upon thefull range of our capabilities to protect against, and to respond to, the threat posed to us and to our allies by North Korea , he

    declared. He also called on China to deepen its military-to-military dialogue with the U.S.andto take serious steps to end the hacking of U.S. government and private -business computer networksa practice which he

    said has become a key point of concern and discussion with China at all levels of our governments. His remarksonthe latter subject, which included a call for the two countries to hold a direct dialogue toestablish acceptable norms of behaviourin cyberspace, marked the first time a top-ranking U.S. official hasaccused China by name of carrying out such attacks many of which, according to a recent New York Times investigation,have been launched by a Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) unit based in a 12 -story Shanghai office tower. Beijing hasstrongly denied it is responsible. (T)his is not solely a national security concern or a concern of the U.S. government, hesaid. Increasingly, U.S. businesses are speaking out about the serious concerns about sophisticated, targeted theft ofconfidential business information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating from China on anunprecedented scale. The international community cannot afford to tolerate such activity from any country. Donilonsspeech came amidst threats and counter-threats between North and South Korea in the wake of last months undergroundnuclear test by Pyongyang, the inauguration of the Souths new president, Park Geun-hye, and Mondays launch of a major

    joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise which purportedly provoked the Norths announcement to renounce the 60 -year-old armistice and disconnect its hotline with Seoul. The rapid build-up in tensions between the two Koreas has reportedlyspurred growing demands within the South to consider developing a nuclear weapon itself, just as renewed tensions between

    Beijing and Tokyo over a group of islands in the East China Sea has provoked a somewhat similar reaction in Japan. The

    hawkish reactions in both Seoul and Tokyowhere doubts are growing about whether

    Washington can actually follow through on its military re-balancingwhen the Pentagon budgetappears headed for declineare clearly of concern to the Obama administration. Donilon went out of hisway to reaffirm its goal of moving 60 percent of the U.S. naval fleet to the Asia-Pacific by 2020 and expanding radar andmissile defence systems to protect U.S. allies from the dangerous, destabilising behaviour of North Korea. In thesedifficult fiscal times, I know that some have questioned whether this rebalance is sustainable, he said. But make no

    mistake: President Obama has clearly stated that we will maintain our security presence andengagement in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to reassuring Tokyo and Seoul, Mondays speech also

    appeared intendedin part to dispel any doubts about the regionspriority in its global

    strategy, particularly givenSecretary of State John Kerrys choice to make Europe and the MiddleEast the site of his maiden overseas tourand Obamas decision to make his first second -term trip also to theMiddle East. There have been a number of people in the region looking at Kerrys trip andsaying maybe theyre looking to re-balance the re-balance, noted Alan Romberg, the head of East Asia

    programmes at the Stimson Center here.

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    Plan trades offa credible pivot requires downgrading other geopolitical

    concernsManyin 12Mark et al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing' towards asia,"http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf

    TheAdministrations rebalancing toward Asiaand the Pacific comes in the midst of profound

    changes in global economic, political, and security relationships. The breadth of issues isasgreatas at any time in recent history, encompassing security relations, economics and trade, the U.S. ability to competeand create jobs in the face of ever-stiffer global competition, global financial stability, and even fundamental questions

    about political and economic models, given the rise of China and other emerging economies.In the context ofsuchglobal challenges, a revitalized focus on Asia potentially reflects the Administrationswillingness to make far-reaching strategic choices,involving judgments that explicitly

    downgrade concerns about some challenges to U.S. security, while elevating others. Whether the

    Administration has set the right priorities, whether its perceptions of global trends are sufficiently hedged,and whether the risks it is willing to countenance are appropriate, all are criticalmatters for Members of Congress toconsider.

    Commitment to Asian security key to shore up perceptions of declining

    credibilityKapila 6/19Subhash, PhD in Strategic Studies, South China Sea Conflicts Ignited United States Pivot To Asia PacificAnalysis,http://www.albanytribune.com/19062013-south-china-sea-conflicts-ignited-united-states-pivot-to-asia-pacific-analysis/ ///cmf

    There is a nagging fear in South East Asian capitals on the intensity and longevity of theUS strategic pivot to Asiafearing that both as a result of the US traditional China Hedging Strategy and also

    because of domestic budget cuts in defence spending, the US commitment to South China Sea securitymay be a transient phase. How would the United States assure South East Asian countriesof its resolve to contain China w ithin its national boundaries and not let it spill its military adventurism in SouthChina Sea region and in South East Asia as a whole? The United States needs to remember how China muscled into SouthEast Asia in the last decade or so when the region lay neglected by the United States. The United States could let South EastAsia remain in benign neglect because during that period Chinas military and naval build -up levis were still maturing. In2013 Chinas military and naval build-up has reached alarming levels and consequently China has already put the UnitedStates on notice that at least in the Western Pacific wherein lies the South China Sea conflictual region is located, China is no

    longer a military push-over or subject to US political and military coercion. The United States can no longerpersist in following its traditional China Hedging Strategy and Risk Aversion Strategytowards China. Persisting in doing so could end up in denting United States image of acredible strategic partner in Asian capitals and endanger its continued embedment in Asia.South China Sea conflicts stood ignited by Chinas military brinkmanship and Chinas military adventurism to which theUnited States responded by its strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. In 2013 a higher call now awaits the United States incheckmating Chinas military adventurism by shedding ambiguity from its South China Sea policies. The United Statesneeds to take advantage of the Asian strategic polarisation which the China-generated South China Sea conflicts have

    brought in its wake in favour of the United States. Robert Kaplan, the noted US Author and expert on strategic affairs haswisely observed that: Just as German soil constituted the military frontline of the Cold War, the waters of the South ChinaSea may constitute the military frontlines in the coming decades. Worldwide multipolarity is already a feature of diplomacyand economics but the South China Sea could show what multipolarity in a military sense actually looks like United States,it is your call now.

    Credibility key to hegprevents emboldened adversaries and scared alliesTunc 8Hakan, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq, Orbis Volume 52 Issue 42008

    Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actors past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior.

    In international politics, a major component of building or maintaininga countrys reputationinvolves resolve.5 Policy makers maybelieve that a lack of resolve in one militaryconfrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness.6 According to Shiping Tang, thisconcern frequently amounts to a cult of reputation among foreign policy makers, which he defines as a belief system

    holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) thatbacking down in a crisis will lead ones

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
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    adversaries or allies to underestimate ones resolve in the next crisis.7 Of particular importance tothe cult of reputation is concern about the consequences of withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate ofthe cult of reputation is that a country should stand firm and refuse to withdraw from atheater of war. The underlying belief is that a withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to acountrys reputation and thus embolden the adversariesby boosting commitment and recruitment totheir cause.8 Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who

    maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image of strength andresolve.9 According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness deters adversariesand reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely,being perceived as weak andirresolute encourages adversaries to be more aggressive and results in allies being lesssupportive. This logic has had two general consequences for Americas use of force abroad: First, exhibitingresolve has been deemed necessary even in small and distant countries.This is because themere perception of power generates tangible power,thereby reducing the need to use actual physical forceagainst every adversary.10 In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions inseveral places, notably in Korea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United Statesappeared questionable to some.11 Second, reputational concerns made it difficult for theUnited States to withdraw from a theater of war. The Vietnam War is the most prominent case, although thelogic was also evident during the Korean conflict in the early 1950s.12 As is well-documented by historians, both the LyndonJohnson and Richard Nixon administrations took reputation seriously and argued that leaving Vietnam without an

    honorable exit would seriously hurt U.S. credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike. For both Johnson andNixon, an honorable exit meant creating an autonomous South Vietnam (much like independent, anti-communist SouthKorea after the Korean war) that was recognized by all parties involved in the conflict, particularly by the North Vietnamesegovern- ment. Such an outcome would vindicate U.S. sacrifices.13

    Decline causes great power warsAmerican retrenchment collapse current

    restraintsZhang and Shi 11*Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Currently on leavefrom Graduate School in Economic and Political Development, Lin Shi, MA from Columbia in International Affairs, also serves as anindependent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World BankAmericas decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/

    This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appearsto be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess

    and its economy remains the worlds largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm thatseparated America from anyone else is narrowing.Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, andthe inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict

    regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability toseriously challenge theUS military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors havebandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India,Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to

    mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so willthe pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power ismore diffuse, American interests and influence can bemore readily challenged, and conflictsor wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power declineand redistribution result inmilitary confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century Americas emergence as a regional

    power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquesttowards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century,

    accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notionthat Britain rules the waves. Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole g uardians of the WesternHemispheres security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of

    law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of propertyrights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equalopportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets,liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countrieshave sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperativerelations.However, what will happen to these advances as Americas influence declines? Given that Americas authority,

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    although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, aswell as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly

    detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would returnto the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry.Furthermore,multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regionalorganisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum

    left by Washingtons withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional politicaland economic orders.Free markets would become more politicisedand, well, less freeand major

    powers would compete for supremacy . Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed azero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and WesternEuropean economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international

    regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).A world without American hegemony is one

    where great power wars re-emerge , the liberal international system is supplanted by

    an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisationbarriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled USprimacy.

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    ***Uniqueness

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    2NC Yes PivotAllies Reassured

    US committed to pivot nowallies reassured in squo despite budget cutsDilanian 6/1Ken, Hagel: Cuts won't halt Asia pivot, The Baltimore Sun, lexis /// cmf

    Chuck Hagel emerged from combat in the Vietnam War with two Purple Hearts and "a sense of how important it would befor America to engage wisely in Asia," as he put it to top defense officials gathered here.Now, more than a yearafter President Barack Obama pledged to refocus America's security strategy toward Asia,Hagel is using his first visit to the region as defense chief to reassure allies that theso-calledpivot won't be derailed by Pentagon budget cuts or competing demands from the civil warin Syria, the nuclear stalemate with Iran and other high-priority issues. "The United Statesmilitary is not only shifting more of its assets to the Pacific, we are using these assets innew ways to enhance our posture and partnerships," Hagel said at a regional security forum Saturday.Although Hagel didn't say it, his weekend visit also is intended to convince anxious allies that theadministration isn't ignoring their concerns about China's recent military buildup andincreasingly assertive foreign policy. He hopes to bolster defense ties to traditional alliessuch as Japan and the Philippinesand cement support for new partners, including Vietnam. The regional shiftshave added tension as Obama prepares to meet the new Chinese president, Xi Jinping, at a private estate in Rancho Mirage,Calif., next week, their first summit since Xi took office in March. The White House hopes to persuade Xi to help rein in

    North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile tests, to control what U.S. officials call pervasive cyberspying and digital theft byChina, and to avoid aggressive moves in disputed shoals and islands in the South China Sea and near Japan that coulddestabilize regional peace. Hagel had no formal bilateral talks scheduled with Chinese officials on the sidelines of theShangri-La Dialogue, an annual security conference, although an informal session is planned. As in the past, Beijing sent amidlevel delegation headed by a military official, not its defense minister, to show its unhappiness with Washington's plans to

    boost its military presence in the region. With no new deployments or policies to announce, Hagel was left to toutdevelopments begun under his predecessor, Leon Panetta, including sending 250 Marines to northern Australia and a littoralcombat ship to Singapore. Hagel is set to visit the ship, the USS Freedom, on Sunday. The Pentagon plans to assign 60

    percent of its naval fleet to the western Pacific by 2020, up from 50 percent now. But the mandatory federal sequestrationbudget cuts have forced the Pentagon to trim about $40 billion in spending this fiscal year, and that has affected sometraining efforts and ship movements in Asia. The Air Force 374th Airlift Wing, based at Yokota Air Base in Japan, forexample, has reduced flying time by 25 percent and canceled participation in a joint exercise in Thailand, officials said. Areport by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service in March said the budget cuts could make the pivot untenable."Plans to restructure U.S. military deployments in Asia may run up against more restrictive budget constraints," it warned.

    But in his speech, Hagel said budget pressures wouldn't undermine the emphasis on Asia. "Itwould be unwise and shortsighted to conclude ... that our commitment to the rebalancecannot be sustained," he said. Hagel became the latest senior U.S. official to accuse China of launching cyberattackson U.S. industry and defense systems, a charge Beijing has repeatedly denied. According to recent news reports, China'scyberspies have obtained data on two dozen U.S. weapon systems, including the combat ship that Hagel plans to tour. Hagel

    provided no new details, but he said U.S. officials had expressed concerns to Beijing "about the growing threat ofcyberintrusions, some of which appear to be tied to the Chinese government and military." He praised the establishment of aU.S.-China cyberworking group and said China's new defense minister, Gen. Chang Wanquan, would visit the Pentagon thisyear. U.S. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China in April. Hagel is scheduled to flyfrom Singapore to Brussels on Monday to attend a meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense ministers.Cyberwarfare will be a top agenda item at the NATO conference, he said.

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    2NC UniquenessPivot Now

    Obama administration focusing all foreign policy tools on Asianothing

    expected to disrupt that attention

    Stearns 4/11Scott, VOAsState Department correspondent, North Korea, 'Asia Pivot', Tops Kerry's Agenda,http://www.voanews.com/content/north-korea-asia-pivot-tops-kerrys-agenda/1639121.html /// cmf

    U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry makes his first trip to Asia later this week, where he willbe talking aboutNorth Korea and a more active U.S. military and diplomatic presence in theregion. On Asia, President Obama's second term starts where his first left off --boostingmilitary, diplomatic, and commercial assets in the region as part of aso-called "Asia Pivot."Ahead of his first trip to Asia as secretary of state, John Kerry compared U.S. goals for the region to those of North Korea. "We want to see a peaceful community of nations trading with each other, working to improve the lives of their citizens; andthat is in direct contrast to the North, which maintains gulags, has thousands of political prisoners, treats people in the most

    inhumane way, and now starves their people in order to build nuclear weapons," Kerry stated. With so much at stake- and needing China's help with North Korea - American University professor Pek Koon Heng sees nochange in Washington's Asia engagement. "The whole bundle of issues about trade and defense and securityand political cooperation and global issues, China more than any other country is who the U.S. has to work with. So I don't

    see the Americans taking their eyes off the ball in the second Obama administration," shesaid.

    US shifting foreign policy attention fully to AsiaLogan 13Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute , China, America, and the Pivot to Asia, Policy Analysis No. 717, Jan-8/// cmf

    Slowly, Washington policy elites have comeback around to the position that the mostconsequential international-political changes are taking place in Asia.On an October 2011 trip toAsia, Defense SecretaryLeon Panetta remarked that Washington was at a turning point awayfrom the Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific and that this shift will entail a strategicrebalancing.6 Similarly, a recent article by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked that the futureof geopolitics will be decided in Asia,not in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States should be

    right at the center of the action.7 Assistant Secretary of Statefor East Asia and the Pacific KurtCampbell says that one of the most important challenges for U.S. foreign policy is to effect atransitionfrom the immediate and vexing challenges of the Middle East to the long-term and deeply consequential issuesin Asia.8

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    2NC AT Link Non-unique

    The Asia Pivot is the priority over Latin America nowBryant 12Dane Bryant, 9/28/12, World Politics Review, "Chavez or not, it's time to rethink the US-Venezuela relationship,"

    http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-to-rethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationshipOver the past four years, the Obamaadministration has been preoccupied, both militarily anddiplomatically, with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistanand the shifting dynamics of the post-Arab

    Spring Middle East. More recently, the Asia pivot has become the lodestar of U.S. strategic

    planning . As a result, Latin America has not received the attention it warrants, at a time whenthe region is undergoing rapid changes.

    There has been no change in Latin American policy, the aff is that

    transformationBranigan et al 2012(Tania Branigan in Beijing, Jason Burke in Delhi, David Smith in Johannesburg, Jonathan Watts inRio de Janeiro, Ian Traynor in Brussels; Obama's first term: pivot to Asia and tweaks to Latin America; Oct 21;www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/21/obama-foreign-policy-pivots-asia; kdf)

    Obama has tweaked rather than transformed US policy towards Latin America, despite theincreased influence and integration of a region that is growing economically and becoming more dependent on China.

    Aside from a slight relaxation of the embargo on Cuba in 2009, the White House haslargely continued the approach of previous administrations by putting a priority on the

    (losing)battle against narcotics trafficking. Promises to put more emphasis on

    reducing US demand as well as Latin American supply have failed to produce

    results : drug use and murder rates are both rising.

    http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-to-rethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationshiphttp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-to-rethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationship
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    **AT Thumpers**

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    2NC AT Thumpers Generic

    Asia is Obamas top priorityGerges 13Fawaz, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science where he directs the Middle East

    Centre, Obama and the Middle East: the lessons of Iraq? Feb-18, http://www.opendemocracy.net/fawaz-gerges/obama-and-middle-east-lessons-of-iraq /// cmf

    Another point that must be stressed is that the Middle East is not a priority on the Obamaforeign policy agenda. The Administration has shifted its foreign policyand economicpriorities to Asiawhere Obama and his aides believe that Americas future lies. The Obama administrationhas reduced its commitments in the non-oil producing Arab states and has relied on itsregional and European allies to shoulder the burden and responsibilitiesof maintaining westerninfluence. Although Obamas rhetoric had given the impression of heightened USinvolvement and commitment to the region, his actual foreign policy priorities lieelsewherethe rising powers in the Pacific Ocean.But as often happens, before the end of Obamas firstterm in the White House, the major popular uprisings witnessed in the Arab world forced him to become more involved inthe region against his own will.

    Kerry reaffirmed US commitment to Asiadebunked doubts about otherprioritiesHookway 7/1James and Natasha Brereton-Fukui, Kerry Affirms Renewed Focus on Asia Ties,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323297504578578772762356056.html /// cmf

    BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, BruneiU.S. Secretary of StateJohn Kerry sought to reassure SoutheastAsian leaderson Monday that America is committed to deepening its relationship with theregion, despite fears that Washington's foreign-policy agenda was returning to the MiddleEast. Some Asian diplomats have privately expressed worriesthat U.S. budget cuts and Mr. Kerry'sown growing focus on Syria and reviving the stalled peace process between Israeli andPalestinian leaders is weakening Washington's push to rebalance its foreign policy towardAsia's booming economies. At the same time, China has launched a charm offensive with the strategically importantcountries of Southeast Asia, potentially undermining America's momentum, analysts say, by agreeing to discussions on how

    to best resolve territorial conflicts in the energy-rich South China Sea and offering to upgrade its trade relationship with the

    10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc. "Let me be crystal clear,"Mr. Kerry said at a securityforum here. "I know some people wonder whether the second termof the Obama administration and a newsecretary of state are going to continue on the path that we are on. And the answer I say to all ofyou is 'yes,' and not just 'yes': We hope to increase the effort." To emphasize the point, Mr. Kerry tolda news conference afterward that he and foreign ministers from South Korea, China and Japan had agreed that North Koreamust take concrete steps to unwind its nuclear-weapons program before reviving multiparty talks on breaking North Korea'sinternational isolation. "All of us, all four of us, are absolutely united and absolutely firm in our insistence that the futurewith respect to North Korea must include denuclearization," he said. Under President Barack Obama, the U.S. has steppedup its diplomatic and commercial involvement in Asia after a decade focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. FormerSecretary of State Hillary Clinton made a stark statement of intent during an earlier Asean meeting in Vietnam, declaring that

    America was back in the region as a Pacific power. Mr. Obama has dabbled in similar rhetoric, tellingAustralian lawmakers in 2011 that the U.S. is "all in" on Asia. Since then, Washington has from timeto time infuriated China by declaring America's interest in seeing a peaceful resolution to conflicting territorial claims in the

    South China Seawhich Beijing views as U.S. encroachmentwhile U.S. forces have gradually stepped up their militaryrelationship with old allies, such as the Philippines, and new partners like Vietnam. Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert delRosario said in an interview Monday that his country is reviewing how to provide U.S. forces with more access to thecountry's military bases. But since Mr. Kerry succeeded Mrs. Clinton as secretary of state, he has at times appeared moreinterested in addressing issues in the Middle East. Mr. Kerry arrived in Brunei a day behind schedule after four days ofnegotiations in the Mideast over the Palestinian issue. Earlier this year, he pulled out of a planned trip to Indonesia, SoutheastAsia's largest economy and most populous nation. Cuts in Pentagon spending are also threatening to delay Washington'smilitary and economic pivot of its resources to Asia. Across-the-board federal budget reductions known as the sequesterrequired the Defense Department to cut spending by as much as $41 billion in the fiscal year to the end of September, andfurther cuts could follow. "The U.S. may have lost some of its traction, some of the momentum built up by Hillary Clinton,and it's not really offering anything new," said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in

    Singapore. Mr. Kerry singled out maritime security in the shipping lanes of the South China

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    Sea as a policy priority.The waters are claimed in whole or in part by China, Vietnam and the Philippines, amongothers, occasionally sparking armed confrontations. "What happens here matters to the United States and it also matters toeverybody else, it matters to the global community," Mr. Kerry said. He was careful to stress that the U.S.'s interest in theregion wasn't designed to "contain" or "counterbalance" any one countrya thinly veiled reference to China, whose owninfluence continues to grow.

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    2NC AT Syria Thumper

    Arming of Syrian rebels not perceived as a major foreign policy commitmentThe Economist 6/22Barack Obamas tentative step, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21579851-americas-decision-send-more-

    arms-rebels-no-means-guaranteed /// cmfIt was in that spirit of caution that the administration announcedon June 13th that, for the first time, itwould give weapons and other forms of lethal military kit to the rebels. Though the move met with

    bluster from Mr Assads ally, Russiaand wary enthusiasm from Syrian rebel commandersit was not a giant

    step. American officials have given scant detail,but it is thought that the CIA will co-ordinate the

    supply of light arms to the rebels . In an interview with PBS television on June 17th, Mr Obama derided the ideathat heavier weapons, such as anti-tank or anti-helicopter rockets and missiles, could swiftly tip the balance of power awayfrom the Assad regime. The new weaponry will be channelled through the Supreme Military Command, a Western-backedrebel body headed by Selim Idriss, a general who defected from Mr Assads forces, and whose connections to moderategroups America has been testing with supplies of food and medicine. Americas programme, likely to be based in Jordan, onSyrias southern border, may in effect amount to a beefing up of a Saudi operation there, which already involves the CIA intraining vetted rebels. The official explanation for the decision to start arming the opposition rests on a recent assessment byAmerican intelligence agencies, after weeks of investigations, that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, includingthe nerve agent sarin, in several small-scale attacks on the opposition, killing as many as 150 people. However, Obama aideshave also linked the new policy to a deteriorating situation on the ground in Syria in recent weeks, as the regime enjoyedgreater success on the battlefield, in part thanks to help from Iran and Hizbullah, Lebanons Shia party-cum-militia, whichthe United States regards as a terrorist outfit. A question-mark hangs over what America hopes to achieve. Washingtonsources say thathaving warned Syria publicly that the systematic use of chemical weapons would cross a red line andforce America to change its policyMr Obama had to do something, on the grounds that superpowers do not bluff. Inaddition, advocates of arming the opposition have long argued that America may gain leverage by sending its own weaponrydown supply-lines already filled with aid from Gulf Arab countries and Turkey. But without supplying anti-aircraft weapons,America is unlikely to give a boost to the rebels of the magnitude that Hizbullah gifted the regime when it helped Mr Assads army to capture the rebel stronghold of Qusayr on June 5th. Some reckon it is even too late to achieve the more modest goalsof bringing the fissiparous rebel groups under a single command structure and marginalising more extreme elements, in

    particular the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. Once a group has seen its fortunes fall, it is hard to resuscitate it. Take, forexample, Shuhada Suria (Martyrs of Syria). Just a year ago this group, which operates in the north-west province of Idleb andwhose leader sits on the Supreme Military Command, was a leading fighting force. But it has faltered in part because fundinghas shrivelled, prompting defections to stronger groups, usually more Islamist ones. One rebel commander moans that thestinginess of foreign supplies of arms has been like giving us injections just often enough to stop us from being killed off.America must stomach some arms falling into the wrong hands, too. Gulf-purchased Croatian weapons delivered to the rebels

    earlier this year led to gains in the south, which were reversed when supplies abruptly stopped, apparently after some werespotted in the hands of unsavoury groups including the Yarmouk Martyrs, an Islamist lot that abducted four UN peacekeepersin May. Private donations from such places as Kuwait, usually to Salafist groups, continue to bolster the sort of militias thatgive the rebelsin Western eyesa bad name. A policy that fuels but does not change the dynamics of the war is the worstof all worlds, says Emile Hokayem, an analyst based in Bahrain for a London -based think-tank, the International Institutefor Strategic Studies. Rebel commanders hope that Americas shift includes a green light for Saudi Arabia to provide themwith man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADs)hitherto vetoed by America. That may be a forlorn hope. Mr

    Obama noted this month that some of the most effective opposition fighters are no friendsof America, so that arming themwilly-nilly is hardly in Americas long-term interests.

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    2NC AT Middle East Thumper

    Middle East is not a foreign policy priorityno material proof, only rhetoricGerges 13Fawaz, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science where he directs the Middle East

    Centre, Obama and the Middle East: the lessons of Iraq? Feb-18, http://www.opendemocracy.net/fawaz-gerges/obama-and-middle-east-lessons-of-iraq /// cmf

    Another point that must be stressed is that the Middle East is not a priority on the Obamaforeign policy agenda. The Administration has shifted its foreign policyand economicpriorities to Asiawhere Obama and his aides believe that Americas future lies. The Obama administrationhas reduced its commitments in the non-oil producing Arab states and has relied on itsregional and European allies to shoulder the burden and responsibilitiesof maintaining westerninfluence. Although Obamas rhetoric had given the impression of heightened USinvolvement and commitment to the region, his actual foreign policy priorities lieelsewherethe rising powers in the Pacific Ocean.But as often happens, before the end of Obamas firstterm in the White House, the major popular uprisings witnessed in the Arab world forced him to become more involved inthe region against his own will.

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    2NC AT Israel Peace Process Thumper

    Obama not spending political capital on the peace processno hint at future

    plans either

    Gerges 13Fawaz, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science where he directs the Middle EastCentre, Obama and the Middle East: the lessons of Iraq? Feb-18, http://www.opendemocracy.net/fawaz-gerges/obama-and-middle-east-lessons-of-iraq /// cmf

    For example, after his initial attempt to help broker a Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Obamahas taken a cautious stance.Netanyahus opposition has frustrated Obamas quest. Instead of challengingNetanyahu and exerting more pressure on him to accept a sensible solution, Obama let theIsraeli Prime Minister off the hook. Obamasquarely lost the first and final round because he wasunwilling to spend more political capital at home. He recognized the costs to his domestic and foreign

    policy agenda and cut his losses. Given Obamas worldview and his priorities, it is doubtful if the US presidentwill make another major drive to broker a peace settlement between the Palestinians andIsraelis. Just a few days ago, Obama reportedly bemoaned Netanyahus decision to build more settlements on occupiedPalestinian lands. He reportedly called Netanyahu a coward because of his failure to meet the Palestinians halfway, adding

    that he expected Netanyahu to continue his reckless ways. In his second term in office, Obama will most likelyavoid pursuing efforts to broker a peace settlementbecause he does not see conditions ripe to do so. Whatthis means is that the US president does not seem to be inclined to exert pressure on IsraelAmericas strategic client in the region.

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    2NC AT Africa Thumper

    Africa is not a prioritythe renewed interest is just a reaffirmation of

    existingprograms and commitments

    Galvez 6/30Rick, International Relations MA graduate of Syracuse University's Maxwell School, Obama Africa Trip: Bush Was Better ForAfrica Than the Guy Accused Of Being Born in Kenya, http://www.policymic.com/articles/51549/obama-africa-trip-bush-was-

    better-for-africa-than-the-guy-accused-of-being-born-in-kenya /// cmf

    Obama, in contrast, has done little outside of a 2009 visit to Ghana when he offered words and not muchelse. He has Kenyans in a "small uproar" because he will not be visiting, which is representative of his larger stance ormore aptly, non-stanceon the region. The itinerary of this "guilt trip," as some have called it, is a miss; it neglects the

    biggest regional powers in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Additionally, the most successful USAIDdevelopment programsFeed the Future and the Global Health Initiativeare simply incarnations ofprevious administration's programs and are not limited to Africa in particular.The CommerceDepartment's "Doing Business in Africa" campaign has produced minimal results, along with USAID attempts at bolstering

    trade. The larger point is that African development is simply not a priority for Obama. This

    is, to a certain extent, understandable. He's had a lot on his plate. Between economic crises, war, and scandal,Obama has had to prioritize, leaving Africa on the back-burner.Many argue that this is notnecessarily a bad thing; Obama should be focusing on domestic crises and shoring up security at home before spending timeon security around the world which has minimal impact on America.

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    ***Links

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    LinkBag of Goods (Dip Cap)

    Latin American engagement and Asia pivot are zero-sumAnderson and Grewell 2k1(Terry, Professor of Economics at Montana State University, Bishop J., Research Associate at the Political Economy Research Center,

    From Local to Global Property, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2 Chi. J. Intl L. 427, Fall, Lexis) Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag ofgoodsthat includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighsit down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues.Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as

    the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and

    more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources

    necessary to deal with traditional international issues.As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic

    currency is finite. . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic

    efforts on issues of paramount importanceto the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been

    opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing

    vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies." 40

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    LinkGeneric Regional Focus Tradeoff

    Focusing on one region trades off with anotherengagement with Latin

    America can undermine the credibility of the Asia Pivot

    Mark Manyinet al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing'towards asia,"http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf Increasing the relative importance of the Asia-Pacific in U.S. policy could conceivablydiminish U.S. capabilities in other regions. In particular, in an era of constrained U.S. defense resources, anincreased U.S. military emphasis onthe Asia-Pacific region might result in a reduction in U.S.military presence or capacity in other parts of the world, which in turn could increase risks for theUnited States in those other regions.While the United States does not want t o reduce itscommitments in the Middle East, for instance, forces similar to those needed in Asia are alsorequired there. High priority capabilities in both

    regions include short- and m edium-range missiledefense, rotational naval deployments and air attack forces, and rapid-reaction ground forces. Such forces may be

    strained by simultaneous demands in both regions. The high-profile manner in which the Pacific Pivot initiativeshave been unveiledthrough aseries of Presidential and Cabinet-level trips, announcements, speeches, and articlesappears tohave been designed to call as much attention to them as possible.

    (See Selected Documents andSpeeches.)Part of the reason for this may have been to demonstrate to regional players the depthof the Administrations commitment and resolve.Thisapproach also carriesthepotentialcosts and risks. For example, the high profile that ObamaAdministration officialshave given to the initiative could lead leaders in other regions to believe,rightly or wrongly, that theUnited States is disengaging, thereby eroding U.S. global influence.Even the use of the t erm pivot, which has persisted despite the Administrations latersubstitution of the term rebalancing, could signal the changeability of U.S. policy priorities.23 For instance, when the Ob ama Administration first came to office, it sometimes appeared to putthe

    U.S.-China relationship at the center of its Asia strategy. If that ever was Administrationpolicy, such an approach has been abandoned. Also, if the United States

    pivots once, it can pivot again ,perhaps if a successoradministration adopts a different set of

    priorities. 24The depth of theObama Administrationsrebalancing toward the Asia-Pacificregionalsomay be called into question as time goes on.As yet, it does not appear that the Administration hastranslated its pronouncements into an across-the-government plan to implement the new elementsof the strategy. The Administrations budget request for FY2013 sends ambiguous signals. On th eone hand, the proposed budget includes a 5%decrease for East Asia and Pacific (EAP) bilateralassistance programs below projected spending levels for FY2012. On the other hand, compared tosome other aid r egions, funding for EAPremains relatively stable. Overall assistance funding toEurope, Eurasia, and Central Asia (which includes Afghanistan), for example, is t o fall by 18%,according to the FY2013 budget request.25Additionally, the prominence the Obama Administration has given to the initiative hasundoubtedly raised the potential costs to the United States if it or successor administrations fail tofollow

    through on public pledges. Chinese analysts have already expressed skepticism about theU.S. abilitytofollow through on the pivot, givenU.S. economic difficulties and the continuingturmoilinthe Middle East, Afghanistan, and otherareas.26 If such predictions come to pass, U.S. influencemay fall farther and faster due tothe Obama Administrations high profileannouncements.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
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    LinkGeneric Tradeoff

    The US is moving away from the West to focus on the pivot, plan reverses the

    trend

    Carament and Palamar 2012 (David and Simon; Canada Grapples with Asia Dilemma; Feb 10;thediplomat.com/2012/02/10/canada-grapples-with-asia-dilemma/comment-page-1/?all=true; kdf)First and foremost, a broader policy agenda must grapple with the military and strategic aspects of China's tremendouseconomic success and the U.S. reaction. Much ink has been spilt and hands have been wrung over Chinas military build -up.

    However, with the announcement of the new American Strategic Guidance document, it seems as if the United Statesis ready to pivot away from the North Atlantic and Near East and towards the Pacific basin, whereVietnam, Singapore, Australia, and others have welcomed them as a balance to China. The Strategic Guidancedocument has China in mind, as it calls for U.S. armed forces that are lighter on the ground, and that emphasize sea and air

    assets, Special Forces, and exotic technology.This Asia pivot is further affected by what one formerU.S. State Department official described as a declining appetite in Washington to ownthe worlds problems. The United Statesmay still continue to intervene in failed states, civil wars, and disasterzones, but their commitment may be more limited, their footprint smaller, and the expectations of their allies(including Canada), greater. In an age of austerity, the Obama administration has prioritized seekingcontinued dominance in the Pacific basin at a cost to power projection elsewhere.

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    LinkSpending Tradeoff

    Asia pivot is zero-sum with new spending on other US interestsKelly 12Robert, professor of political science at Pusan National University, Senior Analyst as Wikistrat, Why the U.S. wont pivot t o Asia

    anytime soon, March-29, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/29/why-america-wont-pivot-to-asia-anytime-soon/ /// cmfAmerica obviously needs to spend less, and money which could fund domestic entitlements is going todefense instead. The opportunity cost of buying aircraft carriers to semi-contain China iscutting Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Those programs, plus Defense, comprise around 70% ofthe U.S. budget, making the pivot a classic guns vs. butter trade-off.Americas debt exceeds ten trilliondollars and its deficit a trillion. Bush borrowed hugely, and the Great Recession worsened the red ink. Given Chinas

    enormity, a U.S. build-up in the region could cost massive sums that just arent thereanymore. The average American voter will see that domestic entitlements are suffering to fund the continuing post-9/11U.S. military expansion. It is unlikely Americans will choose guns over butter (aircraft carriers instead of checks forgrandma) in the medium-term.

    Resources are finiteplan causes tradeoffKlinger 2013

    (Bruce; Increasing Risk of North Korean Tactical Attack on South Korea: What US Needs to do; Mar 30;www.eurasiareview.com/30032013-increasing-risk-of-north-korean-tactical-attack-on-south-korea-what-u-s-needs-to-do/; kdf)

    But friends and enemies are questioning U.S. ability to deliver on its security promises. DeputySecretary of Defense Ashton Carter traveled to Asiain mid-March to addressrising allied concerns that massivecuts to the U.S. defense budget have weakened President Obamas Asia Pivot strategy andU.S. military capabilities. Carters reassurances were at odds, however, with earlier Pentagon statements of the devastating impact of sequestration, including Cartersown March 12 speech that the cuts could reduce the naval ship and aircraft operations in the Pacific region by one-third, force four carrier air wings to stop flying, and

    leave gaps in the availability o f Marine Amphibious Ready Groups.[11] Even prior to sequestration, the Obama Administrations boldrhetoric on its Asia Pivot strategy was not backed with sufficient resources. Claims of theU.S. being back in Asia were undermined by a budget-driven defense strategy that leftthe military shortchanged and U.S. credibility and resolve in doubt.

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    LinkEconomic Engagement Generic

    Economic engagement with the Asia-Pacific region is key to the Asia PivotMark Manyinet al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing'towards asia,"http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf

    Economics and trade are bothcauses of and instruments for the pivot toward the Asia-Pacific. Historical trends and most future projections indicate that the greater Asia-Pacific region is rising in importance in theglobal economy and world trade.55 The region has been actively pursuing greater economic integration at a pace exceedingthat of other parts of the globe. As shown in The Economic Rise of Asia, the Asia-Pacific region has become more vital

    to the global and U.S. economies as well. Accordingly, the Obama Administration has increased theU.S. focus oneconomic and trade relations in the Asia-Pacific. Among other motivations, the region

    plays acrucial role in President Obamas National Export Initiative. Four of the ten emerging export markets targeted in the2011 National Export StrategyChina, India, Indonesia, and Vietnamare part of the Asia-Pacific region.56 Additionally,

    heightened U.S. economic engagement forinstance, through participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP) FTA talksdemonstratethat the United States wishes to remain a major force in theregions economic and geopoliticaldynamics.

    Latin American economic engagement and Asia pivot engagement are zero-

    sumAnderson and Grewell 2k1(Terry, Professor of Economics at Montana State University, Bishop J., Research Associate at the Political Economy Research Center,From Local to Global Property, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2 Chi. J. Intl L. 427, Fall, Lexis)

    Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag ofgoodsthat includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighsit down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues.Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as

    the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and

    more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources

    necessary to deal with traditional international issues.As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic

    currency is finite. . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic

    efforts on issues of paramount importanceto the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have beenopposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securingvital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies." 40

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
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    LinkMexico

    Economic engagement with Mexico ruins the pivotTaylor 2012(Guy; Obama looks to Asia as trade markets beckon south; Nov 12;www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/12/obama-looks-to-asia-as-trade-markets-beckon-south/?page=all; kdf)

    President Obamaspostelection trip to Southeast Asia presages a greater second-term focus on that region,but some foreign-policy analysts say that shouldnt distract from the need to build betteralliances with U.S. neighbors, which could be key to restoring the nations sluggish economy.Nowhere is thatmore apparent than Mexico, whose president-elect, Enrique Pena Nieto, is scheduled to visit Washington this month and has

    signaled an openness to deeper cooperation, including in the energy sector. Ithink the Obama

    administration is focused on the Asia pivot , said Andrew Selee, who heads the Mexico Institute at

    the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. But if things in Mexico get

    exciting, we may see a pivot toward the Western Hemisphere, which has much more

    tangible consequences.One of our greatest paths to making the U.S. economy more dynamic isto tie it much more closely to the Mexicanand Canadian economiesin terms of innovation andmanufacturing, Mr. Selee said. This will make the U.S. much more competitive globally.

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    LinkLatin America Focus Generic

    The plan is a major adjustment in foreign policyjeopardizes the pivotHaibin 6/23(Niu [Research Fellow, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies]; Latin America's Rising Status in the Sino-US Relationship;

    www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/latin-americas-rising-status-in-the-sino-us-relationship/; kdf)For the Obama administration's second term, it is a major policy adjustment rather than a policycontinuation to focus on Latin America.Since 9/11, counter-terrorism efforts, the international financial crisis,and the pivot to Asia have occupied the majority of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Subsequently, Latin America has been anoverlooked region for more than a decade. The Obama administrations first term tried to improve its relationship with theregion, but faced setbacks because of its policies on Cuba, immigration and anti-drug issues. Instead, the regional approachmust be shifted to a bilateral, country-by-country approach.There Obama administrations policy shift in Latin America can

    be explained by two factors: the rediscovered importance of Latin America to the United States economic recovery andLatin Americas position as a promising region could allow US engagement to make visible achievements. First, in the 2012

    presidential debates, Republican candidate Mitt Romney criticized Obama's Latin American policy andtreated the Latin American economy as an alternative to China, arguing to strengthen UStrade with the region. This argument obviously had an impact on Obamas second term agenda and Latin American

    policy. Second, following the same logic of its pivot to the Asia Pacific, Latin America is astable and promising region the U.S. cant afford to overlook. Achievements in US relations withLatin America will also help Democrats win future presidential elections considering the increasing influence of Latinos indomestic politics.In regards to President Xis Latin American policy, it is more a continuation than an adjustment of policy.In the past decade, the Sino-Latin American relationship has witnessed a golden period of development. China is the secondlargest trading partner for Latin America; its demand for raw materials and primary products has both improved LatinAmerican countries terms of trade and contributed to the regions better performance in dealing with the recent internationalfinancial crisis. Additionally, President Xi has worked to deepen the ties by addressing potential challenges, strengtheningthis promising relationship. China raised its strategic partnerships with Peru and Mexico to comprehensive strategic ones.Mutual investment, financial cooperation and open trade are being paid more attention from the Chinese side. One aim ofChinas recent diplomacy is to establish a Sino-Latin American Dialogue Forum, which has received positive supports from

    Brazil, Mexico, and other countries within the region.Now, it is necessary to understand how thisstrengthening interest by the US and China in Latin America could impact the Sino-USrelationship as well as Latin America as a whole. From a geopolitical perspective, both sides havesome arguments to dilute each others influence globally. However, policy influence of such argumentsis very limited. It is natural for both world powers diplomatic agendas to intersect. One noteworthy argument from Chineseside is that China should enhance its engagement with regions outside of Asia as the US pivot to the Asia Pacific attempts to

    contain China. This argument should be interpreted to explore the diplomatic space available for China as a global powerrather than to counter US hegemony. Also, China needs to understand the recent intensive American engagement with LatinAmerica by following the same logic.In fact, both countries demonstrated their pragmatic spirit and economic-orientedapproach during their recent engagements with Latin America. The most cited achievement about President Xi's visit toMexico was that China agreed to resume imports of Mexican pork and to import tequila. Similar review was also given toPresident Obamas visit to Mexico by arguing the trip was to focus on economic cooperation rather than drug issues. This is agood posture considering that no Latin American country wants to choose side between the US and China. Ultimately, Latin

    American countries benefit from cooperation with the worlds two largest markets.Although both countries aretrying to avoid geopolitical competition, it is important to manage their interaction in LatinAmerica.At the bilateral level, the United States and China have held several strategic dialogueson Latin American affairssince 2006. The purpose of the dialogue is to enhance mutual trust and preventmiscalculations by interpreting their engagements with Latin America. This continual dialogue can help interpret why the USgovernment holds a positive attitude to Chinas increasing ties with Latin America despite some very conservative andsuspicious attitudes in the US. The US has showed its support to both Chinas permanent observer status in the Organizationof American States and Chinas membershipat the Inter-American Development Bank.

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    LinkMilitary Assistance

    Causes tradeoffs that wreck the budgetJack Spencer 11, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at TheHeritage Foundation, 6/22/11, Capability, Not Politics, Should Drive DOD Energy Research,

    http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/capability-not-politics-should-drive-dod-energy-researchWith multiple warsongoing, traditional threats looming, and new onesemerging, theU.S. Armed

    Forces are already under tremendous stress. So introducing a new assignment that

    needlessly bleeds scarce resources away from core missions to advance a political agenda is

    untenable . Yet this is exactly what the Obama Administration is doing by ordering the militaryto lead a green

    revolution.The White House is pushing the idea that the alternative energy industry would get the kick start it needs if the military will just

    commit to using them. But the assumptions behind this argument are flawed, and the strategy would increase

    demands on the military budget while harming national security. Congress should put a stop to itright away.

    Budget tradeoffs undermine the U.S. pivot to Asianuclear warColby 11Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to the Secretary ofDefenses Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire, The Diplomat, online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes

    But the pendulum shouldnt be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasntbeen

    overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. The USalliance and partnership structure,what the late William Odom called the United States liberal empire that includesa substantial militarypresence and a willingness to use itin the defence of US and allied interests, remains avitalcomponentofUS security and global stability and prosperity. This system of voluntary and consensualcooperation under US leadership, particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable blocdefending the liberal international order. But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this systemis under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to

    become the centre of the global economy. A nuclear North Koreas violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, aswell as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyangs development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover,

    brings into sight the day whenNorth Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack, aprospect that will further imperil stability in the region. More broadly, the rise of Chinaand especially its rapid andopaque military build-upcombined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troublingto the UnitedStates and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the westernPacific is the development of Beijings anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballisticmissile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets.

    While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities willgive China the growingpower to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to

    undermine the US-guaranteed security substructurethat has defined littoral East Asia since World War II.Even if China says today it wont exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring?

    Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must becoupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained

    military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. In short, the United States must increase itsinvolvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintaining the military balancein the

    western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investmentsto improve US capabilities. It willalso require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under

    the US security umbrella. This wontbe cheap, for these requirements cant be met simply by incrementaladditions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech

    capabilities. Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategicdevelopments willdetermine which countryor countries set the international rulesthat shapethat economic future. Conversely, US interventionsin the Middle Eastand, to a lesser degree, in south-

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    eastern Europe have been driven byfar more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the nationalinterest, encompassing the proposition thatfailing or illiberally governed peripheral states can contributeto an instabilitythat nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true,the effort isrightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the benefits gained. Moreover, the United States canscale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interestsin ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism. The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that theUnited States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in

    making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure,leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be

    counted on to look out for US interests. We need to focus onmaking the right interventions, notforswearing them completely. In practice, this means amore substantial focus on East Asiaand the serioussecurity challenges there, andless emphasis on the Middle East. This isnt to say that the United States should

    be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should be more tightly connected

    to concrete objectives such asprotectingthe free flow of oilfrom the region,preventing terrorist attacks

    against the United States and its allies, and forestallingor, if necessary, containing nuclear proliferation as

    opposed to the more idealistic aspirations to transform the regions societies. These more concrete objectives can bebettermet bythe more judicious and economical use of our military power. More broadly, however,itmeans a shift in US emphasis away from thegreater Middle East toward the Asia-Pacificregion, whichdwarfsthe former ineconomic and military potentialand in the dynamism of its

    societies. The Asia-Pacificregion, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global stage, iswhere the future of the international security and economic system will be set, and it is there that

    Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. In light of US

    budgetary pressures, including the hundreds of billions in security related money to be cut as part of the debtceiling deal, itsdoubly importantthat US security dollars be allocated to themost pressing tasksshoring up the US position inthe most important region of the world, the Asia-Pacific. It willalso requirerestraintin expenditure on those challenges and regions that dont touch so directly on thefuture of US security and prosperity. As Americans debate the proper US global role in the wake of the 2008financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct their ire not at overseas commitments and interventionas such, but rather at those not tied to core US interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the liberal empire that wehave constructed and maintained since World War II. Defenders of our important overseas links and activities should clearlydistinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barely restrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing

    the United States tied down in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed, those

    whorefuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle Eastor call for still more aredirectly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia, given strategicdevelopments in the region and asharply constrained budgetary environment inWashington. We can no longer afford, either strategically or financially, tosquander our powerinunnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The ability and will to intervene is too important to beso wasted.

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    LinkUS/China Relations

    Strong U.S.-China relations are key to sustaining the Asia PivotMark Manyinet al, 5/28/12, Congressional Research Service, "pivot to the pacific? the obama administration's 'rebalancing'towards asia,"http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf

    The Obama Administration can be said to have adopted a two-pronged approach to China: reaffirming and strengthening cooperative ties whilesimultaneously establishing a strong andcredible American presence across Asiato encourage constructive Chinese behavior and to provideconfidence to regional leaders who wish to resist potential Chinese regional hegemony. Inthe Administrations earlystatements about the pivot toward the Asia Pacific, it often seemed thatthe second prong wasmore prominent. However, before a February 2012 White House meeting with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping,who is anticipated to replace Hu Jintao as president later this year, President Obama sought to restore a balancebetween the two prongs, stating that for the United Statesto strengthen relationships in the region, boost tradeand commerce, and be a strong and effective partner with the Asia Pacific region ... it is absolutely vital that wehave a strong relationship withChina. Seeking to reassure China, Obama also said he has alwaysemphasized that we welcome Chinas peaceful rise, that we believe that a strong and prosperous China is one that can help

    tobring stability and prosperity to the region and to the world.48At an official level, China has so far

    responded relatively cautiously to the U.S. shift in regional emphasis. In remarks during his February 2012U.S. trip, Vice President Xi said, China welcomes a constructive role by the United States in promoting peace, stabilityand prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, while, At the same time, we hope the United States will respect the interests andconcerns of China and other countries in this region.49 Also notable is wording in Chinese Premier Wen Jiabaos annualreport to Chinas parliament, delivered on March 5, 2012, stating that, peace, development, and cooperation remain theunderlying trends of the times, and overall the situation is favorable for Chinas peaceful development. That officialChinese assessment of the international environment facing China was similar to the assessment contained in the Premiers2011 report, suggesting that, so far at least, China does not consider the U.S. announcement of the rebalancing to Asia tohave significantly eroded Chinas external environment.50

    [insert plan hurts relations with China]

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
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    ***Impacts

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    ImpactGlobal Economy

    Effective Asia pivot key to the global economyRichard N. Haass 11, former director of policy planning in the US State Department, is President of the Council on ForeignRelations, November 14, 2011, Re-Orienting America, online: http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/re-orienting-

    america/p26490Something akin to this mistake has befallen American foreign policy. The United States has become preoccupiedwith the Middle Eastin certain ways, the wrong Orientand has not paid adequate attention to EastAsia and the Pacific,where much of the twenty-first century's history will be written. The good news is thatthis focus is shifting. Indeed, a quiet transformation is taking place in American foreignpolicy,one that is as significant as it is overdue. The US has rediscovered Asia. "Rediscovered" is theoperative word here. Asia was one of the two principal theaters of World War II, and again shared centrality with Europeduring the Cold War. Indeed, the period's two greatest conflictsthe wars in Korea and Vietnamwere fought on the Asianmainland. But, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Asia receded from American interest. Inthe first decade of the post-Cold War era, the US trained much of its attention on Europe. American policymakers focused

    primarily on enlarging NATO to encompass many of the former Warsaw Pact countries, and on contending with the post-Yugoslav wars. The second phase of the post-Cold War era began with the 9/11 terror attacks. What followed was a decadeof US focus on terrorism and the large-scale commitment of American military forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. The twoconflicts have claimed more than 6,000 American lives, cost more than $1 trillion, and consumed countless hours for two

    presidents and their senior staff. But now this phase of American foreign policy is ending. President Barack Obama has

    announced that US armed forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. In Afghanistan, US force levels have peaked and aredeclining; the only questions concern the pace of withdrawal and the size and role of any residual US military presence after2014. This is not to argue that the Middle East is irrelevant or that the US should ignore it. On the contrary, it is still home tomassive oil and gas reserves. It is a part of the world where terrorists are active and conflicts have been common. Iran ismoving ever closer to developing nuclear weapons; if it does, others may well follow suit. And it is a region nowexperiencing what could prove to be historic domestic political upheavals. There is also the unique American tie to Israel.

    Nevertheless, there are grounds for the US doing less in the greater Middle East than it has inrecent years: the weakening of al-Qaeda; the poor prospects for peacemaking efforts; and,above all, the mounting evidence that, by any measure, massive nation-building initiatives are notyielding returnscommensurate with the investments. At the same time, there are strong arguments for

    greater US involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. Withits large populations and fast-growing

    economies , it is difficult to exaggerate the region's economic importance. American companies

    export more than $300 billion in goods and services to countries in the region each year. Meanwhile, Asian countriesare a critical source of investment for the US economy. Maintaining regional stability is

    thus critical for US (and global) economic success . The US has multiple alliance

    obligationswith Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailandwhich are needed, in part, todeter North Korean aggression. Moreover, US policy must create an environment in which a

    rising China is never tempted to use its growing power coercively within or outside theregion. For this reason, recent US efforts to strengthen ties with India and several Southeast Asian countries make good

    sense. The US is right to shift its focus from the Middle East to the Far East . The good

    news is that this conclusion seems to be shared across the US political spectrum. Mitt Romney, thelikely Republican nominee for president, pledges to increase the rate of shipbuilding a commitment linked to an increasedUS presence in the Pacific. And US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks of America pivoting away from the greaterMiddle East: "The world's strategic and economic center of gravity is shifting east, and we are focusing more on the Asia-Pacific region." Regardless of whether the twenty-first century will be another "American century," it is certain that it will

    be an Asian and Pacific century. It is both natural and sensible that the US be central to whatever evolves from that fact.

    Failed Asia pivot collapses hegrisks miscalMacgregor 2012Douglas A. Mcgregor, contributor and is executive vice president of Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC, retired Army colonel, decoratedcombat veteran and the author of four books on military affairs, 10/26, Affording the Pacific Pivot,http://nation.time.com/2012/10/26/affording-the-pacific-pivot/

    In the turbulent decade leading up to the outbreak of World War I, Winston Churchill, Britains First Lord of the A dmiralty,urged Britains national leadership to concentrate British naval power in the Atlantic and the North Sea where Germanys

    http://nation.time.com/2012/10/26/affording-the-pacific-pivot/http://nation.time.com/2012/10/26/affording-the-pacific-pivot/
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    rapidly expanding high seas fleet seemed determined to challenge British naval supremacy. Churchill reasoned, It would bevery foolish to lose England in safeguarding Egypt. If we win the big battle in the decisive theater, we can put everything elsestraight afterwards. If we lose it, there will not be any afterwards. On the precipice of sequestration and with the surviva l of

    Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid at stake, Churchills strategic rationale is instructive,particularlyfor leadersin Washington, D.C., who advocate a U.S. military buildup in the Pacific. WhenChurchill made the case for concentrating the British fleet in the Atlantic, he waspracticing economy of force, a time honored principle in British military affairs. In 1902, in the midst of a financialcrisis brought on, in part, by the Boer War, London had already turned to Japan for military assistance in blocking Russianexpansion in the Far East. By 1911, the Russian threat had disappeared beneath the waters of the Tsushima Strait, but theAnglo-Japanese Treaty still allowed the withdrawal of British naval and ground forces from Asia, facilitating the

    concentration of British military power in the Atlantic. The result was a debilitating blockade Germanycould not overcome throughout the First World War.Like the British at the beginning of the 20th Century,Washington suffers from a case of Imperial Overstretch. Washington needs a new national securitystrategy, one designed to halt the dissipation of American military resources around the worldand to concentrate it wherever it is needed. For the moment, the point of concentration is Asia,where Chinas assertiveness opens the door to the kind of instability and potential forstrategic miscalculation that is eerily similar to the crises and conflicts that preceded theoutbreak of World War Iin Europe.

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    ImpactUS-China War/Asia Stability

    Credible commitment key to prevent China war and maintain Asian stabilityRudd 13Kevin, Member of the Australian Parliament, Beyond the Pivot: A New Road Map for U.S. -Chinese Relations Feb 26,

    http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/beyond-the-pivot-a-new-road-map-for-u-s-chinese-relations/ ///cmfDebate about the future of U.S.-Chinese relations iscurrentlybeing driven by a more assertiveChinese foreignand securitypolicyover the last decade, the region's reaction to this, and Washington'sresponse -- the "pivot,"or "rebalance," to Asia. TheObama administration's renewed focus on the strategicsignificance of Asia has been entirely appropriate. Without such a move, there was adanger that China, with its hard-line, realist view of international relations, would conclude that an

    economically exhausted United States was losing its staying power in the Pacific. But nowthat it is clear that the United States will remain in Asia for the long haul, the time has come for both Washington and Beijingto take stock, look ahead, and reach some long-term conclusions as to what sort of world they want to see beyond the

    barricades. Asia's central tasks in the decades ahead are avoiding a major confrontation

    between the United States and China and preserving the strategicstability that hasunderpinned regional prosperity. These tasks are difficult but doable. They will require both parties

    to understand each other thoroughly, to act calmly despite multiple provocations, and to manage the domesticand regional forces that threaten to pull them apart. This, in turn, will require a deeper and more

    institutionalized relationship -- one anchored in a strategic framework that accepts the reality ofcompetition, the importance of cooperation, and the fact that these are not mutually exclusive propositions. Such a newapproach, furthermore, should be given practical effect through a structured agenda driven by regular direct meetings

    between the two countries' leaders.

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    ImpactAsia Stability

    Obamas attention and continued pursuit of engagement and presence in Asia

    key to credible pivot and stability

    Munoz 13Carlos, Donilon: US remains 'all in' on shift to Asia, March-11, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/287377-donilon-us-remains-all-in-on-shift-to-asia-#ixzz2YD4zH0FP ///cmf

    The Obama administration remains fully committed to seeing though thePentagon's proposedstrategic shift from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific region, a top WhiteHouse official saidthis week. "President Obama has been clear about the future that the UnitedStates seeks. . . when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, the United States is 'all in,'" National SecurityAdviser Thomas Donilon said during a speech at the Asia Society in New York on Monday. President Obama announcedthe strategic shift to Asia last February, as part of the administration's realignment of national security priorities for a post-Afghanistan and post-Iraq world. However, the recent rise of Islamic extremists groups in North and West Africa have

    prompted some inside the beltway to question whether a strategic shift to the Pacific is the right move. On Monday, Donilonpushed back on such assertions, arguing Asia's influence on the world stage will only increase in the coming years. According to Donilon, nearly half of all economic growth and subsequent global politicall influence will emanate fromregional Pacific powers over the next five years. That growth, he added, "is fueling powerful geopolitical forces that arereshaping the region" including Chinas ascent as a world power, North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons andIndia's expanding influence in South Asia and beyond. "These changes are unfolding at a time when Asias economic,diplomatic and political rules of the road are still taking shape," he added. "The stakes for people on both sides of the Pacific

    are profound." Recognizing that sea change of global influence based in the Asia-Pacific region, the Obamaadministration has taken great strides to solidify the United States' position in that corner ofthe world, according to Donilon. "Perhaps most telling[of] this rebalance is reflected in the most

    valuable commodity in Washington, the Presidentstime ,"he said. The Obama administrationofficials have held bilateral talks with each regional partner in the Pacific, as well as fully participated in the multilateralsummits held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Specifically, the White House has engaged "at anunprecedented pace" with Washington's counterparts in China, holding formal and informal talks with Beijing on a slew of

    regional security issued, according to Donilon. "The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China. Wedo not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation," Donilon said,reiterating the administration's line on the Asian powerhouse. "There is nothing preordained about such anoutcome,"he said regarding a possible boiling over of tensions between Washington and

    Beijing. China took a step forward toward that burgeoning relationship with the United States, backing Washington onnew United Nations sanctions against North Korea's nuclear program. In response, Pyongyang on Monday officiallynullified the 1953 armistice deal with the United States that ended the Korean War. Since North and South Korea are stilltechnically at war, it remains to be seen if the decision will result in conflict breaking out on the peninsula. Howevertensions continue over Beijing's continued efforts to launch cyberattacks against American government and commercialnetworks. In February, security firm Mandiant released a report on Chinese cyberwarfare capabilities, claiming elite militaryunit of Chinese hackers have been working to break into U.S. networks from their headquarters in Shanghai. Weeks afterthe Mandiant report, Senate intelligence committee chair Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said classified intelligence

    documents supported the claims made by the security firm. Despite those reports, Donilon said the United Statescontinued cooperation with Beijing and its influence in Asia is and will be key to

    maintaining stability among the regional Pacific powers. "The regions success . . .

    and the United States security and prosperity in the 21st century, still depend on the presence

    and engagement of the United States in Asia,"he said. " We are a resident Pacific power, resilient and

    indispensable."

    Asian instability escalates to global nuclear warLanday, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, 2K(Jonathan S., Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts, 3 -10, Knight Ridder/Tribune News)Accessed on LexisNexis 12-29-09

    Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India andPakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them coulddestabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and eve