Article on Business Ethics

ABSTRACT. This paper describes and discusses theEnron Corporation debacle. The paper presents thebusiness ethics background and leadership mechanismsaffecting Enron’s collapse and eventual bankruptcy.Through a systematic analysis of the organizationalculture at Enron (following Schein’s frame of refer-ence) the paper demonstrates how the company’sculture had profound effects on the ethics of itsemployees.

Now, when most people hear the word “Enron”they think of corruption on a colossal scale – acompany where a handful of highly paid execu-tives were able to pocket millions of dollars whilecarelessly eroding the life-savings of thousandsof unwitting employees. Not long ago, the samecompany had been heralded as a paragon of cor-porate responsibility and ethics – successful,driven, focused, philanthropic and environmen-tally responsible. Enron appeared to representthe best a 21st century organization had tooffer, economically

and ethically. The questionsbecome, how did Enron lose both its econom-ical and ethical status? Is it because of its very sizeand effects? Is it the direct harm to primary andsecondary stakeholders? Or, is it the worldwidemedia coverage that the Enron demise hasdrawn? These questions make the Enron caseinteresting to us as business ethicists.

At first sight, Enron looks like a mega-sizeillustration of the bad apple and/or the bad barreldisease and, hence, looks like good marketing forthe business ethics business (which almost has avested interest in such scandals and other badexamples). The problem is, however, that Enronlooked like an excellent corporate citizen, withall the corporate social responsibility (CSR) andbusiness ethics tools and status symbols in place.

Enron Ethics (an ironic expression which isused now and then, see e.g. the headings ofTracinski, 2002 or Berenbeim in Executive actionno. 15, Feb. 2002) reads like the new catchwordfor the ultimate contradiction between words anddeeds, between a deceiving glossy facade and arotten structure behind, like a definite good-byeto naive business ethics. Enron ethics means (stillironically) that business ethics is a question oforganizational “deep” culture rather than ofcultural artifacts like ethics codes, ethics officersand the like. With this as a backdrop, the paperwill describe and discuss how executives at Enronin practice created an organizational culture thatput the bottom line ahead of ethical behavior anddoing what’s right. More specifically, the paperfirst provides a brief background on Enron andits rise and fall. Next, the paper systematicallyuses Schein’s (1985) five primary mechanismsavailable to leaders to create and reinforce aspectsof culture (i.e., attention focusing, reaction tocrises, role modeling, rewards allocation andcriteria for hiring and firing) to analyze thecompany’s culture and leadership that con-tributed to it’s ethical demise and filing for bank-ruptcy. It is our contention, that with such apoint of departure one will be better preparedfor a necessary discussion in our field of how toprevent an “instrumentalization” of ethics andCSR for mere facade purposes (this themedeserves and requires a paper on its own, at least).

The culture history of Enron

The Enron case is not least a good illustrationof continuously updated case presentation andcase discussion in the Internet age (which could

Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes)

Journal of Business Ethics 45: 243–256, 2003.© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Ronald R. SimsJohannes Brinkmann

deserve a paper on its own, too). Businessschool researchers, teachers and students alike caneasily keep themselves busy for days just withsorting, structuring, checking and summarizingall the ingredients and pieces of the Enron storyfound on the Internet. One possible way oforganizing and limiting such a task is departingfrom or even staying with the websites oftraditional mass media such as CNN (see e.g.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2002/enron/), the WallStreet Journal, Financial Times, or of the main stake-holders such as the victims’ enrongate.com orthe remainders’ enron.com. Most tempting forbusiness ethicists is of course a closer lookat the websites of the business ethics business (seee.g. http://www.msnbc.com/modules/enron/,businessethics.ca/enron/, caseplace.org, enron-guide.com, all with lots of further links) and asthe up-dated and earliest of all the academicarticles and papers we can expect in the futureTonge et al., 2003; Petrick and Quinn, 2002;Cohan, 2002). In spite of (or because of ) suchan abundance of available information1 wechoose to tell the story once more, as a culturehistory in our own prose, as a background for thefollowing illustration of how Schein’s organiza-tion culture approach can lead to a better under-standing of the Enron case.

Background

A company with humble beginnings, Enronbegan as a merger of two Houston pipelinecompanies in 1985. Although Enron faced anumber of financially difficult years, the companymanaged to survive. In 1988, the deregulationof the electrical power markets took effect, andthe company redefined its business from “energydelivery” to “energy broker” and Enron quicklychanged from a surviving company to a thrivingone. Deregulation allowed Enron to become a“matchmaker” in the power industry, bringingbuyers and sellers together. Enron profited fromthe exchanges, generating revenue from the dif-ferences between the buying and selling prices.Deregulation allowed Enron to be creative – forthe first time, a company that had been requiredto “operate within the lines” could innovate and

test limits. Over time, Enron’s contracts becameincreasingly diverse and significantly morecomplex. As Enron’s products and servicesevolved, so did the company’s culture.

In this newly deregulated and innovativeforum, Enron embraced a culture that rewarded“cleverness”. Deregulation opened the industryup to experimentation and the culture at Enronwas one that expected employees to explore thisnew playing field to the utmost. Pushing thelimits was considered a survival skill.

Enron’s former President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer (CEO) Jeffry Skilling actively cultivateda culture that would push limits – “Do it right,do it now and do it better” was his motto. Heencouraged employees to be independent, inno-vative and aggressive. The Harvard BusinessReview Case Study: Enron’s Transformation(Bartlett and Glinska, 2001) contains employeequotations such as “. . . you were expected toperform to a standard that was continually beingraised . . .”, “the only thing that mattered wasadding value”, or “. . . it was all about an atmos-phere of deliberately breaking the rules . . .”(Bartlett and Glinska, 2001). A culture thatadmires innovation and unchecked ambition andpublicly punishes poor performance can producetremendous returns in the short run. However,in the long run, achieving additional value byconstantly “upping the ante” becomes harder andharder. Employees are forced to stretch the rulesfurther and further until the limits of ethicalconduct are easily overlooked in the pursuit ofthe next big success (Josephson, 1999; cf. alsosimilarities found in the culture at SalomonBrothers in the early 1990s, see Sims, 2000; Simsand Brinkmann, 2002).

A lot of smoke and mirrors

Enron’s spectacular success, and the positivescrutiny the company was receiving from thebusiness press and the financial analysts, onlyadded fuel to the company’s competitive culture.The business community rewarded Enron for itscleverness (and even its ethicalness) and Enron’sexecutives felt driven by this reputation to sustainthe explosive growth of the late 1990s, even

244 Ronald R. Sims and Johannes Brinkmann

when they logically knew that it was not possible.A negative earnings outlook would have been ared flag to investors, indicating Enron was notas successful as it appeared. If investors’ concernsdrove down the stock price due to excessiveselling, credit agencies would be forced to down-grade Enron’s credit rating. Trading partnerswould lose faith in the company, trade elsewhere,and Enron’s ability to generate quality earningsand cash flows would suffer. In order to avoidsuch a scenario at all costs, Enron entered into adeceiving web of partnerships and employedincreasingly questionable accounting methodsto maintain its investment-grade status. Enronexecutives probably felt that they were doing theright thing for their organization.

Partnerships

Partnerships can be an easy and efficient way toraise money. However, in an effort to continueto push the value envelope Enron took partner-ships to a new level by creating “special purposevehicles” (SPVs), pseudo-partnerships thatallowed the company to sell assets and “create”earnings that artificially enhanced its bottom line.Enron exaggerated earnings by recognizinggains on the sale of assets to SPVs. In some cases,the company booked revenues prior to a part-nership generating significant revenues. ProjectBraveheart, a partnership Enron developed withBlockbuster was intended to provide movies tohomes directly over phone lines. Just monthsafter the partnership was formed, Enron recorded$110.9 million in profits prematurely, theseprofits were never realized as the partnershipfailed after only a 1,000-home pilot.

In a success culture like Enron’s such behaviorrepresented a way of least resistance. Enronemployees with a self-image of being the best andthe brightest and being extremely clever do notmake business deals that fail. Therefore bookingearnings before they are realized were rather“early” than wrong. The culture at Enron wasquickly eroding the ethical boundaries of itsemployees.

Keeping debt off the balance sheet

The SPVs not only allowed Enron to boostearnings, but the SPV’s also allowed the companyto keep debt off its balance sheet. A highly lever-aged balance sheet would jeopardize its creditrating as its debt-equity ratio would rise andincrease its cost of capital. To avoid this, Enronparked some of its debt on the balance sheet ofits SPVs and kept it hidden from analysts andinvestors. When the extent of its debt burdencame to light, Enron’s credit rating fell andlenders demanded immediate payment in thesum of hundreds of millions of dollars in debt.

This can be read as another example of ethicalerosion. Enron’s decision makers saw the shuf-fling of debt rather as a timing issue and not asan ethical one. Clever people would eventuallymake everything right, because the deals wouldall be successful in the long run. Moving debtwas as easy as pre-dating a check, and wouldharm no one, and therefore was not an ethicalissue.

Partnerships at “arm’s length”

Each questionable partnership decision carriedadditional cleverness burdens. In order to keepinformation from the public, Enron had to guar-antee that the Securities Exchange Commission(SEC) did not consider its partnerships as Enronsubsidiaries. If the partnerships had been classi-fied as such, in-depth disclosure and stricteraccounting methods would have been required.In order to prevent potential SEC skepticism,Enron enlisted help from its outside accountantsand its attorneys (Arthur Andersen, and Vinson& Elkins). The accountants and attorneys allreferenced the Financial Accounting StandardsBoard (FASB) rule that holds that partnershipsare not considered subsidiaries as long as 3%of their equity comes from outside investorsand they are managed independently of theirsponsors. This is commonly known as being at“arm’s length”. Enron crafted relationships thatlooked (legally) like partnerships, although theywere (in practice) subsidiaries. A closer look atthe partnerships would have revealed that the

Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes) 245

outside investments came from companies (likeSE Thunderbird LLC) that were owned byEnron.

Conflicts of interest

Although the partnerships were classified as part-nerships according to the FASB rules, Enron offi-cials obviously had close ties with them. Thisraised the question about conflicts of interest.Andrew Fastow, Enron’s former Chief FinancialOfficer (CFO), ran or was partial owner oftwo of the most important partnerships: LJMCayman LP and LJM2 Co-Investment LP.Michael Kopper, a former managing director atEnron, managed a third partnership, ChewcoInvestments LP.

The culture of cleverness at Enron started asa pursuit of excellence that devolved into theappearance of excellence as executives worked todevelop clever ways of preserving Enron’s infal-lible facade of success. Although Enron main-tained that top officials in the company reviewedthe dealings with potential conflicts of interest,Enron later claimed that Fastow earned over $30million from Enron with his companies. At somepoint in the bending of ethical guidelines forthe good of the company, Enron’s executivesalso began to bend the rules for personal gain.Once a culture’s ethical boundaries are breachedthresholds of more extreme ethical compromisesbecome lower.

The self-reinforcing decline of Enron

In the long run, Enron’s executives could not“rob Peter to pay Paul”. Even if the Enronculture permitted acts of insignificant rulebending, it was the sum of incremental ethicaltransgressions that produced the business cata-strophe. Although Enron’s executives hadbelieved that everything would work successfullyin the long run, the questionable partnerships leftthe company extremely vulnerable when finan-cial troubles came to light. As partnerships beganto fail with increasing regularity, Enron was liablefor millions of dollars it had not anticipated

losing. Promises began to come due and Enrondid not have the ability to follow through on itsfinancial obligations.2

The financial implosion

The partnerships that once boosted earnings andallowed Enron to prosper became the misplacedcard that caused the Enron house to collapse. Thestability of Enron’s house of cards had beeneroded by the very culture that had allowed itto be built. Enron was forced to renounce over$390 million in earnings from dealings withChewco Investments and JEDI, another partner-ship. The company was also forced to restateearnings back to 1997, and the restated earningstotaled only $586 million, a mere 20% of the ini-tially reported figures. The very results Enron hadsought to prevent – falling stock prices, lack ofconsumer and financial market confidence –came about as a direct result of decisions that hadbeen driven by Enron’s culture.

The Enron case of ethical failure consists ofmore than a series of questionable businessdealings. When strong company leadership wouldhave been needed the most, Enron’s leader leftthe company. In August of 2001, Jeffery Skillingresigned as President and CEO of Enron and soldshares of his company stock totaling $66 milliondollars. Only two months later, Enron restatedearnings, stock prices dropped and the companyfroze shares in an attempt to help stabilize thecompany. Enron employees, who had beenencouraged to invest heavily in the company,found themselves unable to remove and salvagetheir investments. The company culture of indi-vidualism, innovation, and aggressive clevernessleft Enron without compassionate, responsibleleadership. Enron’s Board of Directors was slowto step in to fill the void and individual Enronemployees for the first time realized all of theramifications of a culture with leaders thateschew the boundaries of ethical behavior.

What did the Enron executives do to mold acorporate culture that resulted in unethicalbehavior and the collapse of the company? Theremainder of this paper drafts some answers tothis question.


Leadership mechanisms and organizational culture at Enron

If corporate leaders encourage rule-breaking andfoster an intimidating, aggressive environment,it is not surprising that the ethical boundaries atEnron eroded away to nothing. Schein (1985) hasfocused on leadership as the critical componentof the organization’s culture because leaders cancreate, reinforce, or change the organization’sculture. This applies not the least to an organi-zation’s ethical climate (Sims, 2000; Trevinoet al., 2000; Sims and Brinkmann, 2002).According to Schein (1985) there are fiveprimary mechanisms that a leader can use toinfluence an organization’s culture: attention,reaction to crises, role modeling, allocation ofrewards, and criteria for selection and dismissal.Schein’s assumption is that these five criteria rein-force and encourage behavioral and culturalnorms within an organization. Our paper can beread as an illustration of Schein’s assumptions.The Enron executives used the five mechanismsto reinforce a culture that was morally flexibleopening the door to ethics degeneration, lying,cheating, and stealing.

Attention

The first of the mechanisms mentioned bySchein (1985) is attention. The issues that capturethe attention of the leader (i.e. what is criticized,praised or asked about) will also capture theattention of the greater organization and willbecome the focus of the employees. If theleaders of the organization focus on the bottomline, employees believe that financial success isthe leading value to consider. D. M. Wolfe,author of “Executive Integrity” even suggeststhat a focus on profit, “promotes an unrealisticbelief that everything boils down to a monetarygame” (1988). In such a context, rules ormorality are merely obstacles, impediments alongthe way to bottom-line financial success (Sims,2000).

One former executive of Enron has describedJeffrey Skilling as a leader driven by the almightydollar. “. . . Skilling would say all that matters is

money. You buy loyalty with money” (Zellner,2002). Enron executives’ attention was clearlyfocused on profits, power, greed and influence.They wanted their employees to focus on today’sbottom line. Skilling communicated his priori-ties to his employees overtly, both in word anddeed. Consistently clear signals told employeeswhat was important to leadership – “Profits at allcosts” (Tracinski, 2002). Or with another quotefrom a former Enron employee: “. . . there wereno rules for people, even in our personal lives.Everything was about the company and every-thing was supposed to be on the edge – sex,money, all of it . . .” (Broughton, 2002). In hertestimony before the House Subcommittee,Sherron Watkins described Enron as a “. . . veryarrogant place, with a feeling of invincibility”.Still another Enron employee noted about thecompany’s environment that “. . . it was all aboutcreating an atmosphere of deliberately breakingthe rules. For example, our official vacationpolicy was that you could take as much as youwanted whenever you wanted as long as youdelivered your results. It drove the humanresource department crazy” (Bartlett and Glinska,2001).

Another example of today’s bottom line gainmentality is Andrew Fastow’s, former EnronCFO, network of questionable partnerships.These partnerships provided profit for Fastowpersonally, as well as for some of his more favoredemployees, who were aware of his actions.Fastow demanded that Enron permit him toinvest in and to personally profit from the part-nerships (some of his earnings were passed toassociates who aided him). Such actions sent aclear message that management’s attention wasfocused on the bottom line for the company aswell as personal gain, regardless of the means toget there. When it came to Fastow’s specialinterest dealings the Board of Directors sus-pended the company’s Code of Ethics at leasttwice. This made Fastow a wealthy man at theexpense of Enron (Landers, 2002).

As Stern (1992) has suggested, if the organi-zation’s leaders seem to care only about theshort-term bottom line, employees quickly getthe message too. How else could employeesread the Enron culture than being focused on


short-term when their CEO (Ken Lay) bothblessed the relaxation of conflict-of-interest rulesdesigned to protect Enron from the very self-dealings that brought the company down andparticipated in board meetings allowing thecreation of the off-balance sheet partnerships thatwere part of those transactions. By late summer2001 he was reassuring investors and employeesthat all was well (when he already had beeninformed that the company had problems withsome investment vehicles that could cost ithundreds of millions of dollars, see Gruley andSmith, 2002).

Reaction to crises

The second leadership method mentioned bySchein (1985) refers to a leader’s reaction to acrisis situation. Schein asserts, that a crisis testswhat the leader values and brings these valuesto the surface. With each impending crisis,leaders have an opportunity to communicatethroughout the organization what the company’svalues are. Enron was facing a crisis of how tosustain a phenomenal growth rate. Leadersreacted by defending a culture that valued prof-itability, even when it was at the expense ofeverything else. The off-balance sheet partner-ships were tremendously risky. However, sincenormal growth of the stock price would havefallen short of expectations anyway, the onlything to do was to try to meet the unrealistictarget profitability expectations. In such a case,an accident was waiting to happen.

Once the Enron situation came to light, thereaction from the Enron executives was telling.The executives were busy shifting the blame andpointing fingers. Jeffery Skilling even went as faras telling an incredulous Congress that despite hisHarvard Business School degree and businessexperience he neither knew of, nor wouldunderstand the intricacies of the Enronaccounting deals. (On the other hand, Skillingalso was quoted on CNN saying “. . . if he knewthen what he knows now – he STILL would notdo anything differently.”) Even before the issuescame to light it appears that Skilling was willingto abandon the company to save his own skin as

evidenced by his mysterious resignation inAugust 2001 and giving only the “personalreasons” explanation for his sudden departure(and he still sold significant amounts of companystock at a premium). Both Kenneth Lay andSherron Watkins also sold stock before pricesbegan to dramatically plummet (Kenneth Layclaiming that he had some personal debts to payoff, Sherron Watkins referring to the September11th terrorist attacks. Watkins also sold stock atthe same time when she was making allegationsof deceptive accounting practices).

Enron began systematically firing those itcould lay blame on before it declared bankruptcy(Brown and Sender, 2002). A self-serving exon-eration committee was employed to explain (orexcuse?) the current situation (Eichenwald,2002). After Skilling resigned from his post,Kenneth Lay returned as CEO, promising thatthere were no “accounting issues, trading issues,or reserve issues” at Enron (McClean, 2001).Congressional testimony, news accounts andfederal investigations have told us otherwise.Throughout October 2001, Lay insisted thatEnron had access to cash and that the companywas “performing very well,” while he failed todisclose that Enron had written down share-holders’ equity by $1.2 billion, or that Moody’swas considering downgrading Enron’s debt(“Explaining the Enron Bankruptcy”, 2002).Company insiders also referred to Loretta Lynchas “an idiot” (the Yale-educated litigator whowas among the first to question Enron’s prac-tices), Bethany McLean, the Fortune Magazinejournalist who first broke the story, was called“a looker who doesn’t know anything” (Dowd,2002).

Another crisis consists in having to admitaccounting irregularities. At first, the leaders ofthe company tried to deny there was a problem.They next tried to cover up any evidence of aproblem or any wrongdoing. They even tried toseize computers of anyone they thought wastrying to expose them as well as to destroy manyfiles thought to be guilt-inducing (Daily Press,2002). It transitioned into a blame game as manyexecutives tried blaming each other, saying theydidn’t know what was going on, or it wassomeone else’s responsibility to know about the


problems and do something about it. BothKenneth Lay and his wife proclaimed his inno-cence. Lay claimed to have been unaware of thesweetheart deals, which were entirely the brain-child of Skilling and Fastow. Watkins also blamedthem for the debacle, while shifting any blamefrom herself.

“I take the Fifth” (U.S. CongressionalHearing, 2002 – this was the response KennethLay gave to the Senate Commerce Committeewhen asked to explain Enron’s failure. Althoughall but one of Enron’s officers (curiously Skilling)invoked the 5th Amendment right to not self-incriminate, the story has played out much likethat of the Salomon Brothers and John Gutfreundfiasco in the early 1990s. Document shreddingand lies, both overt and those of omission, havebecome the preferred strategy for Enron’s man-agement (Brown and Sender, 2002). These boldacts from Enron leadership show a poor reactionto crisis.

From anonymous whistleblowing to bank-ruptcy to document shredding, to suicide (CliffBaxter) to hiding behind the 5th Amendment,the leaders at Enron have run the gamut ofextremes in their reaction to the company’s crisis.Willet and Always (2002) noted that “the mantraat Enron seems to be that ethical wrongdoing isto be hidden at any cost; deny, play the dupe,claim ignorance (“the ostrich instruction”) lie,quit.” It appears that the truth and its conse-quences have never been a part of the Enronculture.

Role modeling (how leaders behave)

Schein’s third mechanism is the example leadersset for the acceptability of unethical behaviorwithin an organization. Actions speak louderthan words – therefore role-modeling behavior isa very powerful tool that leaders have to developand influence corporate culture. Through rolemodeling, teaching, and coaching, leaders rein-force the values that support the organizationalculture. Employees often emulate leaders’behavior and look to the leaders for cues toappropriate behavior. Many companies areencouraging employees to be more entrepre-

neurial – that is, to take more initiative and bemore innovative in their jobs. The ScientificFoundation reports a study that showed thatmanagers who want to change the organization’sculture to a more entrepreneurial one must “walkthe talk”. In other words, they must demonstratethe entrepreneurial behaviors themselves (Pearceet al., 1997). This is the case with any culturalvalue. Employees observe the behavior of leadersto find out what is valued in the organization.Perhaps, this was the most significant short-coming of Enron executives.

According to the values statement in Enron’sCode of Ethics and its annual report, thecompany maintains strong commitments to com-munication, respect, integrity, and excellence.However, there is little evidence that supportsmanagement modeling of these values. Forinstance, while the first pillar of the values state-ment addresses an obligation to communicate,Sherron Watkins claims (quoted from theHearing transcripts):

I continued to ask questions and seek answers,primarily from former coworkers in the GlobalFinance Group or in the business units that hadhedged assets with Raptor. I never heard reassuringexplanations. I was not comfortable confrontingeither Mr. Skilling or Mr. Fastow with myconcerns. To do so, I believe, would have beena job-terminating move (U.S. CongressionalHearings, 2002).

Enron’s leaders’ primary message about theirvalues was sent through their own actions. Theybroke the law as they concentrated on financialmeasures and used of the creative partnershipsdescribed earlier in this paper. For example,Kenneth Lay announced to analysts on October16, 2001 that Enron had eliminated $1.2 billionin shareholder equity by terminating a partner-ship created by former CFO Andrew Fastow.This arrangement allowed Enron to buy and sellassets without carrying the debt on its books, i.e.keeping Enron’s credit clean and the stock pricehigh. Such actions clearly show a self-servingattitude of Enron leadership. The executives notonly condoned such unethical behavior, they ini-tiated it and were rewarded for it. The partner-ships were used to deceive investors about the


enormous debt Enron was incurring. It also senta message to employees that full and completedisclosure is not a requirement, or even recom-mended. If the company achieved short-termbenefits by hiding information, it was acceptable.

Enron’s leaders also ignored, then deniedserious problems with their business transactionsand were more concerned about their personalfinancial rewards than those of the company. Forexample, when the company’s stock price beganto drop as the problems were becoming public,the company was transitioning from one invest-ment program to another. While the employeeswere unable to sell their stock, the executiveswere quickly selling off many of their shares.Another example is the executives’ lack ofintegrity in communicating to the employees andinvestors. They maintained that the company wasfinancially stable and that many of their emergingproblems really were not too serious, eventhough they knew the truth and were makingfinancial decisions to protect their personalgains.

In retrospect, the leadership of Enron almostcertainly dictated the company’s outcomethrough their own actions by providing perfectconditions for unethical behavior. MichaelJosephson, President of the Josephson Institute ofEthics, aptly described these conditions as theyrelate to the character of leadership: “People mayproduce spectacular results for a while, but it isinevitable that techniques depending so heavilyon fear as a motivator generate survival strate-gies that include cheating, distortion, and aninternal competitive ethos characterized by alook-out-for-number-one attitude. . . . Just asthe destiny of individuals is determined bypersonal character, the destiny of an organizationis determined by the character of its leadership.And when individuals are derailed because of alack of character, the organization will also beharmed” (Josephson, 1999).

Allocation of rewards

The behavior of people rewarded with payincreases or promotions signals to others what isnecessary to succeed in an organization – this is

what Schein calls the “allocation of rewards”-mechanism. To ensure that values are accepted,leaders should reward behavior that is consistentwith the values (and actual rewards count obvi-ously more than promised rewards, cf. Sims andBrinkmann, 2002).

The reward system created by a leader indi-cates what is prized and expected in the organi-zation. This view is in line with a basicmanagement doctrine. When an instance ofethical achievement occurs – for instance, whensomeone acts with integrity and honor – theorganization’s leaders must reward it. Such aneffort sends as clear a message to the rest of theorganization as when an organization rewards anemployee who acts unethically (see e.g. Larimer,1997). Enron’s reward system established a “win-at-all-costs” focus. The company’s leadershippromoted and retained only those employees thatproduced consistently, with little regard to ethics.Skilling singled out one of his vice presidents,Louise Kitchen, for her results-oriented approachto Enron’s online business. Kitchen had startedthe company’s Internet-based trading businesseven though Skilling repeatedly turned down herrequests to begin such a program. Kitchenignored the former CEO’s decision and insteadused already-allocated funds to pull the newnetwork together. Or, as a former Enron vicepresident who attended the meeting describedit best. “The moral of this story is break therules, you can cheat, you can lie, but as long asyou make money, it’s all right” (quoted afterSchwartz, 2002).

The company’s compensation structure con-tributed to an unethical work culture, too – bypromoting self-interest above any other interest.As a consequence, the team approach once usedby Enron associates deteriorated. Performancereviews were public events and poor performancewas ridiculed (or employees were fired througha “rank and yank” process). The strongest per-forming units even went as far as to “ignore”company policy – granting unlimited vacationtime as noted earlier as long as the work gotdone, ignoring Human Resources’ complaints(Bartlett and Glinska, 2001).

Extremely high bonuses were doled out toexecutives who behaved in desirable ways, e.g. in


the form of stock options) which in turn incitedexecutives to keep the stock price up at any cost(Lardner, 2002). Annual bonuses were as high as$1 million for traders, and for executives theywere even higher). Enron developed a reputationfor both internal and external ruthlessness whereemployees attempted to crush any competitionand was considered extremely aggressive for anon-investment bank (McClean et al., 2001).Additionally, the executives at Enron playedfavorites, inviting top performers to spendweekend vacations with the executive staff. Thebest workers (determined through day-to-daybottom line results) received staggering incentivesand exorbitant bonuses. One example of this wasCar Day. On this day, an array of lavish sportscars arrived for the most successful employees(Broughton, 2002).

Retention bonuses that were paid shortlybefore the company declared bankruptcy toabout 500 executives ranged in value from $1,000to $5 million (possibly as a reward for help withsetting up the problematic financial partnershipsthat led to the company’s downfall). Overall,Enron’s reward system rewarded individuals whoembraced Enron’s aggressive, individualisticculture and were based on short-term profits andfinancial measures.

Criteria of selection and dismissal (how leaders hireand fire employees)

Schein’s (1985) last mechanism by which a leadershapes a corporate culture, describes how aleader’s decisions about whom to recruit ordismiss signals a leader’s values to all of hisemployees. The selection of newcomers to anorganization is a powerful way of how a leaderreinforces culture. Leaders often unconsciouslylook for individuals who are similar to currentorganizational members in terms of values andassumptions. Some companies hire individuals onthe recommendation of a current employee. Thistends to perpetuate the culture because thenew employees typically hold similar values.Promotion-from-within policies also serve toreinforce organizational culture.

Ken Lay placed an immediate focus on hiring

the best and smartest people, those who wouldthrive in a competitive environment. Skillingshared Lay’s philosophy. Skilling hired only Ivy-league graduates with a hunger for money thatmatched his. He hired people who consideredthemselves the best and the brightest and wereout to forward their own causes. Stanford andHarvard graduates, who would have otherwiseworked on Wall Street, these people were paidwell to work in Texas and to build the Enronculture. Their reward for giving up the allure ofSilicon Valley and Wall Street was a high salaryand a large bonus opportunity.

Skilling perpetuated a focus on short-termtransactional endeavors from the very beginningby hiring employees that embodied the beliefsthat he was trying to instill: aggressiveness, greed,a will to win at all costs, and an appreciationfor circumventing the rules. This was the sameculture of greed that brought turmoil to SalomonBrothers on Wall Street in the early 1990s.Divorce rates among senior executives were sky-rocketing as well. Instant gratification, both per-sonally and professionally, was part of the Enronculture and Skilling did everything he could tosurround himself with individuals who hadsimilar values and assumptions and fitted into theEnron culture.

The way a company fires an employee and therationale behind the firing also communicates theculture. Some companies deal with poor per-formers by trying to find them a place withinthe organization where they can perform betterand make a contribution. Other companiesseem to operate under the philosophy that thosewho cannot perform are out quickly (Sims andBrinkmann, 2002).

Enron carried out an annual “rank and yank”policy where the bottom fifteen to twentypercent of producers were let go or fired after aformal evaluation process each year. Associatesgraded their peers, which caused a great amountof distrust and paranoia among employees.Enron’s employee reviews added to the compe-tition by reviewing job performance in a publicforum and sending the bottom 5% to the rede-ployment office – dubbed the “office of shame”(Frey and Rosin, 2002). What better way todevelop a distrustful work environment than to


pit employees against one another and as LarryBossidy, former CEO of Allied Signal recentlynoted “forced ranking promotes bad employeemorale” (2002), a win-at-all costs mentality, anda willingness to cross the ethical line (Wolfe,1988; Sims and Brinkman, 2002).

The occurrence and handling of internalwhistle-blowing also tells a lot about a corpo-rate culture. At Enron, employees who tried toblow the whistle were punished, e.g. by careersetbacks and hostility (cf. e.g. not least the enron-gate website). The most well-known whistle-blower, Sherron Watkins, recounted how herfears about being fired for speaking out led herto reach out to Ken Lay through anonymouswarnings. She even publicly stated that AndrewFastow tried to have her fired once he found outthat she was the author of the anonymous memoto Lay (Hamburger, 2002). Watkins reportedthat her computer was confiscated and she wasmoved to another office after she submitted herletter to Kenneth Lay. Another employee, JeffMcMahon, also spoke up against the conflicts ofinterest seen in the off book partnerships. As areward for his actions, he was reassigned to a newjob.

On the other hand, those who closed theireyes to the wrong doings were rewarded. Or withthe words of a former Enron employee: “It wasvery clear what the measures were and how yougot promoted at Enron. That absolutely drivesbehavior . . . getting the deal was paramount atEnron” (Hansell, 2002). A Houston headhunterdescribed the freedom given by Skilling when hewas Enron’s CEO to loyal employees metaphor-ically: “Once you gained Jeff ’s trust, the leashbecame really long” (Zellner, 2002).

The selection and rewards system was consis-tent with the culture at Enron. It promotedgreed, selfishness, and jealousy within theorganization. Enron’s executives selected thoseemployees who shared their aggressive, win-at-all-costs mentality. Their short-term view mayhave prevented them from seeing what the long-term costs of this kind of personality could beon the organization as a whole.

Final comments and suggestions forfuture work

The story of Enron sounds smart and stupid atthe same time. Deeply defective leadership fromLay and Skilling played a significant role increating the company’s culture that led to it’sundoing, and we may never know whether it washubris, greed, psychological shock or just plainstupidity that led them to behave in the way theydid (Eavis, 2001). “Consequences of unethical orillegal actions are not usually realized until muchlater than when the act is committed” (Sims,2000).

Enron’s house of cards collapsed as a result ofinteracting decision processes. The culture atEnron eroded little by little, by the trespassingof ethical boundaries, allowing more and morequestionable behavior to slip through the cracks.This deterioration did not go entirely unnoticed.Individual employees at Enron, auditors atAnderson and even some analysts who watch thefinancial markets, noticed aspects about theEnron situation that did not seem right, longbefore the public became aware of Enron’s trans-gressions. There were whistle-blowers but theEnron leaders did not listen.

What existed in Enron’s culture that kept indi-vidual employees from exposing the executivewrongdoers? And what about the Enron waypermitted the executives to behave the way thatthey did? Enron’s culture is a good example ofgroupthink (cf. eg. Janis, 1989; Moorehead,1986) where individuals feel extreme pressure notto express any real strong arguments against anyco-workers’ actions. Although very individual-istic, the culture at Enron was at the same timeconformist, or quoting Glenn Dickson, a formerEnron Risk Manager: “The pressure was – youjust didn’t have a choice but to approve the dealsonce everybody had their heart set on that dealclosing” (ABC News, 2002). Employees wereloyal in an ambiguous sense of the term, i.e.,they wanted to be seen as part of the star teamand to partake in the benefits that that honorentailed. Some former Enron employees com-mented that: “loyalty required a sort of group-think. You had to ‘keep drinking the EnronWater’ . . .” (Stephens and Behr, 2002). John


Alarial, a former midlevel manager at Enronnoted that: “Enron’s aggressive business tacticswere embraced by the rank and file, . . . even if(authors addition) . . . many suspected it was ahouse of cards” (ABC News, 2002). Employeeswere focused on the bottom line and “promotedshort term solutions that were immediately finan-cially sound despite the fact that they wouldcause problems for the organization as a whole. . . rules of ethical conduct were merely barriersto success” (Sims, 1992).

Enron’s top executives set the tone for thisculture. Personal ambition and greed seemed toovershadow much of their corporate and indi-vidual lives. They strove to maximize their indi-vidual wealth by initiating and participating inscandalous behaviors. Enron’s culture created anatmosphere ripe for the unethical and illegalbehavior that occurred.

Two of the most important lessons to learnfrom the Enron culture history is that bad topmanagement morality can be a sufficient condi-tion for creating a self-destructive ethical climateand that a well-filled CSR and business ethicstoolbox can neither stop nor compensate for suchprocesses.3

Enron’s new CEO, turnaround-specialistStephen Cooper could use (or should one rathersay needs to use) the same five leader’ influencemechanisms (Schein, 1985) used above for aturnaround of Enron’s culture and ethical climate:

Attention – Cooper needs to focus attentionon improving the moral climate of the organi-zation by looking at the long-term implicationsof employee’s actions instead of only the mostrecent bottom line profits.

Reaction to Crises – Cooper should swiftlyreact to the crisis facing the company by com-plying with authorities and firing ethical wrong-doers. The company must stop the lying,covering up ethical and legal transgressions, andtrying to preserve those ethical wrongdoers atany cost.

Role Modeling – Cooper must convey theimage of the moral manager (Trevino et al.,2002). He must set the example of honesty andintegrity for the rest of the organization.

Allocation of Rewards – Using rewards anddiscipline effectively may be the most powerful

way for Cooper to send signals about desirableand undesirable conduct. That means rewardingthose who accomplish their goals by behavingin ways that are consistent with stated values andit must be assumed that a lack of commitmentto ethical principles will ensure that employeeswill not be promoted.

Criteria for Selection and Dismissal – Coopermust bring employees into Enron who are com-mitted to ethical principles and usher out all oldemployees connected to ethical misconduct. Thecompany must have clear policies on the criteriafor selection and dismissal that employees under-stand.

In other words, Enron’s new CEO, StephenCooper, must take a proactive stance to promotean ethical climate and must be the Chief Ethics Officer of the organization (Trevino et al.,2000), creating a strong ethics message thatgets employees’ attention and influences theirthoughts and behaviors. Executive commitmentto ethical behavior is an important way of sus-taining an ethical organizational culture (Weaveret al., 1999). Cooper must find ways to focus theorganization’s attention on ethics and values andto infuse the organization with principles thatwill guide the actions of all employees. New (andfirst of all credible) values could be the glue thatholds things together at Enron, and these valuesmust be communicated (by deeds) from the topof the organization. Employees must understandthat any single employee who operates outside ofthe organizational value system can cost the orga-nization dearly in legal fees and can have atremendous, sometimes irreversible impact on theorganization’s image and culture. Employees musttrust that whistleblowers will be protected, thatprocedures used to investigate ethical problemswill be fair, and that management will take actionto solve problems that are uncovered.

Our skeptical view regarding any compen-satory use of the CSR and business ethicstoolbox (i.e. as long as morally disputable lead-ership creates a bad moral climate) does notimply any radical rejection of CSR and ethicstools as such (Schein would have called such tools“secondary articulation and reinforcement mech-anisms”, such as “organizational systems and pro-cedures” and “formal statements of organizational


philosophy, creeds and charters”, see Schein,1985, pp. 237–242). Once tools are understoodas (“secondary”) catalysts for (“primary”) lead-ership influence, it is more fruitful to ask for con-ditions under which ethical tools such as codescould further and reinforce a given organization’sethical climate (cf. Brinkmann and Ims, 2003,esp. table #3) and how Schein’s five mechanismscould be operationalized in terms of availabletools.

In our introduction we mentioned brieflyEnron’s image of being an excellent corporatecitizen, with all the corporate social responsibility(CSR) and business ethics tools and statussymbols in place. It was suggested that this wasa key aspect or dimension of the Enron case, asa case of deceiving corporate citizenship and ofsurface or facade ethics (which also has con-tributed to the creation of a new word, EnronEthics). As an academic field we owe the generalpublic and the business public a thorough doc-umentation, analysis and discussion of how Enronand other companies with a similar record andreputation could “instrumentalize” (and thus dis-credit) ethics and CSR for mere facade purposes.

It has also been mentioned that such a focusdeserves and requires a paper on its own, at least.As an open end to this paper we should like todraft briefly a typology with moral culture typesand transitions which such a paper could address,as a prolongation of the present paper and as abridge-building towards a more self-criticalbusiness ethics business and business ethics disci-pline. The typology is made up of two dimen-sions, ethicalness of an organization culture orwhat has been called ethical or moral climate,and presence of business ethical tools or artifacts,such as ethics officers, codes of ethics, value state-

ments and the like. If one for practical purposesdistinguishes dichotomously between low andhigh one ends up with a four-fold table as shownin Table I.4

As mentioned above, Enron looks at first sightlike “type I”, similar to what Kohlberg mighthave called moral “pre-conventionalism”, like aclassical business ethics case, with a typicalmix of “amorality” and “immorality” (cf. forthe distinction Carroll and Meeks, 1999). Forheadline-journalism and public opinion Enronand World.com are simply bad and rotten, onejust didn’t know before it was too late, and thisshows once more an urgent need for more leg-islation and ethics. Our thesis is that Enron (andprobably quite a number of other companieswaiting to be discovered) is an at least as goodillustration of “type II”, of window-dressingethics, with talking instead of walking, ethics asrhetoric. While “type II” looks modern or atleast fashionable, “type III” looks like the old-fashioned type of moral business, from the daysbefore the disciplines of business ethics, CSR,marketing and public relations were invented,with collective moral conscience (borrowing E.Durkheim’s term) as consistent label and content,perhaps additionally communicating moral hum-bleness, with a touch of British understatement.The final “type IV” refers to a moral role-modelbusiness culture in the age of marketing andpublic relations, with walking the talk, withshowing and confessing openly its collectivemoral conscience (call it self-reassurance, or moreU.S.-style self-marketing, to put it stereotypi-cally). In other words, a future paper should pri-marily deal with a documentation and criticismof “window-dressing ethics”, of how to furtherprocesses towards collective moral conscience,


TABLE ITypology of moral culture types and transitions

Presence and marketing 0000000000000Ethicalness of a given organization cultureof business ethical tools

0000000000Low 00000000000High

High II: Window-Dressing Ethics IV: Moral Role-ModelingLow I:I Moral Preconventionalism III: Collective Moral Conscience

II: (Without Disguise)

with more or less marketing of the goodexamples, and of how to prevent degenerationtowards “window-dressing ethics”. We oftenwonder if we would prefer honest amorality andimmorality to dishonest morality. But still, wechoose to read the paper title of Tonge et al.(2003) optimistically: “The Enron story: youcan fool some of the people some of thetime . . .”.

Notes

1 Cf. in addition the Enron-story books for saleas of today by Amazon, see bookhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471265748/millerriskadv-20/002-3887103-5927230.2 For example, Enron had promised CIBC WorldMarkets the majority of the profits from ProjectBraveheart for ten years, or in the event of failureEnron would be obligated to repay CIBC its entire$115.2 million investment. Not only did Enron bookthe earnings prematurely, but it was also forced torepay CIBC its full investment.3 For a draft of possible “latent, negative functions”of ethical codes cf. Brinkmann and Ims, 2003, esp.table #2.4 Thanks to colleague Knut Ims from the NorwegianSchool of Business Administration for a discussionabout this typology.

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Ronald R. SimsGraduate School of Business,

College of William and Mary,Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795,

U.S.AE-mail: [email protected]

Johannes BrinkmannNorwegian School of Management BI,

PO Box 4676 Sofienberg,N0506 Oslo Norway

E-mail: [email protected]


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