Wisconsin v. Yoder

FACTS:

Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the

Amish Church and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the

Mennonite Church. They were charged, tried and convicted of

violating the compulsory-attendance law because they did not

enroll their children in a public or private high school.

ISSUE:

The court is reviewing the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme

Court holding that the respondents‘ sentences of violating the

compulsory-school attendance law were invalid under the Free

Exercise Clause.

HOLDING:

The court states that, ―the First and Fourteenth Amendments

prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause their

children to attend formal high school to age 16.

REASONING:

1. Rule: ―Only the interests of the highest order of the

state can overbalance sincere claims to the free

exercise of religion.‖

The state‘s interest in education is not free from a considering

process when it might impose on rights that are specified in the

Free Exercise Clause.

2. APPLICATION:

The court‘s decision has declined the concept that all religiously

based practices are outside of the protection of the Free Exercise

Clause. The State says that their interest in education is so

powerful that even the Amish community has to abide by these

rules. The State has two arguments as to why their interest in

education should overpower the Amish‘s practices. First,

education is essential to prepare young adults to take part in our

political system efficiently. Second, education prepares young

adults to be independent and ―self-sufficient‖ members of society.

The court agrees with the State. But, they also say that the Amish

community does an equally good job to prepare their children for

life. The State says that the Amish are being ―ignorant‖ by not

sending their children to high school, but the court says that the

Amish have been a very successful community. The Amish are

law-abiding citizens and they are productive. Congress even

recognizes their independence by allowing this community to be

exempt from social security taxes. The State argues that if these

Amish children choose to leave their community, they will not be

equipped with the right education to live in a modern society. The

court says differently. The Amish are skilled in agriculture and are

very ―self-reliant‖. The court finds that they would not become a

burden because of all the training and skills they possess. The

Amish community has been around for over 200 years, which

suggests that they are capable of raising and teaching their own

children responsibly after eight grades.

Summary of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

Facts: State of Wisconsin required 3 members of Amish

community to keep their children in public school until 16 years

old. Amish refused b/c under their religion children 14-16 are at

risk of losing salvation, face censure in their church community,

and endanger the salvation of their parents. Their religious

values are contrary to those taught in public high school.

Issue(s): Whether WI‘s compulsory attendance law regarding

children under 16 years of age is in conflict with the free exercise

of the Amish community?

Holding: Yes, the state is barred by the 1st and 14th from intruding

into family decisions relating to the area of religious training by

compelling children under 16 to attend public high school.

Procedure: All 3 were convicted under WI criminal compulsory

attendance law. S Ct WI Reversed. U.S.S.Ct Affirmed.

Rule(s): 1st and 14th Amend.

Rationale: It is inescapable that exposing Amish children to

worldly influences would substantially interfere with their religious

development at a crucial stage of adolescence. That conclusion

is in opposition with the religious practices of the Amish faith, for

both parents and children.

Amish are not opposed to education beyond eighth grade, just the

conventional form of education beyond the eighth grade being

offered b/c of the stage of religious development in the child‘s life.

WI‘s support for its interest is highly speculative and lacks specific

evid. WI‘s interest in compelling attendance to these children is

less substantial than requiring the same attendance for children in

general.

WI is free to enact compulsory attendance laws that have a

general application, and the state has the power to enact Rble

standards, w/o impairing the free exercise of religion, for the

supplemental education provided to children under 16.

DISSENT: This case involves the freedom to exercise religious

beliefs of parents and children, but the Court holds that the

parents can vindicate their free exercise claims and their

children‘s.

Pl’s A: (WI) State Int: provide compulsory high school education–

which prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient

members of society. State‘s interest is supported b/c of the

possibility that some Amish children will leave the community.

Df’s A: (Amish) An additional one or two years of high school will

accomplish little toward the state‘s interest in light of the

vocational training the children rec‘v w/i the Amish community

Ebralinag vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu

FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from

their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing

to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic

pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not

to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic

pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or

"religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to

anyone or anything except God‖. They feel bound by the Bible's

command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag

as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action

of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge

transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and

invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the

Constitution protects against official control.

ISSUE: Whether school children who are members of a religious

sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school

(both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious

beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing

(by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the

Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge

RULING: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is

entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among

human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold

aspect, freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief.

The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the

realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the

belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no

warrant for their expulsion. The sole justification for a prior

restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the

existence of a grave and present danger of a character both

grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public

morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that

the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat

to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools

is not justified. We are not persuaded that by exempting the

Jehovah's Witnesses, this religious which admittedly comprises a

"small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of

the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and

uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,

patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes.

After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag

ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may

study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of

government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine

history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or

profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for

human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and

duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values. Forcing a

small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to

participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will

hardly be condusive to love of country or respect for duly

constituted authorities. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's

Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate

their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to

receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect

and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to

make such education accessible to all. While the highest regard

must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this

should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless

to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by

actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of

other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag

ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag,

sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not

see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a

grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public

morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that

the State has a right. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is

GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public

respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND

SET ASIDE.

EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF

SCHOOLS OF CEBUG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993

AMOLO et al vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF

SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO A.SANGUTANG.R. No.

95887 March 1, 1993 ; GRIÑO-AQUINO,

Facts:

The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from

their classes by thepublic school authorities in Cebu for refusing

to salute the flag, sing the national anthem andrecite the patriotic

pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making

flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July

11, 1955 , and by DepartmentOrder No. 8 (Rules and Regulations

for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All EducationalInstitutions)

dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and

Sports (DECS)making the flag ceremony compulsory in all

educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they

taught their children not to salute the flag,sing the national

anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those

are"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot

conscientiously give to anyoneor anything except God". They

consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They

think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag

salute and pledgetranscends constitutional limitations on the

State's power and invades the sphere of theintellect and spirit

which the Constitution protect against official control..

Issue:Whether or not school children who are members or a

religious sect may be expelledfrom school for disobedience of

R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

Held:No.Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled

to the highestpriority and the amplest protection among human

rights, for it involves therelationship of man to his Creator

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the

exercise of religiousfreedom is the existence of a grave and

present danger of a character both grave andimminent, of a

serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any

otherlegitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty)

to prevent." Absent such athreat to public safety, the expulsion of

the petitioners from the schools is not justified.(Teehankee) The

petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the

compulsoryflag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts"

or behavior that would offend theircountrymen who believe in

expressing their love of country through the observance of theflag

ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag

ceremony to show theirrespect for the right of those who choose

to participate in the solemn proceedings. Sincethey do not

engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their

expulsion.

The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's

Witnesses from salutingthe flag, singing the national anthem and

reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious groupwhich admittedly

comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up

our partof the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and

uninculcated in and unimbuedwith reverence for the flag,

patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes"

.What the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag

ceremony, not exclusion from thepublic schools where they may

study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of

government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine

history and culture but alsoreceive training for a vocation of

profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respectfor

human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and

duties of citizenship, andmoral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art.

XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula.Expelling or

banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about

the verysituation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a

small religious group, through theiron hand of the law, to

participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs,

willhardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully

constituted authorities.Also, the expulsion of members of

Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where theyare enrolled

violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987

Constitution, to"protect and promote the right of all citizens to

quality education . . . and to make sucheducation accessible to all

(Sec. 1, Art. XIV)

American Bible Society v. City of Manila

Facts: In the course of its ministry, American Bible

Society‘sPhilippine agency has been distributing and selling

bibles and/orgospel portions thereof (since 1898, but except

during the Japaneseoccupation) throughout the Philippines and

translating the same intoseveral Philippine dialects. On 29 May

1953, the acting CityTreasurer of the City of Manila informed the

Society that it wasconducting the business of general

merchandise since November1945, without providing itself with

the necessary Mayor‘s permit andmunicipal license, in violation of

Ordinance 3000, as amended, andOrdinances 2529, 3028 and

3364, and required the Society tosecure, within 3 days, the

corresponding permit and license fees,together with compromise

covering the period from the 4th quarterof 1945 to the 2nd quarter

of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45.On 24 October 1953, the

Society paid to the City Treasurer underprotest the said permit

and license fees, giving at the same timenotice to the City

Treasurer that suit would be taken in court toquestion the legality

of the ordinances under which the said feeswere being collected,

which was done on the same date by filing thecomplaint that gave

rise to this action. After hearing, the lower courtdismissed the

complaint for lack of merit. the Society appealed tothe Court of

Appeals, which in turn certified the case to the SupremeCourt for

the reason that the errors assigned involved only questionsof law.

Issue: Whether the Society is required to secure municipal permit

toallow it to sell and distribute bibles and religious literature, and

topay taxes from the sales thereof.

Held: No. Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC)

exemptscorporations or associations organized and operated

exclusively forreligious, charitable, or educational purposes,

Provided however,That the income of whatever kind and

character from any of itsproperties, real or personal, or from any

activity conducted for profit,regardless of the disposition made of

such income, shall be liable tothe tax imposed under the Code.

Herein, the act of distributing andselling bibles, etc. is purely

religious and cannot be made liable fortaxes or fees therein.

Further, Ordinance 2529, as amended, cannotbe applied to the

Society, for in doing so it would impair its freeexercise and

enjoyment of its religious profession and worship aswell as its

rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. The fact thatthe price

of the bibles and other religious pamphlets are little higherthan the

actual cost of the same does not necessarily mean that it

isalready engaged in the business or occupation of selling said

―merchandise‖ for profit. Furthermore, Ordinance 3000 of the City

of Manila is of general application and it does not contain

anyprovisions whatsoever prescribing religious censorship

norrestraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any

religiousprofession. The ordinance is not applicable to the

Society, as itsbusiness, trade or occupation is not particularly

mentioned in Section3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not

show that a permit isrequired therefor under existing laws and

ordinances for the propersupervision and enforcement of their

provisions governing thesanitation, security and welfare of the

public and the health of theemployees engaged in the business of

the Society

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,

religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing

business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency

established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant appellee

is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in

conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as

the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other

religious materials at a very minimal profit.

On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila

informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general

merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with

the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of

Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529,

3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days,

the corresponding permit and license fees, together with

compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to

the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and

valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of

the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution,

provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and

enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without

discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion

test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free

exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,

which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles

and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit

higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that

appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling

said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe

that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as

amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would

impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession

and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious

beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do

not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right

granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious

practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be

considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said

business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No.

2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so

defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff

Society.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision

dismissing the petitions filed in

these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No.

7716, otherwise known as theExpanded Value-Added Tax Law.

Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of

the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others,

the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred,

"even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally

guaranteedfreedom is unconstitutional."

Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom

Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax,

which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its

imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior

restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its

application to others, such those selling goods,

is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as

the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of

religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S.

Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or

property of a preacher. It is quiteanother thing to exact a tax on

him for delivering a sermon."The VAT is, however, different. It is

not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege,much

less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease

or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of

services and the lease of properties purely for revenuepurposes.

To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise

of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or

subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedomunder

the Constitution.

Pamil vs. Teleron

Facts: The novel question in this case concerns the eligibility of

an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private

respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected

to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.

Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit was then filed by

petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification

based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall

there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,

soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or

compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for

public works of the municipality."

Issue: Is the prohibition imposed on ecclesiastics from holding

appointive or elective municipal offices a religious test?

Held: No. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the

Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does

not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section

2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics

are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of

validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari

lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion,

joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and

Guerrero. They have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of

the lower court decision and declare ineligible respondent Father

Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the

aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief Justice,

entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for

certiorari must be granted.

It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the

applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain

operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be

heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly

insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or

appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious

freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to

impose a religious test.

Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious

faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an

incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied

upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not

a valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the

Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition

against a religious test, and yet such a ban on holding a municipal

position had not been nullified. It suffices to answer that no

question was raised as to its validity.

FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C.

TELERON and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA G.R. No.

L-34854 November 20, 1978

FACTS: Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was,

in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of

Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit

for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant

for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative

Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to

a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons

receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national

funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit

did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father

Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such

statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code

of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by

petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied

repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific

question raised.

ISSUE‖ WON the disqualification of the respondent based on

Administrative Code provision Constitutional

HELD: The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly

insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or

appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious

freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to

impose a religious test. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore

professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office.

There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code

provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional

mandate.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

FACTS:

Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, admittedly while still

married to another, cohabited to Luciano Quilapio, Jr. since 1980,

who was himself married to another. Escritor and Quilapio had a

nineteen-year old son. Alejandro Estrada, the private complainant

herein, was not personally related to Escritor nor did he

personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to declare

the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio as immoral in

consonance with the pertinent provision of the Administrative

Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the rules of

the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of whom she is a

member, the act of signing a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is

sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise be classified

as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor and Quilapio's declarations

are recorded in the Watch Tower Central office. They were

executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Watch

Tower Bible and Tract Society which was lifted from the article,

"Maintaining Marriage in Honor Before God and Men," in the

March 15, 1977 issue of the Watch Tower magazine, entitled The

Watchtower. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the foregoing

rules, she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging

Faithfulness in 1991, and by virtue of such act, they are for all

purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the religious

denomination of which they are devout adherents. Although in

1998 Escritor was widowed, thereby lifting the legal impediment to

marry on her part, her mate is still not capacitated to remarry.

Thus, their declarations remain valid. Once all legal impediments

for both are lifted, the couple can already register their marriage

with the civil authorities and the validity of the declarations

ceases. The elders in the congregations can then solemnize their

marriage as authorized by Philippine law. In sum, therefore,

insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral

about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio

and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should

carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit

relations for which government employees are held

administratively liable.

HELD:

While Escritor's cohabitation with Quilapio conforms to the

religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the cohabitation

violates Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The State cannot

interfere with the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in

the same way that the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot interfere with

the State's prohibition on concubinage. The free exercise of

religion protects practices based on religious grounds provided

such practices do not violate existing laws enacted in the

reasonable exercise of the State's police power. Under the

Revised Administrative Code of 1987, one of the grounds for

disciplinary action is "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

service." The penalty for a first offense is suspension of six

months and one day to one year. A second offense is punishable

with dismissal from the service. Escritor, however, deserves the

same compassionate treatment accorded to a similarly situated

court employee in De Dios v. Alejo if Escritor should end her

unlawful relationship with Quilapio. In De Dios, the Court, in

deciding not to dismiss an employee because he finally

terminated his cohabitation with another woman Given the

circumstances, it would deem unduly harsh to penalize Escritor

for cohabiting for the last 23 years with a man she believes is her

husband and she knows is the father of her son. No third party

has claimed or suffered injury because of their cohabitation. On

the contrary, suspending or even dismissing her for her continued

cohabitation would only work hardship on her family. Accordingly,

respondent Soledad S. Escritor is suspended for six months and

one day without pay for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of

the service. However, the suspension shall be lifted immediately

upon Escritor's manifestation to this Court that she has ceased

cohabiting with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. Moreover, respondent

Escritor is warned that her continued cohabitation with Quilapio,

during or after her suspension and while Quilapio's marriage with

his legal wife still subsists, shall merit the penalty of dismissal

from the service.

Estrada vs. Escritor

Facts: Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting

for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor,

court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her

husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years

old. He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is

committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court,

thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it

might appear that the court condones her act.

Issue: What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is

respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of benevolent

neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?

Held: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must

pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives

to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within

flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality

contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow

for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does

not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if

respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been

afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state

interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is

remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise

Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling

state interest. It is the respondent‘s stance that her conjugal

arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the

scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and

punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise

Clause, the Court‘s action would be an unconstitutional

encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot

therefore simply take a passing look at respondent‘s claim of

religious freedom, but must instead apply the ―compelling state

interest‖ test. The government must be heard on the issue as it

has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of

demonstrating the state‘s compelling interest which can override

respondent‘s religious belief and practice

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS,BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND

TELEVISION and HONORABLEHENRIETTA S. MENDEZ

FACTS:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"

aired on Channel 2every Saturday and on Channel 13 every

Sunday. The program presents and propagatespetitioner's

religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in

comparative studies withother religions. When the petitioner

submitted to the Board of Review for Moving Pictures

andTelevision, respondent, the VTR tapes of its several TV

program series, the Board classified theseries as "X" or not for

public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an

attackagainst other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."

On November 28, 1992, itappealed to the Office of the President

the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowedit through

a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr.,

addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the

respondent Board. According to the letter theepisode in is

protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and

expression and noindication that the episode poses any clear and

present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Casealleging that the

respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion inrequiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV

program and in x-rating them. In their Answer, respondent

Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article

201 of the Revised Penal Code. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.

CA however reversed it hence thispetition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not

constitutionally protected as aform of religious exercise

HELD:

RTC‘s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech

and interferes with its

right to free exercise of religion. This is true in this case. So-called

"attacks" are mere criticisms

of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of

other religions. ―Attack‖ is different from―offend‖ any race or

religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of

other

religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such

criticisms, however, uncleanthey may be. Under our constitutional

scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religionby

protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious

dogmas and beliefs are often atwar and to preserve peace among

their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishmentclause of

freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any

religion. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought

and it is best served by encouraging the marketplaceof dueling

ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an

immediate and gravedanger to the security and welfare of the

community that infringement of religious freedom maybe justified,

and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

There is no showingwhatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will

bring about especially the gravity and imminenceof the threatened

harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,

cannot be justifiedby hypothetical fears but only by the showing of

a substantive and imminent evil

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26,

1996

I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni

Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated ―X‖

– i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review

for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV

programs allegedly ―offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against

other religions which is expressly prohibited by law‖ because of

petitioner INC‘s controversial biblical interpretations and its

―attacks‖ against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent

Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner

INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by

the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled

that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to

review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the

respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when

it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang

Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an

attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV

series ―indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.‖

Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the

Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner‘s

TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely

abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner‘s

religious program?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA

sustained the action of the respondent Board’s X-rating

petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also

voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the

jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV

program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review

petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term ―television program‖ [in Sec. 3 of

PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review

and classify] should not include religious programs like its

program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is

urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution

which guarantees that ―no law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and

worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be

allowed.‖

[The Court however] reject petitioner‘s postulate. Petitioner‘s

public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the

bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches

even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule

that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the

State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of

some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to

prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of

public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez

faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the

liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind

adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of

concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to

subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion

to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational

exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and

its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion

when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious

program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of

invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the

burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If

it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck

down. It failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners

TV series for ―attacking‖ either religions, especially the Catholic

Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-

called ―attacks‖ are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held

dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not

viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as

evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as

indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be

prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This

ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and

interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other

religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such

criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our

constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any

religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In

fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner

Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if

said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our

country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between

the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy

against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom

of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by

encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury

of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech

should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite

speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of

truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed

to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible

Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: ―The constitutional

guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession

and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious

information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other

restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is

a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State

has the right to prevent.‖ In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers

Union, we further ruled that ―. . . it is only where it is unavoidably

necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community that infringement of

religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent

necessary to avoid the danger.‖

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board,

affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of

findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video

tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another

religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the

tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the

threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious

speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the

showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the

life of a reality already on ground

2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:

1. Freedom to believe (absolute)

1. Freedom to act on one‘s belief – where an individual

externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions affecting

the public, this freedom to do so becomes subject to

the regulation authority of the state

United States v. Ballard

322 US 78 (1944)

Bill Long

At issue in this case was whether certain representations or belief

statements made by someone under the guise of a Free Exercise

claim could be evaluated by a jury along with the defendant's

assertion that he held these beliefs in good faith. The Court

reversed the Circuit Court (5-4) in holding that only the issue

of good faith in holding a belief was properly before the

jury. Three dissenters thought that all issues should be avaliable

for jury consideration; one dissenter would dismiss the indictment

completely and have nothing to do with the case.

Facts

Since this case is so heavily fact-dependent, several things need

to be mentioned.Defendant organized the "I Am" movement

and raised money for it through mail solicitation. He claimed

to be Jesus, George Washington and others, and asserted

also he was able to heal "diseases, injuries or ailments"

because of his high attainment of spirituality in this life. He

represented that hundreds of persons had been cured by

him, Edna Ballard and Donald Ballard.

After Guy Ballard's death, Edna and Don were indicted and

convicted for using or conspiring to use the mails to

defraud. Eighteen charges of false representations were

made relating to their ability to heal people. Each of the

representations enumerated in the indictment was followed

by the charge that the Ballard's "well knew" that the

representations were false and untrue and made for the

purpose of defrauding people.

At trial the judge decided that the issue of the religious beliefs or

representations could not be submitted to the jury because the

jury had no competence to judge the truth or falsity of those

beliefs. Specifically, this meant that no one was going to be

able to speculate on the actuality of "the happening of those

incidents" (i.e., the healings). Nevertheless, the judge allowed

the jury to consider whether the evidence showed that the

Ballard's honestly and in good faith believed what they

taught/did More specifically, "if these defendants did not

believe those things, they did not believe that Jesus came

down and dictated...but used the mail for the purposee of

getting money, the jury should find them guilty." The issue

seemed to turn, then, on the good faith of their beliefs in their

healing ministry and not whether healings took place.

The Court of Appeals reversed and held that restricting the issue

to good faith alone was error. Inquiry had to be made also into

whether the representations themselves, or some of them,

were true.

Supreme Court Decision

The Court held that the only issue that should have gone to the

jury was the issue of good faith. "But on whichever basis that

court (the Circuit Court) rested its action, we do not agree

that the truth or verity of respondents' religious doctrines or

beliefs should have been submitted to the jury." Quoting an

earlier case from 1871, the Court said, "The law knows no heresy,

and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment

of no sect." The religious views of the Ballard's might seem

incredible, the Court opined, "but if those doctrines are subject to

trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then

the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect."

Chief Justice Stone, speaking also for Justices Frankfurther

and Roberts, argued in dissent that he was not "prepared to

say that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion

affords immunity from criminal prosecution for fraudulent

procurement of money by false statements as to one's

religious experiences, more than it renders polygamy or libel

immune from criminal prosecution." The indictment charged

that the representations as to the healings were "falsely and

fraudulently made." Certainly those statements were within the

competence of the jury to investigate. The dissenters thus

argued that none of the Ballard's constitutional rights were

violated if they were prosecuted for fraudulent procurement of

money by false representations as to their beliefs. The state of a

person's mind is a fact as capable of fraudulent

misrepresentation as is one's physical condition, they

contended

Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)

Facts:

Pennsylvania state law required that "at least ten verses from the

Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each

public school on each school day." Two families sued, claiming

this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Issue:

Whether an official reading at the beginning of each school day of

Bible passages, without further comment, violates the

Establishment Clause.

Holding:

By a vote of 8-1, the Court held that state-sponsored devotional

Bible readings in public schools constitute an impermissible

religious exercise by government.

Reasoning:

The Court found that state-sponsored devotional exercises violate

the Establishment Clause. The Constitutional defects are not

corrected by allowing an opt-out provision. The Establishment

Clause constrains government from involving itself in religious

matters. Therefore, government action that promotes or inhibits

religion violates the Constitution. The state may not draft or

conduct religious prayers in schools filled with captive audiences

of children.

Majority:

"In addition, it might well be said that one‘s education is not

complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of

religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It

certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its

literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates

that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented

objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be

effected [sic] consistently with the First Amendment. But the

exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious

exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of

the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict

neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion." (Justice Tom

Clark)

Abington Township vs. Schempp

Facts of the Case

Abington Township was the home of the Schempp family:

Edward, his wife Sidney and their children Roger, Donna and

Ellory. The Schempp family followed Unitarian religious practices

closely and attended church on a regular basis. Roger and

Donna both attended Abington Senior High School in

Pennsylvania where every morning a student would read a

chosen verse from the Holy Bible. The readings were

broadcasted into each homeroom through an

intercommunications system. Following the reading, students

would stand to recite the Lord‘s Prayer and the Pledge of

Allegiance. Any other announcements regarding the school day

would conclude this morning broadcast. According to the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, it was required by law that ―at

least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without

comment, at the opening of each public school on each school

day‖. Children were permitted to be excused from the Bible

readings if a request from a parent or guardian was submitted in

writing. Readings and recitation were not followed by any form of

comment, question or interpretation from the teachers. All of the

routines were voluntary, and at any time the student was pemitted

to be excused with the request of a parent or guardian.

The Schempp family brought this situation to the district court,

because they believed it violated their rights under the First

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Schempp argued

that these Bible readings exposed his children to religious beliefs

that were different than their own faith. At the second district

court hearing, Schempp announced that after considering having

his children removed from the morning Bible readings, he decided

against it due to the fact that it could affect the children‘s

relationship with their teacher or classmates. If the children were

removed from the classroom, they could also potentially miss

other important announcements or be viewed in a negative

manner while standing in the hallway.

Court Decision

In 1963, the district court ruled in favor of Schempp regarding the

Pennsylvania school district‘s violation of the First Amendment to

the United States Constitution. However, the case continued

when the Pennsylvania school district appealed the case to the

Supreme Court and on June 17, 1963 the Supreme Court also

ruled in favor of Schempp.

Reasons for Decision

The court‘s decision to rule in Schempp‘s favor came from the

basis of a previous court case ruling in Engel vs. Vitale in which

the court ruled that allowing prayer in school was a violation of the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution that states, ―Congress shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion‖. Therefore, the previous

ruling in Engel vs. Vitale was upheld and the Supreme Court ruled

in favor of Schempp on the basis that religious readings and

prayer in school were unconstitutional, because this violated the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)

Facts:

Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provided state aid to

church-related elementary and secondary schools. A group of

individual taxpayers and religious liberty organizations filed suit,

challenging the constitutionality of the program. They claimed

that, since the program primarily aided parochial schools, it

violated the Establishment Clause.

Issue:

Whether states can create programs that provide financial support

to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way or

reimbursement for the cost of teachers‘ salaries, textbooks, and

instructional materials in specified secular subjects

(Pennsylvania) -- or pay a salary supplement directly to teachers

of secular subjects in religious schools (Rhode Island).

Holding:

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that both programs

violate the Establishment Clause because they create excessive

entanglement between a religious entity and the state.

Reasoning:

The Court looked to three factors in determining the

constitutionality of the contested programs, factors that would

become known as the Lemon test. First, whether the legislature

passed the statute based on a secular legislative purpose. The

Court could find no evidence that the goal of the Pennsylvania or

Rhode Island legislatures was to advance religion. Instead the

Court relied on the stated purpose, that the bill was designed to

improve "the quality of the secular education in all schools

covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Second, the Court

questioned whether the programs had the primary effect of

advancing or inhibiting religion. It bypassed this prong by

examining the third prong and finding a violation there, thus

obviating the need for analysis of this point. The third factor, and

the point at which the Court found the constitutional defect, was

over the issue of excessive entanglement. Here, the Court held

that the state‘s oversight and auditing requirements and the

propensity for political divisiveness generated by this kind of aid

program would entangle the state and the religious entity in

unconstitutional ways.

Majority:

"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;

second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither

advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster

'excessive entanglement with religion.'" (Chief Justice Warren

Burger)

Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Background

The trial of Lemon v. Kurtzman was a groundbreaking case that

took place in Pennsylvania. The case began because the state of

Pennsylvania passed a law that allowed the local government to

use money to fund educational programs that taught religious-

based lessons, activities and studies. This law was passed

through the Non-public Elementary and Secondary Education Act

of 1968.

The case of Lemon v. Kurtzman was filed by Alton Lemon, a

Pennsylvania instructor who claimed that the state had violated

the United States Constitution by passing the law mentioned

above. Lemon believed that Pennsylvania violated the 1st

Amendment to the United States Constitution because the

Constitution does not allow the establishment of any state laws or

legislation that combine the interests of religious people with the

interests of the state‘s population. This is known as the

Separation of Church and State. The government is not allowed

to place the interest of any organization or institution above the

interests of the general population. Using these Amendments,

Lemon believed that the state of Pennsylvania unfairly funded

religious programs that did not appeal to the state‘s general

population.

Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Case Profile

The case of Lemon v. Kurtzman took place on March 3rd of 1971.

Alton Lemon filed the case against David Kurtzman who was the

acting Superintendent of the Department of Public Instruction in

the State of Pennsylvania.

Alton Lemon believed that preferential treatment of services that

are rooted in religion is a direct violation of the Separation

between Church and State. Alton Lemon‘s main argument was

that the state law was a direct violation of the United States

Constitution which did not allow religions from benefitting from

state laws.

Lemon v. Kurtzman was decided on June 28th of 1971. The case

was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Verdict

In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court of the United States

found that the passing of any state laws that establish a religious

body is a direct violation of the United States Constitution.

Therefore, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court of the

United States ruled in favor of Alton Lemon.

The verdict in Lemon v. Kurtzman led to the creation of the

Lemon Test. This test is a classification system that is used to see

whether or not state laws regarding funding or creating religious

institutions with public money violate the United States

constitution. The Lemon test ensures that the general population‘s

interests take priority within public institutions and settings. The

Lemon test also prohibits the Federal Government from

becoming overly religious or involved with a particular religious

institution

Aglipay v. Ruiz

GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)First Division, Laurel (p):

5 concur.

Facts:

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of

Manila that he would orderthe issuance of postage stamps

commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the

33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman

Catholic Church. The petitioner,Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme

Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillmentof

what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,

Esq., member of the PhilippineBar, to denounce the matter to the

President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the

petitioner‘s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announce

d having sent to the United Statesthe designs of the postage for

printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though

thegreater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the

stamps was sought to be preventedby the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of

the Constitution.

Held:

Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of

profound reverence forreligion and is not a denial of its influence

in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith toan active

power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.

And, in so far as itinstills into the minds the purest principles of

morality, its influence is deeply felt and highlyappreciated. When

the Filipino people, in

the preamble of their Constitution, implored ―the aid of

Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall

embody their ideals, conserveand develop the patrimony of the

nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to

themselvesand their posterity the blessings of independence

under a regime of justice, liberty and

democracy,‖ they thereby manifested their intense religious

nature and placed unfaltering

reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.

The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized

here as elsewhere.Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in

view. What it gives the Director of Posts is thediscretionary power

to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would

be

―advantageous to the Government.‖ Of course, the phrase

―advantageous to the Government‖

does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to

appropriate, use or apply of publicmoney or property for the use,

benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at

bar,the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any

sectarian feeling to favor a particularchurch or religious

denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the

benefit of theRoman Catholic Church, nor were money derived

from the sale of the stamps given to thatchurch. The purpose of

the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event

considered of international importance to give publicity to the

Philippines and its people and attract moretourists to the country.

Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained

a map of

the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an

inscription that reads ―Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic

Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.‖

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition,

without pronouncement as tocosts

Aglipay v. Ruiz Digest

Facts:

1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of

Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps

commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd

International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman

Catholic Church.

2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the

Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfilment of what he

considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member

of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President. In

spite of the protest of the petitioner‘s attorney, the Director of

Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the

designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually

issued and sold though the greater part remained unsold.

3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

He alleged that the provisions of Section 23, Subsection 3, Article

VI, of the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling of

the commemorative postage stamps. It was provided therein that,

‗No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,

or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of

any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of

religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,

minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except

when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to

the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or

leprosarium.‘

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in

violation of the principle of separation of church and state

NO.

1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition

of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence

in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active

power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.

In so far as it instils into the minds the purest principles of

morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution,

implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a

government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop

the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and

secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of

independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"

they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the

destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in

human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain

general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious

sects and denominations.

3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No.

4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Sec.

of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage

stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these

officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the

postage stamps in question, still, the case of the petitioner would

fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment

and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is

yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act

assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court

resolved to deny the petition for a writ of prohibition

GREGORIO AGLIPAY vs JUAN RUIZ

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against

respondent Director of Postsfrom issuing and selling postage

stamps commemorative of the 33rd International

EucharisticCongress. Petitioner contends that such act is a

violation of the Constitutional provision statingthat no public funds

shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system

of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the

separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the

occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as

aweapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends

that such issuance is inaccordance to Act No. 4052, providing for

the appropriation funds to respondent for theproduction and

issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the

government.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

HELD:

The phrase in Act No. 4052 ―advantageous to the government‖

does not authorizeviolation of the Constitution. The issuance of

the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular

church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the

benefit of the RomanCatholic Church. The postage stamps,

instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally

planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of

Manila, with the words ―SeatXXXIII International Eucharistic

Congress.‖ The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic

Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress.

This was to ―to advertise thePhilippines and attract more

tourists,‖ the officials merely took advantage of an event

VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKER'S UNION

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano is a member of the religioussect known as

the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employof the Elizalde Rope

Factory, Inc.. As such employee, he wasa member of the Elizalde

Rope Workers' Union which hadwith the Company a collective

bargaining agreementcontaining a closed shop provision which

reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of

employment for all permanent employees workers covered bythis

Agreement.

Under Republic Act No. 875, the employer was not

precluded"from making an agreement with a labor organization

torequire as a condition of employment membership therein, if

such labor organization is the representative of

theemployees."Then Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted,

introducing anamendment to section 4 of Republic Act No. 875,

asfollows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any

religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their membersin any

such labor organization".Being a member of a religious sect that

prohibits the affiliationof its members with any labor organization,

Victorianopresented his resignation to Union. The Union wrote a

formalletter to the Company asking the latter to separate him

fromthe service in view of the fact that he was resigning from

theUnion as a member. The management of the Company inturn

notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless Victorianocould

achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, theCompany

would be constrained to dismiss him from theservice.I

iSSUE:

WON Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favorsthose religious

sects which ban their members from joininglabor unions

HELD:

NO. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular,worldly, and

temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy andeternal. It was

intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the

constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that

certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or

be dispossessed of their right towork and of being impeded to

pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security

agreements.Congress acted merely to relieve the exercise of

religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed byunion

security agreements. It was Congress itself thatimposed that

burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act(Republic Act

875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deemsadvisable, could take

away the same burden.The means adopted by the Act to achieve

that purpose— exempting the members of said religious sects

fromcoverage of union security agreements — is reasonable.It

may not be amiss to point out here that the freeexercise of

religious profession or belief is superior tocontract rights. In case

of conflict, the latter must, therefore,yield to the former. The

Supreme Court of the United Stateshas also declared on several

occasions that the rights in theFirst Amendment, which include

freedom of religion, enjoy apreferred position in the constitutional

system. Religiousfreedom, although not unlimited, is a

fundamental personalright and liberty, and has a preferred

position in the hierarchyof values. Contractual rights, therefore,

must yield to freedomof religion. It is only where unavoidably

necessary to preventan immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community that infringement of

religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent

necessary to avoidthe danger

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE

ROPE WORKERS’ UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY,

INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION,

defendant-appellant.

GRN L-25246 September 12, 1974

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect

known as the ―Iglesia ni Cristo‖, had been in the employ of the

Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was a

member of the Elizalde Rope Workers‘ Union (Union) which had

with the Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision

which reads as follows: ―Membership in the Union shall be

required as a condition of employment for all permanent

employees workers covered by this Agreement.‖

Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA

3350, the employer was not precluded ―from making an

agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of

employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the

representative of the employees.‖ On June 18, 1961, however,

RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to par 4

subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875, as follows: ―xxx but such

agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which

prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor

organization‖.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of

its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his

resignation to appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to

the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the

service because he was resigning from the Union as a member.

The Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that

unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement

with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him

from the service.

Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and

the Union from dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the

―union security clause‖ of the CBA and assailed the

constitutionality of RA 3350 and contends it discriminatorily favors

those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor

unions.

ISSUE:

Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union

or not.

RULING:

YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of

association. Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as well

as Sec 7 of Art IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the

right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to

law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides that

employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form,

join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the

purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual

aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace

Act recognize and guarantee is the ―right‖ to form or join

associations. A right comprehends at least two broad notions,

namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal

restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being

prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee

may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It

is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether

he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join,

he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would

join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and

the power to leave and cancel his membership with said

organization at any time. The right to join a union includes the

right to abstain from joining any union. The law does not enjoin an

employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by

Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The

legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is

withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an

employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the

employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining

union, and the employees must continue to be members of the

union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.

By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of

RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes

to be employed or to keep his employment he must become a

member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of

said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and

withdrawn.

To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,

RA No.3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4

(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: ―but such

agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which

prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor

organization‖. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure

from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement

the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit

affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the

exception provides is that members of said religious sects cannot

be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said

unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in

spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious

sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs

on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective

bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said

religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to

said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to

affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious

beliefs, the members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with

the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their

religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does

not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from

joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel them

to join.

The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual

obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members

in permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there

was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.

The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute

and unqualified. The prohibition is general. The prohibition is not

to be read with literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable

impairment only. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State

continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of

its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests

may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only

are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations

as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes

of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of

the legal order. The contract clause of the Constitution. must be

not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in

appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to

safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has special

application to contracts regulating relations between capital and

labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts,

for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common

good.

The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of

belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by

preventing discrimination against those members of religious

sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions,

confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right

to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means

whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their

dependents.

The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is

confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor, directed

by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The

union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective

force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of

collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of

employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover,

when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a

third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also

needs protection – the collective bargaining relationship.

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to

contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the

former.

The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of

advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion,

by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed

from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being

impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of

union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful

employment whereby they can make a living to support

themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. The

Constitution even mandated that ―the State shall afford protection

to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,

ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed

and regulate the relation between workers and employers.‖

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop

agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit

their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the

protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the

collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a

burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain

extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a

serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people

of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is

our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop

agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of

any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those

who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members

from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is

merely incidental and indirect.

The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions.

The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act

No. 875 and the new Labor Code.

The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for

joining any lawful association membership in any particular

religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require

affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from

joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing

from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union

requires a positive act Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts

members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of

closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector

is not required to do a positive act-to exercise the right to join or to

resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of

any positive act on his part.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'

UNION andELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC. ELIZALDE ROPE

WORKERS' UNION

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano, appellee, a member of the religious sect

known as the "Iglesia niCristo", had been in the employ of the

Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. Assuch

employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union

(Union) which had withthe Company a collective bargaining

agreement containing a closed shop provision. Under Section

4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its

amendment by Republic Act No.3350, the employer was not

precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization

torequire as a condition of employment membership therein, if

such labor organization is therepresentative of the employees."

On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 wasenacted,

introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of

section 4 of Republic ActNo. 875, as follows: "but such agreement

shall not cover members of any religious sects whichprohibit

affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the

establishment of religionclause or separation of Church and State.

HELD:

The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the

support of any religioustenets or the modes of worship of any

sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of theacceptance of any

creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the

free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of

utmost amplitude. It has been said thatthe religion clauses of the

Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible

liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his

conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, andto live as he

believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and

with the commongood. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is

to impede the observance of one or allreligions, or to discriminate

invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the

burdenmay be characterized as being only indirect. But if the

stage regulates conduct by enacting,within its power, a general

law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the

state'ssecular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden

on religious observance, unless thestate can accomplish its

purpose without imposing such burden.In Aglipay v. Ruiz, this

Court had occasion to state that the government should not

beprecluded from pursuing valid objectives secular ID character

even if the incidental result wouldbe favorable to a religion or sect.

It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstandthe

strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular

legislative purpose and a primaryeffect that neither advances nor

inhibits religion. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No.3350

cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-

establishment" (of religion)clause of the Constitution.