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    Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of Agrarian Reform

    On November 22, 2010

    The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by

    petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants andowned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands

    by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

    The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of

    separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no

    private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

    They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.

    228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution,for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to

    Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

    Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands

    intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no

    need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the

    purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only

    where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the

    vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority

    of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the

    irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the

    police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

    Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of AgrarianReform

    G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989Cruz, J.

    Held:The State in the exercise of its police power may regulate ownership of private

    property in accordance with the Constitution. To carry out such regulation, it becomesnecessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of themaximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domainfor which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not amere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to andthe physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to theowner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the policepower but of the power of eminent domain.

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    Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forciblyacquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to theowner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell

    under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of salemay be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, orcannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power ofeminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State overthe interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistibledemands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of thepolice power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

    But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no meansabsolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutionalinjunction that private property shall not be taken for public use without just

    compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from theinterpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of thepower are: (1)public use and (2)just compensation.

    Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property takenfrom its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the ownersloss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation toconvey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall bereal, substantial, full, ample. Just compensation for property taken by condemnationmeans a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable timeafter the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for suchpayment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage.

    As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable takingwhen the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property;(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be underwarrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use orotherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of theproperty for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him ofbeneficial enjoyment of the property.

    Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make adeposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as the compensation is

    a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all theresources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount. Nevertheless, Section16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:

    Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection orno response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designatedby the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act,the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the properRegister of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the

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    Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution ofthe land to the qualified beneficiaries.

    Title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriatoronly upon full payment of the just compensation.

    Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

    constitutionality of some of the measures mentioned in the CARL Payment of justcompensation is not always required to be made fully in money; Other modes of payment which

    are available to the landowner at his option are not unreasonable because payment made inshares of stocks, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits and other things of value are

    equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

    LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

    OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

    Enrique M. Belo for petitioner.

    D E C I S I O N

    PARAS,Jp:

    This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary andpermanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for

    acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise

    known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines

    and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the

    same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the

    constitutional rights of the petitioner.

    As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:

    On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes

    the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).

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    On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and

    Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 ofR.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).

    On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and

    Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).

    Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry

    business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected

    by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32

    of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the

    Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657

    promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof

    as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).

    Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared

    unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining

    order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made

    to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.

    This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms'

    prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31,1989. (Rollo, p. 98).

    Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said

    Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this

    Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to

    the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).

    The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).

    On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his

    Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).

    Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to

    apply to it:

    (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."

    (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted tocommercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

    (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

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    (d) Section 16(d) and 17which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to

    summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law.

    (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

    ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the

    production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end

    of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in

    such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive:

    Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess

    of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper

    application, determine a lower ceiling.

    In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, anadditional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said

    regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the

    fiscal year . . ."

    The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of

    R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law

    includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the ImplementingRules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.

    The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

    ARTICLE XIII

    xxx xxx xxx

    AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

    Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right

    of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands

    they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this

    end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject

    to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into

    account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of justcompensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small

    landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

    xxx xxx xxx"

    Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In

    fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association

    of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14

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    July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It,

    however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of theConstitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its

    coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Landis not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of

    the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners

    of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for

    commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby

    processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands

    support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use

    of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this

    industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry

    production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo,

    p. 11).

    On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is

    embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) ofR.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954),

    defines the following words:

    "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops,

    often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry,

    farming.

    It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .

    Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

    Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp.82-83).

    The petition is impressed with merit.

    The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional

    construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in

    the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA

    413 [1970]).

    Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of

    the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning

    except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them

    prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).

    It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of

    doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as

    throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the

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    convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by

    the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by theterms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way

    toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59SCRA 183 [1974]).

    The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the

    meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of

    the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-

    mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

    The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of

    R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,

    fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).

    The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."

    Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of

    agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties

    because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal,

    however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are

    limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial,

    industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).

    In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed

    several questions, among others, quoted as follows:

    xxx xxx xxx

    "Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and

    farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this

    provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or

    collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include

    those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.

    I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a

    poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will

    automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on

    which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986,p. 618).

    xxx xxx xxx

    The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo,

    quoted as follows:

    xxx xxx xxx

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    "Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay

    Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanangkasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker

    kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2,1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

    It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes

    "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the

    definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial

    activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no

    reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).

    Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of

    R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and

    implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings)whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and tenpercent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for

    being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).

    It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question

    only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first

    satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights

    susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely

    raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the

    decision of the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary

    of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744;

    Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).

    However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with

    constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced thatthis must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and

    God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personalmotives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions.

    Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and

    Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these

    departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution

    (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R.

    78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R.79777, 14 July 1989).

    Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it

    becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had

    assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n

    one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as

    part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and

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    which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208

    [1987]).

    PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11,13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine

    in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance

    therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of

    preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

    SO ORDERED.

    Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,

    Grio-Aquino, Medialdea andRegalado, JJ., concur.

    Feliciano, J., is on leave.

    Separate Opinions

    SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

    I agree that the petition be granted.

    It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed provisions of

    R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its Implementing Rules andGuidelines insofar as they include the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in their coverage

    can not be simplistically reduced to a question of constitutional construction.

    It is a well-settled rule that construction and interpretation come only after it has been

    demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. A close reading

    however of the constitutional text in point, specifically, Sec. 4, Art. XIII, particularly the phrase,

    ". . . in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof," provides a basis

    for the clear and possible coverage of livestock, poultry, and swine raising within the ambit of

    the comprehensive agrarian reform program. This accords with the principle that every

    presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and the court inconsidering the validity of a statute should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached

    to bring it within the fundamental law.1

    The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight when a

    ruling to the contrary would, in effect, defeat the laudable and noble purpose of the law, i.e., the

    welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers in the promotion of social justice, by the

    expedient conversion of agricultural lands into livestock, poultry, and swine raising by scheming

    landowners, thus, rendering the comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely illusory.

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    The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of whether or not the assailed

    provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article II, section 1) whichteaches simply that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to

    rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 2

    There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist between

    land directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for

    livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make real differences, to wit:

    xxx xxx xxx

    No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants

    nor landlords, only employers and employees.

    Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."

    Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is inconsequential that all the

    commercial hog and poultry farms combined occupy less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for

    piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares of land supposedly covered by the CARP.

    And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.

    In every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of an

    inconsequential portion of land is a mere incident of its operation, as in any other undertaking,

    business or otherwise.

    The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere

    more evident when one considers that at least 95% of total investment in these farms is in the

    form of fixed assets which are industrial in nature.

    These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage, waterers,

    blowers, misters and in some cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with grinders,

    mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3) extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and

    other supplies; (4) anti-pollution equipment such as bio-gas and digester plants augmented by

    lagoons and concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and accessory

    facilities; (6) modern equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilities

    complete with expensive tools and equipment; and a myriad other such technologically advanced

    appurtances.

    How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost totally occupied

    by these structures?

    The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural

    tenants surfaces when one considers contribution to output. Labor cost of livestock and poultry

    farms is no more than 4% of total operating cost. The 98% balance represents inputs not obtained

    from the land nor provided by the farmworkers inputs such as feeds and biochemicals (80%

    of the total cost), power cost, cost of money and several others.

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    Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by

    tenancy law. They are entitled to social security benefits where tenant-farmers are not. They arepaid fixed wages rather than crop shares. And as in any other industry, they receive additional

    benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and other incentives such as free housing privileges, lightand water.

    Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also fallacious in the

    sense that like the manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather than a source of agricultural

    output. At least 60% of the entire domestic supply of corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry

    farms. So are the by-products of rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp

    meal), and fish (fish meal).3

    xxx xxx xxx

    In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly situated andhence, can not be treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for the inclusion

    of livestock and poultry industry within the coverage of the agrarian reform program constitute

    invalid classification and must accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the equal protection

    clause of the Constitution.

    Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

    Section II of the CARL which includes private agricultural lands, devoted to commercial

    livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of commercial farms is invalid;

    Livestock or poultry raising

    is not similar to crop or tree farming; agricultural land

    Carino v CHR

    Constitutional Law Adjudicatory Power of the CHR

    On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to

    stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were

    suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990,Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of

    three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the

    Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from

    continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary

    Carino.

    ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific

    cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

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    HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only

    investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannotand should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then

    barred from proceeding with the trial.

    Carino v CHR

    Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate

    FACTS:

    Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the allegedfailure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying

    away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable

    assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within

    24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the

    Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90

    days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was

    consequently formed to hear the charges.

    When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers

    staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary

    Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran,

    Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue ofviolation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually

    elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to

    Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful massactions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and

    consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

    While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it

    earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR

    continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of

    law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative

    charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission isempowered to investigate.

    ISSUE:

    Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

    HELD:

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    The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not

    meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or

    duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

    The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it

    may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights

    violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be

    likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.

    The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a

    judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence

    and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of

    applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or

    determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review

    as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

    Power to Investigate

    The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all

    forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on

    its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such

    rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in

    accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or underits authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose

    possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It

    may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance

    of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be

    required by its findings.

    But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even

    quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or

    the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

    Investigate vs. Adjudicate

    "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,

    research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:

    inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to

    conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to

    learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or

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    resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts

    established by the inquiry.

    The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient

    inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care

    and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal

    inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n

    administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d

    Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts

    concerning a certain matter or matters."

    "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,

    determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights

    and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on:

    settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or

    with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . .

    . ."

    In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To

    determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To

    pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial

    determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

    Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"

    cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in

    Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so

    even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in

    question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had

    been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits"

    the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers

    constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying

    on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions,

    and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constituteinfractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or

    are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts

    done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said

    acts or omissions.

    Who has Power to Adjudicate?

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    These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope

    of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the

    appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

    Manner of Appeal

    Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of

    Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;

    whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the

    respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed

    "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed

    upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education

    himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service

    Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

    Cario v. CHR

    striking of teachers - CHR has adjudicative power (it may investigate i.e. receive evidence and

    make findings of facts as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political

    rights; cannot be likened to a judicial function; CHR has merely the power to investigate; it

    cannot try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate)

    Export Processing Zone Authority vs CHR, Valles, Aledia and Ordonez

    G.R. No. 101476

    April 14, 199

    Facts:Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly

    violating their human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215th

    PNPCompany tried to level the area occupied by complainants. The same parcel of land was reserved

    and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite Export Processing Zone which was bought

    by Filoil Refinery Corporation and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order of injunction for

    EPZA and company to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and

    harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group started bulldozing the area and CHR

    reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist

    from doing work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR for lack ofauthority and said motion was dismissed. EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition

    alleging that CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive

    writ; that the private respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an

    injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint.

    EPZAs petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from

    enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to

    mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).

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    Issue: WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against

    supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the actscomplained of.

    Ruling:

    In Carino vs CHR, it was held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.

    The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it

    may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights

    violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be

    likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.

    The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining there from the facts of a controversy is not a

    judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide

    for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have

    been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commissionto issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution

    would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by implication.Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer

    to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR

    may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a

    court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary

    injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within

    his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of

    preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action,

    for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other

    purpose. EPZAs petition is granted.

    EPZA v. CHR

    CHR is a creation of the Constitution although it is not on the same level as the Constitutional

    Commissions. In essence, its power is only investigative.

    Summary: Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (GR 100150, 5 January1994)

    Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights

    [GR 100150, 5 January 1994]En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concur

    Facts:

    A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an

    Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Officeof the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and

    members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al.were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July1990) within which to vacate the premises of

    North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo,et. al. were informed by

    Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12July 1990,

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    the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang

    SinumpaangSalaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon,Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary

    Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop thedemolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR

    Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing Simon, et. al. "to desist

    from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the

    vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear

    before the CHR. On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July

    1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al.

    carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its

    resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement offinancial assistance of not more than

    P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materials and food under the

    Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition,

    with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."Amotion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12

    September 1990hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion todismiss set for 21 September 1990had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they

    would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon,

    et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia

    despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1March 1991,

    the CHR issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to

    dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied.

    Simon, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary

    injunction, questioning the extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the

    CHR be prohibited from further hearing and investigating CHR Case 90

    1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

    Issue:

    Whether the CHR has the power to issue the order to desist against the demolition of Fermo,

    et. al.s stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stallsdespite the CHR order.

    Held:

    Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of

    human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari

    stores and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involvingcivil and political rights".

    Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the

    same in all parts of the world.

    Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the

    press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political

    rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political

    associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment and social

    services.

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    Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his

    humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only berecognized and protected by it.

    Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights.

    Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his

    natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.

    CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the

    organization or administration of the government.

    POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or

    administration of the government.

    CD Simon, Jr. vs. CHR

    Edit 0 1 Topic:Personal Dignity and Human Rights (Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)

    SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

    G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

    FACTS:

    On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the

    petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the

    resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said

    petitioners to appear before the CHR.

    On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and

    supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners'authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil

    and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and

    political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".

    On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental

    motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order,

    dated April 25, 1991.

    The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary

    injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHRCase No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

    ISSUE:Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

    HELD:

    No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the

    CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate,

    on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and

    political rights".

    The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that

    the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive

    http://lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com/CD+Simon%2C+Jr.+vs.+CHRhttp://lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com/page/menu/CD+Simon%2C+Jr.+vs.+CHRhttp://lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com/page/history/CD+Simon%2C+Jr.+vs.+CHRhttp://lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com/page/messages/CD+Simon%2C+Jr.+vs.+CHRhttp://lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com/CD+Simon%2C+Jr.+vs.+CHR
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    measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated

    or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue anrestraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have

    expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the

    action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

    The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further

    proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

    Simon Jr. v. CHR

    human rights; civil rights; political rights Human rights generic term; civil rights those

    rights that

    belong to every citizen or inhabitant of the state or country [by virtue of his citizenship in thecountry] and are not connected with the organization or administration of government (marriage,

    equal protection, freedom of contract etc.); Political rights right to participate, directly or

    indirectly in the establishment or administration of government (suffrage, run for public office);

    CHR focus on SEVERE cases of human rights violations (right of political detainees, treatment

    of prisoners, fair and public trials etc.); CHR can cite or hold any person in direct or indirect

    contempt but not order them to desist

    MIRIAM COLLEGE V CA

    Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school paper were

    subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were

    filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and

    sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to

    submit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the

    defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they

    alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the

    Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed

    before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee

    questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

    Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

    Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary

    Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution

    guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom

    includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to

    attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare

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    calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate

    upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always

    absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out

    disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus

    Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the

    articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial

    disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to

    investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement

    of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive

    to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom

    of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has

    the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.1wph

    DECS vs. San Diego

    G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

    Facts:Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission

    Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected hisapplication based on the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a petition before

    the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challengingthe constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC

    therefore this petition.

    Issue:

    Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.

    Ruling:

    Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical

    profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily

    entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challengedregulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary oroppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution

    provides that every citizen has the right to choose a profession or courseof study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic

    requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to qualityeducation as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is

    entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was grantedand the RTC ruling was reversed.

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    Republic of the Philippines

    SUPREME COURT

    ManilaEN BANC

    G.R. No. L-40779 November 28, 1975

    EPICHARIS T. GARCIA,

    petitioner,vs.

    THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY,

    hereinrepresented by FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO,

    respondent.

    Epicharis T Garcia in her own behalf.Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala for

    respondents.

    FERNANDO,

    J.:

    The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty AdmissionCommittee of the Loyola School of Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to

    allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein is whether she is deemedpossessed of such a right that has to be respected. That is denied not only ongeneral principle,

    but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution involved. It is a

    seminary. It would appear therefore that at most she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being

    cast on respondent school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to such an obvious conclusion, there is

    the autonomy recognized by the Constitution in this explicit language: "All institutions of higher

    learning shall enjoy academic freedom."

    1 The petition must therefore fail. Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent

    admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when

    Petitioner wanted to enrol for the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent toldher about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-

    admission in their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not

    constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the

    school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25,1975,

    Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at a compromisethat would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the

    kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro

    Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their

    decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate

    School; 7 Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for

    her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that shecould enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfil their

    requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy inorder to have her degree later in Theology

    which would entail about four to five years more of studies

    whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it

    would entail only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering that time was of the

    essence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge

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    necessary for her life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties,

    even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject she wouldtake; 9. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz,

    he being with the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary ofEducation, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for

    registration; ... "

    2 She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current

    semester. She made it more specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would

    be allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and that

    whatever units may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties be likewise

    recognized by respondent. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father Lambino which

    started on a happy note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but

    ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her, as shown by this portion thereof: "Now, you will

    have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too pleasant. The faculty had a meetingafter the summer session and several members are strongly opposed to having you back with us

    at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their reason:They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the

    effect of slowing down the progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the

    presentation a chance and exerted more effort to understand the point made before immediately

    thinking of difficulties and problems. The way things are, I would say that the advisability of

    your completing a program (with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is very

    questionable. That you have the requisite intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would

    seem to be in your best interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with your

    orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am only thinking of your welfare."

    3 This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 19705, required comment on the part of respondentFaculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology.

    4 As submitted on behalf of Father Lambino, it set forth the following: "Respondent is the

    Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a

    religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the Ateneo deManila University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes

    and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained from

    such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the Loyola School of

    Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to

    take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the Assistant Dean of the

    Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order for them to be considered asadmitted to a degree program; Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to

    take some courses for credit but said admission was not an admission to a degree program

    because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such

    admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de

    Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was

    merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Furthermore,

    petitioner was not charged a single centavo by the Loyola School of Theology and/or the Ateneo

    de Manila University in connection with the courses she took in the summer of 1975, as she was

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    allowed to take it free of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the

    Loyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion asto whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school any particular student,

    considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other considerations such aspersonality traits and character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering

    the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The Petition for Mandamus

    therefore does not lie, as there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to

    admit the petitioner therein in the current year to take up further courses in the Loyola School of

    Theology."

    5 It was likewise alleged in the aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter of May 19, 1975,

    the decision not to allow petitioner to take up further courses in said seminary "is not arbitrary,

    as it is based on reasonable grounds, ... ."

    6 Then reference was made to the availability of non-judicial remedies which petitioner couldhave pursued.

    7 The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner sought permission

    to reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she had a detailed recital of why under the circumstances

    she is entitled to relief from the courts. In a resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court considered

    the comment of respondent as answer and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

    That they did, and the petition was deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at the

    outset, we do not see merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.1. In respondent's memorandum,

    it was made clear why a petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner

    cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola

    School of Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola

    School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously notstudying for the priesthood, she being a layperson and a woman. And even assuming

    ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the

    part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn

    down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum

    classroom size and component considerations."

    8 No authorities were cited, respondent apparently being of the view that the law has not reached

    the stage where the matter of admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and

    uncontrolled discretion of the applicant. There are standards that must be met. There are policies

    to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a

    student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannottherefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. Such being

    the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a rather comprehensive

    memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately did not have counsel, an attempt was made to

    dispute the contention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was

    not sufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a

    practitioner that was evident. While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable to

    demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of thiswrit.2.

    Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of

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    higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty

    member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publishthe result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that

    his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in thepolitical, economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right

    claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to

    communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or

    penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or

    beyond the institution."

    9 As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic

    freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover,

    publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no

    control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths

    or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines."

    10 3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scopeof academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference is to

    the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the

    school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives

    and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when

    the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly

    extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a

    niggardly manner or in a gradging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its

    intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of theP hilippines, in his Philippine

    Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grant sthe right of academic freedom to

    the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a universityprofessor."

    11 He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France,

    President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: " "It is awell-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the

    problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing

    as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not

    even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must

    distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the

    freedom of the individual university teacher." "12 Also: "To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the

    individual scholar, he says: "The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each

    university teacher

    recognized and effectively guaranteed by society

    to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his

    capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as

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    important, in considering academic freedom, as the statusof the institutions to which they belong

    and through which they disseminate their learning."'

    13 He likewise quoted from the President of the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby:"'The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should

    have de facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission and examination of students;

    (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff;

    and (iv) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. It would be a

    poor prospect for academic freedom if universities had to rely on the literal interpretation of their

    constitutions in order to acquire for their academic members control of these four functions, for

    in one constitution or another most of these functions are laid on the shoulders of the law

    governing body .'"

    14 JusticeFrankfurter, with his extensive background in legal education as a former Professor of

    the Harvard Law School, referred to what he called the business of a university and thefour essential freedoms in the following language: "It is the business of a university to provide

    that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is anatmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university

    todetermine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be

    taught, and who may be admitted to study."

    15 Thus is reinforced the conclusion reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this case.4. It is

    not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeable in the field, to whom

    cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the need to respect freedom of thought on the part of

    students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount to minimizing the full respect that must be

    accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by the Constitution "to institutions of higherlearning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and

    universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to

    admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly

    higher, category.5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the persistence of

    petitioner to continue her studies in the Loyola School of Theology is the result solely of a legalappraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to be construed as in any way reflecting

    on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent due

    acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter of Father

    Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well as of the other

    students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was nothing

    arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. It could be that on more maturereflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other institution would redound

    to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the

    controversy was touched upon in this decision. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack

    of merit

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    Republic of the Philippines

    SUPREME COURTManila

    FIRST DIVISION

    G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988

    UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE, respondents.

    J.P. Garcia & Associates for petitioners.

    Florido & Associates for private respondent.

    GANCAYCO, J.:

    The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not mandamus is the properremedy to compel a university to confer a degree with honors. The secondary questionis whether or not the refusal of that university to confer honors would constitute bad faithso as to make it liable for damages.

    Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages againstpetitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No.R22022 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Cebu, asking that petitioners becompelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in

    Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her allnecessary credentials evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moraldamages in the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount ofP50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

    After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision dated January 29, 1986, 1 the

    dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

    WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, andaccordingly, defendants University of San Carlos and Dean Victoria A.Satorre are ordered to confer upon plaintiff, Jennifer C. Lee, the degree ofBachelor of Science in Commerce, major in accounting, with cum laudehonors (sic), retroactive to March 28, 1982, and to execute and deliver toplaintiff all the necessary school credentials evidencing her graduationwith such honors; and said defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff jointly

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    and severally the sum of P75,000 as moral damages, the sum of P20,000as exemplary damages, with interest thereon at 12% per annum beginningJuly 22, 1982, until said amounts are fully paid: and the sum of P15,000

    as attorney's fees. The counterclaim is ordered dismissed. Costs againstdefendants. 2

    Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals where the case was docketedas CA-G.R. No. SP-09368. In a decision dated May 28, 1987, the appellate courtaffirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 3

    The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a Resolution of theappellate court dated July 7, 1987. 4

    Hence, this petition where petitioners allege as grounds thereof-

    (a) A university may not be compelled by mandamus to grant graduationhonors to any student who, according to the university's standards, rulesand regulations, does not qualify for such honors; and

    (b) The decision penalizing petitioners to pay excessive moral andexemplary damages and attorney's fees is not justified by the facts andcircumstances of this case and disregards the many decisions of thisHonorable Court setting reasonable standards and limits in the award ofsuch damages. (P. 2, petition; p. 12, rollo)

    Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos(USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the secondsemester of that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.

    The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of theUSC. Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture studentwere then carried over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, sheobtained good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in theCollege of Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in theevaluation of her overall academic performance to determine if she could graduate withhonors.

    So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote 5 the Council of Deans of the USC, requestingthat her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in thecomputation of her grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry ofEducation, Culture and Sports MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 6 and this letterwas referred to the President of the USC for comment and return to the MECS.

    In the 3rd Indorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed theMECS that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any

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    course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy wouldmean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduatewith honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or

    removed because her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had twofailures and one incomplete grade which became a failure upon her inaction to attend tothe incomplete grade within one year; and that while her three failures did not affect hergraduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her disqualificationfrom graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said indorsement but she didnot ask for a reconsideration.

    On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wroteto the USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar7 referred her letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved ina 4th indorsement of March 22, 1982. 8 Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was

    changed to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122and Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn).

    On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Divisiondiscovered that the change of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did nothave the supporting class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortizrequesting the submission of the class record. 9

    On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondentgraduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting,without honors.

    On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel, demanded from DeanVictoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to graduate, cum laude. 10 Dean Satorreexplained that the matter was held in abeyance pending compliance with certainrequirements of the MECS through the memo of Mr. Bacalso. 11

    On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class records,reported he could not produce the same. 12 Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wroteto the MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change ofgrades of private respondent. 13 The request was denied as there was no positive proofof fraud. 14

    It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion toformulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. Thisis part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within thecompetence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant ofhonors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may notbe disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse ofdiscretion in its exercise.

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    In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all otherinterested parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment andacademic achievements. Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not

    officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the writtenpermission of his parents or guardian. 15 For an incomplete grade, there must be anapplication for completion or removal within the period announced by the schoolcalendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically becomes final. 16 A"DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a studentfrom receiving honors. 17 A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18units per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure inany subject disqualifies a student from honors. 18 Good moral character and exemplaryconduct are as important criteria for honors as academic achievements. 19

    Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and

    is bound to comply therewith.

    It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all efforts to have herfinal grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be disregarded in thecomputation of honors. When her request was denied by the university, she did not askfor a reconsideration thereof. Instead, in the middle part of March 1982 when the USCPresident was out of town, she wrote another letter to the USC registrar asking herfailing grades be changed as above related. The matter was referred to the MECS andthe request was approved on March 22,1982.

    However, when it was discovered thereafter that the change of private respondent'sgrades from "IC" TO "1.9" was not supported by the corresponding class records and its

    production was required the same could not be produced. There is thus no justificationfor said change of grade. Moreover, the request for the change of the grade ofincomplete was not made by private respondent within one (1) year so that it becamefinal according to the rules.

    By the same token, the change of the grades of private respondent from "5" to "W"(Withdrawn) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 was without the writtenpermission of her parents or guardian. Indeed, it is unusual that a stu