Are apposition markers discourse markers?

J. Linguistics 32 (1996), 325-347. Copyright © 1996 Cambridge University Press

Are apposition markers discourse markers?1

DIANE BLAKEMORE

University of Southampton

(Received 3 October 1995; revised 15 January 1996)

This paper aims to re-assess the notion DISCOURSE MARKER as it is applied to a subsetof so-called apposition markers. It is argued that the classification of markers ofreformulation as discourse markers alongside expressions like but and so is incoherentfrom a semantic point of view, since this ignores the distinction between PROCEDURALand CONCEPTUAL meaning. Moreover, this classification is based on an account ofdiscourse which is not only based on an insufficiently general account of context, butwhich is also difficult to maintain in the light of the use of these expressions inparenthetical nominal appositions. An alternative account is developed in theframework of Sperber & Wilson's Relevance Theory building on recent work on themeaning of parentheticals and sentence adverbials.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

In this paper I shall be concerned with a group of expressions which havebeen classified by some writers as apposition markers - in other words, thatis, that is to say, in short (see, for example, Burton-Roberts 1975,1994; Quirket al. 1985; Meyer 1992). These expressions also appear on many lists ofdiscourse markers (for example, Fraser 1990, Knott & Dale 1994),2 aclassification which would seem to be consistent with Burton-Roberts' (1994)argument that loose apposition is a discourse or performance phenomenon.However, in the absence of a theory of discourse which can provide acoherent definition of a discourse marker, this is no more enlightening thantheir classification in terms of the equally poorly understood notion ofapposition.3

The aim of this paper is to ask whether the notion of a discourse markercan shed any light on the analysis of these expressions in an explanatorytheory of utterance interpretation. The discussion will focus on two claims

[1] I would like to thank the anonymous referees whose comments and advice have led to anumber of revisions and reformulations. However, I have not always followed their adviceand take full responsibility for the final version.

[2] Although Halliday & Hasan (1976) do not use the term discourse marker, their notion ofa cohesive device plays a prominent role in accounts of discourse markers. Their list ofcohesive devices includes many of the expressions that have been classified as appositionmarkers, for example: that is, in other words, at least, in short and for instance.

[3] See Quirk et al. (1985) and Meyer (1992) for a traditional account of apposition. Burton-Roberts (1994) argues for a pragmatic approach.

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which are often made about discourse markers: first, that they are non-truth-conditional (see Jucker 1993, Fraser 1990); and, second, that they encode arelationship between the utterance that contains them and the preceding textor discourse (see Halliday & Hasan 1976, Fraser 1990, Knott & Dale 1994,Hovy & Maier forthcoming).

Fraser's (1990) list of discourse markers, which includes the so-calledapposition markers, is intended as a list of expressions which signal 'asequential relationship between the current basic message and the previousmessage' and which have no effect on the 'content meaning of the sentence'(Fraser 1995). If to say that an expression does not contribute to 'contentmeaning' is to say that it does not contribute to the truth conditions of theutterance that contains it, then Fraser is right to include expressions like thatis and in other words among his list of discourse markers along with suchexpressions as but or so or after all. For none of these expressions contributeto the truth conditions of the utterances that contain them. However, as Ishall show in the following section, not all expressions which encode non-truth conditional meaning play the same kind of role in the interpretation ofthe utterances that contain them. I shall argue that to include reformulationmarkers alongside expressions like but, so and after all is to ignore thedistinction between CONCEPTUAL meaning and PROCEDURAL meaning, whichas Wilson and Sperber (1993) have shown, is fundamental to a theory oflinguistic meaning in an overall account of utterance interpretation. In otherwords, the notion of discourse marker suggested by this list is incoherentfrom the point of view of the theory of linguistic semantics suggested bySperber & Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory.

However, the classification of expressions like that is and in other words asdiscourse markers also raises questions about their definition in terms oftheir role in discourse. The definition of a discourse marker as an expressionwhich signals discourse connections is based on the view that the productionand interpretation of discourse depends on the connections (or COHERENCERELATIONS) that hold between its segments (see, for example, Hobbs, 1979,1983; Sanders et al. 1993; Knott & Dale 1994). Indeed, some writers (forexample, Sanders et al. 1993; Knott & Dale 1994) argue that suchexpressions are evidence for the psychological reality of coherence relations.

The assumption underlying this approach is that the identification ofcoherence relations is essential both for the production and interpretation oftexts. For example, according to this view, if hearers find it difficult tounderstand the sequence in (1), it is because they do not have the contextualassumptions required for identifying the coherence relations between thesegments.

(1) I haven't had any coffee. It's Tuesday.

According to this view, the role of the context is to enable the hearer toestablish that discourse segments are connected by one of a principled set of

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coherence relations. However, as Blass (1990) has pointed out, everydaydiscourse is full of utterances which cannot be understood in isolation fromthe context, but which could not be said to be part of a coherent text. Forexample, a non-car owner unfamiliar with the business of buying petrolwould find the following utterance found on notices outside some petrolstations mystifying:

(2) Not 24 hours.

It is not clear why the psychological processes involved in using contextualassumptions in the interpretation of (2) and the principles governing thoseprocesses should be different from the ones involved in the interpretation ofutterances which are part of a text.

Moreover, even utterances which are part of an incoherent discoursesequence cannot be interpreted independently of contextual assumptions.For example, B's response in (3) has both a coherent interpretation, in whichit reports what Mike said, and an incoherent interpretation in which itdescribes what B has just seen.

(3) A: What did Mike say?B: Look, that women is wearing a coat just like yours.

Neither interpretation can be recovered independently of the context. Thequestion for the hearer in either case is which context the speaker intendedthe utterance to be interpreted in.

The answer provided by the relevance theoretic framework of this paper isthat the hearer will interpret the utterance in the context which yields anOPTIMALLY RELEVANT interpretation that the speaker could have manifestlyforeseen. Even if we assume that the sight of the identical coat is no morerelevant to A than the answer to her question about what Mike said, it maybe conducive to greater overall relevance in the long run to pay attention tothe information about the coat since, in contrast with the information aboutwhat Mike said, this information may only be relevant for a moment. (Thewoman wearing the coat may disappear from sight.) Alternatively, theincoherent interpretation may be relevant in a context which included theassumption that B is reluctant to let A know what Mike said. In either case,B's utterance is processed for relevance in a context which is distinct from theone in which A's is interpreted. There are no contextual assumptions used inthe interpretation of A's utterance that are used in the interpretation of B's,and the contextual assumptions used in establishing the relevance of B'sutterance do not include the content of A's utterance or any contextualeffects derived from it.

The suggestion is that if a discourse is coherent, it is because there iscontinuity of context in the sense that assumptions made accessible by theinterpretation of one segment are used in establishing the relevance of thenext (see Blakemore 1988; Blass (1990: 78)). Since the interpretation of

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information which has just been processed provides a highly accessiblecontext for the interpretation of an utterance, coherence can be regarded asthe hearer's search for optimal relevance. The fundamental question for thehearer of every utterance, whether or not it is part of a text, how it achievesrelevance.

In this paper I shall argue that this relevance based approach provides amore explanatory account of the role that reformulation markers play indiscourse than is provided by their analysis in terms of coherence relations.In particular, it seems that in contrast with the coherence based account, arelevance theoretic account not only provides an explanation of the role thatthese expressions play in discourse sequences such as (4H5). but is also ableto account for their role in constructions which cannot be straightforwardlyaccommodated in a framework which assumes that discourse markersencode sequential coherence relations.

(4) (a) The answer given in the previous lecture was that the hearer willinterpret the utterance in the context which yields an interpretationwhich is consistent with the Principle of Relevance, (b) That is, shewill interpret it in the context which yields an .optimally relevantinterpretation that the speaker could have manifestly foreseen.

(5) (a) The patient is still alive; the surgeons have retired while anxiousrelatives hover at the bedside, (b) In other words, the pound hassurvived another day without intervention.

(Brian Redhead, Radio 4 News)

It is not difficult to see how in (4H5) that is and in other words might besaid to signal ' sequential relationships' between one segment of discourseand the preceding text. In both cases the speaker could be said to besignalling that (b) is a reformulation or restatement of the preceding text.4

However, it is not clear whether the notion of a discourse marker whichsignals sequential relations between two segments of text applies to exampleslike (6)-(7) where that is and in other words seem to mark not a sequentialconnection between an utterance and the preceding text, but rather aconnection between what Espinal (1991) called a parenthetical 'disjunct'constituent and its host utterance.

[4] What I am calling 'discourse sequence' uses of that is, etc. are not restricted to sequencesof full sentences. There are phrasal appositions containing these expressions which can beinterpreted in exactly the same way as the sequences in (i)-(3)- F° r example, (ii) will beinterpreted in the same way as the expanded version in (i):

(i) They completely clammed up. That is, they refused to speak,(ii) They completely clammed up, that is, refused to speak.

(examples adapted from Burton-Roberts 1994)

The VP in (ii) will be interpreted like any elliptical utterance, and it is not difficult toimagine a context in which the sequence can be interpreted as expressing two propositions,the second of which achieves relevance as a reformulation of the first.

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(6) The Republicans, that is, the third party in the centre-left coalition,disagreed with the legislation.

(Based on an example from Meyer (1992: 78))(7) This aspect of interpretation depends on the pragmatic, in other

words, non-linguistic, properties of the utterance.

At first sight, it might seem that the appositions in (6)-(7) are condensedforms of full discourse sequences. According to one of the frequently citedgrammatical criteria for apposition, the elements in apposition should becapable of having the same syntactic function with respect to the same otherelements in the sentence. Burton-Roberts (1994: 185) claims that thiscriterion guarantees that any sentence containing an apposition of sentenceconstituents can be expanded into an apposition of full sentences without'change of meaning'.

For example, according to this criterion, the NP apposition in (6) can beexpanded without change of meaning into the full sequential apposition in(8).

(8) (a) The Republicans disagreed with the legislation, (b) That is,the third party in the centre-left coalition, disagreed with thelegislation. (Based on an example from Meyer (1972: 78))

From a purely logical point of view, if the Republicans disagreed with thelegislation, and if the Republicans are the third party in the centre-leftcoalition, then it is true that the third party in the centre-left coalitiondisagreed with the legislation. In this sense, (6) and (8) might be taken to havethe same meaning.

However, the fact that a proposition is logically implied by an utterancedoes not necessarily mean that the speaker intended the hearer to believe thatit is relevant. For example, it is not difficult to think of contexts in which thespeaker of (9a) would not have intended the hearer to believe that (9b) or (9c)are relevant.

(9) (a) Mike is a vindictive man.(b) Mike is a man.(c) Someone is a man.

Similarly, although the proposition in (10) might be logically implied by (6),the speaker will not necessarily be understood as having intended the hearerto believe that it is relevant.

(10) The third party in the centre-left coalition disagreed with thelegislation.

The speaker will only be understood to be communicating the relevance ofthe propositions in (11) and (12).

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(n) The Republicans disagreed with the legislation.(12) The term the Republicans is coreferential with the term the third

party in the centre-left coalition.

This leaves us with the task of explaining just what the relevance of (12) is.And, indeed, this will be the main aim of Section 5 of this paper. The mainpoint here is that if the speaker of (6) is not actually communicating therelevance of the proposition in (10), then the acceptability of the utterancedoes not depend on the hearer's ability to access a context in which (10) hasrelevance over and above that of the proposition in (11).

In contrast, the speaker of (8) WILL be understood as having intended tocommunicate that the proposition in (10) has relevance over and above thatof the proposition in (11). More specifically, she will be understood to haveintended this proposition as a reformulation of the one in (11).

(8) The Republicans disagreed with the legislation. That is, the thirdparty in the centre-left coalition disagreed with the legislation.

This suggests that the hearer will find (8) acceptable only to the extent thathe can access a context in which (10) has relevance over and above thatachieved by (11).

Consider, for example, a context which included the assumptions that thesmaller parties in this particular coalition usually agree with legislationproposed by the opposition and that the legislation mentioned has beenproposed by the opposition. In an unplanned discourse the point of thereformulation may have been to ensure that the hearer understood theintended relevance of the original formulation. In a planned discourse theintention behind the reformulation could be to emphasize the significance ofthe fact that it was a minor party who disagreed with the opposition.6

This asymmetry between discourse sequences and parenthetical nominalappositions is not restricted to reformulations or restatements. As (13) and(14) show,/or example can be used in both discourse sequences and parenthe-tical nominal appositions. However, it seems that there is an interpretationavailable for sequences like (13) which is excluded in utterances like (14).

(13) Some of the students didn't want to know their marks. For example,Anne didn't and neither did Mike.

(14) Some of the students, for example, Anne and Mike, didn't want toknow their marks.

As Carston (1993) points out, exemplification is a very common way ofproviding evidence for a claim. Her example, taken from Bar-Lev & Palacas(1980), is given in (15).

[5] For further discussion of this kind of effect, see Blakemore (1993: 113-119).

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(15) Wars are breaking out all over: Champaign and Urbana have begunhaving border skirmishes.

Here the speaker is communicating the relevance of the proposition thatChampaign and Urbana have begun having border skirmishes, and therelevance will be understood to lie in the fact that the truth of thisproposition provides evidence in support of the proposition that wars arebreaking out all over. Similarly, the speaker of (13) might be understood tobe communicating the proposition in (16) which is relevant as evidence forthe proposition in (17).

(16) Anne and Mike did not want to know their marks.(17) Some of the students did not want to know their marks.

However, this interpretation is not available for (14). Instead the speaker willbe understood to be communicating the proposition that Anne and Mike areexamples of the set of students who did not want to know their marks for thepurpose of illustrating or elucidating what she means by (17).

This raises the question of what exactly it means for an utterance toprovide an illustration of what someone means. However, this would take usbeyond the scope of the present paper which is specifically concerned withreformulation markers. My aim in the following sections is to show how boththe discourse sequence and nominal apposition uses of that is and in otherwords can be analysed along the lines suggested by Wilson & Sperber's (1993)analysis of sentential adverbs and Ifantidou's (1993a) analysis of paren-theticals. I shall argue that while this analysis can account for thediscrepancy between the two uses of these expressions, it also allows us toidentify precisely what they have in common. The classification of forexample as an apposition marker might be taken to suggest that its analysisparallels that of the reformulation markers. And, indeed, it seems that thereis evidence that Wilson & Sperber's notion of conceptual non-truthconditional meaning applies equally to for example and the reformulationmarkers. However, the question of how far my analysis of reformulationmarkers extends to for example depends on a closer investigation of therelationship between examples and what they exemplify, and this must be leftfor another paper.6

2. TYPES OF LINGUISTIC MEANING

Fraser (1990) and Jucker (1993) cite my earlier work on the meanings ofexpressions like so, after all and but as an example of a relevance theoreticanalysis of discourse markers. Indeed, I did claim that my analysis would

[6] See Blakemore (1996) for further discussion of exemplification.

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shed light on the sense in which these expressions could be viewed asdiscourse connectives (Blakemore 1987: 105). However, the originalmotivation for this work was the need for an analysis which couldaccommodate counter-examples to classical truth-conditional theories ofmeaning. According to this analysis, so, after all and but are amongst a classof expressions which do not contribute to the propositional content (or truthconditions) of the utterances that contain them, but rather encode constraintson the derivation of implicatures derived from that utterance.

This analysis is based on Sperber & Wilson's (1986) relevance theory,which claims that the interpretation of any utterance, whether it occurs aspart of a discourse sequence or not, is constrained by the assumption that itis consistent with the Principle of Relevance. This principle entitles the hearerof an utterance to assume (a) that it yields adequate contextual effects; and(b) that no gratuitous processing effort is required for the derivation of thoseeffects. In other words, it entitles the hearer to assume that an utterancecomes with a guarantee of its own OPTIMAL RELEVANCE.7

Now, what is optimally relevant to a hearer depends on the contextualassumptions that are accessible to her. Thus, to take an example borrowedfrom Blass (1990), most Western hearers would find the sequence in (18)unintelligible because the interpretation of the first segment would not givethem access to the contextual assumptions required for the interpretation ofthe second.

(18) The river had been dry for a long time. Everyone attended thefuneral.

In contrast, a speaker of Sissala (a Niger-Congo language) would have accessto the contextual assumptions in (19) and would be able to establish therelevance of the second segment.

(19) (a) When a river dries up a river spirit has died,(b) Whenever a spirit dies there is a funeral.

However, it cannot be assumed that the accessibility of a particular contextguarantees a particular interpretation. For example, the assumption that theproposition expressed by the first segment of (20) is a part of the context forthe interpretation of the second is consistent with either the interpretation inwhich (b) is relevant as evidence for the proposition that Tom can open Bill'ssafe or with the interpretation in which (b) is relevant as an implication of theproposition that Tom can open Bill's safe.

(20) (a) Tom can open Bill's safe,(b) He knows the combination

[7] For a more comprehensive introduction to Relevance Theory see Sperber & Wilson (1987),Wilson (1995), Blakemore (1992, 1995) and of course Sperber & Wilson (1986).

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In the first case (20b) is relevant in virtue of the fact that it expresses aproposition which is a premise in an inference which has the propositionexpressed by (20a) as a conclusion. In the second case its relevance lies in thefact that it expresses a proposition which is a conclusion in an inferencewhich has the proposition expressed by (20a) as a premise.

This would suggest that an expression which guided the hearer towardseither of these interpretations is a constraint on the role that the propositionit introduces plays in the inferences performed in the course of establishingits relevance. Thus the role of 50 in (21b) is not to contribute to theproposition expressed by the utterance it prefaces, but to constrain theinferential computations that proposition enters into so that it is understoodto be relevant as a contextual implication of (21a).

(21) (a) Tom can open Bill's safe.(b) So he knows the combination.

And the role of after all in (22b) is not to contribute the propositionexpressed by the utterance it prefaces, but to instruct the hearer to interpretthat proposition as a premise.

(22) (a) Tom can open Bill's safe.(b) After all, he knows the combination.

In other words, the suggestion is that linguistic meaning does not justencode constituents of propositional representations, or in other words,concepts, but also may encode a procedure for manipulating propositionalinterpretations in inferential computations. This distinction between con-ceptual and procedural meaning is justified in a cognitive theory of utteranceinterpretation in which understanding utterances involves the constructionof mental representations which undergo inferential computations. However,the notion of procedural meaning does not, as my earlier work suggests,provide an account of non-truth-conditional meaning. For more recent workhas shown that the distinction between conceptual and procedural meaningis not co-extensive with the distinction between truth conditional and non-truth conditional meaning. In particular, Wilson & Sperber (1993) haveshown that there is a range of expressions which although they do notcontribute to the truth conditions of the utterances which contain them,nevertheless encode conceptual meaning. For example, they have argued thatalthough sentence adverbials like frankly or unfortunately do not contributeto the truth conditions of the utterance they introduce, they neverthelessmust be analysed as encoding constituents of a conceptual representation.

It seems that Wilson & Sperber's arguments for a conceptual analysis ofsentential adverbs apply equally to that is and in other words in theirdiscourse sequence use. In the first place, it seems that in contrast with aspeaker who uses so or after all, a speaker who uses these expressions can becharged with untruthfulness. Consider the dialogues in (23) and (24):

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(23) (a) Seriously, what a gorgeous tie.(b) That's not true. You're never serious.

(Wilson & Sperber 1992: 18)

(24) (a) She said she no longer requires your services.(b) In other words, she said I'm fired.(c) That's not true. She didn't say that.

Second, a procedural account of these expressions would be difficult toreconcile with their compositionality. Not only are expressions like in otherwords or that is to say semantically complex, but also they are productive.There are variants such as to put it in other words or putting it more elegantlyor to put it more concisely.

Third, in contrast with so and after all, these expressions have synonymouscounterparts which clearly must be analysed as encoding concepts whichcontribute to the truth conditions of the utterances that contain them.Consider (25) and (26), for example.

(25) He asked me to put it in other words.(26) That is the same as saying I'm fired.

Following Wilson & Sperber's (1993) argument for illocutionary adverbials,the simplest hypothesis would be that the apposition markers and their truth-conditional counterparts encode the same concepts. The only difference isthat in their apposition marker use, these expressions encode concepts whichdo not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances which theyintroduce.

Wilson & Sperber's (1993) analysis of sentential adverbs is based on theirnotion of explicit content or EXPLICATURE. For them, an explicature of anutterance is not to be identified with its linguistic meaning or semanticrepresentation. As they have shown, the linguistic meaning of an utteranceunderdetermines the proposition it expresses.8 On the other hand, theexplicatures of an utterance are directly dependent on its linguistic meaningin a way that the implicit content is not. Consider, (27b) as a response to thequestion in (27a):

(27) (a) Did you get invited to the conference?(b) They said my paper was too long.

The assumption in (28) is an explicature obtained by fleshing out or enrichinga linguistically encoded semantic representation on the basis of contextualassumptions and the presumption that the utterance is optimally relevant. Incontrast, the assumption in (29) is an implicature inferred from the fleshed-out semantic representation - that is, from (28) - on the basis of the contextand the presumption that the utterance is optimally relevant.

[8] See also Carston (1988).

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(28) The conference organisers said the article submitted by the speakerwas too long for the conference.

(29) The speaker did not get invited to the conference.

The explicature in (28) is, of course, the truth conditional content of theutterance in (27b), or, in other words, the proposition expressed by (27b).However, Sperber & Wilson's notion of explicature cannot be identified withthe notion of truth conditional content. For they argue that the process ofenriching the semantic representation of an utterance is not confined to therecovery of the proposition expressed but also involves using contextualassumptions in 'accordance with the assumption that the utterance isconsistent with the Principle of Relevance to obtain HIGHER-LEVEL expl-icatures in which the proposition expressed is embedded under a higher-levelillocutionary or attitudinal predicate. For example, the speaker of (27b)might have intended to communicate the higher-level descriptions in (30).

(30) (a) The speaker of (27b) is telling the hearer that the conferenceorganizers said that her paper was too long for the conference,

(b) The speaker of (27b) regrets that the conference organizers saidthat her paper was too long for the conference.

Although these higher-level descriptions are obtained by enriching thesemantic representation of (27b), they are not part of the truth conditions forthat utterance. The truth of (27b) would be understood to hinge on whetheror not the conference organizers said that the paper was too long, and noton whether the speaker regrets that this is the case. This means that thelinguistic form of an utterance not only contributes to the propositionexpressed - that is, its truth conditions - but also to explicatures which,although they may be true or false in their own right, make no contributionto truth conditions. For instance, although the adverbial regrettably in (31)does not contribute to the proposition expressed - that is, (28), it doescontribute to a proposition that is explicitly communicated - that is, (30b).

(31) Regrettably, they said my paper was too long.

If Wilson & Sperber's arguments for their analysis of sentence adverbialsapply to that is and in other words, then they should not be classified withexpressions like so, but and after all. In the first place, sentence adverbialsencode constituents of conceptual representations whereas but, so and afterall encode procedures or constraints on interpretation. In the second place,sentence adverbs like frankly contribute to the EXPLICIT side of com-munication - that is, to explicatures - whereas the expressions I analysed assemantic constraints on relevance contribute to the IMPLICIT aspect ofcommunication - that is, to implicatures. We have seen that Wilson &Sperber's arguments for the conceptual status of sentence adverbials alsoapply to reformulation markers. The question now is whether reformulation

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markers can be analysed as contributing to the explicit aspect of theinterpretation of the utterances that contain them, and if so, what thiscontribution is.

3. PARENTHETICAL COMMENTS

According to Wilson & Sperber's analysis, sentential adverbs like regrettablycontribute to propositions with their own truth conditions - even thoughthey do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances that containthem. In her recent analyses of parentheticals and evidentials Ifantidou(1993a, 1994) has taken this analysis further and suggested that parentheticalconstituents such as the ones in (32) and (33) can be analysed as contributingto propositions which have their own relevance - even though they don'tnecessarily contain the main point of the utterance as a whole.

(32) His house is, I suppose, very old.(33) His house, apparently, is very old.

As Ifantidou (1993a, b, 1994) points out, the idea that parentheticalconstituents can be treated as separate discourse units with their own truthconditions and relevance is supported by recent work (Haegeman 1988, Fabb1990, Espinal 1991) which claims that parenthetical constructions aresyntactically independent of their host clauses. According to her analysis, aparenthetical constituent achieves relevance by commenting on the relevanceof the host utterance. For example, the utterance in (32) is analysed asinvolving the two discourse units in (34a, b), where (33b) achieved relevanceby commenting on a higher level explicature of (34a).

(34) (a) His house is very old.(b) The speaker supposes this.

As we have seen, the explicatures communicated by (34a) includepropositions obtained by embedding the propositional form of (34a) underan attitudinal predicate (for example, believe). Given this, the relevance of thespeech act in (34b) could be said to lie in the way it 'fine-tunes' thisexplicature so that the speaker communicates her degree of commitment.9 Inthis way, the parenthetical speech act contributes to the explicit aspect of theinterpretation of the speech act performed by the utterance to which it isattached.

This analysis is derived from Urmson's (i960) speech act theoretic analysisof parenthetical verbs. However, in the original speech act version of thisaccount the commenting speech act does not itself have truth conditions, butsimply 'indicates' how the speech act performed by the host clause is to beinterpreted. In Ifantidou's relevance theoretic version the parenthetical

[9] The term 'fine-tune' is due to Hand (1993).

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encodes a constituent of a conceptual representation with its own truthconditions, even if it does not contribute to the truth conditions of theutterance as a whole. In her 1993b paper, she speculates that the speech acttheorists' intuitions about the non-truth-conditional status of parentheticalscan be explained by the fact that the parenthetical discourse unit achievesrelevance in a different way from the host utterance: 'intuitions about thetruth conditions of the utterance as a whole will be intuitions about the sub-part of it which makes the major contribution to relevance' (1993b: 89).

4. REFORMULATION MARKERS IN DISCOURSE SEQUENCES

If we are to apply Ifantidou's analysis to utterances prefaced by expressionslike that is or in other words, then we need to be able to say, first, what speechact the use of such an expression performs, and, second, what contributionit makes to the overall relevance of the utterance.

Clearly, if the use of these expressions do involve a distinct discourse unitor speech act, then the propositional content of this discourse unit must beunderdetermined by its linguistic properties. From a linguistic point of view,the use of that is simply communicates the information that somethingreferred to by the demonstrative that is identical with something. The hearerhas to identify the referent of that and the complement of is on the basis ofthe context.

However, in this respect the speech act performed by that is is no differentfrom the utterance in (35).

(35) This is another way of putting it.

This utterance is unacceptable unless it is (a) followed by an utterance whichcan be interpreted as providing a referent for this and (b) preceded by anutterance which can be interpreted as a referent for it. Similarly, from alinguistic point of view, the use of in other words simply communicates theinformation that the utterance it prefaces provides 'other words' forsomething. The full interpretation of an utterance prefaced by in other wordsdepends on the identification of the words these are other words for.

This suggests that in contrast with so-called discourse markers like so andafter all which can be used in non-linguistic contexts, the use of that is or inother words is acceptable only in a linguistic or discourse context. Forexample, whereas (36) and (37) are acceptable in the non-linguistic contextsdescribed in brackets, it seems impossible to think of a non-linguistic contextin which (38) and (39) are acceptable.10

(36) [the speaker notices a blackbird singing outside]So spring is here.

[10] See Blakemore (forthcoming) for further discussion of this point.

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(37) [the speaker takes an extremely large slice of cake]After all, it is my birthday.

(38) In other words, I'm fired.(39) That is to say, he knows the combination.

According to this analysis, the use of that is performs a distinct speech actwhich communicates the proposition that whatever the host utterancecommunicates is communicated by the preceding utterance, while the use ofin other words performs a distinct speech act which communicates theproposition that the host utterance is an alternative means for com-municating what is communicated by the preceding utterance. This raises thequestion of what it means to say that one utterance communicates what iscommunicated by another utterance, or, in other words, what it is for oneutterance to be a reformulation or restatement of another. In the remainderof this section I shall show that the answer to these questions provides ananswer to the earlier question of how these expressions contribute to theexplicit content of the utterances that they introduce.

In my 1993 paper, I argued that reformulations are one example of the wayutterances may be relevant as representations of utterances which theyresemble, or more generally, one example of the way in which a phenomenoncan be used to represent another phenomenon which it resembles. As Sperber& Wilson (1986: 224-231) point out, all sorts of phenomena can be used asrepresentations in this way. Consider, for example, pictorial representationsand mimes. Of course, no two phenomena are exactly alike, and acommunicator expects the hearer to identify the respects in which theresemblance holds. For example, one utterance may represent another invirtue of resemblances in phonetic and phonological form, or resemblancesin lexical and syntactic form, or resemblances in logical properties. Consider,for example, (40).

(40) A: We will have to let her go.B: In other words/In short, she's fired.

Clearly, the reformulation is not identical with the original at the level oflinguistic form. Moreover, it is not intended to give rise to exactly the sameset of contextual implications as the more euphemistic original. However, itmay still be said to resemble the original in the sense that it shares some ofits logical and contextual implications with (40A). In such cases, where theresemblance involves the sharing of logical and contextual implications, theutterance can be said to be relevant as a representation of a thought, or, asSperber & Wilson would say, an INTERPRETATION of a thought.

Obviously, a speaker who produces an utterance which is relevant as arepresentation of another utterance cannot be taken to be creatingexpectations of truthfulness. She can only be taken to be creating expectationsof FAITHFULNESS. The degree of faithfulness attempted will vary from

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situation to situation, as with any other aspect of utterance interpretation, itwill be constrained by the criterion of consistency with the principle ofrelevance. Thus the optimally relevant representation of a thought is notalways the fully literal one. For example, while it would not be relevant fora lecturer to repeat her previous lecture word for word, it might be relevantto begin a class with a resume or summary of the contents of the previouslecture. In relevance theoretic terms, the summary would achieve the samecontextual effects but for very much less processing effort.

As Sperber & Wilson have shown, processing effort is a function of thecomplexity and length of the utterance being processed, together with the sizeand accessibility of the context that is required for its interpretation. Clearly,there is a variety of reasons why a hearer might want to be presented with asummary of an utterance or block of utterances, and, correspondingly, avariety of different sorts of summaries a speaker might provide. Here,however, we are specifically concerned with summaries which reformulate anutterance which has just been produced whether by a different speaker, as in(40) or the same speaker, as in (41).

(41) (a) At the beginning of this piece there is an example of ananacrusis.

(b) That is, it begins with a unaccented note which is not part of thefirst full bar.

The fact that the reformulation in (41) contains semantically equivalent butmore frequently encountered vocabulary means that it may achieve the samecontextual effects of the original but for less processing effort. The decisionto provide this reformulation may be based on the speaker's recognition thatin producing the original he had made a miscalculation of the hearer'sprocessing resources. On the other hand, the speaker may have producedboth the original and the reformulation in an attempt to communicateinformation about the term anacrusis.11

In this sort of case, where the reformulation is longer than the original,either that is or in other words is appropriate. However, the expression inshort in (40B) encodes the information that the utterance it prefaces is ashorter, more succinct means of achieving the same contextual effects as theoriginal. Some people may think that letting someone go is not quite thesame thing as firing them. However, B's point in producing the reformulationmay have been to communicate that from her point of view, there is nodifference, and hence that A's utterance was unnecessarily circuitous.

This analysis suggests that the speaker of an utterance which is relevant asan interpretation is not committed to the truth of its propositional form, or,in other words, that the speaker of the utterance is not actually

[11] For further discussion of this kind of example, see Blakemore (1993, 1994).

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communicating the proposition it expresses. And indeed, this would seem tobe the case in (40B): the speaker is not expressing her belief that she has beenfired, but only her belief that this is how A's utterance can be interpreted.

However, while this may be true in this kind of example, when the speakeris reformulating another speaker's utterance, it does not seem to reflect thespeaker's intentions in cases such as (8) (repeated below) or (41).

(8) (a) The Republicans disagreed with the legislation.(b) That is, the third party in the centre-left coalition disagreed with

the legislation.

For as I argued in Section 1, the speaker of (8) is committed to the truth ofthe proposition in (10).


It is not difficult to see that the fact that the speaker of the reformulation in(8) is committed to the truth of (10) is simply due to the fact that thisproposition is relevant as a reformulation of an utterance which DOEScommunicate her commitment to the propositions it expresses.

The question of whether an utterance is intended as interpretation is aquestion about its explicit content, or more particularly, what Wilson &Sperber (1993) call its higher-level explicatures. This means that a speakerwho produces an utterance which is relevant as an interpretation of thethought communicated by another utterance will be taken to be explicatinga proposition of the form in (42) rather than a proposition of the form in(43)-

(42) The speaker believes that P is a faithful representation of a thoughtQ-

(43) The speaker believes that P (where P is the propositional form of theutterance).

This suggests that if a reformulation or summary is an utterance which isrelevant as an interpretation of the thought communicated by the original,then an expression which communicates the proposition that the utterance towhich it is attached is relevant as a reformulation or summary can beanalysed as making a contribution to the explicit content of that utterance.More specifically, the use of a reformulation marker such as that is, in otherwords or in short can be analysed as a distinct discourse unit or speech actwhose relevance lies in the way it leads the hearer to recover a propositionof the form (42) as a higher level explicature of the host utterance. In thisway, the contribution of these expressions to the interpretation of theutterances they introduce must be distinguished from that of expressions likeso, but and after all, which as we have seen contribute to the implicit aspectof the interpretation of the utterances that contain them.

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5. REFORMULATION MARKERS IN NOMINAL APPOSITIONS

According to the argument in Section 1, the utterance in (6) will not beunderstood to be communicating the relevance of the proposition in (10) inaddition to the relevance of the one in (11).

(6) The Republicans, that is, the third party in the centre-left coalition,disagreed with the legislation.


(11) The Republicans disagreed with the legislation.

However, as we saw, this is not to say that (11) is the only propositionexplicitly communicated by (6). For it seems that the speaker of (6)communicates the proposition in (12).

(12) The term the Republicans is coreferential with the term the thirdparty in the centre-left coalition.

This proposition seems to be a development or enrichment of the semanticrepresentation of the parenthetical constituent of (6), that is, the third partyin the centre left coalition in the sense that it is derived by interpreting the thatas referring to the subject NP of the host clause. If it is a development of asemantic representation, then, according to Sperber & Wilson's (1986)definition it is part of the explicit content of the utterance, or in other words,an EXPLICATURE.

On the other hand, (12) is not part of the truth conditions for thatutterance. When (6) is embedded in a conditional utterance such as (44), theproposition in (12) does not fall under the scope of the conditional. Thespeaker of (44) will not be understood to be saying that the situation ishopeless if the NP the Republicans is co-referential with the NP the third partyin the centre-left coalition, but only that the situation is hopeless if theRepublicans disagreed with the legislation.

(44) If the Republicans, that is, the third party in the centre-left coalition,disagreed with the legislation, then the situation is hopeless.

We can reconcile the claim that the speaker of (6) is explicitlycommunicating the proposition in (12) with the claim that this propositionis not a condition on the truth of (6) if we adopt Ifantidou's relevancetheoretic version of the double-speech act analysis of parentheticals outlinedin the previous section. According to this account, the speaker of (6) isperforming two distinct speech acts, each with its own truth conditions andrelevance, and the intuition that (12) is not a condition on the truth of (3) isreally an intuition about the role that this proposition plays in the overallrelevance of the utterance.

Similarly, although the speaker of (45) will be understood to have

DIANE BLAKEMORE

communicated the proposition in (46), the fact that this proposition does notfall under the scope of the conditional in (47) suggests that it is not part ofthe truth conditions of (45).

(45) The speech act performed by an utterance, or in other words, itsillocutionary force, clearly depends on contextual factors.

(46) The words illocutionary force are other words for speech act.(47) If the speech act performed by an utterance, or in other words, its

illocutionary force, depends on contextual factors, this writer wouldhave to say that it is a pragmatic phenomenon.

On the other hand, the fact that this proposition is a development orenrichment of the parenthetical constituent of (45) means that in therelevance theoretic framework of this paper it is an EXPLICATURE of (45).Once again, we can reconcile these two claims if we analyse the parentheticalconstituent as performing a distinct speech act which explicitly communicatesa proposition with its own truth conditions and relevance.

This suggestion raises the same questions raised by the application of the' double speech act' analysis to reformulation markers in discourse sequences:(i) what is the speech act performed by the parenthetical; and (ii) what is therole of the parenthetical in the overall relevance of the utterance?

In the case of nominal appositions containing that is I have assumed thatthe proposition expressed by the speaker is one in which two referring termsare represented as being coreferential. That is, I have assumed that the speechact performed by the parenthetical in (6) has the propositional content in (12)rather than the propositional content in (48) where the copula is understoodpredicatively.

(12) The term the Republicans is coreferential with the term the thirdparty in the centre-left coalition.

(48) The Republicans have the property of being the third-party in thecentre-left coalition.

This would suggest that that is has what Burton-Roberts (1994: 184) hasdescribed as a meta-linguistic quality. While this meta-linguistic quality maybe self-evident in the case of an expression like in other words, it is lessobvious that the proposition expressed by the parenthetical in (6) is notabout the set of individuals referred to by the Republicans but rather aboutthe means of referring to them. However, it seems that is must be able toperform this meta-linguistic function if its use in parenthetical nominalappositions is to be appropriate.12

[12] Notice that instead of that is in examples like (41) the speaker might have used so-calledappositional or.

(i) I want you to meet Simon, or Sir Simon (as we must call him now).

As Burton-Roberts (1994: 186) points out, this use of or might be described as a specialmetalinguistic use of the standard disjunctive connective.

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Nominal appositions are not always introduced by an apposition marker.Indeed, it seems that there are cases in which the use of a marker such as thatis would be unacceptable. Consider, (49) uttered as an introduction:

(49) This is Simon, my friend from Oxford.

Since (49) is uttered as an introduction, it will be assumed that it is evidentto the hearer who is being introduced and that there is no need to provide analternative means of reference. This means that in this utterance, theparenthetical can only be understood predicatively. That is, the speaker willbe understood to be communicating the assumption in (50).

(50) Simon has the property of being my friend from Oxford.

In contrast, it seems that (51) could either be produced in contexts in whichthe parenthetical is interpreted predicatively or in contexts in which it isinterpreted as an alternative means of reference.

(51) Simon, my friend from Oxford, will be there.

If the speaker assumes that the hearer can identify the referent of Simon, thenthe parenthetical will be intended to be interpreted predicatively. However,if for some reason the speaker is unsure that the hearer cannot identify thecorrect referent of Simon - perhaps the hearer knows that the speaker isacquainted with more than one Simon, perhaps the hearer has met the friendfrom Oxford but has not been told his name - then the parenthetical will beinterpreted as providing an alternative means of reference. It is only in thislatter interpretation that the use of that is would have been acceptable.

However, according to the 'double-speech act' analysis outlined above,the speaker of an utterance is not just providing an alternative means ofreference, but is COMMUNICATING the relevance of the proposition that this isan alternative means of reference. To produce the utterance in (52) would beto communicate, and thus guarantee the relevance of, the proposition thatmy friend from Oxford is a reformulation of the referential expression Simon.

(52) Simon, that is my friend from Oxford, will be there.

This suggests an explanation for the fact that not all nominal appositionsintended as reformulations may be appropriately prefaced by that is. Forexample, radio listeners in Britain would probably expect to hear (53) ratherthan (54) in a news broadcast.

(53) The Government has published its new slim-line National Curr-iculum for schools. The Secretary of State for Education, GillianShephard, said on this programme that she hoped it would be the lastword on the subject. (Radio 4 News, 10 November 1994)

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(54) The Government has published its new slim-line National Cur-riculum for schools. The Secretary of State for Education, that is,Gillian Shephard, said on this programme that she hoped it would bethe last word on the subject.

There are a number of reasons why a speaker may provide more than onemeans of referring to an individual in a discourse. For example, although forsome listeners to BBC news broadcasts, the Secretary of State for Educationand Gillian Shephard provide equally good (or relevant) means of accessingthe intended referent, it may be considered disrespectful to use the namewithout the official title. For other listeners, the two referring expressionsmay not provide equally good means of accessing the intended referent, inwhich case both alternatives are given to ensure successful comprehension.This will of course allow the speaker to use either means of reference in thesubsequent discourse.

However, in none of these cases would the speaker be understood ashaving communicated that the proposition that the two expressions arereferentially equivalent is relevant. This is not to say that there are notcontexts in which (54) would be acceptable. For example, one possibleinterpretation that may be recovered from (54), but not from (53), is that thespeaker recognizes that the definite description does not uniquely determinea referent. There may be more than one Secretary of State for Eduction andthe speaker is communicating that she means THAT one rather than anyothers. Or (54) may have been produced just after a Cabinet re-shuffle andthe speaker may be taken to be communicating that she means the newSecretary of State for Education rather than the previous one. In each casethe proposition that Gillian Shephard is referentially equivalent to theSecretary of State for Education is being communicated as having its ownrelevance. And in each case this relevance seems to lie in the effect that it hason the interpretation of the original referring expression in the host clause.

In some cases, it seems, the relevance of a nominal apposition prefaced bythat is may lie in the attitude the speaker communicates towards the fact thatone means of reference is equivalent to another. For example, even in theintroduction scenario described earlier the speaker of (55) could beunderstood to be drawing attention to the referential equivalence of Simonand Sir Simon for the purpose of communicating his attitude towards the factthat Simon is entitled to be addressed as Sir Simon.

(55) I want you to meet Simon, that is, Sir Simon.

The proposition communicated by the parenthetical in (55) is not about theindividual Simon, but rather about the means of referring to him. Similarly,the proposition communicated by the parenthetical in (6) is not about the setof individuals referred to by the Republicans but rather about the means ofreferring to them. In other words, the proposition communicated by these

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parenthetical constituents is not about explicit content of the host clause assuch but about the REPRESENTATION of its explicit content. Nevertheless, it isclear that according to this analysis, the relevance of the parenthetical has todo with the explicit aspect of the interpretation of the host clause rather thanthe interpretation of its implicit content.

6. CONCLUSION

In the first section of this paper I distinguished two apparently different usesof reformulation markers. In what I called their 'discourse sequence' usesthey introduce utterances in connected discourse or text and, superficially,look more like expressions like after all, however and so. In their ' apposition'use they are part of a parenthetical constituent which is juxtaposed with aconstituent of the same type. However, I have argued that in both types ofuse these expressions contribute to a propositional representation with itsown truth conditions and relevance, or, in other words, that they encodeCONCEPTUAL meaning. In this respect they contrast with expressions like afterall, however and so which encode procedural meaning.

I have also argued that in both uses these expressions are constituents ofa proposition whose relevance lies in the contribution it makes to theinterpretation of the explicit content of the host utterance. In the discoursesequence use this is a contribution to the interpretation of the higher-levelexplicatures of the host utterance which identify the host utterance as aninterpretation of the preceding utterance. In the appositional use this is acontribution to the interpretation of the proposition expressed by the hostutterance in the sense that it aids the hearer in reference assignment.

The main objective in this paper was to ascertain whether the notion of adiscourse marker sheds any light on the role of these expressions in theutterances that contain them. In fact, the notion of a discourse marker hasplayed no role at all in my analysis of these expressions in either of their uses.According to one definition, the fact that these expressions do not contributeto the truth conditions of the utterances that contain them would qualifythem, as discourse markers, along with expressions like after all, but and so.However, this classification fails to capture the fact that the appositionmarkers encode conceptual rather than procedural meaning. More generally,the fact that the distinction between truth conditional and non-truthconditional meaning cross-cuts the distinction between conceptual andprocedural meaning means that the classification of ANY of these expressions(both procedural and conceptual) as discourse markers does not allow us todescribe their role in the interpretation of the utterances that contain them.

In many accounts the classification of an expression as a discourse markeris based on the assumption that speakers and hearers are constrained by therequirement that utterances which are part of discourse are related to eachother by coherence relations. However, according to my analysis, if these

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expressions contribute to the connectivity of discourse, it is a connectivitywhich derives from the way the use of these expressions achieve relevance.Thus in the discourse sequence use it derives specifically from the fact thatthese expressions are constituents of a proposition which communicates thatthe host utterance is relevant as an interpretation of another. In theapposition use it derives from the fact that they are constituents of aproposition which contributes to the identification of the propositionexpressed by the host utterance. In other words, the analysis of reformulationmarkers in both their discourse sequence uses and their apposition uses wasbased on the assumption that the interpretation of all utterances isconstrained by the search for relevance rather than the assumption thatutterances in a text are related by coherence relations.

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Are apposition markers discourse markers?