Applying Rapid Results Approach to Local Service Delivery

Local Governance & Development Journal Volume 2 Number 2, December 2008 24

Local Governance & Development Journal Volume 2 Number 2, December 2008: pages 24-39 Copyright ©Municipal Development Partnership for Eastern & Southern Africa Materials for this publication may be quoted or copied provided proper reference is made to its source. ISSN: 1995-4719 Applying Rapid Results Approach to Local Service Delivery: Emerging Issues, Lessons and Challenges from Nairobi City

Council

MARK OSICHE

ABSTRACT

Over the years, the Kenya Government has pursued wide-ranging public sector reforms to improve local service delivery, but little has been achieved due to lack of a wide-ranging decentralization policy and institutional framework. To precipitate the reform process, the Rapid Results Approach (RRA), commonly used to turn around the fortunes of private sector organizations, was recently introduced thorough out the public sector, including local authorities. This paper critically analyzes the efficacy of the Rapid Results Initiative methodology in local service delivery using Nairobi City Council as a prototype; highlighting the success stories, pitfalls and challenges. The analyses are based on the findings obtained using current literature on the subject matter, the author’s experience and anecdotal evidence from the council staff, councillors and other stakeholders. On the basis of the analysis, the paper draws the main conclusions and policy advice on what could be considered critical for further debate, highlighting issues that could be raised to improve the practice of RRI. It is hoped that the key messages presented here will help scholars and practitioners of reform to re-think envisaged replication of RRI to the rest of LAs. Key words: Rapid Results Approach/Initiatives; public sector and local governance reforms in Kenya. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND As a global phenomenon, the New Public Management (NPM) – “a cluster of contemporary management ideas, practices, techniques that seek, at their core, to use private sector and business approaches in the public sector’ (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003:p.12) - has increasingly had a beneficial impact on the management and delivery of some public services. As in other Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), public sector reforms in Kenya have evolved over time. Broadly speaking, there have been three major waves of reforms sweeping across the country, notably: i) restructuring the public service (mid-1980s – mid-1990s), iii) capacity building (late 1990s) and (iii) improved service delivery since 2000 (Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002: pp. 50-53). The later wave is germane for this study. In the last decade or so, the Government of Kenya (GoK) has by and large adopted a genre of broad sectoral public sector reforms as a part of the process of state redesign. Regrettably, these reforms have not been realized, having been torpedoed by the lack of clear and enabling policy, institutional and legal framework, resulting in piecemeal and expedient changes that have had little impact on service delivery. Consequently, Kenya continues to be highly centralized, despite lip service to quasi decentralization. Recent literature increasingly demonstrates that owing to the uncertainty surrounding the introduction of the requisite wide-ranging policy, institutional and legal reforms in the local government sub-sector, Kenya has since the mid-1990s initiated incremental reforms (Oyugi, 2005:pp. 1-6 and Steffensen et al, 2004: p.16). These foremost, have focused on improving the “softer” fiscal aspects of Local Authorities (LAs) without, to date, substantial institutional and policy streamlining.


The draft 2004 Constitution, if adopted as intended would have perhaps heralded the start of a comprehensive decentralization programme based on devolution. Yet, at the time of writing, the whole process had been discarded indefinitely after the Government-backed draft Constitution was crushingly rejected during the November, 2005 national referendum. In anticipation of resumption of the stalled constitutional review process, the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) has embarked on drafting various local government laws and amendments that seek to strengthen the capacity of LAs to deliver services to their citizens. Even so, these efforts have hit a snag and the draft Local Government (Amendment) Bill continued to gather dust after the dissolution of Parliament to pave way for the December, 2007 General Elections, ostensibly having been “overtaken by events because of constitutional requirement that the Government side must get a two-thirds majority” (Ogosia, 2007). This was not possible because of irreconcilable divisions in the ninth Parliament (2003 – 2007). To move forward, LAs have been incorporated into the ongoing introduction and rolling out of the innovative Results Based Management (RBM) approach to public sector transformation by the Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat, Cabinet Office, Office of the President under the motto “huduma bora ni haki yako” (good service is your right). It is largely funded by the World Bank’s “Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Technical Assistance Project (IRCB-TAP)” and to some extent the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). To fast-track the implementation of RBM and speed up the public sector-wide achievement of the desired results, the Rapid Results Approach (RRA), encompassing a series of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) has been introduced. By the time of writing, the approach had initially been piloted in 4 (i.e. Municipal Councils of Nyeri, Mombasa, and Kisumu and the City Council of Nairobi) out of the 175 LAs. The intention is to experiment with these pilots before developing a nation-wide replication strategy to ultimately put all LAs on RRI. On the one hand, proponents hypothesize that barring the long-awaited but elusive long-term policy and legal framework, RRI has been seen by the Government as an important tool to jump-start change process because of its potential impact can be very high, demonstrating that tangible results can be achieved speedily. For instance, it can improve service delivery while positively boosting LAs’ widely held reputation of being unresponsive, unaccountable, corrupt, bureaucratic, insular and lethargic in service delivery. Conversely, cynics assert that RRI as presently packaged is untenable and inappropriate “quick fix” in the context of Kenya’s local government system and contend that it is just too early to celebrate its effectiveness. What is clear is that both sides agree that RRI is a noble innovation in local government service delivery, but cannot agree on to what extent. Against this background and contentious standpoints, this article seeks to critically analyze the efficacy of the RRIs in local service delivery using Nairobi City Council as a prototype. The case study is based on the findings obtained using current literature on the subject matter, the author’s experience and anecdotal evidence from the council staff, councillors and other stakeholders. More specifically, this study seeks to thoroughly interrogate a number of fundamental research questions, viz: a) What are the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of RRI and how does it work in practice? b) Given the failure to implement comprehensive local government reforms, is RRI the best option in improving service delivery? c) Is RRI in sync with the realities of the current legal and policy framework? d) To what extent has RRI helped Nairobi City Council to jump-start major change efforts and enhance service delivery? e) What emerging lessons, challenges and opportunities can be discerned from the Nairobi City Council experience in implementing RRI prior to replication to other LAs? This paper is made of the above introduction and three parts: an overview of the underlying conceptual and theoretical foundations of the Rapid Results Approach by describing its salient attributes, content and dynamics; presentation of the complexity of the emerging issues, experience, lessons learned, “quick wins”, pressures and increasing challenges of RRI implementation in the case of Nairobi City Council under the


prevailing conditions. In so doing, a critical assessment is made on the reasons why certain aspects of RRI turned successful while others have got stuck or had consequences opposite to the intended objectives. Finally, there are the main conclusions and policy advice on what could be considered critical for further debate, highlighting issues that could be raised to improve the practice of RRI. It is hoped that the key messages presented here will help scholars and practitioners of reform to re-think envisaged replication of RRI to the rest of LAs.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RAPID RESULTS APPROACH This part highlights the broad conceptual and theoretical underpinnings for the introduction of RRI as a critical approach in public sector management. This is predicated upon the premise that in the lightning-fast business landscape of the 21st century, managers are expected to produce solid results, quickly. Put differently, in the business world, it's all about rapid results. Initially designed to turn around the fortunes of projects and activities in the private corporate world, RRI principles have been used to improve public sector performance. Most traditional change or reform efforts have miserably failed because they include a number of valuable elements such as training, new policies and procedures, new processes and structures, elaborate mission and vision statements, communication campaigns etc, which can be time and resource consuming. While these elements are important, they lack the urgency and excitement that comes from working on the achievement of short term compelling results. In the respected opinion of the pioneer gurus of RRA, “the key to creating widespread, lasting progress begins with achieving rapid results at the micro-level as you engineer small victories, your company will build a solid foundation for future, more global success” (Schaffer and Ashkenas, 2005: pp. 1-3). The gist of this publication is that twofold. One, that one of the best routes to large-scale innovation is, paradoxically, through short-term achievement projects. If organized properly, these rapid-change projects not only deliver bottom-line results quickly but also can develop in hundreds or thousands of people the essential capacity to carry out co-ordinated change. Two, the approach challenges leaders to liberate themselves from dependence on big-fix programs driven from the top-down orientation that often collapse for lack of implementation skills and know-how at grass-roots level. Since then, the approach has been applied extensively in partnership with the World Bank in a number of Bank-financed institutional development lending projects globally to fast-track implementation processes. Over the past few years, dozens of teams from African and other countries have been able to achieve remarkably unusual results in 100 days or less – results that were hitherto unthinkable at the outset of these efforts, and that have surprised government officials who commissioned these teams as well as observers from development partners (Matta, 2005:pp. 2-3). Examples include: Nicaragua – to improve production and sale of milk; Eritrea - HIV/AIDS, malaria, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis project; Sri Lanka – Anti-Retroviral (ARV) treatment program; Madagascar - accelerated cotton growing and production; Ethiopia – Public Sector Capacity Building Program and Kenya – various Government ministries and departments, including local authorities. Perhaps the case of Sierra Leone stands out as the only other country in Sub-Saharan Africa apart from Kenya, where the RRA methodology has been applied in local government in the recent past (World Bank, 2006). The ongoing World Bank-supported “Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCB)” support to local councils is an example of simultaneously tackling the dual agenda of short-term results delivery in post-conflict situation and medium-term capacity agenda to nascent governance institutions and to support the decentralization process, the councils were encouraged to adopt the RRA, which became an important driver in building a culture of performance, accountability and results. The initial efforts have also


unleashed implementation capacity within the newly-created local Councils that delivered measurable improvements in public services over a short period. The Councils implemented the RRIs prior to completing a participatory development planning process. The initial wave of initiatives built the confidence of the Council members in their own ability to deliver; established the credibility of the Councils with their constituencies; and forced accelerated implementation of enabling activities – such as opening a bank account and putting in place disbursement and accounting mechanisms. In the process of achieving their goals, simple yet effective monitoring systems were also developed. This helped publicize the stories of good governance, as well as recorded failures to create competitive pressures among local governments (see Box 1, Box 2 and Table 1).

BOX 1: FUNDAMENTALS OF RAPID RESULTS APPROACH Sources: The below summarized excerpts were obtained from Matta, N. et al, 2005, The Rapid Results Approach: A Briefing Note, July 10 and PRS&DS, Presentation on RRI, November 14 2006.

The “Rapid-Results Approach” (RRA) is a set of management tools, processes, and skills that help leaders in organizations use a series of short-term projects to translate long-term goals into concrete actions, quick results and impact. It is a results-focused learning process aimed at jump-starting major change efforts and enhancing implementation capacity. RRA tackles large-scale change efforts through a series of small-scale, results-producing and momentum-building initiatives. It allows knitting rapid-result initiatives together and combining them with other longer-term traditional activity-oriented investments to create a dynamically evolving implementation strategy.

The engine of the Approach is the “Rapid-Results Initiative” (RRI) – 100-day project designed to unleash the capacity and creativity of teams in pursuit of a strategically critical goal that delivers a real result, and that ties directly to strategic long-term plans. The premise of the Rapid-Results approach is to create a context for learning and for enhancing implementation capacity, through helping clients work on sharply-defined initiatives that deliver value to beneficiaries. These initiatives are structured in 100-day cycles from agreeing on goals to achieving results, with each goal directly connected to one or more of the overall objectives of the development effort. Each RRI becomes a vehicle for achievement, learning, and the advancement of long-term goals. Teams start by prioritizing the areas they want to impact, and develop capacity as they go – in the context of achieving 100-day results.

How RRI Works Starts by focusing on a few results Challenges teams to achieve 100-day results goals Creates temporary governance support structure Reinforces basic management skills Manages the scale-up beyond the first 100 days RRI achieves systemic change through a series of small-scale, results producing and momentum building initiatives

Why does RRI work? Unleashes existing creativity and capacity by helping the teams overcome natural inertia and resistance to change that makes

it difficult to obtain meaningful results. Unleashes and enhances implementation capacity Accelerates learning and discovery and reduces hidden risks inherent in long-term strategies Provides a structured methodology for building and practicing management disciplines that are required for successful

implementation Creates an efficient governing structure and helps leaders adapt and refine implementation strategies through strengthened

accountability at all levels Develops a comprehensive work Plan, that sets up the road map for the achievement of results Breaks down long-term intent and goals into 100-day Results Commitments Strengthens confidence to achieve results and builds support for change Strengthens Stakeholder participation and collaboration Stimulates innovation due to the urgency of the goal


Conditions for selecting RRA New government/administration facing political pressure to perform Government showing political commitment to reform Presence of reform champions within the government Entrepreneurial spirit: willingness to take some risk The leaders in each case are a diverse group with differing styles. One quality they all exhibit is a stubborn belief in the possibility, or even the inevitability, of succeeding in tackling big challenges by entrusting the people closest to, and mostly affected by, the issue to channel their existing knowledge and capacity to achieve results. These are individuals who step forward and take a risk in spite of the odds. In doing so, they inspire others to take a leap of faith as well – to contribute rather than staying on the sidelines – to own the problem and find the solution. The Approach emphasizes that implementation and “learning by doing” are integral parts of the policy development process and a means to assess the capacity for, and the political will to, undertaking larger policy reforms through the achievement of tangible results. Despite the tremendous investments and technical expertise provided in developing countries, implementing effective reform remains a very difficult task and simply looking for better policies may not be the answer.

TTaabbllee 11:: PPhhaasseess ooff RRaappiidd--RReessuullttss IInniittiiaattiivveess

Estimated Time Step Activities 1-2 Weeks Orientation Introduce RRA to strategic LA leaders

Ensure high-level buy-in and commitment to implementation 1-2 Weeks RRI

identification Clarify challenge, outline possible RRIs & align stakeholders Identify and mobilize RRI team

1-2 Days Launch Finalize goal of RRI Develop preliminary work plan

60 – 120 Days Implementation Support

Implement work plan, and adjust as needed Provide guidance and implementation support Review progress and disseminate learning

6 – 12 Months Sale-up Scale up successful RRIs Adjust portfolio of activities and rapid-results initiatives in the

strategic plan Source: Adapted by author from PSR&DS, RRI presentation for Nairobi City Council, November 14, 2006. BOX 2: RRI TEMPORARY GOVERNING STRUCTURE AND ROLES IN A LOCAL AUTHORITY Source: Adapted by author from PSR&DS, RRI PowerPoint presentation for Nairobi City Council, November 14, 2006. Political Leader – (Mayor) Broadcast RRI achievements within government and stakeholders Supports overall policy framework Sponsor – (Town Clerk/Clerk to Council) Helps team overcome extraordinary problem Mobilize Resources Communicate and advocate results within government & stakeholders Results Leader


Holds TL accountable for results Communicates overall challenges to the Sponsor Mobilize resources Monitor and evaluate progress Communicate RRI achievements Initiate Scale-up Pull the plug – ability to decide termination of RRI Team Leader (TL) • Day to day role • Coordinates support for the RRI • Communicates challenges to the Results Leader • SL and TL accountable for results Strategic Leader (SL) • Works with the team leader to recruit the RRI team • Scopes the initiative • Reviews and supports team progress • Leads thinking on expanding - passion • Ensures that lessons from the RRI advance the strategic plan • Source of inspiration • Not a daily management role Team Members • Develop comprehensive goals & work plans • Complete action steps thoroughly and on time • Communicate obstacles, successes & challenges to TL other team

EMERGING LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE AND CHALLENGES FROM NAIROBI CITY COUNCIL As elaborated in the foregoing discussion and study of the underpinning conceptual and theoretical framework of RRI, this part focuses on the specific early success stories, “quick wins”, lessons of experiences and challenges on the efficacy of implementation of RRI in Nairobi City Council. To jump-start its service delivery to residents, the Nairobi City Council embarked on a series RRIs. In December, 2005 the City Council under pressure to unlock the World Bank funded multi-million US dollar Kenya Municipal Program embraced RRI to enable it prepare Terms of Reference for the within a record 22 days. As a corollary to this, in November 2006, the Council received assistance from Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat, Cabinet Office’s “Results for Kenyans Program” towards its efforts to promote good governance, efficient and effective service delivery (Ogot, 2007:pp. 1-3). The Council scaled up RRIs to great effect to keep 14 service delivery areas on track and deliver visible results within 100 days of schedule. A one-day training workshop on Rapid Results Approach was held at City Hall, where the RRI teams in varied thematic areas were launched. During the launch, the RRI teams supported by RRI coaches selected and confirmed on the choice of focus area. These sessions gave the RRI teams opportunity to clarify what they had wanted to achieve in their various focus areas identified.


Most importantly, the teams through the guidance of their respective coaches developed their work plans clearly highlighting the RRI goal, milestones, action steps, time frames for completion of milestones, and person(s) responsible for accomplishing each milestone. Budgeting and development of team operational plans were also part of the launch sessions. After the 100 RRI days, the Council was able to post a number of achievements and rapid results (Nairobi City Council, 2007) on the basis upon which subsequent scale-ups have been undertaken. Table 2 is a summarized excerpt report of the key results achieved during the RRI reporting period.


Table 2: RRIs for Nairobi City Council DEPARTMENT THEMATIC AREA RRI GOAL RESULTS 1. Social services Improve customer satisfaction

through innovation and landscaping To improve the state of 48 houses in Pangani estate within 100 days

Improve customer satisfaction through external painting and preliminary beatification of 48 housing units in Pangani Estate within 100 days. Achievement: 85% ( 41 houses repainted and renovated)

2. Planning Processing a minimum of 100 development applications within 30 days from the day of submission

To increase the number of Building plans approved from 50 to 100 within 30 days in 100 days.

Increase the number of approved building plans from 450 – 600. Achievement: 96% ( 580 plans)

3. Environment Scale up improvement of

cleanliness in the city outside CBD Improvement of solid waste collection in Westlands division from 70% to 90% in 100 days.

Increase the level of Solid Waste Collection within Westlands Division (Kilimani Ward) from 7tons/week to 21 tons/week. Achievement 85% (18 tons).

4. Procurement Disposal of unserviceable equipment at CE’s mechanical workshop

To dispose all obsolete and unserviceable motor vehicles and increase revenue by 5 million from the baseline survey in 100 days.

To dispose off all identified obsolete motor vehicles so as to raise Kshs. 5 million. Achievement: 97%( Kshs 4.86 million raised)

5. Investigation and Information analysis

Reduce the number of corruption incidences in the City Council of Nairobi

To reduce corruption incidences in city mortuary by increasing revenue by 20% from the baseline in 100 days.

To reduce the Number of Corruption Incidences at City Mortuary by Increasing Revenue by 20% from the Baseline. Achievement: 157.2% total of Kshs.5,138,648.80

6. Housing & Development

Revenue enhancement To increase revenue collection by 25% in 100 days.

Increase revenue collection from 16 million to 20 million Achievement: The actual collection is 77.5% above shs.16 million baseline and 33.3% above the target of Kshs. 20 million

7. City Treasurer Revenue enhancement at car parks To increase revenue in car park by 28% from 43million to 53 million in 100 days in 100 days

Increase parking revenue from Kshs. 44 million to Kshs. 55 million. Achievement :51.5million

8. Town Clerk Increase the number of trees along Mombasa road

Increase the number of trees planted along Mombasa road from 2,000 to 3,000 in 100 days.

Tree planting and beautification was revised from 3000 to 5000. Achievement: 75% ( 4500 trees planted)

9. City Inspectorate Improve the management of matatu stages and traffic flow

To increase the number of properly manned & managed bus terminus / stages from 30 to 60 in

To increase the number of well managed routes from 30 to 60 and renovate/repair the bus termini/stages. Achievement: 78% (53 routes)


100 days.

10. Human Resource Improvement of staff rationalization Thematic area: improvement of staff policy: To reduce absenteeism within decentralization program by 10% in 100 days.

To reduce absenteeism in the Decentralization program by 30% (From 572 days to 400 days) Achievement: 96% ( reduced to 410 days)

11. Public Health Increase the number of fully immunized children under 1 year

Increase immunization of children under 5 years from 75% to 80% in 100 days

To increase the percentage of fully immunized children from 75% to 85%.(of eligible population of 102,992) Achievement: 103%

12. City Engineer Increase security lighting in selected shopping centers in the city

To improve security lighting levels from 10% to 80% in 5 shopping areas in Nairobi in 100 days.

Increase the level of security lighting within 5 shopping centres (Ruai, Buruburu, Pangani, Nairobi West & Dagoretti corner) in Nairobi from 10% to 80%. Achievement: 100% all 5 No. shopping centres well light.

13. Education Increase enrolment in primary schools in Nairobi

To increase enrolment in primary schools in Kamukunji division by 3,000 pupils from 17,000 to 20, 000 in 100 days. Should involve other stakeholders to obtain information on the enrolment levels.

Increase enrolment in Kamukunji Division schools by 3,000 pupils from 16,728 to 19,728 pupils. Achievement : 58% of target equivalent 1727 new admissions

14. Legal Affairs Prosecution of cases under the Physical Planning Act.

To increase successful prosecution of cases under the Physical Planning Act from the 61 number won in the months of September, October and November, 2006 to 100 in 100 days.

To increase successful prosecution of cases under the Physical Planning Act from the 61 number won in the months of September, October and November, 2006 to 100. Achievement: 91% ( 55 cases completed)

Sources: Nairobi City Council, 2007, End-Term Report: Achievements Registered by Departments of The City Council Of Nairobi Under The Rapid Result Initiative Aspect of The Result Based Management, October 31 and Ogot, C. A., 2007, Rapid Results Initiative: The Experience of The City Council Of Nairobi, May 15.


The matrix (Table 2) clearly illustrates that RRIs, if implemented properly have a very high potential of enhancing the Council’s service delivery. On this premise, it is critical at this juncture to take stock of all the factors while analyzing the efficacy of RRI. Initial success stories and “quick wins” On the one hand, the champions have asserted that RRI has by and large led to improved Council service delivery in many aspects, bequeathing a number of lessons upon which to build on for future scale-ups (Ogot, 2007 and Saulo and Ringa, 2007). First, RRI has by and large accelerated the implementation of the Council’s existing strategies, goals, annual work plans and performance contract targets. Concerted efforts have been made to ensure that all goals and strategies for the RRI are derived from the objectives outlined in the strategic plan and annual work plans. Second, RRI has enhanced the working camaraderie between council staff, civic leaders and stakeholders. The RRI team approach in solving problems contributed in producing tangible results which was highly satisfactory as expressed by team members in a transparent and accountable manner. One main lesson from the Nairobi experience is that feed back between RRI teams increased the level of trust and confidence between the teams, civic leaders and stakeholders. Pushing the lines of accountability further down, the whole team was responsible for the results, and each one of them knew exactly what needs to be done. Third, physical development became evident within very short time as evidenced by the newly built infrastructures e.g. security lighting at Dagoretti, Ruai, Buruburu, renovation and repainting of Pangani Estate. Garbage collection improved significantly. Other achievements included the replacement of broken slabs, painting of arches, beautification programme (gardens, recreational parks), road marking, restoration of water fountains, repairs of walkways and pavements, kerbing, naming of streets, numbering buildings, and installing traffic signs. In doing so, the council was able to forge strategic public-private partnerships with stakeholders such as Adopt-A-Light (street-lighting) and Nairobi Central Business Distract (NCBDA) and other businesses that chipped in resources. Fourth, some amount of progress was seen to be made in the area of the financial management. Set criteria leading to disbursement and accessing of scarce council funds were strictly followed despite the limited time of the RRI implementation. In terms of revenue collection, the council collected a record Kshs. 7 million more in parking fees between October and December, 2006, compared to the same period in the previous calendar year (Adero, 2007). Fifth, RRI has helped the council to put in place a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system and the experience also served as an eye-opener for the need for documenting information for future reflections and learning. Breaking down the goals into initiatives with specific results helped the teams put together such a system. This exercise moved the process from the abstract to the concrete - the inputs, outputs, and desired outcomes became very clear and focused. Each one of the results was an indicator by itself and each one of the teams that identified a result established a set of activities that would help them reach that result. Consequently, both activities and results were being monitored through convening of review meetings and striving to meet set deadlines. Storage and retrieving of documents and proper filing of information was improved. Sixth, the Nairobi City Council experience clearly brings the importance of committed and engaging political and executive leadership mutual interdependence as a critical prerequisite for RRI transformation. John Gakuo, Town Clerk (Sponsor) and His then Worship Mayor, Cllr. Dick Wathika (Political Leader) – were instrumental in injecting a sense of urgency for results providing continuing leadership vigilance and focus (Mathenge, 2007). Their engaged leadership continually provided visibility and afforded bragging rights to teams that delivered unusual results, not only in response to one-off crisis or to leadership whims, but in a sustained manner. They created the enabling conditions for a positively reinforcing cycle results achievement and leadership development. Ultimately, the


experience of better results raised the overall level of expectations among recipients of council services, which in turn reinforced the demand for better and faster results. Problems, constraints and challenges Conversely, a number of arguments have been advanced by RRI pessimists to demonstrate that the implementation of RRI in Nairobi City Council has been plagued by a number of teething problems, challenges and constraints. One, despite its potential for reactivating council service delivery, the RRI methodology as implemented in Nairobi City Council has been a largely centralized reform initiative. As it has been aptly argued, this is largely because external partners (the World Bank and the UNDP) favour centralizing reform structures and initiatives because “a centralized hierarchical system lowers transaction costs external assistance and enlarges the comfort zone for external participants in terms of monitoring the utilization of their funds for the intended purposes” (Shah, 1998:p. 33 and Polidano, 2001:p.6). The lending-based incentives international organizations create for reforming governments encourage such to adopt top-down, control-oriented reforms. Two, as stated elsewhere, Kenya lacks a full-fledged policy and constitutional framework for decentralization and most of the ongoing decentralization reforms have been limited to intergovernmental delegation instead total decentralization. The downside of such an approach is that it prohibits local demand-led reform innovations by LAs, limiting any chance of citizen-based, results-oriented governance approaches such as RRI. In the nature of things, results-oriented reforms such as RRI aim to replace top-down, monopolistic, unresponsive public organizations with “flat” performance oriented, productive and responsive public organizations. On the contrary, such reforms have been implemented in a centralizing way, limiting the ability of line agencies to develop results-based competencies and reinforcing process-based organizational incentives and insularity. Some experts have aptly referred this to as “a loose collection of contradictory and flawed ideas, derived primarily from the private sector, and traveling between countries” (Desai and Imrie, 1998: p.645). This description is apt in the case of Nairobi City Council, where the RRIs have been introduced as add-ons to pre-existing rigid, process-oriented and bureaucratic organizational structures and actually reducing reason or incentive to create personnel or process abilities related to decision-making, prioritization and allocation. Three, like most Kenyan LAs, Nairobi is typically shown to suffer from widespread problems of low administrative capacity and poor performance, weak personnel and systems capacities, all entrenched by insufficient skills bases, low compensation and poor human resource and organizational policies. In view of these, the much-touted flat matrix “RRI temporary governing structure” has not guaranteed the kind of leadership necessary for implementation and scale-up vis-à-vis the existing rigid traditional vertical council service ethos. Additionally, there arose a confusion of roles with some councillors seeing themselves as implementers rather than policy makers and fighting over the location of the some of the RRIs. In like vein, some senior council officers felt threatened with this arrangement and this bred discontent, suspicion and low morale, ultimately resulting in a dysfunctional relationship between the traditional rigid and bureaucratic council grading system and the temporary governing structure to support the RRI rules (Miring’uh and Mwakio, 2006). Put bluntly, meetings convened by the loose governance structures soon degenerated to forums for recording events rather than taking decisions. Participants eventually lost interest, skipping either skipping crucial meetings or sending ineffectual lower-levels officials in their stead. Four, and linked to the above point, is overwhelming evidence that recent reform measures, including RRI have failed to stop immense hemorrhage of revenue at the City Hall. A recent damning forensic report by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission states that City Hall continues to lose a huge portion of parking fees, land rates or rent to corrupt officials exploiting weak financial management systems. KACC says perpetrators of the rip-off at the Council had devised a complex system to block evidence of


unremitted money estimated to be worth millions of shillings. Key to the racket is concealment of the paper work involving such money, including bouncing cheques, tempering with the numbering of parking fees receipts and the filing of fraudulent expenditure claims at the council’s cash office (KACC, 2007:pp. 4- 6). At the end of April, 2007, City Hall was unable to account for Kshs. 33.6 million in unsurrendered imprest and Kshs. 9 million worth of obsolete stock in its stores. The pilferage occurred at a time when the council has started an overly ambitious RRI campaign to boost its revenue base with a target of Kshs. 10 million a day (Aron, 2007). The report further blames the rip-off on a complex web of system manipulation involving city council employees, defaulters and a coterie of dodgy business magnates and “cowboy” contractors. The revelations on loss of revenue came barely a week after the Council said it was unable to pay millions of shillings in salaries and pensions arrears to sacked employees due to lack of funds. The key message here is that weak and inappropriate bureaucratic controls and corruption often undermine the RRI processes and practices. Five, the experience of RRI implementation by Nairobi City Council has been hampered by poor organizational evaluation and accountability systems. Effective evaluation of such an approach underscores the institutional arrangements and incentives. Performance evaluation for all the Kenyan LAs, often undertaken by the all-powerful parent Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Finance and other cognate line ministries or Auditor-General’s office, tend to have limited influence and are often open to criticisms of political interference (Osiche, 2005:pp.2-5). Another censure of these evaluations relates to the irregularity and inconsistent quality. For instance, Nairobi City Council has been dissolved on various occasions; ostensibly to pave way for audits and inspections. In such situations, results–oriented managers at City Hall have more often than not received a conflicting message: “Manage for results ……but you will be audited on your adherence to process, not results” (Andrews, 2001:p.10). In essence, the point being made here is that an “untreated” public sector shortcoming as important as this acts as a negative to any reform initiatives introduced. Under such conditions, RRIs will be prone to collapse if they fall short of incorporating evaluations that introduce incentives conducive for public sector reform. A further sticky issue is that these evaluations tend to one-dimensional, concentrating on fiscal probity and vertical rule adherence – e.g. through Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) and its stringent eligibility criteria (i.e. budget estimate for that financial year; a cash and bank balance; a statement of debtors and creditors; abstracts of accounts for that financial year; a revenue enhancement plan; a plan to achieve a 5 % reduction in spending on staff each successive year in the mid-term and a Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan etc). Whereas citizens are supposed to participate in this process, they are not aware and little time and resources have been put aside towards sensitizing them on their role in ensuring accountability at the local government level (Ojiambo, 2004:pp-9-10). This institutionalizes the centralizing structures discussed earlier, and reinforces process-oriented incentives at the expense of social responsiveness and efficiency. Hence, it is no wonder that whereas the RRI has taken root at the City Council, citizen sensitization and consultation like in the case of LATF has been limited to a few targeted groups with the effect of undermining activity and project ownership. Six, in implementing RRI, the Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat, Cabinet Office experimented with another short-lived New Public Management (NPM) tenet of contract appointments from outside the public service. The RRI Coaches (the so-called “war room team”), comprising of a cabal of leading Kenyan professional consultants from the private sector. In ‘poaching’ them, the government was obliged to pay them at astronomical market rates in monthly salary and emoluments. The experts were attached to the various council departments to assist the RRI teams to develop, plan and implement the proposed initiatives through coaching and mentoring. A number of lessons can be discerned. The folly of selective contract appointments of coaches inherently lies in its high potential for attrition leading to fragmentation of the public service. While the rest of Council chief executives’ and other top cadres’ terms and conditions of service were governed by the centralized Public Service Commission (PSC), the coaches’ were separately negotiated as part of


the World Bank funding. This logically engendered resistance and sabotage from within the council due to sky-high disparities in remuneration and teething problems of lack of a clear framework controlling, co-ordination and monitoring the latter’s activities in terms of their performance. Consequently, RRIs were either blocked outright or put in effect only in tokenism, half-hearted fashion. The lesson for reformers here is that any haphazard transplant and implementation of generic-prescriptive NPM-like reforms without a coherent corporate strategy is a misnomer in the public sector context as it is likely to cause centrifugal tendencies (Adamolekun, 2002:pp.380 and Kiragu, 2006:p. 12). Linked to this is that fact that demanding results without rewarding and recognizing performance can lead to cynicism, on-the-job resignation and reform fatigue. This line of thought was volubly apparent in the author’s interviews with a senior Council staff who tersely dismissed the whole RRI endeavor as “an alien reform idea emanating from the centre (sic) Cabinet Office, Office of the President and the donors) …..An extra workload without monetary motivation and a distraction from routine duties…”. This view was best exemplified by the difficulties encountered by the coaches and team members to convene timely meetings with full quorums. Seven, another challenge confronting RRI implementation at Nairobi Council was that of inadequate funding. On the one hand, in the case of the Sierra Leone, the World Bank-financed the first wave of RRIs where Local Council chairmen were asked to identify areas of focus before disbursement procedures were established, bank accounts set up, even before they had officially taken office (World Bank, 2006). Each Council was provided with a small grant (on average USD$30,000) and RRI coaches to implement a high-visibility, high-impact project within 100 days. During the period of September 2004 and January 2005, all Councils launched Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) and most achieved their results in water, sanitation, feeder roads, traffic, rice production and mitigating post- harvest loss etc. In contrast, the Bank channeled its financing for the Nairobi City Council RRIs through the Ministry of Planning and National Development and the Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat, Cabinet Office respectively. Unlike the case of Sierra Leone, Kenya Government only took up payment for the coaches’ consultancy services, leaving the Council to operate on centre-controlled and restricted thrifty regular budget heavily controlled by the parent Ministry of Local Government and which had not provided for additional funds for RRIs. This constraint was consistently highlighted as the main impeding factor confronting all the RRIs teams. Eight, given the murky nature of Kenyan politics, the few positive gains made by RRIs were reversed in the run-up to the tumultuous December 2007 General Elections. A few weeks to the elections, hawkers hitherto barred from trading in the hawker-prohibited Central Business District (CBD) since 2004 brazenly flooded the city center with all manner of merchandise hampering movement by pedestrians, stifling established businesses and increasing the crime rate. The prevailing political mood was best illustrated by the arrest of the flamboyant former Mayor Cllr. Joe Aketch who overtly protested to the Council’s inspectorate and police arrests of hawkers. TV footage and pictures of him engaging the security enforcers in running battles and shouting “….Stopping hawkers from trading in the city centre would lead to loss of would-be votes for President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU)..” were splashed across the media electronic and print media. On his part, the John Gakuo (Town Clerk) admitted that "…The situation is out of control but the council cannot handle the menace single handedly. …The law enforcement agents that have always assisted us have suddenly fizzled out" (Ombati, 2007). Similarly, the City Inspectorates’ RRI efforts to improve the management of matatus (public transport vehicles) stages and traffic flow were stymied by the sudden relaxation of guard by the traffic police who failed to crack down on the overloaded trucks and pick-up vehicles ferrying slogan-chanting supporters on the campaign trail. In the same volatile period, the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki revoked the 2004 Transport Licensing Board Regulations imposed by former Transport Minister, Mr. John Michuki, requiring among other things that matatu crews to wear uniforms at a campaign rally, saying it was costly (Wachira, 2007).


CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS The preceding two parts have broadly discussed the fundamental conceptual and theoretical framework of RRI and critically analyzed its efficacy for Nairobi City Council, bringing out the key success stories and “quick-wins”, reflections, pitfalls and challenges. What is clear is that the RRI approach remains an integral plank of the ongoing raft of NPM-type like reforms that can simultaneously produce both short-term results, and lay a strong foundation for sustainable change in Kenya’s public sector. The preliminary outcomes in Nairobi City Council that are presented in this paper show that, despite the plethora of pitfalls pitted against it, there is still room for RRI practices in reactivating local service delivery. Barring the mixed fortunes, the Nairobi case is a microcosm with vital lessons and a tool that is worthy of use by other LAs as a reference point in developing their own reforms prior to the intended replication across the country. On the basis of the foregoing analyses, a number of conclusions can be drawn. One, stand-alone and one-off reforms to jumpstart reforms do not generally produce sustainable and visible results in better service delivery. Two, unsystematic and ad hoc reforms such as RRI that are top-down and driven by the centre and donor interests are likely to fail in producing tangible benefits and results. Perhaps the solution could be to develop a strategy in which short-term quick fixes feed into a sustainable reform strategy, that is, are contained within and contribute to a longer-term public sector-wide strategy of reform. This is not an argument for a “big bang” approach. Tactically, the government might to start with small, manageable reforms that can be accomplished rapidly, but the big picture over say 3 - 6 years is important to keep reform moving in the right direction and to reassure the key actors. Three, any meaningful public sector reforms must take cognizance of the peculiar specific context of the respective targeted institutions, which in most cases are incongruous to RRI. Suffice it to recapitulate here that under these circumstances, it is difficult to design, complex to implement and even more difficult sustain public sector reforms that guarantee the right outcomes and impact on service delivery in the long run. The limited experience of Nairobi clearly suggests that there are institutional capacity and other problems whose persistence are binding constraints to RRI implementation. These can only be resolved if there is a re-think about putting in place an enabling governance, policy, legal and cultural environment to avoid institutional bottlenecks. The evidence from this study lends credence to the widely-held premise that RRI-related reforms can only take place in Kenya’s LAs if the right frame conditions are in place. More importantly, there needs to be enhanced incentives at both organizational and individual levels, clear performance targets and accountabilities and effective monitoring and evaluation systems. Four, what is discernible from the foregoing analysis is that while the adoption of RRI practices in Nairobi City Council has posted a modicum of positive results and quick wins, there are both potential for real capacity limitations to applying some elements in such a weak institution. A related point to be emphasized is that blind and non-strategic adoption of RRI practices is a sure recipe for disaster for Kenya’s local service delivery. Systematic assessment of an organization’s governance implementation environment and implementation capacity should precede the introduction of any new management practices, including those associated with RRI. It is better to start with simple business re-engineering processes (e.g. streamlining licence issuance, strategic planning, staff appraisals etc) before plunging into full-scale RRI. Finally, strategic and tactical success factors i.e. firm support (particularly by both political leaders and technocratic managers); keeping the scope of change narrow; establishing internal council-level accountability mechanisms; limiting the role of aid donors (World Bank and UNDP) through de-projectization so as to introduce greater flexibility in the design and implementation of reforms and allow


for more experimentation by the host government. These are critical to the successful re-design and implementation of next phase of RRI replication to other LAs if success chances are to be maximized. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mark Osiche is a Senior Local Governance Specialist, “RTI/USAID Iraq Strengthening Local and Provincial Governance Program”, Baghdad. Previously, he was UNDP Programme Officer (Local Government), Public Service Reforms and Development Secretariat (PSR&DS), Cabinet Office, Kenya and Programme Officer, Association of Local Government of Kenya (ALGAK). He holds a Master of Public Management degree from Potsdam University, Germany. Disclaimer: The paper was researched and partly written while I was at the PSR&DS and benefited from the critical advice from a cross-section of Nairobi City Council staff, councillors and stakeholders. However, it represents the author’s personal views and should not be ascribed to any other person, or to nay other institution.

REFERENCES Adamolekun, L., 2002, “Africa’s evolving civil service systems: three challenges – the state, continuity, efficient service delivery and accountability”, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 373 -388. Adero, B., 2007, “City parking revenue rises”, The Standard Online Edition, January 16. Aron, M., 2007, “City Council corruption rot revealed”, Business Daily Online Edition, November 22. Andrews, M., 2001, “Adjusting External Audits for Facilitate Results-Oriented Management”, The International Journal of Government Auditors, April, pp. 10-14. Denhardt, J. and Denhardt, R., 2003, The new public service: serving not steering, M. E. Sharpe: New York. Desai, V. and Imrie, R., 1998, “The New Managerialism in Local Governance: North-South Dimensions”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.4: pp- 635-650. KACC, Examination Report on the Systems, Polices, Procedures and Practices of the City Council of Nairobi, Directorate of Preventive Services, March, 2007. Kiragu, K., 2006, “The Place of New Public Management in Developing Countries”, A Presentation at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Seminar on New Public Management in Developing - Focus on Africa, Copenhagen, 15 December. Mathenge, G., 2007, “Gakuo’s great plans for the jungle Nairobi”, The Standard Online Edition, September 29 Matta, N. et al, 2005, The Rapid Results Approach: A Briefing Note. July 10. Matta, N., 2005, “Rapid Results for Capacity Development”, presented at the Workshop on Capacity Development for Growth, Service Delivery, Empowerment and Security in Africa, June 27. Miring’uh, E. and Mwakio, P., 2006, “Rapid Results rules unrealistic, say chiefs”, The Standard Online Edition, September, 8 Mutahaba, G., and Kiragu, K., 2002, ‘Lessons of International and African Perspectives on Public Service Reform: Examples from Five African Countries’, African Development, Vol. XXVII, Nos. 3 & 4: pp. 48-75.


Nairobi City Council, 2007, End-Term Report: Achievements Registered by Departments of The City Council of Nairobi Under The Rapid Result Initiative Aspect of The Result Based Management, October 31. Ogosia, K., 2007, “Government sends all councillors home”, Daily Nation Online Edition, October 23. Ogot, C. A., 2007, Rapid Results Initiative: The Experience of the City Council of Nairobi, May 15. Ojiambo, E, 2004, “Participatory Governance and Access to Information: Holding Government to Account”, Adili Newsletter, Transparency International, Issue No. 58:pp. 9-11. Ombati, C., 2007, “Council workers say politicians behind return of hawkers’, The Standard Online Edition, Sunday 4. Osiche, M., 2005, “Rethinking Central-Local Government Power Relations in Kenya: A Study and Critical Analysis of Patters of Conflict and Interference”, Unpublished Masters Thesis Report University of Potsdam- Germany, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of Master of Public Management (MPM) Degree Program (2004/2005) - April, 2005. Oyugi, L., 2005, Fiscal Decentralization in Kenya: The Case of Local Authority Transfer Fund, Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 069/2005. Polidano, C. 2001, “Why Civil Service Reforms Fail”, Public Policy and Management Working Paper No. 16, Institute for Development Policy and Management, Manchester University. Available at http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/469 PSR&DS, 2006, RRI presentation for Nairobi City Council, Launch Workshop, November 14 Saulo, M. and Ringa, M., 2007, Report says City Council has improved”, The Standard Online Edition, January 12. Schaffer, R. H. and Ashkenas, R, N., 2005, Rapid Results! How 100-Day Projects Build the Capacity for Large-Scale Change, Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint. Shah, A., 1998, “Balance, Accountability and Responsiveness: Lessons about Decentralization”, Working Paper No.: 2021, December, World Bank. Steffensen, J, et al, Final Synthesis Report: A Comparative Analysis of Decentralization in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, August, 2004. Wachira, P., 2007, “Touts given uniform reprieve”, The Standard Online Edition, November 20 World Bank, 2006, “Sierra Leone: The Role of the Rapid Results Approach in Decentralization and Strengthening Local Governance”, Findings, No. 261, April, Online Edition. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find261.htm

Documents

Applying Rapid Results Approach to Local Service Delivery