Appendix B - (Earth Fault Protection Grading)

Appendix B - (Earth Fault Protection Grading)

TITLE:-

DESCRIPTION:NO. DESIGNED CHECKED

0 VM EG Final Issue

Base Voltage 33 kV

33kV Max Earth Fault 4500 A PSS4-T1 and PSS2-T1 in parallel, all generators in service parallel with the incoming 33kV supply33kV Min Earth Fault 4200 A Main - No CEPS Operation (PSS2-T1 in service and PSS4-T1 out of service)

Notes: 33 kV interconnector and bustie curve shows coordination curve for 33 kV Bustie (ISS1-ISS2) and33 kV Interconnector (ISS1-PSS1, ISS1-PSS3, ISS2-PSS2, ISS2-PSS4, and PSS3-PSS4).

RAAF Base Williamtown

PROJECT:-

LogoBASE WLM - ELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTURE -HV TRUNK SERVICES

HV Protection - 33 kV Earth FaultGrading Curves

DOCUMENT No:- REVISION

Appendix B (R8000-WLM-15-RP-EL-03-953)PLANT LOCATION:-

APPROVEDDB

DATE13.08.18

0.01 sec

0.10 sec

1.00 sec

10.00 sec

1 A 10 A 100 A 1000 A 10000 A

33kV Power Transformer (16MVA), A, TMS , 33kV Max Earth Fault16000 kVA Inrush 62000 kVA Inrush33kV Interconnector and Bustie , 50A, TMS 2.9, IEC EI 33kV Incomer, 100A, TMS 1.1, IEC EI33kV Min Earth Fault

TITLE:-


0 VM EG Final Issue

Base Voltage 11 kV11kV Earth Fault 1000 A 11kV fault (NER)

Notes:11 kV Interconnector (PSS3-CEPS2 , PSS4-CEPS1 , and PSS2-PSS4).and 11kV Bustie (PSS4-CEPS2, PSS3-CEPS1)


PROJECT:-

LogoBASE WLM - ELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTURE - HVTRUNK SERVICES

HV Protection - 11 kV Earth FaultGrading Curves - Mains Operation (NACC)


Appendix B (R8000-WLM-15-RP-EL-03-953)

PLANT LOCATION:-

APPROVEDDB

DATE13.08.18

0.01 sec

0.10 sec

1.00 sec

10.00 sec

1 A 10 A 100 A 1000 A 10000 A

11kV Incomer, 750A, TMS 0.9, inst NACC 11kV Ring, 100A, TMS 0.2, IEC EI 200kVA Ring Transfomer, 25A, TMS 0.15, IEC EI

2500kVA Ring Transfomer, 25A, TMS 0.15, IEC EI 11kV Earth Fault RMU setting, 25A, TMS 0.1, IEC EI

11kV Interconnector and Bustie, 700A, TMS 0.6, inst

TITLE:-


0 VM EG Final Issue

Base Voltage 11 kV

Max. 11kV Earth Fault 950 A 11kV fault (1 Generating Set)Min.11kV Earth Fault 900 A 11kV fault (1 Generating Set)


PROJECT:-


HV Protection - 11 kV Earth FaultGrading Curves - CEPS


Appendix B (R8000-WLM-15-RP-EL-03-953)

PLANT LOCATION:-

APPROVEDDB

DATE13.08.18

0.01 sec

0.10 sec

1.00 sec

10.00 sec

1 A 10 A 100 A 1000 A

NEW Interconnector, 700A, TMS 0.6, inst 1874kVA Generating Set, 105A, TMS 0.35, IEC EI 2500kVA Generating Set, 140A, TMS 0.2, IEC EINAAC 11kV Ring, 100A, TMS 0.2, IEC EI NEW Interconnector, 700A, TMS 0.6, inst 200kVA Ring Transfomer, 25A, TMS 0.15, IEC EI2500kVA Ring Transfomer, 25A, TMS 0.15, IEC EI Max. 11kV Earth Fault Generating Set SEF, 10A, TMS 0.01, instMin.11kV Earth Fault 2500 kVA Inrush 13000 kVA Inrush200 kVA Inrush

TITLE:-

DESCRIPTION:NO. DATE DESIGNED CHECKED

Ref. Report Ref. Report Ref. Report Ref. Report As Per Report Description

Base Voltage 11 kV11kV Earth Fault 12790 A 11kV fault


PROJECT:-


HV Protection - 11 kV Earth FaultGrading Curves - Mains Operation (WLM)


Appendix to Report R8000-WLM-15-RP-EL-03-953

PLANT LOCATION:-

APPROVEDRef. Report

0.01 sec

0.10 sec

1.00 sec

10.00 sec

1 A 10 A 100 A 1000 A 10000 A

NACC 11kV Ring - Stage 2, 40A, TMS 0.5, IEC VI 11kV Incomer, 500A, TMS 0.8, inst NACC 11kV Ring - Stage 2, 40A, TMS 0.5, IEC VI

200kVA Ring Transfomer, 25A, TMS 0.15, IEC EI RMU setting, 25A, TMS 0.1, IEC EI 11kV Interconnector exisitng, 400A, TMS 0.55, inst

TITLE:-



Base Voltage 11 kV

11kV Max Earth Fault (At Substation Level) 6700 A PSS4-T1 and PSS2-T1 in parallel, all generators in service parallel with the incoming 33kV supply11kV Min Earth Fault (At Substation Level) 660 A No Grid + only one generator running


Appendix to Report R8000-WLM-15-RP-EL-03-953PLANT LOCATION:-

APPROVEDRef. Report

PROJECT:-


HV Protection - 11 kV Earth FaultGrading Curves - Mains Operation-Airfield Ring


0.01 sec

0.10 sec

1.00 sec

10.00 sec

1 A 10 A 100 A 1000 A 10000 A

Airfield Ring Feeder, 40A, TMS 0.5, IEC VI 500kVA Ring Transfomer, 25A, TMS 0.1, IEC EI 11kV Min Earth Fault (At Substation Level)

11kV Max Earth Fault (At Substation Level) PSS1 to PSS3 Interconnector, 400A, TMS , inst PSS1 and PSS3 Incomer, 500A, TMS , inst

200kVA Ring Transfomer, 10A, TMS 0.1, IEC EI

TITLE:-



Base Voltage 11 kV

11kV Max Earth Fault (At Substation Level) 10570 A PSS4-T1 and PSS2-T1 in parallel, all generators in service parallel with the incoming 33kV supply11kV Min Earth Fault (At Substation Level) 710 A No Grid + only one generator running


Appendix to Report R8000-WLM-15-RP-EL-03-953

PLANT LOCATION:-

APPROVEDRef. Report

PROJECT:-


HV Protection - 11 kV Earth FaultGrading Curves - Mains Operation-Northern Ring


0.01 sec

0.10 sec

1.00 sec

10.00 sec

1 A 10 A 100 A 1000 A 10000 A

Northern Ring Feeder, 40A, TMS 0.5, IEC VI 500kVA Ring Transfomer, 25A, TMS 0.1, IEC EI , A, TMS ,

11kV Min Earth Fault (At Substation Level) 11kV Max Earth Fault (At Substation Level) PSS1 to PSS3 Interconnector, 400A, TMS , inst

PSS1 and PSS3 Incomer, 500A, TMS , inst 200kVA Ring Transfomer, 10A, TMS 0.1, IEC EI

Appendix C - (Bus Zone High Impedance DifferentialProtection Calculation)

33kV Hi Z Bus Zone

CT Impedance RCT 3.00 Ohms

CT Ratio ICT(PRIMARY) 600 Amps

CT Ratio ICT(SECONDARY) 1 Amps

CT Lead Resistance RL 0.10 Ohms

Max. Primary Fault ISC 15000 Amps

Max. Feeder Load Current ILOAD 350 Amps

Imag at Knee Point IMAG VK 0.05 Amps

Number of CTs N 4

Maximum Relay Burden PRELAY 0.15 VA

Calculated VS(CALC) 80.06 Volts

Selected VS 85 Volts

Multiple of VS K 5

Minimum Knee Point Voltage VK MIN 425 Volts

Knee Point Voltage Selected VK 450 Volts

CT Magnetising Current at VS IMAG VS 0.01 Amps

Relay Operating Current IOP 0.04 Amps

Minimum Stabilising Resistor RSTAB MIN 156.31 Ohms

Stabilising Resistor Selected RSTAB 160 Ohms

Minimum Setting Current ISET MIN 0.53 Amps

Setting Current ISET 0.60 Amps

Minimum Primary Operation Current I(OP PRIMARY) 382.67 Amps

CT Specification

Output

600/1 0.05PX450R3

Assumptions

Relay Operating Current - IOP = (PRELAY / VS) + (N * IMAG Vs)

Stabilising Resistor - RSTAB = VS / (ILOAD SEC - IOP)

Minimum Primary Operation Current - IOP(PRIMARY) = (ISET + N * IMAG VS) * ICT(PRIMARY)

Setting Current - ISET = VS / RSTAB

CT Magnetising Current at VS - IMAG VS = VS / VK * IMAG VK

Voltage Setting (1 CT saturated) - VS = ISC(SEC) * (RCT + 2 * RL)

Calculations

Knee Point Voltage - VK = VS * K

Data Input

1. CT magnetising current is linear from 0V to the CT knee point voltage VK.

2. CTs have 1A secondary.

11kV Hi Z Bus Zone

CT Impedance RCT 3.00 Ohms

CT Ratio ICT(PRIMARY) 1000 Amps

CT Ratio ICT(SECONDARY) 1 Amps

CT Lead Resistance RL 0.10 Ohms

Max. Primary Fault ISC 15000 Amps

Max. Feeder Load Current ILOAD 840 Amps

Imag at Knee Point IMAG VK 0.1 Amps

Number of CTs N 7

Maximum Relay Burden PRELAY 0.15 VA

Calculated VS(CALC) 48.04 Volts

Selected VS 50 Volts

Multiple of VS K 5

Minimum Knee Point Voltage VK MIN 250 Volts

Knee Point Voltage Selected VK 300 Volts

CT Magnetising Current at VS IMAG VS 0.02 Amps

Relay Operating Current IOP 0.12 Amps

Minimum Stabilising Resistor RSTAB MIN 69.41 Ohms

Stabilising Resistor Selected RSTAB 70 Ohms

Minimum Setting Current ISET MIN 0.71 Amps

Setting Current ISET 0.75 Amps

Minimum Primary Operation Current I(OP PRIMARY) 866.67 Amps

CT Specification

Output

1000/1 0.1PX300R3

Knee Point Voltage - VK = VS * K

CT Magnetising Current at VS - IMAG VS = VS / VK * IMAG VK

Relay Operating Current - IOP = (PRELAY / VS) + (N * IMAG Vs)

Stabilising Resistor - RSTAB = VS / (ILOAD SEC - IOP)

Setting Current - ISET = VS / RSTAB

Minimum Primary Operation Current - IOP(PRIMARY) = (ISET + N * IMAG VS) * ICT(PRIMARY)

Voltage Setting (1 CT saturated) - VS = ISC(SEC) * (RCT + 2 * RL)

Assumptions

1. CT magnetising current is linear from 0V to the CT knee point voltage VK.

2. CTs have 1A secondary.

Data Input

Calculations

Appendix D - (Reference Drawings)

630A630A 630A

-ISS1-33-A01

ISS1-33.AUS-33-A02

ISS1-33.PSS1-33 ISS1-33.PSS3-33

INTERCONNECTORTO EXISTING PSS1-33

TARIFFMETER

Wh

Id>Wh

CHECKMETER

BUSZONE

TYPE1

TYPE2

33kVPROTECTIONAND CONTROLRACKS

PSLPSL PSL

V VN>

SYNCHRONISM CHECK

HIGH IMPEDANCE DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

PHASE FAILURE RELAY

SYNCHRONISM CHECK

WATT-HOUR METER

SF6 GAS LOW PRESSURE SWITCH

SINGLE MODE OPTICAL FIBRE

OVERFREQUENCY PROTECTION

UNDERFREQUENCY PROTECTION

CIRCUIT BREAKER FAIL PROTECTION

TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION

SYMBOL DESCRIPTIONSYMBOLS

DEFINITE TIME OVER CURRENT PROTECTION

INVERSE TIME OVER CURRENT PROTECTION

DEFINITE TIME EARTH FAULT PROTECTION

INVERSE TIME EARTH FAULT PROTECTION

TYPE 2 LINE DIFFERENTIAL RELAY

BIASED DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT PROTECTION ELEMENT

INTERTRIP SEND PROTECTION ELEMENT

INTERTRIP RECEIVE PROTECTION ELEMENT


IS1

IR1






TYPE 1 DIRECTIONAL OC / EF RELAY

REVERSE POWER PROTECTION

OVERVOLTAGE PROTECTION

UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION

DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT PROTECTION

DIRECTIONAL OVER CURRENT PROTECTION

Wh

Id>

m<3

PSL

SM

φ<



φ<

MV SWITCHBOARD TERMINAL

PROTECTION RACK TERMINAL

ELECTRONIC VOLT METER (WITH IEC 61850 MMS)V

TRANSFORMER CONTROL AND MONITORING TERMINAL

NOTES:1. PROTECTION RELAYS SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH

IEC 61850 COMMUNICATIONS OVER COPPERETHERNET.

2. PROTECTION RELAYS PROVIDE METERING DATAACROSS IEC 61850 MMS TO THE SAS, GCS AND PCMS.

3. WHERE PRACTICAL ALL PROTECTION FUNCTIONSSHOWN FOR EACH DEVICE SHALL BE INTEGRATEDINTO A SINGLE PROTECTION RELAY.

4. SWITCHGEAR ARRANGEMENT INCLUDINGINSTRUMENT TRANSFORMER LOCATIONS TO BECONFIRMED WITH VENDOR DATA.

ABBREVIATIONS:AUS AUSGRIDGCS GENERATOR CONTROL SYSTEMPCMS POWER CONTROL AND MONITORING SYSTEMSAS SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM

NEUTRAL DISPLACEMENT PROTECTIONVN>

SURGE DIVERTER

TEST LINK TERMINAL

DISCONNECT LINK TERMINAL

TEST BLOCK

INCOMING FEEDERFROM AUSGRID

TYPE2

INTERCONNECTORTO PSS3-33(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-500)

TO COMMSRACK(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-267)

SM

33kV 3 PHASE 630A 31.5kA FOR 1s

630A

PSL

TYPE2

BUS TIE TO ISS2-33(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-250)

ISS1-33.ISS2-33-A05

PROTECTION RELAY OUTPUT (SAS)

PROTECTION RELAY INPUT (SAS)


SM

m<3φ< φ<


SM


PRIMARY BUS

PRIMARY CABLE

SECONDARY WIRING

SECONDARY CABLE

SIGNAL (VIA ETHERNET)





TYPE 3 ANTI-ISLANDING RELAY


LOW FORWARD POWER PROTECTION





TYPE3

-A03 -A04

TYPE2

SM


φ<

Defence Support GroupDepartment of Defence

REV DATE DESCRIPTION APP'D

TITLE

ORIGINAL SCALE @ A1 DATE

DO NOT SCALE DRAWINGSALL DIMENSIONS TO BE VERIFIED & CHECKED ON SITE

CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR

CONSULTANT REF FILE :

PROJECT

R8000 FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

Lend Lease Building PTY LTDLevel 4, The Bond30 Hickson Road, Millers Point, NSW 2000ph (02) 9236 6111

PROJECT MANAGERS

Level 4, 211 Victoria Square Adelaide SA 5000 Australia

GPO Box 2052 Adelaide SA 5001

T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699

E [email protected] W www.ghd.com

REV'DDES'NREV'W

THIS DRAWING IS TO BE PRINTED IN COLOUR

Level 19, Tower B, Citadel Tower799 Pacific Highway, Chatswood. NSW 2067ph (02) 9406 1000 fax (02) 9406 1002

Drawn: Designed: Reviewed:

DraftingCheck:

DesignReview: Approved:

BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS1-33 33 kV SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM

N.T.S 05-07-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-200 5

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 11.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*3 18.08.17 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*4 16.02.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*5 18.05.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*

NOTES:1. PROVIDE TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION ON ALL TRIP

CIRCUITS.2. FOR SYMBOLS, REFER TO DRAWINGS

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 200.3. METERING CTs, VTs AND INSTALLATION SHALL

COMPLY WITH AUSGRID ES3.

10kA

-T1,2,33

6

-T4,5,6

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 3P

-Q1630A

-S1

CLOSECOIL

TRIPCOIL (A)

(NOTE 1) -Y2

-Y1

-Q1-CL -Q1-OP -Q1-DS -S1-ESPSL

CB DISCONNECTORCLOSED

CB CLOSED

CB OPENED

CB EARTH SWITCHCLOSED

SF6 GAS PRESSURE LOW

REMOTE CLOSE

REMOTE OPEN/TRIP

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

PHASE FAILURE

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

TRIP

m<3-F3

φ<

-F1 (DIRECTIONAL)

Wh CHECKMETER

Id> -F2Vs = 85V

-X1

-Y1

-T19,202

-T16,17,183

-T13,14,153

1000-500:10.1PX500R2.7

-T7,8,9

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 0.5MVOLTAGE FACTOR 1.9(BUS VT)

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 0.5MVOLTAGE FACTOR 1.9(TARIFF METERING)

400:10.5S, 5VAISF: 10Icont: 2A

600:10.05PX450R3.0

BUS VT BUS (110V)

33kV INCOMER AND METERING FEEDER RACK # 1 PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM-ISS1-33-A04 AND A05

ISS1-33 33kV SWITCHBOARD

Wh

TARIFFMETER

33kV BUS

BUS ZONE CT

-X1

BUS VT BUS (110V)

400:10.5S,5VA

-T21,22,233

400:15P20,10VA

6

6 6

V

220 Ω160 Ω SET

SEALABLEMETERINGBLOCK

VN>

-X1

-X1

REFER TO NOTES 3

REMOTEMODE

LOCALMODE

TO PSS1-11-A10PROTECTION(COMMS)TO PSS3-11-A05PROTECTION(COMMS)

33kV FEEDERPROTECTION ANDMETERING PANELS

LOCA

LRE

MOTE

TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

ANTI-ISLANDING

LOCALREMOTE

LOCALCLOSE

LOCALOPEN

-X1 -X1

4666

TESTMODE

CB TRIPPED

TCS-Aφ<

CB FAIL

CLOSE (SAS)

OPEN (SAS)TRIP (BUS TRIP)

BUS FAULT

BUS TRIP

BUSTRIP

-A05 -A04

TYPE 1

TESTMODE

-X1

M

TRIPCOIL (B)

(NOTE 1) -Y3

-T10,11,123

400:15P20,10VA

6

REFER TO DRAWINGR8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-204


TRIP

VT CT (A

USGR

ID D

IFFE

RENT

IAL P

ROTE

CTIO

N)

CT (D

UPLIC

ATE

ANTI

-ISLA

NDIN

G)

TCS-B



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS1-33 33 kV INCOMER AND METER PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-201 6

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 11.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 17.03.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*3 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*4 18.08.17 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*5 16.02.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*6 18.05.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS1-33 33 kV BUSTIE PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-202 4

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 11.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 17.03.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*3 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*4 16.02.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*


CIRCUITS.2. FOR SYMBOLS, REFER TO DRAWING

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 200.

-T4,5,63

6

-T7,8,9

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 3P

-Q1630A

-S1

CLOSECOIL

TRIPCOIL

(NOTE 1) -Y2

-Y1


LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

TRIP

-F1

-Y1

-T1,2,33

400:10.05PX450 R3.0

6

33kV BUS

600:10.05PX450R3.0

BUS VT BUS (110V)

33kV BUSTIE PANEL PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM-ISS1-33-A03


33kV BUS

BUS ZONE CT

BUS VT BUS (110V)

6

-X1

REMOTEMODE

LOCALMODE

33kV BUSTIEPROTECTION PANEL

LOCA

LRE

MOTE

LOCALREMOTE

LOCALCLOSE

LOCALOPEN

-X1

-X1

BUS ZONE CT

TESTMODE

M

CLOSE (SAS)

BUS TRIP



CB CLOSED

CB OPENED



TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

CB FAIL

CB TRIPPED

REMOTE CLOSE

REMOTE OPEN/TRIP

-F1

IS1IR1

TCSφ<

TYPE 2

-X1

SPARE

φ<

-X1

-F2

NOTES:1. PROVIDE TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION ON ALL TRIP CIRCUITS.2. FOR SYMBOLS, REFER TO DRAWING

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 200.3. POWER SUPPLY FOR CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

SHALL ORIGINATE FROM DIFFERENT DC SUPPLY TO THEPRIMARY DIRECTIONAL PROTECTION.

4. FOR COMPATIBILITY THE CONTRACTOR TO MATCHSOFTWARE VERSIONS WITH AUSGRID RELAY ATWILLIAMTOWN ZONE SUBSTATION.

5. POWER SUPPLY FOR DUPLICATE VOLTAGE PROTECTIONAND DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION SHALL ORIGINATE FROMDIFFERENT DC SUPPLY RAIL TO THE PRIMARY PROTECTION.

TRIP-F1 (PRIMARY DIFFERENTIAL)

33kV BUS

BUS VT BUS (110V)

33kV INCOMER FEEDER RACK # 3 PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM


BUS VT BUS (110V)

-X1

33kV INCOMER FEEDERPROTECTION PANEL

-X1

-X1

IS1IR1

TO COMMS RACK(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-267)

SM TESTMODE

BUS TRIPTYPE 2(NOTE 4, 5)

-X1

TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

CB FAIL

CB TRIPPED

VT CT (A

USGR

IDDI

FFER

ENTI

ALPR

OTEC

TION

)

TRIP


-A04 AND -A05

-Q1-OP -S1-CL-Q1-CL -S1-OP


CB C

LOSE

D

CB O

PENE

D

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

CLOS

ED

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

OPEN

INCO

MER

CB C

LOSE

D

INCO

MER

CB O

PENE

D

INCO

MER

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

CLOS

ED

INCO

MER

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

OPEN

BUST

IE C

B CL

OSED

BUST

IE C

B OP

ENED


33kV BUS

IN01

SEL-2506

48 VDC SUPPLYFROM DC DISTRIBUTION

REMOTE I/O MODULE

SM

+ DCPOWER SUPPLY

- DC

IN02 IN03 IN04 IN05 IN06 IN07 IN08



BUST

IE C

B CL

OSED

BUST

IE C

B OP

ENED

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

CLOS

ED

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

OPEN

BUST

IE C

B DI

SCON

NECT

OR C

LOSE

D

BUST

IE C

B DI

SCON

NECT

OR O

PEN

-A03

-X1 -X1

TRIP -X1

-F1 (DUPLICATE)

TEST MODE

VN>

CT (D

UPLIC

ATE

ANTI

-ISLA

NDIN

G)

TYPE 3(NOTE 5)

-X1

ANTI-ISLANDING

MODE: SINGLEWAVELENGTH: 1300nm

ORDERING OPTION: 3



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS1-33 33 kV INCOMER FEEDER PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-204

0 16.02.18 FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*1 18.05.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*

φ<

630A 630A 630A

-ISS2-33-A01ISS2-33.AUS-33

-A03ISS2-33.PSS2-33-A04

ISS2-33.PSS4-33

INTERCONNECTORTO PSS2-33

(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-300)

TARIFFMETER

Wh

Id> Wh

CHECKMETER

BUSZONE


SM

TYPE2


PSL PSL PSL

V

INCOMING FEEDERFROM AUSGRID

TYPE2



SM


630A

PSL

BUS TIE TO ISS1-33(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-200)

ISS2-33.ISS1-33-A05-A02

φ<

TO COMMSRACK

(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-267)

SM

TYPE2

SYNCHRONISM CHECK


PHASE FAILURE RELAY

SYNCHRONISM CHECK

WATT-HOUR METER

















IS1

IR1






TYPE 1 DIRECTIONAL OC / EF RELAY

REVERSE POWER PROTECTION



DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT PROTECTION

DIRECTIONAL OVER CURRENT PROTECTION

Wh

Id>

m<3

PSL

SM

φ<



φ<





NOTES:1. PROTECTION RELAYS SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH

IEC 61850 COMMUNICATIONS OVER COPPERETHERNET.

2. PROTECTION RELAYS PROVIDE METERING DATAACROSS IEC 61850 MMS TO THE SAS, GCS AND PCMS.

3. WHERE PRACTICAL ALL PROTECTION FUNCTIONSSHOWN FOR EACH DEVICE SHALL BE INTEGRATEDINTO A SINGLE PROTECTION RELAY.


ABBREVIATIONS:AUS AUSGRIDGCS GENERATOR CONTROL SYSTEMPCMS POWER CONTROL AND MONITORING SYSTEMSAS SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM


SURGE DIVERTER

TEST LINK TERMINAL


TEST BLOCK




PRIMARY BUS

PRIMARY CABLE

SECONDARY WIRING

SECONDARY CABLE



TYPE1

VN>

m<3

TYPE3





TYPE 3 ANTI-ISLANDING RELAY






SM

TYPE2

TO COMMSRACK

(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-267)

φ<



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS2-33 33 kV SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM

N.T.S 11-05-2015

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-250 5

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 11.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*3 18.08.17 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*4 16.02.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*5 18.05.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*


CIRCUITS.2. FOR SYMBOLS, REFER TO DRAWINGS

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 200.3. METERING CTs, VTs AND INSTALLATION SHALL

COMPLY WITH AUSGRID ES3.

10kA

-T1,2,33

6

-T4,5,6

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 3P

-Q1630A

-S1

CLOSECOIL

-Y2

-Y1



CB CLOSED

CB OPENED



REMOTE CLOSE

REMOTE OPEN/TRIP

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

PHASE FAILURE

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

TRIP

m<3-F3

φ<

-F1 (DIRECTIONAL)

Wh CHECKMETER

Id> -F2Vs = 85V

-X1

-Y1

-T19,202

-T16,17,183

-T13,14,153

1000-500:10.1PX500R2.7

-T7,8,9

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 0.5MVOLTAGE FACTOR 1.9(BUS VT)

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 0.5MVOLTAGE FACTOR 1.9(TARIFF METERING)

400:10.5S, 5VAISF: 10Icont: 2A

600:10.05PX450R3.0

BUS VT BUS (110V)

33kV INCOMER AND METERING FEEDER RACK # 1 PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM-ISS2-33-A04 AND A05


Wh

TARIFFMETER

33kV BUS

BUS ZONE CT

-X1

BUS VT BUS (110V)

400:10.5S,5VA

-T21,22,233

400:15P20,10VA

6

6 6

V

220 Ω160 Ω SET

SEALABLEMETERINGBLOCK

VN>

-X1

-X1

REFER TO NOTES 3

REMOTEMODE

LOCALMODE

TO PSS1-11-A10PROTECTION(COMMS)TO PSS3-11-A05PROTECTION(COMMS)

33kV FEEDERPROTECTION ANDMETERING PANELS

LOCA

LRE

MOTE

TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

ANTI-ISLANDING

LOCALREMOTE

LOCALCLOSE

LOCALOPEN

-X1 -X1

4666

TESTMODE

CB TRIPPED

CB FAIL

CLOSE (SAS)


BUS FAULT

BUS TRIP

BUSTRIP

-A05 -A04

TYPE 1

TESTMODE

-X1

M

-Y3

-T10,11,123

400:15P20,10VA

6



TRIP

VT CT (A

USGR

ID D

IFFE

RENT

IAL P

ROTE

CTIO

N)

CT (D

UPLIC

ATE

ANTI

-ISLA

NDIN

G)

TRIPCOIL (A)

(NOTE 1)

TRIPCOIL (B)

(NOTE 1)

TCS-Aφ<

TCS-B



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS2-33 33 kV INCOMER AND METER PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-251 6

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 11.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 17.03.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*3 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*4 18.08.17 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*5 16.02.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*6 18.05.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS2-33 33 kV BUSTIE PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-252 4

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 11.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 17.03.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*3 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*4 16.02.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*

BUS ZONE CT



R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 250.

-T4,5,63

6

-T7,8,9

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 3P

-Q1630A

-S1

CLOSECOIL

TRIPCOIL

(NOTE 1) -Y2

-Y1


-Y1

-T1,2,33

400:15P20 10VA

6

33kV BUS

600:10.05PX450R3.0

33kV BUSTIE PANEL PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM-ISS2-33-A03


33kV BUS

BUS ZONE CT

6

BUS ZONE CT

M

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

TRIP

-F1

BUS VT BUS (110V) BUS VT BUS (110V)

-X1

REMOTEMODE

LOCALMODE

33kV BUSTIEPROTECTION PANEL

LOCA

LRE

MOTE

LOCALREMOTE

LOCALCLOSE

LOCALOPEN

-X1 TESTMODE

CLOSE (SAS)

BUS TRIP



CB CLOSED

CB OPENED



TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

CB FAIL

CB TRIPPED

REMOTE CLOSE

REMOTE OPEN/TRIP

-F1

IS1IR1

TCS

TYPE 2

-X1

-X1

SPARE

φ<

-X1

-F2

φ<

NOTES:1. PROVIDE TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION ON ALL TRIP CIRCUITS.2. FOR SYMBOLS, REFER TO DRAWING

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 200.3. POWER SUPPLY FOR CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

SHALL ORIGINATE FROM DIFFERENT DC SUPPLY TO THEPRIMARY DIRECTIONAL PROTECTION.

4. FOR COMPATIBILITY THE CONTRACTOR TO MATCHSOFTWARE VERSIONS WITH AUSGRID RELAY ATWILLIAMTOWN ZONE SUBSTATION.

5. POWER SUPPLY FOR DUPLICATE VOLTAGE PROTECTIONAND DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION SHALL ORIGINATE FROMDIFFERENT DC SUPPLY RAIL TO THE PRIMARY PROTECTION.

TRIP-F1 (PRIMARY DIFFERENTIAL)

33kV BUS

BUS VT BUS (110V)

33kV INCOMER FEEDER RACK # 3 PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM


BUS VT BUS (110V)

-X1

33kV INCOMER FEEDERPROTECTION PANEL

-X1

-X1

IS1IR1


SM TESTMODE

BUS TRIPTYPE 2(NOTE 4, 5)

-X1

TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

CB FAIL

CB TRIPPED

VT CT (A

USGR

IDDI

FFER

ENTI

ALPR

OTEC

TION

)

TRIP


-A04 AND -A05



CB C

LOSE

D

CB O

PENE

D

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

CLOS

ED

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

OPEN

INCO

MER

CB C

LOSE

D

INCO

MER

CB O

PENE

D

INCO

MER

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

CLOS

ED

INCO

MER

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

OPEN

BUST

IE C

B CL

OSED

BUST

IE C

B OP

ENED


33kV BUS

IN01

SEL-2506

48 VDC SUPPLYFROM DC DISTRIBUTION

REMOTE I/O MODULE

SM

+ DCPOWER SUPPLY

- DC

IN02 IN03 IN04 IN05 IN06 IN07 IN08



BUST

IE C

B CL

OSED

BUST

IE C

B OP

ENED

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

CLOS

ED

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

OPEN

BUS-

TIE

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

CLOS

ED

BUS-

TIE

CB D

ISCO

NNEC

TOR

OPEN

-A03

-X1 -X1

TRIP -X1

-F1 (DUPLICATE)

TEST MODE

VN>

CT (D

UPLIC

ATE

ANTI

-ISLA

NDIN

G)

TYPE 3(NOTE 5)

-X1

ANTI-ISLANDING

MODE: SINGLEWAVELENGTH: 1300nm

ORDERING OPTION: 3



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)ISS2-33 33 kV INCOMER FEEDER PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-254 1

0 16.02.18 FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*1 18.05.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION VM* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESISS (INTAKE SWITCHING STN)SAS HV COMMUNICATIONSSCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

N.T.S 11-05-2015

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-267 2

0 17.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION ATL* DB* DA*1 11.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 16.02.18 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* MS* DE*

AOK AOK DB*

JW* LB* DA*

(NOTE 11)(NOTE 11)

(NOTE 11) (NOTE 11)

ISS2-33 - FEEDER RACK 1

ETHERNET SWITCH A(NOTE 4)

2SM

ETHERNET SWITCH B(NOTE 4)

2

CAT 6 PATCH PANEL

CAT 6 PATCH PANEL

4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P

4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P2

SM

2

2SM

2

4P 4P 4P

4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P

4P 4P 4P 4P 4P 4P

LC LC

LC LC

4P

ISS1-33INCOMER

CHECK METER

IEC 61850


ISS1-33INCOMER

PROTECTIONRELAY

IEC 61850 IEC 61850 IEC 61850 IEC 61850

ISS1-33 - PSS1-33INTERCONNECTOR

PROTECTIONRELAY

4P 2

DIFF. COMM'S

SM

2

IEC 61850

4P 2

DIFF. COMM'S

SM

2

ISS1-33BUS ZONE

PROTECTIONRELAY

IEC 61850


IEC 61850 IEC 61850 IEC 61850 IEC 61850 IEC 61850 IEC 61850 IEC 61850

2

DIFF. COMM'S

2SM

2

DIFF. COMM'S

2SM

ISS1-33 INCOMERVOLTAGE RELAY

ISS1-33 - ISS2-33BUS TIE

PROTECTIONRELAY

ISS2-33INCOMER

CHECK METER

ISS2-33INCOMER

PROTECTIONRELAY

ISS2-33 INCOMERVOLTAGE RELAY

ISS2-33 - ISS1-33BUS TIE

PROTECTIONRELAY


PROTECTIONRELAY

ISS1-33 INCOMERLINE DIFF.

RELAY

4P

4P

ISSHV SAS

RTU

ISSHV SASCLIENT


4P

LEGENDCABLE DESCRIPTION

NOTES:1. THE SEQUENCE ORDER OF EQUIPMENT ON COMMUNICATION NETWORK IS DIAGRAMMATIC

ONLY. THE OPTIMUM NETWORK SEQUENCE ORDER SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THECONTRACTOR.

2. ETHERNET NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS SHALL UTILISE IEC 61850: GOOSE AND MMSPROTOCOL.

3. ETHERNET SWITCHES SHALL BE CERTIFIED FOR IEC 61850 AND IEEE 1588 PTP NETWORK USE.4. ETHERNET SWITCHES SHALL BE RUGGED AND DESIGNED FOR USE IN A SUBSTATION

ENVIRONMENT. ETHERNET SWITCHES SHALL HAVE GIGABIT FIBRE OPTIC PORTS AND AMINIMUM OF FAST ETHERNET COPPER PORTS.

5. ETHERNET SWITCHES SHALL BE PROGRAMMED TO GIVE NETWORK PRIORITY TO GOOSEMESSAGES WITHIN THE SUBSTATION AND TO BLOCK GOOSE MESSAGE TRAFFIC BETWEEN ISS1AND OTHER NETWORK NODES.

6. COPPER ETHERNET CABLING SHALL BE CAT6 UTP. FIBRE OPTIC CABLING SHALL BE OS1 SMOF.7. FIBRE OPTIC ETHERNET CABLING SHALL USE ROBUST PATCH CABLES AND SHALL GENERALLY

USE LC CONNECTORS. PATCH CABLING FOR EQUIPMENT USING OTHER CONNECTORS SHALLHAVE A CONNECTOR TO SUIT AT THE EQUIPMENT END AND AN LC CONNECTOR AT THEETHERNET SWITCH END.

8. TIME SYNCHRONISATION BETWEEN ISS AND OTHER NETWORK NODES SHALL BE IEEE 1588ACROSS FIBRE OPTIC RING.

9. TIME SYNCHRONISATION OF HV IED'S SHALL BE SNTP.10. REFER TO DRAWING R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-268 AND R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-095 FOR HV SAS

RTU DETAILS.11. CONNECTOR DEPENDS ON THE RELAY PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACTOR/VENDOR.12. REFER DRAWING R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-292 FOR CABLE AND CONDUIT RETICULATION

LAYOUT.


PROTECTIONRELAY

ISS2-33BUS ZONE

PROTECTIONRELAY


PROTECTIONRELAY

TO ISS1 33kVSWITCHROOM TESTEQUIPMENTNETWORK SOCKET[R8000-WLM-15-DR-03-285]

4P

4P4P4P4P4P4P4P

22

TO PSS1

22

22

SM

SM

SM

22

22

SM

SM

2

2

2

2

2

22 SM2

4P4P4P4P 4P

FIBRE OPTIC - SINGLE MODE

COPPER ETHERNET

COAXIAL CONNECTOR

RJ45 CONNECTOR

COAXIAL CABLE

FIBRE OPTIC TERMINATIONDEVICE WIRING TERMINALS

LC FIBRE OPTIC CONNECTOR - LC TYPE

SM

SERIAL CABLE

FIBRE OPTIC - MULTI MODEMM

ST FIBRE OPTIC CONNECTOR - ST TYPE

TO ISS2 33kV SWITCHROOMTEST EQUIPMENTNETWORK SOCKET[R8000-WLM-15-DR-03-285]

4P

ISSDC SYSTEM B

ISSDC SYSTEM A

4P

2

2

2

2


4P

IEC 61850 DIFF. COMM'S

SM

22

ISS1-33 REMOTEIO MODULE

DIFF. COMM'S

SM

22

4P


4P

4P

ISS - STATION CONTROL RACK

ISS - DC SYSTEM PANEL

ISSSAS

FOBOT

COMM'SFOBOT

(BY OTHERS)

22

22

SM

22

SM

22

IEC 61850 DIFF. COMM'S DIFF. COMM'S

ISS2-33 INCOMERLINE DIFF.

RELAYISS2-33 REMOTE

IO MODULE

2

48 COREFIBRE OPTIC(FO) CABLETO COMM'SPIT ALONGMEDOWIE RD(NOTE 12)2

SM

SM

AUSGRIDCOMM'SFOBOT

2SM

2SM

TO PSS2

48 COREFIBRE OPTIC(FO) CABLETO COMM'SPIT ALONGMEDOWIE RD(NOTE 12)


SECONDARY CABLE

630A


-PSS2-33-A01

PSS2-33.ISS2-33

-A02

PSS2-33.T1

Id>

BUSZONE

TYPE4

TO 11 kV SWITCHBOARDPSS2.T1 CT'S(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-310)

TO 11 kV SWITCHBOARDPSS2-11(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-310)

PSS2-T116MVA33/11 kVKNANDyn1110.5%

WTICT


PRVOS

TRANSFORMERMONITORINGTO HV SASRTU


PHASE FAILURE RELAY

WINDING TEMPERATURE PROTECTION ELEMENT

OIL TEMPERATURE PROTECTION ELEMENT

OIL SURGE PROTECTION ELEMENT

PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE

BUCHHOLZ PROTECTIVE DEVICE (GAS RELAY)

WATT-HOUR METER






TYPE 4 TRANSFORMER PROTECTION

Wh

PSL

SM


RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT PROTECTIONREF


PRV

OS




TRANSFORMER CONTROL AND MONITORING TERMINALNOTES:1. PROTECTION RELAYS SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH IEC 61850

COMMUNICATIONS OVER COPPER ETHERNET.2. WHERE PRACTICAL ALL PROTECTION FUNCTIONS SHOWN FOR

EACH DEVICE SHALL BE INTEGRATED INTO A SINGLE PROTECTIONRELAY.

3. SWITCHGEAR ARRANGEMENT INCLUDING INSTRUMENTTRANSFORMER LOCATIONS TO BE CONFIRMED WITH VENDORDATA.

4. THE NEUTRAL EARTHING RESISTORS (NERs) ADDED.

ABBREVIATIONS:CT CURRENT TRANSFORMERGCS GENERATOR CONTROL SYSTEMKNAN LIQUID NATURAL AIR NATURALPCMS POWER CONTROL AND MONITORING SYSTEMRTU REMOTE TERMINAL UNITSAS SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMWTI WINDING TEMPERATURE INDICATOR

TEST LINK TERMINAL


TEST BLOCK

INTERCONNECTORFROM ISS2-33(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-250)

Id>

m<3










IS1

IR1




SM

TYPE2 PROTECTION RELAY OUTPUT (SAS)


PSLPSL

φ<

SYNCHRONISM CHECKφ<

V


PRIMARY CABLE

SECONDARY WIRING

PRIMARY BUS

SURGE DIVERTER

NER6.35 Ω(1000 A)10s

PSS2-R1

630A



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W



Drawn:

BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESPSS2 (PRIMARY SWITCHING STN 2)33 kV SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM

N.T.S 02-11-2015

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-300 3

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 12.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 02.11.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*3 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*



R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 300.3. 3.BUS ZONE HIGH IMPEDANCE DIFFERENTIAL RELAY

WILL BE LOCATED IN PANEL -A02 ONLY.

-T4,5,63

6

Id> -F2Vs = 85V

-X1

-T1,2,33

400:10.05PX300R3.0

33kV BUS

600:10.05PX450R3.0

BUS VT BUS (110V)

33kV CABLE PANEL PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM-PSS2-33-A02

PSS2-33 33kV SWITCHBOARD

33kV BUS

BUS ZONE CT

-X1

220 160 SET

33kV INTERCONNECTORPROTECTION PANEL

-X1

IS1IR1


SM

6

-T7,8,933,000/ 3 : 110/ 330VA EACH PHASE 0.5M(BUS VT)

TO PROTECTION RELAY IN33kV TRANSFORMERPROTECTION PANEL(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-303)

BUS ZONE CT

6

TESTMODE

BUS FAULT

V

BUS TRIP

10kA

-X1

-X1

TESTMODE

TYPE 2

-A02

-Q1630A

-S1

CLOSECOIL

-Y1-Y1

M



CB CLOSED

CB OPENED



LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

TRIP

-F1

-X1

REMOTEMODE

LOCALMODE

LOCA

LRE

MOT

E

TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

LOCALCLOSE

LOCALOPEN

NOTE 3TCS

BUS ZONE TRIP

CB TRIPPED

REMOTE CLOSE

REMOTE OPEN/TRIP

CLOSE (SAS)

CB FAIL

OPEN (SAS)TRIP(BUS TRIP)

BUS TRIP

BUS VT BUS (110V)

-X1FROM CTS PANEL -A01(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-308

TRIPCOIL

(NOTE 1) -Y2

-F2



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W




DraftingCheck:


BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESPSS2 (PRIMARY SWITCHING STN 2)33 kV CABLE PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-302 3

0 27.03.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 12.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 17.03.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*3 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*



R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 300.3. 33/11kV TRANSFORMER PROTECTION RELAY SHALL

PROVIDE INTERTRIP SIGNALS TO PSS2-11kV INCOMERPANEL USING IEC 61850 GOOSE MESSAGING.

-T4,5,63

6

-T7,8,9

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 3P

-Q1630A

-S1

CLOSECOIL

TRIPCOIL

(NOTE 1) -Y2

-Y1



CB CLOSED

CB OPENED



LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

TRIP

REF

φ<

-F1

-Y1

33kV BUS

600:10.05PX450R3.0

BUS VT BUS (110V)

33kV TRANSFORMER PANEL PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM-PSS2-33-A01


33kV BUS

BUS ZONE CT

-X1

6

-X1

REMOTEMODE

LOCALMODE

33kV TRANSFORMERPROTECTION PANEL

LOCA

LRE

MOTE

TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

LOCALCLOSE

LOCALOPEN

-X1

-X1

SPARE

-T1,2,33

6

-F2

TO PSS2-11-A02CT TERMINALS

-F2

TRANSFORMER OILTEMPERATURE TRIP

TRANSFORMER WINDINGTEMPERATURE TRIP

TRANSFORMER OIL LEVELTRIP

TRANSFORMER BUCHHOLZTRIP

TRANSFORMER TANKPRESSURE TRIP

OLTC OIL LEVEL TRIP

OLTC BUCHHOLZ TRIP

OLTC TANK PRESSURE TRIP

FROM TRANSFORMEROLTC MARSHALLINGPANEL

FROM TRANSFORMERMARSHALLING PANEL

PSS2-R1NER

-X1

-X1

400:10.05PX500R3.0

TCS

REMOTE CLOSE

REMOTE OPEN/TRIP

CLOSE (SAS)

OPEN (SAS)TRIP (11kV CBF)TRIP (BUS TRIP)

CB TRIPPED 11kV INTERTRIP(NOTE 3)

FROM CT IN PSS2-33 PANEL -A02(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-302)

TO PROTECTION RELAY IN 33kVINTERCONNECTOR PRTECTION PANEL(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-302)

-X1 TESTMODE

CB FAIL BUS TRIP

TRIP SIGNAL FROM PROTECTION RELAY(-F1) IN INTERCONNECTOR PROTECTION(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-302)

M

-A01

TYPE 4

-T13

1000:10.05PX300R3.0

NER6.35 Ω(1000 A)10s

TO PSS2-T1NEUTRAL

OLTC TANK PRESSURE TRIPOLTC BUCHHOLZ TRIP

TRANSFORMER TANK PRESSURE TRIPTRANSFORMER BUCHHOLZ TRIP


BUS VT BUS (110V)




TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W



Drawn:

BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESPSS2 (PRIMARY SWITCHING STN 2)33 kV TRANSFORMER PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-303 4

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 12.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 02.11.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*3 17.03.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*4 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

JW* LB* DA*

10kA



R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-005 AND 400.3. 33/11kV TRANSFORMER PROTECTION RELAY SHALL

PROVIDE INTERTRIP SIGNALS TO PSS2-11kV INCOMERPANEL USING IEC 61850 GOOSE MESSAGING.

-T4,5,63

6

-T7,8,9

33,000/√3 : 110/√330VA EACH PHASE 3P

-Q1630A

-S1

CLOSECOIL

TRIPCOIL

(NOTE 1) -Y2

-Y1



CB CLOSED

CB OPENED



LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

LOCAL CLOSE

LOCAL OPEN

TRIP

REF

φ<

-F1

-Y1

33kV BUS

600:10.05PX450R3.0

33kV TRANSFORMER PANEL PROTECTION AND CONTROL DIAGRAM-PSS4-33-A01


33kV BUS

BUS ZONE CT

-X1

BUS VT BUS (110V)

6

-X1

REMOTEMODE

LOCALMODE

33kV TRANSFORMERPROTECTION PANEL

LOCA

LRE

MOTE

TRIP CIRCUIT FAULT

LOCALCLOSE

LOCALOPEN

-X1

-X1

SPARE

-T1,2,33

6

-F2

TO PSS4-11-A02CT TERMINALS

-F2

TRANSFORMER OILTEMPERATURE TRIP

TRANSFORMER WINDINGTEMPERATURE TRIP

TRANSFORMER OIL LEVELTRIP

TRANSFORMER BUCHHOLZTRIP

TRANSFORMER TANKPRESSURE TRIP

OLTC OIL LEVEL TRIP

OLTC BUCHHOLZ TRIP

OLTC TANK PRESSURE TRIP



-X1

-X1

400:10.05PX300R3.0

TCS

REMOTE CLOSE

REMOTE OPEN/TRIP

CLOSE (SAS)

CB TRIPPED 11kV INTERTRIP(NOTE 3)

-X1 TESTMODE

OPEN (SAS)TRIP (11kV CBF)TRIP (BUS TRIP)

CB FAIL BUS TRIP

TYPE 4

M

10kA

PSS4-R1NER

-T13

1000:10.05PX300R3.0

NER6.35 Ω(1000 A)10s

TO PSS4-T1NEUTRAL

BUS VT BUS (110V)

OLTC TANK PRESSURE TRIPOLTC BUCHHOLZ TRIP

TRANSFORMER TANK PRESSURE TRIPTRANSFORMER BUCHHOLZ TRIP





TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W



Drawn:

BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESPSS4 (PRIMARY SWITCHING STN 4)33 kV TRANSFORMER PANEL SLD

N.T.S 17-03-2016

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-403 4

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 12.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 02.11.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*3 17.03.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*4 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

AM* LB* DA*


630A

-PSS3-33-A01 -A02

PSS3-33.PSS4-33

-A03

PSS3-33.T1


Id>

BUSZONE


SM

TYPE2


PSL


PHASE FAILURE RELAY

WINDING TEMPERATURE PROTECTION ELEMENT

OIL TEMPERATURE PROTECTION ELEMENT

PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE

WATT-HOUR METER













IS1

IR1

Wh

Id>

m<3

PSL

SM



PRV





NOTES:1. PROTECTION RELAYS SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH IEC

61850 COMMUNICATIONS OVER COPPER ETHERNET.2. WHERE PRACTICAL ALL PROTECTION FUNCTIONS

SHOWN FOR EACH DEVICE SHALL BE INTEGRATEDINTO A SINGLE PROTECTION RELAY.


ABBREVIATIONS:CT CURRENT TRANSFORMERGCS GENERATOR CONTROL SYSTEMKNAN LIQUID NATURAL AIR NATURALPCMS POWER CONTROL AND MONITORING SYSTEMRTU REMOTE TERMINAL UNITSAS SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMWTI WINDING TEMPERATURE INDICATOR

TEST LINK TERMINAL


TEST BLOCK


630A

PSL

PSS3-33.ISS1-33

INTERCONNECTORFROM ISS1-33(R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-200)


SM

TYPE2

630A

TYPE4

TO NEW 11 kV SWITCHBOARDPSS3-11.T1 CT'SR8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-510

TO EXISTING 11 kVSWITCHBOARD PSS3-11

PSS3-T1

16MVA33/11 kVKNANDyn1110.5%

WTICT

PSL



TYPE 4 TRANSFORMER PROTECTION RELAY


RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT PROTECTIONREF




EXISTING

SYNCHRONISM CHECKφ<

φ< V

SECONDARY CABLE


PRIMARY CABLE

SECONDARY WIRING

PRIMARY BUS

PRV

φ< φ<



TITLE



CLIENT

CONSULTANT

MANAGING CONTRACTOR


PROJECT



PROJECT MANAGERS



T 61 8 8111 6600 F 61 8 8111 6699


REV'DDES'NREV'W



Drawn:

BASE WLMELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTUREHV TRUNK SERVICESCEPS/PSS3 (PRIMARY SWITCHING STN 3)PSS3-33 33 kV SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM

N.T.S 12-05-2015

R8000-WLM-15-DR-EL-03-500 2

0 10.04.15 FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* DB* DA*1 12.05.15 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION LB* DB* DA*2 20.09.16 RE-ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION AOK* MS* DE*

MJC LB DB*

AM* LB* DA*

Appendix E - (Ausgrid Williamtown Protection andResponses)

Item # Ausgrid Comments GHD Response Ausgrid Response ActionREVIEW OF SUPPLIED DRAWINGS

1

Drawings do not show sufficient detail to confirm the correct polarity connection of VT’s and CT’s connected to Line Differentialand Directional OCEF protections.

Detailed shop drawings will only be available once Downer/ABB have prepared them,and then reviewed by GHD. As an example, a number of existing Downer/ABB 'As-Built'drawings have been provided as an attachment to this correspondence which depictthe VT & CT polarity connections on the existing 33 kV Incomer panels at RAAFWilliamtown. The GHD drawings presented to Ausgrid as part of the protection reportreview process represent the design intent, it must be noted that Downer will be shopdrawing the detailed connections in more finite detail.

Lend Lense in conjunction with Downer/ABB.

2

Drawings do not show sufficient detail to confirm correct connection to Line Differential and Directional OCEF protection relays Detailed shop drawings will only be available once Downer/ABB have prepared them,and then reviewed by GHD. As an example, a number of existing Downer/ABB 'As-Built'drawings have been provided as an attachment to this correspondence which depictthe VT & CT polarity connections on the existing 33 kV Incomer panels at RAAFWilliamtown. The GHD drawings presented to Ausgrid as part of the protection reportreview process represent the design intent, it must be noted that Downer will be shopdrawing the detailed connections in more finite detail.

Lend Lense in conjunction with Downer/ABB.

3There are discrepancies between the ordering of CT's on the two incoming feeders between different drawings. Eg. Drawings - 200& 201 – 250 &251: Line Differential, DOCEF, Metering and Check Metering CT’s are shown in different location between the twodrawings.

Noted. CT ordering will be corrected and re-issued on respective drawings -200 & 201, -250 & 251

Noted Applicable drawings have been amended.

4 7SD610 relay shows multiple VT connections Noted. Drawings -204 & -254 will be corrected and re-issued. Noted Applicable drawings have been amended.

5Three phase schematics showing the connections between the CT and VT and the relays between should be provided. They sholddetail the connection at the CT. e.g. P1/2 and S1/2 terminals and the provision of the CT star point

Comment as per Line Item 1 above. Lend Lense in conjunction with Downer/ABB.

6 DC Schematics or wiring diagrams showing relay connections shall be provided. Comment as per Line Item 2 above. Lend Lense in conjunction with Downer/ABB.7 Necessary modifications to drawings to confirm consist CT locations on the incomers Comment as per Line Item 3 above. Lend Lense in conjunction with Downer/ABB.

FEEDER RACK 1 PANEL - INCOMER PROTECTIONFeeder Protection and Anti Islanding Relay

8GOOSE messages: GOOSE messaging shall only be used for anti-islanding protection functions, not MMS due to speedrequirements

Agreed. GOOSE Required or alternative hardwired scheme required. MMS triptimes of 10-12s from test results does not meet NS194 and is notacceptable

Lend Lense in conjunction with Downer.

9

Under Frequency: Please confirm what the multiple elements do The multiple under frequency (UF) elements are used for potential under frequencyload shedding (UFLS) provisions in accordance with the National Electricity Rules (NER).The RAAF Williamtown HV network has under frequency load shedding (UFLS) based onprogrammed functionality within the Substation Automation System (SAS). This shallopen ring main CBs in order to disconnect load.The SAS shall monitor the multiple UF elements of the 33 kV incomer protection relaysand operate load shedding based on the supply network frequency of the connected 33kV supply. This load shedding shall be triggered automatically on system UF when the33 kV under frequency protection elements are active, staged progressively between49.0 Hz and 47.0 Hz as required by the National Electricity Rules (NER). These frequencypoints and the associated shedding time delays are programmed into the protectionrelay and are not alterable by the SAS. Reconnection of the load after an UFLS eventshall automatically occur when the system frequency returns to normal for a pre-setperiod of time, with reconnection staged progressively between 47.0 Hz and 49.0 Hz inthe reverse order to the load shedding operations.

Noted Closed out

10

Grid Reverse Power: What is the rationale behind the chosen setting, noting that this is what the existing setting is? I.e. with theload on the base, will the generators ever export more than 1000kW to our network if Williamtown Zone is islanded from thenetwork? Can this be made more sensitive with a higher time delay?

The grid reverse power settings have been selected from GHD experience on similarinstallations. The dynamic performance of the governors has been tested with thecurrent settings and proven stable enough to regulate under the instance that a largeload is suddenly disconnected from the base.The current grid reverse power settings could be adjusted to a more sensitive pickupsetting (say 300 kW for 3-secs) however there is the potential for nuisance tripping asthe performance of the governors with more sensitive settings is untested.

So no actual system modelling of the loading on the RAAF andsurrounding network was performed to come up with this setting?From the load info on the application the generators should be non-export. Therefore Ausgrid's preference is that a lower setting that willactually detect reverse power situtations along with a 2 second timedelay is preferred. Customer should provide calculations showing thebase's nominal loads during generator testing.

Testing can occur at any time of year at any time of day and sothe Base load varies greatly. In addition, the load variesdepending upon the operational tempo at the time.GHD are unable to provide information about the Base'snominal loads during testing.

The generator controls are set to maintain a minimum importlevel when running in parallel. However, should a large load beswitched off while testing is occuring then there is a potentialthat the system will export power until the governors respond.The reverse power setting needs to be stable while thiscorrection occurs.

We note Ausgrid preference for a more sensitive setting hencethe setting has now been amended to 300kW for 2 seconds.

Ausgrid Review of GHD Protection Report and Stage 2 Design Drawings 08/05/2018

11

Overcurrent:They have used/ been given fault levels at Williamtown Bus that are higher than our model, because system changes haveoccurred that removed the tee to Nelson Bay. They have been provided with an update of fault levels 3/4/18 via planningThey need to lower the Dir OC settings. I would suggest they should lower their Dir OC settings to 250A with 200ms delay or lessThey should set the Dir EF with 50A pickup or less and a time delay of 200ms or lessThey need to select different characteristics or risk mal-grades.The Hi-set OC settings appear to be too high.

1. Revised fault levels - to incorporate the revised fault levels will require extensiverework. Lend Lease to provide GHD direction on approved variation works.Alternatively, the intended settings may remain as currently provided (withoutamendment and rework to the existing documentation) as the revised fault levels are areduction of ~25% to the previous Ausgrid fault levels, and shouldn't impactsignificantly on the settings.2. The proposed revised Directional OC settings are acceptable. Protection report willbe updated and reissued to 250A at 200ms.3. The proposed revised Directional EF settings are acceptable. Protection report willbe updated and reissued to 50A at 200ms.4. Ausgrid had not previously advised of the limitation on the use of standard inversecurves. Extreme inverse curves have been selected inorder to grade over existingdownstream RAAF HV protection settings. Modifying the upstream grading at thisstage of project may cause a mal-grade in the existing downstream RAAF HV network.Ausgrid to provide settings for GHD to overlap and assess the impacts of mal-grade?5. The Hi-set is based on 33kV earth fault level, and the 11kV through fault on HVSYS-A.(HVSYS-A is not currently impedance earthed). It can be reduced to reflect the decisionby the Redevelopment project to provide impedance earthing of HVSYS-A.

1-3, 5. Noted4. Data available on request.Comment: It is stated in the report that the OCEF grading philosophy ofthe incomers and busties will be achieved with unit schemes and it'spurpose is to serve as a backup should a unit scheme fail. We wouldfollow this same philosophy on our network. However all bus ties havebeen set with instantaneous elements to grade under the incomer andAusgrid's stipulation of a 400ms clearing time. The difference betweenthe min and max 33kV Fault levels on the RAAF base (especially EarthFaults) do not vary that much. So I would say that you will not achievegrading with the unit schemes using your proposed settings.

You could use the following philosophy; Set all bus ties with OC and EF hi-sets with a small delay so that you will grade with unit schemes and thenset the incomer with a 400ms delay on OC and EF Hi-sets. You could thenuse Definite time Earth fault settings through out the site on the 33kVnetwork to simplify grading and testing. The main benefits are gradingfor 33kV faults where the unit schemes operate correctly is provided.This has the secondary benefit that the risks of tripping on txf inrush arereduced further.

1: Fault level study has been amended to reflect revised faultlevels provided by Ausgrid.2-3, 5: Closed out.

4. We note Ausgrid comments regarding grading philosophymal-grade hence the hi-set settings have now been amended assuggested.

We would set our Feeder protection with a 400ms delay on highset asoutlined. With the accepted changes in the Directional OCEF protection(200ms hi-sets,) this will grade with the incoming 33kV Feeder'sDirectional protection for a failure of the Line Diff schemes and allinternal unit schemes plus the OCEF protection on the bus ties.

It won't grade with your non-directional incomer protection, howeverthe only scenario where this is of concern is for a bus fault on ISS1 orISS2 where the bus bar protection fails. In this scenario the Bus Tiebetween the two busses will operate on the OCEF highset, before boththe incomer and Ausgrid Fdr operate. The result is still the same as if thebusbar protection operated successfully in that supply from one feeder islost.

This malgrade is acceptable as the incomer OC/EF is a backuponly.

FEEDER RACK 3 PANEL - INCOMER PROTECTION12 Under Frequency: Please confirm what the multiple elements do Comment as per Line Item 9 above. Closed out

1

Vojislav Mirkovic

From: Michael CookSent: Tuesday, 3 April 2018 2:44 PMTo: Vojislav Mirkovic; Leigh BengerCc: Rob Baxter (InTouch); Andrew Levett (InTouch); Jeff Eyles (InTouch); Dean Birkett

(InTouch); David Bradshaw; Jo LeverSubject: FW: R8000 NACC Protection Report/Details - Revised Fault Levels

Gents,

FYI, please find comments below regarding updated fault levels for RAAF WLM from Ausgrid.

These updated values will need to be used in the protection study and report.

There were no other comments or attachments at this stage.

Kind Regards

Michael CookTechnical Director - Electrical

GHDT: +61 2 4979 9971 | F: +61 2 4979 9988 | V: 229971 | M: +61 438 267 753 | E: [email protected] Tower 24 Honeysuckle Drive Newcastle NSW 2300 Australia | www.ghd.comWATER | ENERGY & RESOURCES | ENVIRONMENT | PROPERTY & BUILDINGS | TRANSPORTATION

Please consider our environment before printing this email

From: Scott Short <[email protected]>Sent: Tuesday, 3 April 2018 2:25 PMTo: Rob Baxter (InTouch) <[email protected]>Cc: Andrew Levett (InTouch) <[email protected]>; Jeff Eyles (InTouch) <[email protected]>; DeanBirkett (InTouch) <[email protected]>; Michael Cook <[email protected]>Subject: RE: R8000 NACC Protection Report/Details

Hi Rob,

During the protection review it has been noted that the network configuration has changed along with the fault levels,thus the settings and protection assessment will be required to be updated accordingly.Please find the updated levels below.It should be noted that the cable impedances from Williamtown to RAAF have been assumed. As such fault levels havebeen provided at Williamtown. All max levels should be multiplied by 1.1. Minimum fault levels can be provided ifrequired. No generators at Williamtown have been connected in this study.

System Normal Fault Levels at RAAF base.

Single feeder into the RAAF

<-SCMVA-> <-Sym I''k rms-->/I/ AN(I)

X---------- BUS ----------X MVA AMP DEG4309 [WRAF033A 33.000] 3PH 259.49 4539.8 -80.35

LG 161.45 2824.6 -79.73LL 224.72 3931.6 -170.35

2

THEVENIN IMPEDANCE, X/R (OHM) Z+:0.703+j4.137, 5.88198 Z-:0.703+j4.137, 5.88209 Z0:2.200+j11.637,5.28882

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------With two feeders into the RAAF from Williamtown



LG 211.83 3706.1 -78.35LL 277.96 4863.1 -169.46


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Future Max. (Two feeders into the RAAF and all feeders closed into Williamtown)



LG 217.39 3803.4 -78.62LL 284.46 4976.7 -169.69


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Current Fault level at Williamtown<-SCMVA-> <-Sym I''k rms-->

/I/ AN(I)X---------- BUS ----------X MVA AMP DEG

4645 [WILL033B 33.000] 3PH 420.40 7355.1 -78.01LG 307.45 5378.9 -75.73LL 364.08 6369.7 -168.01


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Future Max at Williamtown


X---------- BUS ----------X MVA AMP DEG4645 [WILL033B 33.000] 3PH 433.41 7582.8 -78.26

LG 319.38 5587.7 -76.01LL 375.35 6566.9 -168.26


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kind regards,

Scott Short | Engineering Officer | Customer Relations & Major Connections | Ausgrid

Level Ground, 33 Kangoo Road, Somersby NSW 2250 AUSTRALIA: 02 4399 8098 (Extn 38098) | : 02-43510377 | : 0409 738 260 |: [email protected] |

Please consider the environment before printing this email

From: Rob Baxter <[email protected]>Sent: Tuesday, 27 February 2018 4:25 PM

3

To: Scott Short <[email protected]>Cc: Levett, Andrew <[email protected]>; Jeff Eyles <[email protected]>; Dean Birkett<[email protected]>; Michael Cook <[email protected]>Subject: R8000 NACC Protection Report/Details

Scott,

As discussed at our last meeting, here is a link to the revised GHD protection report/designs for NACC 33kV/CEPS.

This forms part of the Stage 2 33kV feeder design submission as well as the CEPS final NS194 protection submission.

https://⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀⸀/open?id=1sSi7IlAyfQC5zVZiGZtCkrq5fgm8u4MU

Can you please arrange for Ausgrid review/comment. Can you also confirm once you’ve downloaded the files.

Kind regards,Rob BaxterPh: 0412 684980

GRIDSCAPE PTY LTD

This email is privileged and confidential and is intended only for those to whom it is addressed. If you are not theintended recipient then any disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of the information is strictly prohibited; and would youplease contact this office immediately by return email or by phoning 61 2 4929 5102. The user assumes all responsibility for any lossor damage directly or indirectly from the use of this message and any attachments.

This e-mail may contain confidential or privileged information. If you have received it in error, please notifythe sender immediately via return e-mail and then delete the original e-mail. If you are the intended recipient,please note the change of sender email address to @ausgrid.com.au. Ausgrid has collected your businesscontact details for dealing with you in your business capacity. More information about how we handle yourpersonal information, including your right of access is contained at http://www.ausgrid.com.au/_____________________This e-mail has been scanned for viruses

1

Vojislav Mirkovic

From: Gridscape <[email protected]>Sent: Wednesday, 1 August 2018 6:04 PMTo: Leigh Benger; Vojislav MirkovicSubject: Fwd: NACC R8000 Ausgrid Meeting 57 NotesAttachments: Ausgrid Review of GHD Protection Report and Drawings_AG_080518.xlsx;

ATT00001.htm

CompleteRepository: 3316018Description: NACC ProjectJobNo: 16018OperatingCentre: 33RepoEmail: [email protected]: Job

Fyi

Kind regardsRob BaxterSent from mobile device 0412 684980

Begin forwarded message:

From: Lindsey Collison <[email protected]>Date: 1 August 2018 at 5:31:59 pm ACSTTo: Rob Baxter <[email protected]>, Roland John Robertson <[email protected]>, JeffEyles <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>,Dean Birkett <[email protected]>, "[email protected]"<[email protected]>, Michael Cook <[email protected]>, Scott Short<[email protected]>Cc: Adam Bradford <[email protected]>Subject: RE: NACC R8000 Ausgrid Meeting 57 Notes

Hi Rob,

Please find details below regarding protection information and options to move forward.

Please note that the following information provided is to be utilised as a starting point, generallyAusgrid will perform a review the settings that have been proposed by the customer and look to gradeover the top of the settings proposed if reasonable. In this instance Ausgrid have asked to adjustsettings as there was an internal grading issue that had been identified due to the selection of curves(being EI) don't perform fast enough in the lower current regions.

There are two options identified below based upon the way in which GHD wish to proceed:

Option 1:If GHD choose to follow the previous correspondence from the protection review feedback collated inthe attached spreadsheet, and utilise definite time elements set at 200ms on bus ties and 400ms on theincomer. These settings are based upon the assumption that GHD elect the same pickups as stated intheir report being 80A and 100A respectively.Then Ausgrid will set feeder protection with a Definite Time element set at 120A, 400ms.

Option 2:If GHD elect to utilise curves for lower fault currents and utilise Hi-sets with timers as outlined by in theprevious protection feedback responses.

2

Ausgrid would deploy the settings below:Pickup - 120ACurve - IEC Std InvTMS - 0.2Hi-set - 1250A / 0.4s

Kind Regards,

Lindsey Collison | Engineer | Major Connections - North | AUSGRID

Level Ground, Wallsend Administration, Block A, 145 Newcastle Road, Wallsend NSW 2287AUSTRALIA: 02 4951 9276 (Extn 59276) | : 0427 000 903 |: [email protected] |

Please consider the environment before printing this email

From: Rob Baxter <[email protected]>Sent: Friday, 20 July 2018 10:45 AMTo: Roland John Robertson <[email protected]>; Lindsey Collison<[email protected]>; Jeff Eyles <[email protected]>; [email protected];Dean Birkett <[email protected]>; [email protected]; Michael Cook<[email protected]>; Scott Short <[email protected]>Subject: NACC R8000 Ausgrid Meeting 57 Notes

Notes from yesterday’s meeting attached

Could we make next meeting on the Friday 3/8/18 (say 11am)?

NACC R8000 Ausgrid Meeting 57Scheduled: 19 Jul 2018 at 11:00 am to 12:00 pmLocation: 145 Newcastle Rd, Wallsend NSW 2287, AustraliaInvitees: Roland John Robertson, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected],[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected],[email protected], [email protected]::~:~::~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~::~:~::-Please do not edit this section of the description.

This event has a video call.Join: https://meet.google.com/qim-khjo-hia+1 904-580-9022 PIN: 383394838#-::~:~::~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~::~:~::-

Rob BaxterConsulting DirectorMobile: 0412 684 980Email: [email protected]

GRIDSCAPE Pty Ltd

This e-mail may contain confidential or privileged information. If you have received it in error,please notify the sender immediately via return e-mail and then delete the original e-mail. If youare the intended recipient, please note the change of sender email address to @ausgrid.com.au.Ausgrid has collected your business contact details for dealing with you in your businesscapacity. More information about how we handle your personal information, including yourright of access is contained at http://www.ausgrid.com.au/

_____________________This e-mail has been scanned for viruses

Project No. R8000 Facilities Requirements for the New Air Combat Capability

Page 1 of 1 Printed: 27 January 2018

CEPS – Protection Requirements Description of Meeting: Discuss Ausgrid final protection requirements for the RAAF Williamtown CEPS installation.

Date: 23rd January 2018 Time: 9:30am – 11:00am

Location: Ausgrid Wallsend Admin Building (Newcastle)

Invitee: Organisation/Appointment Abbrev Present

Jeff Eyles Lend Lease JE Yes Dean Birkett Coffey DB Yes Leigh Benger GHD LB Yes Scott Short Ausgrid – Major Connections SS Yes

Lewis Garland Ausgrid – Tech Services LG Yes Joshua Payne Ausgrid – Protection Design JP Yes

Ben Jeayes Ausgrid – Protection Design BJ Yes Rob Baxter (notes) Gridscape RB Yes

Ref ITEM Action DATE 1.1 Meeting called to review outcomes from recent CEPS Stage 1 (2x2MW) commissioning and

discuss final CEPS protection requirements. Email from Ausgrid (SS) 11/1/18 outlining items for discussion was noted (attached).

Noted

1.2 Ausgrid confirmed that interim operation of CEPS stage 1 is now approved and subject to 11kV operational controls to avoid manual back energisation of the 33kV network. Noted

1.3 GHD (LB) advised that the interim intention is not to test or operate the generators in parallel with the mains until final schemes are implemented. CEPS operation requires PSS1-11.T1, PSS2-11.T1, PSS3-11.T1 and PSS4-11.T1 to be opened.

Noted

1.4 Site Operating Protocol with Ausgrid to be updated to outline/confirm above arrangements. Coffey (DB) to liaise/instruct HV Network Controller (John Robertson) who should attend the next Ausgrid coordination meeting.

Coffey /BGIS 8/2/18

1.5 DB/JL clarified that final CEPS anti-islanding schemes will be implemented with the second 33kV feeder (as part of the current NACC project). This will be before the two additional CEPS generators are commissioned (as part of WLM Stage 2 project).

Noted

1.6 Further discussion took place re final protection arrangements including: • Consideration for inter-tripping with Ausgrid 33kV CB’s at Williamtown • Coordination with protection requirements for second 33kV feeder • Ausgrid need for remote end indication • UV/OV/UF/OF and check-synch arrangements • Upgrading MMS messaging on PSS1-11.T1 to GOOSE

A revised protection report to be prepared by GHD (LB) confirming proposed final CEPS protection arrangements and compliance with Ausgrid NS194.

GHD TBC

1.7 It was acknowledged/agreed that Ausgrid review & approval for NACC final protection should also cater for the final CEPS (4x2MW) configuration. Noting that a new connection application will still need to be submitted prior to installation of the two additional generators by WLM Stage 2 project (as well as some local witness testing when they’re commissioned).

Noted

1.8 RB to prepare overview diagram illustrating above project approval coordination and include BGIS (John Robertson Daniel Zucca) on circulation of these minutes. RB 30/1/18

1.9 Follow-up meeting to be arranged (10am, 8 Feb 2018) to discuss 1.7 & 1.8 above with WLM Stage 2 representatives (TTT/CPB) and BGIS. RB/DB 8/2/18



High Voltage 33kV Ausgrid Supply – Meeting 49 Minutes Description of Meeting: To Progress the Upgrade of 33kV Ausgrid Supply and CEPS Installation

Date: 23rd January 2018 Time: 11:00am – 12:00pm

Location: Ausgrid Wallsend Admin Building (Newcastle)

Invitee: Organisation/Appointment Abbrev Present

Jeff Eyles Lend Lease JE Yes Dean Birkett Coffey DB Yes

Michael Cook GHD MC Yes Leigh Benger GHD LB Yes Scott Short Ausgrid – Major Connections SS Yes Kevin Smith Ausgrid – Major Connections KS Part Ben Jeayes Ausgrid – Protection BJ Yes

John Robertson BGIS – RAAF Network Controller JR No Rob Baxter (notes) Gridscape RB Yes

Ref ITEM Action DATE

1. General:

1.1 No objections raised to previous meeting 48 minutes. Noted

2. CEPS Protection Review:

2.1 Separate CEPS meeting also held 8/2/18 (refer notes). Noted

2.2 The need for coordinating design of protection upgrades for the second 33kV feeder with final CEPS protection details was identified to ensure compatibility/consistency. Noted

2.3 GHD (LB) to prepare revised protection report confirming proposed final CEPS arrangements and compliance with Ausgrid NS194 with consideration for 33kV feeder protection requirements (per CEPS meeting notes above).

GHD March 2018

3. Existing 33kV Feeder Upgrade (SC-06850):

3.1 Successful cutover prior to Christmas. Ausgrid (KS) advised that finalising related documentation/records is in still train between Downer and Ausgrid Compliance Group. Downer TBC

4. Second 33kV Feeder Project Design (SC-07947):

4.1 As noted earlier, feeder design submission to include details for related feeder protection upgrades per SC-07947 Design Information Package (DIP). Noted

4.2 SC-07947 DIP asks for primary feeder differential protection schemes (which is not catered for by existing relays at ISS). Noted

4.3 Ausgrid (BJ) noted that space limitations at Williamtown ZS will limit Ausgrid relay option to the Siemens 7SD610. GHD to incorporate this relay in designs for RAAF end (noting required firmware version will need to be confirmed with Ausgrid for compatibility).

GHD

4.4 Ausgrid to progress related protection design for Williamtown Zone. Ausgrid TBC

4.5 GHD (LB) to review/finalise designs for 33kV protection schemes in light of above and in consultation with Ausgrid (BJ) as required. GHD March

2018



Ref ITEM Action DATE 4.6 GHD (MC) requested clarification from Ausgrid following earlier verbal suggested changes

to second communication path (likely to require problematic trenching/dewatering). Ausgrid (SS) to follow-up and clarify requirements asap.

Ausgrid ASAP

4.7 GHD (MC) highlighted need for early review by Ausgrid of PLSCAD inputs prior to finalising designs. Ausgrid (KS) agreed, noting a similar approach for CYME rating assessments. GHD to prepare/provide details for Ausgrid review.

GHD/ Ausgrid ASAP

4.8 Final design submission being progressed by GHD, noting that incorporating protection details may take up to two months. GHD March

2018

5. Final CEPS (10MVA):

5.1 Coffey (DB) confirmed additional CEPS generators not to be commissioned until 33kV feeder and protection requirements above have all been completed. Noted TBA

5.2 TTT/CPB representatives to be included in related discussions on 8/2/18 (refer notes). DB/RB 8/2/18

Next general meeting proposed for 11:00am Thursday 8/2/18 (preceded by CEPS Review meeting at 10:00am).

Item Ausgrid Comment GHD Response2 P&C responses which are direct requests to the customer.

2.1 General 33 kV clearing time requirementsAll equipment directly connected to the 33 kV system shall be fitted with:• At least one instantaneous primary protection.• Backup protection which may have a time delay.

At Williamtown Zone, Ausgrid will fit a "high set" overcurrent or distance protection which can see all equipment directly connected to the 33 kV system,but will not see through the downstream transformers.

The high set element will have a time delay of no more than 400 ms, and all downstream protection will be expected to grade below. The 400 ms delay willallow for:• One instantaneous downstream element plus one breaker fail margin.• One instantaneous element, plus one other element graded above.

It is Ausgrid's view that the rules above provide a reasonable balance between minimisation of clearing time, and provision of grading.For the modern 33 kV switchgear proposed, Ausgrid considers a grading margin of 200 ms to be suf ficient.

A 400ms upstream protection time is a tight requirement, and would result in theremoval or coordination issues between the protection elements in the 33 kVnetwork. The proposed settings are offered as a balance between ensuring availabilityof supply to as much of the Defence network as possible under fault scenarios due toprotection coordination, and overall tripping time for the incomer overcurrent whichacts as a backup to the downstream protection.

Ausgrid to please confirm the current setting on which is highset element is based – itwould be considered that this is only achievable for fault protection and notovercurrent.

We will provide definite time set to 200ms. Pickup will be below the 33kV fault levelbut above the level of the 11kV fault referred to the 33kV side.We will allow for two 33/11kV transformers running in parallel when working out the11kV fault level just to add a margin.

2.2 General backup requirements for the whole networkAttention is drawn to clause S5.1.9 (c) of the National Electricity Rules, which states that all parts of the network must be covered by primary protection andbackup protection with allowance for breaker failure.

The Defence protection system is designed on the principle of the upstreamprotection providing backup coverage of the downstream elements. For the 33 kVnetwork, this results in the 33 kV incomer protection OC and EF providing the backupto the downstream network.

Do we need to provide duplicate protection on the incomer? (2 relays). This meansone relay on the X DC supply and one on the Y supply.Separate CTs for the backup protection. No VT input required it is just a simpledefinite time relay. All the main functions are on the primary relay.Two trip coils will be required.

2.3 Protection for 33 kV incoming feedersRefer to principle requirement in 2.1 above.Ausgrid requests that the 33 kV feeders between Williamtown Zone and RAAF be fitted with at least one line differential protection.Existing direct connected single mode optical fibre communications availability between Williamtown Zone and the RAAF base will be confirmed as a part ofthe stage 2 feasibility review.

The customer may choose between the following line differential relays which are approved for use on the Ausgrid network:(a) Siemens 7SD610(b) Schneider P54x(c) GE Multilin L90For item (a), the Ausgrid end (i.e. at Williamtown Zone) will have:• Order code 7SD6101-4BB99-0CJ0-L0S-M1A• Comms converter 7XV54610BH00• Firmware 4.63.01• Parameter set 4.61.04For item (b), the Ausgrid end will have:• Order code P54521BC6N0579K• Firmware 57VFor item (c), the Ausgrid end will have:• Order code L90-J03-HKH-F8L-H6A-LXX-N6U-S67-UXX-W7K• Firmware 6.04It is acceptable for the customer to vary the order code used at the customer end if required, but it is the customer's responsibility to ensure that the partinstalled is fully compatible with the Ausgrid end.

The CTs installed at Williamtown Zone Substation which will be used for line differential protection will be connected on 1000/5 ratio and have thefollowing class:• 1000-500/5• 0.1PX200R0.5 on 1000/5• As per AS60044.1The 5A secondary of the existing CTs is a legacy arrangement. Ausgrid recommends use of 1A CTs at the customer end, and advises for information that thefollowing class is used in new Ausgrid 33 kV breakers:• 1000-500/1• 0.1PX500R2.5 on 500/1• As per AS60044.1The customer must ensure that line differential CTs at the customer end are adequately dimensioned to ensure through-fault stability. The line differentialprotection will not be delayed or de-sensitised to account for inadequate CT performance.

2.4 Protection for 33 kV ISS1-ISS2 bus tieRefer to principal requirement in 2.1 above.Ausgrid requests that differential protection be installed on the ISS1-ISS2 bus tie, rather than the directional overcurrent scheme proposed.It is Ausgrid's understanding that, after the change above, all 33 kV equipment will be covered by at least one instantaneous differential protection.Confirmation of the above from the customer is requested.

This request can be accommodated, with modifications to the protection relays andCTs included in the 33 kV switchgear procurement package.

It is GHDs opinion as the designer that the protection of the bus-tie using overcurrentis acceptable given the low probability of failure of the bus-tie cable, which is installedcompletely within the 33 kV switchroom trench. The blocking scheme will be alomostas fast.

Adoption of this recommendation will assist in achieving a workable protectionsolution with the Ausgrid upstream protection clearance time.

2.5 Blocking of protection which covers assets owned by AusgridIn a number of places in the report, it is proposed that protection elements which cover Ausgrid owned equipment be blocked based on logic distributedacross the customer facility.In order to simplify witness testing requirements, Ausgrid requests that all elements which protect Ausgrid assets be continuously active.It is acceptable for overcurrent elements contained within line differential relays to be enabled or accelerated during communications failure.

The protection report includes blocking signals which are to be implemented in theDefence 33 kV network only.No blocking is intended to the upstream Ausgrid line differential protection orupstream backup.

The neutral displacement and anti-islanding is blocked unless the power station isconnected in parallel. We are not in favour of having the neutral displacementenabled all the time unless there is a significant time delay on it to avoid nuisancetripping. We would prefer the anti-islanding not to be enabled also to avoid nuisancetripping unless the generating sets are operating.

2.6 Backup protection for power transformersRefer to principal requirement in 2.2 above.Section 4.3.2 of the report mentions only a single transformer protection relay (RET615), and further suggests that buchholz and oil surge trips will berouted through the main protection relay. The wording suggests that failure of the main transformer protection relay will leave the transformer withoutprotection for internal faults. Please could the customer review and con firm that the transformers are provided with adequate backup for NER S5.1.9(c)compliance.

As per the response to 2.2, the Defence protection system is designed on the principleof the upstream protection providing backup coverage of the downstream elements.

If this is not acceptable, our proposal is to put in an OC/EF relay and wire the buchholzetc to it. Same arrangement as the duplicate incomer protection.

2.7 Remote indication of switchgear statusAusgrid requests that the status for the following items of switchgear at the customer end be communicated back to Williamtown Zone:• ISS1 Ausgrid incomer bay.• ISS1 bus tie bay.• ISS2 bus tie bay.• ISS2 Ausgrid incomer bay.For each item of switchgear, both 'a' and 'b' pallet statuses are required. If withdrawable switchgear is used, indication of circuit breaker state only issufficient. If fixed pattern switchgear is used, pallet status of series isolating switches is required in addition to breaker status.Depending on available relay I/O, it may be acceptable to transfer the switchgear state via the line differential relays described in 2.3. If I/O capacity in theline differential relays is insuf ficient, switchgear status may be transferred via SEL contact transfer modules:• Order code SEL 0250603313X

Ausgrid previously advised that no status monitoring signals would be required.

This can be accommodated.The design of the Ausgrid protection panels and connections is not within the scopeof the Defence HV infrastructure works.

2.8 Alarms for missing GOOSE messagesIn section 2.9 of the report, it is stated that the only action a relay will take for absence of a GOOSE message is local annunciation.If GOOSE messages are used for protection-critical functions, absence of the GOOSE message must raise an alarm which will be monitored by a humanoperator.

The modes of operation which would result in a loss of GOOSE messages, being testmode, relay fault or a communications fault are monitored through the SubstationAutomation System and hence the Power Control and Monitoring System on site.

2.9 Testing of functions which protect Ausgrid assetsIn section 2.9, mention is made of a special relay test mode. Any elements which protect Ausgrid assets must be witness tested as they will be while in-service. Test modes and temporary disabling of elements are not permitted.

The protection report includes test modes which are to be implemented in theDefence 33 kV network only for ongoing protection relay testing throughout the life ofthe equipment. They are not intended to be a substitute for full commissioningtesting of the protection system.

No inhibiting is intended to the operation of the upstream Ausgrid line differentialprotection or upstream backup.

2.10 Fault rating of 33 kV equipmentThe fault rating of the 33 kV equipment is not listed in the report. The customer is advised that 33 kV equipment must be designed for a fault rating of 31.5kA for 3 seconds.

The Defence 33 kV switchgear is rated to 31.5 kA for 1 second, which is consideredsufficient for the advised prospective current and future fault levels and clearancetimes with margin for reasonable future growth.

The Defence 33 kV cables are rated appropriately for the prospective current andfuture fault levels advised for the system with margin for reasonable future growth, asis standard practice for private installations.

As far as we are aware, the requirement for the entirety of the 33 kV installation to berated to 31.5 kA for 3 s has not been advised previously, and would be extremelyonerous and expensive to accommodate.

2.11 Operating mode and paralleling of Ausgrid suppliesThe customer is requested to confirm the operating rules for the proposed network. In particular, the following information is requested:• The location of normally open points.• Allowable abnormal switching.• The behaviour of any auto-closing or automatic changeover schemes.

Ausgrid requests the following operating restrictions:(a) The two 33 kV feeders from Ausgrid must not be paralleled, except by prior written agreement for short periods during switching.(b) The 11 kV windings of downstream transformers must not be paralleled, unless the 33 kV windings are paralleled first.Item (b) is intended to prevent 33 kV equipment being back-fed through delta windings without appropriate earth fault protection. It may be possible torelax item (b) depending on the availability and position of neutral voltage displacement (NVD) protection.

The actual procedures and rules will be developed by the Network Controller.

(a) This is as expected for the operation of the network. Operation procedures willlimit the parallel operation on the 33 kV network to with Ausgrid approval only.

(b) Under normal circumstances we will not be paralleling the transformers. Again, theactual procedures and rules will be developed by the Network Controller.

A NVD protection element has been implemented on the 33 kV incomers which isenabled while the Defence generators are in operation, in addition to the anti-islanding functionality.

3 P&C responses which are recommendations to the customer.3.1 GOOSE breaker fail scheme

Throughout the report, it is proposed that all relays associated with a bus subscribe to breaker-fail GOOSE messages from all other relays on the same bus.The proposed arrangement means that a setting or relay change in one bay may require setting changes and/or re-proving of relays on all other bays on thesame bus. Additionally, the required GOOSE mappings are substantial and complicated.Ausgrid recommends that the arrangement be re-considered. Ausgrid internally prefers hard-wired signals for CBF trips because they are much easier toprove and isolate. If the customer absolutely requires GOOSE communication for breaker-failure, the following arrangement is recommended:• Subscribe the busbar protection relay to CBF GOOSE messages from each bay relay.• Provide a separate trip contact on the busbar protection relay for CBF trips.The arrangement above makes practically no difference to hardware requirements, yet substantially reduces the number and complexity of GOOSEmappings. The separate contact on the busbar protection relay allows individual bay relays to be re-con figured and re-tested without taking the busprotection or unrelated bays out of service.

The GOOSE tripping is used on the protection system to minimise the complexity ofthe wiring in the system.The CBF tripping is inhibited from an individual bay when the relay is under test, andwould also be during modification. This is considered acceptable for the network, asthe CBF is provided as a backup function only to speed up clearance to faster than theupstream protection setting.It is our experience that protection changes in Defence HV networks occurinfrequently and usually as a result of primary system modification or equipmentreplacement, which will inherently require re-configuration and re-commissioning ofthe system.In addition, the individual mapping of peer relays is used to implement the test mode,which allows end to end monitoring from send to receive register of trip signals sentover GOOSE to the receiving IED, without unintended operation of the other IEDs.This was successfully implemented and commissioned on a recent Defence project atHMAS Albatross.

3.2 Use of ROCOF for anti-islanding protectionThe report proposes use of rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) elements in the Ausgrid incomer relays for anti-islanding protection, despite all generatorsbeing non-exporting.Experience indicates that ROCOF elements, when set sensitively enough to detect genuine islanding, will operate for most faults on the upstream 33 kVnetwork. Ausgrid recommends avoiding both ROCOF and vector shift elements if suitable alternatives are available.Strategically positioned low-forward-power, reverse-power and intertrip facilities are likely to be much less troublesome.

The above comment is noted.The following anti-islanding functions are currently proposed for use when agenerating set is operated in parallel to the mains:• ROCOF; and• Reverse power at 33 kV incomer.

Some supply authorities insist on ROCOF, we are open to using other methods ifpreferred by Ausgrid.

We note that the above anti-islanding elements are implemented as a backup to theanti-islanding inherent to the Generator Control System, which has direct operationcontrol of the 11 kV incomer CB for anti-islanding events.

3.3 Tripping of 11 kV incomer breakers for anti-islandingThe report suggests that all 11 kV incomer breakers will be tripped when anti-islanding protection operates. The customer is strongly advised to ensure thatanti-islanding protection only trips generators, and not loads.

The anti-islanding isolates the base from the mains so that the generators cancontinue to supply the base without backfeeding the Ausgrid network.

The synchronising point is on the 11kV incomer breakers so these breakers areopened. The 33kV incoming breakers remain closed.

2.3 This seems to conflict with 2.1 above.Ausgrid have previously told us that their protection will not be differential and wehave designed on that basis. We had originally designed a room to house equipmentthat Ausgrid would require access to the building.Where would the equipment be proposed to be located?

This can be accommodated in the design. CTs have been included in the 33 kV designdocumentation to allow for the connection of Ausgrid line differential protection.These will be adjusted to the recommended CTs as used by Ausgrid to match their endof the line.

The design of the Ausgrid protection panels and connections is not within the scopeof the Defence HV infrastructure works.

The location of the Ausgrid protection equipment is to be negotiated and confirmed,as it has not been allowed for the ISS design, being removed when negotiations wereunderway for a separate Ausgrid building.

GHD

145 Ann Street Brisbane QLD 4000GPO Box 668 Brisbane QLD 4001T: (07) 3316 3000 F: (07) 3316 3333 E: [email protected]

© GHD 2018

This document is and shall remain the property of GHD. The document may only be used for thepurpose for which it was commissioned and in accordance with the Terms of Engagement for thecommission. Unauthorised use of this document in any form whatsoever is prohibited.G:\33\16018\WP\470957.docx

Document Status

RevNo.

Author Reviewer Approved for IssueName Signature Name Signature Date

0 S. Horoufi L. Benger *L. Benger D. Ellis *D. Ellis 23.12.16

1 V.Mirkovic L. Benger *L. Benger D. Ellis *D. Ellis 11.10.17



4 V.Mirkovic E.Goasdoue *E.Goasdoue D. Ellis *D. Ellis 14.08.18

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Documents

Appendix B - (Earth Fault Protection Grading)