Apeiron Volume 30 Issue 4 1997 [Doi 10.1515%2FAPEIRON.1997.30.4.25] Graham, Daniel W. -- What Socrates Knew

What Socrates KnewDaniel W. Graham

Thus came about the end, O Echecrates, of our companion, the man, weshould say, who of all those we knew of his generation was most nobleand wisest and most just. (Phd 118al5-18)

Of all the paradoxes associated with Socrates, perhaps none is moredeeply rooted in the life and death of the man himself than the problemof whether he was, in his own terms, virtuous. By both his portrayalsand his testimony, Plato makes him a paragon of virtue. On the otherhand, Socrates' own principles seem to make philosophical wisdom aprerequisite of virtue. And Socrates notoriously claims to have no specialwisdom. Was Socrates virtuous because of his being a philosopher, orrather in spite of or independently of his philosophical theory? Or, to putit another way, was Socrates philosophically virtuous or simply conven-tionally virtuous? The answer to the question seems to depend cruciallyon what Socrates knew.

Consider three characteristics of Socrates' philosophy, method andlife:

Disavowal of Knowledge (DK). Socrates has no specialknowledge.

VK. Virtue is knowledge.

SV. Socrates is virtuous.

These three points seem to be incompatible. If Socrates has no specialknowledge, and if virtue is knowledge, then Socrates is not virtuous; if

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26 Daniel W. Graham

he has no special knowledge but yet is virtuous, then virtue must not beknowledge; if virtue is knowledge and Socrates is virtuous, then he musthave knowledge. Thus DK and VK entail not-SV; DK and SV entailnot-VK; while VK and SV entail not-DK. Clearly some sort of revisionof the list is needed, or some point or points must be reinterpreted orqualified if we are to arrive at a consistent interpretation of Socrates' lifeand teachings. Several options may be considered a priori. It may be thatSocrates is only feigning ignorance and that in reality he has a wellworked out theory which would count as philosophical knowledge andwhich would qualify him as having philosophical virtue and hence asbeing virtuous. It may be that the apparently stringent claim that virtueis knowledge, when properly interpreted, points to something much lessidealized than perfect theoretical knowledge, so that even with a modestamount of knowledge, Socrates can be virtuous. Finally, it may be thatDK and VK should be taken at face value, and that Socrates is indeedlacking in virtue, at least in the kind of virtue he seeks to attain, namelythat based on philosophical wisdom. There is some prima facie plausi-bility in each of these options, and they all deserve, no doubt, to beexplored in detail. However, I shall not undertake to pursue any of thesecourses. I wish to suggest that all three of the principles in question aretrue in some important sense. But when we understand them, we shallsee that they are all compatible.

II

We can take it as a datum that Socrates is virtuous. As he says on his ownbehalf at his trial,

Throughout my whole life, in whatever acts I have done in public, Ihave manifestly behaved as I have in private, never consenting toinjustice by anyone, much less to injustice by any of those whom myslanderers claim are my disciples. (Ap 33al-5)

However apologetic Socrates may be about his reputation for wisdom,he finds nothing to repent of in his actions, whether public or private.His behavior has been above reproach (he gives examples at 32aff. and28e). The question at hand is whether his behavior is grounded in theory— whether he is philosophically virtuous in some important sense. Itwill remain a further question whether Socrates thinks, all things con-sidered, that he is a philosophically virtuous person by his own stand-



What Socrates Knew 27

ards. For now let us concentrate on the question whether we think he isphilosophically virtuous by our standards. I propose that we considertwo criteria for philosophical virtue.

(i) A philosophically virtuous person acts on the basis of ethicalprinciples. It will not be enough to be philosophically virtuous that oneshould act in such a way that some good outcome result from his action.One could achieve such a result by chance or by whim or for evil or selfishor self-serving reasons. Minimally one should act on the basis of somekind of recognizable principle. We need not require that the principle orprinciples in question be rules: the act utilitarian may well qualify as aphilosophically virtuous person even though he acts not on a rule per se,but by subjecting an individual act to a philosophical principle. But thatprinciple does have objective value as at least an allegedly general basisfor evaluating acts that any potential agent could invoke. The importantthing is that the principle in question purport to offer an objective basisfor moral action that does not amount to a mere personal preference onthe agent's part.

(ii) The ethical principles referred to by the agent must be appealedto on the basis of philosophical reasons. Imagine for instance that I amvirtuous because I adhere to the principle that one should always do untoothers as one would have done unto oneself. I could adhere to thatprinciple either because it was commanded by Jesus in the Sermon onthe Mount, or because it was equivalent to the Categorical Imperativeenunciated by Kant. An action based on the principle would, I assume,be virtuous in either case. But in the former case I would not be said tobe philosophically virtuous, but religiously virtuous. In the latter case Imight be philosophically virtuous. Note, however, that even in the lattercase, I might be less than philosophically virtuous if, for instance, I didnot understand a word of Kant, did not know what the CategoricalImperative was, and did not have any theoretical ability to explain,defend, or otherwise evaluate the theory behind the principle. I might,for instance, have been impressed by a follower of Kant and wish tobecome a disciple without any philosophical equipment to understandthe theory for myself. At that point I would accept the principle oftreating others always as ends, but I would accept it on authority; I wouldnot have philosophical reasons for adhering to it. Thus rather thanholding to an ethical principle for philosophical reasons, I might hold toit for various other reasons: religious faith, the recommendation of somerecognized authority, tradition, social constraint, et cetera.

If, on the other hand, I act on the basis of an ethical principle, and Iadhere to the principle for philosophical reasons, I would seem to have



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at least a prima facie case for being philosophically virtuous. Now it maybe that on reflection we shall put further stipulations on philosophicalvirtue. But for now it seems desirable not to restrict unduly the notionof philosophical virtue. Our preliminary specification provides themeans of an evaluation of Socrates' behavior relative to his principles.

The best test case of Socrates' virtue is perhaps the Crito, whereSocrates is faced with an ethical choice of his own to make: should heaccept Crito's invitation to break out of jail, or should he remain to beexecuted? There is no conventional interest to be served by his remainingin prison. He has had his trial; there is no appeal, no hope of his sentencebeing commuted, no personal benefit (as Plato presents it) to his remain-ing — no life insurance policy or state death benefit. Crito aims to saveSocrates from personal harm that will come to him by remaining. ToCrito's urgent pleas Socrates replies,

Let us consider whether we should do this or not, as I am not now forthe first time but always committed to follow none of my own inclina-tions but only the argument1 which seems to me to be most reasonable.(Cn46b3-6)

In what follows Socrates makes it clear that he has a well-worked-outposition on the matter from which Crito must dissuade him if he willconvince him to flee prison. Socrates directly asks Crito whether hethinks Socrates should abandon (ekballeiri)2 his principles now that he isin trouble. But clearly Socrates will abandon them only if Crito canadvance some powerful reasons that will contradict his own establishedprinciples.

There is no need to rehearse Socrates' argument. But I would like topoint out a few crucial moments in the argument. After distinguishingbetween the many and the expert craftsman, Socrates asks whose advicewe should follow. Clearly that of the expert, who, because he hasknowledge, will counsel us to our benefit and not to our harm. "Thus weshould not/ Socrates concludes, 'consider what the many will say to us,

1 Λόγος Bumet ad he translates 'rule'. But as the understood cognate accusative ofλογιζόμενος (line 6) the noun seems the carry more of the sense of the verb.

2 With the sense of 'throw overboard' as Bumet ad loc notes: threatened with ship-wreck one may be forced to lighten ship; but the act, Aristotle notes, is ultimatelyvoluntary (EN HI, 1110a8-14).




but what the expert on justice and injustice will say, the one and truthherself' (48a5-7). It becomes clear in what follows that Socrates is notinvoking some flesh-and-blood expert here, but only truth herself, whichwill appear only in the conclusion of the argument. Socrates does notseek an ex cathedra announcement from a self-proclaimed moral expert,but the results of an elenctic examination.

Having dismissed the concerns of the many, Socrates presents anethical principle for Crito's approval: it is always bad to do wrong (49b).Furthermore, to do wrong in return for a wrong is likewise bad (49b-c).And there is no difference between harming someone and doing wrong(49c). After inviting Crito to consider carefully whether he agrees withthese principles, and offering to discuss them if Crito demurs, Socratesgoes on to lay them down as the basis for a discussion about whether heshould flee prison or not. Subsequently, Socrates himself is subjected toan elenchus conducted by the imaginary persona of the Laws of Athens(SOaff.), who argues that Socrates would be harming and doing wrongto the laws if he should escape from prison. Clearly the notion of anethical principle is prominent and central to the whole deliberation here.If Socrates can escape prison only by violating his ethical principles, heis not justified in fleeing. Socrates' decision is based on his ethicalprinciples.

But what is his relation to those principles? Does he hold them forreligious reasons, on the basis of authority, the mos maiorum, or someother non-philosophical justification? Apparently not; consider his ap-peal to Crito: Ί have held these views for a long time and I still hold them;but if you have some other view, speak and instruct me. On the otherhand, if you hold to your former views, listen to my next point' (49el-3).Why has Socrates held these views for a long time? If they come to himmerely by tradition or habit, they will not serve as ethical principles heldfor philosophical reasons. But it appears that Socrates has at least tworeasons for holding these views, both philosophical. In the first place, hehas just argued that if life is not worth living with one's body ruined,inasmuch as the soul is more valuable than the body, a fortiori life is notworth living with the soul ruined (47c ff.). Further, the only way to livewell is to live justly, i.e., to do what justice demands (48b ff.).

Thus Socrates has an argument to show that it is always best to dojustice rather than to harm or do injustice; and that argument specificallyprovides a reply to Crito's concern about death: it is better to live wellthan just to live, it is better to care for the soul than for the body. YetSocrates offers to Crito the opportunity to test his views if he has nowembraced some moral principles other than those he has shared with



30 Daniel W. Graham

Socrates. The test would be, of course, an elenctic examination. And ifthat is what Socrates has in mind, he will hold his principles preciselybecause they have stood up to elenctic scrutiny over a period of manyyears. He will hold them for philosophical reasons.

If the argument of the Crito itself seems too much driven by prudentialconsiderations, we may note that Socrates has available another argu-ment that does not appeal to the welfare of the soul. This argumentdepends purely on logical and ethical considerations. In Republic I Soc-rates defends precisely the view discussed in the Crito, that it is neverright to harm or do wrong to anyone. In examining Polemarchus' Si-monidean definition of justice as rendering to each his due, Socratesleads him to interpret the definition as requiring that we should harmthe unjust and benefit the just (334d). But Socrates goes on to argue thatto harm is to make something worse, to make something worse is todamage it with respect to its appropriate virtues, i.e., to make an unjustperson worse is to make him more unjust, and hence on this account itwill be just to promote injustice — surely a contradictory conclusion(335). Thus Socrates has available a philosophical argument to establishprecisely the ethical principle that he shares with Crito. It can be de-fended elenctically, and has been defended in the dialogues. As far aswe see, there is no other reason for accepting the principle of not harmingothers: the negation of the principle simply leads to a contradiction.

Thus far, then, we see that Socrates' deliberation on a moral questionof the greatest importance, both for Socrates' future and for his personalintegrity, is founded on ethical principles grounded in philosophicalreasons. Whether his principles are right or not, whether they are ulti-mate, whether they form part of a coherent moral philosophy, thesequestions we may leave for another occasion. What is important for ourpurposes is that we see Socrates acting as a moral agent inspired byphilosophical principles. He is, it appears, acting in accordance with hisbest philosophical understanding when he makes a choice to acceptdeath rather than life because the argument, and truth herself, require it.

We should say, accordingly, that Socrates is philosophically virtuousby our standards. Is he philosophically virtuous by his own standards?More would need to be established to verify the assertion that he is.Among other things, we would have to understand better what Socratesdemands of the philosophically virtuous person. If we are right inattributing the thesis that virtue is knowledge to Socrates, we willeventually have to understand what Socrates understands by 'knowl-edge' in the relevant sense. Here I shall not attempt to answer directlythe question of what Socrates understands by philosophical virtue. But




in what follows, I hope to provide some indirect evidence that willsuggest an answer to the question.

Ill

In the Apology Socrates professes to have only a small advantage overother individuals: he has 'a sort of wisdom' which is best regarded asImman wisdom' (20d7-8). He recounts how, spurred on by the oraclethat said no one was wiser than he, he discovered his advantage incomparing himself to politicians:

It is likely that neither of us has any special knowledge [καλόν κάγαθόνείδέναι]3 but this fellow thinks he knows something when he does not,whereas I, inasmuch as I do not know anything, do not think I do knowanything. So I am probably a tiny bit wiser than he by this very fact,that what I do not know I do not think I know. (21d3-7)

Socrates concludes that by saying no one is wiser than Socrates, theoracle must mean that he is wisest who knows that his wisdom isworthless (23a-b). Socrates does not claim to know absolutely nothing,but what he does seem to hold is that whatever wisdom he has consistsin knowing his own limitations and in avoiding the delusions of wisdomothers are prone to.

At the same time Socrates is professing to have a very humble sort ofwisdom, Plato portrays him as a man of exceptional valor. His acts ofcourage seem to be in part a matter of public record: he did not flee inpanic at the rout at Delium (La 181b, Smp 221aff.). He stood up to thewhole assembly when he was a president of the senate during the trialof the ten generals, refusing to allow an unconstitutional trial he wasalmost lynched for his action (Ap 32b-c). And when he was ordered bythe Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leon of Salamis, he went home withoutcomplying, at the risk of his own life (Ap 32c-3). The dialogues add somestriking examples of courageous behavior: Socrates will not entertain anoffer to stop philosophizing in return for his freedom or his life (Ap 29d,30b-c). And, as we have seen, he will not cooperate with Crito's plan to

3 The term here does not mean 'noble' or the like; see Bumet ad loc, contrary to thetreatment of the passage in LSJ, s.v. καλοκάγαθος.



32 Daniel W. Graham

arrange a jail break, even though the consequence will be his own death.Do these actions have a causal connection with Socrates' philosophicaltheory and method? Are the theory and the life merely accidental con-juncts, or does the theory somehow dictate the behavior?

One salient feature in Socrates' response to moral challenges is hisrefusal to consider the threat of death as a motive. In opposing theunconstitutional trial of the ten generals, Socrates observes, Ί thought itbetter to take my chances on the side of the law and justice rather thanto side with you when you were seeking injustice, for fear of prison ordeath' (Ap 32b8-c3). In the Crito Socrates explicitly rejects the threat ofdeath as a motive: 'we must not consider whether we shall die if weremain here and keep quiet, or whether we shall suffer any othermisfortune, but only whether we shall be doing wrong/ (Cri 48d3-5).There seems to be an incommensurability between considerations ofdeath and personal misfortune, on the one hand, and considerations ofright and wrong, on the other. Considerations of the latter sort alwaysoutweigh considerations of the former sort and render them, if notirrelevant, at least impotent.

But why should considerations of right and wrong outweigh consid-erations of death and life? There is a brief but illuminating hint in theApology: 'To fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else but to seem to be wisewhen you are not' (29a4-6). Socrates adds, by way of explanation, 'it isto think you know what you do not know' (a6). He goes on to say thatno one knows whether death is the greatest good. For Socrates thequestion what value, negative or positive, death has for an individual,is unanswerable: we do not have the information necessary to make sucha judgment. But those who do, de facto, make the judgment that deathis the greatest evil, make an unjustifiable assumption. Socrates is discuss-ing his behavior in battle and in other situations of danger; he remarksthat if he deserts the post he has been assigned to by the oracle now, hewill be acting in as cowardly a manner as if he deserted his place in thephalanx. The desertion itself is for Socrates evidence of a tacit belief: thebelief that death is more terrible than disobedience. It is to take as acertainty the fact that death is a great (perhaps the greatest) evil — a factthat reflection shows we cannot know.

Here is a case in which one's awareness of one's own ignorance mightmake a significant difference in one's behavior. If to act rationally is tocalculate for oneself the benefits and disadvantages of a proposed action,and then to act so as to maximize the benefits and to minimize thedisadvantages, then it will matter a great deal what factors are allowedinto the calculation. In conventional valuations, life and death normally




seem to command the greatest attention. Traditionally the death penaltyis attached as punishment to the most grievous crimes and the citizen'sright to life is protected by the threat of death. If, however, one were torule out considerations of life and death, other factors would immedi-ately increase in significance for deliberation. If, furthermore, it is ra-tional to take into account in deliberations only those factors which oneknows to be beneficial or harmful, and if the value of life and death areunknowable, then we effectively rule out the consideration of life anddeath. Ignorance in this case invalidates an important factor for moraldeliberation. And awareness of one's ignorance changes fundamentallythe basis for making decisions in precisely those cases in which the threatof death is a factor.

Now the awareness that one did not know the value of life and deathwould fall short of some ultimate philosophical wisdom. Such wisdomwould be able to discern, either in particular cases or in general, whatthe value of life and death was. One might, then, regard the acknow-ledgment of ignorance in the present case as a shortcoming. On the otherhand, to pretend to know the value of life and death when one had noknowledge would, for the reflective moral agent, constitute culpableignorance. It would be better to have the ultimate philosophical wisdom;but in the absence of such wisdom, it would behoove one to acknowledgehis ignorance and to proceed to enter into moral deliberations consider-ing only those factors that one knew to be relevant. At the same time,those who, whether reflectively or unreflectively, admitted life to be thegreatest good and death to be the greatest evil, would deliberate usinga different and incompatible set of principles. Conventionally we call asoldier who flees his post in battle a coward. Philosophically we couldidentify his moral failure as arising from a cognitive failure: the failureto recognize what he did not know, whether death was an evil. It beginsto appear that moral failure might be caused by unfounded beliefs.

Assuming that at least one large and important class of moral actionsare unfavorably influenced by unjustified beliefs, one has a clue as tohow to reform moral life. One must replace false or unjustified beliefswith true beliefs. We might also observe that one special genus of beliefsis more troublesome than the others, namely that involving predicationsof good and evil.4 We are prone to assume without further ado that some

4 Euthphr7b-d



34 Daniel W. Graham

things are evil and some things are good because of, say, instinctive fearsand attractions. Death is evil, life is good; pain is evil, pleasure is good;poverty is evil, wealth is good; sickness is evil, health is good; weaknessis evil, power is good, et cetera. Now some of these judgments may betrue, but some may be false, and others may be indeterminate given ourpresent state of knowledge. What would be truly dangerous for moralcalculations would be to assume these judgments without proper reflec-tion. Other beliefs, e.g., those about the facts of a situation, could also, ofcourse, cloud our ability to make correct moral judgments. But factualbeliefs would presumably be more amenable to revision and their fail-ures more quick to be recognized than those about the very values onwhich the judgments were made in the first place. Evaluative beliefswould be among the most hidden and the most intransigent. Hence thepossibility of moral reform might well hinge on the ability to identifyand correct evaluative beliefs.

Let us take one step farther. Suppose that not only some, but all moralfailures were ultimately traceable to erroneous beliefs; and that allvicious behavior was due to the acceptance (tacit or otherwise) of falseor indeterminate evaluative beliefs. In this case, all moral failure wouldamount to thinking one knew what one did not know. The remedy forsuch a defect would consist in the replacement of false or indeterminatebeliefs with true ones. Wisdom, in other words, would consist of one'sknowledge of what judgments one was entitled to and what one was notentitled to — in particular, what evaluative judgments one was entitledto. Obviously, the small advantage Socrates had over his contemporarieswould loom very large indeed. Socrates would have found the key to themoral law, and with it, moral autonomy.

Does Socrates, however, consistently appeal to a principle of choosinggoods over evils and indeterminates? Consider his reasoning concerningproposing a counter-penalty to death:

Being convinced that I do not wrong anyone, I am certainly not goingto wrong myself and accuse myself of being worthy of some evil andto propose such a punishment for myself. What am I supposed to beafraid of? That I should suffer the punishment Meletus proposes forme, one I maintain I do not know whether it is good or evil? Insteadshould I choose as my punishment something that I know perfectly wellis an evil? (Ap 37b2-8)

Socrates carefully threads his way through the possibilities by calculat-ing what things he knows are good, what things are evil, and what things




are indeterminate. Based on this train of reasoning, Socrates rejects somealternatives that might save him from the death penalty and chooses afine — i.e., a payment of money, a commodity that Socrates has shownhimself to be supremely indifferent to. He is not, as some commentatorsfrom Xenophon on have suggested,5 flirting with death as a quick wayout. Nothing could be farther from the truth: he is dismissing death as arelevant consideration and asking what punishment would be appropri-ate, whatever the reaction of the judges may be to his proposal. Thepresent passage confirms Socrates' adherence to the principle that oneshould take into account only known goods and evils. Here as in the Critoand earlier in the Apology questions of life and death are expressly ruledout of court.

Notice how strong is the principle of dismissing indeterminate values.If one could indeed calculate how to act without bringing into accountone's own life and death, as Socrates so blithely assumes one could, therewould be no motivation to flee from battle, to desert one's post, to backdown from the mob, to give in to the tyrant's unlawful command. Thethreat, uttered or tacit, if you do not comply, we shall put you to death wouldcarry no weight. Of course the threat of death would not necessarily bethe impediment to virtues other than courage. But some similar beliefmay be found. The belief that we should harm those who harm us orwho are our enemies might be the source of injustice. But philosophicalreflection shows us that it is never right to do wrong, and never right toharm (Cri 49b-c). Here the interfering belief is not only indeterminate, itis false, as can be demonstrated by an elenctic examination (Rep I,335b-d). Without the offending belief, we have no motive to harm andwe become just. To be unjust is only to think you are wise when you arenot — to think you know something you do not, namely, that it is rightto do harm to enemies. Similarly the incorrect belief that pleasure is thegreatest good might interfere with one's ability to make personal choices;to lack the belief would be to exemplify the virtue of prudence.

This may be precisely what Socrates has in mind when he says thathe has only one small advantage over his allegedly wise contemporaries.That small advantage is enough to ground the claim that Socrates has akind of knowledge; and that kind of knowledge seems to be productiveof the type of state of character Socrates has. In sum, it would appear that

5 Xenophon Apology 6-9,27,32.



36 Daniel W. Graham

Socrates himself has the grounds for admitting that he is virtuous, indeedphilosophically virtuous.

Evidently, we have arrived at an interpretation in which DK is true,for Socrates does not have a certain kind of knowledge; in which VK istrue, for Socrates' awareness that he lacks a certain kind of knowledgekeeps him from making a certain kind of unwarranted assumptionwhich would lead to moral failure; and in which SV is true, for Socrates'moral choices are based on moral principles derived from philosophicalreasoning based on the knowledge which blocks erroneous beliefs andhence errors of moral judgment. Indeed, on this interpretation it turnsout that the conjunction of DK and VK, far from being incompatible withSV, actually entails that principle. Socrates does the right thing not bychance, because of religious conviction, trust in authority or tradition, orbecause of an innate disposition or good moral training, but by knowl-edge. The relevant knowledge presupposes a kind of ignorance: Socratesknows what he does not know; he knows the limits of his moral knowl-edge. He has second-order knowledge of first-order ignorance.6 Pre-cisely because he has knowledge of his own ignorance, he avoids fallinginto the errors engendered by that ignorance. He avoids vice and wick-edness. His knowledge presupposes ignorance, and his awareness ofignorance constitutes a humble kind of knowledge. That knowledge isnot enough to make him a wise man in the conventional sense of thephrase. But it is enough to make him virtuous. And perhaps it is enoughto make us rethink our concept of wisdom, and to recognize a sense inwhich we can recognize a powerful, if very human, sort of wisdom inwhat Socrates knew.

Bibliography

Bumet, J., ed Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924

6 This concept of knowledge is presented at Charmides 167a and subsequently criti-cized. Is Plato rejecting Socrates' concept7



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Apeiron Volume 30 Issue 4 1997 [Doi 10.1515%2FAPEIRON.1997.30.4.25] Graham, Daniel W. -- What Socrates Knew