Apartheid and NATO: Britain, Scandinavia, and the Southern Africa Question in the 1970s

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Apartheid and NATO: Britain,Scandinavia, and the Southern AfricaQuestion in the 1970sHallvard Kvale SvenbalrudPublished online: 30 Nov 2012.

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Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23:746–762, 2012Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0959-2296 print/1557-301X onlineDOI: 10.1080/09592296.2012.706538

Apartheid and NATO: Britain, Scandinavia,and the Southern Africa Question in the 1970s

HALLVARD KVALE SVENBALRUD

In the 1970s, questions of apartheid and decolonisation rose tothe forefront of international political debate. Building on recentlydeclassified, multinational archival research, this analysis assessesthe question of whether to impose international economic sanc-tions against the apartheid regime in both South Africa and whiteminority-ruled Rhodesia during this decade. The issue of sanctionsbecame a strain on the relationship between Great Britain andthe three Scandinavian states—Denmark, Norway, and Britain,were allies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Waryof communist influence in Africa as well as concerned aboutprotecting their interests on the continent, the British preferredmoderate measures and a long-term perspective when dealing withSouthern Africa. The Scandinavian Powers, building a reputationas internationalist and progressive states and with few nationalinterests in the area, presented themselves as leading advocates ofsanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia. These differences inapproach caused recurring tension between the British and theirScandinavian allies, even leading some British officials to suggestsanctioning Norway and Sweden for their Southern Africa policy.However, the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia in 1980 as wellas the increasing focus on European security matters during thesecond Cold War of the early 1980s reduced Anglo–Scandinaviantension over Southern Africa, with the Powers continuing their closerelationship throughout and beyond the Cold War.

The increased distance of time and the opening of new archives have madeway for more nuanced approaches in scholarship on the Cold War. A ques-tion relevant to developing a better understanding of Cold War alliancedynamics is how political discord in non-military matters influenced intra-alliance relations. This analysis assesses the impact of one such instance: thedisagreement in the 1970s between Great Britain and the three ScandinavianPowers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden over how to manage their

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Apartheid and NATO 747

relations with the apartheid regime in South Africa and the white minority-ruled Rhodesia. In this diplomatic equation, Denmark and Norway wereallied with Britain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); Swedenwas non-aligned. Though the question was of limited strategic interest tothe Scandinavian states, they nevertheless initiated a high-profile SouthernAfrica policy that put them at odds with Britain and, to some degree, withthe United States. At the heart of this disagreement was the issue of whetherapplying international economic sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesiawould force an end to the regimes of apartheid and white minority rule. TheScandinavian states loudly advocated that the United Nations (UN) throughthe Security Council impose sanctions to increase the pressure for reformin the apartheid states. Wary of Soviet influence in a majority-ruled SouthernAfrica and concerned about their economic and political interests in the area,the British wanted a slower and more careful approach.

Displaying how aspects of the “global Cold War” affected not onlythe Soviet–American relationship but also intra-alliance relations, this exe-gesis considers this Anglo–Scandinavian discord in its historical and politicalcontext. Shaped by its history as a long-time colonial Great Power, Britainbelieved in the necessity of continued western influence in Africa and priori-tising stability and gradual, controlled change on the continent. Scandinavianforeign policy in this period, particularly relating to Third World matters,was more internationalist, influenced by significant elements of progres-sive activism that considered major changes in the relationship between theglobal north and south as vital for maintaining international peace.

Whilst it may not be surprising that the Scandinavian Southern Africapolicy caused discontent in London in the 1970s, the extent and intensityof Britain’s reaction lacks analysis, in part because the declassification ofthe relevant British archival materials has only occurred recently. Still, theissue is more than a footnote in the history of Anglo–Scandinavian relationsand NATO history. The Scandinavian governments’ Southern Africa policyin the 1970s constituted a strain on their relationship with Britain and, tosome degree, it made the British question the loyalty and trustworthinessof these states. Indeed, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, officials at theBritish Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) suggested imposing puni-tive measures against both Norway and Sweden to sanction their positionin South African matters. And different organisations/institutional affilia-tions shaped British perceptions and policy prescriptions when dealing withthe Scandinavian Powers in these matters—particularly how British policyconcerning Denmark’s European Community membership was consideredhelpful for influencing the Danes.

In 1978, the FCO produced a country assessment sheet, a “descriptionof British interests, objectives and priorities in a country,” for Norway.1 It laidout British objectives towards Norway in order of priority:

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748 H. K. Svenbalrud

I. Defence: To maintain Norwegian loyalty to NATO . . . .II. Political: To secure Norwegian support (and through her, Nordic

support) for British policies towards the Third WorldIII. Trade . . . .IV. Energy . . . .2

Thus, at this point, Norwegian and Nordic Third World policy constitutedmore vital British interests in Norway than such traditional pillars of nationalinterest as trade and energy. Similarly, the same year’s country assessmentsheet for Sweden stated: “Britain’s interests are to ensure that Sweden’s ori-entation does not shift to the advantage of the Soviet Union and to seekSwedish support for our policies in Africa and towards the Third Worldgenerally.”3 How did the geographically remote Third World—and SouthernAfrica in particular—in which the Scandinavians had little strategic interest,come to occupy such a prominent position in Anglo–Scandinavian relations?

The Anglo–Scandinavian relationship was generally close during theCold War, continuing a long history of friendly relations.4 Two ScandinavianPowers, Denmark and Norway, were allied with Britain in North AtlanticTreaty Organisation (NATO). The third Scandinavian state, Sweden, thoughnon-aligned with a view to neutrality in war, also maintained close andfriendly relations with the Western alliance, including Britain. Indeed, overall,Britain and the Scandinavian states shared many basic foreign policy posi-tions and interests such as support of the post-war international liberal orderand the desire to contain the international spread and influence of Sovietcommunism. Yet, throughout the 1970s, the FCO increasingly described theScandinavians in internal documents as unhelpful and intrusive rather thanuseful allies and friends in matters of Southern Africa.

Whilst this disagreement to some degree was rooted in national inter-ests, or indeed the Scandinavian lack thereof, in the political situation inSouthern Africa in the 1970s, it also reflected some basic and historicallydeeply rooted differences in the international orientation of British politi-cians and diplomats, on the one hand, and their Scandinavian counterparts,on the other. Britain’s history shaped its worldview as a participant in GreatPower politics and as a former colonial Power with political and economicinterests in Southern Africa, favouring cautious actions and gradual change.In their Southern Africa policy in the 1970s, the British attempted to juggleseveral conflicting concerns of which the moral aspects of apartheid wereonly one. In addition to relatively significant British economic interests inSouthern Africa, two concerns particularly shaped its Southern Africa policyin the period.

First, like the United States, Britain weighed her moral objections againstthe apartheid system with the strategic value of the Southern African statesas allies in containing Soviet influence in Africa.5 The independence of

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Portugal’s former colonies after the 1974 regime change in Lisbon—andPortugal was a NATO member—diminished Western control in Africa atthe very time that the Soviet Union and Cuba attempted to strengthen theirfoothold on the continent. The Marxist MPLA party’s seizure of power inAngola in 1975–1976 and the newly independent Mozambique’s procla-mation of adherence to international Marxism–Leninism played strongly toAmerican and British concerns over Soviet influence in Africa. Uncertaintyregarding the foreign policy orientation of a majority-ruled South Africa ata time when Western fear of Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa was ata peak increased British willingness to disregard human rights violations inSouthern Africa.

Second, despite the crumbling of the British Empire, British thinkingon Southern African matters still contained a significant element of globaland Imperial thinking.6 It has been argued that British South Africa policyin the UN was not only the product of strategy, economics, geopolitics,and prestige, but “also, crucially, of the British determination to resist UNinterference in the British Empire or Commonwealth.”7 Thus, combinedwith a worry over the anti-British bent characterising much of the Africananti-apartheid resistance, strategic and economic considerations made manyBritish decision-makers willing to wait until Black majority rule in SouthernAfrica forced its way without outside interference. Hence, seeking to retainits own influence in the area and prevent substantial political changes thatcould advantage the Soviet Union, Britain preferred moderate measures anda long-term perspective in dealing with Southern Africa.

The three Scandinavians Powers, on the other hand, displayed a moreprogressive and activist foreign policy orientation than Britain during andafter decolonisation.8 Considering self-government and economic develop-ment in the Third World a pre-condition for maintaining international peace,the governments of these states did not always share British caution andpreference for slow change in the 1970s—as they largely had in the 1950s.With few significant national interests at stake in Africa, the Scandinaviansattempted to create a common position as internationalist and morallyresponsible states through high levels of development aid and political sup-port for much of the developing states’ agenda during the North–Southdebate of the 1970s. The advocacy of more immediate and substantial actionin Southern Africa was in part rooted in this Scandinavian self-perception ofbeing advocates of global justice and a counterweight to the power-orientedperspective of Great Power politics. For Denmark, Norway, and Sweden,gradually positioning themselves internationally as leading per capita donorsof foreign aid, a Third World policy was made a question of morality andjustice in international affairs and was also favourable in popular opinion.The three Scandinavian Powers presented themselves from the 1950s and1960s as leading Western advocates of decolonisation and resistance againstapartheid. The strategic importance of Africa from a Cold War perspective

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was, to the frustration of several of Norway and Denmark’s allies in NATO,often given less consideration.9

These differing priorities and self-perceptions shaped the British andScandinavian governments’ views of each other regarding Southern Africapolicy as well. In these matters, the Scandinavians considered Britain abackward-looking Great Power putting narrow self-interest above the globalcommon good. The British, conversely, saw the Scandinavians as naïve, self-absorbed idealists without the necessary experience for the responsibilitiesof global politics and considered the position of their Scandinavian friendsand allies as politically and strategically untenable self-aggrandisement.

Standing united in their international anti-colonial and anti-apartheidposition in the 1970s and 1980s, the Scandinavian stance became easier by amore distinct American distancing from the policy of the colonial Powers andthe apartheid regimes in that same period.10 This occurred despite AmericanPresident Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy never specifically includ-ing support for economic sanctions against the Southern African apartheidstates.11 The most significant part of the Scandinavian states’ anti-apartheidpolicy was advocacy for imposing binding international economic sanctionson the apartheid states as a “middle course between words and wars.”12

The goal was to help create a unified economic and moral front against theapartheid regimes, bringing about regime change, democratisation, and theend of racial discrimination.

However, unifying international society behind this objective proveddifficult, not least because imposing economic sanctions would entail finan-cial losses for many states. This was the case for Norway as well, becauseNorwegian shipping companies had significant economic interests related toSouth African trade, and a full-fledged boycott could put shipping-relatedjobs in Norway at risk.13 As a result, Oslo pursued two seemingly contradic-tory policy tracks. It gave financial and political support to the SouthernAfrican liberation movements such as the Rhodesian Patriotic Front andmade calls for economic sanctions on the apartheid government. However,Norwegian economic interactions with South Africa grew until 1985, notleast because of the shipping industry. Whilst Norway implemented a num-ber of unilateral sanctions against South Africa in the late 1970s, includinga halt in oil sales, Norwegian ships continued carrying a substantial part ofSouth Africa’s oil imports.14 Regardless of this double standard in NorwegianSouthern Africa policy, attempting to win Security Council support for theirview of the situation in South Africa as a threat to international peacebecame vital in Scandinavian calls for international economic sanctions onthe apartheid regimes.

Furthermore, Scandinavian Third World policy also became a matter ofconsiderable national pride, with politicians and diplomats flattering them-selves for being more supportive of Third World aspirations than mostother Western states. Without providing any concrete political objectives, the

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Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1976 encouraged its UN mission,when conditions were right, to “take stands that go further in accommodat-ing the demands of the developing states than the majority of industrializedstates are willing to.”15 Scandinavian foreign policy during and after the ColdWar also contained elements of rather self-conscious posing where the branditself to some degree became the product:

to some extent the brand of the “Nordic model” has developed elementsof this about it, where it is not so much what the Nordic model actuallyis that counts, but rather what it is seen to stand for.16

This element of self-congratulation probably contributed to provokingBritain’s ambassador to Oslo in the early 1970s, R.W. Selby, to note “alatent sense of moral superiority about the Norwegian which it is not easy toovercome”17—an impression shared by several foreign policy officials in theLondon and Washington in the post-war era.

The post-war decolonisation process, as well as the related internationalfight against apartheid, was one of the central developments of internationalpolitics during the second half of the twentieth century. Described as “mas-sive political decentralization,”18 decolonisation changed political as well asgeographical maps and was a principle factor behind the near tripling ofthe number of UN member states from 51 in 1945 to 144 just 30 yearslater.19 Besides the large regional implications of this process, decolonisationand the anti-apartheid struggle also influenced Great Power politics and thelarger patterns of the Cold War. The Superpowers struggled for influence inthe newly independent Third World states, and former colonial Powers likePortugal and Britain struggled to retain traces of their former power and pro-tect their interests in those areas. In one estimate of the role and importanceof the Third World in the Cold War: “Though the processes of decoloniza-tion and of superpower conflict may be seen as having separate origins, thehistory of the late twentieth century cannot be understood without exploringthe ties that bind them together.”20

From the 1970s until the fall of the white minority rule in Rhodesia in1980 and the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, SouthernAfrica became one of the most contested issues in international politics.The policy of racial discrimination and minority rule made a majority of theworld’s states, particularly from the Third World, call for economic sanc-tions and other measures to put pressure on the apartheid regimes. SouthAfrica’s flouting of its international obligations in occupied Namibia fur-ther increased the pressure against the apartheid regime. The UN GeneralAssembly, where the Third World held a majority of the votes because ofthe post-war decolonisation process, became a main forum for condemna-tion of the apartheid system. Excluding South Africa’s UN delegation fromthe Assembly between 1974 and 1994 by a majority vote dismayed Britain as

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well as the Scandinavian states, which considered universal membership inthe General Assembly a fundamental principle of the UN. On the questionof Security Council-imposed sanctions against the apartheid states, however,the Anglo–Scandinavian views differed markedly.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to imposesanctions on states, groups, or individuals. As signatories to the Charter,UN members are obliged to comply with these sanctions. The wording ofChapter VII deliberately leaves considerable room for interpretation of whensuch measures are considered necessary or justified. Article 39 states:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to thepeace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make rec-ommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordancewith Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace andsecurity.21

Thus, exposing any state or group to co-ordinated UN sanctions depends ona sufficient majority of the Security Council, including the five veto-wieldingPowers, understanding its behaviour as a threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace, or act of aggression. Article 41 of the Charter lists non-militarysanctions available to the Security Council and includes “complete or partialinterruption of economic relations.”22

The dominant view, at least amongst scholars, has been that economicsanctions generally do not work.23 Near-universal difficulties with inter-national economic sanctions are the problem of states undermining theembargo imposed by maintaining their economic relations with the sanc-tioned state as well as making sure that restrictions hurt the regime ratherthan the sanctioned state’s population. Still, economic sanctions remainfavoured by many as a non-military attempt to change behaviour perceivedas dangerous, threatening, or repressive, or at least as a way to “collec-tively delegitimise” such behaviour. In the case of South Africa, an additionalproblem of reaching international agreement on sanctions was the concep-tual leap of viewing a national policy of racial discrimination as a threatto international peace. Labelling policies of national suppression as threatsto international peace during the Cold War was highly contested, and theSecurity Council was far less prone than the General Assembly to such aninterpretation of the situation in Southern Africa. On the matter of SouthernAfrica and apartheid, the Security Council rarely proved able to act substan-tively in agreement or, when it did, implement agreed measures. ThoughRhodesia faced economic sanctions beginning in 1966, the United States, apermanent Security Council member with veto power, openly violated thesanctions.24 Though the Council passed a large number of resolutions con-demning South African apartheid policy, likely French and British vetoesagainst economic sanctions ensured that little more than the mandatory

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arms embargo of 1977 passed the Council.25 However, this did not preventa high-profile Scandinavian advocacy of stricter Security Council-imposedsanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia and universal adherence to thesemeasures.

As recently as in the late 1960s, FCO descriptions of Scandinavian for-eign policies as a whole were generally sympathetic. A 1969 report from theBritish embassy in Stockholm even described Sweden as playing “a useful‘middle Power’ role” in the international field.26 However, in the 1960s and1970s, the G-77 group of developing states’ position on North–South mattersgradually radicalised with a considerable degree of Scandinavian support.During the so-called North–South debate, encompassing matters of decoloni-sation, anti-apartheid, and economic redistribution through the planned NewInternational Economic Order, the Scandinavian Powers attempted, with lim-ited success, to act as bridge-builders between North and South. For theScandinavians, like the G-77, matters of apartheid and decolonisation wereattributed a particular significance both politically and symbolically. Callsfor the Security Council to initiate economic sanctions against the apartheidstates by labelling their policy a threat to international peace became animportant part of the Scandinavian North–South policies in the 1970s. Thiswas less than welcome in Britain, where the FCO displayed increasing con-cern with Scandinavian foreign policy to a large degree because of thisSouthern African policy.

The Nordic anti-apartheid campaign at times took the form of a contestto be the “best,” with Sweden generally taking the lead as the most radicalin the group.27 As a non-aligned state, Sweden strove to display indepen-dence from both the eastern and the western bloc during the Cold War, nothesitating to criticise elements of the foreign policies of the western GreatPowers. Particularly under Social Democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme in1969–1976 and 1982–1986, Sweden pursued an independent foreign policythat won praise from many Third World leaders; it also at times drew strongcriticism from the United States and other western Powers. In a FCO briefregarding Palme’s proposed visit to London in 1972, questions regarding thesituation in Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and Rhodesia were gathered underthe heading “‘Holier than Thou’ Questions.”28 Mostly, however, Washingtonand the other Western capitals chose to tolerate Swedish policy as long asStockholm remained firmly anchored to the Western camp in Europe.29

Notwithstanding Sweden’s desire to lead the pack, Denmark becamethe first Scandinavian state to introduce Security Council-imposed sanctionsagainst the apartheid states as an explicit objective of its UN policy. Thisensued in the annual General Assembly policy briefs, signed by the minis-ter for foreign affairs, which guided Denmark’s UN mission during GeneralAssemblies. In the 1971 Assembly brief, Copenhagen introduced new word-ing regarding Southern Africa—it remained in Danish briefs throughout andbeyond the 1970s:

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the Danish government may support the General Assembly calling tothe Security Council’s attention that the situation in South Africa consti-tutes a threat to international peace and security; that measures under theCharter’s Chapter VII is requisite to solve the problem; and that univer-sally imposed economic sanctions are the only way to attain a peacefulsolution.30

The Danish formulation planted the seed for Anglo–Scandinavian conflictover Southern Africa. The other Scandinavian Powers followed suit, makinganti-apartheid advocacy a trademark of their UN policy in the 1970s and1980s. In addressing the 1975 General Assembly, Norway’s minister of for-eign affairs, Knut Frydenlund, described the apartheid system as a threat topeace “in that part of the world,” implicitly calling for action by the SecurityCouncil.31 The Swedish 1976 General Assembly policy brief instructed itsUN mission to make use of every possibility within the organisation’s frame-work to work for an effective policy of sanctions against and isolation ofthe apartheid states, including a mandatory arms embargo.32 Scandinaviansanctions advocacy cracked open the Western front that Britain wantedto establish against swift political changes in South Africa and Rhodesia,contributing to making the sanctions question a regular feature of inter-national political debate. Scandinavian representatives did not shy awayfrom lecturing their Western friends on the question of Southern Africa, liketelling the Americans in 1976 that Oslo worried its Western allies “may lagbehind what is needed to move these (Southern African) matters towardresolution.”33

Calls for economic sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia becamea routine part of Scandinavian UN policy in the 1970s. A joint Nordic Programof Action for efforts against South Africa issued forth in 1978.34 In it, theNordic states agreed to work in favour of Security Council resolutions thatprohibited new investments in and restricted trade with South Africa and thatensured strict observance of the Security Council’s resolutions on the armsembargo against South Africa.35 Considering Britain’s long-standing interestin South Africa and because of its status as the western Power most affectedby developments there, the FCO did not much welcome such interven-tion from well-meaning Scandinavian states with few stakes of their ownin the matter. From the perspective of British politicians and diplomats,the Anglo–Scandinavian differences regarding Southern Africa derived fromScandinavian naïvity in international politics, as well as a Nordic inclinationto see the world as they wanted it to be instead of how it really was. In 1975,the FCO accused Norway of “neo-isolationism” and of having a desire to livelike a “secluded, moral back-water” in a “clean, Nordic existence.”36 Britain’sambassador to Norway summed up the FCO position in his judgment ofNordic sanctions policy in 1977, the same year the Security Council adoptedthe arms embargo on South Africa:

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If emotion is left out of account, the Norwegian Government’s supportof the Nordic line seems at first sight indefensible. That line is in manyrespects irresponsible and mis-judged because its adherents are depress-ingly naïve about Southern Africa. But it is nonetheless serious that allthe Nordic countries should have committed themselves to the view thata full-scale violent conflict in Southern Africa is now virtually inevitable,that in Chapter VII terms, a threat to the (world) peace already exists andthat international sanctions against South Africa should now be put intoeffect beginning with a general arms embargo.37

Though the FCO expressed concern with the Southern Africa policy of allthree Scandinavian Powers, its assessment of each varied. For independent-minded and non-aligned Sweden, Southern Africa in the late 1970s wasa prioritised and essential area like earlier opposition to the Vietnamwar.38 Whilst Sweden’s active Third World policy won it several friendsamongst the developing states, it provoked strong reactions in the FCO.Describing Swedish Southern Africa policy as “priggish and insincere,”39 aswell as “moralistic” and “obsessional,”40 the FCO obviously felt disappointedin its hopes that the new non-socialist Swedish coalition government of1976 would act less as “mother-in-law to the world.”41

The somewhat more careful rhetoric of Norwegian politicians inSouthern African matters provided a bit more goodwill in the FCO. Yet,several policy-makers were concerned and frustrated with what they consid-ered Norway’s unreliability as an ally, a recurring topic in internal discussionsabout Norwegian foreign policy at the time. This perceived unreliabilitywas not only limited to what was regarded as Norwegian interference inBritain’s national interests in Southern Africa. It also concerned matters suchas Norwegian criticism of the military dictatorships in fellow NATO membersGreece and Portugal whilst only very reluctantly raising its voice regardingSoviet human rights policy for fear of retaliations. Already in 1974, the Britishembassy in Oslo expressed displeasure with the alleged tendency of Norwayas a NATO member “to pursue her own interests in a way seeking to securethem without offering any concessions to her western allies.”42

One of the most remarkable, and hitherto little known, results of Britishdissatisfaction with Norway’s foreign policy in the late 1970s was the con-siderable FCO scepticism displayed with the election of Norway to the UNSecurity Council in 1979. The Western European and Others (WEO) elec-toral group in the UN, to which both Britain and the Scandinavian statesbelonged, had two allocated non-permanent seats in the Council. Everytwo years, elections placed two of the group’s diverse membership, sev-eral of which were not NATO members, on the Council. The compositionof the Security Council’s membership ensured that the non-permanent WEOmembers sometimes ended up with the decisive vote on contested mat-ters, such as Sweden in 1975–1976 against American protests, casting the

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determining vote allowing the Palestine Liberation Organisation to partakein the Council’s Middle East debates. Norway and Portugal replaced WestGermany and Canada as the two WEO non-permanent Council members in1979; the FCO UN Department noted that the five Western representativeson the Council “are likely to find it difficult, if not impossible, to maintainthe impressive cohesion and initiative which has characterised their activ-ity over the last year and more.”43 This pessimism pertained not least toNorway’s role. Whilst the Norwegian government throughout the Cold Warprided itself as a solid and reliable member of the Western alliance, FCOfrustration with Norwegian foreign policy at this point had grown so strongthat it was questioned who would have Oslo’s ear in the Council:

It is uncertain to what extent Norway will function in the Security Councilin concert with other members of the Western Group (UK, US, France andPortugal), and to what extent Norway will be influenced by the Nordicgroup, the USSR and the developing countries.44

The British ambassador in Oslo joined the sceptics the same year with a bluntobservation about “the reluctance the Norwegians are showing to stand upand be counted amongst Britain’s supporters.”45

As for Denmark, the FCO expressed more hope for changingCopenhagen’s anti-apartheid position to one more aligned with its own.Admittedly, the Danish government was described in 1977 as “commit-ted to the point of being dogmatic to the forward, moralistic position onapartheid.”46 Yet, after Denmark’s accession to the European EconomicCommunity (EEC) in 1973, the FCO attached a distinct belief in Danishmembership as a “continuous process of education,”47 creating a changefor the better. As the only Scandinavian member, Denmark during the 1970sattempted to act as a bridge-builder between the other Scandinavian statesand the EEC whilst balancing their own foreign policy between the demandsof the two groups.

Nevertheless, during the latter half of the 1970s it became increasinglyobvious to all parties that there was a qualitative difference in Danish foreignpolicy between the importance of the EEC and that of the Nordic group.48

The British embassy in Copenhagen reported in February 1977 that the Danesemphasised that with the EEC there was a conscious, if not always successful,effort to achieve common positions; the Nordic countries did no more thanexchange and compare views to collaborate more effectively when theseviews proved to be similar.49 A deputy political director at the Danish ForeignMinistry informed the British the same year that Denmark occupied a positionon Southern African matters somewhere between the EEC states and theother Scandinavians. It was an uncomfortable position, he said, but one withwhich they could live.50 Thus, the FCO believed in change due to the Danishexposure to “the arguments of those, like our own Secretary of State, who

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have real responsibilities in the area and have to deal with the situation asit is,” ensuring that the Danish policies were “not conceived and pursued insome sort of Nordic vacuum.”51 This made the FCO somewhat more patientand understanding when dealing with the Danish Southern Africa policy.

Accordingly, maintaining hopes for influencing Copenhagen in the late1970s, the FCO increasingly channelled British frustration over ScandinavianSouthern Africa policy toward Sweden and, to a lesser degree, Norway.British discontent remained especially strong regarding matters pertainingto Rhodesia, as the United States and Britain attempted to regain some ofthe initiative in Africa by negotiating a settlement of the Rhodesian con-flict. Considered by many unlikely to succeed in this project, the Britishregarded Scandinavia’s continuing high-profile Southern Africa policy par-ticularly unhelpful. Yet, the foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, successfullyshepherded the Lancaster House negotiations that in December 1979 endedRhodesia’s apartheid regime, and which produced elections in April 1980 thatbrought the rebel leader, Robert Mugabe, to power as prime minister andwon the new state international recognition under the name of Zimbabwe.

In this period, Sweden came under mounting fire from Britain, inpart because the Swedish parliament in 1979 adopted a law prohibitingnew investments in South Africa.52 Amongst the British ambassadors to theScandinavian capitals as well as FCO officials in London, expressions of con-cern and irritation over Scandinavian sanctions advocacy grew. The Britishambassador in Oslo at one point summarised the correspondence with hiscolleagues in Denmark and Sweden by stating that they “agreed that onSouthern African questions the Nordic countries tended to be myopic andjejune if not downright silly.”53 This new, even more condemning languagereflected not only on Scandinavian policy at this time; it constitute the “highpoint of a British tolerance toward apartheid” following a weakening ofanti-British rhetoric in the Afrikaner movement.54

British dissatisfaction peaked in 1979 and early 1980, as FCO officialssuggested reprimanding Sweden and Norway for their lack of support ofBritish objectives in Southern Africa. In fact, the ambassadors in Stockholmand Oslo took a leading role in suggesting sanctions or at least threats ofsuch reactions. A March 1978 memorandum from the embassy in Stockholmstated:

I think there is a case for arguing for the occasional reminder . . . thatwe do not see their policies as tending to lead to the same ends as oursand that to the extent that the Swedes choose to follow policies whichamount to little more than pandering to the Marxist revolutionary campthey must expect to be judged accordingly in the West.55

By November, the Stockholm embassy reported that the Swedish ForeignMinistry state secretary, Leif Leifland, and his Norwegian colleague, Thorvald

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Stoltenberg, had both been told, “friends of Britain should not believe that itdid not matter if they disagreed with Britain on Rhodesia and that the Britishgovernment would not mind. They would.”56

The next month as Norway’s anti-apartheid policy seemingly hardened,Archie Lamb, the ambassador at Oslo, made clear to Frydenlund that “if theNorwegian government were to let Britain down over Rhodesia, it wouldbe difficult for Anglo–Norwegian relations to retain their present degreeof closeness.”57 Lamb took his criticism of Norway’s Rhodesia policy to anew level in early 1980. At this point, his dissatisfaction with the lack ofNorwegian support during the Lancaster House negotiations, as well as withwhat he considered an absence of Norwegian will even to initiate consul-tations with Britain on Rhodesian matters, reached a limit. Suggesting thatLondon give the Norwegians a sign that “we cannot be expected to use ourdiplomatic efforts in their behalf when they will not use theirs in ours,” heproposed not accommodating a Norwegian desire for closer consultationson EEC matters.58 Making little effort to conceal his view that such a tacticwould play to Norwegian fears of becoming isolated as a non-EEC mem-ber on Europe’s outskirts, Lamb considered it an appropriate sanction forNorwegian obstinacy in Southern African matters.

Yet, the FCO did not adopt Lamb’s suggestions. Although several FCOofficials expressed strongly critical views regarding Scandinavian SouthernAfrica policy in the late 1970s, fear of alienating their Norwegian allyeclipsed the desire to protest Norwegian policy. It probably also helpedthat the British UN mission reported that contrary to British concerns,its Norwegian counterpart on the Security Council adopted a low profileon Southern African matters and co-ordinated their policy with the otherWestern members.59 Replying to Lamb had stimulated much head scratch-ing in London. D.A.S. Gladstone of the FCO Western European Departmentagreed that the Norwegians were in some ways unfortunate partners, “self-righteous and usually readier to lecture their friends than to lend thema hand.”60 Yet, understanding that the Norwegians had many friends inLondon, Gladstone concluded that the FCO still preferred the carrot to thestick when dealing with Norway:

We see a real danger that any kind of punitive policy might only drivethe Norwegians down those roads (e.g. towards Moskow [sic]) we aremost anxious to place no entry signs on: or, at best, into their shells.61

Indeed, the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia and the subsequentelection of Mugabe subdued much of the Anglo–Scandinavian discord overSouthern Africa—though some discord regarding South Africa would con-tinue into the 1980s as the Scandinavians continued their anti-apartheidpolicy. In 1986 Denmark became the first Western state to adopt a fullembargo of goods and services from South Africa’s apartheid regime.62

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Sweden followed in 1987 with a law banning trade with South Africa.63

That same year the Norwegians adopted a boycott law, though with signif-icant exceptions protecting national economic interests.64 Still, the intensitywith which the British ambassadors to Norway and Sweden plus others inthe FCO expressed their dismay with Scandinavian Southern Africa policyseemed to ease considerably during 1980 and after. This situation reflectednot only the changed circumstances in Rhodesia but also demonstrated thedesire of both parties not to let discord over this policy area embitter theirrelationship in general. Whilst Scandinavian politicians would not let Britaindictate their foreign policy, they clearly felt certain disquiet about provokingLondon. Ronald Nash of the FCO Western European Department reportedafter a visit to Norway in February 1980:

The head of the UN Department . . . told me Frydenlund would be gladwhen the election (in Rhodesia) was over so that Norway could recognizeand get rid of its old entanglement with the Patriotic Front. For the past2 years the issue had been a terrible burden for Mr. Frydenlund who hadbeen pulled in one direction by the (Norwegian) Labour Party and inanother by his close allies, especially the British.65

In addition, Southern African matters became somewhat less central toAnglo–Scandinavian relations due to developments in the Cold War in gen-eral, particularly NATO’s dual track decision and the emerging “Second ColdWar” of the early 1980s. Rather than anti-apartheid policy, concern overNATO members Denmark and Norway’s scepticism of NATO’s planned the-atre nuclear forces (TNF) modernisation won a more prominent position inBritish discussions of Scandinavian foreign policy in the last decade of theCold War. It left Anglo–Scandinavian discord over Southern Africa, like mostof the North–South debate, a phenomenon that reached its height in the1970s.

Anglo–Scandinavian discord over Southern Africa in the 1970s displayshow, beneath the simplistic duality of East–West conflict, an intricate set ofpolitical facets shaped and affected intra-alliance relations during the ColdWar. Apart from the common objective of containing Soviet communism andcreating a strong regional defense for the Atlantic region, the foreign policyinterests and objectives of NATO allies often differed markedly. For Britainand the three Scandinavian states, disagreement over how to manage theirrelationship with the Southern African apartheid regimes in part came downto differences in national interests in the area, but it was also rooted indiverging views of the nature of North–South relations. Scandinavia’s pro-gressive activism was a particularly bad fit for the cautious British approachas Britain and the United States attempted to negotiate a peaceful solution tothe Rhodesian conflict in the late 1970s.

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The degree to which the Scandinavian Powers, with few immediateinterests of their own in Southern Africa, allowed the dispute over sanc-tions against the apartheid states to sour their relations with London is inmany ways remarkable. This was particularly so for Norway and Denmark,NATO members, which depended particularly on a good relationship withtheir Great Power allies. The determination of these two governments topersist in their anti-apartheid policies despite British objections points totheir dedication at the time to build a Scandinavian position—and brand—as bridge-builders between North and South. Yet, there were limits to howmuch both sides were willing to let the disagreement over Southern Africaescalate into open conflict. Although alliance membership and the manycommon interests of the allied Powers in no way dictated all parts of the for-eign policies of NATO members, it constituted a framework for co-operationthat they were unwilling to break. The emerging second Cold War andthe debate over TNF modernisation in Europe ultimately eclipsed Anglo-Scandinavian disagreement over Southern Africa. Accordingly, analysing theSouthern African problem in the 1970s continues a more nuanced approachto Cold War scholarship.

NOTES

1. FCO memorandum, “Country assessment sheets,” 22 March 1978, FCO (Foreign andCommonwealth Office Archives, National Archives, Kew) 33/3821.

2. FCO “Country assessment paper: Norway,” nd 1978, Ibid.3. FCO “Country Assessment Sheet: Sweden,” October 1978, FCO 33/37614. For example, see. P. Salmon, Scandinavia and the Great Powers, 1890–1940 (Cambridge, 1997).5. For a discussion of anti-communism as an integral part of the policy of white-ruled Rhodesia,

see D. Lowry, “The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 1920s–1980,”Cold War History, 7/2(2007), pp. 169–94. For American Southern Africa policy, see N. Mitchell, “Tropesof the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia,” Ibid., pp. 263–83; P. Rich, “United States ContainmentPolicy, South Africa and the Apartheid Dilemma,” Review of International Studies, 14/3(1988), pp. 179–94;D.R. Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969–1986,” PoliticalScience Quarterly, 111/1(1996), pp. 127–49.

6. For a most relevant example, see J.W. Young, “The Wilson government and the debate overArms to South Africa in 1964,” Contemporary British History, 12/3(1998), pp. 62–86

7. R. Hyam and P. Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa Since the BoerWar (Cambridge, 2003), p. 147.

8. For an introduction to the historiography of Nordic foreign relations during the Cold War,see Thorsten B. Olesen, ed., The Cold War—and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads(Odense, 2004).

9. For an overview of the relationship between NATO and the Nordic states during the Cold War,see O. Riste, “NATO, the Northern Flank, and the Neutrals,” in G. Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO: TheFirst Fifty Years, Volume 3 (Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 241–55.

10. See C. Saunders and S. Onslow, “The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976–1990,” in M.P. Lefflerand O.A. Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 3: Endings (Cambridge, 2010),p. 222.

11. Rich, “Containment Policy,” p. 190.12. D. Cortright, G.A. Lopez, and L. Gerber-Stellingwerf, “Sanctions,” in T.G. Weiss and S. Daws,

eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford, 2007), p. 349.

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13. See R. Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965–1995, Volume 6: Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (Oslo, 1997),p. 364.

14. Ibid., 367–68; T.L. Eriksen and A.K. Krokan, “‘Fuelling the Apartheid War Machine’: A CaseStudy of Shipowners, Sanctions and Solidarity Movements,” in T.L. Eriksen, ed., Norway and NationalLiberation in Southern Africa (Uppsala, 2000), p. 194.

15. “Norwegian policy brief for the 31st General Assembly (1976),” NMFAA (Norwegian Ministry ofForeign Affairs Archives, Oslo) 26.5/83b, p. 11.

16. C.S. Browning, “Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism,”Cooperation and Conflict, 42/1(2007), p. 29.

17. British Embassy, Oslo, to FCO, 15 December 1972, FCO 33/1915.18. A. Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (Abingdon,

2009), p. 297.19. M.J. Peterson, “General Assembly,” in Weiss and Daws, United Nations, p. 107.20. O.A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times

(Cambridge, 2007), p. 74.21. The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39: http://www.un.org/en/documents/

charter/index.shtml.22. Article 41, Ibid..23. J. Hovi, R. Huseby, and D.F. Sprinz, “When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?,” World

Politics, 57/4(2005), p. 480.24. T.G. Weiss et al., The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 5th Edition (Boulder, CO,

2007), p. 42.25. See E.C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise (London, 2006), p. 60.26. British Embassy, Stockholm, to FCO, 6 January 1969, FCO 33/1880. For discussions

of Norwegian and Swedish foreign policy, see FCO Rhodesia Political Department memorandum,3 December 1968, FCO 36/484; British Embassy, Copenhagen, to FCO, 6 January 1969, FCO 33/454.

27. Tamnes, Oljealder, Volume 6, p. 364.28. FCO, “Principal brief,” 31 August 1972, FCO 33/1888.29. W. Agrell, Fred och fruktan: Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918–2000 (Lund, 2000),

pp. 174–81; C.-G. Scott, “Swedish Vietnam Criticism Reconsidered: Social Democratic Vietnam Policya Manifestation of Swedish Ostpolitik?,” Cold War History, 9/2(2009), p. 256.

30. “Danish policy brief for the 26th General Assembly (1971),” DMFAA (Ministry for Foreign AffairsArchives, Copenhagen) 119.H.2.D.71, 3.

31. “Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Frydenlund to the 30th UN General Assembly,”26 September 1975, in St. meld, 62(1975–1976), p. 182.

32. “Swedish policy brief for the 31st General Assembly (1976),” NMFAA 26.6/48, p. 4.33. United States Embassy, Oslo, to Secretary of State, 10 August 1976: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/

createpdf?rid=211935&dt=2082&dl=1345.34. The Nordic group includes Finland and Iceland in addition to the three Scandinavian states.35. See E.H. Østbye, “The South African Liberation Struggle: Official Norwegian Support,” in

Eriksen, National Liberation, pp. 168–69.36. FCO Western European Department to British Embassy, Oslo, 22 January 1975, FCO 33/2815.37. British Embassy, Oslo, to FCO, 24 January 1977, FCO 33/3225.38. For Swedish Vietnam policy, see Scott, “Swedish Vietnam Criticism”; U. Bjereld, “Critic or

Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945–90,” Journal of Peace Research, 32/1(1995), pp. 30–31.39. British Embassy, Stockholm, to FCO, 31 May 1977, FCO 36/254240. British Embassy, Stockholm, to FCO, 9 July 1979, Ibid.41. British Embassy, Stockholm, to FCO, 24 February 1977, FCO 33/3226.42. British Embassy, Oslo, to FCO, 28 October 1974, FCO 33/258943. Ibid.44. FCO UN Department memorandum, 27 November 1978, FCO 58/1300.45. British Embassy, Oslo, to FCO, 7 December 1979, FCO 36/254246. British Embassy, Copenhagen to FCO, 13 January 1977, FCO 33/3110.47. British Embassy, Copenhagen, to FCO, 17 April 1978, FCO 33/3890.48. For example, “Minutes from British–Danish talks on Africa,” 20 January 1978, FCO 33/3392; J.N.

Laursen and T.B. Olesen, “A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark’s Nordicand European Policies, 1945–1998,” Contemporary European History, 9/1(2000), pp. 59–92.

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49. British Embassy, Copenhagen, to FCO, 24 February 1977, FCO 33/3226.50. British Embassy, Copenhagen, to FCO, November 1977, Ibid.51. Ibid.52. See U. Bjereld, A.W. Johansson, and K. Molin, Sveriges säkerhet och väldens fred: Svensk

utrikespolitik under kalla kriget (Stockholm, 2008), p. 298.53. British Embassy, Oslo, to FCO, 13 March 1978, FCO 33/3765.54. Hyam and Henshaw, Lion and the Springbok, p. 330.55. British Embassy, Stockholm, to FCO, 2 March 1978, FCO 33/3765.56. British Embassy, Stockholm, to FCO, 14 November 1978, FCO 36/2542.57. British Embassy, Oslo, to FCO, 18 December 1978, Ibid.58. British Embassy, Oslo, to FCO, 9 January 1980, FCO 33/4567.59. See British UN mission to FCO, 5 February 1979, FCO 58/1543; “Visit by Secretary of State to

Oslo, 26–28 October, brief no. 5: Southern Africa,” nd, FCO 36/2542.60. FCO Western European Department to British Embassy, Oslo, 22 February 1980, FCO 33/456761. Ibid.62. Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, FN, verden og Danmark (Copenhagen, 1999), p. 66.63. Bjereld, Johansson, and Molin, Sveriges säkerhe, p. 298.64. Eriksen and Krokan, “ ‘Apartheid War Machine.’ ” 204–10; Tamnes, Oljealder, Volume 6, p. 370.65. FCO Western European Department memorandum, 27 February 1980, FCO 36/2763.

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Documents

Apartheid and NATO: Britain, Scandinavia, and the Southern Africa Question in the 1970s