APA Central 2016 Handout With Greek

8/20/2019 APA Central 2016 Handout With Greek

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ARISTOTLE ON ARTIFACTS

Phil Corkum, University of Alberta

SAGP Central, Chicago, March 2016

It is standardly held that Aristotle denies that artifacts are substances, since artifacts lackautonomy, are merely accidental unities, or are impermanent. I argue that Aristotle holds that

artifacts are substances. However, where natural substances are absolutely fundamental, artifacts

are merely relatively fundamental.

An artifact appears substantial: impredicable, no contrary, doesn’t admit of degree …

T1 one man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or

less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more

or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is

said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white,

is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be

warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be moreor less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was

before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. (3b37-4a9)

… admits of contraries, persists through qualitative changes, is a ‘this’, an unity, separate.

Does Aristotle nonetheless deny artifacts are substances?

T2 But it is not yet clear if the substances of destructible things are separate; except it

is obvious that it is not possible for some cases—those things that are not able to

exist apart from individual things, for example a house or utensil. But perhaps

(is! s) neither these things themselves nor any of the others that are not formed by

nature are substances, for one might posit only nature as a substance in destructiblethings. (1043b18-23)

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Compare substances and most-of-all substances …

T3 Of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, others artificially, and

others spontaneously; but everything which is generated is generated by something

and from something and becomes something. When I say "becomes something" I

mean in any of the categories; it may come to be either a particular thing or of some

quantity or quality or in some place. Natural generation is the generation of things

whose generation is by nature. That from which they are generated is what we call

matter; that by which, is something which exists naturally; and that which they

become is a man or a plant or something else of this kind, which we call substance

most of all (malista). (1032a12-19)



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T4 The term ‘substance’ is used, if not in more, at least in four principal cases; for both

the essence and the universal and the genus are held to be the substance of the

particular, and fourthly the substratum. The substratum is that of which the rest are

predicated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else. Hence we must first

determine its nature, for the primary substratum seems most of all (malista) to be

substance. (1028b33-29a2)

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#2/-2%'5/): µQ82%', ;@- #/=!M !A),2 /0%1, 'P R6/=!1µ!)/) 6-('/).

T5 If we hold this view, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for it

is accepted that separability and individuality belong most of all (malista) to

substance. Hence it would seem that the form and the combination of form and

matter are more truly substance than matter is. (1029a26-30)

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… interpreted in terms of relative and absolute fundamentality. Why then are artifacts merely

relatively fundamental?

Gill (1991, 213): “artifacts are not self-preserving systems but depend on external agents

both for the full realization of their being and for their maintenance. Artifacts lack

autonomy, and for this reason they are ontologically dependent on other more basic

entities.”

Rather, artifactual forms are grounded in natural substances

T6 Again, is there anything besides the concrete whole (I mean the matter and the form

in combination) or not? If not, all things in the nature of matter are perishable; but if

there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in what

cases this is possible and in what it is not; for in some cases, e.g. that of a house,

the form clearly does not exist in separation. (1060b23-28)



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T7 if we had to define … a house we should define as ‘bricks and timbers arranged so-

and-so (h!di keimena)’ or a final cause (to heneka) may exist as well in some

cases…. And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who define a house as

stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the

matter; but those who propose ‘a receptacle to shelter goods and bodies’, or

something of the sort, speak of the actuality. (1043a5-18)

/>/) !" /0#P) #5/2 g-1%,%+,2, YJ8/) B 81+/) h#& =!1µ!)/) <-/Cµ!), =,& /"=1,) 681)+/KD =,& YJ8, h#& =!1µ!), B S'2 =,& 'P /U i)!=, <6$ <)14) S%'2) ... /. µF) 85;/)'!D '1 <%'2) /"=1,, :'2 81+/2 681)+/2 YJ8,, '9) #K)Qµ!2 /"=1,) 85;/K%2), [8L ;@- ',C',: /. #F O;;!M/) %=!6,%'2=P) 3-LµQ'4) =,& %4µQ'4) j '2 I88/ '/2/C'/) 6-/'2+5)'!D, '9) <)5-;!2,) 85;/K%2)

Contemporary view that artificial definitions make reference to the intentional process of

production:

Passinsky (ms., 4) provides an informal definition of a sandcastle as “an object

constituted by some quantity of sand’s being intentionally arranged in the castle shape.”

Evnine (ms., 12): “the property of being arrowhead-shaped is itself a purely natural one.

Any old piece of flint can have it, by design or by accident. As an artifact, however, it is

essential to the existence of an arrowhead, rather than merely an arrowhead-shaped piece

of flint, that it be the product of a certain kind of intentional making and that it have a

certain telos or function.”

On this rival line, the status of the object as a substance, and the characterization of its definitionor essence, are distinct issues from the status of the object as an artifact , and the process of its

production.

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APA Central 2016 Handout With Greek