Antonio Negri_Insurgencies Constituent Power and the Modern State_1999

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S a n d r a B u c k l e y

M i c h a e l I l a r d t

Br i a n .M a s s um i

T H E C B ?O U T O FB O U N D15 Insurgencies: Constituent Power andthe Modern State Antonio Negn

14 When Pain Strikes Bil l Bur ns ,C a t h yBus by,and

Kim S awch u k ,E d s .

13 Critical Environments: Postmodern Theory and

the Pragmatics of the "Outside" Gary Wolfe

12 Metamorphosis of the Body J o s e Gil

11 The New Spinoza Wa r r e n M o n t a gand Ted Sto lze,Eds

1O Power and Invention:Situating Science Isabel le Ste ngens

9 Arrow of Chaos:Romanticism and Postmodernity Ir a Livingston

8 Becoming-Woman C a m i l l aGnggers

7 A Potential Politics:Radical Thought in Italy Paolo Virno and M ic ha e l H a rd t ,Ed s .

6 Capital Times:Tales from the Conquest of Time E n c A U i e z

5 The Year of Passages Re c k Be n s m a i a

4 Labor of Dionysus:

A Critique of the State-Porm M i c ha e lH a r d tand An t o n i oNegn

3 Bad Aboriginal Art: Tradition,Media r and Technological Horizons Erie Michaels

2 The Cinematic Body Steven Shavi ro

1 The Coming Community Giorgio A g a m h e n


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Insurgencies

Constituent Power and the Modern State

AntonioNegri

Translated by Maurizia Eoscagli

Theory Out of Bounds Volume15

Univer s i t y of Alinnesota Press

Minneapolis London


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The U n i v e r s i t yof M i n n e s o t a P r e s s g r a t e f u l l y a c k n o w l e d ge sf i n a n c i a las s i s t ance p rov idedfo r the t r an s la t ion o f th i s book by the M c K n igh t F oun da t ion .

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I . I B R A R \ O K C O X G R K S S C V l ' A L O G l N G - I N - P U B L I C AT IO N D AT A

Negn, Antonio , 1933-[P o te re cos t i tuen te .E n g l i s h ]

I n s u rg e n c i e s: cons t i tuen t pow erand the modern s t a te/ A n t o n i oNegn ; t r a n s l a t e db y M a u r i z i aBos cag l i .

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Contents

Foreword Theory Out ofB ounds Ser ies E di torsvi iC h a p t e r 1. Constituent Power: The Concept of a Crisis i

On the Jur id ica l Conceptof Const i tuent Power 1Ab solute Procedu re, C onst itut ion, R evolu t ion2From S tructure to the Su bject 2 5

c h a p t e r 2. Virtue and Fortune: The Machiavellian Paradigm 37T he Logic of Time and thePrince's Indecision 31Dem ocracy as Absolu te Governme nt and the R eform of the R ena issanc61

C ritical On tologyof the C onst i tue nt Pr inciple 81C h a p t e r 3. The Atlantic Model and the Theory of Counterpower 9 9

Mutatio and Anakyclosis 9 9Harrington: C onsti tuen t Poweras Coun te rpower 111T h e Const i tuen tMotor and theC onst i tut ional is t Obstacle128

c h a p t e r 4. Political Emancipation in the American Constitution 141Constituent Power and the"Frontier" of Freedom 141H omo Pol it icusand theRepub l i can M ach ine 155C risis of the E vent an d Inversion of the T endency175

c h a p t e r 5. The Revolution and the Constitution of Labor 193Rousseau 'sEnigmaand theTime of the Sansculot tes 19 3T h e C onstitutionof L a b o r 2 1 2T o T erm ina te the R evolu tion2 3 0

c h a p t e r 6. Communist Desire and the Dialectic Restored 251Const i tuent Powerin Revolut ionary Mater ia l ism251Lenin and theSoviets:T h e Inst i tut ional Compromise 2 6 8Socia l ism an dEnterpr ise 2 9 2


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c h a p t e r 7. The Constitution of Strength a o s"Mul t i tudee t Potent ia" :T h e Problem 3 0 3C onstitutive Disutopia 313BeyondMo d ern i ty 3 2 4

Not es 337

Index 365


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Foreword

T H E H I S T O R Yof modern Euro-Amer ican revo lu t ionshas oftenb een r eadby schol-ars as a series of contras ts or a l ternatives . T he dynam ics of the A m erican R evolution are opposed to the French ,or perha ps bo thare contras tedto the Ru ssian expe-r i e nc e .Such s tud iesend up byposing th e differen tmodern revolut ionsase m b l e m sof opposing ideologicalpositions l iberal, bourge ois, totalitarian,and soforth. An to-n io Negri proposes, rather, thatwe t race the common th read tha t l inks these mod-e rn revolut ionsand read themas the progressive developm entand expressionof oneand th e sam e concep t,constituentpower. C onst ituent poweris the active, operative

elem ent comm on to a l l m ode rn revolut ions and the conceptual key to un ders tan dingt h em.One can approach the conceptof const i tuent powerthrough the

dem ocrat ic pract ices of m ode rn revolut ions a nd begin by looking at the popula r or-ganizationalf rameworkstha t are i tsexpress ionsin the differen trevolut ionary expe-r iences ,such as the const i tue nt assem bl ies in the A m erican and French revolutionsor the Soviets in the Russ ian .Here w e find that con st i tue nt power is an ex press ionof the popularwill, or, bet ter, i t is the power of the mult i tude. Democracy i tself is

thus inseparab lefrom th e concept and pract ice of const i tuent power.Throughout the modern era , however, const i tuent powerhas

been in conflict w ithconstituted power,the fixedpower of formal constitutionsand cen-


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tral author i ty. Whereas const i tuent power opens each revolut ionary process , throw-in g ope n th e doors to the forcesof c ha ngeand them yr iad d e s ir e sof the mul t i t ude ,consti tuted power closes downth e revolutionand br ings it back to order. In e a c hofth e modern revolu t ions ,th e State roseup in opposition to the democra t ican d revo-lutionaryforces and imposesa re turn to a constituted order,a newThermidore , which

e i the r r e c upe r a t e dor r e p r e s se dth e const i tuent impulses .T h e confl ict be twe e nac -t ive cons t i tue n t powe r and reac t ive cons t itu ted power i s wh a t cha rac te r izes theserevolu t iona ry exper iences .After th e d e f ea t of each revolut ion, const i tuent desiresdisappeared but did not die .They bur rowed underground in wa i t fo r a new t imeand a new place to spring forth again in revolution.This is the s tory N egri te lls as het races the movements o fconstituent power and its revolutionsfrom Machiavel l i ' sFlorence to the English Revolut ion,an d from th e A m e r i c a n ,to the F r e nc h an dRuss ianrevolut ions. Each t ime const i tuent power spr ings for th and each t ime i t is

be a te nba c kby const i tu ted powerand its forces of orde r. H o w c a n w em a k ea revo-lut ion, Negri asks cont inua l lythroughout his study , thatis never c losed dow n?H owcan wecrea te a const i tuent power tha tis never re ined inand defea tedby a newcon-st itu ted pow er?H o w c a n w ef inal ly r e a li ze d e m oc r a c y?

W e should situate Negri 's conceptionof consti tuent power along-side th e other at temptsto unde r s t a ndthe ce ntrality of thepoliticalin modern thoughtand soc ie ty, such as M iche l Foucau l t's theory of powe r and H ann ahArendt ' snotionof politics an d action. T h e pr imary contr ibut ionof Negri's wor k is his articulationof a dis t inc t ion within power be tweenconstituent power and const i tu ted power.This distinction providesh im both an analyt ica land anevalu ative criter ion that dif-ferent ia tes power.Negri thus forces us to refuse any uni tary concept ion of powerand recognize , ra ther,tw o f unda m e n t a lpowers that conf l ic t cont inual ly throughou tm odern i ty. S imi la r ly, m odern i ty and i ts de ve lopm en t cann ot be cap tured in an y u n itary concept ion or te leologica l development; moderni ty is ins tead charac ter ized byth e antagonis t ic play be tween const i tuent poweran d const i tu ted power,and i t s de-ve lopm en t i s de te rm ine d by the i r r e la tive advance s and de c l ines . T he two powercan thus serveas e m b l e m sfor the f u n d a m e n t a la l te rna t ives wi th in m odern i tyandthe twocompeting not ionsof the poli tica l tha t c hara c ter izeit.

Negri ' s book opensin an in te l lec tua lfield in which const i tuentpower has been recognizedbu t cont inual lynegated the field ofconstitutionalandlegal theory. Legal theor is ts , par t icular ly cont inenta l legal theor is ts , a re among thescholarsw h o have devotedth e most a t tent ionto the conceptof const i tuent power,but asNegri shows they have distorted i t and takenaway i ts revolut ionary c hara c ter,

twisting itfinally in to a suppor t of ra ther than a threa t to const i tu ted power.This


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O N E


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Constituent Power:

The Concept of a Crisis

On the Juridical Concept of Constituent Power

T O S P E A Kof const i tuent poweris to speak of democracy.In the m o d e r n age thetw o concepts have of ten been re la ted ,and aspar t of a process thathas in tens i f iedd u r i n g the twen t ie th cen tu ry, they have bec om e m ore and m ore su per imposed . Inother w ords , const i tue nt powerhas been c ons iderednot only as an a l l -powerfu landexpansivepr inc ip le ca pab leof produc ingth e const i tut ional normsof anyj u r i d i ca lsys tem,bu t also as the s u b j ec tof this production an act iv ity equal ly a l l -powe rfuland expansive.From th is s tandpoint , cons t i tuent power tends to becomeident if iedw ith the very conce pt of polit ics as it conc ept is un de rstood in a dem ocr at ic society.T o acknowledge const i tuent poweras a const i tut ionaland jur id ic al pr inciple ,w em u s t see it not simply as producing const i tu t ional normsand s t ructur ingconsti-tu ted powersbu t primari lyas a su bjec t that regulates d em ocrat ic poli tics .

Y et this is not as imple m at te r.In fact, const i tuent power resistsbe ing constitutionalized: "Studying const i tuent powerfrom the jur id ical perspec-tive presents an except ionaldifficulty given the hybrid nature ofthis p o w e r. . . . T h estrength h i d d e nin const i tuent powerrefuses to be fully in tegratedin ahiera rch ica lsys tem of norms andcompetencies const i tuen t power a lways rem ains a l ien toth e law." 1 T he ques tion becom es even m oredifficultbecause dem ocracy,too, resists


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bein g const i tu t ional ized: dem ocracyis in fact a theory of absolute government, whileconst i tu t ional ismis a theory of l imi ted governmentand the re forea pract ice tha tl imits d emo cracy.2 Our aim then will be to find a definit ion of cons t i tuen t powerwithin th e b o u n d a r i e sof this c r is is tha t charac ter izesit. We will try to u n d e r s t a n dthe rad ica l cha rac ter of the foun da t ions of the c oncept of const ituent power, and

the extent of i tseffects, f rom democracy to sovere ignty,from politics to the State,from power \potere] to strength \potenza].3 In shor t , we wil l t ry to understand theconceptof con st i tue nt power exac t ly insofaras it is thec onc e p tof a crisis.

Therefore le t ' sfirstconsiderth e articulationsof the ju r id icaldefi-nition of consti tuent power: they will a llowus to getimme d ia t e lyto the core of thea rgum ent . A f te rw ard , we wi l l cons ide r the prob lem of cons t ituen t pow erfrom th es tandpoin tofc ons t i t u t iona l i sm.

What is cons t i tuen t powerfrom th e perspect iveof ju r id ica l

theory? I t is the source of production of consti tutionalnorms that is , the powerto m ak e a cons t itu tion and the re fore to d ic ta te the fu nd am en ta l normsthat orga-nize the powe r sof the Sta te .In othe r words ,it is the power to establ isha new ju -r id ica l a r r a n g e m e n t ,to regula te ju r id ica lre la t ionsh ips w i th ina new co mmu n i t y.4

"Constituent power is an imperativeact ofna t ion, r is ingfrom nowhereand organiz-ing the hierarchy ofpowers." 5 This is an extrem ely paradoxica l de f ini tion: a powerr is ing f rom now here organizeslaw. This paradox i s unsus ta inab le p rec ise ly becauseit is soext reme . Indeed , neveras clear lyas in the case of const i tuent powerhas ju-r id ical theory been caught in the game ofaff i rming and den ying , abso lu t iz ing andl im iting tha tis charac te r i s t icof its logic (a s Marx cont inual lyaffirms).

E v e n though consti tuent power isal l -powerfu l ,i t nonethelesshas to be l im ited tem pora lly,def ined ,and dep loyed as an ex t raord ina ry power. T het ime ofconst i tuent power,a t ime cha rac te r izedby a form idable capac ityof acce le r-a t ion the t im e of the e vent and of the gen era l iza t ion ofs ingu la r i tyha sto beclosed ,t rea ted , red uc ed in jur idic a l ca tegor ies , an d res tra in ed in the a dm inis tra t iverout ine . Perhaps this impera t iveto t ransform const i tuent power into extraordinarypower, to c rush it against th e event , to shu t it in a factual i tyrevealed onlyby thelaw, w as never as anxiouslyfelt as d u r i n gthe French Revolut ion.Constituent poweras a l l - embrac ing poweris in fact th e revolution i tself . "C itizens,th e revolution isd e t e r m i n e dby the principles that begani t . The constitution is f o u n d e don the sa-cred r ights of property, equality, freedom[liberte]. T he revolu tion is over,"pro-c la imed Napoleon with inimitable ,ironic ar rogance ,6 be c a useto c la im tha tcon-stitu en t pow er is over is pure logical n onse nse . It is clear, however,that that revolutionand

tha t const i tue nt power c ould be m ad e legal only in the form of theThermidor.


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Th e p ro b l em o fFrench l ibera l i sm,throughout th e first hal f of the n ineteenth cen-tury, w as tha t of bringing th e revolut ionto a conclusion.7 B u t const i tuent powerisnot only a l l-pow erfu l ; i t is also expansive: i ts un lim ited qu ali ty is not only tem pora lbu t also spatial . H owever,this lat ter characteris t ic wil l also haveto be r e d u c e dspatially r ed u ced an d r eg u l a t ed .Constituent power must i t se l f be reduced to thenorm of the produc tion of law; i t m ust be inc orporated into the establ ished powe r. I tsexpansiveness isonly shownas an in te rpre ta tive norm ,as a form of contro l of theState's const i tut ionali ty,as an activityof const i tut ional revision. Eventual ly,a palereproduct ionof const i tuent powercan bes een a t w o rk in r e f e ren d u m s , r egu l a to ryactivities,and so on,opera t ing in te rm i tt en t ly wi th inwel l -def inedl imitsan d proce-d u res .8 A ll this from an objective perspect ive:an ex t remelystrong set of jur id ica ltools covers over and al ters the n atu re of con st i tue nt powe r, de finin g the con ce pt ofconst i tuent poweras an insoluble essence.

If w e regardth e quest ionfrom a subject ive perspect ive ,th e crisisbecomes even more ev iden t .After be ing object ively perver ted , const i tue nt powerbe c ome s ,so to speak, subject ively des iccated .First of all thes ingular charac ter is ticsof its originary and ina l ienab le na tu re van i sh ,and the nex us that h is tor ical ly l inksconst i tuent power to the right of resistance (and thatdef ines ,in a sense, the act ivecharacterof the fo rmer)is e rased.9 What is left then und ergoes every typeof distor-t ion. C ertainly, once si tuated w ithin the conc ept of the nat ion, con st i tue nt powe rs e e m s to m ai n ta i n s omeof its originary aspects ,but it iswell known that th isis asophism, andthat th e notion of const i tuent power i s moresuffocated than devel -oped by the concept ofnation. 10

Not even this reduct ionsuffices, however, and the beas t seemsnot yet to be t amed .Thus the action of the scissorsof logic is a d d e dto the ideolog-ical sophism , and jur id ical theory ce lebra tes one of i ts ma sterpieces . T he parad igmis split: to originary,commissionary cons t ituent power is opposed cons t ituent powerproper, in i t s assem bly form ;finally, const i tuted power is opposed toboth. 11 In thisway, const i tuent poweris absorbed into the mech an i s mof representation. 12 Theboundlessnessof const i tuent expressionis l imitedin its genes is bec auseit issub jec tedto the ru les and re la t ive e xtens ionof suffrage; in its func t ion ing becauseit is s u b -

jec ted to the ru les of assembly ;and in theper iod dur ing whichit is in force (whichis cons idered de l im i tedin its funct ions , assum ing m oreth e form of classic "dictator-ship" than referr ing to the idea and pract ices ofdemocracy). 13 Finally, and on thewhole ,th e idea of const i tuent poweris j u ri d ica l ly p re fo rm ed , w h e reasit wasc l a i medtha t it would generateth e law;it is in fact absorbedin the notion of political represen-tat ion, whereasit was supposed to legi t imize thisnotion. Thus const i tuent power,

C o n s t i t u e n t P o w e r


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the contradict ion is avoided through a dislocat ion of planes. Whereas the order ofthe c onstituted powe r is that of theSollen(what ought to be ), the ord er of const i tuen tpower is that ofSein (what is) . Thefirst belongs tojur id icaltheory, the second tohistory or sociology.There i s no in tersect ion be tween norm andfact, validi ty a ndeffectiveness,wh at ough tbe and theontological horizon.T h e second is the fo u n -dat ion of the f irs t but through a causal l ink that i s im m ed iate ly brok en, so that theconst i tutedjur id ica lsystemis absolutely autonomous.

T he great school of Germ an publ ic law, in the secondhalf of thenine teenth century and at the beginning of the twe nt ie th , has by and largeident if iedi tself w ith this position. A cc ordingto Georg Jellinek, constituent poweris exogenouswith respectto the constitutionand derivesfrom th e empirical-factualsphereas nor-mativeproduction. 16 This normat ive product ionis l imi ted ,or, better, it containsitsow n l imi ta t ion becauseth e empir ical - factualis that historicalan d ethical rea l i tytha t a la K a n t i fthe lawal lowsi t l im i ts theextensionof the principle outsideofthe law. C onst i tuent power, if the law and the con st i tut ion al low i t, w ants n othingbut the regulat ion and therefore the self-l imitat ion of i ts own force.17 In this senseth e t r an s cen d en ceof the factualwith respectto the law can becons idereda differ-ence of m i n im a l d eg ree .It is in teres t ingto notice how Jellinek's school (particularlyw h e n faced with the effects of the revolut ionary counci l movement inpost-FirstWorld War Germany) doesnot hesi ta te to r e d u c ethe gap that dividesthe sourcefrom the jur id ica l arra nge m en t , thus acc epting the n eed to inc lud e wi th in th is spacerevolut ionary product ionsan d ensuing un foreseen ins ti tu t ionaleffects that certainlyexceedth e fu n d amen ta lnorm of the const i tut ion of theReich.18

This i s w hat H ans Kel senrefuses.For h im t ranscen denc e i s u t -m ost and ab solute . T he charac ter is t ic of the law is to regu late it s own product ion .Only a norm can de te rm ine , and does de te rm ine , the p roced urethrough which an-other normis p ro d u ced .The norm regulat ingthe product ionof another normandthe norm produced accord ingto this prescript ion (representablethrough the spatialimage of superordinat ion and subordinat ion) have nothing to do wi th const i tuentpower. Norms follow th e ru les of the ju r id ical fo rm, and const i tuent powerhasnothing to do with the formal process of the produc t ionof n o rms . C o n s ti tu en t

power isitself, at the l imit, def ined by the system in its entirety.Its factualreal i ty,om nipotenc e, and e xpansiveness are im pl ied in that point of the sys tem w here theformal strength \potenza] of the law isi tself om nipotentand expansive:the basic norm[Grundnorm].19 An d thefact that in Kelsen'sfinalwritingsth e entire factual,jur ispru-dential , andinstitutional life of the lawappearsto be absorbed in the normat iveprocessdoes not change the s i tuat ion much.The new d y n a m i cis never d ia lect ical ;



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politicall imit, which is the (Kantian) condition of theconstitution of the t ranscen-d en ta l . Imm an en ceis w e a k ,of m inim al degree , even thougheffective.22

Let's now consider some theoretical positionsin whichthe degreeof i m m a n e n c eis greater. Once againw e n e e d to shift ou r at tent ion,after this br iefexcursusinto the Anglo-Saxon world , to thejur id icaltheory and also the poli t icaltheory of the Germ anReich.Ferdinan d Lassal le c la im s that the norm at ive val id i ty ofthe juridical-forma l consti tut ion depe nds on the m aterial andformal (that is, sociolog-ical and juridical)degreeof adaptat ionof the ordersof real i ty thathas bee n posedbyconstituent power.This is an actual form ative power.Its extraordinarinessis prefor-mative, and i tsintensi ty radiatesas an implici t projectonto th e system as a w h o l e .Keeping in mind the res is tance of the real condi t ions and the reach shown by con-st i tuent power, the const i tut ional process can be imagined and studied as aninter-mediate determinat ion between two orders of real i ty.23 H e r m a n n H e ll er, a n o th e rcritic gravitatingin the orbit of those juridica l tenden cies closeto the workers ' move-ment , br ingsto com pletion Lassal le 's vision.Here the processof const i tuent powerbecomes endogenous , in ternalto const i tut ional development. Ini t ial ly, const i tuentpower infusesits dynam ism in toth e constitutional systemand then is i tself reform edby the constitution. 24 We are not farfrom th e m o m en t w h en Ru d o l f Sm en d cancallthe const i tut ion "the dy nam ic principleof the State'sbecoming." 25 How can the ori-gins ofconstituent powerbe, at the en d of theanalyt ical process, com pletely absorbe dby th e State?H ow i s i tpossible thatth e mediat ionof differentordersof real i ty endswith a d y n ami s m cen t e red ,or bet t e r, madeits own, as an in t imate essence,by theState? Once again,w h a t is going on here is a neutral izat ionof const i tue nt power.A nd

al though these authors deny i t , claiming rather that the evolut ion of the State alsoimplies the progressive real izat ion of a set of const i tuent norms, the determinationthat these norm s assumein thereal movem ent becom es tota l ly unc er ta in .T h e i m m a -nence of const i tuent power is shown by the State to be aform of natural evolut ion.

C an constitutional historybe anatural history?T w omajo r twen-t ieth-centuryscholarsanswer th is ques t ion: M ax We ber and C arl Sch m itt .With anacute percept ion Weber unders tood thatth e natural is t cri terionis insufficient tom a k e cons ti tuen t power im m anen tto const i tuted power. Instead, Weber insistent ly

pushes consti tuen t pow erto confront historicosocialreality.26

Throughout the coreof his polit ical sociology w he re hedef inesthe theory of the types of legitimacy, i t isclear that for Weber consti tuent power i s s i tuated betwe en c har isma tic and ra t ionalpower. C onst i tue nt power derivesfrom the first theviolenceof innovation,and fromthe sec ond i ts const i tut ive instrum en tal i ty. I t sudd en ly form s posit ive law ac cord ingto an inn ovativeprojec t that grounds a paradigm of rat ionali ty.



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T h e cons t itu t ional is t parad igm a lwaysrefers to the "mixed consti tution,"th e m e d i -ation of inequa l i ty,and the re foreit is anonde m oc r a ti c pa r a d igm .

In contrast , the paradigm of consti tuent power is that of aforcetha t burs ts apar t , breaks, in ter rupts , unhinges any preexis t ing equi l ibr ium and anypossible continuity. C onsti tue nt powe r is t ied to the notion of de m ocrac y as absolu tepower. Thus, as a violent and expansiveforce, const i tuent power is a concept con-nec ted to the social preconst i tu t ionof the de m ocra t ic to ta l ity.This preformativeand im aginary d im ension clashes with constitutionalism in a sharp, strong, and lastingma nne r.In this case, history doesnot dispense w ithth e contradictionsof the present;in fact, th is mor ta l s t ruggle be tween democracyand consti tutionalism, between con-sti tuent powerand the theory and praxisof the limits of democracy, becomes morea nd mor e p r omine n tth e fur ther his tory advances.40 In the concept of const i tuentpower is thus im plic i tth e i dea tha t th e past n o longer explainsth e present ,an d tha tonly th e fu ture will be able to do so. AsAlexisde T ocquevi lle wr i tes , "The pasthasceased to throw its l ight upon th e fu ture , and the m i n d of m an w a n d e r sin obscu-rity." 41 Parad oxica l ly, th is n egat ive ide a , more thana thousand other motivations,explainsth e birth of "de moc r a c yin Ame r ic a . "This i s whyconsti tuent power pro-duce s and reproduc es i tse lf everyw here and cont inu al ly. C onst itu tional ism 's c la imof regula t ing const i tuent powerjur id ica l lyis nonse nse not only be ca us e i t w ants todividethis power bu t also bec au se i t seek s to block i ts consti tutive tem porali ty. C on-stitutionalism is a ju rid ic al doc tr ine that kn ows only the past: i t is con tinu ally re fe r-r ing to t ime past ,to consol ida ted s t rengthsand to their inertia ,to the tamed spir i t .In contrast, const ituent power a lway s refersto the f u tu r e .

Constituent power hasalways a s ingular re la t ionship to t ime.Indeed, const i tuent power is on the one hand an absolute wil l de termining i ts owntemporali ty.In other words,it represen tsan e s se n ti al m om e n tin thesecular iza t ionof power and pol i t ics . Power becomes an immanent dimension of his tory, an ac tua ltempora l hor izon.T h e break wi thth e theological tradit ioni s com ple te .42 B u t thisis n ot enough: const i tuent power,on the other hand , a l so represen tsan extraor-dinary accelera t ionof t ime. History be c om e s c onc e n t r a te din a present tha t devel-ops impe tuously, and i ts possibi l it ies c ond en se into a very s t rong n uc leus of im m e-

diate production.From this perspective constituent poweris closely conne ctedto theconceptof revolution. 43 A nd since it is a l r e a dy l i nke dto the conceptof de moc r a c y,now i tpositions itselfas the motor or ca rdin al expressionof democra t ic revolut ion.A nd we see i t tak ing par t in all them e c h a n i s m s at t imes, extremelyv i o l e n t t h a tpulsa te in the democra t ic revolut ion, v ibra t ing be tweenthe one and them a n y,b e -tween power and mul t i tude , in a ve ryfast, often spasmodicrhythm. What could



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cal thought does to no a v a i l w eshould , ra ther, acceptit, in order to grasp be t terthe nature of the concept . To accept th is cr i s i s means ,first of all, tore fuse the no-t ion that the c oncept of const ituent power m ay som ehow be foun de d by some thingelse, taken away, thatis, from its ownnature as founda t ion .This a t t emp tsurfaces,as we have seen, whenever const i tuent power i s subordinated to representat ion orto the principle of sovereignty,but it al ready s tar ts operat ing whenthe omnipo-tence and expansiveness of const ituent power are l im i ted or m ad e subject to consti -tut ionalis t aims.Constituent power, theysay andd ec ree ,c an only be def inedas ex-t raordinary(in t ime) and it canonly be fixed (in space)by a s ingular determinat ion:it is considered e i theras a normat ivefact tha t is d e e m e dpreexis tentor as amat e r i a lconst i tut ion that de velops in tan de m w ith i t! Bu t al l this is ab su rd : how can a n or-mative fact val idatedby custom do just iceto innovation?H o w c a n apreconstituted"poli t ical class" be the guarantor of a newconstitution? 48 A lready theeffort of en-closing const i tuent powerin a cage of spat iotemporal l imitat ionw as u n s u s t a i n ab l e ,but: any at tempt to block i t by giving i tfinality becomes downright inconceivable .One can try to mi n i mi zethe impac t of the event ,but certainlyit is not possible todef ine i ts innovative singularity inadvance .49 These logical skirmishes, carried onto the verge of nonsense, infact const i tute the m ystif icat ion that ju rid ic al theoryand pract ice take care to col lect and rear t iculateinto the theories of sovereigntyand representat ion .Constituent power, l im i tedand f inalized in such a way, is thush e ld back wi th in the h ierarc hical rout ines of successive product ion and re prese nta-tion, and conce ptual ly reconst ructed not as the sys tem 's cause but as i ts resul t. T hefoundat ion isinver ted ,and sovereigntyas suprema potestasis reconst ructedas the

foundat ioni tself.But it is afound a t ion con t ra ryto const i tuent power;it is a s u m -mit , whereas const i tuent poweris a basis .It is anaccompl i shedfinality,whe reas con-st i tue nt poweris unf ina l ized;it impl iesa l imitedt ime andspace, whe reas const i tuen tpower impl iesa m ult id i rect ional p lural i tyof times andspaces;it is arigidifiedfo rmalconst i tut ion, w he rea s const i tuen t power is absolute process.Everything, in su m , setsconst i tuent powerand sovereigntyin opposition, eventhe absolute character thatboth categorieslay claimto: the absolutenessof sovereigntyis a total i tarian concept ,whe r e a sthat of const i tue nt power is the abs olutene ss of dem ocrat ic governm ent.

In this way, thus, b y insisting on the conce pt of cons tituent powe ras an absolute process all-powerfuland expansive, unl im i tedand u n f in a l i zed wecan begin to appre ciate the originali ty of i ts s truc ture. B ut we m ust im m ediatelyfacean object ion: what else can absoluteness given in thisform be but the absolutenessof an absence,an infin i te voidof possibilit ies,or, really, th e presenceof negativepossibilities?It s eemsto me that in this object ionthe mi s u n d e r s t an d i n gof absence



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is exace rba tedby the misapprehens ionof the concept of possibility.This objectioncan be refuted. If the concept of consti tuent power is the concept of an absence,w hy should this absence resul tin an absenceof possibil i t iesor the presenceof ne g-ative possibilities? Infact, here we are touching a crucia l point in the metaphysica lde bate , the d eba te center ing on the que st ion of s t rength\potenza] and its relation topower \potere]. T he m etaphy sica l a l te rna t ive in the de f ini t ion of s t rength tha t run sfrom Aristot le to the Renaissance and f romSche l l ingto Nietzsche is precisely anal terna t ive be tween absence and power, be tween desire and possession, be tween refusal and domination. 50 Somet imes th i s a l te rna t iveis closed,as it iswhen powerisconsidered f romit s origin as preexisting physicalfact, as finalized order,or as dia lec-tical result .In other casesth e al terna t iveis open . A great currentof modern pol i t i -cal thought , f rom M achiavel l ito Spinozato Ma r x , has developed around this openalternative,which is the ground of democra t icthought. 51 In this tradition,th e absenceof preconstituted and f inal ized pr inc iplesis combined wi thth e subjec t ive s t rengthof the m ult i tude , thus const itu t ing the socia l in the a lea tory ma ter ia l i ty of a u niver-sal re la t ionship,in the possibilityof f r e e d o m .

T he con stitution of the social is a stren gthfoundedon absence that is, ondesi re and desire unceasinglyfeeds the m ovem ent o f s tr ength . H um anstrength produces a cont inual dis loca t ion of desire and accentuates the absence onwhic h th e innovat ive eventis p r o d u c e d .T he expans ivenessof strength and its pro-

ductivityare groundedin thevoid of l imitations,in the a bse nc eof positive determi-na tions, in thisfullnessof absen ce . C onst i tue nt power isdef inedemerging f rom thevortex of the void, from th e abyss of the absence of de te rmina t ions ,as a totallyope n ne e d .This i s whyconsti tutive strength never endsup aspower, n or does th emultitude tend to become a totali ty but, rather, a set of singularit ies, an open multi-plicity.Constituent power is this force that, on the absence offinalit ies,is projec tedout as an a l l -powe rful and a lways m ore expansive tende ncy. Lack of preconst itu tedassum ptions andful lnessof strength: this is a truly positive conce pt of free dom . Om -

nipotenc e and expansiveness also characterize dem ocracy, since theydefine constituentpower. Dem ocracyis both absolute processand abso lu te governm ent .Thus, the ef-fort to keep open wha tju r id icalthought wantsto close,to get toknow more deep lythe crisis of i ts scientif ic lexicon, does not simply makeavailableto us the conceptof constituent powe r bu t m ake s i tavailableto us as the m atr ix of de m ocra t ic thoughtand praxis. A bsenc e, void, and de sire are the m otor of thepoli t icodemocrat icdyna micas such . It is a disutopia tha t is, the sense of an overflowing constitutive activity,as in tense as a Utopia bu t without its i l lusion,an d fully mate r ia l .52


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H a n n a h Arendt well unders tood th istruth about const i tuentpower. 53 She arr ives a t i t by an ob l ique path , by coun terposing the A m erican to theFrench Revolut ion ,but it is noless effective a path , ra the rso much s t rongerfor be-ing paradoxical .The thes is aboutthe two revolutions has a long history.It waselabora tedby Friedr ichvon Gentz in his introductionto the German t rans la t ionofE d m u n d B u r k e ' sReflectionson theFrench Revolution, but it wasabove all popular-ized b y John A dam s 's supporters agains tJefferson du ring the pres ide nt ia l cam paignof 1800. 55 T h e American Revolut ionan d C onst itu tion , foun de don the respectan ddeve lopmentof f reedom , stands aga ins tthe horrid Jacobins, againstthe revolutionas an a bs t ract and ideological force . A ren dt take s up the sam e notion , sh i f ting how-ever its cen t ra l axis , wh ichis no longer th e opposi t ion betweenth e concreteand theabstrac tbut between poli t ical and social revolut ion. Poli t ical revolut ion transcendsthe social wi thout ann ihi la ting i t but , ra ther, by produc ing a h igher level of und er-s tanding, equi l ibr ium,and cooperat ion ,a publ ic spaceof f reedom.Social revolution,ins tead, and the French Revolut ion in par t icular,nullif iesthe pol i tical by su bordi -na t ing i t to the soc ial . T he social , in turn,left to i tself , spins em ptily in a searc h forf reedom that becomes increas ingly b l indan d i n s an e . Wh en ev e rthe polit ical doe snot al low society to understanditself, to ar t icu late i tse l f in un de rs tan din g,folly andterror will t r ium ph.Hence tota l itar ianism c annot bu t be e s tabl ished. Later and m orethan oncewe will haveto go b ack to this thesisof the two revolut ionsto evaluateitfrom diffe re nt points of view. For the t im e be ing let's leave aside the historical jud g-m e n t and consider ins teadhow the principle of f reedom takes shapein Arendt ' stheory, becauseit is precisely through th is conce pt,and byre fusing t radi t ion, that

she deeply renew s poli tical theory. C erta in ly, revolut ion i s a beginning, but m odernhis tory begins only when the const i tuent pr incip le i s removedfrom violence andwar. Only then i s the const i tuen t pr incip le f reed om : "C rucial , then , to any u nd er -s tandingof revolut ionsin the m o d e r nage istha t th e idea of f r eed o mand theexpe-rience of a newbeginning shouldcoincide." 56

B u t what does thisf reedom become? I t becomes pub l i c space ,const i tut ing a communicat ive relat ion, i ts own condit ions of possibi l i ty, and there-fore i ts own strength. It is thepolis. Freed om is a beginn ing that poses its own con-

di t ions . T he r ight of com m uni ty pre dom inates over a l l o thers , over the r ight tolife,over the very spe cifica t ions of the righ t to property, so tha t i t is both a c onst i tuen tand const i tu ted pr incip le . "Independent governmentand the founda t ionof a newb o d y politic" th is i s w ha t i t me ans "to befree." Freedom canno t be redu ced ; ne i -ther doesit co me after l ibera t ion :f reedom m e a n sto "be a l r ead yfree"; it is political



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constitution, an absolute process (Arendt, 26 ff). As far as we areconcerned, then,followingour argument, we want to stress how this new definition of the constituentprinciple is grounded on nothing more than its own beginning and takes place through

nothing but its own expression. The radical quality of the constituent principle is

absolute. It comes from a void and constitutes everything. It is not by chance that,

a t this point, Arendt takes stock and, through a very rich and fierce phenomenolog-ical exercise, begins demolishing any heteronomous (and in particular social) con-tent of public space, both its constitutive process and the constituent actors. The

problem lies in posing the social as a priori, as preceding the constitutive event, and

in characterizing th e social as a preconstituted political question (5 3 f f ) . This is thecase not only for historical reasons: "Nothing... could be more obsolete than to at-

tempt to liberate mankind from poverty by political means; nothing could be morefut i le an d more dangerous" (110). Not only because this is a pure an d catastrophicillusion:

The massesof the poor, this enormousmajority of all men, whom the FrenchRevolution calledles m a l h e r e u x ,whom it turned into le s enrages, only to desert them and let them fall

back into the state o f le s miserables, as the nineteenth century called them, carriedwiththem necessity,to which they had been subjectas long asmemoryreaches,

togetherwith the violencethat had alwaysbeen usedto overcomenecessity.Both together,necessityand violence,made them appear irresistible:la puissance de la terre. (110)

The reason for this situation is theoretical and deeper. Only the political reconstruc-

tion of reality, th e constitution of public space, allows for the revolutionary rebirth that is, it makes the search for happiness a possibility: "The central idea of [the Amer-ican] revolution... is the foundation of f r e e d o m , that is, the foundation of a bodypolitic that guarantees the space where freedom can appear" (121). This idea istherefore an ontological institution, an actual fundamental determination of being.

The concept of constituent power is the constituent event, the absolute character of

what is presupposed, a radical question. A nd i t isexactly on this point, th e radical fun -damenta l i tyof political being, that Arendt is strongest. Constituent power, insofar asit constitutes the political from nothingness, is an expansive principle: it allows no

room for either resentment or resistance; it is not selfish but supremely generous; itis not need but desire. Arendt's denunciation of "the social question" 57 proceeds asa parallel to an overflowing an d expansive notion of the ontological institutionalityof political democracy: in all i tsforms, from the Greek polls to the Renaissance city,from the American assemblies to the revolutionary workers' councils of 1919 and

1956.58


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Why do these s t rongly made points , sopowerful lydeployed inthe discussion and defini t ion of const i tuent power byArendt, leave us in the endunsat i sf ied ,even ill at ease?A t the v e ry mo m en t w h enshe i l luminatesth e nature ofconstituent power, Arend t rendersit i n d i ff e r en tin its ideal i tyor equivocalin itshistorical e xem plificat ion. If one teases her wri t ing a l i tt le, eac h of the cha racteris t icsattribu ted to constituent power loses its intensity, bec om es pale, andrevealseclipsedby the bri l l ianc e of the e xposi t ion its opposi te.Thus, for instance, the constitutivephenom enology of the pr incip le reveals i tse l f as perfect ly conservative . T he cont in-uous celebrat ionof the fact that fre ed om preexists l iberationand that the revolutionis real izedin the format ionof poli tical spac e bec om esthe key to ahistoricist herme-neut icsthat sys temat ically f la t ten s dow n, or d eform s, the novel ty of the event andlimitsit to the Am er ican exam ple .

The ambigui tyof the beginningand the absolute takingroot ofconst i tuen t power (an am bigui ty connected to the H eideggerian de f in i tion of be ingand th e consequent const i tu t ive a l ternat iveof f r eed o m)are resolved by A r e n d tinformal term s, according to the d em an ds of an idea l i smcontent to find acorrespon-d e n c ein inst i tut ions. A ren dt at tack s w ithfiercede te rmina t ionth e categoriesof pityand com pass ion as de vas ta t ing fun ct ions of the process tha t produces the ideologyof the "social quest ion." She counterpoises desire to sympathy,truth to theatrics ,the m i n d to the hear t , pat ienceto terror, founda t ionto l iberat ion .Up to this pointshe upho ldsth e ontologicalradicali tyof the const i tuent principle;but shedoes n otsustain the trajectory that would lead to preserving poli t ical space as a terrain off reedom and ahorizon of desi re , thus denyingit as a space dedicatedto media t ion

and the product ion of power. She d oes not u nm ask Rousseau as the theoret ic ian ofsovereigntyas m u c h as she scorns him as the theoret icianof compass ion. Arendtwan t s poli t ical emancipat ion,and she cons idersit as the acco mp l i s h men tof dieAmerican Revolut ion:in fact, she conce ives this passage onlyas the real izat ionof adete rm ina te cons ti tuen t appara tusand exaltsit in its c ru d eeffectivenessas an idealparad igm. Rather than be ingan ontological beginning, poli t ical emancipat ionb e -c o m e sh e re a hermeneutic legacy. 59

Arendt's a rg u m e n tis even more c lear ly inadequa teif we focus

on her analys isof the d y n ami cof const i tuent power.The choiceof takingthe A m e r-ican Re volution as an exem plary m odel not only b locks the ontological process bu talso cheapensthe analysisof the political apparatu s.For A ren d tthe Constitutio libertatisis s implyand mere lyidentifiedwith th e historical eventsof the American const i tut ion(139-79). A ll the theoretical problem s tha t the de f in i tion of const ituent power hasraised are resolvedby seeking ra t ional a l terna t ivesand apoli t ical decision founded



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not on t he m but on thebasis of the solut ions imposedon them by the Ame r ic a nconsti tution.

A r e n d tthus givesu s a se r ie sof banal i t ies , more appropr ia teto ane ophyte than to a H eide gger ian phi losopher. For ex am ple , she proposes the not ionthat const i tue nt powe r is a cont inua l his tor ica l process not l im ited by its im m ed ia te

de te rmina t ionsbut tempora l ly opento in terpre ta t ionand impr ove me n t ;or that thecon st itu t ional absolu te divides in to and isjus t if ied by the dy nam ics tha t genera te i t,such tha t const i tuent powerand const i tu ted powerdo not composea vicious c irclebu t, rather, are progressively legitim ate d in a virtuou s circle; or finally tha t con stitue npower m ay be crea t ive , but a t the sam e time i t has the n a ture of a pac t ma de by m utual consent : "The grammar of ac t ion:that act ion is the only hu m anfaculty tha tdemands a plura l i ty of men; and the syntax of power : tha t power is the only humanat tr ibute tha t applies sole ly to the wor ldly in-betwe en space by which m en are m utu

ally re la ted , com bine in the ac t of foun da t ion by virtue of the m ak ing and the kee p-ing of prom ises"(175). T o say th is m eansnothing but goingback to that Anglo-Saxonsociology tha t , be tweenTalcott Parson an d John Rawls,proposes a "positive sum"political exchange, polite and consensual, and has very little to do with Arendt's in-tuition of theabsolute found at ion.60 In fact, Arendt opensb y refusingcontractual isman d ends by pra is ing i t ; she begins by grounding her a rgument in theforce of con-st i tuent power and concludes by forget t ing i tsr ad ica l quality; she star ts by fore-g r o u n d i n gth e reasonsfor d e m o c r a c yan d e nds b y aff i rming those of l ibera l ism.

It wil l not a ppea r s t range , then , tha t even Aren dt 's de f ini tion ofth e expans ivenessof const i tuent poweris m a r r e dby contradic t ionsand diff icult ies .I nde e d ,this is inevitable: the h erm en eu tics of the l iberal consti tutional m odel presentsa l i nea rand not an antagonistic sch em a for the d ev elo pm en t of consti tue nt power. I tis l inea r and idy l l ic i f com pared to the rea l problem s tha t the A m erican R evolut ionhad to face s inceits beg inn ing , p rob lem sof class struggle,slavery,and the frontier.It is l i n ea rand spontane ist as in the w orst versions of sociologicalinstitutionalism. 61

The antagonis t ic event disappears .Thus Arendt ' s phi losophy comes c lose , withoutdeservingit, to the"we ak" vers ionsof H eidegger ianism , those vers ions tha t produc eits most ex t remeresul ts .62 Even though soughtafter and ack nowledged , the foun da-tion is abandoned to the version that the real provides of i t .This is not re a l ism bu t ,rather, a historicist cynicism:it eclipsesth e rea l effort that consti tuent ref lectionh asdevelopedin the hope of recogniz ing theful lness of strength in the absolute of thefounda t ion ,and the ful lnessof f r e e d o min the void of the ontological b asis.

A t th is poin t we can un de rs tand how H aberm as , a l though tak ing

his point of departurefrom a perspe ctive that does not possess the stren gth and doe s


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not accep tth e risk of A rendt 's theory (whichis w h a t m a k e sit great),63

stil l developsa reasonab leand acc eptable cr i tiqueof her pos itions . H aberm as e labora teda theorythat can becal led "the reversalof the thesisof the tworevolutions." 64 In other words,he claims that both the French and the American Revolut ions der ive f romspecificin terpreta t ionsof natu ra l right. The French Revolut ion takes naturalright as anidea l to rea l i ze , wh ereasth e American Revolut ion takesit as area l s tate tha t poli t i-cal interve ntion c an only disfigu re. T he con st i tut ive produc tivi ty of the poli tical isthus all on the s ideof the French Revolut ion:it is the only modern revolut ion .TheAme r ic a nRe volution is a conservative revolut ion, wh ose ideology is prem ode rn andcorporative , thus an t imod ern and ant ipoli tical .

In fact, th e revolut ionsin A mer i caand France were qu i tediffer-ent . T he interpretat ion of the revolut ionary ac t w asdifferen t b ecau s e w h ereas inone case it was necessaryto impose ex novo a concept ionof natural r ight agains tadespotic power, in theother what mat tered was to l iberate the spontaneousforcesof self-regulat ionin o rd e r for them to agree w i th n atural r ight .The relat ion to theState, too,w as different:in A mer i cath e revolut ionarieshad to resista colonial powe r,whe r e a sin France theyhad to bu i lda new order. Final ly,th e political ideologyw asdifferen t ,l iberalin the firstcaseand democrat icin the second:in Amer icath e revolu-tion had to se t in m otion the egoism of na tural in teres ts , wherea s in France i t ne ed edto m obi li ze m ora l in te res t s . C onsequen tly,it is not t rue thatin the French Revo lu-t ion the social subordinated thepolitical rather, the social was const i tuted by thepolitical,and h ere in l ies the su per ior ity of the French Re volution . C onsti tu t ive i sthe opposite of conservat ive.Thus the re la t ionship between societyand State, as it

is posed in the twonatural-right const i tut ions,is rad ica l lydifferent, even divergent .In France and only in France was the const i tut ive principleaff i rmed and fully de -f ined: in the Declarationof theRightsof Man it i m m e d i a te l y b e c a m ean act ofdieconst i tut ional foundationof a newsociety. Shouldw e say, then , tha t thereare twocon st i tut ions? C ertainly, bu t the French const i tut ion w as theconstitution of the fu-ture , runningthroughout the history of the nineteenth century, graf tedonto thehistory of the working class, and st i l l const i tut ing today the principal basis of thejud ic ia la r r a n g e m e n tof the welfarestate. 65

What shouldw e say?This H aberm asian reversal leavesa bad tastein our m ouths be cau se a l though correct i t i s unge nerous . A ctually, A ren dt has givenus the c learest im age of const i tuen t power in its radicalness and strength. T he abbot 'sfrock in w h i chshe later dressedup the princip le doesnot take away its l ively figure ;it s im ply m asksit. The problem is tha t we d e m a n d th a tthe const i tuent principlebeontological ly grounded:it m u s t be def ined not by ordered spacebut open time; it



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of anotherauthor, perhapsa theoretical precu rsorand in anycase a problem atic cata-lyst of their theories,John C al d w e l l C a lh o u n , t h e s e r e s emb l an ces b eco meevident. 71

In Calhoun's thought, too, constituent poweris definedas anegative powerand opensa s ingular and ext remelyradicaldialect ic . H e developed th is problem at ic wi th in thepa r a me te r sof the const itu t ional d iscuss ion of the A m erican C onfe de rated Statesbefore the C ivi l War. C alhoun 's dec larat ions thatthe government(as const i tuentagen tan d expressionof com m un i ty) ontologically precede sth e constitutionand tha tth e const i tuentact isdef inedas the capacityto prescr ibeth e choice betwee nwar andpeace ,to im pose possible com promises, and thus to organize c onfe de rate pub lic lawas a t ruce are sointense that theycan bel inked back ,as A ren d t mak esclear,72 purelyand simply to theright of res is tance and organized in const i tu t ional procedure .T he r ight of res is tance provides us wi th a bas ic andfascinatingrefe ren ce point . I t isth e negative powe rpar excel lence, w hoseprefigurativeforce can hardlybe el iminatedfrom the history of modern const i tu t ional ism.The right of resistance,together withth e negat ive, em ergesas the radical ly found ing express ionof comm uni ty. E xac tlyatthis point, whereas Schmit t capi tu la tes to theforce of an attraction that is by nowdevoid of principles,Arendt 'sthought runs into a sort of insurmountable roadblockwh en she d iscovers that"nothing resem bles v i r tue so mu ch as a great crime":noth-ing resem bles const ituent power so m uch as the m ost radical and d eep, most des-pera te andf ierce negation. 73

Whereas Schm i tt can play wi th th is nega tion and H aberm as canm a k e i t d isappear in the f la t tes t of t ransce nde ntal hor izons , Are nd t ins tead rem ainsboth fascinatedand re pulsed by i t.Here probably lie the origins of her (so contradic-

tory!) conversionto classicaland conservative constitutionalism.We see how shecan-not stand the dee ply radical and verypowerfulprinciple she d iscovered. A rendt 's m archgets be m ired. C onsti tu t ional is t thought in gene ral and Am erican const itu tional ismin part icular com e to her rescu e in her a t tem pt tofree herse l ffrom the vortex of thecrisis,from the definitionof constituent poweras crisis.T he procedureis well-known:one voluntari ly makes oneself prisoner of the sophism of sovereignty,subjec tsone-self to the tradi t ional routine of i ts defini t ion, and thus creates a s i tuat ion in whichonly const i tuted power canjustify const i tuent power.

But isn ' t there any other l ine ofthought capable of appreciat ingthe rad ica lnessof const i tuent power wi thout drowningit in the philistinismof tra-di t ional jur idic al theory?In at tempt ingan answer,w e start from a part icular convic-tion (whichwe will try to con firm historical ly and con struct theoret ical ly throughoutth is work )that th e truth of cons t ituen t powe r is not w ha t can be a t tr ibuted to i t, inany wa y wh atsoever, by the conc ept of sovereignty. It can not be so, bec au se con-



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stituent p o w er is not only, obviously,an eman a t i o nof const i tuted power,but it is not even th e inst i tut ionof const i tuted power.It is, ra ther,an act ofchoice,th e pre-

cise determination that opensa horizon,th e radical apparatusof something that doesnot ye t exis t, and w hose c ondi tions of exis tence im ply that the creat ive act does n olose i ts chara cteris t ics in the act of cre at ing.When constituent power sets in motion

th e const ituen t process, every de term inationis free and r ema i n sfree. On the contrary,sovereignty presents i tselfas a fixing of constituent power, and there fo reas its ter-mina t ion ,as the exhaust ionof the f reedom that const i tuent power carries:oboedientiafacit auctoritatem.No, the phrase "expression ofstrength" can n ev e r m ean"institu-tion of power."

B u t at the very moment when s t rength gets ins t i tu ted i t ceasesbe ing strength and thus de clare s i tse l f as never having bee n such.There is only onecorre ct (and pa rad oxica l) condit ionfor a defini t ionof sovereignty l inkedto tha t of

const i tuent power: thatit existsas the praxis of a const i tut ive act , renewedin f ree-dom , o rgan izedin the continuityof a free praxis .B u t this contradictsth e entire t ra-dition of the concep tof sovereigntyand all itsposs ib le meanings . Consequent ly,th econcept of sovereignty and that of const i tut ive power stand in absolute opposi t ion.We can thus con clud e that if an inde pen de nt way of deve loping the conc ept of con-stituent power exists ,it has ex c l u d edany r e f e ren ceto the conceptof sovereignty.Itrelies,ra ther,on the bas isof const i tuent power i tselfan d tries to unrave lfrom thisand nothing else every const itu t ional conse quen ce.

Let's t ry once again to m eas ure the densi ty of the concept by com -paring it toother theoret ical pos i tions . We can be gin wi th a cruc ial and i r redu ciblecla im:wh en s treng this ins t i tu t ional ized ,it is necessar i ly n ega ted .B y this claimw eopen a polem ic wi th ins t itu t ional ism , and in par t icu lar wi th the m ost sophis ticatedforms i t has assumed in recenttimes. 74 B reak ing wi th A rend t's H eidegger ian am bi -guities,the institutionalismof the con tem porary suppor te rsof the "inventionof thesocial"or of the "model of thepolis" does not come closer but , ra ther, grows more

d is tan t from th e rad ica lnessof the concep t . Indeed ,the organic cont inui tyof theinst i tut ional processin this case rel ieson a purely ideologicalbasis as if the mo s tsacredprincip lesand fun da m en ta l r igh ts cou ldlay claim to historical causal i tyandontologicaleffect ivenessan d w e r e n ot i n stead m ad e r ea lby the sam e cr isis that ,byem b o d y in g th em , m ak es th em g rea tand impor tan t .This, however,is not the point.We m ust ins tead m ak e clear that c onst ituent powe r, f rom the perspective of i tsorig-inary rad ica lne ss , cann o tbe conceived sat isfactori lyas a formal processof the con-stitution of f r e e d o m .It is not anelan vi tal that real izesi tself in institutionality; 75 it

is not an ac tthat , by d e t e rmi n i n gitself, b eco mes m o reand m o r e actual ;76

nei theris


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Figures of rebel l ion, res is tance , t ransformation, c rea t ion,th e construction of t ime(acce le ra ted , p rogram m ed , ex tende d time) , and the invent ion of law a re bound to -gether in th is synthesis . Revolut ion is necessary, as necessary as the human need tobe moral, to consti tute oneself ethically, tofree body and mindfrom slavery, andconst i tuent poweris the m e a n s towa r d th isend. 85

From this point ofview the re la t ion be twee n revolut ion and law,between revolut ionand cons t i tu t ion becomesa c on t inuumon whic h w ha t e xc e e dsth e ra t ional is r e p r e se n te db y revolut ion.T he l aw and theconsti tution follow con-sti tuent power: consti tuent power gives rationalityand subs tanceto the law.86 C o n -stituen t powe r stan ds as a revolutionary e xtension of the hu m an capac ity to constructhistory, as a f u n d a m e n t a lact of innovat ion,and the re fore as abso lu te p rocedure .The process star tedby const i tuent power never s tops.The question is not to l imitconst i tuent power,but to m a k e it un l imi t e d .The only possible conceptof consti tu-tion is that of revolution: precisely , con stituen t powe r as ab solu te and un lim itedproced ure . C ondorce t comes nea r th i s concept wh en ,in 1793,h e def ines the "loirevolu t ionna i re" a s" tha t law that s ta r ts , acce lera tes ,and ru les th e courseof the rev-o lu t ion , " thus unders tanding tha tthe lawgives shapeto the t empora l flux of therevolution and activelydesignsi tself on its modali ty.87 T he Declarationof th e Rightso f M an of1793 repe a ts th i s conce pt whenit regards cit izens ' r ightsas active in thecon sti tutional sc hem a and recognizes in this activity the m otor of socialdemocracy.88

T h e Ma r qu i sd e S a d e is in perfec t agreement when, with far-s ighted cruel ty,he in -cites h is r e a d e r sto tha t "necessary insurrec t ionin which th e republ ican constant lyholds th e gove r nme n tof whic hhe ismember." 89 In this contexti t is notsurpr i s ingthat in 1789, in the m i d s t of the c oun te rr e volu tiona r y c a m pa ign , I m m a nu e l Ka n tproposed c onsider ingth e revolutionas an edu cat ional processand as acu ltura l actionwith extensive and profoundeffects on the w hole hu m an en vironm ent , a p rocessthat consti tutesthe "commona l i tyof ends." 90

A web of at housa nd th r e a dsdef ines th e orig inaryrad ica lnessof

const i tuent power.T he c ohe r e nc eof the we ave, however,is a lwaysin danger. Per-verse insti tutionalor formal de te r mina t ionsare super imposedon the concept and ,as in Arendt ' scase, deprive i t of that radical ontological openingthat gives i t sh ape .H o w c a nth is radica lnessb e conce ived?H ow can i t berecognized in history andlaw, avoid ing anyfalse path? C ar l Schm itt, who, notw ithstand ing thefolly of the re-sults , has posed this quest ion with extraordinary intensi ty,refers us to Spinoza. 91 I,too, am convinced that Spinoza 's philosophy allowsus to cons t ruc ta first s c h e m aofth e conceptof const i tuent powerand to guard it from misunde r s t a nd ingsand mys-

tifications.T h e effort to theorize "a causali tythat accountsfor the effectivenessof


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the A ll upon i ts parts and the act ion of the par ts upon the All" m ake s S pinoza "theonly or almost the only witness" of a theory of a total i ty withoutclosure, 92 a con-st i tuent power without l imitat ions.

From Structure to the Subject

Up to this pointw e h av e accu m u l a teda ser iesof prob lems .W e have before u s aproduct ivesource of r ights and jur id ical arran gem ent thatrefusesto close and stub-bornly repeatsits c la imsin the face of juridical theory 'sand political philosophy'sattempts to fix it in a final fo rm. It s e e m sthat the i ssueson the table cannotbe ad-dressed e xcept throughth e interventionof a force capableof media t ingth e rad ica l -ness of const i tuent power.This force m u s tb e able to in terpret th e s t ruc tu re whenthis structureis presentedas absolute procedure ,as continuallyreactualizedstrength,but nonetheless posi tively ground ed in real ity. A n ade qu ate answ er to the que s t ionthat motivatesm y investigation willbe found by iden t i fy inga s t rength adequatetostructure,and asub jec t adequa teto absolute procedu re .T he problemof const i tuentpower thus becom es a que s t ion ab ou t the const ruction of a consti tu t ional m odel ca-pab le of keep ingth e form at ive capaci tyof const i tuent power i tselfin motion: it is aquest ionof ident i fy inga sub ject ive s t rength ad eq ua teto this task.

If th is subjectis the sub jec tof an absolute procedure , thenit isnot enough to pose the quest ion of the sub jec t ra i sedby const i tuent power.In ju-ridical theory th is ques t ion ar ises w hen everth e volun ta ry na tu reof law is affirmedand th e s u b j ec tof this wil l m us tbe discovered.93 Posed in these termsth e searchistoo gener ic becauseit does not insiston the logically adequ ate re la tionship betwee n

sub jec t and struc ture. T he history of juridic al though t , how ever, does provides aseriesof exam ples that com e close to th is object ive . We should e xam ine them m oreclosely.

The first hypothesis:the subjec tin question is the nation. 94 Thisconc ept se em s to be, at fi rs t s ight, part ic u larly appropria te to that of ab solu te pro-c e d u r e ,except that , on the one hand, i t is a generic concept , real only in the imagi-nary (and therefo re indef in i te ly ma nipu lab le );on the other, it is a concept thatishistoricallyd e t e rmi n edat differen t t imes , often with th e funct ionof b reak i n gand

l imiting the constituent process. The generic conception of the nation (resultingfroman intricate playof ethnic determ inism , h is tor ical jud gm en ts , pol i tical nece ss i ties ,jur id icald e m a n d s ,bu t aboveall a strong natural i s t ic overdeterminat ion) producesapolysemy that al lows for sophist ic interpretat ions of the concept and instrumentaluses of it inpractice. 95 T h e lat ter concept ion , whichrefers to his tor ical determina-tions, sets in motion a const i tut ional d yn am ic that ,far from procedu ra l ly reopen ing



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th e re la t ionship be tweenth e sub jec t and the consti tutional structure, hypostatizesan d blocksit. 96

A second hypothes is a imeda t posing an adequa te re la t ionsh ipbe twe e nsub jec t and s t ruc ture ( in the dy nam ic sense) sees the sub jec t as the people .97

T h e c onc e p tof "people ," however,is no less gene r ic than tha tof "nation." This de -

finition also soon falls pr e y to the ju r id i c a l m e c ha n i sm o fqualif icat ion.The ge ne r i cessenceof the conceptis r e r e a din a consti tutional key:if the "people" is the sub je c tof con sti tue nt power, it can be so onlyinsofar as it first un de rgoes an organiza t iona lprocess ca pab le of expressing its essenc e . Inde ed , to im agine and above a ll to as-s u m e as sc ien t i f ic sub jec t"an order ing force tha tcan be o r de r e d by a mul t i t udewi thout o rde r" would represen ta cont rad ic t ionin terms. 98 This concept ion doesgo be yond th e l imita t ionsand the natura l is t ican d organic is t m yst i fica t ionsof thei dea of const i tuent poweras an at t r ibute of the na t ion . T he theore t ica l desireto

clear aw ay the am bigui ty of the na t ion is c lear. E qual ly c lear, howe ver, is the wil l tob reak th e expansive forceof the c onc e p tof cons t i tuen tpower. 99 T he fact tha t an ydef ini t ionof the cons t i tuen t sub jec tin t e r m s of the people boi ls downto a norma-tivist conception and a ce lebra t ionof the consti tuted law is not ana c c ide n tbut anecess i ty.10 0 This norm ative conc ept ion con fuse s const i tue nt pow er withone of thein te rna l sourcesof law an dwith th e d y n a m i c sof its revision,its const i tu t ionalself-renovat ion. Brief ly s ta ted, const i tuent power is the people only in the context ofrepresen ta t ion .

A th ird hypothesis : const i tuent poweras sub je c tis a l r e a dy m a te -rial ly def ined by ju r id ica lm ec hanism s inh ere n t in i ts com pos ition , and cons t i tue n tpowe r is i tselfa mult ip l ic i tyof ju r id ic a l powersset in as ingular re la t ionship suchtha t e lements o fju r id ica lm ed ia t ion are a lway s nec essar i lypresupposed. 101 Fromthis pointof v iew, wh ichis ec lec t icbu t still effective,th e possibil i ty that con sti tue ntpowe r is r e p r e se n te das a bso lu t e pr oc e du r eis t aken awayor t r ansf iguredfrom th ebeginning .The point hereis not to insist on the singularityof the his tor ica l de f ini-

t ion of every em ergenc e of const i tue nt power, but to pose this de term inat ion as anunsurpassab lel imi t , as m ate r ia l ly de te rm ined se l f - lim i ta t ion . Jur id ic a l theoryh asbecome c leve r.It does not deny const i tuent s t rengthbut affirms its singularity.Itdoes not, however, consider c onst i tue nt power a process and a prec ar ious ontologi-cal ins is ten ce bu t , ra ther,a limit. Limitation is posed a la Hegel as determination. 102

Media t ionand c ompr omiseare assum ed w ithin consti tuen t powe ras the sub jec tthatfounds th e ma te r i a lconstitution not outside b u t within it: this is the effectivenessof myst i f ica t ion .This is in fact a mat te r of m yst if ica t ion be causeth e problem of

const i tuent power cannot be solved by making s ingular i ty the l imit of i ts absolute


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2 6 , 7

c h a r a c t e r atem poral , spatia l, and proce dura l l im i t. T hefact that the absolute char-acter ofconstituent power l ies in i ts s ingulari ty is perfect ly evide nt , but this , an d notsom ething else , i s the problem .

A t this pointwe cou ld examineother theories thattry to connectconst i tuent powerto absolute procedurein o rd e r to domest icatethe former, butthey wou ld re al ly te l lus nothing new.It is more in teres t ingto notice thatthe n eg a -t ion in absolute terms of the adequate re la t ionship between subject and procedureis th e f igure of a metaphysicalnegation that is, a negat ionof the fact that mul t i -pl ici ty can be repre sen ted as a col lect ive singulari ty,that the mul t i tude can becomea un i ta ry and o rder ingforce, that this relat ionship (open and impossible to bring toa conclus ion) betwee nsub jec tan d procedurecan berea l and effectivelyconst i tuteareal temporal i ty.On the contrary,an y format ionof power mus tb e const i tu ted out -side th i s hum an con tex t by the d ivin ity or some o theridea loverdeterminat ion , int r an s cen d en ceor t ranscendental i ty.The negation of an ade qua te re la t ionsh ipbe-tween sub jec tand s t ructure is thus alwayse m b e d d e din an externaland hypostaticf igure for the justificationof power.T he rad ica lnessof const i tuent power cannotbene gated in real i ty, but here i t i s s imply den ied in pr incip le .

It is not enough, however,to exposeand denouncethe metaphys-ical part ial i tyof the posi tions th at relat ivize const i tue nt powerin a t ranscenden ta lm a n n e rin order to resolveour prob lem,the problem of its abso lu te charac te r.De-nunciat ion cannot take the p lace of a const ruct ive argument .Thus we must poseonce againth e problem of the ade qua te re la tionsh ip be tweensubjectan d absolutep ro ced u re .

M iche l Foucau l t i s und oubted ly the one who has m ade the m os tsubstant ia lprogress indef in inga concept of power that , in i ts relat ionship to thesubject ,al lowsfor cons truc t ive d im ens ionsan d abs olute openings .In Foucaul t ,h u -m ani ty appearsas a set ofres is tance s that re lease (outs ideany finalism tha t is not anexpressionof life i tself and i ts reproduc t ion)an absolute capaci tyfor l iberat ion .Life is l iberatedin h u man i t yand opposes anything that enclosesit and imprisonsit. 103 What we n eed to s tress he reis that the re la t ionship between subjectand pro-c e dur e is free. In other words ,after d emo n s t r a t i n ghow power c an subjugate hu -

mani ty to the point of m a k i n git funct ion as a cog of ato ta l i tar ian machine(w ecould accept thisspecific use of the term totalitarianism),Foucaul t shows ins teadhow the const i tut ive process running throughlife, biopolitics and biopower, has anabsolute (and not total i tarian) movement.This movement i s absolute because i t i sabsolutelyfree from de term inations not intern al to the act ion of l ibe rat ion, to thevital assemblage [agencement].10 4



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Star t ing f rom this viewpoint , which permitsus to ground th eques t ionof the consti tuent subject, Foucault a llows us to go sti l l further. Indeed, heshows us that th e sub jec tis , first, strength, produ ction. C ertainly,th e subjec tcan beredu ced to a pure ph an tom , a res idu e of the tota l ity of the system of repres sion. B uh ow product ive it remains , evenin th is reduct ive hor izonan d impr isoned within

the se me c ha n i sms!It is produc t ive becauseon this l imitth e subjec t goes backintoitself an d rediscovers thereth e vita l pr inc iple . Second, besides be ing s t rength,th esubjec tis also action,a t ime of action and f r e e d o m ,an assemblage ope n be c a useno te leology conditionsor pre f iguresit. Foucaul t c r i t ica l ly performsa processofdisar t icula t ion of the rea l and then, construc t ive ly, reopens a processthat a s sume sthe disa rticula tion as a positive cond ition.What was a pa th through necessity opensthe way for a process of f reed om .105 This is essen t ia l ly the s am e process w efind inSpinoza. 106 Third, Fouc aul t deve lops the para digm of sub jec t ivi ty as the place of

the recomposi t ion of res is tance and publ icspace.107 Here we a re con f ron ted by af igure of the subjec t tha t fo rmal lyan d methodologica l lyhas charac ter is t ics ade-qua te to absolute procedure . Ineffect th is su bje c t is s t rength, t im e, and const i tu-tion: i t is the strength of producing consti tutive trajectories; i t is t ime that is in now ay predetermined; and i t is thus a s ingular const i tu t ion.When this cr i t ique hasdestroyedth e prisons of consti tuted power,it ide ntif ies i tselfas ontological strength,const i tuent power capableof producing absolute events .T h e political is here pro-duct ion, product ionpar excellence,collective a ndnon-te leological .Innovation consti-tutes the polit ical; consti tution cannotbut be constant innovat ion.What A r e n d ttr ied to art iculate in terms of the inessentiali ty of l iberal polit ics as alternative to aH eide gger ian void of be ing Fouc aul t construc ts in theful lnessof being, as an appa -ra tus of posi t ive f reedom. The socia l , negated by Arendt as thesuffocation of thepoli t ical ,revea ls i tse lfas the spaceof biopolitics of tha t hum a n r a d ic a lne s sof thepolitical tha tconstituent power revealsin its absoluteness. 108

Absolu tenessis u n d e rn o c i rcum stance tota li ta r ian ism.T h e lat-

te r is not a necessary corol lary of the former, but th is accusa t ion spr ings up when-ever the sac red pr inc ip les o f l ibe ra l i sm a re no t g lori fied and thus de m and s our a t-tention. 109 If our "ade qu ate su bject" is in no w ay tied to l ibe ral princ iples, or, rath er ,if in som e waysit cont rad ic t s them,it n e e d not for this reasonbe totali tar ian.T heequa t ion"refusalof l ibera l pr inc iples equ als to ta l i ta r ianism " is redu ct ive and m yst i-fying. I t is foun de d on a t radi t ion of m ode rn thought tha t presu m es tofound h u m a nrights on contractual i sm.Contractualism, however, cannotbe theground for h u m a nr ights , cannot give them tha t m ater ia l and im m an en t basis , tha t wor ldly absolutene ss

tha t is the only guaran teeof the r ights themselves .T he perspectiveof const i tuent


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power puts the contractualist position under attack and recognizes in it the inevitabledefe r ra l to transcendence, to constituted power and its apology. This is indeed theoutcome of contractualism, the logical demand that it claims it cannot resist, whether

expressed by Hobbes as a God that transforms the association of individuals into

sovereignty and the contmctum unionisinto contractumsubjectionis,or by Rousseau asthe "will of all" that is sublimated in a "general will," or by idealist transcendental-

ism as the process of the economic and the ethical that leads the contingent and the

singular to the totality of the spirit and its State configurations. 110

On the other hand, another tradition of modern metaphysics,

from Machiavelli and Spinoza to Marx, sees the development of the dynamic ofconstituent power as absolute, but here that absoluteness never becomes totalitar-

ian. In Machiavelli and Spinoza strength is expressed and nourished by discord and

struggle; in both authors the process extends between singularity and multitude,

and the construction of the political is the product of permanent innovation. What

in Machiavelli is involved in the analysis of popular movements and the conflictual-

ity of republics, in Spinoza develops in a high metaphysics. And it is precisely when

we compare it to Spinoza's metaphysical absolute that the claim of pushing constituent

power, its procedure, and its subject toward totalitarianism (even as a hypothesis)

becomes ridiculous. There does indeed exist a totalitarianism in which the enigma

of constituent power is not revealed, where its powerful e ffec t ivenessis denied ormystif iedin constituted power, and where the radicalness of its metaphysical strengthand collective desire [cupiditas] is r e fu sed .In the lack of desire, the political becomesdisciplinary totality, totalitarianism. Neither in Machiavelli nor in Spinoza, however,

does the revolutionary process that embodies and establishes the constitution pre-sent itself as closure; rather, it is always open, both temporally and spatially. It flows

as potently as freedom. It is at the same time resistance to oppression and construc-

tion of community; it is political discussion and tolerance; it is popular armament

and the aff i rmat ion of principles through democratic invention. The constituentabsolute and the democratic absolute have nothing to do with the totalitarian con-

ception of life and politics. This absolute that builds the social and the political to-gether has nothing to do with totalitarianism. Once again, then, political philosophy

finds its dignity and its primary distinctions in metaphysics on the one hand, theidea l i s tmetaphysics that, from Hobbes to Hegel, produces a transcendental con-cept of sovereignty; on the other, the historical materialism that develops a radical

concept of democracy from Machiavelli to Spinoza to Marx. In this framework it isevident that the opposite of democracy is not totalitarianism but the concept of sov-

ereignty i tself, and it is now clear that the concept of democracy is not a subspecies



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Let's thus focus on M a r x ,on the crucialpoint w h ere the cri t iqueof power and the cr i t ique of labor in tersect , because th is i s what we are ta lk ingabo ut, and it is on this crux that the contradictions of the h istory of constitue nt powerdevelop. T he def in i t ion of const i tuen t power, wh en we m ovefrom the concept toth e real , is d ec i d edon this prob lem . Natural ly, M arx 's pathis a long one. Fromth ecr i t iqueof ideologyto the critique of power to the cri t iqueof labor, an extraordi -nary acc um ulat ion of theoret ical in i tia tives unrave ls .

W e begin w ithTheHoly Family and "On theJewish Quest ion"of1844. Marx's demystif icat ion of theconcept of equal i ty here leadsto a critique oflabor,or, better, the proclamation of human rightsleadsto the discovery of the un iver-salityof exploi tat ion and private appropr iat ion, to the de nu nc iat ion of individualismand the exal tat ion of the community ofworkers. 116 Political e m anc ipat ion isnothingbut the a t t empt to displacethe m e a n i n gof the impulseto revolt, the jur id icalhypo-stasis of the social s ta tus quo. H um anrights an d all the con stitue nt propositions ofthe bourgeois ie represent nei ther product iveforces n or Utopia.They are no th ingbu t mystif icat ionsand celebrat ionsof the status quo. So-cal led poli tical em anc ipat ionce lebra testh e force of the const i tuted while pretending to exal t theconstituent. 117

In The GermanIdeologyof 1845-46 const i tuent poweris def inedtwice.In its bourgeois formulat ionit is im m ediate ly c lass consciousness ,a universalthat through i tsaff irmation adjuststhe State const i tu t ion to the demands of bour-geois rule a nd the produ ctive nec essi ties of the division of labor. C onst i tuen t poweris also expressedas co mmu n i s m: "Co mmu n i s mis for us not astate of affa i r s tha t isto be es tabl ishe d, anideal to which reality [will] have toadjus t i tself . We cal l com-

m u n i s m th e real movement tha t abo l i shesth e present s tateof things. T h e cond i -tions of th i s movem ent resu l tfrom the prem ises now inexistence." 118 This def in ingprocess resul ts in a fur ther development :"Thus th ings have now come to such apass tha t th e individuals m ust appro pria teth e ex isting totalityof product iveforces,not only to achieve se lf-act ivi ty, but , also, m ere lyto safeguard their very existence.This appropriat ion isfirst dete rm ined by the ob jec t to be a ppropr ia ted , the p roduc-tive forces , which have been developedto a totality and which only exist withinauniversa lintercourse"; and "the appropriat ion of theseforces is i tself nothing m ore

than the d ev e l o p men tof the individ ua l capaci ties correspon dingto the mat e r i a lin-s t rum ents of product ion . T he appropria tion of a to ta l i ty of ins t rum ents of produc-tion is, for this very reason,th e d ev e l o p men tof a totality of capacit iesin the indi -viduals ." Further:"Only the proletar ians of the presen t day, wh o are c om plete lys h u t off from all self-activity,are in aposition to achievea completeand no longerrestricted self-act ivity, wh ich consists in the appro priat ion of a total i ty of produ c-



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as "poli t ical movement," that const i tuentforce of a radicald emo cracyin which th ecri tique of power is com bined w ith the em anc ipation of labor, the "real m ovem ent."

B u t this is not enough .A s long as we follow th e pol it ical M arx,poli t ical revolut ion and social emancipat ion are two historical matrices that inter-sect on the same terra in the const i tut ionalt e r ra in but s ti ll in an ex ternal ma n-ner, without a metaphysical logic of this intersect ion being given.There must besom ething dee per and more u rgent that dem onst ra tes that th is encou nter i s in now ay acc idental and m akes necessary the m ater ia l i s t ru le a ccording to which pol it icall iberat ion and economic emancipat ion are one and the same th ing.This necess i tyres idesat the core of M arx's theory of capital , w he re l iving lab or appe ars as the fou n-dation and the m otor of al l produc tion, de velopm en t, and innova tion.This essentialsource also anim ates the c enter of our investigation. Living labor againstdead labor,const i tuent power against const i tuted power: this s ingle polari ty runsthrough thewhole schem a of M arxist analysis and resolves i t in an e ntirely original theo ret ica l-pract icaltotality. 123 T he bas is of M arxian d iscourse in the passagefrom the cri t iqueof power to the cri t iqueof labor an d viceversa therefore consistsin the d ep l o y men tof th e concept of living laboras an i n s t ru men tthat, wh ile des t royingth e equivocalqualityof the bourgeoistheory of labor (consolidated , acc um ulated , de ad labor setagainstthe creativity of living labor), shows the bourgeois theory of power itself tobe an overde te rmina t ionof l iving laborby dead labor.

Living labor, ins tead , em bodies const ituent powerand offers itgeneral social condi t ions through which i t can beexpressed:const i tuen t pow er isestablishedpolit ical ly on that social cooperat ion that is conge nital in l ivi

Documents

Antonio Negri_Insurgencies Constituent Power and the Modern State_1999