ANSWERS TO VTL

Rock 10-11$ingh AT: VTL

Answers To VTL

Answers To VTL..............................................................................................................1_____...................................................................................................................................2**1NC................................................................................................................................2Value to Life Disad 1NC............................................................................................3Value to Life Disad 1NC............................................................................................4___________.......................................................................................................................5**Overviews....................................................................................................................5Block Overview..............................................................................................................62NR Overview................................................................................................................7___________.......................................................................................................................8**NEG Blocks.................................................................................................................82NC Frontline................................................................................................................92NC Frontline..............................................................................................................102NC Frontline..............................................................................................................112NC Frontline..............................................................................................................122NC Impact—Sanctions Genocide and Extermination................................132NC Right to Life Outweighs Value to Life.....................................................142NC AT Ethics Outweigh.........................................................................................152NC AT Ethics Outweigh.........................................................................................162NR AT Ethics Outweigh.........................................................................................17AT Voting Affirmative Restores Value to Life.................................................18AT No Link—We Say That You Assign Value..................................................19AT “Life Not Worth Living”....................................................................................20AT Zimmerman/Ontological Damnation............................................................21_____.................................................................................................................................22**2AC...............................................................................................................................222AC AT No Value to Life..........................................................................................232AC AT No Value to Life..........................................................................................24___________.....................................................................................................................25**AFF Blocks................................................................................................................251AR Extension..............................................................................................................262AR Extension..............................................................................................................27AT YOU Assign Value to Life.................................................................................28AT “Life Not Worth Living”....................................................................................291AR Right to Life Outweighs Value to Life......................................................30

“Sandwiches…” - 1 -


_____

**1NC



Value to Life Disad 1NC

Turn—There’s Always Value to Life

A. The notion that absent the Affirmative, ________________ negates all value to human life is morally repugnant. Their reductionist perspective of human worth legitimizes a framework of state sanctioned violence.

B. The quest to decipher the value to human life beyond mere existence opens up a pandora’s box of eugenic murdersRichard Coleson, JD Law, Summer, 1997, Issues in Law and Medicine, 13 Issues L. & Med. 3, LexisFrustrated with the ethic of "preserving every existence, no matter how worthless ," Dr. Alfred Hoche in 1920 wrote, expectantly: "A new age will arrive--operating with a higher morality and with great sacrifice --which will actually give up the requirements of an exaggerated humanism and overvaluation of mere existence . " 8 Issues in Law & Med. at 265. Euthanasia proponents of our day, too, seek with great zeal to usher in a new age. They speak , in words echoing from a distant age, that it is cruel to deprive those who are suffering from their desired means to peace and freedom from pain. Like Binding, they scold: "Not granting release by gentle death to the incurable who long for it: this is no longer sympathy, but rather its opposite." Id. at 254. The early promoters of euthanasia appeared to be sincere in their belief in the virtues of merciful death. Today's promoters of physician-assisted suicide may also be sincere, but it is a sincerity born of an unpardonable carelessness. Unlike their predecessors, euthanasia proponents today have the benefit of the lesson of history, which has taught the true nature of physician-assisted killing as a false compassion and a perversion of mercy. History warns that the institution of assisted-death gravely threatens to undermine the foundational ethic of [*30] the medical profession and the paramount principle of the equal dignity and inherent worth of every human person .



Value to Life Disad 1NC

C. Their argument risks a slippery slope – once we decide that certain lives are not worth living, we jeopardize all ethics and legitimize killing babies for their organs. Welcome to moral nihilism.Lisa Hanger, B.A. at Miami University, Summer, 1992, Journal of Law-Medicine, 5 Health Matrix 347Considering anencephalic infants "dead" or " close enough to death " instills in the public a fear that other individuals very near death also will be declared dead and will be killed for the sake of procuring their organs. If the UAGA or state statutes are amended to require anencephalic infants to become organ donors, it is believed that other individuals with neural tube anomolies or debilitating cognitive deficiencies also may be forced to become organ donors before their natural deaths. n38 Specifically, the " slippery slope " would lead most directly to those infants born with hydroencephaly n39 and microencephaly n40 as becoming forced organ donors . This position could then extend to other groups of people similarly situated who possess only limited cognitive functioning or who arguably lack a "valid" interest in life , including death row inmates, adults in a permanently vegetative state , individuals with Alzheimer's disease, [*357] or incompetent individuals with terminal illnesses . n41 To declare as dead many of these groups whom the general population perceive to be very much alive could jeopardize the ethical integrity of the medical profession and decrease public trust in medicine. n42 Many individuals also would become even more skeptical of organ donation. While some groups have tried to minimize the fear of a slippery slope by arguing that "safeguards" would prevent groups of individuals other than anencephalic infants from being affected by an amendment to the UDDA, n43 any "safeguard" would not be sufficient. Once "very fine distinctions [are made ] regarding the dying," n44 the risk of descending down the slippery slope becomes significant .

D. Consequentialism the best framework to avoid their impacts. Robert E. Goodin, professor of social sciences and philosopher at the Research School of Social

Sciences at Australian National University, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, 1995, p. 39The rather more grand way of phrasing the point here might be couched in terms of undermining moral agency. Failure to discharge isolated, individual responsibilities may well result in other people's being harm ed. That is wrong, but it is , at least in principle, a remediable wrong. People can , at least in principle, always be compensated for harms to their interests (or so the libertarian would claim, anyway). Failure to discharge shared, collective responsibilities has more grievous consequences, undermin ing in certain crucial respects other people's moral agency itself . For that, compensation is in principle impossible . There must be a moral agent to be compensated, and it is that very moral agency that is being undermined."



___________

**Overviews



Block Overview

Their impact calculus is genocidal and should be rejected in favor of consequentialist thinking. They have conceded their position is morally repugnant. The idea that certain conditions explained by the Affirmative such as _________________ can negate all value to human life reduces human worth to something that is inherently calculable instead of intrinsically valuable, which flips their calculative thinking bad arguments. There are a couple impacts:

A. Eugenics—the idea that life is “as good as dead” under certain conditions comes with great sacrifice. This is proven by their willingness to accept millions of deaths in the name of preserving some higher value. Our Coleson evidence says this attempt to preserve value beyond existence opens a pandoras box, justifying murder in the name of preserving a quality of lifestyle.

B. Slippery Slope—theres only a risk of spill over—they set the ethical bar very low. Incarceration makes life not worth living, so does being poor, so does being afraid of people. Who are they to decide? Our Hanger evidence says once we can decide that certain life is the living dead, we jeopardize all ethics and legitimize extermination. The people who will die as a result of the disad become “already dead,” so its ok to let them die.

C. Cosequentialism Solves—Extend Goodin—consequentialism is fundamentally the choice between two lesser evils—even if certain conditions must be kept in place in order to accomplish the greater good, it is both a necessary and remediable action. Any alternative to util is a fallacy that causes greater moral infringements and must be rejected.



2NR Overview

We straight turn the Affirmative:

First, they concede they result in a slippery slope—as soon as we can define a condition which removes the value to life, that condition immediately becomes a justification for murder. An incarcerated individual who dies as a result of a nuclear war is ok because they already exist in a mental prison. They set the ethical bar too low—Extend Hanger.

Second, they cause genocide—Coleson says attempting to preserve value beyond existence accepts Eugenics and Nazi style genocide because it opens a pandoras box to determine what life has meaning and what life doesn’t.

Third, this turns the case—instead of viewing all life as intrinsically valuable, regardless of any conditions, they put themselves in a position to assign value to life. It is this process of assigning value which allows them to calculate life to the point of death.



___________

**NEG Blocks



2NC Frontline

Only scenario for genocidal exclusion when people can be assigned a zero value to life—their totalizing claims are violentLisa Schwartz, 2002, "A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?" Chapter 6, Medical Ethics: A Case-Based Approach, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdfThose who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement , and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes . Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes , preferences and aspirations . As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine's choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which 110 Medical ethics: a case-based approach considerations can be used to protect the patient's interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the type of life and the fact of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions : 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. Relative value The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving , based on the relative social value of the individual concerned. So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high . Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option. According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one person's life and is measured against that person's needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her life before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to her. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against Schwartz Continues…


http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf


2NC Frontline

Schwartz Continued…permitting people in Katherine's position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth The value of life: who decides and how? 111 Write a list of three things that make your life worth living and ask someone else to do the same. Compare your lists. Are they identical? Why? Are they not identical? Why not? living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this; they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, a case-based, context-sensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve, the decision to seek other ways of valuing this major life change led to him perceiving his life as highly valuable, even if different in value from before the accident that made him a paraplegic. This invokes the second assertion, that Katherine could change her view over time. Although we recognize this is possible in some cases, it is not clear how it applies to Katherine. Here we have a case in which a rational and competent person has had time to consider her options and has chosen to end her life of suffering beyond what she believes she can endure. Ten months is a long time and it will have given her plenty of opportunity to consult with family and professionals about the possibilities open to her in the future. Given all this, it is reasonable to assume that Katherine has made a well-reasoned decision. It might not be a decision that everyone can agree with but if her reasoning process can be called into question then at what point can we say that a decision is sound? She meets all the criteria for competence and she is aware of the consequences of her decision. It would be very difficult to determine what arguments could truly justify interfering with her choice. Subjective determination The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that , ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients' judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves. It is important to remember the subjectivity assertion in this context, so as to emphasize that the judgement made about the value of a life ought to be made only by the person concerned and not by others. Of course, this presumes that the person deciding is conscious and competent to make the decision at all, which is especially complicated in cases when the patient is unconscious, immature or suffering from a mental illness, such as depression, that could distort their decisionmaking abilities. Thus, seeking patient choice is not always a viable option. Not all patients are capable of choosing for themselves. In Janet Johnstone's case, and in the similar case 112 Medical ethics: a case-based approach of Tony Bland, the decision was made externally, by people involved in their care. In such situations, family or practitioners have been known to make the decision on behalf of the incompetent patient, usually because they claim to know what the patient in question would have wanted. Relatives and Schwartz Continues…



2NC Frontline

Schwartz Continued…doctors of Janet Johnstone argued that her condition lacked the dignity and control she valued, and that her situation would not improve. Under the circumstances, the judge decided the quality of her life was so diminished that her life was no longer worth living and that Ms Johnstone herself would have reached the same conclusion. The same sort of proxy decision making occurs when a woman, or couple, decide to terminate a pregnancy based on antenatal screening and testing. Here, parents make the decision on behalf of a fetus or a child. In such cases the parents must decide if, on balance, their child's life is worth living given the possibility of pain and suffering or such inhibited interaction with the world that it would be of no value to the person living it. Needless to say, this is a difficult and trying dilemma for anyone to face. It also introduces a concern that underlies all prenatal screening programmes, in that these are supported by the social values implied by screening, which direct women towards termination of positive tested pregnancies.3 In the past, women were barred from screening and testing for similar conditions if they had previously decided that they would not terminate a pregnancy if the fetus carried the genetic condition. Hence screening was meant to be followed by testing, and positive results were meant to be followed by termination of pregnancy. The conclusion this yields, like it or not, is that our screening programmes carry with them an implication that the lives of those who are affected with certain conditions ought to be terminated because they are of comparatively less value than the lives of those who are not. This is supported in law by Wrongful Life suits in which parents of people born with screenable genetic conditions, such as spina bifida, have successfully sued doctors for the burden involved in caring for those born with such conditions.4 The problems associated with screening will be discussed elsewhere in Chapter 8 (p. 146–147). They are significant here because they elucidate the third assertion made by supporters of quality of life considerations in the medical context. Equal or unequal value? The third assertion is that, as a result of subjective and relative determinations about the quality of a life, lives can be seen to be of unequal value. At the extreme, it follows that it is possible to describe a life as valueless , especially when it is compared with the value of a life that has greater quality. In the case of the unborn fetus affected by a debilitating inherited condition, the welfare of the parents and their other children can be invested with greater value than the potential good of a potential child born with a severe disability. This allows us to make relative judgements among or between lives of individuals or groups. This is especially useful in healthcare economics, where decisions about distribution of resources rely on comparative information of the effectiveness of treatments. In this way it can be determined that resources will be made available for treatments that are more effective at improving quality of life in The value of life: who decides and how? 113 Case 24 Screening/testing for Down syndrome A 42-year-old woman presented at an antenatal clinic with her husband to discuss the results of her recent amniocentesis. In addition to Down syndrome, echocardiography of the fetus showed cardiac abnormalities, including atrioventricular septal defect. After extensive discussion between the parents and the obstetrician, the parents decided that the fetus had too many problems and that it would be unfair to the unborn child and to their other four children to continue with the pregnancy. particular conditions and not where the quality of life is not improved or so diminished that improvements are too small to justify. This point will be developed more fully in the section on quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) and rationing in Chapter 9 (p. 163). Here, it is important to point to the possibility of making comparative judgements based on assessments of the quality of life and to emphasize that such judgements can be used to inform decisions about distributing and rationalizing scarce resources. As a result, there is a concern about quality of life decisions being made for others without their participation, and about decisions imposed without their consent. Both these concerns are tempered by the second assertion of the quality of life ethic. This states that value must be personally assessed by the individual concerned, and imposed externally only in extreme circumstances where patients are unable to decide on their own behalf and their wishes can be reasonably determined. An advance directive can be highly useful in the latter case.



2NC Frontline

Only util provides a baseline for quality and quantity of life—allows individual determinations. Lisa Schwartz, 2002, "A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?" Chapter 6, Medical Ethics: A Case-Based Approach, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdfIf a balance is made between both subjective determination and comparative decisions, we can avoid classifying a life as of comparatively low value where the person possessing it does not agree. Basing value of life decisions on quality of life has strong advantages. It: • Is subjective: takes seriously personal assessments made by individuals about the quality of their own lives • Is flexible: recognizes the possibility that the subjectively determined value of one's life can change • Is comparative: recognizes that the way one life is valued need not impose the identical value on a similar life condition • Permits rational suicide: recognizes that one can legitimately assert the relatively low value of one's own life. No one denies the importance of a good quality of life, or one that is acceptable to the person who has to live it. However, some argue that it is not the sole criterion upon which to base value of life decisions. These people include considerations of quantity and sanctity in their determination. Quantity The value of the quantity of a life should not be underestimated. In the past, so much emphasis was placed on the quality of life lived that quantity was virtually forgotten. More recently, attitudes have changed and consideration is given to the possibility that a long life of diminished quality could be as highly valued as a short life of high quality. In some senses the comparison seems absurd, unless we consider cases in which patients have refused complicated or agonising treatments that they perceived would exacerbate their suffering rather than extend their lives. Other patients prefer to extend their lives at any cost or risk to them because they value their existence so much that they will sacrifice quality in favour of quantity. This indicates that quantity ought not to be mistaken for quality and that prolonging a patient's life might be nothing more than a burdensome and painful extension of suffering for them and their loved ones. However tempting it is for doctors to provide whatever care they are capable of providing, there is a responsibility to ensure that the treatments are actually useful to the patient and not unnecessarily burdensome. This means that a cost–benefit analysis can be usefully applied to a care management plan for an individual patient. The aim is to determine the extent to which treatment will be helpful and where the healing stops and the burden begins. Quantity might not be identical with quality but, often, increased quantity in medicine can be equal to cure or control of disease and hence does enhance quality of life . The Compression of Morbidity principle cited by Downie and Calman is useful for guiding these decisions: 114 Medical ethics: a case-based approach Compression of morbidity principle: the objective of increasing life-span should be associated at the same time with an increasing quality of life or reduction of disability.5 So, provided quality of life is maintained or enhanced, quantity is a positive factor in healthcare. There is a sense in which quality of life judgements are made in a wider context and not just as they pertain to particular patients. Health economists have long tried to determine the appropriateness of costly treatments on the basis of their burdensomeness and effectiveness. The most famous of these is a system known as QALYs. QALYs stand for quality-adjusted life-years, and are a means of making comparisons between health states . Equally concerned with quantity and quality , QALYs can be applied to a 'relative health states' scale. The problem is that these scales are themselves value-laden. Such issues will be covered in Chapter 9, where the idea of QALYs will be discussed as they relate to rationing and distribution of resources. They are introduced here because they show how a model for decision making can include the notions of quality and quantity discussed in this chapter. QALYs help decide which healthcare needs will be met by identifying which yield: • the greatest amount of good for • the greatest amount of time for • the greatest number of people.


http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf


2NC Impact—Sanctions Genocide and Extermination

Historical Atrocities: in 1550, the Spanish crown held a debate on whether or not indians were human beings. This attempt to put the value of human lives up for debate resulted in the massacre of 70 million people. Their “no value to human life” claim discursively replicates this very logic and sanctions genocide.CALDWELL, J.D., 1996 [Julie, Northern Kentucky University Law Review, 24 N. Ky. L. Rev. 81, Fall]Calling Indians "savages" meant that "Indians were sufficiently different from whites to be regarded as less than persons and not protected by any moral or legal standards ." Mohawk, supra note 6, at 54 (citing Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 49 (1987)). The fact that in 1550, the Spanish Crown held a debate "to determine whether or not Indians were true human beings " is incredibly ironic, considering the " unspeakable violence of the Spanish conquest" which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 70 million Natives . Id. at 4849. "None of the great massacres of the twentieth century can be compared to this hecatomb ." Id. at 48 (citing Tzvetan Todorow, The Conquest of America 133 (Harper & Row) (1982)).



2NC Right to Life Outweighs Value to Life

The right to life is the greatest and most overriding libertyVasil Gluckman, staff at Preson University, Humanity and Moral Rights, 1999, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Huma/HumaGluc.htmI accept the idea that human society has been founded through the idea of social contract, and that its being is possible only due to that social contract performed on the international level, for example, like international cooperation in trade, health and environmental care and so on. The representatives of the social contract idea (for example Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Rawls and others) present the prior view that human society has been established and works (in the present) only when individuals give up a part of their freedom as well as rights. Therefore, they delegate mandates that benefit the social institution (state) for the sake of the protection and performing of their rights as well as justified interests in accordance with rights and interests of others. The essential principle for the performing of a social contract is a cooperative idea for the sake of the protection of human beings. It follows that one of the aims of humankind is a stable community as well as society, where the individual delegates a part of itself to rights and freedoms that benefit the social institution. That institution has the duty to protect and pursue its rights and justified interests in accordance with rights and justified interests of other concerned people. The prevention against the abuse of that institutional power is the performing of the fundamental requirement towards social institution, i.e., that social institutions must not violate or restrict basic human rights of innocent people, with the exception of the cases where it could prevent more harms. However, it is possible to do only with the agreement of the concerned people. A social institution must not violate or restrict the right to life of innocent people in any case, nor for the benefit of the prevention more harm. A social institution is not the owner of human lives of individuals who delegate a part of their freedom and rights to the social institution in a social contract. Every free, rational and innocent individual has the right to decide about life itself. The individual can sacrifice itself for the benefit of the prevention of danger that jeopardizes a community, society or all humankind. However, it is possible to do only as the individual decides freely, because it is not its duty. Hence I think that there is only one priority of right, i.e., the right of innocent people to life itself. However, it does not mean that a social institution has the possibility to violate or restrict the other rights of individuals. John Rawls affirms that a social institution could do it only for the sake of prevention more of harms to the individuals' rights.

The right to life is the most important and absoluteJohn Hasnas, senior research fellow at the Kennedy Institute, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 900, 1995, lexisWhat made Hobbes's right of self-preservation distinctive was his attempt to provide an empirical basis for it. He believed that human beings' rights must be determined by their actual capacities; they must have a right to do that which it is impossible for them not to do. Therefore, the source of rights is not to be found in some pre-existing ethic, but in the observable attributes of human nature. 25 And since according to Hobbes's observations, the most basic attribute of human nature is the drive to preserve one's own life, human beings must have a right to attempt to do so. 26 The interesting thing about this approach is that it implies that the right to self-preservation is absolute; that no other obligation can override it. For, if human beings are compelled by their nature to act so as to preserve themselves - if it is impossible for them not to - it would be absurd to claim that they have an obligation not to. 27 Since "ought implies can," there can be no obligation to do the impossible. It follows, then, that an essential characteristic of Hobbes's natural [*909] right is its indefeasibility. It simply is not subject to being overridden by a conflicting obligation and, hence, is absolute in nature.


http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=6261cc4b9edbf9ac1c1f0c461170729e&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=318c3b3f7d724422d630a89d380cf130#n27




2NC AT Ethics Outweigh

Turn: The aff is moral evasion. Consequentialist decisionmaking is imperative.Kai Nielsen, Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Absolutism and Its Consequentialist

Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, 1993, p. 170-2 Forget the levity of the example and consider the case of the innocent fat man. If there really is no other way of unsticking our fat man and if plainly, without blasting him out, everyone in the cave will drown, then, innocent or not, he should be blasted out. This indeed overrides the principle that the innocent should never be deliberately killed, but it does not reveal a callousness toward life, for the people involved are caught in a desperate situation in which, if such extreme action is not taken, many lives will be lost and far greater misery will obtain. Moreover, the people who do such a horrible thing or acquiesce in the doing of it are not likely to be rendered more callous about human life and human suffering as a result. Its occurrence will haunt them for the rest of their lives and is as likely as not to make them more rather than less morally sensitive. It is not even correct to say that such a desperate act shows a lack of respect for persons. We are not treating the fat man merely as a means. The fat man's person-his interests and rights are not ignored. Killing him is something which is undertaken with the greatest reluctance. It is only when it is quite certain that there is no other way to save the lives of the others that such a violent course of action is justifiably undertaken. Alan Donagan, arguing rather as Anscombe argues, maintains that "to use any innocent man ill for the sake of some public good is directly to degrade him to being a mere means" and to do this is of course to violate a principle essential to morality, that is, that human beings should never merely be treated as means but should be treated as ends in themselves (as persons worthy of respect)." But, as my above remarks show, it need not be the case, and in the above situation it is not the case, that in killing such an innocent man we are treating him merely as a means. The action is universalizable, all alternative actions which would save his life are duly considered, the blasting out is done only as a last and desperate resort with the minimum of harshness and indifference to his suffering and the like. It indeed sounds ironical to talk this way, given what is done to him. But if such a terrible situation were to arise, there would always be more or less humane ways of going about one's grim task. And in acting in the more humane ways toward the fat man, as we do what we must do and would have done to ourselves were the roles reversed, we show a respect for his person. In so treating the fat man-not just to further the public good but to prevent the certain death of a whole group of people (that is to prevent an even greater evil than his being killed in this way)-the claims of justice are not overriden either, for each individual involved, if he is reasonably correct, should realize that if he were so stuck rather than the fat man, he should in such situations be blasted out. Thus, there is no question of being unfair. Surely we must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is no avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die? Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt herethough for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt."" Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed. Nielsen Continues…



2NC AT Ethics Outweigh

Nielsen Continued…Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be return ed by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion . I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he [it] allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his `moral purity' and [to] avoid `dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called `double-mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right.[it and to are my feminist editing. JAC]



2NR AT Ethics Outweigh

Extend Nielsen—their theory is just masked moral evasion. Consequentialist decision making is necessary for the greater good. The 1AC is an attempt to keep their hands clean of moral repulsion, but the long-term effect is simply more catastrophe and suffering. Making short-term sacrifices for the long-term greater good is the only authentic ethical act.



AT Voting Affirmative Restores Value to Life

The trauma of rape oftentimes induces feelings of worthlessness - the notion that life may not be worth living. Voting for them tells rape survivors to sign their suicide note instead of attempting to overcome the trauma they’ve faced.EDWARDS, Professor @ Golden Gate Law School, 1996 [Daphne, Golden Gate University, 26 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 241]For most of you, rape is the most serious life crisis you will have to face, with few exceptions. It is a time of overwhelming turmoil, confusion, and disorganization. You may be concerned about the way you are feeling in response to the rape. You've probably never felt the extreme and conflicting emotions you do now-the fears, the rage, the panic attacks, or the worthlessness . You may even be afraid that you are "going crazy," or that you will never recover and be able to go on with life again . But you will . What you are experiencing is normal after a very serious life crisis .



AT No Link—We Say That You Assign Value

1. No—we don’t assign a value to life. We say all life is equal. Just because we make arguments about how your affirmative would result in death doesn’t mean that we say certain lives are not worth living.

2. You Link—our argument is that the moment you can say certain lives are stripped of their value is a very important ethical decision. It allows you to bracket certain populations as already dead, removing ethical concerns for their life until situations are improved. This is exactly the logic of valuation we are criticizing as resulting in eugenic programs of murder.



AT “Life Not Worth Living”

The argument that certain conditions make “life not worth living” accepts the philosophical premise of nazi Germany style murders and concentration camps. NEELEY, Assistant Professor @ Saint Francis, 1994 [Steven, Akron Law Review, 28 Akron L. Rev. 53, Summer]The final solution in the United States and other western societies will be unlike the final solution in Nazi Germany in its details, but not unlike it in its horror . And I fear that some who now live will experience this final solution. They will live to see the day they will be killed . n27 Variations of the "slippery-slope" argument as applied to suicide and euthanasia are abundant.n28 Beauchamp has argued, for example, that at least from the perspective of rule utilitarianism, the wedge argument against euthanasia should be taken seriously. Accordingly, although a "restricted-active-euthanasia rule would have some utility value" since some intense and uncontrollable suffering would be eliminated, "it may not have the highest utility value in the structure of our present code or in any imaginable code which could be made current, and therefore may not be a component in the ideal code for our society . . . . For the disutility of introducing legitimate killing into [*59] one's moral code (in the form of active euthanasia rules) may, in the long run, outweigh the utility of doing so, as a result of the eroding effect such a relaxation would have on rules in the code which demand respect for human life . " n29 Beauchamp then continues down a now-familiar path: If, for example, rules permitting active killing were introduced, it is not implausible to suppose that destroying defective newborns (a form of involuntary euthanasia) would become an accepted and common practice, that as population increases occur the aged will be even more neglectable and neglected than they now are, that capital punishment for a wide variety of crimes would be increasingly tempting, that some doctors would have appreciably reduced fears of actively injecting fatal doses whenever it seemed to them propitious to do so . . . . A hundred such possible consequences might easily be imagined. But these few are sufficient to make the larger point that such rules permitting killing could lead to a general reduction of respect for human life .



AT Zimmerman/Ontological Damnation

Your evidence is missing a crucial part—the part that says you are wrong. Nuke war outweighs. Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical

Ecology and Postmodernity, 1994, pg 119-120Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing one’s relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any “being” at all, the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material “happiness” for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologist might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.



_____

**2AC



2AC AT No Value to Life

Turn—Always Value to Life

A. The notion that ________________ negates all value to human life is morally repugnant. Their reductionist perspective of human worth opens a pandoras box which legitimizes a framework of state sanctioned violence. Richard Coleson, JD Law, Summer, 1997, Issues in Law and Medicine, 13 Issues L. & Med. 3, LexisFrustrated with the ethic of "preserving every existence, no matter how worthless ," Dr. Alfred Hoche in 1920 wrote, expectantly: "A new age will arrive--operating with a higher morality and with great sacrifice --which will actually give up the requirements of an exaggerated humanism and overvaluation of mere existence . " 8 Issues in Law & Med. at 265. Euthanasia proponents of our day, too, seek with great zeal to usher in a new age. They speak , in words echoing from a distant age, that it is cruel to deprive those who are suffering from their desired means to peace and freedom from pain. Like Binding, they scold: "Not granting release by gentle death to the incurable who long for it: this is no longer sympathy, but rather its opposite." Id. at 254. The early promoters of euthanasia appeared to be sincere in their belief in the virtues of merciful death. Today's promoters of physician-assisted suicide may also be sincere, but it is a sincerity born of an unpardonable carelessness. Unlike their predecessors, euthanasia proponents today have the benefit of the lesson of history, which has taught the true nature of physician-assisted killing as a false compassion and a perversion of mercy. History warns that the institution of assisted-death gravely threatens to undermine the foundational ethic of [*30] the medical profession and the paramount principle of the equal dignity and inherent worth of every human person .

B. Slippery Slope– once we decide that certain lives are not worth living, we jeopardize all ethics.Lisa Hanger, B.A. at Miami University, Summer, 1992, Journal of Law-Medicine, 5 Health Matrix 347Considering anencephalic infants "dead" or " close enough to death " instills in the public a fear that other individuals very near death also will be declared dead and will be killed for the sake of procuring their organs. If the UAGA or state statutes are amended to require anencephalic infants to become organ donors, it is believed that other individuals with neural tube anomolies or debilitating cognitive deficiencies also may be forced to become organ donors before their natural deaths. n38 Specifically, the " slippery slope " would lead most directly to those infants born with hydroencephaly n39 and microencephaly n40 as becoming forced organ donors . This position could then extend to other groups of people similarly situated who possess only limited cognitive functioning or who arguably lack a "valid" interest in life , including death row inmates, adults in a permanently vegetative state , individuals with Alzheimer's disease, [*357] or incompetent individuals with terminal illnesses . n41 To declare as dead many of these groups whom the general population perceive to be very much alive could jeopardize the ethical integrity of the medical profession and decrease public trust in medicine. n42 Many individuals also would become even more skeptical of organ donation. While some groups have tried to minimize the fear of a slippery slope by arguing that "safeguards" would prevent groups of individuals other than anencephalic infants from being affected by an amendment to the UDDA, n43 any "safeguard" would not be sufficient. Once "very fine distinctions [are made ] regarding the dying," n44 the risk of descending down the slippery slope becomes significant .



2AC AT No Value to Life

C. Consequentialism solves. Robert E. Goodin, professor of social sciences and philosopher at the Research School of Social

Sciences at Australian National University, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, 1995, p. 39The rather more grand way of phrasing the point here might be couched in terms of undermining moral agency. Failure to discharge isolated, individual responsibilities may well result in other people's being harm ed. That is wrong, but it is , at least in principle, a remediable wrong. People can , at least in principle, always be compensated for harms to their interests (or so the libertarian would claim, anyway). Failure to discharge shared, collective responsibilities has more grievous consequences, undermin ing in certain crucial respects other people's moral agency itself . For that, compensation is in principle impossible . There must be a moral agent to be compensated, and it is that very moral agency that is being undermined."



___________

**AFF Blocks



1AR Extension

Their Impact Calculus is bad:

1. Slippery Slope—saying theres no value to life within our framework creates a condition in which murder is justified. Letting someone who “has no value to their life” die in a nuclear war becomes legitimate—Hanger says they set the ethical bar too low.

2. Genocide—Coleson says attempting to preserve value beyond existence accepts Eugenics and Nazi style genocide.

3. Turns their Impact—Goodin says they put themselves in a position to assign values to life. They are worse calculation because they undermine peoples moral agency.



2AR Extension

Their impact calculus is genocidal and should be rejected in favor of consequentialist thinking. They have conceded their position is morally repugnant. The idea that certain conditions explained by the Negative such as _________________ can negate all value to human life reduces human worth to something that is inherently calculable instead of intrinsically valuable, which flips their calculative thinking bad arguments. There are a couple impacts:

A. Eugenics—the idea that life is “as good as dead” under certain conditions comes with great sacrifice. This is proven by their willingness to accept millions of deaths in the name of preserving some higher value. Our Coleson evidence says this attempt to preserve value beyond existence opens a pandoras box, justifying murder in the name of preserving a quality of lifestyle. Our evidence literally says they remove the “EQUAL dignity and inherent worth in EVERY human person” no matter what.

B. Slippery Slope—theres only a risk of spill over—they set the ethical bar very low. Incarceration makes life not worth living, so does being poor, so does being afraid of people. Who are they to decide? Our Hanger evidence says once we can decide that certain life is the living dead, we jeopardize all ethics and legitimize extermination. The people who will die as a result of rejecting the Affirmative become “already dead,” so its ok to let them die. Our evidence says their position can always “extend to other groups of people similarly situated.” The act of declaring these people as “already dead’ jeopardizes ALL ethical integrity.

C. AFF Solves—Extend Goodin—consequentialism is fundamentally the choice between two lesser evils—even if certain conditions must be kept in place in order to accomplish the greater good, it is both a necessary and remediable action. Their alternative is a fallacy that causes greater moral infringements and must be rejected.



AT YOU Assign Value to Life

1. No—we don’t assign a value to life. We say all life is equal. Just because we make arguments about how our affirmative saves lives and the alternative results in death doesn’t mean that we say certain lives are not worth living.

2. You Link—our argument is that the moment you can say certain lives are stripped of their value is a very important ethical decision. It allows you to bracket certain populations as already dead, removing ethical concerns for their life until situations are improved. This is exactly the logic of valuation we are criticizing as resulting in eugenic programs of murder.



AT “Life Not Worth Living”

The argument that certain conditions make “life not worth living” accepts the philosophical premise of nazi Germany style murders and concentration camps. NEELEY, Assistant Professor @ Saint Francis, 1994 [Steven, Akron Law Review, 28 Akron L. Rev. 53, Summer]The final solution in the United States and other western societies will be unlike the final solution in Nazi Germany in its details, but not unlike it in its horror . And I fear that some who now live will experience this final solution. They will live to see the day they will be killed . n27 Variations of the "slippery-slope" argument as applied to suicide and euthanasia are abundant.n28 Beauchamp has argued, for example, that at least from the perspective of rule utilitarianism, the wedge argument against euthanasia should be taken seriously. Accordingly, although a "restricted-active-euthanasia rule would have some utility value" since some intense and uncontrollable suffering would be eliminated, "it may not have the highest utility value in the structure of our present code or in any imaginable code which could be made current, and therefore may not be a component in the ideal code for our society . . . . For the disutility of introducing legitimate killing into [*59] one's moral code (in the form of active euthanasia rules) may, in the long run, outweigh the utility of doing so, as a result of the eroding effect such a relaxation would have on rules in the code which demand respect for human life . " n29 Beauchamp then continues down a now-familiar path: If, for example, rules permitting active killing were introduced, it is not implausible to suppose that destroying defective newborns (a form of involuntary euthanasia) would become an accepted and common practice, that as population increases occur the aged will be even more neglectable and neglected than they now are, that capital punishment for a wide variety of crimes would be increasingly tempting, that some doctors would have appreciably reduced fears of actively injecting fatal doses whenever it seemed to them propitious to do so . . . . A hundred such possible consequences might easily be imagined. But these few are sufficient to make the larger point that such rules permitting killing could lead to a general reduction of respect for human life .



1AR Right to Life Outweighs Value to Life

The right to life is the greatest and most overriding libertyVasil Gluckman, staff at Preson University, Humanity and Moral Rights, 1999, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Huma/HumaGluc.htmI accept the idea that human society has been founded through the idea of social contract, and that its being is possible only due to that social contract performed on the international level, for example, like international cooperation in trade, health and environmental care and so on. The representatives of the social contract idea (for example Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Rawls and others) present the prior view that human society has been established and works (in the present) only when individuals give up a part of their freedom as well as rights. Therefore, they delegate mandates that benefit the social institution (state) for the sake of the protection and performing of their rights as well as justified interests in accordance with rights and interests of others. The essential principle for the performing of a social contract is a cooperative idea for the sake of the protection of human beings. It follows that one of the aims of humankind is a stable community as well as society, where the individual delegates a part of itself to rights and freedoms that benefit the social institution. That institution has the duty to protect and pursue its rights and justified interests in accordance with rights and justified interests of other concerned people. The prevention against the abuse of that institutional power is the performing of the fundamental requirement towards social institution, i.e., that social institutions must not violate or restrict basic human rights of innocent people, with the exception of the cases where it could prevent more harms. However, it is possible to do only with the agreement of the concerned people. A social institution must not violate or restrict the right to life of innocent people in any case, nor for the benefit of the prevention more harm. A social institution is not the owner of human lives of individuals who delegate a part of their freedom and rights to the social institution in a social contract. Every free, rational and innocent individual has the right to decide about life itself. The individual can sacrifice itself for the benefit of the prevention of danger that jeopardizes a community, society or all humankind. However, it is possible to do only as the individual decides freely, because it is not its duty. Hence I think that there is only one priority of right, i.e., the right of innocent people to life itself. However, it does not mean that a social institution has the possibility to violate or restrict the other rights of individuals. John Rawls affirms that a social institution could do it only for the sake of prevention more of harms to the individuals' rights.

The right to life is the most important and absoluteJohn Hasnas, senior research fellow at the Kennedy Institute, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 900, 1995, lexisWhat made Hobbes's right of self-preservation distinctive was his attempt to provide an empirical basis for it. He believed that human beings' rights must be determined by their actual capacities; they must have a right to do that which it is impossible for them not to do. Therefore, the source of rights is not to be found in some pre-existing ethic, but in the observable attributes of human nature. 25 And since according to Hobbes's observations, the most basic attribute of human nature is the drive to preserve one's own life, human beings must have a right to attempt to do so. 26 The interesting thing about this approach is that it implies that the right to self-preservation is absolute; that no other obligation can override it. For, if human beings are compelled by their nature to act so as to preserve themselves - if it is impossible for them not to - it would be absurd to claim that they have an obligation not to. 27 Since "ought implies can," there can be no obligation to do the impossible. It follows, then, that an essential characteristic of Hobbes's natural [*909] right is its indefeasibility. It simply is not subject to being overridden by a conflicting obligation and, hence, is absolute in nature.





Documents

ANSWERS TO VTL