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Barkan, En, Hernandez, Kaplan, Yannix

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  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix1

    AnnotatedBibiliography

    PrimarySources(52)"TheBattleForIran."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.

    435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.20Dec.2014.ThisrecentlydeclassifiedinternalCIAreportsummarizesOperationAJAXsprocess,andconfirmsinanappendixthatmostofthedocumentationcoveringthecoupwasdestroyed.Interestingly,itstatesthatmuchofthepublicsknowledgeoftheeventaroundthetimeperiodwaswildlyinaccurate.Additionally,itshowsthattheCIAwasextremelynaiveintheaftermathofvictory,neglectingtofollowtheShahsgovernmentcloselyortheoppressiveregimethathebeganwiththecreationofSAVAK.

    Baraheni,Reza.""..AmnestyIntl.N.p.,28Oct.1976.Web.04Jan.2015.Thissource,whichiswritteninArabic,wasusefulindetermininghowIranwasduringthebrutalruleundertheshah.ThissourcewasadirectwritingfromRezaBaraheni,anIranianhistorianduring1976,whentheturmoilwasrisingandactionswerecomingtoahead.ThissourcetalksabouthowlowthepublicopinionwasoftheIraniansecretpolice,theSAVAK.Specifically,itdetailshowSAVAKwouldrandomlytakecitizensfromtheirhouseandwouldtorturethemeveniftheysimplylivednexttoapossibleShahprotester,inagrotesquedescriptionofthebrutalityallowedundertheShahsregime.

    BritishForeignandCommonwealthOffice,ed."BritishAmericanPlanningTalks,Washington,

    October1011,1978."(n.d.):n.pag.TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity).GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.13Oct.2014.ThisdocumentisasetofnotesfromameetingoftheBritishForeignandCommonwealthOfficefrom1978,astheydiscussthestateofforeignaffairswithAmericanofficials.InthesectionpertainingtoIran,thenotetakeroutlinesapointthatHenryPrecht,BritishCountryDirectorforIran,makes,wherehecallsthemessinIran"theworstforeignpolicydisastertohittheWestformanyyears."PrechtgoesontocorrectlypredictthefalloftheShah'sgovernmentwithinayear,andtheuprisingofKhomeini.AllinattendanceagreedthathoweverbadrelationswithIrangot,theycouldnotbeterminatedbecauseofIraniandependenceontheWestbuyingoil.ThisshowsthatwhilebothAmericansandBritishofficialsunderstoodthesituationwasratherdireasaresultoftheCoup,andtheyrealizedtheyhadmadeamistake,theydidnotfullyappreciatethelegacythattheycouldbeleaving,andthefullextentoftheirmistakes,astheydidnotaccountfortheantiwesternsentimentfeltinIranatthetimeofKhomeini'srisetopower.

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix2

    Bruce,DavidK.,andRobertA.Lovett.BruceLovettReport.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.ThisreportcommissionedbytheBoardofConsultantsonFederalIntelligenceActivitieshighlightstheshortfallsoftheCIAorganizationalsystem,whichitdescribesasfreewheelinganduncheckedbyqualifiedauthorities,bothinternallyandexternally.AuthorsDavidK.E.BruceandRobertA.Lovett(theSecretaryofDefense)werehighlycriticalofthefreenatureoftheCIA,statingthatitcontainednoneofthelongrangeguidanceandvisionsnecessarytoensureeffectivepolicyprocedure(PP)operations.Theyprovidefewspecificdetailstosupporttheirclaims,usingmostlybroadgeneralizationsaboutCIAworkersorleaders,althoughtheauthoritativenatureofthereportanditswritersleadsustobelievethattheyhavesomeweightbehindtheirclaims.

    CampaigntoInstallaProWesternGovernmentinIran.N.d.CIA,Summary.Thisreport

    releasedin2011withtheCIAFreedomofInformationAct,likelypreparedbyDonaldWilbur,anarchitectofthecoup,detailstheUnitedStates'spointofviewandthoughtprocessregardingtheeventsandtheiractionsinIran.Althoughlikelybiased,itprovidesanelucidatingperspectiveofthecoup,firstpresentingknowledgeoftheTudehparty'sandSovietUnion'sinfluenceandrecognizingtheexistenceofFedayenIslam.ItclaimsthattheUSsawitselfasan"honestbroker,"andthatitwas"admittedlyreluctant"totakecovertactioninIran,butthatthecoupwasa"moredesirablerisk"thanlettingtheSovietsgainanadvantageintheregion.Itmaybeimportanttonotethatthedocumentwasheavilyexcised,presentingthepossibilitythattheCIAiswithholdingyetmoreimportantinformation.

    Coyne,J.Patrick.CoyneReporttotheCIA.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.ThisreportonthestatusofCIAoperationssystemsprovidedacomprehensivesummaryoftheissueswithintheCIAorganizationalsystem.Primarily,alackofproperchecksandbalancesonCIAoperationsallowedittopursuemultiplepotentiallydisastrousundertakings,withoutanyofthelongrangeguidanceandplanningthatshouldbeprovidedbytheStateandDefenseDepartments.Overall,thissourceunderscoredthedownfallsoftheCIAatthetime,andgavesomesuggestionsonhowtoimprovetheaccountabilityoftheorganization.

    Daniel,Clifton."U.S.andBritainConfrontedByDilemmaonHelptoIran."TheNewYork

    Times11Aug.1952:n.pag.Print.Thisprimarysourcenewsarticle,publishedintheNewYorkTimesaboutayearbeforethecoup,discussesthedilemmaoftheAmericanandBritishgovernmentsindecidingwhetherornottoactinIran.TheprimaryBritishmotivationinIranwastocombatMossadeq'snationalizationoftheAIOC.TheBritishinsisteduponmeetingwiththeUnitedStatesfirstinordertogetthemtoagreetoassist.OfparticularinterestinthisarticleisthefacttheUnitedStates'StateDepartmentwas

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix3

    mentionedasthedrivingforcebehindtheAmericandecisiontoinstigatethecoupduetothebeliefofacommunistthreatbytheTudehParty.TheheadoftheStateDepartment,ofcourse,wasnoneotherthanJohnFosterDulles.ThisarticleprovidesaninterestinglookathowtheBritishwereabletodragtheUnitedStatesalongwiththemtohelptheminthecoup,andhowmisinformedtheUnitedStateswere.ItalsoreflectsthemisguidedandmisinformedleadershipofJohnFosterDullesandtheresultinglegacyofthat.

    Dulles,Allen."AllenDullesInterview."Interview.YouTube.Google,20Feb.2010.Web.13Oct.2014.This1966interviewofAllenDullesprovidesagoodlookatDulles'spersonalcoveringupofthecoup.WhentheinterviewerdescribestheamountofdocumentsstillclassifiedbytheCIAabouttheCoup,Dullesclaims"Ithinkeverythingthatisvitalasfarasformingajudgementastowhatreallyhappenedhasbeenmadeavailable."Thisisablatantlie,andtheinterviewercontinuestovoicehisskepticism,onlytobemetbyDullesunyieldingandcharismaticdefense.ThissourcewasafairdemonstrationofboththelackofleadershipofthecoupbecauseitshowedtheCIA'sadamantdenialthattheymessedup,andpartiallythelegacytoobecausetheywereunwillingtocomeoutwiththetruthandtrytofixtheirmistakes.

    Dulles,Allen."Correspondence."LettertoDonaldWilbur.30Jan.1954.MossadeghProject.N.p.,22June2014.Web.22Nov.2014.InaninternalCIAletter/memorandum,AllenDullescongratulatesDonaldWilburforhisworkonthe1953Iraniancoup.ThisletterhelpedusunderstandtherelationshipbetweentheBritishandAmericansidesofthecoupthatWilburmediated,whichwasgenerallytactfulandprofessionalwithoutcopiouscommunication.Also,heonceagainexpresseshissomewhatignorantopinionofthecoup'ssuccess,withoutanythoughtforthelongtermconsequencesofanoppressiveandauthoritarianregimeinIran,evenifitsupportedtheWest.

    Dulles,Allen."AllenW.DullesOralHistoryInterview."InterviewbyThomasBraden.JohnF.KennedyPresidentialLibrary.N.p.,n.d.Web.30Dec.2014.ThisinterviewofAllenDullesin1964coverstheplanningfor,execution,andaftermathoftheBayofPigsinvasionledbytheCIAduringDulles'stenureasDirector.DullesexplainsthathemadeamistakeinallowingPresidentKennedytobecomesoinvolvedinthecrisis.Hebelieves,despitethedisasterthatoccurred,thattheoperationhadhadsomehopeforsuccess,andthatitwasmainlypoorluckandexecutionthatledtothepartialfailureoftheoperation.ThissourcehelpedusunderstandDulles'sopinionsonhowCIAoperationsshouldberunandled,withoutinterferencefromoutsidegovernmentagencies.

    Dulles,Allen.Germany'sUnderground.NewYork:Macmillan,1947.Print.Thisbook,which

    waswrittenbyAllenDulles,goesindepthintohowtheOSSwascreated,andhowthat

  • Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix4

    affectedtheeventsinWorldWarII.Withinthisbook,Dulles'judgmentalattitudeisapparenttoalltheleadershedisagreedwith.HetalkedabouthowtheUnitedStatesshould'vegottenintothewarasearlyaspossible.Fromthisbook,wecanseehowhisthoughtsaboutradicalactionaffectedhisleadershipinthecoup.Itisaveryhelpfulprimarysource,inthatitprovidesdeepinsightintoDullessperspectiveonhisownleadership.Combiningitwithothersources,onecandrawconclusionsabouthisoverconfidence,andhowJohnFosterDulleswasoverconfidentaswell.Itwasverybeneficialtotheleadershipargument.

    Dulles,Allen.TheInvisibleWar.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,2007.HarveyMuddLibrary.Web.14Dec.2014.ThisundatedOSSreportissuedbyAllenDullesexplainsthestandoffbetweentheUnitedStatesandtherecentlyinpowerCommunistsinRussia.HespendsasignificantamountoftimedetailingtheAmericanpublicopinionoftheCommunistadvance,thoughhebelievesthatpeopleshouldbemorewaryofthethreat.HeadmitsthatnobodyhasanyaccurateinformationontheSoviets,showingthatmostofthehyperbolicclaimshecontinuestomakeareunfounded.Overall,itshowstheinaccuratepreconceptionsthatDullesformedevenbeforehewasfullyinformedoftheCommunistsituationaroundtheglobe,andthereforeisveryhelpfulfortheleadershipargumentofimpulsiveforeignpolicy.

    Dulles,AllenW."THEPRESENTSITUATIONINGERMANY."CouncilonForeignRelations.3Dec.1945.ForeignAffairs.Web.4Jan.2015.ThisisanofftherecordspeechwhichAllenDullesmadethatwasrecentlyreleasedtothepublic.AlthoughitisaboutGermanyin1945,itprovidesinsightintoDulles'sleadershipabilities.Heoftendescribesthesituationasimpossibleandmakesbroadgeneralizationsaboutthepopulationsinvolved,supportingtheideathatDulleswasgenerallypessimisticintheshortterm,andthathewaspronetoromanticizethesituationinhismindtomatchwithhisselfimageasaChristianAmericancrusaderouttohelpthepeopleoftheworldagainstallevils.

    Dulles,Allen.SovietEconomicInfluences.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1958.05Dec.2007.Web.6Jan.2015.ThisreportwrittenbyAllenDullesfortheCIAoutlinesSovieteconomicactivitiesaroundtheglobe,focusingmainlyon"thirdworld"countries,includingIran(althoughbythispointIranwasalreadyunderUScontrol).DullesexpressesconcernsofthepowerofSovietpropagandathroughouttheglobe,specificallyinEgyptandIran,demonstratinghisfearoftheSovietsintheMiddleEast.Mostimportantly,though,hehighlightstheextentofSoviettradeintheMiddleEast,whichhebelievedtobeanindicatorofSovietexpansionarytendencies.ThishelpedrevealthatwhileDulleswasanidealisticleader,set