Ang Galing Pinoy vs. Comelec (Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition)

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court Manila

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary-General G.R. No: _____________________ BERNARDO R. CORELLA JR., For Certiorari and Prohibition

Petitioner, with an Urgent Prayer for the -versus- Issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order and/or a THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Writ of Preliminary Injunction

Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

P E T I T I O N

“It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the

betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: ‘The end does not justify the means.’ No matter how noble and worthy of

admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with

constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass.”

—Biraogo vs. Truth Commission1

Petitioner Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), through the undersigned counsel, unto this

Honorable Court, most respectfully files this Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and avers that:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND MATERIAL DATES

1. This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to annul the Resolution2

promulgated by the respondent Commission on Elections on October

1 G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010.

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG) vs. Commission on Elections Petition for CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER and/or a Writ of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Page 2 of 32

31, 2012, which resolved “to CANCEL the Certificate of Registration

and/or Accreditation of ANG GALING PINOY (AG) under the Party-list

System of Representation.”

2. The instant Petition is being filed under the provisions of Section 7,

Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides that “any decision,

order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme

Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from

receipt of a copy thereof.”

3. Since a certified true copy of the assailed Resolution was only received

by the petitioner on November 15, 2012, the thirty-day period within

which to file the instant petition pursuant to Section 3, Rule 64 of the

Rules of Court lapses on December 15, 2012.

THE PARTIES

4. Petitioner Ang Galing Pinoy (AG) is a duly-registered party-list

organization accredited through SPP No. 06-050 (PL) in an Omnibus

Resolution promulgated on January 16, 2007 by the Second Division of

the Commission on Elections. The petitioner’s principal address is at

Unit C, Mario Paule Bldg., San Nicolas I, Lubao, Pampanga. However, for

purposes of this action, the petitioner may be served summons and

other processes of this Honorable Court through the undersigned

counsel.

5. The respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) may be served

summons and other processes at the Office of the Clerk of the

Commission, Palacio del Gobernador, Gen. Luna St. cor. Andres Soriano

Jr. Ave., Intramuros, Manila.

2 A certified true copy of which is attached herewith as Annex “A.”



SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

6. The facts, chronologically-arranged for better appreciation, are as

follows:

7. On May 31, 2012, the petitioner AG filed before the respondent Comelec

its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of

Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.3 This Manifestation was

docketed as SPP 12-256 (PLM-N).

8. On August 2, 2012, the respondent Comelec en banc, in exercise of its

administrative functions, promulgated Resolution No. 9513 resolving to

(1) initiate the automatic review of pending petitions for registration of

new party-list groups, and (2) set for hearing the manifestations of

intent to participate of already-accredited party-list groups.

9. On August 9, 2012, AG founding member and current secretary-general

Bernardo R. Corella Jr. received a copy of Resolution No. 9513 together

with a Notice regarding the summary hearing scheduled on August 28,

2012. As stated in Resolution No. 9513, the hearing was “for purposes of

determining their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A.

No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case.”

10. Meanwhile, on August 13, 2012, Kontra Daya, a group claiming to be an

“election watchdog,” filed a letter-complaint seeking the disqualification

of the petitioner AG on the ground, among others, that it does not

represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

11. On August 25, 2012, in compliance with the Notice that accompanied

Resolution No. 9513, Corella went to the Comelec three days before the

scheduled hearing to submit the evidentiary documents. However, his

3 Attached herewith as Annex “B.”



submissions were not received by the personnel of the Office of the

Clerk of the Commission. Note that August 25 was a Saturday, while the

Monday that followed, August 27, was a national holiday.

12. Despite his pleas with the said Office, the documents were not received

on the ground that Corella was not a lawyer and that he needed counsel

to accompany him for the documents to be received. Because the

evidentiary documents were not received, the scheduled hearing on

August 28, 2012 did not push through as far as AG was concerned.4

13. Meanwhile, knowing very well that it did not suffer from any of the

grounds for cancellation of registration as a duly-accredited party-list

organization, and with the Comelec granting their accreditation for the

last two successive National Elections, the officers of AG just waited for

the Order allowing them to participate yet again in the 2013 National

Elections.

14. On October 31, 2012, the respondent Comelec en banc, in what was

obviously an exercise of quasi-judicial power, promulgated the assailed

Resolution resolving to cancel the registration of petitioner AG for the

following reasons:

“First, AG’s non-appearance during the scheduled summary

evidentiary hearing showed its wanton disregard for the

rules and regulations of the Commission.

x x x

“Second, AG does not intend to represent any marginalized

and underrepresented sector evidenced by its lack of track

record.

x x x

4 Affidavit executed by Bernardo R. Corella Jr. attached herewith as Annex “C.”



“Lastly, the nominees of AG do not belong to the sector that

it is seeking to represent.”

15. Petitioner now comes before this Honorable Court to preserve the

constitutionally-enshrined right of the sovereign people to choose their

representatives in Congress through the Party-list System of

Representation.

ISSUES

16. The basic issues for the determination of this Honorable Court are:

(1) Whether or not the respondent Comelec en banc

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it ruled on a quasi-judicial

matter that is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Comelec in division;



excess of jurisdiction by denying the petitioner due process

when it cancelled petitioner AG’s registration based on a

ground that is due to the respondent’s own arbitrary refusal

to receive evidentiary documents required by Resolution

9513;



excess of jurisdiction when it decided to cancel the

registration of petitioner AG on a ground that is not

included in the exclusive enumeration of grounds for



Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration under Section 6

of Republic Act No. 7941.

DISCUSSION

I. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE The Comelec en banc has no jurisdiction to cancel the registration of a duly-accredited party-list group, such power being adjudicatory and vested exclusively in the Comelec in division 17. Going into the core of this Petition is the power of the Comelec en banc

to issue the assailed October 31 Resolution cancelling accreditation of an

incumbent party-list organization.

18. In the recent case of Bedol vs. Comelec,5 this Court had occasion to

classify the broad powers granted to the Comelec by the Constitution

and pertinent election laws. According to this Court, the three powers of

the Comelec “may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative,

and quasi-judicial.”

19. Expounding on these three powers, this Court said that “The quasi-

judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve

controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be

the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests

relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications.”

20. Meanwhile, “Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules

and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such

legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.”

5 G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009.



21. Lastly, “Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and

administration of election laws.”

22. As can be gleaned from the assailed October 31 Resolution, it was issued

by the respondent Comelec en banc to dispose of its “review of the

continuing compliance of the Ang Galing Pinoy (AG) Party-list pursuant

to Comelec Resolution No. 9513.”

23. It is correct that the Comelec en banc indeed had jurisdiction to issue

Resolution 9513. However, the petitioner stresses that the Comelec en

banc had no jurisdiction to issue the assailed October 31 Resolution. The

reason for the difference lies in the fact that these two acts are

completely different in nature, the first one being both quasi-legislative

and administrative, while the second one being exclusively quasi-

judicial.

24. A brief review of Resolution 9513 and how it gave birth to the assailed

October 31 Resolution is necessary for better understanding of the

latter’s unconstitutionality. Resolution 9513 was issued by the Comelec

en banc in line with the provisions of Republic Act No. 79416 and the

doctrine enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec7 to ensure that

“only those parties, groups, or organizations with the requisite

character consistent with the purpose of the party-list system is (sic)

registered and accredited to participate in the party-list system of

representation.”

25. Having been issued under the mandate of Section 2(5) Article IX-C of the

Constitution to “Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,

organizations, or coalitions,” the Comelec en banc indeed had

jurisdiction to issue Resolution 9513 because the registration of political

6 The Party-List System Act. Signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on March 3, 1995. 7 G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001.



parties, organizations, and coalitions is an administrative matter and

the implementation of the guidelines for the conduct of such

registration is a quasi-legislative in character.

26. Resolution 9513 “set for summary evidentiary hearings by the

Commission En Banc” the (1) Petitions for Registration of new party-list

groups and the (2) Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-

List System of Representation of already-registered party-list groups.

27. For already-registered party-list groups such as AG, the summary

hearings were “for purposes of determining their continuing compliance

with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang

Bagong Bayani case” so that the Comelec may cancel their registrations

should they be found to be non-compliant.

28. While it is true that the registration of party-list groups is an

administrative function that is within the province of the Comelec en

banc, the matter of approving the accreditation of an applicant party for

registration or the matter of cancelling the registration and

accreditation as an existing party such as AG is not an administrative

matter but an adjudicatory matter that the Comelec would determine in

the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.

29. This is the reason why since the inception of the party-list system of

representation, the Comelec had been approving Petitions for

Registration of party-list groups through its divisions and NOT through

the Commission en banc.

30. In fact, petitioner AG’s Petition for Registration, docketed as SPP No. 06-

050 (PL), was granted by the Comelec Second Division8 through an

8 Composed of Presiding Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Nicodemo Ferrer.



Omnibus Resolution promulgated on January 16, 2007. This is for the

simple reason that the approval of a petition for registration to

participate in the party-list system of representation is an adjudicatory

matter that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec in division

and not the Commission en banc.

31. Corollary to this, the cancellation of registration of a party-list

organization is a quasi-judicial matter which cannot be decided upon by

the Comelec en banc. Simple reading of the assailed October 31

Resolution shows that the Comelec exercised its adjudicatory or quasi-

judicial power to determine the qualification of petitioner AG to

participate in the 2013 National Elections. Having been issued by the

Comelec en banc, the assailed October 31 Resolution is null and void for

having been issued by the respondent Comelec en banc in excess of its

jurisdiction, the matter at hand being under the exclusive jurisdiction of

any of the two divisions of the Comelec.

32. The rationale behind this requirement of exclusivity of jurisdiction is to

afford the parties affected greater protection of due process considering

that decisions or resolutions of the Comelec’s divisions are appealable

to the Comelec en banc. Denying the parties the opportunity to ventilate

their cause at first instance to the divisions of the Comelec and to ask for

reconsideration or appeal to the Comelec en banc would deprive them

due process.

33. This Court had already ruled a number of times that the Comelec

exercises quasi-judicial powers through its divisions, while the exercise

of its quasi-legislative and administrative powers is vested on the

Comelec en banc.9

9 Balindong vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 153991, October 14, 2003.



34. Quasi-judicial power, as defined by this Court in Dole Philippines Inc.

vs. Esteva, is “the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate

rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine

questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide

in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in

enforcing and administering the same law.”

35. In the above-cited case of Bedol, this Court held that the Comelec’s

quasi-judicial power “embraces the power to resolve controversies

arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge

of all pre-proclamation controversies.”

36. Thus, while it is within the administrative and quasi-legislative power of

the Comelec en banc to initiate and schedule hearings to review the

continuing compliance of already-accredited party-list groups with RA

7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani, it is NO longer within its power to resolve

whether or not these party-list groups are compliant with RA 7941 and

Ang Bagong Bayani.

37. The reason is simple. When the Comelec initiated the review and

scheduled hearings to determine compliance with RA 7941 and Ang

Bagong Bayani, it was exercising its constitutional duty to “Register,

after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions.”10 This is a power which is administrative in character.

38. On the other hand, the determination of whether or not a party-list

group complied with RA 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani is no longer

administrative in nature. Such determination already falls squarely

within the Comelec’s adjudicatory power because facts, evidence, and

10 Section 2(5) Article IX-C of the Constitution.



conclusions of law would be used to reach a resolution of a party-list

group’s compliance with RA 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani.

39. As this Court said in Dole Philippines Inc., “In carrying out their quasi-

judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to

investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh

evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official

action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.”

40. Using its discretion in exercise of the aforesaid quasi-judicial power, the

Comelec en banc issued the assailed October 31 Resolution to adjudicate

the right—or lack thereof—of petitioner AG to participate in the 2013

National Elections. In order to arrive at a valid ruling regarding this

issue, the respondent needed to hear and determine questions of fact so

it may decide whether the petitioner complied with the requirements of

RA 7941.

41. Clearly, the determination of whether or not the petitioner AG complies

with the requirements of the Constitution and pertinent election laws

fall under the exercise of the respondent’s quasi-judicial powers, which

is beyond the jurisdiction of the Comelec en banc.

II. DUE PROCESS ISSUE The Comelec denied AG due process by refusing to accept the evidentiary documents that AG tried to submit as required by Resolution 9513 42. The rules governing due process in administrative bodies had already

been etched in jurisprudential doctrine as early as the pre-war era

through the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations.11

11 G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940.



43. In this landmark case, the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel laid down the

following as the “primary rights which must be respected even in

proceedings of this character:

(1) “The right to a hearing, which includes the right to

present one’s case and submit evidence in support

thereof.

(2) “The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) “The decision must have something to support itself.

(4) “The evidence must be substantial.

(5) “The decision must be rendered on the evidence

presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the

record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) “The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on

its or his own independent consideration of the law

and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the

views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) “The board or body should, in all controversial

question, render its decision in such a manner that

the parties to the proceeding can know the various

issues involved, and the reason for the decision

rendered.”

44. The assailed October 31 Resolution failed to comply with not even one of

the seven (7) primary rights established by the Ang Tibay doctrine.

45. First, the assailed October 31 Resolution did not afford petitioner AG the

“right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and

submit evidence in support thereof.”



46. While it is true that Resolution 9513 indeed “set for summary

evidentiary hearings” the petitioner’s Manifestation of Intent to

Participate in the Party-List System, such setting was defeated by the

deliberate refusal of Comelec personnel to allow petitioner AG to submit

the evidentiary documents that were required to be submitted by

Resolution 9513.

47. On August 25, 2012, AG secretary-general Bernardo Corella Jr. himself

went12 to the Comelec office to submit the evidentiary requirements13

three (3) days before the scheduled hearing in compliance with

Resolution 9513. However, the personnel in the Office of the Clerk of the

Commission categorically refused to receive the aforesaid documents on

the flimsy ground that Corella was not a lawyer and he was not

accompanied by counsel. Thus, Corella was precluded from attending

the scheduled summary hearings on the documentary requirements on

August 28.

48. The Comelec could thus not claim, as stated in the assailed October 31

Resolution, that “AG’s failure to appear during the scheduled summary

evidentiary hearing and its failure to submit pertinent documents in

relation thereto” should be considered as “sufficient grounds for this

Commission to motu proprio cancel the registration of AG.”

49. In the first place, no evidentiary requirement could be resolved in the

August 28 hearing as the documents were rejected by the Office of the

Clerk of the Commission when Corella tried to submit it on August 25.

Thus, petitioner AG could not be faulted for “failure to submit” the

evidentiary requirements when it was the Comelec itself which refused

to accept the said documents.

12 Affidavit executed by Bernardo R. Corella Jr. attached herwith as Annex “C.” 13 The evidentiary requirements are attached herewith as Annex “D” with submarkings.



50. Now, how can the assailed October 31 Resolution comply with the

second, third, fourth, and fifth requirements in Ang Tibay when no

evidence was ever received by the respondent?

51. The second to fifth requirements of Ang Tibay are: “(2) The tribunal

must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have

something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; and

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the

hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties

affected.”

52. Clearly, the categorical refusal of the Office of the Clerk of the

Commission to receive the evidentiary requirements that were

supposed to be the subject matter of the August 28 hearing rendered

futile the second to fifth requirements in Ang Tibay.

53. The respondent Comelec en banc cannot now blame petitioner AG for

failing to submit the documentary requirements when its own

personnel refused to accept them for no reason at all.

54. Further, the petitioner takes offense from the assailed October 31

Resolution’s biased conclusion that AG’s “non-appearance can only mean

that it purposely ‘boycotted’ a lawful order of the Commission en banc

or it is not interested in fighting for the cause of the sectors that it is

seeking to represent.”

55. The earlier discussion on the Comelec’s refusal to receive the

evidentiary requirements submitted by Corella belies the respondent’s

biased conclusion that the petitioner “boycotted” a lawful order of the

Commission.



56. If there is anyone to blame for AG’s failure to submit evidentiary

requirements and attend the August 28 hearing, it is no other than the

Comelec itself. The party and its members should not be held to account

for the respondent’s grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily denying AG

the right to submit evidence to support its continued participation in

the party-list system of representation.

III. LACK OF LEGAL BASIS The Comelec en banc cancelled AG’s registration without any legal basis, the list of grounds for cancellation in RA 7941 and Resolution 9366 being exclusive 57. The final issue for resolution of this Honorable Court is the respondent

Comelec en banc’s disregard of the provisions of our elections laws and

Comelec rules in its quest of purging the party-list system of so-called

sham organizations. The provisions of RA 7941 in relation to Section

2(f), Rule 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366 are as clear as daylight.

Nowhere in the exclusive grounds for cancellation of registration can

the assailed October 31 Resolution lean on for support.

58. Section 6 of RA 7941 states:

Sec. 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The

COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of

any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and

hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral

party, organization or coalition on any of the following

grounds:

1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association organized for religious purposes;

2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;



3. It is a foreign party or organization;

4. It is receiving support from any foreign government,

foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether

directly or through any of its officers or members or

indirectly through third parties for partisan election

purposes;

5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or

regulations relating to elections;

6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

8. It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding

elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%)

of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two

(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it

has registered.

59. The assailed October 31 Resolution seeks refuge in the similar provisions

of Section 2(f), Rule 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366, which provides

that “The Commission may deny due course to the petition motu

proprio or upon verified opposition of any interested party, after due

notice and hearing, on any of the following grounds: x x x f.) It violates

or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections.”

60. According to the assailed October 31 Resolution, “AG’s failure to appear

during the scheduled evidentiary hearing and its failure to submit

pertinent documents in relation thereto is in violation of Comelec

Resolution 9513 and under Comelec Resolution 9366, these are sufficient

grounds for this Commission to motu proprio cancel the registration of

AG.”



61. Again, how can the petitioner’s failure to appear during the hearing and

to submit the evidentiary documents constitute “violation of Comelec

Resolution 9513” when it was the Comelec itself which refused to accept

the petitioner’s submissions?

62. As earlier stated, AG secretary-general Corella tried to submit the

evidentiary requirements in compliance with Resolution 9513 but these

were rejected at the Office of the Clerk of the Commission for the flimsy

reason that Corella is not a lawyer. The petitioner finds this ridiculous

as nowhere in Resolution 9513 is it required that the evidentiary

requirements be submitted by counsel.

63. Knowing very well that it has no valid ground to cancel petitioner AG’s

registration, the respondent Comelec en banc correlated the former’s

failure to submit the evidentiary requirements (which is actually the

respondent’s fault) to Section 2(f), Rule 2 of Comelec Resolution No.

9366.

64. Not only was this action a denial of due process; it is also an arbitrary

exercise of the discretion entrusted to the respondent by the

Constitution. Not only is it void and illogical; it is also immoral.

65. Surely, the respondent’s actions, in line with Tanada vs. Angara,14

constitute “grave abuse of discretion” that amounts to the “capricious

and whimsical exercise of judgment” that is “equivalent to lack of

jurisdiction.”

The Comelec en banc violated the principle of administrative res judicata when it concluded that AG does not intend to

14 G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997.



represent any marginalized or under-represented sector based on facts and evidence already resolved in 2007 66. The second ground upon which the respondent Comelec en banc based

its cancellation of petitioner AG’s registration is its baseless conclusion

that “AG does not intend to represent any marginalized or

underrepresented sector evidenced by its lack of track record.”

67. The assailed October 31 Resolution mentions this ground but

unfortunately failed to discuss how and why it arrived at this

conclusion. Plain reading of the Resolution shows that its writer merely

stated the aforesaid ground, pasted excerpts from AG’s 2006 Petition for

Registration and Accreditation, and then laid down the conclusion that

“nowhere did it state that it is seeking to represent the marginalized and

the underrepresented.”

68. It then said that “The only instance when [AG] mentioned some

marginalized sectors was in its Memorandum filed before the Clerk of

the Commission on November 29, 2006.”

69. The assailed October 31 Resolution also noted, based on the petitioner’s

2006 Petition for Registration, that:

“AG did not categorically mention that it is seeking to

represent the above-mentioned sectors. What it said is that

it is conducting seminars, lectures and organizing these

multi-sectoral forces. Even assuming that it indeed

organized these sectors in order to represent them, it did

not submit sufficient documentation to substantiate these

claims. It further gave itself away when it said that it has

been established since 2003 but nowhere in its record

shows that it has activities and policies that championed the



plight of the sectors that it mentioned. What it just

submitted are lists of its members which do not even

indicate what sector/s they belong.”

70. AG’s Petition for Registration was already resolved by the Comelec

Second Division way back in January 16, 2007 through Omnibus

Resolution SPP No. 06-050. The Division was unanimous.

71. Clearly, respondent Comelec en banc is resurrecting whatever issues it

may dig from its files five (5) years ago just to justify its assailed October

31 Resolution disqualifying AG from participating in the 2013 Elections.

72. If the respondent really wanted to cancel petitioner’s registration based

on its “lack of track record,” it should not have looked into its files from

five (5) years ago which only pertain to AG’s record BEFORE

accreditation. Instead, the logical thing to do is to look into AG’s track

record AFTER accreditation.

73. The respondent CANNOT, in the guise of “cleansing” the Party-list

System, violate the principle of administrative res judicata by disturbing

the Second Division’s Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 06-050 granting

petitioner AG’s registration on January 16, 2007.

74. When the Comelec Second Division disposed of SPP No. 06-050 six (6)

years ago, it resolved that AG was qualified to be registered as a party-

list organization based on the facts and evidence raised before the

Comelec back then. That resolution already became final, executory, and

immutable. The Comelec en banc CANNOT now suddenly cancel the

petitioner’s registration through the assailed October 31 Resolution

based on the submissions made in SPP No. 06-050 six (6) years ago.



75. This Court already decreed in Amistoso vs. Ong15 that “the rule of res

judicata applies to final decisions of quasi-judicial agencies.” Thus, the

basic rule on res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment bars the

respondent from disturbing the issues and evidence touched upon by

the six-year old Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 06-050 granting the

petitioner’s registration.

76. As enunciated by this Court in Manalo vs. Court of Appeals,16 “the

judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter

offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which

might have been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that

could have been adjudged therein.”

77. It is therefore grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent

Comelec en banc to resurrect the facts and evidence involved in an

already-final Petition of Registration and use them as basis to cancel the

registration of petitioner AG. Instead, it should have used facts and

evidence relevant to petitioner’s current status as a party-list

organization.

78. But of course, how can the respondent do that when it arbitrarily

refused to receive evidentiary documents pertaining to petitioner’s

post-accreditation accomplishments from AG secretary-general Corella

on August 25, 2012?

79. Worse, the respondent Comelec en banc even attacked the legislative

record of AG’s current representative in Congress, saying:

“Interestingly, its incumbent representative Mikey Arroyo

authored only a single legislation pertaining to security

15 G.R. No. 60219, June 29, 1984. 16 G.R. No. 124204, April 20, 2001.



guards. This bill has just gone past the first reading and was

referred to the House Committee on Public Order and

Safety. If one is truly an advocate, he/she is expected to

exert his/her best efforts to push for legislation that will

alleviate the cause of the sector/s he/she is representing.

We do not know if this is just sheer laziness but to us, this is

glaring lack of zeal and empathy for the plight of the truly

marginalized.”

80. The petitioner is at odds as to how the respondent came up with its

standard in concluding that “AG does not intend to represent any

marginalized or underrepresented” just by looking at the legislative

record of its incumbent congressman. History itself proves that even a

twelve-year legislator who authored only a single law can be elected to

the country’s highest elective office notwithstanding such dismal

performance in Congress. If the sovereign people entrusted the

presidency to such a mediocre legislator, then the Comelec should not

deprive the same sovereign people the right to vote for a party-list

group notwithstanding the legislative record of its outgoing

representative in Congress.

81. Even assuming that Rep. Mikey Arroyo only authored one (1) House Bill,

this should only reflect upon his performance as a legislator. The

represented sector must not be made to suffer for its representative’s

shortcomings by depriving the party-list group the right to be re-elected

for the next elections. In the first place, the people vote for the party-list

group, NOT for the nominee.

Contrary to the Comelec’s twisted view, all of AG’s six nominees actually belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors



82. This brings us to the respondent’s third and last reason for cancelling

petitioner’s registration, i.e., that “the nominees of AG do not belong to

the sector that it is seeking to represent.” According to the assailed

October 31 Resolution:

“The first nominee, Atty. Charlie G. Chua is a lawyer and a

businessman. The second nominee is Dr. Eder G. Dizon, a

physician. Jerold Dominick S. David who is a businessman

and an employee is the third nominee. The fourth nominee,

Ryan M. Caladiao is also an employee. Its fifth nominee, Alan

N. Trinidad, is a basketball coach and an employee. Its last

nominee, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., is its consultant in the

House of Representatives.”

83. The respondent then concluded that “Based on the above-mentioned

list, not even one from among its nominees is a security guard, a

tricycle/FX/taxi/jeepney/bus driver, a vendor, a tanod, or a small scale

businessman.”

84. To justify AG’s disqualification based on this reasoning, the respondent

quoted the landmark party-list cases of Ang Bagong Bayani vs.

Comelec17 and BANAT vs. Comelec.18

85. This Court said in Ang Bagong Bayani that:

“...not only the candidate party or organization must

represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so

also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA

7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens ‘who belong to

marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations

17 G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001. 18 G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009.



and parties.’ Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be

fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the

urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To

allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine

representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.”

86. Eight years later, this Court would rule in BANAT that:

“It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral

party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized

and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee

represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if

the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must

be a senior citizen.”

87. The petitioner strongly asserts that all of its six (6) nominees for the

2013 Elections are qualified to represent the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors in line with the doctrines laid down by this

Court in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.

88. Unfortunately, the assailed October 31 Resolution was crafted, albeit

poorly, to show that neither of the nominees were qualified.

89. Firstly, the assailed October 31 Resolution listed AG chairman Ryan

Caladiao as an “employee.” This is not how Caladiao actually filled up his

Certificate of Acceptance. He actually wrote “employee/SG” as his

occupation. By omitting “SG,” the Comelec made it appear that Caladiao

does not belong to any of the sectors AG is trying to represent. The

truth, however, is that Caladiao is a security guard.



90. Secondly, the assailed October 31 Resolution contradicted itself by

recognizing Charlie Chua and Jerold Dominick David as businessmen

and then stating one paragraph later that the two are neither a security

guard, a driver, a vendor, a tanod, or a small scale businessman. In

reality, Chua and David are both small-scale businessmen who run their

own local enterprises. The fact that Chua is a lawyer and David is an

employee does not in any way negate the fact that they belong to the

sector AG is trying to represent—small-scale businessmen.

91. Thirdly, the assailed October 31 Resolution listed Eder Dizon as a

physician, Alan Trinidad as a basketball coach/employee, and Bernardo

Corella Jr. as a congressional consultant. Indeed, these three nominees

filled up their respective Certificates of Acceptance with such

information regarding their occupations. But this does not negate the

fact that they also run their respective small-scale businesses in their

locality.

92. The fact that the nominees did not specifically write down any of the

words “security guard,” “driver,” “vendor,” “tanod,” or “small-scale

businessman” is of no moment as there is nothing in our election laws

and regulations that require a nominee to state an occupation that

matches the sector he seeks to represent.

93. Even the Framers of the fundamental law foresaw this situation.

According to Commissioner Christian Monsod, sponsor of the Party-list

System during the 1986 Constitutional Convention,

“Precisely, the party-list system seeks to avoid the dilemma

of choice sectors and who constitute the members of the

sectors. x x x ...we had the problem of who comprise the

farmers. A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a



farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say

‘I am a farmer’ so he would be included in that sector.”19

94. Nonetheless, it is the petitioner’s submission that all of its nominees are

qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors

comprising AG, and the respondent should not be allowed to arbitrarily

twist the wordings on the nominees’ Certificates of Acceptance to justify

its bias against AG or its incumbent representative in Congress. More so,

the respondent must not be allowed to re-interpret the words

“marginalized” and underrepresented” just to justify its purge of the

Party-list System.

Prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to protect the petitioner’s right to participate in the 2013 Elections pending resolution of this Petition for Certiorari 95. The petitioner repleads the allegations in this Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition to support this ancillary Prayer for the issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin

the Comelec from implementing the assailed October 31 Resolution.

96. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that:

“A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is

established:

“(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,

and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining

the commission or continuance of the act or acts

complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or

acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

19 Records of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, pages 85 to 86.



“(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance

of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would

probably work injustice to the applicant; or

“(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,

threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or

suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation

of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the

action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment

ineffectual.”

97. A party-list organization’s right to participate in the electoral process

being in line, it is the petitioner’s submission that enjoining the

respondent Comelec from implementing the assailed October 31

Resolution would not only protect its right to participate in the

upcoming Elections, but would also prevent injustice in the event this

Court decides in its favor.

98. There being no imaginable damage or injury that may be sustained by

the respondent or the government from the issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction, the petitioner should therefore be exempted

from the posting of bond under Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of

Court.

EPILOGUE

99. While the petitioner agrees with the respondent’s noble desire to rid the

Party-list system of sham organizations, it cannot simply sit idly while

that noble desire becomes a tool for what seems to be selective partisan

hostility.



100. Recently, this Court defied popular clamor and struck down a

presidential issuance that stepped on constitutionally-protected rights.

As aptly said by this Court:

“It cannot be denied that most government actions are

inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the

betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is

important to remember this ethical principle: ‘The end does

not justify the means.’ No matter how noble and worthy of

admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be

employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with

constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.

The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it

pass.20

101. This same wisdom is once again being called upon to save the people’s

constitutionally-protected right to choose their own representatives in

Congress. After all, the real essence of our democratic and republican

government is that “Sovereignty resides in the people and all

government authority emanates from them.”21 If the petitioner no

longer enjoys the confidence of the sector that it represents, then let the

people—NOT the Comelec—say so through the ballot.

102. Having been “exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason

of passion and hostility”22 against petitioner Ang Galing Pinoy, the

assailed October 31 Resolution issued by the Comelec must be annulled

in line with this Court’s constitutionally-expanded23 judicial power “to

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

20 Biraogo vs. Truth Commission, G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036. December 7, 2010. 21 Section 1, Article II of the Constitution. 22 Yu vs. Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011. 23 Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.



amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.”24

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed that this

Honorable Supreme Court:

1. GIVE DUE COURSE to this Petition and immediately ISSUE a Temporary

Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction

ENJOINING the respondent Commission on Elections from:

1.1. IMPLEMENTING the Resolution dated October 31, 2012;

1.2. CANCELLING the Certificate of Registration of the petitioner Ang

Galing Pinoy (AG) under the Party-list system of Representation.

2. FURTHER, it is ultimately prayed this Honorable Supreme Court GRANT

this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and RENDER JUDGMENT

to:

2.1. ANNUL the Resolution dated October 31, 2012 of the respondent

Commission on Elections;

2.2. ORDER the respondent Commission on Elections to REINSTATE

the petitioner Ang Galing Pinoy (AG) in the list of parties eligible

to participate in the Party-list system of Representation for the

2013 National Elections.

Other reliefs that this Honorable Court would deem just and equitable are

likewise prayed for.

24 Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.



Quezon City for the City of Manila, this 28th day of November 2012.

R. LAMBINO LAW FIRM Counsel for the petitioner

Unit 201B Times Square Bldg. 57 Examiner St. cor. Times St.

West Triangle, Quezon City 1104 Tel/Fax: (+632) 448-7551

Email: [email protected] By:

RAUL L. LAMBINO Roll No. 35291

IBP Lifetime No. 05601; 01-11-06 MCLE No. IV–0008442; 10-08-12

PTR No. 5037344; 02-15-12; Pangasinan

JOHN CARLO GIL M. SADIAN Roll No. 61635

IBP OR No. 893168; 03-13-12; Laguna MCLE pending; admitted 03-28-12

PTR No. 6673453; 04-23-12; Quezon City

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

I, BERNARDO R. CORELLA JR., of legal age, Filipino, and with postal address at Block 10, Lot 8, Piña St., Phase I, West Camella Springville, Molino 3, Bacoor, Cavite, after having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:

1. I have caused the preparation and execution of the foregoing Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction to be filed before the Honorable Supreme Court.



2. I have read the same and verify that all the allegations contained therein are true, correct, and of my own knowledge and/or based on official records;

3. I have not commenced any action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any division thereof, or any tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of my knowledge, no such other action is pending therein. If I should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any division thereof, or any tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, I shall report to this Honorable Court such fact within five (5) days from such notice.

BERNARDO R. CORELLA JR.

AG Secretary-General

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, affiant BERNARDO R. CORELLA JR. presenting his Social Security System ID No. 03-5143060-4, a competent evidence of his identity bearing his photograph and signature in accordance with A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal this 5th day of December 2012 at Quezon City, Philippines.

Doc. No. _____________ Page No. _____________ Book No. _____________ Series of 2012

SECRETARY-GENERAL’S CERTIFICATION

I, BERNARDO R. CORELLA JR., of legal age, Filipino, and with postal address at Block 10, Lot 8, Piña St., Phase I, West Camella Springville, Molino 3, Bacoor, Cavite, after having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:

1. I am the incumbent Secretary-General of Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), a duly-registered party-list organization accredited through SPP No. 06-050 (PL) in an Omnibus Resolution promulgated on January 16, 2007 by the Second Division of the Commission on Elections;



2. During a special meeting of the National Executive Council on November

21, 2012 at the Party’s headquarters at Unit C, Mario Paule Bldg., San Nicolas, Lubao, Pampanga, at which meeting a quorum was present, the following Resolution was unanimously adopted, and is now in full force and effect:

“WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED by the National Executive Council, that Ryan M. Caladiao and/or Bernardo R. Corella Jr. be authorized to cause the preparation and filing of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court to annul and set aside a Resolution promulgated on October 31, 2012 by the Commission on Elections cancelling the accreditation of Ang Galing Pinoy (AG) as a party-list organization; “BE IT RESOLVED, FURTHER, that Ryan M. Caladiao and/or Bernardo R. Corella Jr. be authorized to sign, execute, deliver, and swear under oath, for or in behalf of Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), any or all pleadings, documents, or instruments which may be required to carry out the authority granted above;”

3. The aforequoted Resolution is in full force and effect and has not been

amended, suspended, superseded, or revoked;

BERNARDO R. CORELLA JR. AG Secretary-General

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, affiant BERNARDO R. CORELLA JR. presenting his Social Security System ID No. 03-5143060-4, a competent evidence of his identity bearing his photograph and signature in accordance with A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal this 5th day of December 2012 at Quezon City, Philippines.




AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, JOSELITO A. SACAY, of legal age, Filipino, and with postal address at 4711 San Vicente Ferrer, Area D, Camarin, Caloocan City, after having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:

1. I am the Filing Clerk of R. Lambino Law Firm with office address at Unit 201B Times Square Bldg. 57 Examiner St. cor. Times St. West Triangle, Quezon City;

2. On December 6, 2012, in my aforementioned capacity, I had served copies of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the case entitled Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), represented by its Secretary-General Bernardo R. Corella Jr. vs. the Commission on Elections to the following recipients:

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Palacio del Gobernador Gen. Luna St. cor. Andres Soriano Jr. Ave. Intramuros, Manila THE SOLICITOR GENERAL Office of the Solicitor General No. 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City

JOSELITO A. SACAY Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, affiant JOSELITO A. SACAY presenting Passport No. XX0634309, a competent evidence of his identity bearing his photograph and signature in accordance with A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal this December 6, 2012 at Quezon City, Philippines.

Notary Public


Documents

Ang Galing Pinoy vs. Comelec (Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition)