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Andrew Lewman [email protected]

Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject

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The Tor Project, Inc.

501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and

development of technologies for online anonymity and privacy

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‣Anonymous Communications

‣ Tor Overview

‣ The Future

TopicsTopics

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What is Anonymity?

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‣Cryptography

Anonymity isn't:

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‣ Cryptography

‣Stenography

Anonymity isn't:

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‣ Cryptography

‣ Stenography

‣Wishful Thinking

Anonymity isn't:

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‣ “They can't prove it was me.”

‣ “Promise you won't tell.”

‣ “Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

Examples of Wishful Thinking

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‣“They can't prove it was me.”

‣ “Promise you won't tell.”

‣ “Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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Proof is a very strong word. Statistical analysisallows suspicion to become certainty.

‣“They can't prove it was me.”

‣ “Promise you won't tell.”

‣ “Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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‣ “They can't prove it was me.”

‣“Promise you won't tell.”

‣ “Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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Will other parties have the abilities andincentives to keep these promises?

‣ “They can't prove it was me.”

‣“Promise you won't tell.”

‣ “Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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‣ “They can't prove it was me.”

‣ “Promise you won't tell.”

‣“Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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Not what we're talking about.

‣ “They can't prove it was me.”

‣ “Promise you won't tell.”

‣“Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣ “The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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‣ “They can't prove it was me.”

‣ “Promise you won't tell.”

‣ “Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣“The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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Nope!

‣ “They can't prove it was me.”

‣ “Promise you won't tell.”

‣ “Well, I didn't sign it.”

‣“The Internet is already anonymous, right?”

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Anonymous CommunicationAnonymous Communication

People need to hide in a crowd of other people.

”Anonymity loves company.”

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Anonymous CommunicationAnonymous Communication

The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible.

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Anonymous CommunicationAnonymous Communication

Hide who is communicating with whom.

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Anonymous CommunicationAnonymous Communication

Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic.

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:

Anonymity

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Anonymity

Private Citizens“It's Privacy!”

Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:

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Anonymity

Private Citizens“It's Privacy!”

Governments“It's traffic-analysis

resistance!”

Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:

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Anonymity

Private Citizens“It's Privacy!”

Governments

“It's network security!”

Businesses

Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:

“It's traffic-analysis resistance!”

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Human Rights Activists

“It's reachability!”

Anonymity

Private Citizens“It's Privacy!”

Governments

“It's network security!”

Businesses

Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups:

“It's traffic-analysis resistance!”

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Tor is not the first system: ZKS, mixmaster, single-hop proxies, Crowds, Java Anon Proxy, VPNs.

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Low Latency Systems

Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks.

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High Latency Systems

High-latency systems are more resistant to end-to-end correlation attacks, but by definition, are less interactive.

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‣Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today's user:

Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users)

Low Latency Systems

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‣Online anonymity software and network

What is Tor?What is Tor?

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What is Tor?What is Tor?

Open source, freely available, 3-clause BSD licensed

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What is Tor?What is Tor?

Active research environment:Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel, Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, Boston Univ, Harvard, MIT, RPI, Georgia Tech

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Increasingly diverse toolset:Tor, Torbutton, Tor Browser Bundle, TA(I)LS LiveCD, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, Torora, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, Tor Wall, TorVM

What is Tor?What is Tor?

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Twitter In Iran: Good

From http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html

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Twitter In USA: Bad

From http://gothamist.com/2009/10/05/fbi_raids_queens_home_in_g20_protes.php

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Who Uses Tor?

‣ Law Enforcement

‣ Human Rights Activists

‣ Business Executives

‣ Abuse Victims

‣ Militaries

‣ Normal People

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Estimated 300k to 800k Estimated 300k to 800k daily users worldwidedaily users worldwide

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A Typical Internet ConnectionA Typical Internet Connection

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Alice Bob

Network

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Alice might be watched.

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Alice

Network

Bob

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Parts of the network could be monitored.

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Alice

Network

Bob

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Bob could be compromised.

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Alice

Network

Bob

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How is Tor Different?How is Tor Different?

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Alice

Relay

Bob

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A Basic Relay System

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Alice

Relay

Bob

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An Evil Relay

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Alice

Evil Relay

Bob

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An Evil Network

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Alice

Relay

Bob

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How Tor WorksHow Tor Works

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Alice

Middle Node

Exit NodeEntry Node

Bob

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Alice connects to an Entry Node.

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Alice

Middle Node Bob

Exit NodeEntry Node

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The data is routed through a Middle Node.

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Alice

Middle Node Bob

Exit NodeEntry Node

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The data is routed through an Exit Node.

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Alice

Middle Node Bob

Exit NodeEntry Node

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Alice's circuit to Bob is established.

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Alice

Middle Node Bob

Exit NodeEntry Node

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Vidalia Network Map

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Metrics‣ Measuring the Tor Network anonymously

‣ NSF grant for research

‣ Archive of hourly consensus, ExoneraTor, VisiTor

‣ Metrics portal: https://metrics.torproject.org

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Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...

Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my...

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Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...

Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my... ...some call this sharing.

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Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...

Did you know Microsoft Word and OpenOffice Writer are browsers?

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Operating Systems leak info like a sieve...

www.decloak.net

Discover how much you like to share!

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Mobile Operating Systems

‣ Entirely new set of challenges for something designed to know where you are at all times.

‣ Orbot: Tor on Android. https://guardianproject.info/apps/

‣ Tor on iphone, maemo/meego, symbian, etc

‣ Tor on Windows CE. For example:http://www.gsmk.de

‣ Guardian Project, https://guardianproject.info/

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Next steps:

Visit us at https://www.torproject.org/ for more information, links, and ideas.

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Credits and Thanks

‣ Presentation: Andrew Lewman, Executive Director for The Tor Project – [email protected]

‣ Danger!, http://flickr.com/photos/hmvh/58185411/sizes/o/ hmvh, CC-BY-SA.

‣ 500k, http://www.flickr.com/photos/lukaskracic/334850378/sizes/l/ Luka Skracic, used with permission.

‣ Illustration and Design: J.M.Todaro – http://jmtodaro.com