Analysis Report by High Level Safety Review

Committee

Mukesh Mehrotra, IRSSE, Chief Signal Engineer, NWR

Abstract

Indian Railways is one of the largest railway systemsin the world and is fully owned and operated by Min-istry of Railways, Government of India. It plays a sig-nificant role in driving economic growth of the coun-try, offering highly affordable, environment- friendlytransportation to passengers and freight, speciallybulk commodities, across the country. Indian Rail-ways, like any other transportation system, is tech-nology intensive not only for ensuring high produc-tivity of its assets but also safety in train operations.

Though the data of consequential train accidentsover the years has been showing declining trend de-spite phenomenal growth of traffic, safety on IR re-mains to be a matter of serious concern. Recentaccident such as derailment of Kalinga Utkal Ex-press near Khatauli in Muzaffarnagar district of Ut-tar Pradesh on 19 August 2017 resulting in death of23 passengers and injuries to 156 passengers raise analarm over the safety standards and practices adoptedon Indian Railways. This accident being the fourthmajor passenger train derailment in 2017 and thethird in Uttar Pradesh.

Taking note of the unsatisfactory safety record ofIR, it is necessary to revisit and analyse the mostimportant and latest report on safety, that is HighLevel Safety Review Committee Report commonlyknown as Kakodkar Report.

1 Committee members

The Committee Members are as under:

1. Dr.Anil Kakodkar, former Chairman, AtomicEnergy Commission and Secretary, Departmentof Atomic Energy(Chairman)

2. Shri E. Sreedharan, Managing Director, DelhiMetro Rail Corporation (Adviser).

3. Dr. N. Vedachalam, Vikram Sarabhai SpaceCentre (VSSC), Thiruvananthapuram, (Mem-ber)

4. Prof. Sanjay Dhande, Director, IIT, Kanpur,(Member)

5. Shri G.P. Srivastava, Director E & I Group,Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC),(Member)

6. Shri Amitabh, SAG/IRSME, Chief RollingStock Engineer, Northern Railway, (Secretary)

2 Earlier Committees

Ministry of Railways have earlier constituted theKhanna Committee 1998, the Sikri Committee 1978,Wanchoo Committee 1968 and Kunzru Commit-tee1962. The present Committee which comprises ofscientists and technocrats is more strongly mandatedto go into all technical and technology related aspectsin connection with safe running of train services in thecountry.

3 Statistics of ConsequentialTrain Accidents

Indian Railway is a vast system comprising of nearly64000 route kilometres with over 7000 block stationsand holding nearly 9000 locomotives, 43500 Passen-ger coaches,

The Committee analysed data of consequentialtrain accidents on IR to have an insight into the weakareas leading to accidents. The Committee is alsoseized of the fact that the data maintained in Rail-way Board office pertains to only those train acci-dents with apparent consequences and train accidentsof minor nature and near misses are not included inthe figures. Further, the Committee learnt that casu-alties due to trespassing of railway track, or for otherreasons connected with railway infrastructure and ca-sualties of IRs own staff while on duty, though quitesubstantial, are not included in the statistics of trainaccident related casualties.

Casualties of Railways own staff while on duty werecollected from Zonal Railways and the position ismarkedly high. About 1600 railway staff were killedand 8700 injured while working during the periodfrom 2007-08 to October, 2011 which is substantially

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Analysis Report by High Level Safety Review Committee

more than 1019 deaths and 2118 injuries in train ac-cidents for the period from 2007-08 to 2010-11. Itis to be noted that casualties in train accidents in-clude a large chunk of 723 deaths and 690 injuries dueto unmanned level crossing accidents attributed tothe negligence of road users. Departments that con-tributed maximum are engineering track with 1100deaths and 2070 injuries and Mechanical with 110deaths and 4900 injuries. Mechanisation of track andother maintenance is one solution to reduce humanpresence in high risk areas of railway working. Onthe whole, Casualties in train accidents and for otherreasons due to railway infrastructure remain a seriouscause of concern.

3.1 Consequential Train Accidents

Total Consequential train accidents have come downfrom 195 in 2006-07 to 141 in 2010-11 (Fig 1) andconsequential train accidents per million train Kilo-metre have also come down from 0.23 to 0.15 duringthis 5 year period (Fig 2).

Figure 1: Total consequential train accidents

3.2 Type Wise Accidents

Derailments constitute largest chunk of 50% of to-tal accidents followed by 36% accidents at unmannedlevel crossing gates, 5% collisions, 4% accidents atmanned level crossing gates, 2% fire accidents andbalance 3% accidents are due to misc. reasons (Fig 3).

Variation/decline in types of accident over this 5year period can be seen in Fig 4.

3.3 Causalities

Deaths have gone up from 208 to 381 and total casu-alties from 610 to 844 during the same period due to

Figure 2: Consequential train accidents per milliontrain km

Figure 3: Typewise accidents - distribution

Figure 4: Typewise accidents - trend

severity of accidents (Fig 5).

Proportion of deaths, injuries and total casualties(deaths + injuries) due to different types of accidents

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Figure 5: Casualities

is shown from Fig 6, Fig 7 and Fig 8.

Figure 6: Causalities Proportions

Figure 7: Deaths in Train Accidents

3.4 Responsibility of Train Accidents

Cause-wise analysis indicates that 42% of accidentstook place due to failure of railway staff, 43% due to

Figure 8: Deaths in Train Accidents

failure of other than railway staff, 7% due to sabo-tage, 3% each due to failure of equipment and inci-dental and balance 1% each due to combination offactors and non-establishment of cause(Fig 9).

Figure 9: Responsibility of Train Accidents

Thus a large chunk of 85% of accidents is on ac-count of human failure. The Committee noted thatthere are prescribed rules to run trains during ab-normal conditions with greater human interventionunder failure conditions of the assets such as signalfailure. The Committee also noted that train acci-dents due to sabotage have increased from 4.1% on2006-07 to 11.36% in 2010-11(Fig 10).

3.5 Collisions

Collisions which are 5% of the total tally but resultedinto 24% deaths and 26% injuries (25% total casual-ties). Numbers of collisions have varied from 13dur-ing 2008-09 to 5 in 2010-11 whereas deaths and totalcasualties during the same years have been 9 & 62during 2008-09 and 240 & 536 during 2010-11. This

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Figure 10: Responsibility% of train Accidents

scenario of more deaths/casualties with fewer colli-sions during 2010-11indicates the severity of collisions(Fig 11).

Figure 11: Analysis of collision

Analysis of collisions based on their time of occur-rence indicates that period of 22:00 to 06:00 hrs ismost vulnerable during which about 50% collisionsoccurred (Fig 12).

Further analysis indicates that out of a total of 43collisions occurred during this period 21 where on ac-count of driver passing signal at danger (SPAD), 10on account of driver passing automatic signal in onposition at higher speed and balance for other rea-sons.

3.6 Derailments

Derailments which are half of the consequential trainaccidents resulted in 4% deaths and 27% injuries(19% total casualties), have gradually come downover this period (Fig 13).

Figure 12: Collision Distribution

Figure 13: Analysis of Derailments

Analysis of derailments based on their time of oc-currence indicates that there is no correlation thoughthere is slightly higher possibility of derailments dur-ing 22:00 to 06:00 hrs (Fig 14).

Figure 14: Derailment Distribution

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Out of 441 derailments occurred during this pe-riod, maximum of 129 were contributed due to CivilEngineering defects, followed by 56 due to sabotage,54 due to combination of staff, 43 due to carriage &wagon defects, 36 due to failure of other than railwaystaff, 27 due to failure of operating staff, 24 due tofailure of equipment, 28 due to failure of Loco pilot,26 incidental and balance for other reasons.

3.7 Unmanned LC Accidents

Unmanned Level Crossing accidents which are 36%of the total tally resulted in 59% deaths and 32%injuries (42% total casualties). Their numbers havealso come down over this period (Fig 15).

Figure 15: Unmanned Level Crossing Gate

Analysis of Unmanned Level Crossing based ontheir time of occurrence indicates that day light pe-riod of 08:00 to 19:00 hrs is most vulnerable duringwhich about 86% accidents occurred (Fig 16).

Figure 16: Unmanned Level Crossing Distribution

3.8 Manned LC Accidents

Manned Level Crossing accidents which are 4% of thetotal tally resulted in 6% deaths and 6% injuries (6%total casualties). Their numbers have also come downduring this period (Fig 17).

Figure 17: Manned Level Crossing Distribution

Analysis of Manned Level Crossing based on theirtime of occurrence indicates no correlation betweenthem (Fig 18).

Figure 18: Manned Level Crossing Distribution

3.9 Fire Accidents

Fire accidents which are 2% of the total tally resultedin 2% deaths and 1%injuries (1% total casualties).Deaths and injuries have not reduced with reductionin fire accidents in 2008-09 (Fig 19).

Analysis of fire accidents based on their time ofoccurrence indicates that there is higher possibilityof fire between 14:00 to 06:00 hrs. during which 88%accidents occurred (Fig 20).Eight cases were due to

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Figure 19: Analysis of Fire Accidents

Failure of other than Railway Staff (FORS) out of 16cases of fire occurred during this period.

Figure 20: Fire Accidents Distribution

It is noted that many a time practices and incidentsimpinging on safety in train operation and also thecause of accidents are not fairly brought to the noticeof management as departmental loyalties often over-shadow the quest for getting into the ground realitiesfor improvement. As has been the practice in some ofthe developed countries, the Committee recommendsan IT system based on email / SMS should be putin place to report such matters which should be in-vestigated by the safety officers at Headquarter andDivisional levels followed with appropriate correctiveaction.

4 Recommendations of theCommittee

4.1 General Safety Matters

a) IT system based on email / SMS should be intro-duced to report safety related matters by railwayand non-railway persons. (Para 2.4.10).

b) Redundancies should be built in the system suchas track circuiting by two diverse means at vulner-able locations so that normal operations are leasthampered due to single point failure.(Para 2.5)

c) IT based system should be set up within 6 monthsto collect and collate all train accidents whetherconsequential or of little significance, near misses,safety related asset failures, etc. (Para 2.5)

d) Projects for augmentation of line capacity on busyroutes and maintenance facilities for coaches andwagons in open line and workshops should befunded and executed on top priority in missionmode. (Para 2.7)

e) No new trains should be introduced without ad-equate capacity for operation and maintenance.(Para 2.7)

4.2 Organizational Structure

a) Restructuring of IR should be examined and stud-ied by a Separate Expert Group. (Para 2.8.2)

b) Earlier system of only Operating and technical of-ficers being considered for general posts of GMsand DRMs should be restored. Only capable of-ficers should be selected as DRMs and posted indivisions with a minimum tenure of 3 years. (Para2.8.3

4.3 Empowerment at Working Level

Powers should be delegated to GMs and DRMs inregard to safety matters as under (Para 2.9.5):

a) Powers of General Managers to be enhanced to 3times for sanction of works under all Plan Headsexcept New Lines and M & P items. These shouldalso be applicable under out-of-turn basis, de-pending on the urgency. Powers of DRMs alsoto be accordingly enhanced to 3 times.

b) General Managers to be given full powers for re-appropriation of funds from one work to anotherunder the same Plan Head and source of fundsunder all the Plan Heads, except New Lines.

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c) General Managers to have full powers to re-appropriate funds under Revenue under the sameDemand from one PU to another within the over-all budget allotment.

d) DRMs to be fully empowered to decide the pro-cess/procedure such as Spot Purchase Committee,Single/Limited Tenders, etc.

e) DRMs to have full powers to accept tendersfloated by the division. To enter into repair orAnnual Maintenance Contracts (AMC) throughOEM or otherwise. To purchase stock items incase of shortages and non-stock items upto Rs. 3Lakhs per case but without any monthly ceiling.

f) DRMs to be empowered to award works of essen-tial nature related to operation and maintenanceassets on quotation basis for 3 months as a stopgap arrangement.

g) DRMs to have full powers for hiring of resourcesincluding utility vehicles.

h) DRMs to have full powers to sanction constructionof RUBs, limited height subways and ROB underRoad Safety works.

i) Powers those vested with DRMs of the Divisionto be enjoyed by the Chief Workshop Managers(CWM) in respect of their workshops.

j) Powers to sanction cash awards for good perfor-mance in safety related matters should be en-hanced to three times. (Para 2.9.6)

k) Enhanced delegation of powers to the divisionsshould be directly mandated by the RailwayBoard as a onetime measure. (Para 2.9.7)

4.4 Safety Related Works and Issues

Core Safety Groups should be formed under theconvenor-ship of the Additional General Man-ager/Safety (a new post carved in Zonal headquar-teras part of the new safety architecture) at head-quarter level and Sr. Divisional Safety Officer at di-visional level. Principal Heads of Departments at HQlevel and branch officers at divisional level of Civil,Mechanical, Electrical, Signalling, Operating and Fi-nance should be the members. (Para 2.10.1)

Group of Officers headed by AGMs and ADRMsat the Headquarter and divisional levels respectivelyshould convene meetings once every week to clear allthe pending Engineering and Signalling Plans. (Para2.10.2)

4.5 Shortage of Critical Safety Spares

Concerned directorates should issue a defined list ofsafety items to Zonal Railways for uniformity. (Para2.13.1)

RDSO should take full responsibility of all thosesafety items for which drawing, specification, vendorapproval, etc. are issued by RDSO. They should en-ter into long term rate contract with their approvedvendors for 3 to 5years after negotiating rates basedon the value of the item which can be best assessedby RDSO.(Para 2.13.3)

A simple but effective vendor qualification andapproval process should be followed for non-RDSOsafety items at Zonal railway level.(Para 2.13.7)

A thorough review of the quality system for mate-rial procurement process by an external professionalagency and revamping of the system should be doneas necessary. (Para 2.13.8)

Conventional method of technical inspectionshould be replaced with modern Quality ManagementSystem for which necessary check sheets should bedeveloped by the respective departments directly as-sociated with safety. These check sheets should bebased on present rules, regulations, manuals, instruc-tions, etc. and should form part of the safety manualof the Railway.(Para 2.14)

4.6 Signalling, Telecommunicationand Train Protection

State of the art signalling and protection system atleast equivalent to the functionalities of ETCS L-2should be deployed throughout IR, starting with thebusy routes (19000 Kms) immediately. A sub-groupof the Committee shall examine some of the criticalaspects during visit to some of the European railwaysystem and submit its report. (Para 3.5)

Diverse and redundant means of Satellite basedtrain position sensing (as used in ACD) should beincorporated and merged in ATP functions. (Para3.5)

A dedicated Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) shouldbe formed having full powers and the mandate toformulate and execute the sanctioned projects of ATPin a time bound manner (5 Years). (Para 3.6)

A high power standing technical review committeeshould be set up to guide the SPV on technical issues.This Committee should continue till the implementa-tion of the project of ATP and should have expertsfrom Railways as well as from outside. (Para 3.6)

Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) sys-tem should be used in Metros and dedicated corridorsections like Mumbai suburban, to meet the require-

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ments of head way less than 1.5 minutes after studyof design margins.(Para 3.6)

A “Task Force” should be set up to study the fea-sibility of communication backbone for IR, utilizingdiverse and redundant technology to ensure highestlevel of availability of the networks for safety and op-erational requirements. (Para3.6)

RDSO signalling directorate should be augmentedwith comprehensive research framework in order toinclude work on forecasting/newer signalling and tele-com technologies. (Para 3.6)

4.7 Level Crossings

All Level Crossings whether manned (with or withoutsignals) or unmanned should be eliminated in next 5years. This is gigantic task for which dedicated SPVsshould be formed in each of the Zonal railway fullyempowered and mandated to complete the project ina time frame of 5 years. (Para 5.6)

Level Crossings having little road traffic should beclosed. Merger of nearby LCs by constructing con-necting roads at railways cost even on non-railwayand should be taken up. (Para 5.6)

Construction of limited height sub-ways, Road un-der Bridge (RUB) and Road over Bridge (ROB)should be taken up in mission mode and traffic blocksshould be generously granted. (Para 5.6)

No LC should be newly introduced under any cir-cumstances on the existing system as well as duringgauge conversion, doubling and construction of newrailway lines. ( 5.6)

No LC gate should henceforth be manned or inter-locked. (Para 5.6)

The present policy of sharing the cost of RUBor ROB with the State Governments should be dis-pensed with and the full responsibility and entire costof construction should be taken over by the Railways.For this purpose, the present Railway policy needs tobe changed and section 19 of Railway Act needs tobe amended. Further, to augment the Road SafetyFund a large share of diesel cess should come to theRailways for which Government of India should beapproached. (Para 5.6)

To expedite the construction of limited height sub-ways, RUBs and ROBs the CRSs role should be takenaway and relevant plans and documents should be ap-proved and signed at the level of the concerned PHODinstead of sending them to the CRS for sanction un-less there is some change in the track/yard layout.(Para 5.6)

4.8 Human Resource Development

A large number of projects of importance to Railwaysshould be regularly awarded to some select engineer-ing academic institutions in which students can par-ticipate. Courses, minor stream and major special-izations in the area of railway engineering should beintroduced in the Indian engineering academic pro-grams. (Para 6.1)

All officers should be periodically imparted train-ing in safety engineering for building a safety culture.(Para 6.2)

One training institute at the divisional level shouldbe nominated and upgraded for training to staff onsafety environment in the Railways. This instituteshould have animation films; general equipment, toolsand gadgets used on Indian Railways, etc. (Para 6.2)

Departmental staff should be encouraged and ex-tended resources to upgrade their professional qualifi-cations and skills to be fit for promotion to the higherlevel. (Para 6.3)

All the newly recruited Assistant Loco Pilotsshould be Diploma holders instead of present Matric-ulate/ ITI holders. All the Maintenance Techniciansin all Technical Departments should at least be ITIholders and supervisors should be at-least Diplomaholders, preferably, Engineering Graduates. (Para6.3)

Cadre of electric and diesel running staff should beseparated in the present operating environment hav-ing large number of loco variants of both types.(Para6.4)

Such running staff who fails in any of the manda-tory refresher course should be given only one extrachance to repeat the course and test should be takenat the concerned Branch Officer Level. In case therunning staff fails again, he should be debarred fromrunning duty and posted on other non-safety relatedassignments or given voluntary retirement followingthe prescribed rules and process. (Para 6.5)

Some portable cheaper version of loco simulatorsshould be procured and located in drivers runningrooms where running staff can brush up their drivingskills at their convenience. (Para 6.7)

Customized signalling Panels should be introducedat the earliest in Zonal Railway Training Insti-tutes (ZRTIs) for the training of station operatingstaff.(Para 6.8)

Separate hand-books should be prepared for theoperating staff, such as loco pilots, station masters,etc. which should contain all the necessary instruc-tions to be followed by them while performing theirduty. (Para 6.9).

Each Division should have Grievance Redressal

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Machinery which should deal with staff grievances intime-bound manner. (Para 6.10)

Special allowance equivalent to 25% of the salaryand grade pay should be given to the staff who workas regular Gatemen as a special incentive during theintervening period till LC gates are closed.(Para 6.11)

4.9 Training Institutes on IR

All sanctioned capacity enhancement works of CTIs,ZRTIs and STSs should be fully funded and executedwithin next two years. (Para 6.2)

Posting as a trainer in Centralised Training Institu-tions (CTIs) should be based on the recommendationof a committee of which the Head of the instituteconcerned must be a member. Tenure of deservingofficers may be extended on the recommendation ofthe Head of the CTI even if it involves transfer of el-ements of posts if such a trainer is due promotion sothat he/ she can be promoted in the training instituteitself. (Para 6.2)

Heads of CTIs should be given full powers to in-vite academicians, industry leaders, technocrats, etc.as visiting faculty within the allocated budget grant.In case of Railway Staff College, where Managementtraining is imparted to officers of all railway disci-plines, arrangements should be made to have one ortwo professional academicians on loan from manage-ment institutes of repute for a few years fixed tenure.(Para 6.2)

Funds for CTIs, Zonal Railway Training Institutes(ZRTIs) and Supervisors Training Schools (STSs)should be allocated separately both under Works aswell as Revenue. Incurrence of expenditure underthese fund-allocations should be fully under the con-trol of Heads of the institute. Considering the impor-tance and size of CTIs, they should have their ownmaintenance infrastructure. (Para 6.2)

Terms of Principals of ZRTIs and STSs should befixed for at least 3years.(Para 6.2)

Teaching allowance of trainers of ZRTIs and STSsshould be increased from 15% to 30% to bring it atpar with trainers in CTIs. (Para 6.2)

5 Analysis of the Report

The Committee has given several recommendationsin the report. Some of the recommendations have fi-nancial implications while many of the recommenda-tions do not require funds for their implementation.

The recommendations which do not require fundsmay be implemented.

The requirement of funds to implement such fundsspecific recommendations indicating funds required

against individual items is shown in the table ofFig 22.

With present tight financial condition of IR it is notpossible to implement recommendations with fundsavailable. Methodology proposed for raising of fundsfor this purpose is shown in the table of Fig 21.

Figure 21: Modes of Funding

A non-fungible non-lapsable safety fund generatedwith safety cess shall be required. It is possible to findthe required resources for the critically needed safetyexpenditure through an innovative non-fungible andnon-lapsable Dedicated Safety Fund for which the an-nual inflow comes from the captive passenger traffic.

However, increase of fare is a political decision,which may not be agreed seeing forthcoming elec-tions.

Deferment of dividend to the tune of Rs. 5,000Crores per year is proposed. This is justified as so-cial service obligation being borne by Indian Railwaysis about Rs. 15,000 crores every year due to low ordi-nary class fare, sub-urban and non-sub-urban seasonfare, a variety of concessions granted on passengertickets, transportation of certain commodities belowcost and working of un-economic branch lines.

With Railway raising about Rs. 5,000 Crores perannum through safety cess, a matching grant fromCentral Government for safety related works is fullyjustified and demanded.

Three most important recommendations are-

1. Advanced Signalling system to prevent collisionwith increased line capacity.

2. Elimination of all level crossings (manned andunmanned) by grade separation (RUB/LimitedHigh Subway/ROB.)

3. Switching over to production of all new coachesto LHB design.

Other recommendations may be implemented inthe order as given in Table in Fig 22 depending onavailability of funds.

Indian Railways severely suffers from implementa-tion bug. This has caused non-implementation of

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Figure 22: Requirement of Funds

some of the important accepted recommendationsgiven by the past Safety Review Committees.

It is unfortunate if recommendations of this Com-mittee as accepted by the Ministry of Railways alsomeet with the same fate.

The Committee recommends an empowered groupof officers (including an officer from finance) in Rail-

way Board to pilot the implementation of safetyenhancement recommendations and projects as ac-cepted by the Ministry of Railways in a time boundmanner with full funding. Other projects shall be ap-propriately pended or slowed down for the time beingto accommodate funding of these key projects.

The Committee also recommends that newly con-

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stituted Railway Safety Authority under the Govt. ofIndia. Instead of this the existing Safety organisationof railways may be strengthened.

In the present set-up, Central Board for RailwayResearch (CBRR) contains 13 non-Railway membersfrom different academia and industries and 11 Rail-way Members. This body is chaired by DG/RDSOand focuses on issues that are relevant, urgent andare on priority of IR. RRDC if created would be du-plicating this work.

DG/RDSO should be made Adviser to MOR onR&D matters. Thus, strengthening/reorganisingCBRR by taking members from proposed RRCs andgiving status of Advisor to MOR to DG/RDSO wouldmeet the objective more effectively. Hence establish-ing RRDC does not appear to be helpful in this re-gard.

It has been recommended by the Safety Commit-tee that RDSO should take “ful” responsibility of allthose safety items, for which drawing, specification,vendor approval etc. are issued by RDSO. The state-ment gives an impression that in case of any failureof such an item, in the field, RDSO shall be held re-sponsible. RDSO should be responsible only in caseswhere there is a deficiency in the drawing or specifi-cation or the vendor approval carried out by it. Inall fairness, RDSO should not be held responsible foritems failing due to other reasons like failure due topoor maintenance or isolated manufacturing defects.

It has been further recommended by the SafetyCommittee that RDSO should enter into a long-termRate Contract with their approved vendors after ne-gotiating the rate based on the value of the item asassessed by RDSO. At present, there are 385 safetyitems, for which vendor approval is done by RDSO.Finalizing rate contract tenders for all these items willfritter away RDSOs energy and resources in storesprocurement, which is not connected with the ba-sic function of R&D, for which RDSO has been cre-ated. Moreover, RDSO currently does not have theresources for entering into Rate Contracts for pur-chasing such a large number of items or carrying outdetailed costing of items and hence, is ill-equippedfor handling this work. Also, if RDSO were thesole authority to draw specifications, approve ven-dors, inspect materials and also finalise rate con-tracts/procurement, it would give rise to more com-plaints from the point of view of inherent conflict ofinterest.

The recommendation seems to have stemmed fromthe fact that Zonal Railways & PUs are unable toarrange adequate supply of RDSO approved safetyitems at reasonable rates which is due to the per-ceived problem that Production Units/Zonal Rail-

ways are not able to many a times discipline theRDSO-approved vendors. Tender committees of thefield units always have the option of passing over theoffer of those vendors, who exhibit indiscipline in sup-ply or rates or make substandard supplies, which theycan always report to RDSO. Moreover, if they sendsubstantiated complaints to RDSO, penal action canbe initiated by RDSO against the erring vendors.

However, if it is felt that only a Central Organi-zation should procure such safety items, a separateCentral Purchase Organization may be created, towhich RDSO should provide the necessary technicalsupport. RDSO is not capable of handling procure-ment.

Recommendation regarding augmentation of signaldirectorate of RDSO is welcome. The present set-upof Signalling and Telecom Directorates has limited re-sources and mainly deals with development of spec-ifications for current and foreseeable future railwayrequirements, development of vendors either throughindigenous development or through cross approvaletc. Most of the advances signalling systems arenow software based and software as well as hardwareneeds to be evaluated for meeting the SIL-4 (SafetyIntegrity Level-4) requirements. Also signalling sys-tems are now more and more communication based.Presently very little knowledge is available on designof software embedded system in RDSO. It is, there-fore, necessary to have expertise in the following ar-eas:

1. Development of software for safety systems.

2. Development of software embedded hardware forsignalling systems.

3. Train control systems involving communication.

For this, a separate cell for each of the above ar-eas may be created. Initially few consultants whohave expertise in above areas are hired for a periodof at least three years who will be fully associatedwith the team at RDSO and start development ofwork in the areas suggested by safety committee. Itis expected that in three years, sufficient expertisewill be developed in-house for taking up these tasksindependently. Subsequently, it is also proposed todevelop advance signalling laboratory with hardwareand software simulators which will help in develop-ing and evaluating designs of modern and advancesignalling systems. The core purpose and objectiveof RDSO is to conduct high-end research to meet outthe technical requirements in various railway specificareas. Therefore, high end facilities of ARRI canbe located at RDSO itself. Creating a separate Ad-vanced Railway Research Institute would only be a

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duplicating effort as of setting up a parallel institutewith the same objective. The logical need is to ra-tionally address the constraint and challenges whichtoday RDSO is facing in meeting out its core objec-tive of advanced research. Instead of a parallel in-stitute for the same task it would be appropriate ifthe relevant issues pertaining to autonomy, logistics,personnel selection/recruitment and enhanced pow-ers are tackled at apex level.

The recommendation of Railway Research Centresis acceptable, as it would be a good collaborationbetween academia and railways. It would also helpin upgrading expertise of institutions in Railways re-lated area also as the institutes would be able to planand develop their facilities for Railway Research withlong term objective. In turn IR will get benefit oftheir expertise in carrying out research & develop-ment activities in relevant fields. At present, CRR(Centre for Railway Research) at IIT, Kharagpur isfunctional but it is multidisciplinary, not meant todeal with specific area of discipline only, as recom-mended by the Committee.

6 Conclusion

• With Implementation recommended by thesafety of train operation is likely to be improvedto a next level.

• However there is a need to generate funds. Basedon the availability of funds recommendationsmay be implemented priority wise.

• There must be political and bureaucratic will forimplementation in time bound manner.

• Instead of creating newly constituted RailwaySafety Authority, the existing Safety organiza-tion of railways may be strengthened.

• Instead of opening new research unit, RDSOmaybe strengthened.

7 References/Bibliography

1. Report of High Level Safety review committee(Feb 2012).

2. www.railway-technology.com

3. www.indianrailways.gov.in

4. Indian Railway vision 2020

5. Year book 2010-11.

6. Corporate Safety Plan

The information / views expressed in this pa-per is of the authors and are based on theirexperience. Comments / observations may besent to the author at mukesh mehrotra@yahoo.com

Mukesh Mehrotra,Chief Signal Engineer atNWR, has graduated fromMNIT/Jaipur in ECE. Heserved in R&D Division ofHCL Limited and ITI beforejoining Indian Railways asIRSSE 1988 Batch Officer.He is having 28 years ofexperience in Signalling. Heexecuted several projects inNR, NCR, NFR, NER involving modern technology.He also served as Executive Director in SignallingDirectorate of RDSO being in charge of all modernS&T projects including development of TCAS,EI, Axle Counter, LED Signals, etc,. He was inRajasthan State Merit in Secondary and HigherSecondary school examination. He is also recipientof NTSE scholarship, IRISET Academic Award andGM Awards.Mukesh Mehrotra, IRSSE, CSE/NWR

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