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Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 10-15 April 2014 in Salamanca, Spain

Analysing ethnic interest representation in Latin America - A comparative framework and

methodological challenges

Marie-Sophie Heinelt, M.A.

Research Assistant

Chair of Comparative Politics

FernUniversität in Hagen

58084 Hagen

Marie-Sophie.Heinelt@fernuni-hagen.de

WORK IN PROGRESS: This is a draft! Please, do not cite.

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1. Introduction

With (re-)democratization spanning over Latin America since the 1980ies, ethnic minority groups

began to politically mobilize to an increasing extent by seizing new spaces and opportunity contexts

to voice their interests. By the beginning of the 2000s, the risen politization of ethnic interests was

even qualified by some authors as having reached a stage of a more encompassing, so-called

ethnization of politics (Ströbele-Gregor 2004: 171ff., Madrid 2012). These assessments were

primarily based on references to countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador where governments had

come to power considerably based on support by organizations that primarily promoted demands

of ethnic groups. Emanating from a more moderate perspective, however, a marked tendency of

ethnogenesis may in fact be confirmed for the region (Hill 1996), thus, presenting the puzzle of

mechanisms of ethnic interest representation as a very relevant one for the sub-continent. The

catalogue of political demands that are promoted by ethnic groups to a great extent centers on

requests requiring the preservation of cultural identity, but there is also a set of more material

demands that are primarily driven by their solidly marginalised social status in Latin American

societies. Generally, the region belongs to the most unequal societies in the world regarding socio-

economic indicators of its population. Ethnic minorities like Indigenous and Afro-descendant

peoples commonly constitute its poorest segments (Hall/Patrinos 2006, Thorp et al. 2008). In this

context, decision-making processes on land-use and on natural resource governance currently

constitute one of the most salient issues that make ethnic minority groups become involved in

politics. This field of policy-making does not only touch upon material foundations of subsistence of

ethnic groups, but also on cultural identity claims as communal land is often neatly tied to cultural

foundations of ancestry and tribal traditions (Humphrey-Bebbington 2012).

Actually, democratization has also brought about a set of institutional innovations that present

special opportunities for an improved political integration of ethnic minority groups and may

strengthen the representation of ethnic interests in policy-making, for instance by assuring ethnic

quotas in legislative chambers, by prescribing consultation mechanisms with ethnic communities

and by providing for self-government of sub-national ethnic entities. The extent of these so-called

'multicultural' innovations that have institutionalized special participatory rights for Indigenous and

Afro-descendant peoples varies from country to country. Some states have prominently introduced

new legal devices for minority groups, such as Bolivia and Peru, whereas other states

constitutionally have very little to offer in this realm, such as Chile or Argentina. However, curiously,

these countries belong to the most consolidated ones regarding evaluations of democratic quality

(Freedom House 2012). Scholarship on legal multiculturalism in Latin America has expanded in the

last two decades (Arocena 2008, Sieder 2009, González et al. 2010, Tomaselli 2012). Yet studies

have commonly focussed on one type of legal devices of institutional multiculturalism and remain

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primarily based on case study research. There seems to be a lack of systematic comparative inquiry

on if and how the new institutional access opportunities may be applied as effective tools for

making ethnic minorities' voices heard in the political process. I am going to propose an analytical

framework for making a systematic assessment of conditions for successfull ethnic interest

representation in the present institutional context in Latin America feasbile. The first part of the

paper is devoted to present this framework that integrates the degree of formal macro-institutional

opportunities, group level variables, such as organizational forms, and that also attempts to control

for power relations that may impede group rights becoming effective access-points. In this manner,

the theoretical contribution of the paper may be seen in applying a set of quite classical approaches

of interest group scholarship to a new setting, namely, a region that is yet in the process of

consolidating democratic institutions and procedures. The main challenge of an adequate

conceptual adaptation to this setting lies in doing justice to informal power politics that shape

interest representation in the region, such as clientelism and co-optation of interest groups by elite

actors. The second part of the paper seeks to address methodological challenges and issues of

designing meaningful research when attempting to assess (informal) power relations in a complex

regional setting: Strategies for reasonable case selection are discussed and an outlook is offered on

how to best operationalise relevant patterns of actor interactions that shall be studied by social

network analysis.

2. Analytical framework

2.1 Successful ethnic interest representation: Affecting policy outputs in decision-making on land-use

Decision-making processes on land-use and natural resource governance are characterised by high

salience and they are particularly conflict-ridden (McNeish 2012). This type of decision-making

commonly is about redistributive policies that result in an unequal distribution of costs and benefits

(Lowi 1972). Ethnic groups in Latin America above all are often affected by the structural (and

cultural) costs of extractive and infrastructure projects on former communal land (Schilling-Vacaflor

2012, Bebbington 2012). In this field of policy-making, on part of all, as well as ethnic communal

actors and public or antagonistic societal actors, high grievances and strong preferences are at play.

The result is a rather confrontative and conflictive relation between bargaining partners. Although it

may be assumed that incentives for confrontational and extra-institutional mobilization on part of

ethnic actors and for neglect on part of public actors predominate, negotiations and search for

consent are, however, preferable for public actors for gaining public legitimacy and for assuring

societal stability. Therefore it may indeed be assumed that the opinions of ethnic minority groups

are taken into account for decision-making. Also, from the perspective of ethnic actors, willingness

to establish consent and cooperation as well as compliance with accords can be expected. Ethnic

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groups do not negate development per se, instead, they in fact strongly engage in voicing their

demands and preferences by institutional means for being heard when decisions are taken

(McNeish 2012: 39). Successful ethnic interest representation via institutional bargaining processes

is therefore feasible, inspite of a policy context that is prone to conflict. Influence by ethnic groups

shall be understood as exerting a certain control on policy outputs when decision-making affects

them, such as agreements on compensation for infrastructure venues or ressource projects on

communal land, or the suspension of a project. Hence, our dependent variable shall primarily be

assessed regarding the empirical quality of policy outputs: Does the output mirror the preferences

of ethnic groups? The degree of contribution of ethnic groups' preferences on decision-making

outputs shall be the central measure of "success". In doing so, one cannot assume that ethnic

preferences will be mirrored to a great extent in the output. Here, the strength of preferences of

other involved actors matter, too. Nevertheless, a minimum of discursive participation in the

decision-making process should be reached. The decision to reduce the focus of our dependent

variable on formal outputs is mainly based on rather pragmatic reasons regarding measurability and

control for intervening factors that may impact the policy-process. Therefore, although policy

outcomes may have more significant societal relevance, they will not be explitly integrated when

assessing our dependent variable, because the implementation stage involves further actor-

centered and structural factors that would exceed the analytical framework.

2.2 Access and influence via new participatory rights? The institutional context

The extent of institutional access opportunities for ethnic groups shall constitute our first

independent variable. I argue that (new) multicultural rights may offer special devices for ethnic

minority groups to approach actors that are authorized for decision-making.1 In Latin America there

are three types of participatory rights that may offer special access opportunities for ethnic

minority groups: territorial autonomies, prior consultations and ethnic quotas. In the region, we

find different forms of autonomy regulations for ethnic territories, from quasi-federal arrangements

to a mere devolution of administrative competencies, f.i. in form of land rights (Chile, Brazil, and

Peru). The most encompassing self-government entities for ethnic groups are currently found in

Panama and Nicaragua, and there are some notable autonomous regimes for indigenous peoples in

process of implementation on the communal and municipal level in Bolivia. However, Norris would

call the present autonomy arrangements "hybrid unions" (2008: 184). Formally, autonomous

territories may be equipped with a substantial share of legislative and executive powers in central

policy areas (f.i. education, transport, and health), although de facto there are various formal and

1 The (normative) necessity of minority rights has been advocated by Kymlicka 1996, Lijphart 1977, Goodin 1996, Norris 2008 and Lapidoth 1997.

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informal structures that restrict their independency from the central state, such as financial

dependency on national budget plans (Hooker 2009: 32). Also, the managemant of natural

ressources very often remains in the realm of competencies of the central state. In Bolivia and

Nicaragua decision-making on natural resource management is formally granted to the

autonomous, sub-national levels. Non-renewable ressources, however, fall into the sphere of

national interest with the consequence that the central government results to be the deciding

actor. Certainly, representatives of the autonomous entities have to be consulted before decisions

are taken (vgl. República de Bolivia 2009, Art. 30, 14). This arrangement, however, implies just a

very weak form of veto right of sub-national autonomous units in non-renewable resource politics,

because consultation mechanisms remain non-binding (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013). But, nevertheless,

representatives of the autonomous territories may seize this institutional opportunity to influence

policy-makers of the central level.

Prior consultations with ethnic communities are legally prescribed in many Latin American

countries, thereby covering various fields of policies. Their degree of institutionalization, however,

varies considerably from country to country (Schilling-Vacaflor & Flemmer 2013). Many countries'

constitutions very broadly foresee consultations of ethnic groups when legislative and

administrative measures affect them. Often there is a lack of specifying procedures of how to reach

accords and agreements. So far, it has just been Peru that established a detailled legal framework

that regulates consultations with ethnic groups (Ibid.). Although less institutionalized, consultations

are also regularly in practice in other countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil). The

legal guarantee to be consulted does not present any form of veto-right for ethnic groups, because

agreements and accords are commonly non-binding (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013). Nevertheless, they

provide another institutional access opportunity for ethnic groups to influence policy-making.

Finally, we can find fixed minimum quotas for representatives of Afro-descendant and Indigenous

groups in some countries' parliaments. Although guarantees for the legislative representation of

minorities are globally quite prominent as a device of electoral engineering, we see that they play a

minor role in the Latin American region (we just find them in Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela).

Also, the mere presence of ethnic delegates in parliament is commonly rated as a rather marginal

tool for promoting substantial political participation of societal groups (Reynolds 2002: 301,

Williams 1998). I therefore concentrate on access opportunities for ethnic interest representation

offered by territorial autonomy arrangements as well as the legal necessity for consultations.

Both types of collective rights codify certain means for ethnic groups to be heard by central

decision-making authorities in the area of land-use and natural resource governance. The setting of

institutional bodies, where ethnic interest groups may present their demands and articulate

opinions, varies. They may be constituted by forms of policy-specific commitees or special

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commissions that are part of public institutions. These arenas of interest representation represent

opportunities for affecting the policy stage of agenda setting, thus, they offer channels for

influencing the positions of public actors that are authorized to take decisions (Stokman/Van den

Bos 1992: 222, 234). Based on the observation that ethnic groups' preferences may indeed be taken

into account by public actors (McNeish 2012), it can be assumed that their mode of interaction with

public actors can be categorized by terms of bargaining processes. In this context, the main proper

resource of ethnic interest groups is lending legitimacy to public actors; therefore groups will rely

heavily on their organizational capabilities for collective mobilization (Atkinson/Coleman 1989).

The empirical variance of institutional access opportunities for ethnic groups in Latin America may

be expressed by the following continuum: (1) Autonomy rights offer the most encompassing

opportunities for bargaining policies with public actors. In this case, ethnic interest representation

can rely on a proper administrative unit, therefore its institutionalization should be more nuanced

than in the case of prior consultations where ethnic groups may be left without any proper

collective organizational entity. (2) Prior consultations offer a moderate opportunity setting for

ethnic groups. They provide a temporally opportunity window opened up for a specified piece of

policy-making. They constitute less institutionalized and routinized access points than the

representation of autonomous interests does. Finally, there is a sample of countries that (3) do not

offer any particular participatory rights for minorities (f.i. Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and

Honduras). One such control case should be included when evaluating access opportunities for

ethnic interest representation in the region, too. In those cases we may find other 'regular' or ad

hoc devices that may temporally open up opportunity spaces for ethnic groups for influencing

policy-making. Summing-up, as a first research guiding assumption there may be stated: The more

ample the extent of institutionalized access opportunities is, the higher are the chances of ethnic

interest groups to influence decision-making outputs (H1).

2.3 Organizational forms and capabilities for mobilization

As ethnic minorities belong to the poorest segments of Latin American societies, it can be assumed

that they are commonly weakly equipped with classic resources, such as economic power or

expertise, seen as necessary for seeking influence on decision-makers. Their unique resource will be

collective mobilization. Societal mobilization is not just a very effective and commonly practised

tool of interest representation in the Latin American region (Oxhorn 2008, Lauth/Merkel 1997), but

its effectiveness for pressuring public actors that are reliant on public legitimacy has also been

confirmed by classical perspectives (Atkinson/Coleman 1989). In stressing capabilities for and

strategies of mobilization I may seem to strongly link ethnic interest representation in Latin America

to concepts of Social Movements Theory (della Porta/Diani 2006). Nevertheless, the focus is not on

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contentious politics per se, as I concentrate on ethnic interest representation via channels

supported by institutional access points.

When stepping down to a micro-level, the inquiry involves individual actors as members of ethnic

groups. In the course of decision-making on land-use and resource management, the interests of

individual ethnic actors primarily meet on a common set of issues: the protection and promotion of

socio-economic foundations for living, and claims of cultural integrity. The collective good that is

aimed to be achieved by mobilization on an ideally broad scale, is to generate a preferably high

pressure on public actors for influencing their preferences in the decision-making process. However,

following rational-choice premises and collective action theory, there are certain patterns of

incentives that are supposed to increase or constrain an involvement of individuals in collective

action (Olson 1969). According to the political opportunity approach, the extension of institutional

access points, for instance in terms of minority rights, may be stimulating for collective mobilization

as it increases the perceived collective chances for group success meaningfully (Opp 2009: 19,

Tarrow 1998: 77, Meyer/Minkoff 2004: 1457 f., Brocket 1991: 254, Eisinger 1973, McAdam 1999). In

addition to the significance of this kind of macro-institutional context, also termed as

'opportunities', capabilities for collective mobilization are primarily shaped by features of the forms

of ethnic organisations themselves (Tarrow 1998). Empirically, we find varying organizational forms

of ethnic interest groups that have evolved for manifesting and aggregating their individual

members’ interests for influencing the political process, such as communal assemblies, social

movements, and also ethnic parties. Consequently, distinct ethnic organizations dispose of different

selective incentives for enforcing collective mobilization and assuring compliance of their members,

thus, as well for restricting free-ridership (McAdam et al. 1996: 3f., Opp 2009: 51, Olson 1969: 2f.).

Scholarship on collective action has discussed a broad catalogue of incentives that may favor a

coherent and sustained collective mobilization. For this paper, just a brief synthesis shall be

provided. The following characteristics of organizational forms are assumed to be particularly

relevant for explaining varying capabilities for collective mobilization on part of ethnic interest

groups in Latin America. Empirically, ethnic interest organizations shall be examined regarding the

degree of exhibiting these criteria: group size/social control (Olson 1992: 3), perceived group impact

(Opp 2009: 78, Chong 1991: 31), longevity (McCarty/Zald 1977: 1233, Marwell/Oliver 1993: 1),

strength of collective identity (Friedman/McAdam 1992: 157), abilities for campaigning (Ledyard

1995, Sally 1995) and features of leadership (Popkin 1979: 122, Chong 1991: 88).

Based on the observation that collective mobilization will be the central resource for ethnic groups

for influencing policy-makers, two further hypotheses may be formulated for guiding the inquiry:

H2.1: Broader institutional access opportunities increase collective mobilization and, thus, make an

influence on decision-making outputs more probable. H2.2: The more positive selective incentives

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an organizational form offers, the higher will be collective mobilization, and prospects of influencing

policy outputs will increase. The organizational features of the Kuna Yala indigenous council in

Panama may serve for an illustration of the argument: This long-living organization has traditionally

been built upon the autonomous status of its constituency. Its hierarchic internal structure lends

strong incentives for making individual group members comply with collective, communal interests

and sustains a coherent mobilization; thus, it has traditionally been a strong bargaining partner that

has challenged the central state in various occasions (Howe 1998, Kössler 2013).

2.4 The structural context: Tracing power relations in policy networks

In addition to formal access opportunities (see chapter 2.2) a second macro-structural factor shall

be integrated into the analytical framework: Although group rights may facilitate interaction with

decision-makers, power relations that shape the setting of interest representation may effectively

constrain an influence of ethnic groups on policy outputs. There is a catalogue of 'labels' in the

literature for qualifying the setting of interest representation towards political decision-makers,

such as „political environment“ (Eisinger 1973: 11), „context within which politics take place” (Rucht

1996) or “structure of political opportunities” in a very broad sense (Opp 2009: 161). There have

also been attempts to systematically capture this context and to make comparisons of systems of

interest representation feasible (Abromeit/Stoiber 2006: 198 ff., Reutter 2005, von

Alemann/Weßels 1997). I decided to choose a network perspective to integrate power relations as

an explaining factor for assessing prospects of successful ethnic interest representation, besides

formal access opportunities (Stokman/van den Bos 1992). The concept of policy networks aims at

mapping interdependent relations between societal and public actors in a systematic manner.

Network theory emanates from the assumption of interdependency of societal and public actors in

decision-making processes. Based on the premises that interactions between rational actors may be

traced by forms of resource exchange processes of legitimacy, information and expertise

(Rhodes/Marsh 1992, 182), causal assumptions on patterns of interest representation may be

deduced.

Parts of network theory have concentrated on the creation of rather descriptive typologies to

categorize political networks (f.i. van Waarden 1992). Table 1 in the appendix attempts to offer an

overview on various network classifications, ranging from rather exclusive types (I. to IV.) to more

diffuse and loose formations (V. & VI) (Schubert/Jordan 1992, van Waarden 1992, Peters 1992,

Marsh 1998, Atkinson/Coleman 1989, March/Rhodes 1992, 1998). A synthesis of these typologies

aims at tackling meaningful dimensions that may be seen as network properties with causal

substance for explaing (non-)successful ethnic interest representation. A first dimension shall be the

degree of accessibilty of a network. This network feature offers insights on if and to what degree

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ethnic representatives will be able to interact with actors with decision-making power at all (see

also Stokman/Van den Bos 1992: 222). Access can be expected to be restricted in compact,

exclusive networks, such as I. state corporatism, II. parantela relationships, III. clientelism and IV.

policy communities.

Another dimension centers on actors that have great positional powers. These dominant actors may

not automatically be the same ones that have the greatest formal decision-making power, but they

may be the ones that are presumably the most influential ones when the policy-positions of

decision-makers are aimed to be shaped in the stage of agenda setting (Ibid.: 232, 234). If the state

(e.g. I. state corporatism, IV. policy communities) or a certain societal actor (II. parentela relations,

III. clientelism) in the network is able to aggregate this type of positional power, it can be assumed

that access to networks is also controlled by this actor, too, either by integrating (and possibly co-

opting) or excluding contending interest groups (Daugbjerg/Marsh 1998: 65). Howard Wiarda

(1997) is one of a few authors who have examined systems of interest representation in Latin

America from a structuralist perspective. For many of the region's countries, he has observed a

dominant position of the state in policy networks and traced different mechanisms of top-down-

governance of interest representation based on state-corporatist structures (Ibid.: 81). Besides the

state, presumably, there will also be societal actors that temporarily succeed in shaping network

structures significantly. Their relative positional power shall be compared for decision-making on

land-use. Currently, in some countries of the region, where ethnicity is significantly politizised, high

support for ethnic groups on part of public actors may be assumed, and ties may resemble

clientelistic patterns (f.i. in Bolivia, Venezuela) (Daugbjerg/Marsh 1998: 63, Wiarda 1997).

Finally, I go along with Atkinson and Coleman (1989) that have focused on the level of

organizational strength of interest groups in its own terms, here aggregated by our third dimension:

Their focus on "societal mobilization" (Atkinson/Coleman 1989: 53) as a central bargaining resource

of societal groups towards public actors brings us back to the organizational forms of ethnic interest

groups and their mobilization capabilities (see our second independent variable). Besides this

group-inherent factor, ties of co-operation with other societal actors in the network will further

increase the bargaining power of ethnic groups.

The integration of power relations in network terms as another explanatory factor brings about two

additional research guiding expectations:

H 3.1: The more accesible networks are, the higher are the prospects of ethnic groups to influence

policy outputs. H 3.2: If there are dominant actors in networks, being linked to them is crucial for

influencing policy-outputs.

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2.5 Synthesis

The analytical framework aims at controlling for feasible intervening variables that may explain

successful ethnic interest representation in Latin America. Its explanatory strength shall be tested

for cases of decision-making on land-use and resource governance involving minority groups in the

region. I assume that the identified actor-specific and structural factors work in conjunction with

each other. The combinatory causal logic of the explanatory model needs to be stressed

(Bennet/Elman 2007: 172), although power relations in networks are assumed to constitute a

central causal angle. The following causal chain may sketch this argument out illustratively:

Daugbjerg and Marsh assume that networks reflect power structures which commonly express

unequal patterns of relationships (Daugbjerg/Marsh 1998: 57, Marsh 1998: 189). Changes in the

institutional setting, such as the introduction of minority rights, may provide some kind of

exogenous trigger entailing incremental changes of network structures, by possibly improving the

position of ethnic groups (gradually) (Marsh/Rhodes 1992: 189, 196). My research project aims at

looking at dynamics of network relations in correspondence to changes and variances in the

institutional setting of access opportunities that may be seized by ethnic groups for influencing

policies. The very general presumption that a change of network formations brings about a change

of policy outputs (our dependant variable) is shared in the literature (Peters 1998: 21, 24, Hay 1998,

53, Daugbjerg/Marsh 1998, 53). We integrate further conditions that may explain if and how ethnic

actors may use these institutional opportunities for promoting their interests for policy-making.

Influence will highly depend on resources, such as collective group mobilization, but also coalition-

buidling with other societal and public actors. The status of ethnic groups in networks can only be

evaluated from a relational perspective, thus, one also has to examine other, dominant actors that

may possibly promote contrary policy-preferences.

Briefly, it shall be noted that the attempt of combining actor-centered and structural variables

resembles classical approaches of analysing interest representation. Centering on endogenous

characteristics of interest organisations in combination with a focus on features of the environment

of the influence stage resembles some parallels to Schmitter and Streeck’s (1999) model of logics of

membership and logics of influence, for instance. The analytical perspective could also be further

embedded into neo-institutionalist theories, like rational-choice institutionalism (Hall/Taylor 1996).

3. Research Design: Issues in comparing ethnic organizations and problems of operationalization

3.1 Case selection – How to level out the trade-off between depth of analysis and generalizability?

The conditions for successful ethnic interest representation that have been identified by the

analytical model shall be tested by an adequately designed empirical analysis. A proper empirical

analysis may contribute to theory development. The analytical framework integrates a number of

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variables, and those are furthermore assumed to interact. The motive was to control for a complex

context on the one hand and to also make comparative inquiry feasible. Certainly, the realization of

meaningful empirical researches will rely on reducing complexity to a certain extent (George/Bennet

2005, x).

A first reduction of complexity is achieved by reducing the focus on a certain policy-domain, i.e., by

concentrating on decision-making on land-use and resource governance. This field of policy-making

has been introduced as one of central relevance for ethnic interest representation the region.

Some further steps are proposed to test the complex causal framework in course of an appropiate

empirical research design. A set of explaining factors can be determined ex ante, such as the degree

of institutional access opportunities. Organizational forms of ethnic groups have also been studied

for the region, and may therefore be roughly assessed before field research is carried out, too. Yet, a

qualification of our third independent variable, network relations, can not be executed adequately

without realizing intensive empirical inquiry and collecting primary data. Thus, assessing network

relations and their effect empirically remains the most exploratory part of the study. A thorough

focus on the effect of this variable may also contribute to theory development most, as there are no

systematic analyses of ethnic interest groups’ involvement in networks for the region yet, although,

curiously, the predominance of informal power relations in politics has very often been emphazised

by regional scholarship (Levitsky 2012, Lauth 2004). The decision to focus on network relations as a

central explaining factor necesarily implies a certain neglect of the combinatory causal argument.

The analysis will return to the conjunctural perspective and take stock of the interaction of identified

variables when data is interpreted and analysed in course of process tracing (George/Bennet 2006:

234, 246).

The choice of social network analysis (SNA) as a method for assessing the effects of network relations

best may seem quite straightforward. However, carrying out a SNA involves considerable effort for

data collection. Nevertheless, a sample of three cases seems to be manageable for realizing empirical

research. Data collection will be based on semi-standardized questionnaires and systematic

document analyses. The chosen cases furthermore constitute temporally clearly defined processes of

decision-making. However, doubts may arise on how to arrive at conclusions that can be generalized

to a certain extent, but are based on studying a small-N-sample of cases. In fact, the scope of

generalization will be limited. Nevertheless, by relying on patterns of variance and similarities some

general statements that go beyond contingent case specific insights shall be feasible. Based on the

guiding assumptions that had been established in line with the analytical framework, a sample of

most- and least-likely cases were selected. Variance in the quality of the outcome is assumed to be

linked to varying patterns of network relations. The next paragraph aims at presenting the chosen

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cases briefly, highlighting the theoretical insights that may yield each within-case analysis as well as

their contribution for a cross-case comparative evaluation.

As a first example, a decision-making process on a disputed electric line project, that was planned to

cross the indigenous comarca of Kuna Yala in Panama, has been chosen (from 2009 to 2013). In

Panama we find the most encompassing and oldest autonomy arrangements for indigenous groups

in the Latin American region. Indigenous groups in the country also constitute one of the best

organized minority groups on a regional scale (Howe 1998). Therefore, in light of our theoretical

assumptions, the case offers the setting of a most-likely type. However, the chosen case of decision-

making exhibits a negative value regarding our dependent variable. The project has been cancelled

due to a lack of financial resources (La Prensa 2013). There could not be traced any influence of Kuna

indigenous people on that output, who indeed had opposed the endeavour. Thus, in this

disconfirmed or deviant mostl-likely case it can strongly be assumed that patterns of network

relations may have impeded any influence on part of ethnic interest groups, inspite of ample

institutional access opportunities and organizational strength. When examining and interpreting

network relations, the focus of process tracing shall lie on the question of why access could not be

achieved by Kuna representatives.

In parallel, the examination of a contrasting case may be of analytical interest, too. Consequently, a

least-likely case with a positive value on our dependent variable needed to be found. The case of

decision-making on a mining project in Chile has been chosen. Chile can be seen as paradigmatic for

a setting of rather few institutional access opportunities for ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless,

indigenous communities had substantial impact on the decision output in the chosen case by urging

an abandonment of the project. Here, the analysis shall primarily focus on mechanisms that may

show how ethnic interest groups gained access to decision-makers without disposing of any

particular institutional access opportunities. Have there been other, ‘regular’ patterns of entering

policy networks? Could resource be successfully be used for influencing policy-makers?

Finally, a consultation process in the Colombian Chocó on a highway project lends itself as an

example of a confirmed most-likely case for illustrating best practices. Afro-Colombian minority

interests could successfully be channeled into the decision-making outputs that were mirrored in the

final accords of the project (Oxfam 2011). An analysis of this case may offer insights on mechanisms

that show how access opportunities can be complemented by an effective mobilization and how

access to networks was effectively gained for successful interest representation. Process tracing on

this ideal type can test if the predicted mechanisms of the analytical framework are plausible

(Rohlfing 2009: 136, Seawright/Gerring 2008: 299).

Extensive within-case analyses shall be complemented by a cross-crase interpretation by looking for

regularities in the assumed effects of network relations (Ibid.: 296; George/Bennet 2005: ix).

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Objections on the very limited scope of generalization that may be delivered by a comparison of

these three cases may reasonable be raised. Neither do the countries share significant regional

contexts, nor can the exemplarily chosen ethnic groups be considered as being very similar to others

in the region, so that general factors for successful ethnic interest representation might be

synthesized. However, some arguments for sorting the chosen cases to a type of most similar system

design that is representative for ethnic politics in the region can be put forward: It may be argued

that the salient involvement of ethnic interest groups in decision-making on land-use in the region

points to the prevalence of common grievances across ethnic groups of different cultural heritage

and across country-specific contexts. Nevertheless, one crucial structural controll variable has been

taken into consideration: All three countries show similar, rather moderate shares of ethnic groups

(approx. 4,5% Indigenous in Chile, 3% Indigenous and 10% Afro-Colombian in Colombia, 8%

Indigenous in Panama). Therefore, countries such as Bolivia with a nearly majority building

Indigenous population, or Peru (40% Indigenous) were not be considered for case selection.

It should be noted that the search for a positive value on our dependent variable, thus, cases that

show features of successful ethnic interest representation, is challenging for the region. One reason

may be due to data recording. Most of available secondary data, such as conflict barometers,

primarily monitor negative events. Best practices are rarely documented. Another reason maybe the

unlikelihood of this event per se. Indeed, "success" could depend on very contingent factors. Having

this in mind, results of the empirical analysis need to be interpreted with caution. However, as

research on the topic yet is in a very initial stage, the exploratory character of the endeavour might

also lend some excuse regarding constraints of generalizability.

Some further discussion of limitations of inquiry on ethnic interest representation in the Latin

American region shall conclude this paragraph. Democratic quality is still very limited in many of the

region's countries. For assessing conditions for successful ethnic interest representation via

formalized institutional channels, it was therefore also considered important for case selection to

guarantee a minimum of institutional consolidation of democracy so that it can be made sure that all

actors are committed to binding rules of the political game (Hönnige 2007: 235). Minority rights

should have been institutionalized to such a degree that they can realistically be used by ethnic

groups. These requirements could not be met by some countries, like Venezuela and Paraguay.

3.2 Outlook on the operationalization of power relations in network terms

Our third independent variable, power relations, shall be assessed by carrying out a network

analysis. In the following paragraph, feasible measures to assess opportunities of accessibility and

to identify dominant and powerful actors in network are presented.

14

It should be noted that when analysing network relations, we are implicitly integrating another

causal level. SNA does not only offer instruments for precisely describing the position of ethnic

interest groups in relation to other societal and public actors, but it also helps to understand and to

explain their positions by interpreting ties of communication and support as further resources that

additionally favor access to influence networks.

For specifying the boundaries of the influence networks for our three cases, a combination of

nominalist and realist criteria will be carried out (Diani 2003: 7, Lauman et al. 1983).2 By relying on

nominalist, event-based criteria, I have identified the following network boundaries and population

of actors for our three cases, so far: In the decision-making process on the Interconexión électrica,

dating from 2009 untill March 2013, on part of Kuna Yala indigenous people, it was primarily Kuna

Comarcal Council that had lead the negotiations with central government's authorities. According to

the Environmental Law, the adequate setting for presenting Indigenous, autonomous demands

should have been a proper commission linked to the parliament. In the Colombian case of the

Ànimas-Nuqui highway in Chocó, representatives of the National Highways Department, the

Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transport and representatives of the local communal

councils of the affected Afro-Colombian communities participated in negotiations that took place

from 2006 to 2009 (Centro de Estudios para la Justicia Social Tierra Digna 2011). For the Chilean

decision-making case on a mining project in the community of Carahue in the Cautín province, that

was closed down in 2012, the following population of actors was identified: Representatives of non-

indingeous neighboured communities in alliance with representatives of the Carahue community,

as well as the national indigenous umbrella organization CONADI and the public development

agency Orígenes participated in the negotiations with public representatives and the Copper Mining

company. Encounters took place in course of ad hoc-commissions on indigenous affairs initiated by

the presidency of the Republic of Chile (Conflictos Mineros 2012).

The identification of this initial set of actors shall be completed by the realist method of boundary

specification. Accordingly, interviewees shall be asked for their perceptions on who (else)

participated in the process. This so-called snowball sampling shall assure that no relevant actors are

missed (Johnson 1990).

Subsequently, for identifying dominant (or the most powerful) actors in the agenda setting network

– that we will call (a) influence network from now - a reputational question shall be integrated in the

questionnaire by asking the interviewees whom they perceived as most influential. The significance

2 It should be noted that the network analysis concentrates on the agenda setting stage and therefore

focusses on patterns of interactions of ethnic organizations with other societal and public actors. Carrying out a network analysis for assessing mechanisms of mobilization in ethnic organizations, thus, looking at individual group members as nodes, may be feasible, too. This is how SNA has been applied by Social Movement scholarship, for instance (see Diani 2003: 6). A parallel analysis of intra-groups networks will not be realizable in course of my research.

15

of perceptions concerning social relations for constituting power relations has been emphazised in

the literature (Brass/Krackhart 2012: 356). Therefore, the indicator of attributed impact may offer a

helpful tool to assess power relations when looking at the whole influence network. Notably, it can

not automatically be expected that actors with formal decision-making authority are named for this

category. Very often, also other organised actors may be called here. This indicator yields the

opportunitiy to also detect informal power relations and processes of influence (vgl. Pappi et al.

1995: 177, Thurner/Stoiber 2002: 594). For analysis, in a first step, measures of centrality and

prestige will be of help to evaluate the positions of actors here (Knoke 1990, 9f.).

Influence on policy outputs will be contingent on ethnic groups' resources. Initially, we have

primarily identified collective mobilization as a central resource for pressuring decision-makers. The

strength of mobilization toward public actors may be operationalized by looking at ties and (uni-

directional) requests for contact initiated by ethnic interest groups. Do ethnic interest groups

succeed in accessing public actors and approaching them with their requests to make them

eventually modify their policy positions? (reciprocal ties)

Coalitions with other societal actors or also support by some public actors3 may offer further

resources for influencing policy-outputs. To assess the degree of resources of this kind, two further

seperate networks shall be modelled by qualifying the ties and interactions that ethnic interst

groups have with other nodes in more detail (Knoke 1990: 235). Coalitions may pressure public

actors more effectively than single, weakly resourced actors act (Diani 2003b: 106f.). Interactions

based on exchange of information and communication flows (Diani 2003a: 11), coordination with

and support by other societal actors have been identified as central resources for influencing policy-

outputs (Pappi et al. 1995: 279). The formation of network alliances and coalition-building can be

assumed to be either power or policy-driven (Stokman/Zeggelink 1996). Thus, ethnic interest

groups may search for alliances either with powerful actors or with those that share similar policy-

positions.

In course of the interviews (b) information networks and ties of co-ordination shall be traced by

asking who was in contact with whom. The case of Kuna Yala in Panama may offer an example of a

lack of integration in information networks. Although Kuna mobilization had been high and

coherent, communication flows toward public authorities may have remained non-reciprocal and

Kuna indigenous also were isolated without any communication exchange with non-Kuna

organizations.

Besides information networks, ties and (c) interactions of support shall be analysed as another

relevant network. Support by other actors may take various forms (f.i. technical and juridical advice,

3 When talking about "public actors" I mean those actors that are part of the formal decision-making system and government institutions, also including parties of parliament.

16

financial support). The amount and degree of interactions of support in favor of ethnic interest

groups may be traced by a separate category in the questionnaire. Without having had much formal

access opportunities, a dense integration in support networks may have worked as a decisive factor

that facilitated an influence of ethnic interest groups on the output of our Chilean case.

Both, communication and support networks shall be interpreted by various statistical tools. One of

the most prominent devices for analysis are those for assessing status and centrality. Closeness-

centrality, degree-centralities and eigenvektor-centrality seem to be appropiate measures to work

on the research question (Borgatti et al. 2013). When looking at ethnic groups in particular,

measures of embeddedness will be of central relevance, too: Each network may be qualified by

measures of densitiy. If our three types of networks are too loose or too small, naturally, their

explanatory significance for the decision-making output needs to be considered as rather marginal.

Another interesting feature of network properties is the presence of brokers (Burt 1995). There may

be actors in the network that occupy linkage positions, for instance, by opening channels of indirect

access for ethnic interest groups to present their demands towards public actors. It can be assumed

that brokers are crucial for a political integration of minority groups. Empirically feasible is the

mediating position of a NGOs or a public (development) agency, such as Orígenes in Chile, that may

favor an access of ethnic groups to policy networks. The presence of such intermediary actors may

possibly level out the absence of special minority rights (see our Chilean case). Nevertheless,

brokers just offer much more unstable, temporally and indirect access oportunities than formal

minority rights do. There are two measures for identifying broker nodes, either by calculating

betweenness-centrality or by detecting structural holes (Diani 2003: 107).

When looking at networks in our three cases, concentrating on certain subgroups and performing

separate analyses on them may be of interest, too. Naturally, as ethnic interest organizations

constitute our primer 'ego', focussing on them by carrying out proper analyses on their position and

interactions will form the core of the inquiry. Additionally, further analysis on other nodes, for

instance, the ones that share common policy positions or group characteristics (such as private

companies or by just looking at the most central actors of networks) can be carried out. Statistical

network analysis offers different methods for conducting separate analyses for sub-groups, such as

blockmodelling or clustering (Borgatti et al. 2013).

Finally, the distinct network patterns of all three cases shall be synthesized by cross-case

comparison (regarding the position of ethnic groups as our primer ego-node as well as concerning

relevant contextual patterns, such as the presence of brokers, but also by looking at whole network

features such as their density or patterns of structural equivalence between our networks). Also,

the effects of network patterns then need to be linked to the characteristics of our other variables.

17

The dynamics of varying access opportunities in conjunction with capabilities for mobilization and

coalition-buidling shall lie at the heart of comparative data interpretation.

3.3 Methodological challenges

Data collection for evaluating network relations shall be primarily carried out by face-to-face

interviews with network actors, based on a semi-standardized questionnaire.4 The survey will be

complemented by archival analyses and an evaluation of official documents, too. An integration of

external expert opinions may be a further device to confirm network relations (Borgatti et al. 2013:

24).

Regarding data collection, network scholars are faced with three rather classical issues that lie at

the core of my methodological concerns, too: How to assess negative ties? How to deal with

temporal notions in network dynamics? And how to face lack of data? Theses issues shall be briefly

discussed in the following paragraphs, as well as strategies for dealing with them for my research.

Finally, a core objection that may be put forward regarding the validity of the analytical modell will

be discussed in the remainder of the chapter.

Network designs primarily document realized interactions and present ties, therefore, conflict in

form of a lack of interaction or failed attempts of contacting other actors are often not explicitly

adressed. Also, relational attributes of influential actors tend to be more strongly stressed by

measures of SNA than those of less influential actors. Unfortunately, we may face a setting where

our focus group of ethnic organizations may be at the very margins of network relations.

For my research purpose, relations of conflictive quality are of central interest. Conflictive relations

or ‘negative ties’ may be carefully interpreted as being present, for instance, when a tie, that can be

strongly expected theoretically, is absent. If Kuna Yala indigenous groups should have been

consulted by participating in a proper commission, but there cannot be documented any reciprocal

tie with public authorities, negative ties may be assumed and access to networks was very probably

denied. In general, I see two ways of dealing with the issue of how to tackle negative ties: The first

one is, to extract ties that are perceived and documented as very weak in relation to others that

have been reported as being of more intense quality, and then perform a proper analysis on these

implicitly weak ties of interaction. A second strategy would be to integrate a seperate question in

the survey by asking explicitly: Who was particularly difficult to contact? With whom did you

communicate less?

The research question implicity involves a notion of dynamism in expecting network changes as a

consequence of the introduction of minority rights that may produce a change in the degree of

4 The questionnaire shall center on the collection of network data. However, the qualification of the other variables (dependent variable and mobilization capabilities) will also partly be based on some additional categories collected in the same survey.

18

integration (accessibility) of ethnic interest groups. It is difficult to validly confirm changes of this

type based on interview data, neither are there any means to collect network data retrospectively

for our three cases. Consequently, I decided to exclude temporally variance of network dynamics

from the analysis and to integrate variances of institutional access opportunities by a cross-case

design instead.

Collecting data on all involved actors will be challenging in a context where state bureacracies are

difficult to approach, public services are reported to be corrupt and when an area of decision-

making is involved that is highly conflictive as in our case of politics on land-use and resource

governance. Although all chosen cases show positive features to a certain extent (regarding respect

for the rule of law, no forced implementation of the planned project against the will of societal

actors), such as the best-practice example in Colombia, data on the decision-making processes will

be considered as highly confidential and will probably involve delicate information when informal

ties and venues of interaction shall be documented.

Data collection based on secondary sources (newspapers, archives, official data on meetings), like

network scholars have done in difficult settings (Christoupoulos/Walther 2013), will very probably

not yield a sufficient picture, because secondary data tends to be limited to primarily documenting

formal interactions (Borgatti et al. 2013). In any case, the interviews will require to be cautiously

planned and interviewees need to be contacted in early advance. To increase the willingness of

public interviewees for being available for an interview the questionnaire should be as brief as

possible and reduced to the central issues of interest, so that interviewees do not need to devote

much time.

Reducing the network focus to our central focus group, ethnic interest organizations, could be

feasible, too, to circumvent problems of lack of data. Instead of attempting to perform a whole

network analysis of the influence stage, one could just concentrate on an ego-network for data

collection. Representatives of ethnic groups may be assumed to be more available for interviews

than representatives of public institutions. Nevertheless, although some meaningful analysis could

be done by just concentrating on the local setting of ethnic groups in networks, f.i. by looking at

their ties to other societal and public actors, loss of data will be implied by missing antagonistic

actors and just a restricted analysis of means provided by social network analysis could be fruitfully

applied or could just be captured indirectly, such as embeddedness. Central (dominant) actors may

get out of sight (Borgatti et al. 2013: 28f, 43, 262).

A final issue relates to some conceptual trickiness in adequately working on the research question:

The approach of assessing a linear relation between (non-)accessing networks and (not-)impacting

policy-outputs may be critized for being too simplifying and missing out intervening factors that

characterize the chain of an influence stage to the decision-making stage (Borgatti et al. 2013, 7).

19

Power relations in the decision-making stage differ crucially from those in the influential stage

(Stokman/van den Bos 1992). A strategy of keeping certain control on the entire causal process

could be to integrate the issue positions and policy preferences of the main actors that are

endowed with decision-making authority more explicitly for analysis. The opposition of an

important actor in the decision-making process may decisively limit the effects of pressuring by

ethnic groups in the influence stage. Another final control variable shall be the nature of issue

demands by ethnic groups. It will certainly be more likely for them to influence policy outputs if

they are not opposing planned venues and projects completely. This may have been one reason,

why the consultation accords in our Colombian case can be interpreted as favorable to communal

interests: Afro-Colombian communities had not opposed the project itself, instead they had

required regulations and compensations for its implementation (Oxfam 2011).

4. Conclusion

The article proposed a comparative framework for analysing interest representation by ethnic

groups in Latin America. I assume that besides the design of the formal-institutional setting, thus,

the extent of multicultural rights, one needs to account for additional variables when assessing

conditions for successful ethnic interest representation: (I) The organizational forms of ethnic

groups on a meso-level and (II) macro-structural features of power relations that determine if

groups can seize access to relevant decision-making areas. To tackle the subject, some classical

concepts of scholarship were applied, like collective action and social movement theory. A network

perspective was chosen to capture informal power relations that are assumed to be of central

relevance for the region. Some further characteristics have been stressed that shape the specific

regional setting, too: With regard to the central issues and contents, policy-making on land-use and

resource governance has been identified as constituting the most frequent events that make

Indigenous and Afro-descendant groups become involved in politics. The focus of inquiry shall lie on

this domain of policy-making. Another central factor that determines how ethnic interest

representation is carried out in the region is the varying institutional setting; we addressed the way

that different formal access opportunities work, such as consultation rights for minorities, as well as

their (supposed) dynamic effects on network relations. I decided to choose three cases that

represent different formal opportunity structures for ethnic groups in Latin America. Corresponding

varying dynamics in network patterns and their effects shall be observed for empirical research. A

Colombian case of a decision-making process on a highway project gives the opportunity to study

typical mechanisms of ethnic groups’ participation in policy-making on land-use, favored by the

right to consultation. Two further cases of decision-making, one on a mining project in Chile and

another one on an electric line project in Panama, present least-likely and most-likely cases, and

20

thereby offer the opportunity to test the soundness of the analytical framework and our theoretical

expectations.

The endeavor to systematically analyse network relations in ethnic politics is linked with various

methodological challenges. Capturing network relations empirically will not be easy in a setting that

is very prone to conflict, such as decision-making on land-use in Latin America. I proposed to

empirically capture the central analytical dimensions of accessibility of networks, dominant actors

and degree of societal mobilization - that have been identified by a synthesis of network theory - by

carving out at least three distinct network models and by a strong focus on the position of ethnic

groups in each: a) Influence networks, b) communication networks and c) support networks shall be

analysed by social network analysis for our three cases. Intensive preparatory work will be

necessary to confront challenges that arise for data collection, such as the need to engage in early

preliminary contact with interviewees and to approach public actors convincingly, in particular. A

brief and precise design of a standardized questionnaire shall furthermore promote the willingness

of respondents to participate in the survey. The paper ended with presenting a central conceptual

concern for discussion, that is, regarding the soundness of the main causal argument on the role of

ethnic groups in policy-making that may be based on a too simplifying and too linear

concepualization of the policy-process. A way of avoiding an oversimplistic emphasis of ethnic

groups’ influence on decision-making may be to control more explicitly for the issue positions and

policy preferences of all actors involved in the policy-process.

21

Appendix

Table 1: Types of networks (own compilation based on literature review)

Type of policy network

Dimensions

I. State Corporatism

(Schmitter 1974)

II. Parantela relations

(LaPalombara 1964)

III. Clientelism/

Captured Statism

IV. Policy Communities

(Marsh/Rhodes 1998)

IV. Iron triangles

(Lowi 1969)

V. (Pressure) Pluralism

(Atkinson/Cole-man 1989)

V. Issue Networks (Heclo 1978)

A) Degree of openness Closed Closed Closed (rather) closed (rather) closed Open Open

Number of participants Limited Limited Limited (rather) limited Limited (rather) unlimited

limited

Degree of formalization High High High Moderate (rather) high Low Low

Stability/ degree of institutionalization

High (rather) high (rather) high (rather) high High (rather) low Low

Stability of policy outcomes High High High High High Low low

B) Dominant actor State Party Interest group State, resourceful interest groups

State, resourceful interest groups

None none

Impact of single interest groups

Dependent on state

Dependent on party

High vs. very low

Dependent on resources

Dependent on resources

Dependent on resources

Dependent on resources

Autonomy of the state High Low Low (rather) high High (Low) (Low)

Centralization High High (rather) high Moderate High Low Low

C) Degree of organization of

interest groups

(Low to high) (Low to high) High vs. very

low

(rather) high High Heterogenous heterogenous

Coordination of interest groups/ intensity of interactions

By the state By a dominant party

High vs. low Competitive / many interactions /cooperative

Many interactions / cooperative

Competitive / few interaction

Competitive, few

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