An Attributional Look at Explanatory StyleAuthor(s): Bernard WeinerSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1991), pp. 43-44Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449413 .

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COMMENTARIES 43

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An Attributional Look at Explanatory Style

Bernard Weiner University of California, Los Angeles

In the spirit of Peterson's plea, I provide constructive crit- icism and consciousness raising about topics that need atten- tion and thought. I do not come to bury learned helplessness, either as a theory or as an individual difference approach, but I also do not plan on providing praise given the serious shortcomings that I perceive. My remarks are confined to conceptual issues that are also central in general attribution theory, and proceed along a temporal sequence specified by attribution theorists as outcome perceptions -* causal ap- praisal -* dimensional placement -* psychological conse- quences. Because of space limitations, I do not cite extensive and pertinent literatures, with some publications making similar points during the prior 5-year period, nor do I address issues about scale construction, traits, and so on.

Attributions for What? Outcome Versus Uncontrollability Perceptions

Learned-helplessness theory evolved from experimental manipulations that induced objective uncontrollability. When attributions became incorporated, the initial impetus was quite naturally to be concerned about attributions for this uncontrollability. As Peterson notes: "The helplessness model . . . concerns itself with reactions to uncontrollable events." "People's causal attributions for uncontrollability dictated the extent to which helplessness was chronic, pervasive, .

But attributions generally are considered to be answers to why-questions regarding outcomes, and not concerning un- controllability. Thus, attributions are elicited by success or failure at an exam, being accepted or rejected for a date, and so on. Evidence has revealed that attributions are especially generated by negative and unexpected outcomes, so that causal ascriptions are anticipated to be more prevalent fol- lowing unexpected failure and rejection than after expected success and social acceptance.

When the Attributional Style Questionnaire was devel- oped, the position of "attributions for an outcome" was implicitly accepted. As Peterson notes, the reformulated model "concerns itself only with how people respond to bad events." Hence, attributions are not made for uncon- trollability (unless this is synonymous with a bad event), but for negative outcomes. Indeed, given an outcome orienta- tion, one might ask, for example, if an objectively uncon- trollable outcome will also be perceived as uncontrollable.

To further confound matters, Peterson states: "A bad event believed to have an internal, stable, and global cause is argu- ably one that will be regarded as uncontrollable." In addition

to being incorrect (consider laziness as a cause of failure), Peterson seems to be suggesting that a particular pattern of attributions (internal, stable, global) can be used to identify another attribution (uncontrollability). But why is this pat- tern associated with uncontrollability more than a cause that is perceived as external, stable, and global, such as the at- tribution that the learned-helplessness manipulation is likely to generate?

What is evident, then, is conceptual confusion; the notions of controllability and uncontrollability have been eliminated from operational measures linked with the theory. It is quite clear that a "bad event" can be ascribed to a controllable cause (e.g., lack of effort) or to an uncontrollable cause (e.g., low aptitude), and to an internal cause such as aptitude or to an external cause such as the bias of a teacher. Further- more, there can be uncontrollable causes of good as well as bad events (e.g., the rain can save or ruin the crops), and controllable causes for good and bad events (e.g., high or low grades can be ascribed to the presence or absence of effort). Outcomes surely cannot be considered as isomorphic with perceptions of control and, as already indicated, a "bad event" is not synonymous with uncontrollable and a good event is not necessarily controllable. Now, there is nothing intrinsically incorrect about doing away with the notion of perceived controllability, but there is something wrong if the theory is concerned with perceptions of control. And if per- ceptions of control influence depression (they may not, or they may only be a factor in certain types of depression), then this is indeed a serious flaw. Finally, if internal, stable, and global ascriptions connote uncontrollability, then Peterson is not examining attributions about orfor uncontrollability, but attributions of uncontrollability. This is a key distinction.

Perceptions of Causality: Causes and Dimensions

Given an outcome and a causal search, an attribution is then reached. Peterson does not (and need not) concern him- self with the attributional process, although it certainly can be a rich source for the understanding of depression, as some investigators are demonstrating. He and his colleagues have been concerned, however, with the next stage in the pre- viously hypothesized sequence, which is the identification of the properties or dimensions of phenomenal causality. Peter- son and his colleagues have specified that there are three dimensions of causality: locus, stability, and globality. He states that these were selected to explain "anomalies in pre- vious helplessness findings." He also contends that investi-

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44 COMMENTARIES

gators may specify as many or as few dimensions as is expe- dient to explain their phenomenon of interest; that is, "the researcher must specify dimensions of explanatory style in relationship to some purpose."

Let us consider this statement and examine what is meant by a "causal dimension." As Webster defines a dimension or dimensional space, it represents "the number of coordinates necessary and sufficient to distinguish one among the ele- ments of an aggregate from the others" (Third New Interna- tional Dictionary, 1971). Dimensions are fundamental units-in this case, the units or basic properties of phe- nomenal causality. The dimensions of causality reveal that, for example, lack of effort can be distinguished from lack of aptitude as causes of failure in part because the former is controllable and the latter uncontrollable.

Can, then, dimensions depend on the "purpose that the researcher has in mind?" I do not think that Peterson is guided by that position, for he states that the dimensions he assesses are "among the basic dimensions of the universe as seen by many experimental psychologists." If there are in- deed "basic dimensions of the universe," then causal proper- ties are not entirely arbitrary, but rather emerge from an understanding of cognitive structure. They will be finite in number (less than the number of causal elements in the ag- gregate, but not necessarily three). They will not fluctuate haphazardly between investigators if scientific advances are to be made and an understanding of causal beliefs is to be reached.

Hence, just as the belief that attributions are being made for uncontrollable events is both puzzling and unnecessary, his position about dimensions is paradoxical and unneces- sary inasmuch as at least two of the properties he is assessing (locus and stability) have to a reasonable extent been agreed on as representing dimensions of causality (as he notes). Why, then, not merely recognize that he is assessing causal dimensions identified and accepted well prior to the advent of learned-helplessness research?

Psychological Consequences

If there is misunderstanding that attributions are for out- comes rather than for uncontrollability, and there is misun- derstanding that properties of causality concern cognitive structure and are not imposed on an ad hoc basis, then it is also likely that the consequences of causal attributions will be subject to conceptual error. For example, Peterson sug- gests that "(stability + globality) should predict one's future expectations of controllability." But attributions of crop failure to living in a dry climate (stable) or to a temporary drought (unstable) do not differentially alter perceptions of primary control. On the other hand, they do alter expecta- tions of crop success, or of future weather conditions. Expec- tancies and, more precisely, expectancy change are deter- mined by the stability of causal ascriptions, whereas controllability is determined by the perceived amenability of the cause to volitional change.

Let us examine another example in more depth, for it shows the danger of composite indexes and the importance of more in-depth analyses. Peterson poses the question: "If it is not pessimistic to locate the causes of misfortune within oneself and project these causes across time and situation, then what is it?" But consider living in a totalitarian regime, where opportunities and options are not allowed or provided. Does this not produce overwhelming pessimism if the forces seem invincible? Now such an external attribution may not weaken self-esteem and feelings of self-worth. If pessimism is defined as including these consequences, then Peterson's conclusion seems warranted. But if pessimism (i.e., empha- sizing and anticipating the worst) is independent of self- value (it may or may not be), then the locus dimension is unrelated to this experiential state. At this time, it seems premature to conclude that pessimism will be greater (or less) when attributing negative outcomes to personal ability as opposed to a repressive society.

A Closing Note

Peterson seems to think that psychologists are unfairly scrutinizing learned helplessness and explanatory style. "Its flaws seem neither more numerous nor more severe than those inherent in any individual difference with which we concern ourselves," he argues, and "explanatory 'style' is as coherent an individual difference as most personality con- structs." He says we should "heed the good sug- gestions . . . and get about the business of investigating substantive questions about explanatory style."

But I think he is giving external and uncontrollable attribu- tions that he hopes are unstable. I suggest that, if there is unusual attention given to helplessness that is negative, then the attributions by Peterson should be internal to him and his co-authors and associates, quite controllable by them, and hopefully unstable. Prediction claims made on the basis of one simple personality questionnaire or its equivalent in- clude grade-point average, physical health over a 35-year period, depression, and presidential election outcomes, to name just a few; this raises skepticism. The conceptual anal- ysis is problematic; this raises concerns. The labels used are admittedly selected because "people pay more attention to the construct." The entire research program has this feeling, which raises eyebrows and perhaps even jealousy. And then the preferred attribution by Peterson is uncontrollable by him, which in itself generates problems for the conception, although it is external rather than internal, which does have positive affective consequences, and his article is one at- tempt at secondary control.

Note

Bernard Weiner, Department of Psychology, University of California, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1563.

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