AM Com NonLegReport · 2020-02-06 · Antonio López-Istúriz White, Vangelis Meimarakis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou Motion for a resolution Recital J Motion for a resolution Amendment

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European Parliament2019-2024

Committee on Foreign Affairs

2020/2004(INI)

29.1.2020

AMENDMENTS1 - 117Draft reportSven Mikser(PE645.058v02-00)

Recommendation to the High Representative and to the Council under Rule 118 in preparation of the 2020 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) review process, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament options(2020/2004(INI))

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AM_Com_NonLegReport

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Amendment 1Mounir Satourion behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolutionCitation 11

Motion for a resolution Amendment

— having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 20 September 2017,

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Or. en

Amendment 2Mazaly Aguilar, Hermann Tertsch, Charlie Weimers, Assita Kanko

Motion for a resolutionCitation 11 a (new)


- having regard to the NATO Secretary General’s Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear forces Treaty of 2 August 2019,

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 11 b (new)


- having regard to the new START Treaty signed by the United States and Russian Federation in effect since 5 February 2011,

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Or. en




- having regard to its resolutions of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation, of 17 January 2013 on the Recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, and of 10 March 2010 on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Or. en




- having regard to Russia’s repeated violations of the INF Treaty due to Russia’s deployment of the SSC-8 missile system,

Or. en

Amendment 6Arnaud Danjean

Motion for a resolution

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Recital A


A. whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has undoubtedly been the most important international instrument to regulate the nuclear regime for the last 50 years and has contributed substantially to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, reducing the nuclear arsenal and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy; whereas in 1995, NPT state parties agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely;

A. whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has undoubtedly been the most important international instrument to regulate the nuclear regime for the last 50 years; whereas it is the cornerstone of global strategic stability and an irreplaceable bulwark against the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons; whereas it has contributed significantly to reducing the nuclear arsenal and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy; whereas it is a mature and pragmatic treaty, almost universal and very widely complied with; whereas in 1995, NPT state parties agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely;

Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionRecital A


A. whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has undoubtedly been the most important international instrument to regulate the nuclear regime for the last 50 years and has contributed substantially to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, reducing the nuclear arsenal and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy; whereas in 1995, NPT state parties agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely;

A. whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has undoubtedly been the international instrument to regulate the nuclear regime for the last 50 years and has contributed substantially to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, reducing the nuclear arsenal and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy; whereas in 1995, NPT state parties agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely; whereas, given the failure in 2015 to agree on a substantive outcome document, it is of utmost importance to make the 2020 review a success;

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Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital A a (new)


Aa. whereas since 1968 the NPT has prompted several States to abandon nuclear weapons in Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific; whereas it has enabled the peaceful development of nuclear energy; whereas it has led to drastic reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals since the Cold War; whereas only a few States have developed arsenals outside the NPT;

Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionRecital B a (new)


B a. whereas, unfortunately, it must be stated that no progress can be detected as regards the NPT's nuclear disarmament objective and whereas attempts realise the univerzalisation of NPT failed until today;

Or. en


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Motion for a resolutionRecital C


C. whereas the objective of the NPT’s periodical review conferences is to evaluate the implementation of the NPT and to draw up a roadmap for achieving further progress based on a step-by-step approach; whereas the review process represents an opportunity for the state parties to uphold and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime once every five years;

C. whereas the objective of the NPT’s periodical review conferences is to evaluate the implementation of the NPT and to draw up a roadmap for achieving progress based on a step-by-step approach; whereas the review process represents an opportunity for the state parties to uphold and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime once every five years;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D


D. whereas the ultimate goal of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime in the 2010 Review Conference was achieved further to NPT states recommitting to the basic provisions of the NPT and adopting a 64-point action plan that includes, among other features, specific action plans on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, underpinned by concrete and measurable actions that the state parties will take to support the three pillars;

D. whereas the aim of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime in the 2010 Review Conference was partially achieved further to NPT states recommitting to the basic provisions of the NPT and adopting a 64-point action plan that includes, among other features, specific action plans on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, underpinned by concrete and measurable actions that the state parties will take to support the three pillars;

Or. fr


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Motion for a resolutionRecital D


D. whereas the ultimate goal of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime in the 2010 Review Conference was achieved further to NPT states recommitting to the basic provisions of the NPT and adopting a 64-point action plan that includes, among other features, specific action plans on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, underpinned by concrete and measurable actions that the state parties will take to support the three pillars;

D. whereas the ultimate goal of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime in the 2010 Review Conference was reiterated further to NPT states recommitting to the basic provisions of the NPT and adopting a 64-point action plan that includes, among other features, specific action plans on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, underpinned by concrete and measurable actions that the state parties will take to support the three pillars;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D a (new)


D a. whereas there is concern at the lack of implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan;

Or. en

Amendment 14Mounir Satouri, Brando Benifei, Joachim Schuster, Dietmar Köster

Motion for a resolutionRecital D b (new)


D b. whereas there is hope that the

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2020 NPT Review Conference, and the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), can contribute to the implementation of the 64 steps foreseen in the 2010 NPT Action Plan;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital E


E. whereas in the section on nuclear disarmament, state parties, including recognised nuclear-armed states, for the first time undertook to accelerate real progress on disarmament and ultimately accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, deployed or non-deployed; whereas actions agreed under the non-proliferation pillar include a wide range of issues, such as reinforcement of safeguards, support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), physical protection of nuclear material, conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols, safeguards for nuclear-related exports, transfers of nuclear technology, and nuclear terrorism;

E. whereas unfortunately the nuclear disarmament objective has not been implemented or met so far; whereas actions agreed under the non-proliferation pillar include a wide range of issues, such as reinforcement of safeguards, support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), physical protection of nuclear material, conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols, safeguards for nuclear-related exports, transfers of nuclear technology, and nuclear terrorism;

Or. en

Amendment 16Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolutionRecital I


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I. whereas the NPT has laid the foundation for establishing nuclear-free zones around the world; whereas the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (MENWFZ) is one of the EU’s longstanding goals; whereas the EU has recently earmarked a budget for activities aimed at fostering inclusive dialogue among experts and policymakers with the purpose of advancing the commitment to establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East;

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Or. en

Amendment 17Antonio López-Istúriz White, Vangelis Meimarakis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou

Motion for a resolutionRecital J


J. whereas in the political declaration adopted at the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) held in New York in November 2019, participating Member States undertook to pursue the drafting of a legally binding treaty to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD, which could ultimately contribute to building regional and international trust;

J. whereas in the political declaration adopted, with the abstention of the 28 Member States of the EU, at the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) held in New York in November 2019, the remaining participants undertook to pursue the drafting of a legally binding treaty to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital L

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L. whereas the 2020 review conference will take place in a particularly challenging international security context, owing to the lack of progress in the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula as well as the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran; whereas the current degree of disagreement and division between the 191 NPT nuclear-armed and non-armed state parties over the best approach to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons will add a further challenge to the debate;

L. whereas the 2020 review conference will take place in a particularly challenging international security context, owing to the lack of progress in the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula as well as the US withdrawal, Iran’s alleged violations and the responding formal complaints of France, UK and Germany formally triggering a dispute mechanism in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran; whereas the current degree of disagreement and division between the 191 NPT nuclear-armed and non-armed state parties over the best approach to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons will add a further challenge to the debate;

Or. en

Amendment 19Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolutionRecital L


L. whereas the 2020 review conference will take place in a particularly challenging international security context, owing to the lack of progress in the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula as well as the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran; whereas the current degree of disagreement and division between the 191 NPT nuclear-armed and non-armed state parties over the best approach to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons will add a further challenge to the debate;

L. whereas the 2020 review conference will take place in a particularly challenging international security context, owing to the lack of progress in the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and from the INF with Russia as well as the stalemate in negotiations for the extension of the START between Russia and the USA; whereas the current degree of disagreement and division between the 191 NPT nuclear-armed and non-armed state parties over the best approach to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons will add a further

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challenge to the debate;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital L a (new)


L a. whereas several nuclear armed states are planning to modernise or are currently modernising their nuclear weapons or their means of delivery and whereas some of them are lowering threshold of their use in their national military doctrines;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital L a (new)


L a. whereas nuclear disarmament does not only mean the reduction of the number of active nuclear warheads, but also the downsizing of the military and political role that is assigned to nuclear weapons;

Or. en


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Motion for a resolutionRecital L b (new)


L b. whereas there are widespread concerns about the growing budgets for the maintenance and renewal of nuclear arsenals in all nuclear-armed countries, as well as the introduction of smaller nuclear weapons and the broadening of scenarios in which they may be used, all contributing to a vastly increased likelihood of nuclear detonations;

Or. en

Amendment 23Martin Horwood

Motion for a resolutionRecital M


M. whereas the previous failure by Russia to honour the security guarantees given to Ukraine by the Budapest Memorandum has had a corrosive effect on the climate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation talks;

M. whereas the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, provided security guarantees against threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine in exchange for the relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and its accession to the NPT; whereas the previous failure by Russia to honour the security guarantees given to Ukraine by the Budapest Memorandum has had a corrosive effect on the climate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation talks;

Or. en

Amendment 24Javier Nart

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M. whereas the previous failure by Russia to honour the security guarantees given to Ukraine by the Budapest Memorandum has had a corrosive effect on the climate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation talks; moreover, after the election of Donald Trump we are witnessing an increasing arms race threat, particularly following the announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA;

Or. en





M. whereas the complete disregard by Russia to honour the security guarantees it had given to Ukraine by the Budapest Memorandum and disregard for international law, has had a corrosive effect on the climate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation talks;

Or. en

Amendment 26Jérôme Rivière, Thierry Mariani, Nicolas Bay

Motion for a resolutionRecital N

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N. whereas the worsening of the global security environment is further exacerbated by growing mistrust among states and nations, and the modernisation of arsenals has been advanced by new technologies that increase global security risks, in particular in relation with possible cyberattacks against nuclear weapons, their command, control and early warning systems, as well as by an increasing role of nuclear weapons in national policies, strategies and doctrines; whereas some states are pursuing nuclear weapons that allow for battlefield use;

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Or. fr

Amendment 27Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolutionRecital N


N. whereas the worsening of the global security environment is further exacerbated by growing mistrust among states and nations, and the modernisation of arsenals has been advanced by new technologies that increase global security risks, in particular in relation with possible cyberattacks against nuclear weapons, their command, control and early warning systems, as well as by an increasing role of nuclear weapons in national policies, strategies and doctrines; whereas some states are pursuing nuclear weapons that allow for battlefield use;

N. whereas the worsening of the global security environment is further exacerbated by growing mistrust among states and nations, and the modernisation of arsenals has been advanced by new technologies that increase global security risks, in particular in relation with possible cyberattacks against nuclear weapons, their command, control and early warning systems, as well as by an increasing role of nuclear weapons in national policies, strategies and doctrines, leading to the risk of a new global nuclear arms race; whereas a growing number of states are pursuing nuclear weapons that allow for battlefield use;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionRecital O


O. whereas major military powers no longer tend to resort to arms control and disarmament to ease international tensions and improve the global security environment, ultimately leading to an increase in nuclear risks worldwide;

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Or. en





O. whereas major military powers no longer tend to resort to arms control and disarmament to ease international tensions and improve the global security environment, ultimately once again assigning nuclear weapons pride of place on strategic balance sheets, leading to an increase in nuclear risks worldwide;

Or. fr

Amendment 30Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Bernard Guetta, Christophe Grudler, Petras Auštrevičius



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O. whereas there is a significant risk that major military powers no longer tend to resort to arms control and disarmament to ease international tensions and improve the global security environment, ultimately leading to an increase in nuclear risks worldwide;

Or. en

Amendment 31Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Bernard Guetta, Javier Nart, Petras Auštrevičius, Christophe Grudler

Motion for a resolutionRecital Q


Q. whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted in 2017 by 122 states;

Q. whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted in 2017 by 122 states, among which none of the nuclear -weapon States; whereas the European Union was not able to agree on a common position on the Treaty;

Or. en

Amendment 32Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolutionRecital Q


Q. whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted in 2017 by 122 states;

Q. whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted in 2017 by 122 states; and by January 2020 the Treaty was signed by 80 states and ratified by 32 states;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionRecital R


R. whereas the extension of the bilateral US-Russian Federation new START Treaty that limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on either side to 1 550, until its expiration in February 2021, would be a key element in preserving strategic stability and containing a new arms race;

R. whereas the extension of the bilateral US-Russian Federation new START Treaty, whose prime objective must be to continue to reduce in a verifiable manner nuclear weapons stockpiles established as a result of the arms race during the Cold War, and which limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on either side to 1 550, until its expiration in February 2021, would be a key element in preserving strategic stability and containing a new arms race;

Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionRecital R


R. whereas the extension of the bilateral US-Russian Federation new START Treaty that limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on either side to 1 550, until its expiration in February 2021, would be a key element in preserving strategic stability and containing a new arms race;

R. whereas the extension of the bilateral US-Russian Federation new START Treaty that limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on either side to 1 550, until its expiration in February 2021, would be a key element in preserving strategic stability and containing a new arms race among great powers;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionRecital S a (new)


S a. whereas the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, UK and France have contributed to nuclear deterrence for decades;

Or. en

Amendment 36Jérôme Rivière, Thierry Mariani, Nicolas Bay

Motion for a resolutionRecital U


U. whereas the ‘stepping stone’ approach, presented by Sweden, introduces incremental, more easily achievable steps in four main areas aimed at building habits of cooperation, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, enhancing transparency and reducing nuclear risks, which would allow for the existing disarmament objectives to be fulfilled;

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Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionRecital U a (new)


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U a. whereas the risks of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional use of nuclear weapons are evident due to the vulnerability of nuclear command and control networks to human error and cyberattacks; whereas cyberattack methods such as data manipulation, digital jamming and cyber spoofing could jeopardize the integrity of communication, leading to increased uncertainty in decision-making; whereas in times of crisis, such cyberattacks on nuclear weapons systems could cause an escalation, including inadvertent nuclear launches;

Or. en

Amendment 38Mazaly Aguilar, Hermann Tertsch, Assita Kanko

Motion for a resolutionRecital V


V. whereas multilateral dialogue and diplomacy have proven to be effective tools in preventing the proliferation crisis and an escalation of conflicts, as demonstrated by the JCPOA, which is considered a historic accomplishment and a key contribution to the global non-proliferation regime;

V. whereas multilateral dialogue and diplomacy have proven to be effective tools in preventing the proliferation crisis and an escalation of conflicts, as multilateral dialogue and diplomacy are required to revive the JCPOA, which is considered a floundering agreement due to Iran´s recent violations and the resulting triggering of the dispute mechanism by all of the JCPOA´s European signatories;

Or. en

Amendment 39Charlie Weimers

Motion for a resolutionRecital V

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V. whereas multilateral dialogue and diplomacy have proven to be effective tools in preventing the proliferation crisis and an escalation of conflicts, as demonstrated by the JCPOA, which is considered a historic accomplishment and a key contribution to the global non-proliferation regime;

V. whereas multilateral dialogue and diplomacy have proven to be effective tools in preventing the proliferation crisis and an escalation of conflicts;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital V a (new)


V a. whereas pursuant to the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA, as well as the rising tensions in the region following the killing by US forces of the Iranian Major-General Qassem Soleimani, Iran has announced a series of incremental and escalatory steps pertaining to a tenfold increase in the volumes of production of enriched uranium, thereby violating its commitments under the JCPOA;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital W


W. whereas the status of the W. whereas the status of the

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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) weapons of mass destruction remains unchanged; whereas, according to the IAEA Annual Report for 2018, Pyongyang continued its nuclear activities; whereas signs of activity from DPRK’s nuclear sites were reported throughout 2019, and Pyongyang announced an imminent ‘very important test’ at a satellite-launching site; whereas perspectives for concrete steps towards denuclearisation of the area in the short-term are slim;

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) weapons of mass destruction remains unchanged and continues to pose risks to the non-proliferation regime; whereas, according to the IAEA Annual Report for 2018, Pyongyang continued its nuclear activities; whereas signs of activity from DPRK’s nuclear sites were reported throughout 2019, and Pyongyang announced an imminent ‘very important test’ at a satellite-launching site; whereas perspectives for concrete steps towards denuclearisation of the area in the short-term are slim; whereas North Korea still represents a nuclear and ballistic threat to the region and the world;

Or. fr

Amendment 42Javier Nart, Urmas Paet, Malik Azmani, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolutionRecital W


W. whereas the status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) weapons of mass destruction remains unchanged; whereas, according to the IAEA Annual Report for 2018, Pyongyang continued its nuclear activities; whereas signs of activity from DPRK’s nuclear sites were reported throughout 2019, and Pyongyang announced an imminent ‘very important test’ at a satellite-launching site; whereas perspectives for concrete steps towards denuclearisation of the area in the short-term are slim;

W. whereas the status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK), who withdrew in 2003 from the Treaty and acquired the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons despite strong international sanctions, weapons of mass destruction remains unchanged; whereas, according to the IAEA Annual Report for 2018, Pyongyang continued its nuclear activities; whereas signs of activity from DPRK’s nuclear sites were reported throughout 2019, and Pyongyang announced an imminent ‘very important test’ at a satellite-launching site; whereas perspectives for concrete steps towards denuclearisation of the area in the short-term are slim;

Or. en

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Amendment 43Urmas Paet

Motion for a resolutionRecital W a (new)


W a. whereas Inside the Arctic Circle, the number of nuclear-powered vessels has increased sharply over the last decade; whereas the presence of radiological and nuclear material in the Arctic poses a risk for serious incidents or accidents;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital W a (new)


Wa. whereas the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal on 8 May 2018 and the sanctions imposed by the United States have led to a very worrying stage of uncertainties in relation to Iran;

Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point a


(a) reiterate that effective (a) reiterate that effective

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multilateralism and rules-based international order are a pre-condition for countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons; reaffirm that the NPT is a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and is an irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening peace and security worldwide;

multilateralism and rules-based international order are a pre-condition for countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons; reaffirm that the NPT is a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, a vital bulwark against the risk of nuclear proliferation and an irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening peace and security worldwide;

Or. fr

Amendment 46Tonino Picula

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point b


(b) reaffirm the EU’s full support to the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and confirm the validity of the previous step-by-step approach based on commitments made during past review processes, in particular in 1995, 2000 and 2010; stress that a balanced approach between the three pillars is essential for a positive outcome of the 2020 Review Conference, and for the adoption of concrete, effective and consensual measures that would allow for previous commitments to be built on;

(b) reaffirm the EU’s full support to the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and confirm the validity of the previous step-by-step approach based on commitments made during past review processes, in particular in 1995, 2000 and 2010; stress that a balanced approach between the three pillars is essential for a positive outcome of the 2020 Review Conference, and for the adoption of concrete, effective and consensual measures that would allow for previous commitments to be built on; stress the important role of the EU in facilitating peace-oriented policies and promoting international stability;

Or. en


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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point b


(b) reaffirm the EU’s full support to the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and confirm the validity of the previous step-by-step approach based on commitments made during past review processes, in particular in 1995, 2000 and 2010; stress that a balanced approach between the three pillars is essential for a positive outcome of the 2020 Review Conference, and for the adoption of concrete, effective and consensual measures that would allow for previous commitments to be built on;

(b) reaffirm the full support of the EU and its Member States to the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and confirm the validity of the previous step-by-step approach based on commitments made during past review processes, in particular in 1995, 2000 and 2010; stress that a balanced approach between the three pillars is essential for a positive outcome of the 2020 Review Conference, and for the adoption of concrete, effective and consensual measures that would allow for previous commitments to be built on;

Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point b a (new)


(b a) adopt without delay a Council Decision formalising the common position of the EU as regards the NPT Review Conference which contains ambitious objectives and proposals in particular as regards the disarmament and non-proliferation pillar of NPT; remind the need to speak with one voice at international fora in order to strengthen the EU’s impact and foreign policy and recall in this respect previous common positions adopted by Council ahead of the 2010, 2015 and 2000 Review Conferences;

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Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point c a (new)


(c a) increase significantly its budget for seminars, conferences, and any kind of activity or initiative related to the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, similar initiatives on other regions, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament topics;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point d


(d) continue emphasising that any further deepening of divergences among states would lead to a progressive discrediting of the NPT as a reliable global legal instrument and to an erosion of the global disarmament regime; warn state parties that, owing to the lack of consensus at the 2015 Review Conference and the preparatory committees, the future of the NPT can no longer be taken for granted without clear commitment by the states;

(d) continue emphasising that any further deepening of divergences among states would lead to a progressive discrediting of the NPT as a reliable global legal instrument and to an erosion of the global disarmament regime, thereby raising the risk of further global nuclear arms proliferation; warn state parties that, owing to the lack of consensus at the 2015 Review Conference and the preparatory committees, the future of the NPT can no longer be taken for granted without clear commitment by the states;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point e


(e) remind the states that the 50th anniversary of the NPT, coinciding with the 2020 Review Conference, could provide momentum for engaging in a sincere and result-oriented dialogue in order to restore mutual trust and confidence, the aim being to enlarge areas of overlap and identify a common ground in order to make headway with discussions; the ultimate goal being the adoption of an agreed document recognising nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons as a common objective;

(e) remind the states that the 50th anniversary of the NPT, coinciding with the 2020 Review Conference, could provide momentum for engaging in a sincere and result-oriented dialogue in order to restore mutual trust and confidence, the aim being to enlarge areas of overlap and identify a common ground in order to make headway with discussions;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point e


(e) remind the states that the 50th anniversary of the NPT, coinciding with the 2020 Review Conference, could provide momentum for engaging in a sincere and result-oriented dialogue in order to restore mutual trust and confidence, the aim being to enlarge areas of overlap and identify a common ground in order to make headway with discussions; the ultimate goal being the adoption of an agreed document recognising nuclear disarmament and the

(e) remind the states that the 50th anniversary of the NPT, coinciding with the 2020 Review Conference, could provide momentum for engaging in a sincere and result-oriented dialogue in order to restore mutual trust and confidence, the aim being to enlarge areas of overlap and identify a common ground in order to make headway with discussions; the ultimate goal being the adoption of an agreed document recognising nuclear disarmament and the

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total elimination of nuclear weapons as a common objective;

total elimination of nuclear weapons as a common objective, in line with Article VI of the NPT;

Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point f


(f) call for a strong political leadership to support the NPT review conference; convey a message to the NPT state parties that the participation of the Heads of State and Government at the NPT review conference would show the importance the states attach to the NPT and to the review process; call on the representatives of the state parties to use the opportunity of the 10th Review Conference to reaffirm that ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’;

(f) call for a strong political leadership to support the NPT review conference; convey a message to the NPT state parties that the participation of the Heads of State and Government at the NPT review conference would show the importance the states attach to the NPT and to the review process;

Or. fr


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point g


(g) encourage the States to reconfirm their commitment to uphold and actively promote the 72-year practice of non-use of nuclear weapons as a binding, non-violable norm; highlight that safeguarding the norms against such use is key to preserving global security and achieving humanitarian objectives; warn

(g) welcome the fact that, for 72 years, nuclear weapons have not been used; warn NPT state parties that any expansion of the situations in which nuclear weapons could be used could seriously jeopardise global strategic stability and the practice of non-use;

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NPT state parties that any expansion of the situations in which nuclear weapons could be used could seriously jeopardise global strategic stability and the practice of non-use;

Or. fr

Amendment 55Javier Nart, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point g


(g) encourage the States to reconfirm their commitment to uphold and actively promote the 72-year practice of non-use of nuclear weapons as a binding, non-violable norm; highlight that safeguarding the norms against such use is key to preserving global security and achieving humanitarian objectives; warn NPT state parties that any expansion of the situations in which nuclear weapons could be used could seriously jeopardise global strategic stability and the practice of non-use;

(g) encourage the States to reconfirm their commitment to uphold and actively promote the 72-year practice of non-use of nuclear weapons as a binding, non-violable norm; highlight that safeguarding the norms against such use is key to preserving global security and achieving humanitarian objectives; warn NPT state parties that any expansion of the situations in which nuclear weapons could be used could seriously jeopardise global strategic stability and the practice of non-use; that the imposition of sanctions on any signatory country could be considered in the case of any withdrawal from the Treaty;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point h


(h) call on states to recognise nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-

(h) call on states to recognise nuclear arms and related delivery technologies

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proliferation regimes as crucial tools in substantially contributing to reversing the deterioration of the international security environment, thereby preventing major interstate war and preserving peace and security;

control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as crucial tools in confidence building and in substantially contributing to reversing the deterioration of the international security environment, thereby preventing major interstate war and preserving peace and security;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point h


(h) call on states to recognise nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as crucial tools in substantially contributing to reversing the deterioration of the international security environment, thereby preventing major interstate war and preserving peace and security;

(h) call on states in violation of the NPT such as Iran, to recognise nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as crucial tools in substantially contributing to reversing the deterioration of the international security environment, thereby preventing major interstate war and preserving peace and security;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point h a (new)


(h a) Stresses that the selective application of the Treaty or non-compliance with Treaty memoranda by some parties to the NPT undermines trust in the whole NPT system; calls on all signatories to the NPT to ensure compliance with the commitments that

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they signed up to;

Or. lt


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point i


(i) stress that effective nuclear disarmament verification is essential for achieving a world without nuclear weapons; pursue and intensify efforts, including in cooperation with international and regional organisations and civil society, to address verification challenges with respect to safety, security and non-proliferation requirements;

(i) stress that effective nuclear disarmament verification is essential for achieving a world without nuclear weapons; pursue and intensify efforts, including in cooperation with international and regional organisations and civil society, to address verification challenges with respect to safety, security and non-proliferation requirements; reaffirm that only a realistic arms limitation and confidence-building process will contribute to strategic stability and shared security;

Or. fr

Amendment 60Michael Gahler

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point k


(k) urge the US and Russia to assume responsibilities that stem from their possession of the bulk of world’s nuclear arsenal in order to enhance mutual trust and confidence in view of resuming a dialogue on possible ways to build a new arms control relationship; stress that a clear commitment by Russia and the US, ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to

(k) urge the US and Russia to assume responsibilities that stem from their possession of the bulk of world’s nuclear arsenal in order to enhance mutual trust and confidence in view of resuming a dialogue on possible ways to build a new arms control relationship; stress that a clear commitment by Russia and the US, ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to

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extend the new START Treaty before February 2021 would be an important contribution to the review conference; strongly encourage both parties to negotiate a new instrument that would encompass both deployed and non-deployed weapons, as well as strategic and non-strategic weapons;

extend the new START Treaty before February 2021 would be an important contribution to the review conference; strongly encourage both parties to negotiate a new instrument that would encompass both deployed and non-deployed weapons, as well as strategic and non-strategic weapons; expresses its concerns regarding Russia's recent deployment of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles in the region Orenburg; reminds Russia that all deployed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles will be subject to New Start’s overall 1,550 warhead limit and associated verification provisions;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point k


(k) urge the US and Russia to assume responsibilities that stem from their possession of the bulk of world’s nuclear arsenal in order to enhance mutual trust and confidence in view of resuming a dialogue on possible ways to build a new arms control relationship; stress that a clear commitment by Russia and the US, ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to extend the new START Treaty before February 2021 would be an important contribution to the review conference; strongly encourage both parties to negotiate a new instrument that would encompass both deployed and non-deployed weapons, as well as strategic and non-strategic weapons;

(k) urge the US and Russia to enhance mutual trust and confidence in view of resuming a dialogue on possible ways to build a new arms control relationship; stress that a clear commitment by Russia and the US, ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to extend the new START Treaty before February 2021 would be an important contribution to the review conference; strongly encourages both parties to negotiate a new instrument that would include China in light of its widespread proliferation of missile technologies, as well as strategic and non-strategic weapons;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point l


(l) reiterate the EU’s deep regret in connection with the recent collapse of the INF Treaty, while stressing the significant negative impact of this on European security; call on both signatories to the INF Treaty to resume dialogue on possible ways to put in place a new legally binding instrument for short- and medium-range missiles; support efforts to multilateralise such instrument;

(l) reiterate the EU’s deep regret in connection with the recent collapse of the INF Treaty due to Russia's deployment of the SSC-8 missile system, which is nuclear-capable, mobile, hard to detect, and lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict, while stressing the significant negative impact of this on European security; call on both signatories to the INF Treaty to resume dialogue on possible ways to put in place a new legally binding instrument for short- and medium-range missiles; support efforts to multilateralise such instruments to include China in light of its widespread proliferation of missile technologies;

Or. en

Amendment 63Özlem Demirel




(l) reiterate the EU’s deep regret in connection with the recent collapse of the INF Treaty, while stressing the significant negative impact of this on European security; call on both signatories to the INF Treaty to resume dialogue on possible ways to put in place a new legally binding instrument for short- and medium-range missiles; support efforts to multilateralise such instrument; urges both parties to explore the options for on-site inspections in order to solve the disputed aspects

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regarding every parties’ treaty obligations;

Or. en





(l) reiterate the EU’s deep regret in connection with the recent collapse of the INF Treaty, while stressing the significant negative impact of this on European security and on the strategic nuclear arms control architecture; call on both signatories to the INF Treaty to resume dialogue on possible ways to put in place a new legally binding instrument for short- and medium-range missiles; support efforts to multilateralise such instrument;

Or. fr





(l) reiterate the EU’s deep regret in connection with the recent collapse of the INF Treaty, while stressing the significant negative impact of this on European security; call on both signatories to the INF Treaty to resume dialogue on possible ways to put in place a new legally binding instrument for short- and medium-range missiles; support efforts to multilateralise such instrument to all countries owning

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this kind of weapons;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point l a (new)


(l a) express alarm at the demise of the INF Treaty, also in view of the fact that medium range missiles are particularly liable to increase the risks of nuclear escalation on the European continent;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point l a (new)


(l a) encourage talks about the possibility of a multilateral ballistic missile treaty that goes beyond the INF Treaty between U.S.A and Russia to include other parties;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point m a (new)

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(m a) call on Russia to abide by its commitment enshrined in the Budapest Memorandum and to respect the security guarantees offered to Ukraine;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point p


(p) highlight the contribution made by the NATO States in fulfilling their commitments under the NPT as regards reducing the stock of nuclear weapons by 95 % since the end of the Cold War, de-targeting them, reducing their alert status and downgrading their role in defence; call on NATO to pursue its efforts in further reducing nuclear weapons in full compliance with the NPT, based on the step-by-step approach that promotes international stability and security;

(p) highlight the contribution made by the NATO States in fulfilling their commitments under the NPT as regards reducing the stock of nuclear weapons by 95 % since the end of the Cold War, de-targeting them, reducing their alert status and downgrading their role in defence; call on NATO and other NPT signatory states to pursue their efforts in further reducing nuclear weapons in full compliance with the NPT, based on the step-by-step approach that promotes international stability and security;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point p


(p) highlight the contribution made by the NATO States in fulfilling their commitments under the NPT as regards reducing the stock of nuclear weapons by

(p) highlight the contribution made by the NATO States and Russia in fulfilling their commitments under the NPT as regards to substantially reducing their

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95 % since the end of the Cold War, de-targeting them, reducing their alert status and downgrading their role in defence; call on NATO to pursue its efforts in further reducing nuclear weapons in full compliance with the NPT, based on the step-by-step approach that promotes international stability and security;

stock of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, de-targeting them, reducing their alert status and downgrading their role in defence; calls on both parties to pursue its efforts in further reducing nuclear weapons in full compliance with the NPT, based on the step-by-step approach that promotes international stability and security;

Or. en

Amendment 71Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Bernard Guetta, Christophe Grudler

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point q


(q) consider the adoption of the TPNW by 122 states as evidence of the desire of the majority of the international community to achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapons-free world;

deleted

Or. en





(q) note that the adoption of the TPNW by 122 states is evidence of the desire to achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapons-free world; stress that nuclear disarmament cannot be separated from collective security and can only be achieved while taking into account the strategic context; that it must be part of a gradual process guaranteeing the

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undiminished security of all and preventing any new arms race; recall that, as a means of preventing the quantitative development of nuclear weapons arsenals, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is a vital and irreplaceable step towards a world free of nuclear weapons;

Or. fr





(q) consider the adoption of the TPNW by 122 states as evidence of the desire of the majority of the international community to achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapons-free world; urges all EU member states to sign and ratify the TPNW;

Or. en

Amendment 74Javier Nart, Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius




(q) consider the adoption of the TPNW by 122 states, signed by 80 States and ratified by 35, as evidence of the desire of the majority of the international community to achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapons-free world;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point q a (new)


(q a) welcome the initiative undertaken by a majority of NPT State Parties to strengthen multilateral approaches to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by adopting the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), unequivocally stigmatising the last weapons of mass destruction not yet prohibited under international law;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point q b (new)


(q b) highlight the complementary nature of the nuclear weapon prohibition treaty, as foreseen by Article 6 of the NPT; note in particular that stigmatising nuclear weapons will contribute both to disarmament and to non-proliferation efforts;

Or. en



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Paragraph 1 – point q c (new)


(q c) look forward to entry into force of the TPNW as soon as the 50th ratification instrument is deposited at the United Nations, ensuring the prohibition under international law of all weapons of mass destruction;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point q d (new)


(q d) consider to position itself vis-a-vis the TPNW and its objectives and to look into the arguments that led to its establishment such as the humanitarian consequences of nuclear detonations and other risks associated with the possession of such weapons of mass destruction;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point q e (new)


(q e) consider initiating an open discussion on the consequences and risks associated with the possession of nuclear weapons and the meaningfulness of the concept of nuclear deterrence in the 21st

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century;

Or. en

Amendment 80Joachim Schuster, Dietmar Köster

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point r


(r) confirm the inalienable right of the NPT parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to meet their long-term energy requirements, in conformity with the NPT provisions; work with countries wishing to develop capacities in this area towards a responsible use of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, provided all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met; recall in particular that the needs of developing countries should be duly taken into account; encourage the state parties to use the opportunity of the 2020 review process to further deepen the debate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; recognise the role and value of the IAEA and its safeguard system in implementing the NPT and in strengthening the nuclear security framework;

deleted

Or. en




(r) confirm the inalienable right of (r) acknowledge the fact that nuclear

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the NPT parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to meet their long-term energy requirements, in conformity with the NPT provisions; work with countries wishing to develop capacities in this area towards a responsible use of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, provided all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met; recall in particular that the needs of developing countries should be duly taken into account; encourage the state parties to use the opportunity of the 2020 review process to further deepen the debate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; recognise the role and value of the IAEA and its safeguard system in implementing the NPT and in strengthening the nuclear security framework;

energy is a dual-use technology and that every civil program can be used by the relevant state to acquire nuclear weapons within a short period of time and to possibly contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and undermine the NPT objective of nuclear disarmament; conclude that for security and defence considerations this pillar of NPT needs to be reconsidered as it significantly weakens its nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives;

Or. en

Amendment 82Petras Auštrevičius, Urmas Paet, Javier Nart



(r) confirm the inalienable right of the NPT parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to meet their long-term energy requirements, in conformity with the NPT provisions; work with countries wishing to develop capacities in this area towards a responsible use of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, provided all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met; recall in particular that the needs of developing countries should be duly taken into account; encourage the state parties to use the opportunity of the 2020 review process to further deepen the debate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; recognise the role and value of the IAEA and its safeguard system in

(r) confirm the inalienable right of the NPT parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to meet their long-term energy requirements, in conformity with the NPT provisions; work with countries wishing to develop capacities in this area towards a responsible use of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, provided all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met; in cases when such countries fail to cooperate and comply with all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions, an appropriate measures to be considered; provide help and make it obligatory for countries wishing to develop capacities in the peaceful use of nuclear energy to develop a strong nuclear safety culture;

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implementing the NPT and in strengthening the nuclear security framework;

recognise the role and value of the IAEA and its safeguard system in implementing the NPT and in strengthening the nuclear security framework;

Or. en




(r) confirm the inalienable right of the NPT parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to meet their long-term energy requirements, in conformity with the NPT provisions; work with countries wishing to develop capacities in this area towards a responsible use of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, provided all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met; recall in particular that the needs of developing countries should be duly taken into account; encourage the state parties to use the opportunity of the 2020 review process to further deepen the debate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; recognise the role and value of the IAEA and its safeguard system in implementing the NPT and in strengthening the nuclear security framework;

(r) confirm the right of the NPT parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to meet their long-term energy requirements, in conformity with the NPT provisions; work with countries wishing to develop capacities in this area towards a responsible use of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, provided all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met; recall in particular that the needs of developing countries should be duly taken into account; encourage the state parties to use the opportunity of the 2020 review process to further deepen the debate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; recognise the role and value of the IAEA and its safeguard system in implementing the NPT and in strengthening the nuclear security framework;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point r a (new)

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(r a) limit the transfer of proliferation-relevant nuclear technology to NPT State Parties which have concluded and are implementing IAEA full scope safeguards, thus supporting the decision by the 1995 NPT review conference that new supply arrangements for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point r b (new)


(r b) insist that nuclear technology transfers should be limited to those NPT states parties that have concluded and are implementing an Additional Protocol to their IAEA safeguards agreements and have committed, in a binding way, to not pursue national enrichment or reprocessing capabilities ("gold standard");

Or. en

Amendment 86Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point s

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(s) continue its efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in line with the 1995 resolution; pursue the initiatives carried out in order to promote confidence-building through actions aimed at fostering inclusive dialogue among experts and policy makers, supported by a financial envelope of EUR 2.86 million for the implementation of the projects;

(s) continue its efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in line with the 1995 resolution, which are today jeopardized by the resumption of Iran's uranium enrichment activities and Israel's reaction with this regard; pursue the initiatives carried out in order to promote confidence-building through actions aimed at fostering inclusive dialogue among experts and policy makers, supported by a financial envelope of EUR 2.86 million for the implementation of the projects;

Or. en

Amendment 87Javier Nart

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point s


(s) continue its efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in line with the 1995 resolution; pursue the initiatives carried out in order to promote confidence-building through actions aimed at fostering inclusive dialogue among experts and policy makers, supported by a financial envelope of EUR 2.86 million for the implementation of the projects;

(s) continue its efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in line with the 1995 resolution, which are today weakened by Israel's policies and the resumption on Iran's uranium enrichment activities ; pursue the initiatives carried out in order to promote confidence-building through actions aimed at fostering inclusive dialogue among experts and policy makers, supported by a financial envelope of EUR 2.86 million for the implementation of the projects;

Or. en

Amendment 88

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Antonio López-Istúriz White, Vangelis Meimarakis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point t


(t) take into account the outcome of the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and continue supporting the longstanding goal of drafting a legally binding treaty allowing for the establishment of a MENWFZ; encourage all participating states to do their utmost to advance in this endeavour at the second session of the Conference;

deleted

Or. en





(t) support the regional approach as one of the important avenues for the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation; take into account the outcome of the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and continue supporting the longstanding goal of drafting a legally binding treaty allowing for the establishment of a MENWFZ; encourage all participating states to do their utmost to advance in this endeavour at the second session of the Conference;

Or. fr

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(t) take into account the outcome of the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, the abstention from an instauration of a convention by all 28 Member States and continue supporting the longstanding goal of drafting a legally binding treaty allowing for the establishment of a MENWFZ; encourage all participating states to do their utmost to advance in this endeavour at the second session of the Conference;

Or. en

Amendment 91Petras Auštrevičius, Javier Nart




(t) continue supporting the Establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, given that all official exchanges and decisions related to the disarmament issues to be held under a format based on the agreed principles of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC); encourage all participating states to do their utmost to advance in this endeavour at the next session of the Conference on the establishment of MENWFZ;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point t a (new)


(t a) Calls for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in Europe; urges in particular the French and British governments to disarm their nuclear weapons; urges the US government to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and the government of the Russian Federation to not deploy/or withdraw its nuclear weapons from the western part of its territory; calls for the dissolution of all nuclear sharing arrangements between EU Member States and the USA/NATO;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point t a (new)


(t a) consider initiating a process leading to a European Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains;

Or. en



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Paragraph 1 – point t b (new)


(t b) recognise that mutual and simultaneous removal of short-range, theatre and designated sub-strategic nuclear-weapon warheads from European territory could contribute positively to creating the conditions for the construction of further Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the non-proliferation and disarmament obligations contained in the NPT and, in the meantime, setting a precedent for further nuclear disarmament;

Or. en

Amendment 95Jérôme Rivière, Nicolas Bay, Thierry Mariani

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point u


(u) uphold the ‘stepping-stone approach’ proposal put forward by Sweden with the aim of building political support for pragmatic, short-term, achievable commitments to the global disarmament regime, the overall goal of which is to rebuild trust and confidence; support measures focused on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons; enhance habits of cooperation among states; reduce nuclear risks; and enhance transparency, as intermediate steps towards facilitating the fulfilment of existing obligations by state parties;

deleted

Or. fr

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point u a (new)


(u a) invites states to consider the scientific evidence for the concept of nuclear deterrence, assess the risks and contradictions inherent to this posture, including risks of accident, miscommunication, malfunction, and deliberate escalation;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point v


(v) call on the state parties to develop and put in place measures aimed at mitigating the risks of using nuclear weapons, be it intentionally, by misperception or miscalculation in an escalating conflict, or accidentally; measures could include improving communication channels and protocols, creating a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear assets, as well as improving resilience to cyberattacks and extending decision-time in a crisis;

(v) call on the state parties to develop and put in place measures aimed at mitigating the risks of using nuclear weapons, whether unintentionally or accidentally; measures could include improving communication channels and protocols, creating a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear assets, as well as improving resilience to cyberattacks and extending decision-time in a crisis;

Or. fr

Amendment 98Petras Auštrevičius, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Javier Nart

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(v) call on the state parties to develop and put in place measures aimed at mitigating the risks of using nuclear weapons, be it intentionally, by misperception or miscalculation in an escalating conflict, or accidentally; measures could include improving communication channels and protocols, creating a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear assets, as well as improving resilience to hybrid threats, cyberattacks and extending decision-time in a crisis;

Or. en





(v) call on the state parties to develop and put in place measures aimed at mitigating the risks of using nuclear weapons, be it intentionally, by misperception or miscalculation in an escalating conflict, or accidentally; measures could include improving communication channels and protocols, cybersecurity, creating a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear assets, as well as improving resilience to cyberattacks and extending decision-time in a crisis;

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point w


(w) support the commitment to enhance transparency by the nuclear-weapon states in line with the 13 steps on disarmament adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; recall that further improving the reporting mechanism by systematising the nuclear-weapon-states’ reporting frameworks would contribute to achieving the same level of transparency among the different nuclear-weapon states; in this context calls on the EU to pay special attention to the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative proposals to enhance transparency for strengthening the review process of the NPT;

(w) support the commitment to enhance transparency among all nuclear-armed signatories of the NPT in line with the 13 steps on disarmament adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; recall that further improving the reporting mechanism by systematising the nuclear-weapon-states’ reporting frameworks would contribute to achieving the same level of transparency among the different nuclear-weapon states; in this context calls on the EU to pay special attention to the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative proposals to enhance transparency for strengthening the review process of the NPT;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point y


(y) call on all states to engage without further delay in discussions on the path towards the launch and completion of one of the outstanding priorities – the treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons – as a vital step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;

(y) call on all states to engage without further delay in discussions on the path towards the launch and completion of one of the outstanding priorities – the treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons – as an indispensable means of ruling out the risk of a resumption of the nuclear arms race and a vital step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;

Or. fr

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point z


(z) ensure that the EU continues to be a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO); recall also the importance and urgency of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT;

(z) ensure that the EU continues to be a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO); recall also the importance and urgency of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT in order to prevent new weapons from being developed;

Or. fr

Amendment 103Charlie Weimers

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point aa


(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

deleted

Or. en

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(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT; call upon the United States to reconsider its position on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) relating to Iran’s nuclear programme, resume its role as a party to the JCPOA and work together with the five other partners to fully implement the Vienna agreement;

Or. fr




(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on

(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; regret

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Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

Iran’s removal of limits on its production of enriched uranium, which can be used for the production of reactor fuel, as well as nuclear weapons, thereby contradicting its commitments under the JCPOA; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

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(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions, which are inaugurating a stage marked by very worrying uncertainty regarding international stability and security; reaffirm the need to reach agreement in order to reduce the threat posed by Iran’s missile programme; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

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Amendment 107Michael Gahler


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(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; regret Iran's support of violent non-state actors and the development and use of ballistic missile capabilities destabilizing the broader Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

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Amendment 108Mazaly Aguilar, Hermann Tertsch, Assita Kanko




(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US and Iran´s alleged violations resulting in dispute mechanisms being triggered by all European signatories to the JCPOA risking the re-imposition of sanctions should Iran continue its violations; calls on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

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Amendment 109Jytte Guteland




(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; continue emphasising the EU’s important role in finding a way forwards when it comes to securing the nuclear agreement; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

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Amendment 110Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Bernard Guetta, Christophe Grudler, Petras Auštrevičius



(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s regret over

(aa) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for stability and security in the Middle East; reiterate the EU’s deep concern over

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the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

Iran's violations of its commitments since July 2019; and deplores the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on Iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point ab


(ab) reiterate the EU’s full support to the objective of the denuclearisation of the DPRK in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions; urge DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons programme and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards; continue to support the ongoing dialogue process while seeking a more active part in the negotiations, capitalising on its diplomatic expertise;

(ab) reiterate the EU’s full support to the objective of the denuclearisation of the DPRK in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions; urge DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons programme and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards; continue to support the ongoing dialogue process while seeking a more active part in the negotiations, capitalising on its diplomatic expertise; recall that the DPRK continues to represent a regional and international nuclear and ballistic threat;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point ac a (new)


(ac a) call on the State Parties to take in consideration a reform of the structure of

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the Treaty that provides for forms of accession even for those States that are already in possession of nuclear weapons;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point ad a (new)


(ada) recall that nuclear disarmament must be carried out in a realistic and progressive manner, with due regard for the security interests of all, and that the reduction of strategic risks related to nuclear weapons is based on the transparency of nuclear doctrines, dialogue between political and military decision-makers, crisis communication tools and reinsurance measures;

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(ad a) express support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery, in the Middle East, in line with the 1995 resolution and the final document from the 2010 NPT review conference;

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(ad a) reiterate the EU’s commitment to encouraging India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea to take necessary and decisive steps towards nuclear disarmament;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 – point ad b (new)


(ad b) emphasise that the NPT has been indispensable for peace and security in the world for five decades;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 a (new)


1a. Recalls its commitment to the sovereignty of States; considers that, while non-proliferation is desirable, only States can decide whether they wish to opt for total nuclear disarmament;

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Documents

AM Com NonLegReport · 2020-02-06 · Antonio López-Istúriz White, Vangelis Meimarakis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou Motion for a resolution Recital J Motion for a resolution Amendment