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CakeCuttingAlgorithms
EricPacuit
January
7,2007
ILLC,University
ofAmsterdam
staff.science.uva.nl/∼epacuit
PlanforToday
Discuss
somefairdivisionalgorithms
•Whatdoes
itmeanto
�fairly�dividegoods?
•IndivisibleGoods
•DivisibleGoods(C
uttingaCake)
�DivideandChoose
�SurplusProcedure
�Banach-K
naster
Last
Dim
inisher
�Dubins-SpanierMovingKnifeProcedure
Main
Question
How
dowecu
tacake
fairly?
Main
Question
How
dowecu
tacake
fairly?
•anydesirablesetofgood
s(orchoresormixtures)
•each
may
bedivisibleorindivisible
•theremay
berestrictions(such
asthenumber
ofgoodsaplayer
may
receive)
Main
Question
How
dowecu
tacake
fairly?
•discreteprocedure
•continuousmovingknifeprocedures
•compensationprocedures(usingmoney
asadivisiblemedium
forindivisibleobjects)
Main
Question
How
dowecu
tacake
fairly?
•Interested
notonly
intheexistence
ofa(fair)divisionbutalso
aconstructiveprocedure
(analgorithm)for�ndingit
Main
Question
How
dowecu
tacake
fairly?
•Di�erentresultsknow
nfor2,3,4,.
..cutters!
Main
Question
How
dowecu
tacake
fairly?
•Manywaysto
makethisprecise!
Fairness
Conditions
•Proportional:
(fortwoplayers)
each
player
receives
atleast
50%
oftheirvaluation.
•Envy-Free:nopartyiswillingto
giveupitsallocationin
exchangefortheother
player'sallocation,so
noplayersenvies
anyoneelse.
•Equitable:
each
player
values
itsallocationthesame
accordingto
itsownva
luationfunction.
•E�ciency:
thereisnoother
divisionbetterforeverybody,or
betterforsomeplayersandnotworsefortheothers
Fairness
Conditions
•Proportional:
(fortwoplayers)
each
player
receives
atleast
50%
oftheirvaluation.
•Envy-Free:nopartyiswillingto
giveupitsallocationin
exchangefortheother
player'sallocation,so
noplayersenvies
anyoneelse.
•Equitable:
each
player
values
itsallocationthesame
accordingto
itsownva
luationfunction.
•E�ciency:
thereisnoother
divisionbetterforeverybody,or
betterforsomeplayersandnotworsefortheothers
Fairness
Conditions
•Proportional:
(fortwoplayers)
each
player
receives
atleast
50%
oftheirvaluation.
•Envy-Free:nopartyiswillingto
giveupitsallocationin
exchangefortheother
player'sallocation,so
noplayersenvies
anyoneelse.
•Equitable:
each
player
values
itsallocationthesame
accordingto
itsownva
luationfunction.
•E�ciency:
thereisnoother
divisionbetterforeverybody,or
betterforsomeplayersandnotworsefortheothers
Fairness
Conditions
•Proportional:
(fortwoplayers)
each
player
receives
atleast
50%
oftheirvaluation.
•Envy-Free:nopartyiswillingto
giveupitsallocationin
exchangefortheother
player'sallocation,so
noplayersenvies
anyoneelse.
•Equitable:
each
player
values
itsallocationthesame
accordingto
itsownva
luationfunction.
•E�ciency:
thereisnoother
divisionbetterforeverybody,or
betterforsomeplayersandnotworsefortheothers
Truthfulness
Someproceduresask
playersto
representtheirpreferences.
This
representationneednotbe
�truthful�
Typically,itisassumed
thatagents
willfollow
amaxim
instrategy
(maxim
izethesetofitem
sthatare
guaranteed)
Main
References
S.BramsandA.Taylor.FairDivision:From
Cake-Cuttingto
Dispute
Reso-
lution.1996.
J.RobertsonandW.Webb.Cake-CuttingAlgorithms:
BeFair
IfYouCan.
1998.
J.Barbanel.TheGeometryofE�cientFairDivision.2005.
IndivisibleGoods
S.Brams,P.EdelmanandP.Fishburn.ParadoxesofFairDivision.
Journal
ofPhilosophy,98:6(2001).
IndivisibleGoods
S.Brams,P.EdelmanandP.Fishburn.ParadoxesofFairDivision.
Journal
ofPhilosophy,98:6(2001).
•Playerscannotcompensate
each
other
withsidepayments
•Allplayershavepositivevalues
foreveryitem
•LiftPreferencesto
Sets:
Aplayer
prefers
aset
Sto
aset
Tif
�Shasasmanyelem
ents
as
T
�foreveryitem
int∈
T−
Sthereisadistinct
item
s∈
S−
T
thattheplayer
prefers
tot.
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
Thisistheuniqueen
vy-freeoutcome.
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
Thedivision
(12,
34,5
6)pareto-dominatestheabovedivision
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
Thedivision
(12,
34,5
6)pareto-dominatestheabovedivision
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
Thedivision
(12,
34,5
6)pareto-dominatestheabovedivision
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
Thedivision
(12,
34,5
6)pareto-dominatestheabovedivision
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
How
ever,(1
2,34
,56)
isnot(necessarily)envy-free
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Auniqueen
vy-freedivisionmaybe
ine�
cien
t
A:
12
34
56
B:
43
21
56
C:
51
26
34
A:{
1,3}
B:{
2,4}
C:{
5,6}
Thereisnoother
division,includingane�
cientone,that
guarantees
envy-freeness.
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Theremaybe
noen
vy-freedivision,even
when
allplayers
have
di�eren
tpreference
rankings
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Theremaybe
noen
vy-freedivision,even
when
allplayers
have
di�eren
tpreference
rankings
Trivialifallplayershavethesamepreference.
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Theremaybe
noen
vy-freedivision,even
when
allplayers
have
di�eren
tpreference
rankings A
:1
23
B:
13
2
C:
21
3
Threedivisionsare
e�cient:
(1,3
,2),
(2,1
,3)and
(3,1
,2).
How
ever,noneofthem
are
envy-free.
IndivisibleGoods:
Envy-Freeness
andE�ciency
Theremaybe
noen
vy-freedivision,even
when
allplayers
have
di�eren
tpreference
rankings A
:1
23
B:
13
2
C:
21
3
Threedivisionsare
e�cient:
(1,3
,2),
(2,1
,3)and
(3,1
,2).
How
ever,noneofthem
are
envy-free.
Infact,thereisnoenvy-freedivision.
2Players,1Cake
Twoplayers
Aand
B
Thecakeistheunitinterval[0
,1]
Only
parallel,verticalcuts,perpendicularto
thehorizontalx-axis
are
made
2Players,1Cake
Each
player
hasacontinuousvaluemeasure
v A(x
)and
v B(x
)on
[0,1
]such
that
•v A
(x)≥
0and
v B(x
)≥
0for
x∈
[0,1
]
•v A
and
v Bare
�nitelyadditive,non-atomic,absolutely
continuousmeasures
•theareasunder
v Aand
v Bon
[0,1
]is1(probabilitydensity
function)
2Players,1Cake
Each
player
hasacontinuousvaluemeasure
v A(x
)and
v B(x
)on
[0,1
]such
that
•v A
(x)≥
0and
v B(x
)≥
0for
x∈
[0,1
]
•v A
and
v Bare
�nitelyadditive,non-atomic,absolutely
continuousmeasures
•theareasunder
v Aand
v Bon
[0,1
]is1(probabilitydensity
function)
valueof�nitenumberofdisjointpiecesequals
theva
lueoftheir
union(hen
ce,nosubp
ieceshave
greaterva
luethanthelarger
piece
containingthem
).
2Players,1Cake
Each
player
hasacontinuousvaluemeasure
v A(x
)and
v B(x
)on
[0,1
]such
that
•v A
(x)≥
0and
v B(x
)≥
0for
x∈
[0,1
]
•v A
and
v Bare
�nitelyadditive,non-atomic,absolutely
continuousmeasures
•theareasunder
v Aand
v Bon
[0,1
]is1(probabilitydensity
function)
asinglecu
t(w
hichde�
nes
theborder
ofapiece)hasnoareaandso
hasnova
lue.
2Players,1Cake
Each
player
hasacontinuousvaluemeasure
v A(x
)and
v B(x
)on
[0,1
]such
that
•v A
(x)≥
0and
v B(x
)≥
0for
x∈
[0,1
]
•v A
and
v Bare
�nitelyadditive,non-atomic,absolutely
continuousmeasures
•theareasunder
v Aand
v Bon
[0,1
]is1(probabilitydensity
function)
nopo
rtionofcake
isofpo
sitive
measure
foroneplayerandzero
measure
foranother
player.
CuttingaCake:DivideandChoose
Procedure:oneplayer
cuts
thecakeinto
twoportionsandthe
other
player
choosesone.
Suppose
Aisthecutter.
IfAhasnoinform
ationabouttheother
player'spreferences,then
A
should
cutthecakeatsomepoint
xso
thatthevalueoftheportion
totheleftofxisequalto
thevalueoftheportionto
theright.
Thisstrategycreatesanenvy-freeande�cientallocation,butit
isnotnecessarilyequitable.
CuttingaCake:DivideandChoose
Suppose
Avalues
thevanilla
halftw
iceasmuch
asthechocolate
half.Hence,
v A(x
)=
4/3
x∈
[0,1
/2]
2/3
x∈
(1/2,
1]
v B(x
)=
1/2
x∈
[0,1
/2]
1/2
x∈
(1/2,
1]
Ashould
cutthecakeat
x=
3/8:
(4/3
)(x−
0)=
4/3(
1/2−
x)+
2/3(
1−
1/2)
Note
thattheportionsare
notequitable(B
receive
5/8according
tohisvaluation)
SurplusProcedure
SurplusProcedure
1.Independently,
Aand
Breport
theirvaluefunctions
f Aand
f B
over
[0,1
]to
areferee.
Theseneednotbethesameas
v Aand
v B.
SurplusProcedure
1.Independently,
Aand
Breport
theirvaluefunctions
f Aand
f B
over
[0,1
]to
areferee.
Theseneednotbethesameas
v Aand
v B.
2.Therefereedetermines
the50-50points
aand
bofA
and
B
accordingto
f Aand
f B,respectively.
SurplusProcedure
1.Independently,
Aand
Breport
theirvaluefunctions
f Aand
f B
over
[0,1
]to
areferee.
Theseneednotbethesameas
v Aand
v B.
2.Therefereedetermines
the50-50points
aand
bofA
and
B
accordingto
f Aand
f B,respectively.
3.If
aand
bcoincide,thecakeiscutat
a=
b.Oneplayer
is
randomly
assigned
thepiece
totheleftandtheother
tothe
right.
Theprocedure
ends.
SurplusProcedure
1.Independently,
Aand
Breport
theirvaluefunctions
f Aand
f B
over
[0,1
]to
areferee.
Theseneednotbethesameas
v Aand
v B.
2.Therefereedetermines
the50-50points
aand
bofA
and
B
accordingto
f Aand
f B,respectively.
3.If
aand
bcoincide,thecakeiscutat
a=
b.Oneplayer
is
randomly
assigned
thepiece
totheleftandtheother
tothe
right.
Theprocedure
ends.
4.Suppose
aisto
theleftofb(T
hen
Areceives
[0,a
]andB
receives
[b,1
]).Cutthecakeapoint
cin
[a,b
]atwhichthe
playersreceivethesamepropo
rtion
pofthecakein
this
interval.
SurplusProcedure
Aprocedure
isstrategy-proofifmaxim
inplayersalwayshavean
incentiveto
let
f A=
v Aand
f B=
v B.
Let
cbethecut-pointthatguarantees
proportionalequitabilityand
ethecut-pointthatguarantees
equitabilityofthesurplus.
Theorem
TheSurplusProcedure
isstrategy-proof,whereasany
procedure
thatmakes
ethecut-pointisstrategy-vulnerable.
3Players,2Cuts
FactIt
isnotalwayspossibleto
divideacakeamongthreeplayers
intoenvy-freeandequitable
portionsusing2cuts.
More
than2Players
Adivisionissuper-envyfreeifeveryplayer
feelsallother
players
received
strictly
less
that
1/nofthetotalvalueofthecake.
Theorem
(Barbenel)
Asuper
envy-freedivisionexists
ifand
only
iftheplayer
measuresare
linearlyindependent.
(infact,there
are
in�nitelymanysuch
divisions)
J.Barbanel.Superenvy-freecakedivisionandindependence
ofmeasures.
J.
Math.Anal.Appl.(1996).
Banach-K
nasterLast
Dim
inisherProcedure
Suppose
thereare
ndi�erentagents:
p1,.
..,p
n.
Procedure:
•The�rstperson(p
1)cuts
outapiece
whichheclaim
sishisfair
share.
•Then,thepiece
goes
aroundbeinginspected,in
turn,by
persons
p2,p
3,.
..,p
n.
�Anyonewhothinksthepiece
isnottoolargejust
passes
it.
Anyonewhothinksitistoobig,may
reduce
it,putting
someback
into
themain
part.
Banach-K
nasterLast
Dim
inisherProcedure
•After
thepiece
hasbeeninspectedby
pn,thelast
personwho
reducedthepiece,takes
it.Ifthereisnosuch
person,i.e.,no
onechallenged
p1,then
thepiece
istaken
by
p1.
•Thealgorithm
continues
with
n−
1participants.
Thisprocedure
isequitablebutnotenvy-free
Dubins-SpanierMoving-K
nifeProcedure
Procedure:
Arefereeholdsaknifeattheleftedgeofthecake
andslow
lymoves
itacross
thecakeso
thatitremainsparallelto
its
startingposition.
Atanytime,anyoneofthethreeplayers(A
,B
or
C)cancall�cut�.
When
thisoccurs,theplayer
whocalled
cutreceives
thepiece
to
theleftoftheknifeandexitsthegame.
Dubins-SpanierMoving-K
nifeProcedure
Thegamenow
continues
movinguntilasecondplayer
callscut.
Thesecondplayer
receives
thesecondpiece
andthethirdplayer
getstheremainder.
Ifeither
twoorthreeplayerscallcutatthesametime,thecut
piece
isgiven
tooneofthecallersatrandom.
Thisprocedure
isequitablebutnotenvy-free
OpenQuestions
•3-person,2-cutenvy-freeprocedureshavebeenfound
(Stromquist,1980;BarbanelandBrams,2004)
OpenQuestions
•3-person,2-cutenvy-freeprocedureshavebeenfound
(Stromquist,1980;BarbanelandBrams,2004)
•4-person,3-cutenvyfree
procedure?(U
nknow
n)
�(B
arbanelandBrams,2004):
nomore
than5cuts
are
needed
to
ensure
4-personenvy-freeness.
OpenQuestions
•3-person,2-cutenvy-freeprocedureshavebeenfound
(Stromquist,1980;BarbanelandBrams,2004)
•4-person,3-cutenvyfree
procedure?(U
nknow
n)
�(B
arbanelandBrams,2004):
nomore
than5cuts
are
needed
to
ensure
4-personenvy-freeness.
•Beyond4players,
noprocedure
iskn
own
thatyieldsan
envy-freedivisionofacakeunless
anunbounded
number
ofcuts
isallow
ed(B
ramsandTaylor,1995)
Howaboutsomepie?
Acakeisalinesegmentandbecomes
apiewhen
itsendpoints
are
connectedto
form
acircle.
Thecuts
dividethepieinto
sectors
each
oneofwhichisgiven
toa
player
Gale(1993):
Isthereanallocationofthepiethatisenvy-freeand
undominated?
BarabanelandBrams:
for2playersyes,for3playersenvy-freebut
notnecessarily
undominated,for4playersno.
J.BarbanelandS.Brams.CuttingaPieIs
NotaPiece
ofCake.2005.
References
F.Su.ReviewofCake-CuttingAlgorithms:
BeFair
IfYouCan.American
Mathem
aticalMonthly
(2000).
S.Brams,M.Jones
andC.Klamler.
BetterWaysto
CutaCake.Noticesof
theAMS(2006).
S.BramsandA.Taylor.FairDivision:From
Cake-Cuttingto
Dispute
Reso-
lution.1996.
S.Brams,P.EdelmanandP.Fishburn.ParadoxesofFairDivision.
Journal
ofPhilosophy,98:6(2001).