Alex Jackson Turkey Russia Paper

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Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea Region: An Unequal

Partnership?Alexander Jackson1

The Black Sea region is the key area in which Turkey and Russia interact. As post-imperial

powers which retain extensive military, political, economic and cultural influence in the

region, they have the ability to significantly affect regional geopolitics. Therefore

understanding their bilateral relationship, and the extent to which one partner is dominant in

different aspects of that relationship, is critical for any comprehensive understanding of

regional dynamics. This paper studies four key aspects of their bilateral relationship and finds

that Turkeys economic and energy dependence on Russia ensures that Moscow is the

dominant player in the region.

The Black Sea region remains a contested concept, but the dominant positions of Turkey andRussia within this space are undoubted. Their geopolitical, military, economic and culturalinfluence gives them the capability to shape the region in a way which outside actors do not.

Given this, the relationship between them is critical to understanding the Black Sea region. Thechanging dynamics of competition and cooperation between the two powers has historicallyhad an enormous influence on the area. Although neither is now an imperial power, the samedynamics are still significant today: the bilateral relationship helps to determine the multilateralenvironment.

This paper will not dwell on each aspect of the Moscow-Ankara relationship. Instead it will

identify key areas of conflict and cooperation. However, it is useful to summarise the maincontours of their bilateral relationship.

Historically, relations between the two were tense, with the Black Sea region serving as a zoneof conflict and confrontation between them (a western version of the Great Game whichRussia played with Britain in Central Asia). Since the end of the Cold War, ties have greatlyimproved, particularly in the Putin/AKP era a remarkably significant historical shift2. Thereare four main aspects to their relationship.

Firstly, energy has been a critical component. Russia provides around 70% of Turkeys naturalgas and oil, which is essential to support the countrys economic boom3. Russia is also

investing heavily in Turkeys energy infrastructure and is heavily involved in building nuclearpower stations in Turkey. Secondly, the two sides are close economic partners, even excludingenergy4. Russia became Turkeys largest trading partner in 2008; mutual trade is now around$26 billion, in which tourism, construction, and small-scale shuttle trade are prominent.Turkey runs a serious deficit: Turkish imports from Russia were $21.6 billion in 2010, whilstTurkish exports to Russia were just $4.6 billion5.

1 The author is an independent writer and analyst focusing on the Caspian region. He currently acts as a politicalrisk consultant.2 Punsmann, B (2010) Thinking about the Caucasus as a Land Bridge between Turkey and Russia TEPAV

Policy Note. Available at: http://bit.ly/rtVeML3 Turkey, Russia accelerate cooperationHrriyet Daily News 19/1/120114 Kiniklioglu, S (2006) Turkey and Russia: Partnership By Exclusion?Insight Turkey Vol. 8 No.2. Availableat: http://bit.ly/qfK4yS5 Russia becomes Turkish exporters target market with visa-free travel Todays Zaman 24/4/2011.

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Thirdly, both sides share an interest in maintaining security in the Black Sea region. At a basiclevel this involves a joint desire to prevent non-conventional and inconsequential threats suchas terrorism, weapons proliferation and drug smuggling. However, it also involves refrainingfrom becoming involved in disputes which the other is involved in. Thus Russia has ended itsearlier support for Kurdish separatists, and Turkey has clamped down on Chechen rebels based

in Turkey.

Fourthly and most broadly, both Russia and Turkey seek to cooperate politically and limit theintrusion of Western powers into the Black Sea region. The extent to which they seek to dothis, and the extent to which they cooperate (as a Moscow-Ankara axis), is hotly contested.Clearly, Russian opposition to encirclement by Western blocs is stronger than that of NATOmember and EU aspirant Turkey.

This aspect of their relationship, which acts as a conditioning framework on other aspects,fluctuates with internal politics, regional geopolitics, and most crucially the status ofrelations between both parties and the West. As Turkeys relationship with its traditional allies

has faltered, Russia has become a more attractive partner. In that regard the March 2003decision by the Turkish Parliament to prevent US forces from entering Iraq via Turkey iswidely seen as a watershed, a sign that Turkey was willing to defy its traditional partners.

This paper assesses four key aspects and events of the Russia-Turkish relationship, identifyingareas in which the balance of power dynamics are equal and areas in which one party has beenable to exercise significant influence over the other.

The Russia-Georgia War

There is no better illustration of the regional tension between Turkey and Russia than the warbetween Russia and Georgia in 2008. Turkey was faced with a major conventional war betweentwo of its Black Sea neighbours; one of its biggest regional commercial and political partnerson the one hand, and its immediate neighbour and a valuable strategic ally on the other.

Ankara was therefore in a deeply uncomfortable position. Its response was restrained andcautious during the conflict itself. Turkish officials limited themselves to statements calling fora ceasefire, avoiding any measure of blame. After the end of hostilities the polarisation of theregional community into two camps, pro-Russian and pro-Georgian, continued.

In the immediate post-war period Turkey made two decisions which encapsulate its approach inthe Black Sea region and the complexities of its relationship with Russia. Firstly, immediately

after the end of hostilities Turkish officials proposed a Caucasus Stability and CooperationPlatform (CSCP), which would serve as a mechanism to solve regional problems throughdialogue. Despite some concerns in Moscow that Turkey was using the CSCP to increase itsinfluence, Russia broadly welcomed the move, approving of its regional focus to problem-solving (i.e. it excluded non-regional players like the EU and US)6. One analyst notesapprovingly that this increased Turkish influence in the Caucasus without putting Turkey-Russia relations at risk7.

The CSCP appears to be moribund, as the regions complex and overlapping conflicts make italmost impossible that a forum containing all the key players could be established.

6 Punsmann, B (2009) The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster RegionalAccountabilityp4. ICBSS Policy Brief 13. Available at: http://bit.ly/o910FC7 Beat, M (2009), Turkey and Russia Meet in the Caucasus Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol 8. No. 3. Availableat: http://bit.ly/nP9nNb

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Nonetheless, Turkeys willingness to propose this mechanism shows that it was seeking toaddress regional instability in a way which was inclusive. It sought to include, not exclude,Russia from regional security arrangements despite serious concerns about Russias willingnessto destroy the regional status quo and threaten Turkeys interests.

However, the failure of the CSCP and Turkeys inability to improve Russia-Georgia ties at thebilateral level indicates that good intentions are simply not enough. This was not a situationwhich Turkey wanted to find itself in, and in that sense the CSCP was an exercise in damagelimitation, underscoring the imbalances in the Ankara-Moscow relationship. Russia acted,contrary to Turkeys interests; Turkey was forced to react.

The second, related decision which Turkey made was to publicly acknowledge the extent of itsdependence on Russia in trade and energy. A trade dispute flared up shortly after the war,widely believed to have been orchestrated by Russia to show displeasure with Turkeysdecision to allow US warships delivering aid to Georgia through the Bosphorus, in allegedviolation of the Montreux Convention of 1936 which governs access to the Black Sea8.

Prime Minister Erdoan said bluntly that Turkey could not afford such disruption in ties withRussia Otherwise, we would be left in the dark9. He underscored that message by sayingthat It would not be right for Turkey to be pushed toward any side... One of the sides is ourclosest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important tradevolume. We would act in line with what Turkeys national interests require10.

This stance was realistic but remarkably candid, and illustrated that Turkeys actions areconstrained by its reliance on Russian energy. Indeed, Turkish policy throughout the Russia-Georgia war demonstrated the inequalities in the partnership.

The Armenia-Turkey Thaw

Another critical aspect of the relationship involves the Turkish thaw with Armenia, Russiasclosest ally in the South Caucasus. The border has been closed since 1993 when Turkey closedit in solidarity with Azerbaijan, then fighting Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Efforts torepair ties had been slow since then. However the August war gave an added urgency to thereconciliation process, as Turkey sought to promote stability and reduce possibilities forconflict across the region.

The thaw began in September 2008 and culminated with the October 2009 signing of protocolsaimed at opening the border and restoring relations. Since then the process has foundered,

largely due to nationalist politics within both Turkey and Armenia. Progress is unlikely tooccur without concurrent movement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Turkishgovernment cannot move forward with Armenia whilst the status of the Karabakh conflictremains unchanged; Armenias leaders cannot, politically, restore ties with Turkey and makesacrifices over Karabakh at the same time.

Russias stated support for the rapprochement raised eyebrows among analysts. Theconventional wisdom is that Russia seeks to maintain the frozen status of Karabakh - and, byextension, the impasse between Ankara and Yerevan - in order to maintain its influence inArmenia. This includes security (the Russian military base at Gyumri) economics (Russian

8 Jenkins, G (2008) Ongoing Trade Crisis Demonstrates Turkeys Lack of Leverage Against Russia

Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor9/9/2008.9 Torbakov (2008) p15.10 Aliriza, B (2008) Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasusp2. CSIS Commentary. Available at:http://bit.ly/q4ytEn

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firms control large chunks of Armenias strategic infrastructure) and geopolitics (Armenia actsas one of the bastions of Russian post-imperial power in the Black Sea region).

After the Russia-Georgia war this calculus seemed to have changed. At the fraught, touch-and-go signing ceremony in Zurich, Russias Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov allegedly pressured

his reluctant Armenian counterpart into signing the protocols11. This vignette illustrates thatRussian involvement was not confined to passive approval: Moscow gave active support to areconciliation process which was initiated and driven by Ankara.

Partly this support like Russias sudden intensification of direct diplomacy to settle theArmenia-Azerbaijan conflict - was intended to restore Russias image, which was severelydamaged by the war with Georgia. However this is only part of the story: substantive politics isalways more important for the Kremlin than its international standing, and it seems that itRussia was keen to promote stability in the Black Sea region for its own sake.

The question may be asked whether Turkey would have been able to initiate the thaw without

Russian approval, which leads to the inference that the process collapsed because of meddlingfrom Russia. However despite Moscows significant influence, it does could not easily derailthe rapprochement. The only possibility would be to punish Turkey or Armenia bilaterally, bycutting economic contacts or energy supplies. This is not impossible, given Russias use ofenergy as a weapon, but would be unlikely given the low stakes involved (compared with, say,the Georgia war). In any case the collapse of the thaw occurred because of domestic politicalopposition in Ankara and Yerevan, not Russian meddling.

The implications for the status of the Turkey-Russia partnership are clear. This thaw wasTurkish-led, with Russia playing only a passive role. Although the process has now stalled(seemingly for the long term), success would have had significant impacts on Black Seageopolitics and Russias position. The thaw should be seen as an instance when Turkey and notRussia was the defining force in the region.

Black Sea Maritime Security

The Black Sea is a unique maritime space. Unlike most other seas, it is accessible only througha narrow channel under Turkish control. Under the Montreux Convention of 1936, all non-military vessels enjoy free passage during times of peace. However the size, tonnage, andduration of non-littoral warships is closely regulated12.

The Montreux Convention has been upheld in the post-Cold War era not only because of a

Turkish desire to maintain its influence over Black Sea access; Russia has also supported theConvention in order to limit NATOs presence in its southern rim. Both Moscow and Ankaraare therefore agreed on the need to maintain the status quo.

However, their varying commitment to this goal, and differing security perceptions, affect theirbilateral relationship. In addition the exclusion of outside actors because littoral states canprovide for their own security calls for a very particular understanding of security, by which ismeant security for the few (strongest) regional players, which then impose their interests oneveryone else13.

11 Report: Nalbandian signed deal at Lavrovs insistence Todays Zaman 13/10/2009.12 Karadeniz, B (2007) Security and Stability Architecture in the Black SeaPerceptions Winter 2007.Available at: http://bit.ly/p9ipRA13 Dubovyk, V (2011) Should Europe Care About Black Sea Security?PONARS Eurasia Policy MemoNo.138. Available at: http://bit.ly/pceKQn

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The security mechanisms and fora which have emerged are limited to littoral states as a directconsequence of the Montreux Convention and the shared interest of Russia and Turkey inlimiting non-riparian access. The most significant is BLACKSEAFOR, a Turkish-led initiativeset up in 2001. It is a naval task force comprising ships from the littoral states which conducts

biannual exercises and serves to protect against soft security threats like organised crime,

terrorism and weapons trafficking.

In a practical sense BLACKSEAFOR has achieved little because there the threats present arelow-key and not suited to being addressed by conventional navies, most of which are ageingcollections of former Soviet vessels14. The same is true of Black Sea Harmony, a Turkish-ledinitiative established in 2004 as an anti-terrorism initiative, analogous to NATOs OperationActive Endeavour in the Mediterranean.

However, with regard to Russia and Turkey, BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmonyprovide an opportunity for the Black Seas two largest navies to interact and become familiarwith each other - confidence-building measures. The initiative provides a platform for them to

operate on equal terms, despite the fact that Russias Black Sea Fleet is superior to TurkeysNorthern Sea Area Command15. Although both are increasing their naval forces in the BlackSea, this is not indicative of a regional arms race, and their shared participation in multilateralfora provides an avenue to share information and reduce any grounds for miscommunication.

In both of these initiatives Turkey and Russia cooperate successfully and on an equal footing.However there remains tension over non-littoral access to the Black Sea. In the immediateaftermath of the Russia-Georgia War Moscow criticised Ankara after it permitted three USwarships to enter the Black Sea and stop in Georgia to deliver humanitarian aid. Russia warnedTurkey that if the warships overstayed the 21 days provided for by the Convention, or were infact carrying military supplies for Georgia, it would hold Turkey responsible16.

Ultimately Turkey upheld the Montreux Convention: it denied access to two US hospital shipswhich earlier sought to access the Black Sea, as they violated tonnage requirements, and itensured that NATO warships left the area before the 21 days expired. However, it came at atime when Moscow was blocking Turkish trucks from entering Russia, ostensibly because of atechnical trade dispute. Russias sharp response and warnings to Turkey demonstrate that,although Turkey is responsible for the Bosphorus, Russia also sees a role for itself in upholdingthe Montreux Convention. Flagrant violation of this by Turkey would be greeted by punitiveRussian responses.

Another example came in June 2011, when a US guided-missile cruiser entered the Black Seato participate in bilateral exercises with Ukraine. The USS Monterrey is within the tonnagerequirements of the Montreux Convention and Russias objection was not specifically framedwith the Convention in mind, but rather focused on the sensitivity on the region. It wasviewed as a significant intrusion into an area which Moscow likes to view as a Russo-Turkishlake.

Russia can act on its vocal opposition to non-littoral forces present in the Black Sea. It haseconomic and political leverage over Turkey which it can use to ensure compliance withMontreux. Thus, although Turkey and Russia cooperate on an equal footing in ensuring

14 The BLACKSEAFOR states acknowledged the low level of the threat in a 2005 risk assessment.15 Black Sea Peacebuilding Network (2010) The Black Sea Region In Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy: Russia &Turkey On The Black Seap4. Available at: http://bit.ly/oJe8lq16 Torbakov (2008) p14

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maritime security, with regard to preventing non-littoral intrusion in the area, Moscow is thedominant partner. Although Turkey has control of the Bosphorus, Russia has sufficientleverage in other spheres to ensure that Ankara broadly adheres to Moscows reading of theMontreux Convention.

EnergyRussia is one of Turkeys biggest energy suppliers. It accounts for around 70% of Turkish gasand oil imports, is extensively investing in key energy infrastructure including nuclear power

plants and gas storage terminals, and is working towards constructing new pipelines acrossTurkish soil.

For Turkey that assistance has been a huge boon as it seeks to fuel its booming economy energy demand is forecasted to double from 2009 to 201917. Just as importantly, Turkey isseeking to become a regional energy hub at the crossroads of Europe, Eurasia, and the MiddleEast. Western-backed pipelines also play a role in Turkeys portfolio of pipelines: the BTC andBTE pipelines run from the Caucasus to eastern Turkey, whilst the planned Nabucco pipeline

would bring significant quantities of natural gas from the Caspian region to Turkey. Somewould be lifted off for domestic use whilst the rest would be sent on to Europe.

However, Western-supported projects are limited in their use for Turkey. The quantitiesprovided by existing pipelines are small. Although Nabucco would be more significant, theywould not be game-changing and even more importantly they would not come on-stream forseveral years if at all. Unlike Europe (or the Arab world, where pipelines to Turkey have yetto materialise), Russia has a proven track record of delivering on large-scale energy projects, soit is a natural partner for Turkey.

Talks are underway to expand the Blue Stream pipeline, which runs north-south through theBlack Sea and emerges near the Turkish port of Samsun the expansion would run southwardsto the Turkish Mediterranean, allowing Russia to export gas to countries in the Levant. Russiais also seeking to run its grandiose South Stream project (which would cross the Black Sea andenter Europe through Bulgaria or Romania) through Turkish territorial waters rather than thoseof Ukraine.

Lastly but perhaps most significantly, Turkey has been calling for Russian inclusion in theNabucco project. This position has also been stated by senior US officials involved in theregion however, unlike Turkey, the US will not be directly receiving Nabuccos core output.Turkey will do, and including Moscow would defeat the object of diversifying European and

Turkish gas supply away from Russia18

.

Turkish officials began to realise the risks associated with reliance on Russian energy followingthe gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. Moscows ability andwillingness to cut off gas supplies for a combination of political and economic reasons was aserious lesson for other Gazprom customers. Russia has also used energy as a political weaponagainst Turkmenistan, Georgia and the Baltics, which reiterates the message. The Turkishdiversification strategy is intended to hedge against the prospect of such a cut-off, usingincreased gas imports from the Caspian region and Iran.

However there are several issues with this plan. Firstly, pipelines from the Caspian and Iran run

through insecure areas, and are often targeted by Kurdish militants. Although pipelines can be

17 International Energy Agency (2009) Turkey 2009 Reviewp7. Available at: http://bit.ly/nFldx518 Nabucco partners call for Bakus participationNews.azJune 9 2011.

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fixed relatively easily, this is not a fully secure energy supply. Secondly, Turkey currently lacksadequate gas storage facilities, meaning it is additionally vulnerable to supply fluctuations andreducing its ability to cope with any sudden Russian shut-offs19. Thirdly, other import sources

pale in comparison to imports from Russia. Thus for the medium term Turkey will remaindependent on energy particularly gas from Russia.

This leaves it extremely vulnerable to Russias politicisation of energy. To be clear, to dateRussia has shown no inclination to turn off its exports to Turkey, which unlike other victims

is not a former Soviet state and may be considered a more risky target.

Nonetheless in a serious crisis in relations a cut-off could not be ruled out. Erdoans statementcited above, that Turkey would be left in the dark if it angered Russia, indicates that Ankaradoes take this seriously and acts accordingly. Turkeys reliance on Russian energy, therefore, isa direct constraint on its political freedom of movement, and illustrates the extent of Russianleverage.

ConclusionsThe examples cited above do not fully cover the relationship between Russia and Turkey.However, they do comprise some of the key aspects and current trends which affect theirrelationship and, thus, the wider Black Sea region. The most critical point is that Turkishdependence on Russian energy and their wider economic ties, as well as Russias clearwillingness to use all instruments (including military force) to achieve its goals, are strongconstraints on Turkish action in the Black Sea region.

The Georgia war put Turkey in a corner. Russian forces threatened the South Caucasustransport and energy corridor which Turkey and Georgia had built up over several years;Russia made stark warnings about upholding the Montreux Convention; blocked Turkish

trucks; and blamed Turkey for training Georgian forces. Turkeys response was passive andreflected its economic dependence on Russia. The CSCP proposal acceded to Moscowsdemand that non-regional players be excluded from peacemaking, essentially allowing Moscowand Ankara to dictate regional settlements.

The Turkish-Armenian thaw was different. Driven by Turkey, it received Russian approval andindicated that Moscow was not all-powerful in the region. Although Moscows support mayhave been part of a convoluted Machiavellian scheme, in reality Russia was simply eager toreduce regional tensions and was happy to back Turkeys initiative.

There is also a degree of equality in Black Sea maritime security. The Black Seas tightly

controlled access makes it an area with few security threats, and one where Turkey and Russiacan cooperate easily and equally. However, their slightly differing approaches to non-littoralforces in the region is a cause for tension and Russia can and does pressure Turkey toaccede to its own criteria for Black Sea access.

The extent of Russian influence over Turkey in the Black Sea region ensures that this is not anequal partnership. Russian and Turkish interests have coincided in the past few years, but thishas had much to do with their mutual dissatisfaction with the West and their growing economicrelationship. It is by no means necessarily permanent. Changes in government in either state, arealignment of international geopolitics or a major energy dispute would cause the tensions andinequalities of their relationship to emerge in the Black Sea region.

19 Conversation with energy expert based in Istanbul, June 2011.

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Alex Jackson Turkey Russia Paper