Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 4-1- TB-12- Descent to Chaos

Mullah Omar: 'Jihad Strategies and a Future Vision’ a follow-upBy Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence.

The forgotten Front while we are looking somewhere else; It's a classic military mistake to leave a partially defeated enemy on the battlefield in one form or another -- let them survive; The script Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful, outlined in late 2001

and early 2002 right after the fall of Kabul and Kandahar. At the time, Omar lamented the “catastrophe” of the Emirate’s fall but said that his organisation would survive and return to

challenge the coalition and its Afghan backers over time. Mullah Omar was also quick to predict that he would not be captured by the coalition and would still be able to lead the

Taliban in its war. Here is what he said as early as 26 September 2001: I am considering two promises. One is the promise of God, the other of Bush. The promise of God is that my land is

vast. If you start a journey on God’s path, you can reside anywhere and will be protected. The promise of Bush is that there is no place on earth where you can hide that I cannot find

you. We will see which promise is fulfilled.4 Mullah Omar also put the Taliban struggle after 2001 in a wider context from the start. He associated his movement with other Islamic

struggles against perceived foreign occupiers, especially in Palestine, Kashmir and after 2003, in Iraq. In a message in October 2006 at the start of the Eid festival, he praised Muslim fighters everywhere and especially those in Iraq for fighting America.5 A constant theme in his rhetoric is that the Taliban will defeat the US and NATO just as the Mujahideen defeated

the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This history is important1.

• Kabul is against Washington's alleged decision to transfer weapons and machinery left from its military mission in Afghanistan to Ukraine, an Afghan presidential administration official told TASS.

• Sartaj Aziz, the adviser on National Security and Foreign Affairs to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, "Why should America's enemies unnecessarily become our enemies," Sartaj Aziz said during an interview with BBC Urdu.

• A recently issued report on the status of Afghanistan by the US Department of Defense has described al Qaeda as being primarily confined to "isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan."

• On January 1, the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat mission will be replaced by a NATO "training and support" mission. "At the height of war there were 400,000 NATO troops across the country. We have seen the speed of the gradual withdrawal increase over the last couple of months. By the end of the year only 13 or 14,000 troops will be in Afghanistan," "The government has also failed to name a cabinet, so it is not just the lack of security that is a concern, but also political instability".

“The bottom line is that 10,000 troops is not enough to deny al-Qaida sanctuary in Afghanistan,” one U.S. intelligence officer told The Daily Beast. “As a result, they will come back. We have decided as a political leadership that we can live with this.” This report addresses the cost to the US of the Afghan War from FY2000-FY2013 2. The fact remains, however, that if the CRS and OMB figures for FY2001-FY2013 that follow are

1 The Return of the Knights, Bruce Riedel∗2 http://csis.org/files/publication/120515_US_Spending_Afghan_War_SIGAR.pdf

totaled for all direct spending on the war, they reach $641.7 billion, of which $198.2 billion – or over 30% – will be spent in FY2012 and FY2013.

Sartaj Aziz, the adviser on National Security and Foreign Affairs to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, "Why should America's enemies unnecessarily become our enemies," Sartaj Aziz said during an interview with BBC Urdu. "When the United States attacked Afghanistan, all those that were trained and armed were pushed towards us. "Some of them were dangerous for us and some are not. Why must we make enemies out of them all?," he said when speaking about the Haqqani Network. He further said that the Afghan Taliban are Afghanistan's problem and Haqqani Network is a part of it. "It's the job of the Afghan government to negotiate with them...We can try to convince them, however things are not the same as they were in the nineties," Aziz said.

US military continues to claim al Qaeda is 'restricted' to 'isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan' By BILL ROGGIO November 19, 2014 A recently issued report on the status of Afghanistan by the US Department of Defense has described al Qaeda as being primarily confined to "isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan." But information on Afghan military and intelligence operations against the global jihadist group contradicts the US military's assessment. The Defense Department released its "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan" in October. The report, which "covers progress in Afghanistan from April 1 to September 30, 2014," contains only nine mentions of al Qaeda. Five of those mentions simply reference the mission to conduct "counterterrorism operations against remnants of core al Qaeda and its affiliates." The US military's report states that "[s]ustained ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] counterterrorism operations prevented al Qaeda's use of Afghanistan as a platform from which to launch transnational terrorist attacks during this reporting period." Then the report goes on to describe al Qaeda as "isolated" in the northeastern part of the country, a reference to the remote mountainous provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. "Counterterrorism operations restricted al Qaeda's presence to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan and limited access to other parts of the country," the report continues. "These efforts forced al Qaeda in Afghanistan to focus on survival, rather than on operations against the West. Al Qaeda's relationship with local Afghan Taliban organizations remains intact and is an area of concern." Al Qaeda's operations contradict US military claims; for years, the US military has claimed that al Qaeda is constrained to operating in northeastern Afghanistan, but ISAF's own data on raids against the terrorist group and its allies has indicated otherwise. According to ISAF press releases announcing operations between early 2007 and June 2013, al Qaeda and its allies were targeted 338 different times, in 25 of 34 of Afghanistan's provinces. Those raids took place in 110 of Afghanistan's nearly 400 districts. [See LWJ report, ISAF raids against al Qaeda and allies in Afghanistan 2007-2013.] Continuing this pattern, while the latest DoD report, which covers the period between April 1 and Oct. 30 of this year, claims that al Qaeda is restricted to northeastern Afghanistan, reported Afghan military and intelligence operations during the same time period indicate that al Qaeda remains active beyond Kunar and Nuristan. The most high-profile operation against al Qaeda was conducted in Nangarhar province in October. Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security reported that al Qaeda leader Abu Bara al Kuwaiti was killed in a US airstrike in Lal Mandi in Nangarhar's Nazyan district. The airstrike took place at the home of Abdul Samad Khanjari, who was described as al Qaeda's military commander for the province. Abu Bara likely served in al Qaeda's General Command. He was close to al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, and had served as an aide to Atiyah Abd al Rahman, al Qaeda's former general manager who was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan in August 2011. Abu Bara wrote

Atiyah's eulogy, which was published in Vanguards of Khorasan, al Qaeda's official magazine. US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that Abu Bara was the most senior al Qaeda leader killed in Afghanistan in years. [See LWJ report, Senior al Qaeda leader reported killed in US airstrike in eastern Afghanistan.] Another senior al Qaeda leader known to operate in Afghanistan is Qari Bilal. In August, Afghan officials said that he commands more than 300 fighters in the northern province of Kunduz, where several districts are controlled or contested by the Taliban. Bilal is also a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an al Qaeda-linked group that has integrated its operations with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Bilal escaped from a Pakistani jail in 2010, entered Afghanistan, and was subsequently captured by ISAF special operations forces in 2011. He was later freed by Afghan officials and rejoined the fight. [See LWJ report, Senior IMU leader captured by ISAF in 2011 now leads fight in northern Afghanistan.] This month, Afghan officials announced the capture of Eqbal al Tajiki, a citizen of Tajikistan who served with al Qaeda's network in Kunduz. Sediq Sediqi, the spokesman for the Interior Ministry, said that Eqbal "is an active member of the al Qaeda network" who was "transferred by his colleagues to northern parts of Afghanistan to carry out terrorist activities," according to Afghan Channel One TV. Sediqi said Eqbal had "received terrorist training in North Waziristan for three years." Eqbal may have been a member of the Qari Salim Group, "a high-profile Al Qaeda affiliate" that is commanded by Qari Khaluddin, Pajhwok Afghan News noted in October. Khaluddin "had recently trained in Pakistan's city of Quetta." The group is said to have been plotting to attack a military base in Kunduz. Another al Qaeda group known to be operating in Afghanistan is Junood al Fida. In early October, Junood al Fida released video that purported to show the group taking control of the district of Registan in the southern province of Kandahar. Junood al Fida, which is comprised of Baluch jihadists, has sworn loyalty to the Taliban but also describes Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri as "Our Shaykh al Habeeb" [beloved leader] and its "Ameeruna" [our chief]. The group's propaganda routinely attacks the US. [See LWJ reports, Baloch jihadist group in southern Afghanistan announces death of commander and Jihadist group loyal to Taliban, al Qaeda claims to have captured Afghan district.]

Afghanistan against US plans to transfer military equipment to Ukraine - Kabul official

Published time: December 27, 2014 14:19 Kabul is against Washington's alleged decision to transfer weapons and machinery left from its military mission in Afghanistan to Ukraine, an Afghan presidential administration official told TASS. The issue will be discussed with Obama, he added. American specialists in Afghanistan are currently preparing US army MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles to be transferred to Ukraine, according to the information obtained by the Afghan presidential administration. The US combat mission command refuses to discuss the issue with Kabul, saying the White House is in charge, a representative of Ashraf Ghani’s administration told the agency. Ghani will raise the question during his visit to Washington in January. He plans to urge Obama not to move the equipment to Ukraine, the agency's source said. "The issue is directly connected with sustaining the country's strategic partnership with the US," the official added. Washington has previously ensured Kabul that the US military equipment and weapons, used by its combat mission in Afghanistan, will stay in the country to be employed by the Afghan army and law enforcement, according to the official. He added the country planned to use it in strengthening its fighting capabilities against Taliban forces in the country's south. America’s longest-ever overseas war, which began soon after 9/11, is set to officially wind down at the end of this month. More than 2,000 US soldiers were killed during the 13-year mission. Although the war - which has cost the US around $1 trillion so far, according to the Financial Times and independent reports, will officially terminate, some 10,000 US troops will remain

in Afghanistan through 2016, as part of a "Resolute Support Mission" assist program. US officials and NATO have supported Ukraine over the conflict with anti-government forces in the country's east. In November, US Air Force General Philip Breedlove, commander of US European Command and NATO Allied Command Operations, said there is a plan to address the requirements of Ukraine's military, with parts of it being executed. Speaking about the possibility of sending lethal equipment to Ukraine, the general said nothing was off the table.

Good Taliban are not our problem, adviser to Pakistan's prime minister saysBy BILL ROGGIO November 18, 2014 We've written quite a bit about the Pakistani military and political establishment's support of or indifference to the so-called "good Taliban," or the Taliban and jihadist groups that do not wage jihad inside Pakistan yet enable those groups that do. In fact, our reporting on this subject is the primary reason that the Pakistani government has banned The Long War Journal inside its country. Yesterday, Sartaj Aziz, the adviser on National Security and Foreign Affairs to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, spoke about this issue. The report on his talk, from Dawn , is republished below. Aziz is smart enough to not voice his support of the good Taliban -- groups such as the Haqqani Network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group, both of which wage jihad against the US in Afghanistan while sheltering and supporting al Qaeda and other international jihadist groups. Instead, Aziz makes the "it's not our problem" argument: Adviser to the Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz on Monday said that Pakistan should not target militants who do not threaten the country's security. "Why should America's enemies unnecessarily become our enemies," Sartaj Aziz said during an interview with BBC Urdu. "When the United States attacked Afghanistan, all those that were trained and armed were pushed towards us. "Some of them were dangerous for us and some are not. Why must we make enemies out of them all?," he said when speaking about the Haqqani Network. He further said that the Afghan Taliban are Afghanistan's problem and Haqqani Network is a part of it. "It's the job of the Afghan government to negotiate with them...We can try to convince them, however things are not the same as they were in the nineties," Aziz said. For longtime readers of The Long War Journal, Aziz's comments should come as no surprise. Since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan has operated just as Aziz articulated yesterday.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif says there is now no difference between "good and bad Taliban"3.

17 Nov, Shift in Afghan stance toward militants targeting Pakistan Afghanistan has agreed to target militants attacking Pakistan from alleged sanctuaries on its soil, in a significant move which suggests a thaw in their frayed ties and anti-terror cooperation between them. Pakistan had demanded Afghanistan through official and unofficial channels to uproot the chief of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Mullah Fazlullah, hiding with dozens of supporters in Kunar province. The assurance came from Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during his talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif in his just-concluded maiden trip to Pakistan, officials familiar with the development told The Express Tribune. // 17 November 2014 Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai says initial progress in his country was undermined by the United States ignoring the problem of the Taliban using Pakistan as a ''sanctuary,'' from which to launch attacks in Afghanistan. In an exclusive interview with RFE/RL in which he looked back on his tumultuous years in office, Karzai described his relationship with the

3 http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2014/12/inside-story-pakistan-taliban-armed-groups-20141217201656582322.html

United States as ''tense.'' He said U.S. officials would brief him on Taliban bases in Pakistan but refuse to take action. (RFE/RL)

Al Qaida v/s Islamic state, but don’t Forget the Taliban, Let me recall: Al-Qaeda's guerrilla chief lays out strategy4 15 Oct 2009 interview with: Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, an al-Qaeda leader. In his first-ever media interaction since he joined al-Qaeda in 2005. Ilyas Kashmiri gave his views on what the upcoming battle will look like, what its targets will be, and how it will impact the West in relation to the destabilization of a Muslim state such as Pakistan. Born in Bimbur (old Mirpur) in the Samhani Valley of Pakistan-administered Kashmir on February 10, 1964, Ilyas, with his unmatched guerrilla expertise, turns the strategic vision into reality, provides the resources and gets targets achieved, but he chooses to remain in the background and very low key. "Saleem5 I will draw your attention to the basics of the present war theatre and use that to explain the whole strategy of the upcoming battles.

• The entire Muslim world is sick of Americans and that's why they are agreeing with Sheikh Osama. If all of the Muslim world is asked to elect their leader, their choice would be either [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar or Sheikh Osama," Ilyas said

• This war is being fought from outside of Afghanistan. "So I and many people all across the world realized that analyzing the situation in any narrow regional political perspective was an incorrect approach. This is a different ball game altogether for which a unified strategy is compulsory. He added that al-Qaeda's regional war strategy, in which they have hit Indian targets, is actually to chop off American strength.

• For the Taliban, the main emphasis was to be placed on cutting NATO's supply lines from all four sides of Afghanistan, and carrying out special operations similar to the Mumbai attack in Afghanistan.

• Those who planned this battle actually aimed to bring the world's biggest Satan [US] and its allies into this trap and swamp [Afghanistan]. Afghanistan is a unique place in the world where the hunter has all sorts of traps to choose from. "It might be deserts, rivers, mountains and the urban centers as well.

• As a military commander, the reality is that the trap of Afghanistan is successful and the basic military targets on the ground have been achieved," Ilyas said.

“ if there is one goal that appears to be wholly achieved.. it is to fortify the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from the back. The most that we can say is that these are the eastern and western wings of the same war-front’. Ustadh Ahmad Farooq (12 Jul 2010)

17 Nov 2014, ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Saturday pledged his support to the Afghan president in his attempt to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, a sign of warming ties between the two neighbors. Sharif met with visiting Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai at his office in the capital, Islamabad. Ghani arrived in Pakistan on Friday for a two-day visit, seeking to repair a relationship between the two nations that was often tense in recent years. Ghani’s predecessor, Hamid Karzai, frequently accused Pakistan of turning a blind eye to the Taliban and other militants carrying out cross-border attacks from lawless tribal regions. Pakistan in turn blamed Kabul for failing to police its own borders.

4 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html5 Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com

Several weeks ago, Ghani invited the Taliban to join national reconciliation negotiations. On Saturday, Sharif backed Ghani’s initiative but added that the process must be fully Afghan led and Afghan owned. “I reaffirmed that a peaceful, stable, united and prosperous Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s vital national interest,” Sharif said.

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan:: Afghanistan’s Descent to Chaos – Part One Details Created on Tuesday, 14 October 2014 10:22 Written by Yaseen For the past few years United States and her allies in Afghanistan have tried everything to break the resistance of the Afghan people to foreign occupation. Looking at some of the strategies employed over the past few years it appears that the United States considers victory in Afghanistan as a forlorn hope. Instead it has encouraged mechanisms in Afghanistan which on the face of it are aimed at preventing a takeover of Afghanistan by the Islamic Emirate in the eventuality of full withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.Afghan Local Police: One of the mechanisms to this end has been the setting up of local vigilante forces, known as Afghan Local Police (ALP) under the command of local warlords throughout Afghanistan. Presumably US thinking behind this strategy was that as local actors are familiar with the terrain and people of their localities they would be able to identify insurgent fighters and supporters more easily and would be less prone to insurgent ambushes and attacks. In order to maximize the effectiveness, some would say ruthlessness, of these forces, they have been allowed to operate outside governmental structure and without any meaningful accountability to the government. It is true that while on paper these militias are fully accountable to the Kabul administration, but in reality because these forces mostly operate in areas the government forces don’t usually patrol, they have de facto control of these areas and without any meaningful oversight. Because they operate outside of the legal framework of the government they act with impunity in carrying out their tasks. Many of these local commanders are the very same people who contributed to the lawlessness in Afghanistan prior to the emergence of the Taliban and the subsequent establishment of Islamic Emirate. It is ironic that the US in its initial years of occupation bewailed the ‘warlordism’ prevalent in Afghanistan. They openly accused some of these warlords of grave human right abuses including extortion, random killings, torture and the like. Some of the civil and human right groups in Afghanistan openly talked of the need to prosecute some of these warlords in the International Criminal Court. From confrontation to cooptation: Today, in an ironic turn of events, the US has co-opted these very same warlords in their fight against the insurgency in Afghanistan. They have been given free rein to commit all sorts of abuses including extra-judicial killings, kidnappings, rape, indiscriminate killing of civilians, torture and the like. In many places US Special Forces use these forces as the dirty gloves to do their deeds for them. If the US forces capture a suspect and have no proof against the accused they simply handover the suspect to these forces. In most cases the suspect is never seen again and his family cannot find out what happened to the apprehended after the handover to these forces. It is not that the US troops are not aware of what is being done to these suspects after their handover. For a detailed account of US Special Forces and CIA personnel cooperation with the ALP refer to AAN article (https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/war-without-accountability-the-cia-special-forces-and-plans-for-afghanistans-future/)Arguably the disappearance of these suspects after their handover to these local forces is done under the affirmative instructions of US and ISAF troops. On more regarding the impunity of these militias refer to the following Human Rights Watch Report (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/09/12/just-don-t-call-it-militia-0) While the extent to which US and ISAF forces are responsible for the war crimes committed by local militias (due to operating under US instructions) is an issue for a different time, what this article is more concerned with is the implications of these local warlords operating outside state structures and control and

their implications for the sovereignty and wellbeing of Afghanistan. As stated earlier, these local militias, for all practical purposes, operate outside state control, they owe allegiance to their local commanders with little sense of responsibility to their nation or people, and poorly trained they have little idea of international humanitarian laws or Islamic laws on armed conflict. ALP after 2014: While at the moment these warlords act as mercenaries operating under the payroll of US Army, the concern is what role will these militias play once US forces withdraw and the war chests of Kabul administration dry out. These militias do not fight due to a sense of patriotism. Rather their main concern is maximizing their profits. If these commanders are not receiving money to operate around the main highways linking Kabul with the provinces then most likely these militias will resort to their previous practices of extortions, kidnappings and drug trafficking to sustain their forces and influence. Moreover in the absence of government forces in these peripheral regions, these local militias will set up their own parallel rule in their controlled areas and will refuse to heed government orders. The eventual proliferation of these heedless militias will eventually drag Afghanistan into a similar security dilemma as that facing Libya currently. In such an eventuality it appears that these militias will play a crucial role in the future of Afghanistan. Some of these militias, linked with warlords allied to Kabul will continue to operate in support of Kabul administration albeit they might continue their criminal activities as well in order to sustain their coffers. Already most of these militias operating around the country, in addition to receiving salaries from the government, also confiscate money and valuables for the local populace under the guise of taxes, ushr and the like. Others who are neither allied to Kabul administration nor any other party will simply continue their criminal activities and resist any attempt by either Kabul to rein them in. Yet other militias – being either surrounded by Taliban or lured by them – might ally themselves with the Taliban and embark on the military campaign against the Kabul administration. Regardless of which path they choose their mere presence, size and numbers in Afghanistan will result in complete decentralization of Kabul government. If Kabul ever wishes to reassert its control over the territory of Afghanistan, then they will need to confront these very same militias that it has so encouraged in order to stall the Taliban advance on Kabul. Ironically any attempt by the Kabul administration (without strong support from the US) to disarm these militias or limit their power will most likely drive them into supporting the campaign of the insurgents. A calculated strategy? This proliferation of militias and expansion of the powers of warlords in Afghanistan is one instance where the US has prioritized its short term interests to the long term detriment of Afghanistan. It is interesting to consider why the US did not try to set up these militias in the initial years of their occupation but turned to this strategy after they announced the surge in Afghanistan and the 2014 withdrawal deadline. The US had tried the very same approach in Iraq and in 2009 under the leadership and advice of General David Petraeus. The tendency to create such militias when withdrawing from an occupied land is usually driven by the desire to create a semblance of ‘mission accomplished’. Setting up these local militias usually is very successful in stalling the advances of insurgents in the short term because it creates resistance at every level of a military advance. However these militias are usually funded by large sums of money which sooner or later is likely to dry up. The impunity offered to these local militias coupled with ever diminishing resources creates a strong desire in these militias to turn on the local populace and extort money from them under various pretexts. This total control over the population and lack of any oversight also encourages militias to become more audacious and criminal in their demands upon the local populace. Unlike the insurgents who generally rely on local support and therefore go to great lengths to accommodate their needs, local militias hardly have any need or desire to accommodate the

local populace. Their increasing burden on the local populace usually alienate the local populace and drive them into the arms of the insurgents or other anti-government forces. A recent article by AAN regarding the advances of Taliban in Kunduz province (https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-next-round-of-the-tug-of-war-over-kunduz/) is instructive in how such local militias can create the very conditions that drive the local populace into the arms of insurgents. Moreover it can be argued that the creation of these local militias can be counterproductive to the very results intended for them. The presence of local militias often encourage government forces to withdraw to the main centers. Also the grievances against local militias are easily transferred to all government forces and institutions by the local populace. Moreover because such local militias operate independently and without coordination from the government or each other, it is possible to defeat them piecemeal enabling insurgents to quickly capture the territory outside of main urban and district centers. The recent Iraq experience shows how the setting up of the Awakening Council and its disintegration soon after the US withdrawal created the conditions where the Islamic State group was able to advance on the marginalized territories and occupy them with lightning speed. One cannot account for the blitzkrieg or the Islamic State in Iraq without taking into account the marginalization of the local populace at the hands of the Shia dominated government and the heavy handed tactics of the Awakening Council. How are the ALP counterproductive to the needs for which they were created? It is argued that the ALP is one instance where a US strategy employed to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan will result in achieving the very opposite. At the very least the presence of these local militias will serve as a double-edged sword. While the militias may partially succeed in denting the advance of the Taliban, their mere presence serves to diminish Kabul’s control over the outlying provinces. The militias accustomed to a culture of impunity will serve to alienate the local populace and enflame anti-government sentiments. Their localized and uncoordinated approach against a localized insurgency might prove successful but when faced with large scale insurgent offensives these local militias will either melt away or be defeated piecemeal. As more and more areas fall to the insurgents and as the Taliban military machine becomes more conventional most of these local militias will be left with one of two options, either flee or join the Taliban.