Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 19-53-Caliphate-Training Camps-2

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence. The "War of the Cross"

See also: Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 31-1-AQ- Training Camps

Isis has enough weapons to carry on fighting for two years, UN warns; Defeat or no defeat, on the run or not, hiding in a cave or, ideology or crazed fanatics? Training their fighters and a selected few prepare to attack the West. Moreover the 2nd generation is groomed. Weapons and Armies are needed for the next (AQ masterplan) Phase: expansion in preparation for the Total confrontation. And IS is not the only one: AQ is doing it for years.

4 December 2014 Islamic State setting up Libya training camps, US says

Various Islamist militant groups are competing for power in eastern Libya Islamic State militants have set up training camps in eastern Libya, the head of the US Africa command says. Gen David Rodriguez said there could be "a couple of hundred'' IS fighters undergoing training at the sites. He said the camps were at a very early stage, but the US was watching them "carefully to see how it develops". Libya has been in turmoil since Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, with various tribes, militias and political factions fighting for power. Several Islamist groups are competing for power in the east of the country, with some militants recently declaring allegiance to IS. Syria connection Speaking in Washington on Wednesday, Gen Rodriguez said it was not yet clear how closely aligned the trainees were with IS. "It's mainly about people coming for training and logistics support right now, for training sites," he said. "Right now it's just small and very nascent and we just have to see how it goes." Correspondents say that in the aftermath of the revolution that ousted Gaddafi, many rebel fighters left to fight with militant groups in Syria, and some are believed to have returned home. The elected government has lost Libya's three main cities amid the political crisis. Benghazi, the country's second city, is in the hands of Islamist fighters, and the internationally recognised parliament is now based in the coastal town of Tobruk in the east. The US has been leading an international coalition conducting air strikes against IS in Iraq and Syria in recent months.

More jihadist training camps identified in Iraq and SyriaBy BILL ROGGIO & CALEB WEISS November 23, 2014 Four new terrorist training camps in Iraq and Syria, three of them operated by the Islamic State, have been identified by The Long War Journal. The identification of these camps, three in Syria and one in Iraq, brings the total number of jihadist-run camps identified in the two countries to 46. On Nov. 14, US Central Command issued a statement noting that US or coalition airstrikes targeted an Islamic State training camp "east of Raqqah." That brought the total number of airstrikes against Islamic State training camps near Raqqah to five. Camps near Raqqah were previously struck on Sept. 22, on Sept. 27, on Oct. 3, and again on Oct. 8. Photographs released on Twitter also purport to show the Islamic State utilizing locations in the city of Mosul, the capital of Iraq's Ninewa province, for the training of a "special forces unit." The unit, dubbed Qawat al Muhaam al Khaasa (Special Task Force), has been seen in photographs showing trainees rappelling off of buildings and bridges in Mosul. Some photos also purport to show the graduation of fighters in the unit. In other photographs, American-made weapons such as the M16 are clearly visible. Videos have also been uploaded to YouTube that show the Qawat al Muhaam al Khaasa unit in training. And in a propaganda video entitled "Race Towards Good," the Islamic State showcased a training camp that is used exclusively by Kazakh fighters. The exact location of the camp is unclear, but it appears to be near Raqqah.

The video showed the fighters receiving physical training and schooling in firearms such as American, Russian, and Austrian-made sniper rifles. The second half of the video showed Kazakh children being taught Arabic, as well as physical and military training. In one scene, a Kazakh child is shown assembling an AK-47 assault rifle. At the end of the video, a Kazakh child recites a speech for the camera, saying, "We're going to kill you, O kuffar [unbelievers]. Insha'allah [God-willing], we will slaughter you." Most recently, another jihadist training camp has been identified in Syria, in the province of Latakia. It is operated by Jamaat Jund al Qawkaz (Caucasus), a group composed of Circassians, Chechens, Dagestanis, and other Caucasian ethnic groups. The group is independent and probably small, but is more than likely affiliated with the Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda's Syrian branch, and the Caucasus Emirate. It might also be affiliated to Junud al Sham, a predominantly Chechen group led by Muslim Shishani, a specially designated global terrorist. While Jamaat Jund al Qawkaz has officially taken an anti-fitna stance, the group has promoted Al Nusrah propaganda, according to Aymenn al Tamimi. Video has also been uploaded to YouTube showing the Jamaat Jund al Qawkaz unit in training. In addition to the four camps identified above, more evidence has emerged about another training camp identified by The Long War Journal two months ago. Photos were recently disseminated on Twitter showing a training camp that was run by Abu Yusuf al Turki. As The Long War Journal reported on Sept. 23, online jihadists described al Turki as a commander in the Al Nusrah Front who trained fighters how to become snipers. Al Turki was killed in initial US airstrikes in Syria against the so-called Khorasan Group, a name used by the US government to describe al Qaeda veterans embedded within Al Nusrah. After al Turki was confirmed killed, supporters released a video of his training camp, which is located in or near Aleppo.Jihadist camps in Iraq and Syria Since the beginning of 2012, a total of 46 camps have been identified as being operational at some point in time, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal. Information on the camps has been obtained from jihadist videos, news accounts, and US military press releases that note airstrikes against the training facilities. It is unclear if all of the training camps are currently operational. In addition, this analysis is compiled using publicly-available evidence. It is likely that some training camps are not advertised. Of those camps, 34 are located in Syria and 12 in Iraq. The Islamic State has operated 25 camps (14 in Syria and 11 in Iraq). Al Qaeda's Al Nusrah Front has operated nine camps in Syria. Various allied jihadist groups, including Ansar al Islam, Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, and Junud al Sham, have operated 12 camps (11 in Syria and one in Iraq). Historically, al Qaeda has used its training facilities to fuel local insurgencies while selecting individuals from the pool of trainees to conduct attacks against the West. [See LWJ report, Jihadist training camps proliferate in Iraq and Syria, for more information on the camps; and Islamist foreign fighters returning home and the threat to Europe, on the threat that jihadists training at camps in Iraq and Syria pose to the West.]Harakat Sham al Islam operates training camp

in northwest SyriaLWJ December 2, 2014 A training camp run by Harakat Sham al Islam, a group founded by Moroccan jihadists, was promoted yesterday by the Ansar al Din Front, a coalition to which Harakat Sham al Islam belongs in Syria. The facility was publicized in two tweets showing recruits undergoing firearms training and a fighter holding the group's flag at the camp in the western port city of Latakia. In a series of posts on Twitter yesterday, the Ansar al Din Front highlighted several training camps used by

its constituent groups. Facilities belonging to Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, a Chechen-led entity and the largest group in the coalition, and Harakat Fajr al Sham al Islamiya, a local Syrian organization based in Aleppo, were also showcased. The two groups have previously been noted by The Long War Journal to be running camps in Aleppo province. The Harakat Sham al Islam camp brings the total number of facilities identified by The Long War Journal to 52. [For more information on jihadist training camps in Iraq and Syria, see LWJ reports, Jihadist training camps proliferate in Iraq and Syria, 3 new jihadist training camps identified in Syria, Jihadists tout training camps for children in Iraq and Syria and More jihadist training camps identified in Iraq and Syria.] Harakat Sham al Islam was designated a terrorist organization by the US State Department in September. State described the jihadist group as "a Moroccan-led terrorist organization operating in Syria principally composed of foreign fighters." The designation also noted that Harakat Sham al Islam operates alongside and is allied to the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria. Harakat Sham al Islam was founded in 2013 by Ibrahim bin Shakran, Ahmed Mizouz, and Mohammed Alami, three Moroccans who were captured in Afghanistan after the US invasion in 2001, detained at Guantanamo Bay, and then released to the custody of the Moroccan government in 2004. Bin Shakran was let go despite an assessment by Joint Task Force Guantanamo that identified him as a "high-ranking member" of the theological commission of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, an al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization. Bin Shakran led Harakat Sham al Islam until he was killed while fighting alongside Al Nusrah, Ahrar al Sham, and Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar during the Al Anfal offensive in Latakia earlier this year. [See LWJ report, Former Guantanamo detainee killed while leading jihadist group in Syria, for more details on Bin Shakran.] Alami, one of the aforementioned co-founders of the group, was killed in Syria in August 2013. Harakat Sham al Islam, Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, Katibat al Khadra, and Harakat Fajr al Sham al Islamiya merged to form the Ansar al Din Front on July 25. Katibat al Khadra, a predominately Saudi group, pledged bayat (allegiance) to Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar on Oct. 4.

Jihadist training camps in Iraq and Syria Since the beginning of 2012, a total of 51 camps have been identified as being operational at some point in time, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal. Information on the camps has been obtained from jihadist videos, news accounts, and US military press releases that note airstrikes against the training facilities. It is unclear if all of the training camps are currently operational. In addition, this analysis is compiled using publicly-available evidence. It is likely that some training camps are not advertised. Of those camps, 38 are located in Syria and 13 in Iraq. The Islamic State has operated 27 camps (15 in Syria and 12 in Iraq). Al Qaeda's Al Nusrah Front has operated 10 camps in Syria. Various allied jihadist groups, including Ansar al Islam, Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, and Junud al Sham, have operated 14 camps (13 in Syria and one in Iraq). Historically, al Qaeda has used its training facilities to fuel local insurgencies while selecting individuals from the pool of trainees to conduct attacks against the West. [See LWJ report, Jihadist training camps proliferate in Iraq and Syria, for more information on the camps; and Islamist foreign fighters returning home and the threat to Europe, on the threat that jihadists training at camps in Iraq and Syria pose to the West.]

Jihadists tout training camps for children in Iraq and SyriaBy BILL ROGGIO & CALEB WEISS November 27, 2014

The Islamic State, the Al Nusrah Front, the Islamic Front, and Junud al Sham have been showcasing camps in Iraq and Syria that are being used to indoctrinate and train children to wage jihad. The groups have recently advertised a number of training facilities for children,

including one located in Ninewa province in Iraq and others in Aleppo, in and around the Islamic State's self-proclaimed capital of Raqqah, and other areas of Syria.In a propaganda video called "Blood of Jihad 2," the Islamic State highlighted a children's training camp in Iraq's Ninewa province. The video shows more than a dozen children being taught hand-to-hand combat, weapons handling, and what appears to be infantry tactics. The name of the training facility is apparently the "Abu Musab al Zarqawi camp," a tribute to the deceased founder of al Qaeda in Iraq, which was the precursor to the Islamic State. It is unclear if this facility is related to the "Zarqawi Cubs Camp" in Damascus, Syria or if multiple children's camps are named after the slain terrorist. In another propaganda video titled "Race Towards Good," the Islamic State touted a training camp that is used exclusively by young Kazakh fighters. The exact location of the camp is unclear, but it appears to be situated near Raqqah. The video demonstrated the fighters receiving physical training and schooling in firearms such as American, Russian, and Austrian-made sniper rifles. The second half of the video showed Kazakh children learning Arabic, as well as physical and military training. In one scene, a Kazakh child was seen assembling an AK-47 assault rifle. At the end of the video, a boy recited a speech for the camera, saying, "We're going to kill you, O kuffar [unbelievers]. Insha'allah [God-willing], we will slaughter you." The Syrian activist group Tahrir Souri tweeted that coalition airplanes targeted a children's training camp in Raqqah near the 17th Syrian Arab Army base on Nov. 23. A second activist group, Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, has also tweeted about training camps for children in Raqqah. In one tweet, the group reported on a training facility for children under 16. In an article titled "Islamic State group recruits, exploits children," the Associated Press reported that children are often targeted with forced recruitment, while others voluntarily attend these camps. The Islamic State also runs a camp in Aleppo province in Syria called the "Shaddad al Tunisi camp." According to Aymenn al Tamimi, an expert on Syrian and Iraqi groups, the facility is run by the jihadist group exclusively for children and teenagers. In a photograph released by the Islamic State's Wilayat (provincial district) Aleppo, teenagers are clearly shown training in this camp. Junud al Sham, a Chechen-led group operating in Syria's Latakia province, has also featured a youth training facility in its propaganda. While the video has since been deleted from YouTube, Joanna Paraszczuk of From Chechnya to Syria, a website that tracks Russian-speaking jihadists in Syria, reported that the children were shown undertaking military exercises in a classroom while observed by the emir of Junud al Sham, Muslim Shishani. Shishani, whose real name is Murad Margoshvili, has been blacklisted as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US State Department. He has sworn allegiance to the Caucasus Emirate, an al Qaeda-affiliated group that operates in the North Caucasus region of Russia. The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria, has advertised another children's camp on Twitter. In May, the terrorist group posted pictures of the "Ibn Taymiyyah camp" in Daraa, a southern province of Syria. The facility is named after a 13th century Sunni Islamic theologian whose teachings have become influential among contemporary jihadist groups. The Al Nusrah Front has also released pictures on its official Twitter feed about operations in Syria's Hama province showing an additional camp there. Training camps belonging to two other large Islamist fighting groups, Jaish al Islam and Ahrar al Sham, have also been identified in Syria. The two groups operate within the Islamic Front, a powerful Islamist coalition of Syrian rebel groups. Jaish al Islam was reported to be running a training camp in Daraa, Syria. Ahrar al Sham, a close al Qaeda ally, was also shown to be maintaining a similar facility in Idlib province in northwestern Syria.

30 July 2014 The Caliphate’s Scholar-in-ArmsStudents of Madarasa Bhalwal, Punjab.

With ‘old guard’ Jihadi intellectuals unanimously opposed to ISIS’s ambitions in Iraq and beyond, it’s fallen to a new generation of ideologues to trumpet the organization’s virtues. The most prominent, according to Cole Bunzel, is Turki al-Bin‘ali, a Bahraini who has been the ideological lodestar for ISIS since early 2013. This article was originally published by Jihadica on 23 July 2014. With the Islamic State’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or Caliph Ibrahim, seeking to displace al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri as the leader of the global jihadi movement, a parallel displacement effort is taking place in the more recondite realm of jihadi ideology. The old guard of jihadi intellectuals—Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al-Filastini, and Hani al-Siba‘i, among others—has come out unanimously against the Islamic State and its caliphal pretensions, denouncing the “organization” as hopelessly extremist and out of touch with reality. Their reproach has left a younger generation of pro-Islamic State jihadis no choice but to take up their mantle. One in particular, decrying his jihadi elders and their fierce opposition to his beloved caliphate, appears to be peerless in this effort. He is also the Islamic State’s most prominent and prolific resident scholar, based in Syria since at least February 2014. Known previously to Jihadica readers by his pseudonym, Abu Humam al-Athari, this young ideologue from Bahrain now uses his given name, Turki al-Bin‘ali (@turky_albinali), or kunya, Abu Sufyan al-Sulami. The Caliph’s cause While few outside jihadi circles have probably heard of the young Turki al-Bin‘ali, the twenty-nine-year old Bahraini has played the role of ideological lodestar for the Islamic State since at least 2013. In April of last year, for instance, when Baghdadi announced the expansion of his emirate to Syria, it was Bin‘ali who penned the first monograph in support of his move. Entitled “Extend Your Hands to Give Bay‘a [loyalty] to Baghdadi,” it called on all Muslims in the vicinity of the Islamic State to pledge loyalty to its emir. Moreover, the work anticipated Baghdadi’s caliphate in no uncertain terms: “We ask God for the day to come when we will see our shaykh seated upon the throne of the caliphate!” In addition, Bin‘ali’s biography of Baghdadi, included in this tract, is the most frequently cited by jihadis; already in July of last year he had detailed the future caliph’s lineage going back to the Prophet Muhammad, establishing the crucial caliphal qualification of descent from the Prophet’s tribe. More recently, at the end of April 2014, Bin‘ali authored another essay portending the Islamic State’s caliphate announcement of June 29, 2014 (Ramadan 1, 1435). In this work, on the permissibility of declaring the caliphate before the achievement of full political capability (al-tamkin al-kamil), Bin‘ali set forth the very legal arguments and scriptural evidence that the Islamic State’s official spokesman would use in his Ramadan announcement—most importantly, the gloss of Q. 24:55 by the Andalusian scholar Abu ‘Abdallah al-Qurtubi (d. 1275). Bin‘ali had identified the Islamic State as “the kernel of the anticipated, rightly guided caliphate.” “Doubtless,” he wrote, “the caliphate requires some measure of power, might, and political capability, and this is present in the Islamic State.” Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Bin‘ali’s former teacher, claims to have remarked upon hearing the title of his pupil’s work: “The announcement declaring their organization the caliphate must be imminent.” From Bahrain, with jihad According to a short biography written by one of his students, Turki ibn Mubarak al-Bin‘ali was born in September 1984 in Bahrain, where he began his religious education at an early age. At some point he moved to Dubai for higher education in Islamic studies, but was arrested and deported for jihadi inclinations. Thereafter he studied in Beirut and again in Bahrain. The biography mentions numerous other detentions, both within and without Bahrain, and the fact that the shaykh has been banned from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Egypt, Qatar, and others. The greater part of the work aims to inscribe Bin‘ali within the larger Salafi and smaller Jihadi-Salafi networks, detailing his studies with both quietest scholars like the Saudi ‘Abdallah ibn Jibrin (d. 2009) and Syrian Zuhayr al-

Shawish (d. 2013) and jihadis like the Palestinian-Jordanian al-Maqdisi and Moroccan ‘Umar al-Haddushi. A whole other biography is dedicated solely to detailing these scholarly connections. The most celebrated of these is by far Bin‘ali’s link with al-Maqdisi, the biggest-name jihadi scholar alive. While the details of their relationship are not given, the two scholars’ writings bear witness to what was once a profound mutual affinity and extensive collaboration. Bin‘ali has several books in defense and praise of al-Maqdisi, while the latter has returned the favor by certifying his student’s religious knowledge. Al-Maqdisi provided Bin‘ali with a general ijaza authorizing him to teach all of his works. As he wrote in 2009 in the introduction to one of Bin‘ali’s books, “I provided him with an ijaza to teach all of my books when I saw in him extraordinary passion and support for the religion, for God’s unity (tawhid), for jihad, and for the mujahidin. Such passion as this ought not to be met but with backing and support and encouragement. If a shaykh has the right to take pride in any of his students, I am proud of this beloved brother.” In terms of collaboration, when al-Maqdisi set up a Shari ‘a Council on his website in fall 2009, he appointed Bin‘ali one of its muftis. And according to Bin‘ali’s own testimony , al-Maqdisi made him his successor at the council’s helm, presumably when al-Maqdisi was in prison. In most of his writings for al-Maqdisi’s website Bin‘ali has used the name Abu Human Bakr ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari. Only in April 2014 did he finally clarify the matter of his pseudonym, noting that he has used several others as well (including Abu Hudhayfa al-Bahrayni and Abu Hazm al-Salafi), all with the intention of hiding his true identity from the “tyrants and oppressors” of Arab states. As the Islamic State has gathered strength, Bin‘ali has dispensed with the aliases. According to press reports, he arrived in Syria in late February 2014, though he may have been living there even earlier. In April Bin‘ali wrote that the Bahraini government was threatening to withdraw the citizenship of all Bahraini citizens fighting in Syria unless they return home within two weeks. His response was to compose a poem disparaging the very notion of citizenship, and vowing to stay on in the Islamic State. “Is it reasonable,” he asked, “that we would return, having arrived in the Sham of epic battles and warfare?… A land wherein the rule is Islam is my home; there is my dwelling and there do I belong.” The Refuter Bin‘ali’s signature public role for the Islamic State has been to refute its many enemies, his refutations being the most wide-ranging and most publicized of any Islamic State shar‘i (shari‘a specialist). The sharpening of the pen began in December of last year, just before the January 2014 uprising against the Islamic State in northern Syria led by fellow Islamist groups angry at its refusal to submit disputes to third-party arbitration. The accusation—which seems to have been fair—inspired a number of key Islamist and jihadi thinkers to incite their followers against the Islamic State, on the grounds that it refused to submit to God’s law. Bin‘ali, leading the charge against this allegation, argued that the Islamic State was a sovereign polity with courts and a legal system sufficient for such matters. Between December 2013 and March 2014, Bin‘ali took aim at fellow jihadi ideologues like the JordanianIyad Qunaybi and Syrian Abu Basir al-Tartusi, at Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani , and at more mainstream Islamists like the Saudi-based ‘Adnan al-‘Ar‘ur and a member of Harakat Ahrar al-Sham’s Shura Council. In the period April-June 2014 he put even larger targets in his crosshairs, refuting al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the two biggest-name jihadi ideologues, al-Maqdisi and the Palestinian Abu Qatada al-Filastini . It is his refutation of al-Maqdisi that is most significant. Issued June 7 and entitled “My Former Shaykh,” this refutation is Bin‘ali’s last in a busy six-month period. It came in response to a long document published on al-Maqdisi’s website on May 26 detailing the many efforts of the senior shaykh to mediate between the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Maqdisi’s plan was to sponsor a reconciliation initiative that would involve a third-party

arbiter, much like other initiatives being proposed by different shaykhs at the time. Bin‘ali acted as his intermediary with the Islamic State leadership, whom al-Maqdisi threatened with dire consequences should they fail to participate. In the event, his message to the Islamic State went unheeded, and so the shaykh did as threatened. His statement on “the obligatory position” to be adopted toward the Islamic State was harsh, describing it as “deviating from the path of divine truth, being unjust to the mujahidin, following the road of extremism…refusing arbitration, declining reform, [and] disobeying the commands of its senior leaders and shaykhs.” This last comment concerns the Islamic State’s disputed status as a former al-Qaeda affiliate. In the document, al-Maqdisi follows al-Zawahiri in claiming that it was indeed an affiliate and thus obligated to obey its leaders’ commands. What really piqued Bin‘ali was the insulting approach his former teacher had suddenly adopted toward him. Al-Maqdisi had included in this document long excerpts from emails between himself, Bin’ali, and the administrator of the website, and thrown occasional grammatical errors into Bin‘ali’s excerpted writing. In his discussion of the correspondence al-Maqdisi had furthermore referred disparagingly to his Bahraini pupil as the Islamic State’s “most vaunted mufti” or “most vaunted shar‘i.” The content of Bin‘ali’s response is not worth examining in great detail. The main points of contention are the Islamic State’s stubbornness in refusing arbitration—which they both acknowledge—and its alleged insubordination against al-Qaeda—which they do not agree on. What is noteworthy is Bin‘ali’s authorship of such a refutation to begin with. Rejecting seniority In another statement from early May 2014, al-Maqdisi had written critically of younger jihadi shaykhs dismissing their elders, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Qatada al-Filastini. “Take heed of seniority,” he warned his juniors, accusing them of “wanting to stand upon the shoulders of our best and brightest and then discredit their intellects.” Indeed, just days before this statement was issued, Bin‘ali had written that age was a likely cause of Abu Qatada’s “confusion” surrounding the Islamic State. Bin‘ali’s refutation of “my former shaykh” (shaykhi ‘l-asbaq) is in its very title a rejection of the idea of “seniority” (asbaqiyya). It represents the assured spirit of a younger generation of jihadis ready and willing to break with an established cadre of jihadi intellectuals and carve their own path. It also represents the assured spirit of Bin‘ali himself, who for years has disputed the notion that he is too young to be a religious authority. Visited in prison some six years ago in Bahrain by a Saudi religious official, who was shocked that a twenty-three-year old was issuing religious opinions, Bin‘ali retorted with an essay on the inadmissibility of age restrictions on such practice in Islam. Whether Bin‘ali can succeed in leading this younger generation of pro-Islamic State jihadi thinkers is yet to be seen. For the moment he remains the closest thing that the caliphate has, after the caliph himself, to a big-name religious authority. For more information on issues and events that shape our world, please visit the ISN Blog or browse our resources.

Cees: Isis has enough weapons to carry on fighting for two years, UN warns; Defeat or no defeat, on the run or not, hiding in a cave or, ideology or crazed fanatics? Training their fighters and a selected few prepare to attack the West. Moreover the 2nd generation is groomed. Weapons and Armies are needed for the next (AQ masterplan) Phase: expansion in preparation for the Total confrontation. And IS is not the only one: AQ is doing it for years.