AIIA NSW

AIIA NSW

AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA: MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE

Peter McCawley

Tuesday 15 April 2014

Sydney

Outline(1) Past

(a) Overall trends(b) Two comments

(2) Present(a) Australia(b) Indonesia

(3) Future(a) Short-term(b) Long-term

(4) Conclusion

Theme: It’s all looking a bit harder. And there are significant issues for Australia down the track.

Outline(1) Past




(4) Conclusion


Overall trends

see timeline (handout) … 70 years• Sukarno – Difficult period• Soeharto – Improvement; then Timor; then

Keating … ending in 1997-98 crisis for Indonesia• Habibie, Gus Dur, Megawati – Turbulent period,

East Timor, relations difficult, Megawati cool• SBY – Dramatic change -- SBY’s new approach

+ Howard’s $1 bn aid package (2005) … led into to a period of good relations (2005-2013) … at the time, this suited both leaders

Outline(1) Past




(4) Conclusion


First comment – a pattern?

• Australia-Indonesia relationship … ‘has been particularly fluid with … elements of great harmony and tension, co-operation and competition, selfless commitment and tacit low-intensity armed confrontation’.

(Stephens and Gruber, Harvard Asia Pacific Review 2010.)

• Hayden: the relationship ‘regularly blows hot and cold’.

… and not much change over 30 years Jusuf Wanandi’s 1982 comments ( handout)

• Relations in general are “not very friendly”• Tourism in Bali has not improved understanding• Economic relations minimal• G-to-G are “quite good” but “some elements in

the Australian government remain “suspicious”• Political contacts are minimal• Other mutual prejudices exist … academics on

both sides … media

Second comment -- Various actors

• There are various actors (each side) in the bilateral relationship ... often with different agendas

• G-to-G• Business, commercial, including education• Community links (so-called people-to-people)• Media• Second track (academic, think tank, etc)• … and sometimes strong domestic lobbies driving

particular issues (eg, live cattle trade)

… a map is helpful

Second comment -- Various actors(NB: push and pull between vertical and horizontal pressures)

Outline(1) Past




(4) Conclusion


Summary: Australian policy and Indonesia-1 (Prime Minister Abbott, AFR, 19 Nov 2013.)

“The Australian government uses all the resources at its disposal, including information, to help our friends, and our allies, not to harm them … my first duty is to protect Australia and to advance the national interest …

Consistent with that duty, I will never say or do anything that might damage the strong relationship and the close cooperation that we have with Indonesia, which is, all in all, our most important relationship -- a relationship I am determined will grow stronger in the months and years ahead.

Summary: Australian policy and Indonesia-2 (Prime Minister Abbott, interview with Michelle Grattan, 28 Mar 2014.)

I am determined to be the best possible friend of Indonesia that I can be, consistent with my overriding duty to protect our country. We would never do anything that was damaging to Indonesia … but there are some things which are non-negotiable. Border protection is just non-negotiable. Maintaining a strong security network is just non-negotiable. I think the Indonesians understand that. I just think it is a pity that the inevitable domestic politics of Indonesia, the inevitable sensation-seeking of the media here and there, turned what was always going to go the way it went into some kind of a big storm.

Editorial, ‘The Australian’, 20 Nov 2013 (on the issue of an apology from Australia about intelligence issues)

‘Australia’s interest in Indonesia is no secret’

Tony Abbott right to stand firm but will still need deft diplomacy

Tony Abbott is right to adopt a firm stance. He has expressed regret for the embarrassment caused by the media revelations but is unapologetic about his nation’s security and intelligence actions … Dr Yudhoyono’s angry tweets have heightened tensions, and cool heads have been sorely lacking outside government in Australia.

Outline(1) Past




(4) Conclusion


Feith and Castles political map (1945-1965):

Indonesian political map – 2014 (Adapted from Feith and Castles)

Jokowi and SBY

Jokowi and Megawati

Jokowi and Megawati

Jokowi’s preferred image

Prabowo Subianto

Praboso and SBY

Probowo in the Gelora Stadium, Jakarta

Outline(1) Past




(4) Conclusion


Short-term: two key questions

(a) What will Indonesia do in response to the current situation?

(b) More generally, what broad policy stance can be expected from a new administration in Indonesia?

(a) What will Indonesia do?

• Hard to tell. The Indonesian administration is now in caretaker mode. Many issues are on hold.

• From past experience (2000-2004), cooperation will not stop … but some coolness can be expected … there won’t be many favours.

• Slow response on the IA-CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement)?

• Delay in return of ambassador?• Attention to six steps set out by SBY

(… six steps are …)

Six steps (include the following:) … SBY was stung by the intelligence issue and the Australian response … he set out six steps:

1. Foreign ministers to meet to consider ‘sensitive issues’.

2. New code of ethical conduct.

3. Design of intelligence-gathering protocol.

4. Implementation of the code and protocols.

5. Evaluation of progress.

6. Restoration of full bilateral cooperation.

(b) Policy stance of new administration?

• An Indonesian view: (Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jkt Post, 6 Jan 2014) …

“The current administration is an expiring one …

… from the current batch of presidential frontrunners, nearly all have a limited fondness for foreign policy. Absent will be the kind of keenness and strategic sophistication on global affairs exhibited by Yudhoyono during his decade in office.”

• Overall, expect a shift away from the internationalists towards the nationalists.

Indonesian foreign policy: 5 priorities (Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jkt Post, 6 Jan 2014)

1. Consular issues – protecting and assisting Indonesians abroad, esp. migrant workers.

2. Promoting economic diplomacy; promote Indonesia more effectively.

3. Bilateral activism in regional security and stability; “Indonesia should be the lead player”

4. Diplomatic aggressiveness to maintain the unity and centrality of ASEAN.

5. Thaw the chill between Jakarta and Canberra. (… more on last point ….. )

Indonesian foreign policy: Australia and Indonesia (Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jkt Post, 6 Jan 2014)

On the chill …

“Canberra needs to change its outlook on Asia and to deal respectfully towards its neighbors; the recent cold shoulder by Jakarta was well-deserved. But there should be a perimeter within which the frostiness is contained…The current chill serves no strategic interest, other than satisfying our own ego. Once Prime Minister Tony Abbott has learned who Australia’s true friends are, Jakarta should vanquish the undercurrent of bitterness that presides over bilateral cooperation.”

Other action in the short-term? Wanandi: (handout)

1. Recognise the differences. Moralistic attitudes by Australia are not helpful. Indonesians need to overcome misfeelings towards Australia.

2. Steps are needed to increase relations in various sectors – trade, natural resources, technologies, defence, education, science.

3. Improve relations in the mass media (on both sides)

Outline(1) Past




(4) Conclusion


Long-term: key issue – Australia and Asia cf Australia and Indonesia? --1

Rawdon Dalrymple (2003):

‘It is almost inconceivable that Australia could win acceptance in a developing East Asia institutional framework without at least the acquiescence, and probably not without the active support, of Indonesia.


Bill Hayden (2006):

‘The success with which we deal with [the relationship with Indonesia] will be seen by other nations as the measure of our skill, maturity and intellectual depth, as a nation, in handling international relations.’


Wang Gungwu (1988):

"I am going to assume that Australia is unlikely to be able to influence any part of Asia except marginally … Following from this … the Australia that Asians will see would be largely one that reacts against, or responds to, changing Asia. The future would then centre on how successfully Australia defends itself against what it does not like about Asia and how successfully it adapts itself and absorbs what it does like." [emphasis added]

ADB – 3 Northern groups

ADB – 3 Southern groups

ADB – Australia and the six groups … searching for a niche in the region?

ASEAN and Australia ( handout)

Outline(1) Past




(4) Conclusion


Conclusion-1

1. The period just past (SBY presidency) may have been unusual. Bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia may now be returning to a more ‘normal’ level of ’formal politeness’ between the two countries.

2. Some would say this is not really a problem. Disagreements in Asia are not uncommon. Perhaps it is just the normal job of leaders and ambassadors to ‘manage relationships’?

cartoon

After all, other countries have problems too … (Japan Times, March 2014)

Conclusion-2

3. Domestic considerations will always strongly influence foreign policy (both in Indonesia and in Australia). Leaders must juggle the two. (Corollary: to understand Indonesian foreign policy, Australian policy-makers need to understand domestic issues in Indonesia.)

4. One key long-term issue for Australia, in working with Indonesia, is to understand that it will be hard to work effectively with a strengthening ASEAN without working effectively with Indonesia.

Conclusion-3

5. Indonesia and Australia often see key events differently. There should be more recognition in Australia of the immense challenges that Indonesia faces in building a masyarakat yang adil dan makmur [a just and prosperous society]. In Indonesia, Australian support for this goal is sometimes regarded as unreliable. We may not agree, but it would be useful to understand.

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