Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES,respondents.Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private respondents.PARAS,J.:Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reading as follows;WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5, 1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law,2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.The question certainly calls for a negative answer.We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of lifes other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the peoples happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,Section 6. Retention Limits. Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.Footnotes** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in by Justices Josue N. Bellosillo and Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. of the Fourth Division. Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaSECOND DIVISIONMilestone Farms, Inc., v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 182332. February 23, 2011xxDECISIONNACHURA,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorari[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Amended Decision[2]dated October 4, 2006 and its Resolution[3]dated March 27, 2008.The FactsPetitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960.[4]Among its pertinent secondary purposes are:(1)to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation;(2)to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-products of said business; and (3)to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be authorized by law.[5]On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sittingen banc, ruled inLuz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform[6]that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T-410434) M-15750, (T-486101) M-7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T-274129) M-15751, (T-486103) M-7309, (T-486104) M-7310, (T-332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311, (T-486106) M-7312, M-8791, (T-486107) M-7313, (T-486108) M-7314, M-8796, (T-486109) M-7315, (T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and located in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court inLuz Farms.Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.[7]Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and arrived at the following findings:[T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is 258.8422 hectares; the area which served as infrastructure is 42.0000 hectares; ten (10) hectares are planted to corn and the remaining five (5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that the livestock population are 371 heads of cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of swine and 788 heads of cocks; that the area being applied for exclusion is far below the required or ideal area which is 563 hectares for the total livestock population; that the approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes with an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below the allowable 10% variance; and, though not directly used for livestock purposes, the ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and the five (5) hectares devoted to fishpond could be considered supportive to livestock production.The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCECs findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27, 1994, exempting petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from CARP.[8]The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented by Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994.[9]Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed a letter-appeal with the DAR Secretary.Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 781-T.[10]The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal. Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its Decision[11]dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its Resolution[12]dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and executory.In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881,[13]which was approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL.On October 22, 1996, the fact-finding team formed by the DAR Undersecretary for Field Operations and Support Services conducted an actual headcount of the livestock population on the property.The headcount showed that there were 448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine.

The DAR Secretarys RulingOn January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.[14]Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect.He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the name of petitioners president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered from 1992 to 1995.Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates rather than to the headcount because the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988.Applying the animal-land ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every head of cattle/carabao/horse) and the infrastructure-animal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21 heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare for 21 heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao exempted 240.9776 hectares of the property, as follows:1. 86 hectares for the 86 heads of cattle existing as of 15 June 1988;2. 8 hectares for infrastructure following the ratio of 1.7815 hectares for every 21 heads of cattle;3. 8 hectares for the 8 horses;4. 0.3809 square meters of infrastructure for the 8 horses; [and]5. 138.5967 hectares for the 5,678 heads of swine.[15]Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[16]submitting therewith copies of Certificates of Transfer of Large Cattle and additional Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle issued to petitioner prior to June 15, 1988, as additional proof that it had met the required animal-land ratio. Petitioner also submitted a copy of a Disbursement Voucher dated December 17, 1986, showing the purchase of 100 heads of cattle by the Bureau of Animal Industry from petitioner, as further proof that it had been actively operating a livestock farm even before June 15, 1988.However, in his Order dated April 15, 1997, Secretary Garilao denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[17]Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal[18]before the Office of the President (OP).The OPs RulingOn February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision[19]reinstating Director Dalugdugs Order dated June 27, 1994 and declared the entire 316.0422-hectare property exempt from the coverage of CARP.However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by farmer-groups Samahang Anak-Pawis ng Lagundi (SAPLAG) and Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution[20]dated September 16, 2002, setting aside its previous decision. The dispositive portion of the OP resolution reads:WHEREFORE, the Decision subject of the instant separate motions for reconsideration is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, as reiterated in another Order of 15 April 1997, without prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and verification proceedings that DAR, thru the appropriate Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake pursuant to Rule III (D) of DAR Administrative Order No. 09, series of 1993.SO ORDERED.[21]The OP held that, when it comes to proof of ownership, the reference is the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. Certificates of cattle ownership, which are readily available being issued by the appropriate government office ought to match the number of heads of cattle counted as existing during the actual headcount.The presence of large cattle on the land, without sufficient proof of ownership thereof, only proves such presence.Taking note of Secretary Garilaos observations, the OP also held that, before an ocular investigation is conducted on the property, the landowners are notified in advance; hence, mere reliance on the physical headcount is dangerous because there is a possibility that the landowners would increase the number of their cattle for headcount purposes only. The OP observed that there was a big variance between the actual headcount of 448 heads of cattle and only 86 certificates of ownership of large cattle.Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA.[22]

The Proceedings Before the CA and Its RulingsOn April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner applied for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP coverage. Petitioner was held to have actually engaged in the said business on the property even before June 15, 1988. The CA disposed of the case in this wise:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is herebyGRANTED.The assailedResolutionof the Office of the President dated September 16, 2002 is herebySET ASIDE, and itsDecisiondated February 4, 2000 declaring the entire 316.0422 hectares exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is herebyREINSTATEDwithout prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and verification proceedings which the Department of Agrarian Reform, through the proper Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake pursuant to Policy Statement (D) of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.SO ORDERED.[23]Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR Conversion Order No. CON-0410-0016[24](Conversion Order), granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted with a total area of 153.3049 hectares were covered by TCT Nos. M-15755 (T-332694), M-15751 (T-274129), and M-15750 (T-410434). With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.On the CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for Reconsideration were filed by farmer-groups, namely:the farmers represented by Miguel Espinas[25](Espinas group), the Pinugay Farmers,[26]and the SAPLAG.[27]The farmer-groups all claimed that the CA should have accorded respect to the factual findings of the OP. Moreover, the farmer-groups unanimously intimated that petitioner already converted and developed a portion of the property into a leisure-residential-commercial estate known as the Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex (Palo Alto).Subsequently, in a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration on Newly Secured Evidence pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993[28](Supplement) dated June 15, 2005, the Espinas group submitted the following as evidence:1) Conversion Order[29]dated November 4, 2004, issued by Secretary Villa, converting portions of the property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use, with a total area of 153.3049 hectares; thus, the Espinas group prayed that the remaining 162.7373 hectares (subject property) be covered by the CARP;2)Letter[30]dated June 7, 2005 of both incoming Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Bismark M. Elma (MARO Elma) and outgoing MARO Cesar C. Celi (MARO Celi) of Baras, Rizal, addressed to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II of Rizal, Felixberto Q. Kagahastian, (MARO Report), informing the latter, among others, that Palo Alto was already under development and the lots therein were being offered for sale; that there were actual tillers on the subject property; that there were agricultural improvements thereon, including an irrigation system and road projects funded by the Government; that there was no existing livestock farm on the subject property; and that the same was not in the possession and/or control of petitioner; and3)Certification[31]dated June 8, 2005, issued by both MARO Elma and MARO Celi, manifesting that the subject property was in the possession and cultivation of actual occupants and tillers, and that, upon inspection, petitioner maintained no livestock farm thereon.Four months later, the Espinas group and the DAR filed their respective Manifestations.[32]In its Manifestation dated November 29, 2005, the DAR confirmed that the subject property was no longer devoted to cattle raising. Hence, in its Resolution[33]dated December 21, 2005, the CA directed petitioner to file its comment on the Supplement and the aforementioned Manifestations. Employing the services of a new counsel, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Rejoinder,[34]and prayed that the MARO Report be disregarded and expunged from the records for lack of factual and legal basis.With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order of November 4, 2004, the appellate court had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares.In the same token, the Espinas group prayed that this remaining area be covered by the CARP.[35]On October 4, 2006, the CA amended its earlier Decision.It held that its April 29, 2005 Decision was theoretically not final because DAR A.O. No. 9 required the MARO to make a continuing review and verification of the subject property. While the CA was cognizant of our ruling inDepartment of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton,[36]wherein we declared DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional, it still resolved to lift the exemption of the subject property from the CARP, not on the basis of DAR A.O. No. 9, but on the strength of evidence such as the MARO Report and Certification, and theKatunayan[37]issued by thePunong Barangay, Alfredo Ruba (Chairman Ruba), of Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, showing that the subject property was no longer operated as a livestock farm. Moreover, the CA held that the lease agreements,[38]which petitioner submitted to prove that it was compelled to lease a ranch as temporary shelter for its cattle, only reinforced the DARs finding that there was indeed no existing livestock farm on the subject property. While petitioner claimed that it was merely forced to do so to prevent further slaughtering of its cattle allegedly committed by the occupants, the CA found the claim unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the CA opined that petitioner should have asserted its rights when the irrigation and road projects were introduced by the Government within its property. Finally, the CA accorded the findings of MARO Elma and MARO Celi the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions in the absence of evidence proving misconduct and/or dishonesty when they inspected the subject property and rendered their report. Thus, the CA disposed:WHEREFORE, this CourtsDecisiondated April 29, 2005 is hereby amended in that the exemption of the subject landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.SO ORDERED.[39]Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[40]On January 8, 2007, MARO Elma, in compliance with the Memorandum of DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres, tendered another Report[41]reiterating that, upon inspection of the subject property, together with petitioners counsel-turned witness, Atty. Grace Eloisa J. Que (Atty. Que), PARO Danilo M. Obarse, Chairman Ruba, and several occupants thereof, he, among others, found no livestock farm within the subject property. About 43 heads of cattle were shown, but MARO Elma observed that the same were inside an area adjacent toPalo Alto. Subsequently, upon Atty. Ques request for reinvestigation, designated personnel of the DAR Provincial and Regional Offices (Investigating Team) conducted another ocular inspection on the subject property on February 20, 2007. The Investigating Team, in its Report[42]dated February 21, 2007, found that, per testimony of petitioners caretaker, Rogelio Ludivices (Roger),[43]petitioner has 43 heads of cattle taken care of by the following individuals: i) Josefino Custodio (Josefino) 18 heads; ii) Andy Amahit 15 heads; and iii) Bert Pangan 2 heads; that these individuals pastured the herd of cattle outside the subject property, while Roger took care of 8 heads of cattle inside the Palo Alto area; that 21 heads of cattle owned by petitioner were seen in the area adjacent to Palo Alto; that Josefino confirmed to the Investigating Team that he takes care of 18 heads of cattle owned by petitioner; that the said Investigating Team saw 9 heads of cattle in the Palo Alto area, 2 of which bore MFI marks; and that the 9 heads of cattle appear to have matched the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner.Because of the contentious factual issues and the conflicting averments of the parties, the CA set the case for hearing and reception of evidence on April 24, 2007.[44]Thereafter, as narrated by the CA, the following events transpired:On May 17, 2007, [petitioner] presented theJudicial Affidavitsof its witnesses, namely, [petitioners] counsel, [Atty. Que], and the alleged caretaker of [petitioners] farm, [Roger], who were both cross-examined by counsel for farmers-movants and SAPLAG.[Petitioner] and SAPLAG then marked their documentary exhibits.On May 24, 2007, [petitioners] security guard and third witness, Rodolfo G. Febrada, submitted hisJudicial Affidavitand was cross-examined by counsel for fa[r]mers-movants and SAPLAG.Farmers-movants also marked their documentary exhibits.Thereafter, the parties submitted their respectiveFormal Offers of Evidence.Farmers-movants and SAPLAG filed theirobjectionsto [petitioners]Formal Offer of Evidence.Later, [petitioner] and farmers-movants filed their respectiveMemoranda.In December 2007, this Court issued aResolutionon the parties offer of evidence and considered [petitioners]Motion for Reconsiderationsubmitted for resolution.[45]Finally, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution[46]dated March 27, 2008. The CA discarded petitioners reliance onSutton. It ratiocinated that the MARO Reports and the DARs Manifestation could not be disregarded simply because DAR A.O. No. 9 was declared unconstitutional. TheSuttonruling was premised on the fact that theSuttonproperty continued to operate as a livestock farm. The CA also reasoned that, inSutton, this Court did not remove from the DAR the power to implement the CARP, pursuant to the latters authority to oversee the implementation of agrarian reform laws under Section 50[47]of the CARL. Moreover, the CA found:Petitioner-appellant claimed that they had 43 heads of cattle which are being cared for and pastured by 4 individuals.To prove its ownership of the said cattle, petitioner-appellant offered in evidence 43Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle.Significantly, however, the saidCertificateswere all dated and issued on November 24, 2006, nearly 2 months after this Court rendered itsAmended Decisionlifting the exemption of the 162-hectare portion of the subject landholding.The acquisition of such cattle after the lifting of the exemption clearly reveals that petitioner-appellant was no longer operating a livestock farm, and suggests an effort to create a semblance of livestock-raising for the purpose of itsMotion for Reconsideration.[48]On petitioners assertion that between MARO Elmas Report dated January 8, 2007 and the Investigating Teams Report, the latter should be given credence, the CA held that there were no material inconsistencies between the two reports because both showed that the 43 heads of cattle were found outside the subject property.Hence, this Petition assigning the following errors:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT LANDS DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK FARMING WITHIN THE MEANING OFLUZ FARMSANDSUTTON, AND WHICH ARE THEREBY EXEMPT FROM CARL COVERAGE, ARE NEVERTHELESS SUBJECT TO DARS CONTINUING VERIFICATION AS TO USE, AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH VERIFICATION, MAY BE ORDERED REVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION AND COMPULSORY ACQUISITION[;]GRANTING THAT THE EXEMPT LANDS AFORESAID MAY BE SO REVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION, STILL THE PROCEEDINGS FOR SUCH PURPOSE BELONGS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE DAR, BEFORE WHICH THE CONTENDING PARTIES MAY VENTILATE FACTUAL ISSUES, AND AVAIL THEMSELVES OF USUAL REVIEW PROCESSES, AND NOT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES COMPLETELY UNRELATED TO REVERSION [; AND]IN ANY CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE IS NO LONGER BEING USED FOR LIVESTOCK FARMING.[49]Petitioner asseverates that lands devoted to livestock farming as of June 15, 1988 are classified as industrial lands, hence, outside the ambit of the CARP; thatLuz Farms,Sutton, and R.A. No. 7881 clearly excluded such lands on constitutional grounds; that petitioners lands were actually devoted to livestock even before the enactment of the CARL; that livestock farms are exempt from the CARL, not by reason of any act of the DAR, but because of their nature as industrial lands; that petitioners property was admittedly devoted to livestock farming as of June 1988 and the only issue before was whether or not petitioners pieces of evidence comply with the ratios provided under DAR A.O. No. 9; and that DAR A.O. No. 9 having been declared as unconstitutional, DAR had no more legal basis to conduct a continuing review and verification proceedings over livestock farms. Petitioner argues that, in cases where reversion of properties to agricultural use is proper, only the DAR has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the same; hence, the CA, in this case, committed serious errors when it ordered the reversion of the property and when it considered pieces of evidence not existing as of June 15, 1988, despite its lack of jurisdiction; that the CA should have remanded the case to the DAR due to conflicting factual claims; that the CA cannot ventilate allegations of fact that were introduced for the first time on appeal as a supplement to a motion for reconsideration of its first decision, use the same to deviate from the issues pending review, and, on the basis thereof, declare exempt lands reverted to agricultural use and compulsorily covered by the CARP; that the newly discovered [pieces of] evidence were not introduced in the proceedings before the DAR, hence, it was erroneous for the CA to consider them; and that piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice. Finally, petitioner submits that, in any case, the CA gravely erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that the subject property was no longer used for livestock farming as shown by the Report of the Investigating Team. Petitioner relies on the 1997 LUCEC and DAR findings that the subject property was devoted to livestock farming, and on the 1999 CA Decision which held that the occupants of the property were squatters, bereft of any authority to stay and possess the property.[50]On one hand, the farmer-groups, represented by the Espinas group, contend that they have been planting rice and fruit-bearing trees on the subject property, and helped the National Irrigation Administration in setting up an irrigation system therein in 1997, with a produce of 1,500 to 1,600 sacks ofpalayeach year; that petitioner came to court with unclean hands because, while it sought the exemption and exclusion of the entire property, unknown to the CA, petitioner surreptitiously filed for conversion of the property now known as Palo Alto, which was actually granted by the DAR Secretary; that petitioners bad faith is more apparent since, despite the conversion of the 153.3049-hectare portion of the property, it still seeks to exempt the entire property in this case; and that the fact that petitioner applied for conversion is an admission that indeed the property is agricultural. The farmer-groups also contend that petitioners reliance onLuz FarmsandSuttonis unavailing because in these cases there was actually no cessation of the business of raising cattle; that what is being exempted is the activity of raising cattle and not the property itself; that exemptions due to cattle raising are not permanent; that the declaration of DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional does not at all diminish the mandated duty of the DAR, as the lead agency of the Government, to implement the CARL; that the DAR, vested with the power to identify lands subject to CARP, logically also has the power to identify lands which are excluded and/or exempted therefrom; that to disregard DARs authority on the matter would open the floodgates to abuse and fraud by unscrupulous landowners; that the factual finding of the CA that the subject property is no longer a livestock farm may not be disturbed on appeal, as enunciated by this Court; that DAR conducted a review and monitoring of the subject property by virtue of its powers under the CARL; and that the CA has sufficient discretion to admit evidence in order that it could arrive at a fair, just, and equitable ruling in this case.[51]On the other hand, respondent OP, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), claims that the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising; that the issues presented by petitioner are factual in nature and not proper in this case; that under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questions of fact may be raised by the parties and resolved by the CA; that due to the divergence in the factual findings of the DAR and the OP, the CA was duty bound to review and ascertain which of the said findings are duly supported by substantial evidence; that the subject property was subject to continuing review and verification proceedings due to the then prevailing DAR A.O. No. 9; that there is no question that the power to determine if a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR Secretary; that pursuant to such power, the MARO rendered the assailed reports and certification, and the DAR itself manifested before the CA that the subject property is no longer devoted to livestock farming; and that, while it is true that this Courts ruling inLuz Farmsdeclared that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the CARP, the said ruling is not without any qualification.[52]In its Reply[53]to the farmer-groups and to the OSGs comment, petitioner counters that the farmer-groups have no legal basis to their claims as they admitted that they entered the subject property without the consent of petitioner; that the rice plots actually found in the subject property, which were subsequently taken over by squatters, were, in fact, planted by petitioner in compliance with the directive of then President Ferdinand Marcos for the employer to provide rice to its employees; that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction; and that, inasmuch as the subject property was not agricultural from the very beginning, DAR has no power to regulate the same. Petitioner also asserts that the CA cannot uncharacteristically assume the role of trier of facts and resolve factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower tribunals; that MARO Elma rendered the assailed MARO reports with bias against petitioner, and the same were contradicted by the Investigating Teams Report, which confirmed that the subject property is still devoted to livestock farming; and that there has been no change in petitioners business interest as an entity engaged in livestock farming since its inception in 1960, though there was admittedly a decline in the scale of its operations due to the illegal acts of the squatter-occupants.Our RulingThe Petition is bereft of merit.Let it be stressed that when the CA provided in its first Decision that continuing review and verification may be conducted by the DAR pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, the latter was not yet declared unconstitutional by this Court. The first CA Decision was promulgated on April 29, 2005, while this Court struck down as unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way ofSutton,on October 19, 2005. Likewise, let it be emphasized that the Espinas group filed the Supplement and submitted the assailed MARO reports and certification on June 15, 2005, which proved to be adverse to petitioners case. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process,[54]the same is not without exception,[55]such as this case. The CA, under Section 3,[56]Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in the interest of justice, entertain and resolve factual issues. After all, technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may thus be allowed to attain the prime objective of dispensing justice, for dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.[57]Moreover, petitioner cannot validly claim that it was deprived of due process because the CA afforded it all the opportunity to be heard.[58]The CA even directed petitionerto file its comment on the Supplement, and to prove and establish its claim that the subject property was excluded from the coverage of the CARP.Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the CA by submitting pleadings and pieces of documentary evidence, such as the Investigating Teams Report and judicial affidavits. The CA also went further by setting the case for hearing. In all these proceedings, all the parties rights to due process were amply protected and recognized.With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioners arguments fail to persuade.Its invocation ofSuttonis unavailing. InSutton, we held:In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in theLuz Farmscase that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.Clearly, petitionerDAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.[59]Indeed, as pointed out by the CA, the instant case does not rest on facts parallel to those ofSuttonbecause, inSutton, the subject property remained a livestock farm. We even highlighted therein the fact that there has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.[60]Similarly, inDepartment of Agrarian Reform v. Uy,[61]we excluded a parcel of land from CARP coverage due to the factual findings of the MARO, which were confirmed by the DAR, that the property was entirely devoted to livestock farming. However, inA.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc., represented by Carmen Z. Arnaiz v. Office of the President; Department of Agrarian Reform; Regional Director, DAR Region V, Legaspi City; Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR Provincial Office, Masbate, Masbate; and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR Municipal Office, Masbate, Masbate,[62]we denied a similar petition for exemption and/or exclusion, by according respect to the CAs factual findings and itsrelianceon the findings of the DAR and the OP thatthe subjectparcels of land were not directly, actually, and exclusively used for pasture.[63]Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause.[64]While petitioner advances a defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants of the subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we find it surprising that not even a single police and/orbarangayreport was filed by petitioner to amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover, we accord respect to the CAs keen observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating Teams Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject property.Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the DAR Secretarys competence and jurisdiction.[65]Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure provides:Section 3.Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:x x x x3.8Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine, and poultry raising.Thus, we cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR Secretary of his legal mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over all ALI cases. To succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit parenthetically, Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into residential and golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area originally claimed as exempt from CARP coverage because it was allegedly devoted to livestock production.In sum, we find no reversible error in the assailed Amended Decision and Resolution of the CA which would warrant the modification, much less the reversal, thereof.WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIEDand theCourt of Appeals Amended Decision dated October 4, 2006 and Resolution dated March 27, 2008 areAFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC[G.R. No. 86889 :December 4, 1990.]192 SCRA 51LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.D E C I S I O NPARAS,J.:This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rdHence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.:-cralawThe constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:ARTICLE XIIIxxxAGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORMSection 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.xxx"Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).The petition is impressed with merit.The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs.Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).: rdAscertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs.Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted as follows:xxx"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).xxxThe questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:xxx"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralawIt has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.SO ORDERED.Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.Feliciano, J., is on leave.Separate OpinionsSARMIENTO, J., concurring:I agree that the petition be granted.It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its Implementing Rules and Guidelines insofar as they include the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in their coverage cannot be simplistically reduced to a question of constitutional construction.It is a well-settled rule that construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. A close reading however of the constitutional text in point, specifically, Sec. 4, Art. XIII, particularly the phrase, ". . . in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof," provides a basis for the clear and possible coverage of livestock, poultry, and swine raising within the ambit of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. This accords with the principle that every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and the court in considering the validity of a statute should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law.1The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight when a ruling to the contrary would, in effect, defeat the laudable and noble purpose of the law, i.e., the welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers in the promotion of social justice, by the expedient conversion of agricultural lands into livestock, poultry, and swine raising by scheming landowners, thus, rendering the comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely illusory.The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of whether or not the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article II, section 1) which teaches simply that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.2There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make real differences, to wit:xxxNo land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants nor landlords, only employers and employees.Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is inconsequential that all the commercial hog and poultry farms combined occupy less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares of land supposedly covered by the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.: nadIn every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of an inconsequential portion of land is a mere incident of its operation, as in any other undertaking, business or otherwise.The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere more evident when one considers that at least 95% of total investment in these farms is in the form of fixed assets which are industrial in nature.These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage, waterers, blowers, misters and in some cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3) extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) anti-pollution equipment such as bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and accessory facilities; (6) modern equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilities complete with expensive tools and equipment; and a myriad other such technologically advanced appurtances.How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost totally occupied by these structures?The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural tenants surfaces when one considers contribution to output. Labor cost of livestock and poultry farms is no more than 4% of total operating cost. The 98% balance represents inputs not obtained from the land nor provided by the farmworkers inputs such as feeds and biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power cost, cost of money and several others.Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy law. They are entitled to social security benefits where tenant-farmers are not. They are paid fixed wages rather than crop shares. And as in any other industry, they receive additional benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and other incentives such as free housing privileges, light and water.Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also fallacious in the sense that like the manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather than a source of agricultural output. At least 60% of the entire domestic supply of corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry farms. So are the by-products of rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp meal), and fish (fish meal).3xxxIn view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly situated and hence, cannot be treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for the inclusion of livestock and poultry industry within the coverage of the agrarian reform program constitute invalid classification and must accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.chanrobles virtual law libraryEndnotesSARMIENTO, J., concurring:1. In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 70 L. ed., p. 1059.2. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.3. Rollo, 29-30.

EN BANCDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070REFORM, represented by SECRETARYJOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Present: Petitioner, Davide,C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, versus Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia,JJ.DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T.SUTTON-SOLIMAN and Promulgated:HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents. October 19, 2005x xDECISIONPUNO,J.: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution. The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1]their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.On December 4, 1990, in anen bancdecision in the case ofLuz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2]this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.In view of theLuz Farms ruling,respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3]On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.On December 27, 1993, DAR issuedA.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5]which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits,viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e.,1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under theLuz Farms doctrine,their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6] On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order[7]partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9]with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of theLuz Farms casewhich declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.[10]It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to theLuz Farms caseas the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However,the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE,premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is herebyDECLAREDnull and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.[11] Hence, this petition. The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. Petitioners arguments fail to impress. Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature,i.e.,the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.The fundamental rule in administrative law is that,to be valid, administrative rules and regulationsmust be issued by authority of a law andmust not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.[13]The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution.Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.[14]In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,inter alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in theLuz Farmscasethat livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.[15]Clearly, petitionerDAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.The subsequent case ofNatalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16]reiterated our ruling in theLuz Farmscase. InNatalia Realty,the Court heldthat industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.[17] We stressed anew thatwhile Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands,the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, inNatalia Realty,even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which arearable yetstill undeveloped,could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands. A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention.The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case.Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18]Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is theconversion of agricultural landsfor non-agricultural purposesafter the effectivity of the CARL.There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one.[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20]which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically,the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21]With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.IN VIEW WHEREOF,the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA,petitioner,vs.THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO),respondents.CAMPOS, JR.,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of Bukidnon.In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT Nos. 160, 161 and 162.1In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than 3,000. By 1988, the student population had expanded to some 13,000 students, so that the school community has an academic population (student, faculty and non-academic staff) of almost 15,000. To cope with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly from government appropriation and partly by self-help measures.True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on self-help measures to carry out its educational objectives, train its students, and maintain various activities which the government appropriation could not adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries. The location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is quite a distance from the nearest town, was the proper setting for the adoption of such a program. Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants who were not members of the faculty or non-academic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU.Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement2among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member of their family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impact of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To the CMU-Income Enhancement Program,3a former employee would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint.On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the respondents DARAB and the Court of Appeals, raised the following issues:1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review onCertiorariand affirming the decision of DARAB.In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the DARAB, complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU situated at Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon, consisting of about 1,200 hectares. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the