Upload
others
View
0
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
16.03.2018
1
University of Stavanger Business Schoolhttp://www.uis.no/MohnTwitter: @Mohnitor
Agency theory and behavioural financeInsights for oil company investment behaviourKlaus Mohn, Professor
1
Norwegian Ministry of FinanceOslo, 19 March 2018
Agency theory and behavioural finance
2
Insights for oil company investment behaviour
Introduction/backdrop The benchmark model Selected frictions
Agency theory Managerial bias
Three peculiarities Investment and cash flows Dividends and debt Investment and share prices
A note on the outlook
Source: Bøhm, Marit og Klaus Mohn (2017). Agentteori, atferdsfinans og oljeinvesteringer. Samfunnsøkonomen 6/2017.
16.03.2018
2
Investments: Where it all starts
3
Key to resource revenue management
0
50
100
150
200
250
1985 1995 2005 2015
Pipeline transport
Decommisioning
Onshore processing
Producing fields
Field development
Exploration
0
1
2
3
4
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Yet to find
DiscoveriesUndev. resourcesDeveloped reserves
Produced and sold
Source: Statistics Norway (investment) and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (production).
Productionmmboepd
InvestmentNOK bn (nominal)
0
2
4
6
8
10
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Cumulated returns
Cumulated transfers
Revenue managementOil fund, NOK trn
The benchmark model
4
NPV in a world witout frictions
Markets and prices
Politics and policies
Technology
Drivers of value and risk
Net present value
Cost of capital (CAPM) Required rate of return
T
tt
tii r
CFINPV
1 )1(
fmifi rrErrE )()(
Source: Bøhm, Marit og Klaus Mohn (2017). Agentteori, atferdsfinans og oljeinvesteringer. Samfunnsøkonomen 6/2017.
16.03.2018
3
The benchmark model
5
NPV in a world without frictions
Net present value
Cost of capital (CAPM) Required rate of return
T
tt
tii r
CFINPV
1 )1(
fmifi rrErrE )()(
RevenuesCapexOpexTariffsExploration
Uncertainty
Flexibility
LicensingDev drilling
Production startPDO
Discovery
Information
Oil investment complexities
Source: Bøhm, Marit og Klaus Mohn (2017). Agentteori, atferdsfinans og oljeinvesteringer. Samfunnsøkonomen 6/2017.
The benchmark model
6
NPV in a world witout frictions
Net present value
Cost of capital (CAPM) Required rate of return
T
tt
tii r
CFINPV
1 )1(
fmifi rrErrE )()(
CAPM assumptions Fully rational, perfect markets Investors optimise risk/return No taxes or transaction costs Endless divisibility of assets Homogeneous expectations Individuals are risk averse Fully diversified investors
No great empirical success
Source: Bøhm, Marit og Klaus Mohn (2017). Agentteori, atferdsfinans og oljeinvesteringer. Samfunnsøkonomen 6/2017.
16.03.2018
4
Irregularities of oil company investment
7
Real world behaviour disagrees with benchmark model
Why does investment respond to temporary cash flow fluctuations?
Why are oil companies so concerned with debt and dividends?
Why doesn’t the share price respond positively to investment plans?
Capital expenditureEight major oil companies (USD bn)
Source: Bøhm, Marit og Klaus Mohn (2017). Agentteori, atferdsfinans og oljeinvesteringer. Samfunnsøkonomen 6/2017.
Investment in modern theory of finance
8
Introducing frictions: Agency theory
Principal and agentsTasks and responsibilities
PRINCIPALe.g., shareholders
AGENTe.g., directors
TASKe.g., managing the company
On behalf of
Employs
To perform
Accountable to
Potential conflicting interests Asymmetric information
Adverse selection Moral hazard
Company valuations Dividend decisions Issuance aversion Capital rationing
Asquith, Paul og David W. Mullins (1986). Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of Financial Economics 15, 61-89.Jensen, Michael C. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (2), 323-329.Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221.Rozeff, Michael S. (1982). Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research 5 (3), 249-259.Reiss, Peter (1990). Economic and financial determinants of oil and gas exploration activity. In Hubbard, R. Glenn (red.) Asymmetric information, corporate finance, and investment. University of Chicago Press. Stein, Jeremy (2003). Agency, information, and corporate investment. In Constantinides, George M., Harris, Milton og René Stultz (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Finance, utgave 1A (ch 2), Elsevier.Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review 71 (3), 393-410.
16.03.2018
5
Investment and behavioural finance
9
Psychology-based explanations of investment behaviour
Focus on managerial bias Markets might be efficient
Cognitive biases Over-confidence Miscalibration
Cognitive constraints Simple decision rules Bounded rationality
Baker, M. and J. Würgler (2013). Behavioral Corporate Finance: An updated survey. In Constantinides, George M., Harris, Milton og René Stultz (eds). Handbook of the Economics of Finance, ed 2A (ch 5), Elsevier. Ben-David, Itzhak (2010). Dividend policy decisions. In Baker, H. Kent og John R. Nofsinger (eds.) Behavioral Finance. John Wiley & sons, New Jersey.Ben-David, Itzhak, Graham John R. og Campbell R. Harvey (2013). Managerial Miscalibration. Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4), 1547-1584.Bøhm, Marit F. (2017). Oil and gas investments: Agency problems and managerial bias in investment decisions. MSc thesis. University of Stavanger Business School. June 2017.Graham, J. R. and C. R. Harvey (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243.Krüger, Philipp, Landier, Augustin og David Thesmar (2015). The WACC fallacy: The real effects of using a unique discount rate. Journal of Finance 70 (3), 1253-1285.Malmendier, Ulrike and Geoffrey Tate (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The Journal of Finance 60 (6), 2661-2700.Malmendier, Ulrike and Geoffrey Tate (2015). Behavioral CEOs: The role of managerial overconfidence. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29 (4), 37-60.Osmundsen, Petter og Thore Johnsen (2013). Petroleumsbeskatning. Teori og virkelighet. Samfunnsøkonomen 5/2013, 13-21.
0
30
60
90
120
150
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
The great oil price plunge
10
Cyclical retreat or structural shift?
Oil price reviewBrent blend, USD/bbl (real)
Shock 1
Shock 2
Shock 3
Source: ThomsonReuters (oil price).
16.03.2018
6
Headwinds for oil industry and investors
11
Oil companies have disappointed their shareholders
Short-term challenge: Profitability
12
Returns are eroded by escalating costs and falling oil price
Mixed successGrowth and profitability among major oils (%)
Disappointed shareholders Diverging market views Disputed business model
-10
0
10
20
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
RoACE Annual production growth
Sources: Deutsche Bank (2013), UBS Warburg (2014),
16.03.2018
7
Cash flows matter for investment activity
13
Oil companies adjust capex plans to oil price fluctations
Cash flow by company and aggregate capex (USD bn)
R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 193-225, March. Mohn, Klaus (2008). Investment behavior in the international oil and gas industry. PhD Thesis 51. University of Stavanger.Mohn, K. and B. Misund 2009. Investment and uncertainty in the international oil and gas industry. Energy Economics 31 (2), 240-248.Mohn, K. and B. Misund. 2011. Shifting sentiments in oil and gas investments: an application to the oil industry. Applied Financial Economics 21 (7), 469-479.
Cash flow and investmentCross plot (2002-2016)
Oil company cash flow disposition
14
Separation of accrual and spending of oil and gas revenues
Statoil cash flow statementFor the calendar year 2015 (NOK bn)
Eight major oils: Cash flow dispositionCash flow, capex, and dividend (USD bn)
Sources: Statoil, ThomsonReuters.
16.03.2018
8
Dividends and debt as control devices
15
Constraint on management flexibility reduces agency costs
Predictable and stable dividends Implicit contract
Erosion of trust Over-confidence Accelerating expenditures Poor returns
Devices of shareholder pressure Reign in management flexibility Directors forced to focus
Dividend paymentsand free cash flow (USD bn)
Ben-David, Itzhak (2010). Dividend policy decisions. I Baker, H. Kent og John R. Nofsinger (red.) Behavioral Finance, John Wiley & sons, New Jersey.Deshmukh, Sanjay, Goel, Anand M. og Keith M. Howe (2013). CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. Journal of Financial Intermediation 22, 440-463.Jensen, Michael C. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (2), 323-329.Modigliani, Franco og Merton Miller (1958). "The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment". American Economic Review 48 (3), 261-297.Santamarta, Sylvain, Martén, Iván og Esben Hegnsholt (2016). Big Oil’s Road to Reinvention. Report. Boston Consulting Group. Febrary 2016.
Investment plans and investor response
16
Share price should be lifted by announcement of investment plans
NPV decision rule Apply CAPM to estimate cost of capital Discount all cash flows Accept if NPV > 0
Investment will add value to company,… … and to shareholders Share price will increase
Source: ThomsonReuters.
Eight major oils: Annual impairmentand the oil price (USD bn/USD per bbl)
16.03.2018
9
Investment plans and investor response
17
Shareholders reward capital discipline and cost restraint
Capex cuts have been rewarded Esp among European companies
Diverging views on valuation Partly due to track record Partly due to market outlook
Variation in agency costs Over time Across companies
Data source: ThomsonReuters.McConnell, John J. og Chris J. Muscarella (1985). Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 399-422.
Announcement of capex plansand share price response (2013-2017, per cent)
Long-term challenge: Growth
18
Source: IEA (2014). World Energy Outlook.
Opportunity constrained by access to reserves and demand outlook
Constraints on access and supplyProven oil and gas reserves by global region
Americas13 %
Europe1 %
Asia Oceania0 %
EE/Eurasia8 %
Asia3 %
Middle East48 %
Africa8 %
Latin America19 %
Energy and climate policies Lost ground in transport Shale gale globalisation Markets shift eastward Emerging technologies Shifting OPEC behaviour Access, returns, and risk
16.03.2018
10
Access, returns and risks
19
Scarcity bites: Exploration yields in decline
Big Oil E&A spendingUSD bn
Source: WoodMcKenzie, Wall Street Journal.
Big Oil conventional drill-outAnnual discoveries
Energy and climate policies
20
Values and volumes at risk due to rising cost of CO2 emissions
Source: Cust, Jim, Manley, David, and Giorgia Cecchinato (2017). Unburnable wealth of nations. Finance and Development March 2017. International Monetary Fund.
Global CO2 emissions 2010-2035Giga tonnes
16.03.2018
11
Oil industry response
21
Short-term reaction: Speed up production, push policies, buy time
Mohn, Klaus (2017). The gravity of status quo: A review of IEA’s World Energy Outlook. Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy (forthcoming).Muttitt, Greg (2017). Forecasting failure. Why investors should treat oil company energy forecasts with caution. Report for Greenpeace and Oilchange International. March 2017.
The emergence of energy scenariosMajor Oil companies engage
Front-load production More myopic investment behavior Aversion to long-term projects Focus on oil, and esp shale oil
Bend the business framework Community outreach Energy analysis and dialogue Stakeholder engagement
Oil companies and climate risk
22
Repositioning, readjustment, diversification
Repositioning Fossil fuel portfolio
Readjustment Focus on CO2 intensity Energy efficiency Cost efficiency New KPIs
Diversification Natural gas Power generation New renewable energy
Bøhm, Marit F. and Klaus Mohn (2017). Agentteori, atferdsfinans og oljeinvesteringer. Samfunnsøkonomen 6/2017, 26-38.Helm, Dieter (2017). Burnout: The end-game for fossil fuels. Yale University Press.Statoil (2017). Statoil’s Climate Roadmap. Creating a low carbon advantage (https://www.statoil.com/content/dam/statoil/image/how-and-why/climate/A5-climate-roadmap.pdf).
The emergence of energy scenariosIEA’s World Energy Outlook 2017
16.03.2018
12
Agency theory and behavioural finance
23
Insights for oil company investment behaviour
Insufficient benchmark model Real-world frictions apply
Agency costs Managerial biases
Mind the gap Cash flow Opportunities
Source: Bøhm, Marit og Klaus Mohn (2017). Agentteori, atferdsfinans og oljeinvesteringer. Samfunnsøkonomen 6/2017.