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Behavioural Finance

Behavioural finance

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Behavioral finance

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Page 1: Behavioural finance

Behavioural Finance

Page 2: Behavioural finance

The ExamStructure20 Multiple Choice1 mark each (no negative marks)Based on lectures: study lecture notes for this section5 short answer questions (4 marks each): Write a summary and your own assessment of 5 papers1 essay (20 marks)Requires understanding of Circuit theory and tabular approach to building models of credit dynamicsUse QED program to build models prior to examClosed book

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Short answer questions: summarise & evaluateKirman, AP 1992, 'Whom or what does the

representative individual represent?', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 117-36.Sharpe, WF 1964, 'Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk', The Journal of Finance, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 425-42.Fama, EF & French, KR 2004, 'The Capital asset pricing model: theory and evidence', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 25-46.Minsky, HP 1977, 'The Financial instability hypothesis: an interpretation of Keynes and an alternative to ‘standard’ theory', Nebraska Journal of Economics & Business, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 5-16.Graziani, A. 2003, The monetary theory of production, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 1-32.

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Essay questionDoes the repayment of debt destroy money?Consider the verbal arguments for and against this proposition.Construct two pure credit economy models with constant output (no economic growth), one in which debt repayment destroys money, and one in which it does not. Discuss the dynamics of the two models.

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Recap Circuit model still skeletal

But already reaches different economic policy results to standard models

Model extended to multiple commodities Will be extended to include fixed capital,

government, and Financial Instability Hypothesis

This week The Financial Instability Hypothesis

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The Financial Instability Hypothesis

Developed by Hyman Minsky on simple proposition:Capitalism has suffered several DepressionsDepression every 20 or so years in 19th century“Great Depression” of 1930s merely biggestSo since market economies can have Depressions…“it is necessary to have an economic theory which makes great depressions one of the possible states in which our type of capitalist economy can find itself.” (Can "It” Happen Again? A Reprise)Theory combined insights from Marx, Schumpeter, Keynes & Irving FisherKey foundation Fisher’s “Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”…

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Fisher & Debt DeflationIrving Fisher the “Paul Krugman” of his timeFamous (neoclassical) economistDeveloped early 1900 precursor to “Efficient Markets Hypothesis”Wealthy as inventor of “Rolodex” card systemColumnist on New York TimesStock Market “Bull”Believed Market in 1920 reflected growth prospects for US economyHeavily invested in marketHuge margin loansSupported financial position with theory of finance

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Fisher & Debt DeflationTheory extended standard neoclassical “supply and demand” model to financeRate of interest as “price in the exchange between present and future goods.” (Fisher 1930: 61),Three forces determine price1.Subjective preferences of individuals for present goods over future goods determines supply of funds2.Objective possibilities for profitable investment determines demand for funds3.Market mechanism brings these into equilibrium

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Fisher & Debt DeflationTwist compared to standard supply & demand theoryIn market for apples, supply is objective, demand subjectiveObjective conditions of production determine supply curve for applesSubjective preferences of consumers detemines demand curve for applesBut in financeObjective factor determines demandSubjective factor determines supplyReverse of relationship for standard markets

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Fisher & Debt DeflationSubjective preferences of individuals for present goods over future goods determines supply of fundsa low time preferenceprefers to lend now rather than consumemost likely a lender high time preferenceprefers to consume now rather than latermost likely a borrower.Borrowing how those with a high preference for present goodsacquire the funds they need nowat the expense of later income.

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Fisher & Debt DeflationObjective side of the equationMarginal productivity of investment or “marginal return over cost” (1930: 182)Determines demand for fundsHigh return means high demand for fundsLow return means low demandWillingness to borrow/lend not enoughmust be opportunities for borrowed money to be invested and earn a rate of return

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Fisher & Debt DeflationMarket equates subjective and objective forces Supply: High rate of interest even those with high time preference will lendsupply of funds will be quite highLow rate of interestonly those with low time preference will lendsupply of funds will be smallDemand: High rate of interestmost investments will be unviabledemand for funds will be lowLow rate of interestmost investments have positive net present valuedemand for funds will be high

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Fisher & Debt Deflation So far sounds just like standard supply &

demand: Supply & demand set equilibrium interest rate

But still one curly problem: Standard market model ignores time However time explicitly part of exchanges in finance

Borrow money now, repay later

So Fisher extended standard timeless supply & demand model with two assumptions: “(A) The market must be cleared—and cleared with respect to

every interval of time. (B) The debts must be paid.” (1930: p. 495)

Great assumptions to make in 1930—Not!

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Fisher & Debt Deflation As well as one of world’s most prominent

economists, Fisher was also a newspaper columnist (a risky business...)

On Wednesday, October 15, 1929, Fisher comments “Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau. I do not feel that there will soon, if ever, be a fifty or sixty point

break below present levels, such as Mr. Babson has predicted. I expect to see the stock market a good deal higher than it is today

within a few months.”

On October 23rd, 1929, Black Wednesday: Dow Jones loses almost 10% in a single day

4 years later, the broad market was 1/6th of its peak, and Irving Fisher had lost over $10 million.

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The Wall Street Crash

To below 42at its trough

With rallies that implied “the worst is over…”By the final end, market was down 89% from its peak25 years to recover

1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 201010

100

1000

1 104

1 105

Dow Jones 1914-Now

1929 1929.5 1930 1930.5 1931 1931.5 1932 1932.5 19330

100

200

300

400

DJIA 1929-1933

From 382 at its peak

in less than 3 years

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From Sage to Laughing Stock…

Fisher’s reputation destroyed by wrong predictions

In aftermath, developed theory to explain the crash “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”

based on rejection of conditions (A) and (B) above

Previous theory assumed equilibrium but real world equilibrium short-lived since

“New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below the ideal equilibrium.” (1933: 339)

Disequilibrium the rule in economy & finance markets Fisher realised a disequilibrium theory needed too

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions Key disequilibrium forces are debt and

prices The “two dominant factors” which cause depressions

are “over-indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after” “Thus over-investment and over-speculation are often

important; but they would have far less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed money.

That is, over-indebtedness may lend importance to over-investment or to over-speculation. The same is true as to over-confidence.

I fancy that over-confidence seldom does any great harm except when, as, and if, it beguiles its victims into debt.” (Fisher 1933: 341; emphasis added!)

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions

When overconfidence leads to overindebtedness, a chain reaction ensues:

“(1) Debt liquidation leads to distress selling and to (2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank loans

are paid off, and to a slowing down of velocity of circulation. This contraction of deposits and of their velocity, precipitated by distress selling, causes

(3) A fall in the level of prices, in other words, a swelling of the dollar. Assuming, as above stated, that this fall of prices is not interfered with by reflation or otherwise, there must be

(4) A still greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies and

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions

(5) A like fall in profits, which in a "capitalistic," that is, a private-profit society, leads the concerns which are running at a loss to make

(6) A reduction in output, in trade and in employment of labor. These losses, bankruptcies, & unemployment, lead to

(7) Pessimism and loss of confidence, which in turn lead to

(8) Hoarding and slowing down still more the velocity of circulation. The above eight changes cause

(9) Complicated disturbances in the rates of interest, in particular, a fall in the nominal, or money, rates and a rise in the real, or commodity, rates of interest.” (1933: 342)

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions

Theory fundamentally nonequilibrium in nature

Fisher’s statement is a powerful argument for disequilibrium analysis in macroeconomics and finance: “9. We may tentatively assume that, ordinarily and within

wide limits, all, or almost all, economic variables tend, in a general way, toward a stable equilibrium…

10. Under such assumptions … it follows that, unless some outside force intervenes, any "free" oscillations about equilibrium must tend progressively to grow smaller and smaller, just as a rocking chair set in motion tends to stop…

11. But the exact equilibrium thus sought is seldom reached and never long maintained.

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions

New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below the ideal equilibrium…Theoretically there may be—in fact, at most times there must be—over-or under-production, over-or under-consumption, over-or under-spending, over-or under-saving, over-or under-investment, and over or under everything else.It is as absurd to assume that, for any long period of time, the variables in the economic organization, or any part of them, will “stay put,” in perfect equilibrium, as to assume that the Atlantic Ocean can ever be without a wave.” (Fisher 1933, p. 339; emphases added)

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions

Two classes of far from equilibrium events explainedOrdinary cyclesDeflation or debt but not bothDepressionsBoth debt and deflation…

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions

Cycles, when one occurs without the other with only overindebtedness or deflation, growth eventually

corrects problem; it is … “more analogous to stable equilibrium: the more the boat rocks

the more it will tend to right itself. In that case, we have a truer example of a cycle” (Fisher 1933: 344-345)

Great Depression: overindebtedness and deflation with deflation on top of excessive debt, “the more debtors

pay, the more they owe. The more the economic boat tips, the more it tends to tip. It is not tending to right itself, but is capsizing” (Fisher 1933: 344).

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Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions

Fisher’s new theory ignored Old theory made basis of modern finance

theory Debt deflation theory revived in modern form

by Minsky Fisher’s macroeconomic contribution (which

emphasised the need for reflation and “100% money” during the Depression) overshadowed by Keynes’s “General Theory”

Many similarities and synergies in Keynes and Fisher, but different countries meant one largely unaware of others work

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Keynes and Debt-deflation Some discussion of debt-deflation when

discussing reduction in money wages (neoclassical proposal): “Since a special reduction of money-wages is always

advantageous to an individual entrepreneur ... a general reduction … may break through a vicious circle of

unduly pessimistic estimates of the marginal efficiency of capital …

On the other hand, the depressing influence on entrepreneurs of their greater burden of debt may partially offset any cheerful reactions from the reductions of wages.

Indeed if the fall of wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency—with severe adverse effects on investment.” (Keynes 1936: 264)

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Keynes and Debt-deflation “The method of increasing the quantity of money in

terms of wage-units by decreasing the wage-unit increases proportionately the burden of debt; whereas the method of producing the same result by increasing the quantity of money whilst leaving the wage-unit unchanged has the opposite effect.

Having regard to the excessive burden of many types of debt, it can only be an inexperienced person who would prefer the former.” (1936: 268-69)

Keynes’s focus here more physical and macro (impact on investment) than Fisher; Keynes’s main contributions on finance relate to Dual Price Level hypothesis Analysis of expectations and behaviour of finance markets

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Keynes and the Dual Price Level Hypothesis

In most of General Theory, Keynes argued that investment motivated by relationship between marginal efficiency of investment schedule (MEI) and the rate of interest

In Chapter 17 of General Theory, “The General Theory of Employment” and “Alternative theories of the rate of interest” (1937), instead spoke in terms of two price levels: commodities (cost price) & assets (speculative) investment motivated by the desire to produce “those assets of which

the normal supply-price is less than the demand price” (Keynes 1936: 228) Demand price determined by prospective yields, depreciation and liquidity

preference. Supply price determined by costs of production

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Keynes and the Dual Price Level Hypothesis Two price level analysis becomes more

dominant subsequent to General Theory: The scale of production of capital assets “depends, of

course, on the relation between their costs of production and the prices which they are expected to realise in the market.” (Keynes 1937a: 217)

MEI analysis akin to view that uncertainty can be reduced “to the same calculable status as that of certainty itself” via a “Benthamite calculus”

whereas the kind of uncertainty that matters in investment is that about which “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.” (Keynes 1937a: 213, 214)

So how do investors form expectations?

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Keynes and the Dual Price Level Hypothesis

Given incalculable uncertainty, investors form fragile expectations about the future

These are crystallised in the prices they place upon capital asset

Given fragile basis for expecations, asset prices are subject to sudden and violent change with equally sudden and violent consequences for the propensity to

invest

Seen in this light, the marginal efficiency of capital is simply the ratio of the yield from an asset to its current demand price, and therefore there is a different “marginal efficiency of capital” for every different level of asset prices (Keynes 1937a: 222)

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Keynes on Uncertainty and Expectations

Three aspects to expectations formation under true uncertainty Presumption that “the present is a much more serviceable

guide to the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto”

Belief that “the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects”

Reliance on mass sentiment: “we endeavour to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed.” (Keynes 1936: 214)

Fragile basis for expectations formation thus affects prices of financial assets

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Schumpeter on Cycles & Credit

Joseph Schumpeter leading “Evolutionary Economist” Applying theory of evolution to economics

His “Theory of Economic Development” emphasised cyclical nature of capitalism Credit played important role in cycle

Supervised Minsky’s PhD direct influence on Minsky’s thought

Rejected neoclassical view of money “veil over barter” “Money neutrality: Double all prices & incomes, no-one better or

worse off” Nonsense assumption in a world with debt…

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Schumpeter’s model: money has real effects

Schumpeter accepts neoclassical view as true for existing products, production techniques, etc., in general equilibrium

But new products, new methods, disturb “the circular flow”. Money plays essential role in this disequilibrium phenomenon Affects the price level and output Doubling all prices & incomes would make some

better off, some worse Those with debts would be better off

Including entrepreneurs…

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Schumpeter’s model: money has real effects

Conventional theory suffers from “barter illusion” Existing producers using existing production methods exchanging

existing products “Walras’ Law” applies

Major role of finance is initiating new products / production methods etc.;

For these equilibrium-disturbing events, classic “money a veil over barter” concept cannot apply. “From this it follows, therefore, that in real life total credit must be

greater than it could be if there were only fully covered credit. The credit structure projects not only beyond the existing gold basis, but also beyond the existing commodity basis.” (101) “Walras’ Law” false for growing economy…

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Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects “[T]he entrepreneur needs credit …

[T]his purchasing power does not flow towards him automatically, as to the producer in the circular flow, by the sale of what he produced in preceding periods.

If he does not happen to possess it … he must borrow it… He can only become an entrepreneur by previously becoming a debtor…

his becoming a debtor arises from the necessity of the case and is not something abnormal, an accidental event to be explained by particular circumstances. What he first wants is credit.

Before he requires any goods whatever, he requires purchasing power. He is the typical debtor in capitalist society.” (102)

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Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects

In normal productive cycle, income from production finances purchases; credit can be used, but not essential “[T]he decisive point is that we can, without overlooking

anything essential, represent the process within the circular flow as if production were currently financed by receipts.” (104) Effectively, Say’s Law applies: “supply creates its own demand” Aggregate demand equals aggregate supply (with maybe some

sectors above, some sectors below)

But credit-financed entrepreneurs very different Expenditure (demand) not financed by current receipts (supply) but

by credit Aggregate Demand exceeds Aggregate Supply

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Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects

Credit finance for entrepreneurs thus endogenous: not “deposits create loans” but “loans create deposits”: “[I]n so far as credit cannot be given out of the results

of past enterprise … it can only consist of credit means of payment created

ad hoc, which can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence...

It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon.” (106)

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Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects Say’s Law & Walras’ Law apply in circular

flow, but not entrepreneurial credit-financed activity: “In the circular flow, from which we always start, the same

products are produced every year in the same way. For every supply there waits somewhere in the economic

system a corresponding demand, for every demand the corresponding supply.

All goods are dealt in at determined prices with only insignificant oscillations, so that every unit of money may be considered as going the same way in every period.

A given quantity of purchasing power is available at any moment to purchase the existing quantity of original productive services, in order then to pass into the hands of their owners and then again to be spent on consumption goods.” (108)

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Aside: “Marx with different adjectives” Schumpeter here similar to Marx’s “Circuits of Capital”

Commodity—Money—Commodity Equivalent to Schumpeter’s “circular flow” Essentially Say’s Law applies

Sellers only sell in order to buy Money—Commodity—Money

Equivalent to Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial function Say’s Law doesn’t apply: “The capitalist throws less value in

the form of money into the circulation than he draws out of it...

Since he functions ... as an industrial capitalist, his supply of commodity-value is always greater than his demand for it. If his supply and demand in this respect covered each other it would mean that his capital had not produced any surplus-value...

His aim is not to equalize his supply and demand, but to make the inequality between them ... as great as possible.” (Marx 1885: 120-121)

•Same as Schumpeter’s point:•Capitalist “throws in” borrowed money•Succeeds if can repay debt and pocket some of the gap

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Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects

So Schumpeter’s dynamic view of economy Overturns “money doesn’t have real effects” bias of

neoclassicals/monetarists Breaches “supply creates its own demand” Say’s Law

view of self-equilibrating economy Breaches Walras’ Law “if n-1 markets in equilibrium,

nth also in equilibrium” general equilibrium analysis Links finance and economics: without finance there

would not be economic growth, but Finance can affect economic growth negatively as well

as positively (if entrepreneurial expectations fail)…

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Integration: Financial Instability Hypothesis

Minsky combined concepts of Fisher: debt deflationary mechanism, Role of commodity price inflation Schumpeter: entrepreneurial role of credit Keynes & “2 price levels” analysis

Expectations formation under uncertainty Behaviour of financial markets Finance Investment Savings causal loop

(Also Kalecki: Finance as limit on investment)

Marx: Tendency to cycles & crisis in capitalism

To produce Financial Instability Hypothesis