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Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
Kashif Hussain
Introduction
The announcement of the United States’ (US)
Afghanistan-centric South Asia Strategy in August 2017
led to an increase in the magnitude of war in
Afghanistan allowing the Taliban to gain greater
influence and more ground across the country.1
Consequently, Washington directly approached the
insurgent group for negotiations that commenced in
October 2018. The dialogue continued for more than a
year and a half up until February 2020. On February 29,
2020, the US with the help of regional powers especially
Pakistan, Russia and China managed to strike a peace
agreement with the Taliban in Doha (Doha agreement),
to bring an end to the decades long war in Afghanistan.
Under the Doha agreement, the US announced a timeline
for the complete withdrawal of foreign troops, while the
Taliban pledged to ensure that no terrorist organisation
including al-Qaeda and Daesh would conduct attacks
against the US and its allies using Afghan soil.
Ironically, the timing of the agreement coincided with an
unprecedented leadership crisis and establishment of
parallel governments by Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah
Abdullah, following the announcement of presidential
election results on February 18, 2020.2 The leadership
crisis led to a slowing down of the peace process. While
efforts of the Afghan leadership remained focused on
power consolidation and not peace, the US State
Department had to shift its endeavours from the peace
process to resolve the leadership crisis.3
At the same time, President Ghani disagreed with the
terms of the Doha agreement.4 Ultimately, Ghani’s
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
69
approach caused a delay in the opening of the intra-
Afghan talks and also outraged the Taliban. This in turn
increased violence across the country.5 As the Taliban
and government forces remain engaged with each other,
the situation has provided leverage to Daesh and al-
Qaeda-led terrorists to strengthen, ultimately impacting
the Taliban’s ability to fulfil their commitments made
under the Doha agreement in the medium run.6 As per
the agreement, the insurgent group needs to ensure that
no terrorist operates from the Afghan soil against the US
and its allies in order for the former to reduce the
number of its forces to zero. This can only happen if the
Afghans manage to forgo all the immediate challenges
attached to the opening of all-Afghan talks and reach a
permanent cease fire.7
Moreover, delivering on terror related commitments is
not going to be an easy task as there are controversies
surrounding the measures taken against terrorist
organisations especially the Islamic State Khorasan
Province (ISKP) – Daesh’s Afghanistan wing. Since its
sudden rise in 2015, the notorious terror group has
remained a strategic rival of the Taliban. The Taliban
have not only been inflicting heavy damage on the
terrorists but have also blamed the Afghan government
for rescuing ISKP fighters under their siege.8 Given the
Taliban’s ongoing tussle against both Afghan
government forces and ISKP, the interests of the two
have naturally converged against the Taliban. Moreover,
Russia remains suspicious about the US support for the
ISKP.9 Being a direct security threat for Russia,
Pakistan, Iran and China, these countries have taken
serious anti-terror measures specifically directed against
the ISKP.10
However, they remain unable to develop a
proposal to establish a joint regional mechanism against
the ISKP related threats in Afghanistan. This can be
attributed, in part, to the fact that the US and Afghan
Journal of Strategic Affairs
70
governments are not on good terms and there is also a
lack of trust vis-à-vis the aforementioned regional
powers.
On the other hand, Washington is open to India’s
involvement in Afghanistan which neither perceives a
direct terror threat nor has direct access to the country.
Washington’s encouragement has led India to forge
strong political and military ties with the Afghan
government and maintain full support in its conflict
against the Taliban. Given India’s historical animosity
towards the Taliban, it can go to any length to reduce the
prospects of the group holding legitimate power in
Afghanistan.11
The United States’ partiality towards New-Delhi vis-à-
vis Afghanistan can be attributed to Washington’s
changing policies in the wider Asia Pacific region. Since
2008, the US has been supporting India to raise its great
power status and bring it at par with China. At the same
time, the US has identified ‘revisionist’ China and
Russia as threats and has been working to develop new
strategic alliances.12
Both Moscow and Beijing remain
critical to the changing US’ India-centric policies in the
Asia Pacific including the renaming of the region and
the making of the “Quad,” four nation strategic
alliance.13
Meanwhile China and Russia have also
launched mega geo-economic plans covering the entire
Eurasian region and intend to eventually merge their
projects.14
Given its geostrategic position, the economic
spill over of the mega projects to Afghanistan and rising
Russian and Chinese influence in the landlocked country
is inevitable. The materialisation of these mega
economic plans is also, in part, dependent on the
stability of Afghanistan. Keeping the situation in view,
it can be argued that a complete US withdrawal from
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
71
Afghanistan does not correspond well with its overall
changing policies in the Asia Pacific.
This research navigates through the imminent, medium-
and long-term challenges to a viable peace in
Afghanistan and addresses several pertinent questions
as well as offering recommendations that could help
overcome the numerous challenges and improve the
prospects for a viable peace.
● How does the lack of will on part of the Afghan
leadership to share power with the Taliban give
rise to further conflict and delay the intra-Afghan
talks?
● How the absence of a proposal to establish a
regional mechanism to deal with Daesh and the
natural alignment of interest of the latter with the
US, India and Afghan government creates greater
confusion and also adds to the apprehensions of
the Taliban and regional powers including Russia,
China, Pakistan and Iran?
● How does the US decision to drawdown troops
from Afghanistan not correspond with its overall
policies in the wider Asia Pacific region and
consequently become a long-term challenge for
Afghanistan’s reconstruction?
Background
During his election campaign, US President Donald
Trump pledged an end to America’s longest war and the
withdrawal of the US-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan. In August
2017, President Trump outlined his “conditions-based”
Afghanistan-centric South Asia Strategy.15
The strategy
was aimed at putting military pressure on the Taliban
along with using diplomatic and economic tools to make
the Taliban accept a political solution that would appear
as an “American victory.”16
The strategy, while
Journal of Strategic Affairs
72
continuing its commitment to train and support Afghan
government forces and institutions, and encouraging and
praising India’s role in Afghanistan, severely criticised
Pakistan for providing safe havens to the Taliban and
other terrorist organisations.
As expected, the new strategy remained unsuccessful
especially in terms of exerting military pressure on the
insurgency; in October 2017 alone, hundreds of Afghans
were killed in various attacks, mostly on security
installations, and the insurgent group was also able to
expand its influence over some strategic areas across the
country.17
The Taliban’s growing strength ultimately led
them to reject the Afghan President’s offer of peace
“without any pre-condition” in early 2018.18
In August
2018, the insurgent group once again rejected President
Ghani’s three-month ceasefire offer.19
According to
reports published in western media in September 2018,
the Taliban were in control of more territory than at any
point since the removal of their regime in 2001.20
Under pressure from the growing Taliban influence, the
US initiated direct talks with the Taliban in October
2018.21
The talks continued for almost a year and a half,
amid rising violence and terror incidents. Even during
the course of peace talks, there appeared clear
disagreements over troop withdrawal between the US
State Department and the Pentagon,22
and between the
White House and the Afghan government, and also
between President Trump and his European partners.23
Whilst the White House was pushing for a swift
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the Pentagon
and NATO adopted a more cautious and conservative
strategy as they considered it unwise to abandon
Afghanistan without establishing a permanent base after
almost two decades of hard-fought battles. The
Europeans perceive the growing Russia-Taliban ties as a
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
73
direct threat to their interests in the region. Germany, the
second largest contributor to the ISAF, extended the
duration of its mission while the US-Taliban talks were
underway.24
Nonetheless, after rigorous efforts and
continuous assistance from regional powers, especially
Pakistan, as well as Russia and China, the US managed
to finalise and sign an agreement with the Taliban to
initiate a political settlement of the conflict in
Afghanistan.
The US-Taliban Peace Agreement
Under the Doha agreement, the US committed to
withdrawing all its military forces, allies, and coalition
partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel,
private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and
supporting services personnel from Afghanistan within
fourteen months following the announcement of the
agreement.25
The US’ commitment is contingent on the
Taliban’s obligations and guarantees to prevent the use
of Afghan soil by any group or individual against the
security of the US and its allies. The US will bring the
number of its forces to 8600 within the first 135 days
following the announcement of the agreement, and the
remaining forces will be withdrawn in the remaining
nine and a half months if the Taliban are able to fulfil
their obligations.26
The agreement also encouraged the Taliban to initiate
direct talks with the Afghan leadership. In order to
initiate all-Afghan talks, it was noted in the agreement
that the insurgent group and the Afghan government
would undertake a prisoner exchange as a confidence
building measure under which 5,000 Taliban prisoners
would be released against 1,000 government forces
captives.27
According to the signed document, this
confidence building measure had to take place before the
commencement of the intra-Afghan talks on March 10,
Journal of Strategic Affairs
74
2020. Talks between the Taliban and other Afghan
representatives are essential in order to reach a ceasefire
deal and discuss other significant issues including the
mainstreaming of the Taliban and the nature of the future
government in Afghanistan.28
With the initiation of the intra-Afghan talks, the US also
committed to undertake an administrative review of
current US sanctions and the rewards list against
members of the Taliban with the goal of removing these
sanctions by August 27, 2020. Washington also plans to
initiate the process of removing members of the Taliban
from a second list i.e. the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) sanctions list with the commencement
of intra-Afghan talks. Ironically, many terms of the US-
Taliban deal are conditioned on the initiation of intra-
Afghan negotiations.29
Simultaneously, the US and Afghan government also
released a document titled: “Joint Declaration between
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United
States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”.30
The 4-point “declaration of commitment” proclaims to
work together “to reach a comprehensive and sustainable
peace agreement” that ends the war in Afghanistan. Such
an agreement will include: guarantees to prevent the use
of Afghan soil by any international terrorist groups or
individuals against the security of the US and its allies; a
timeline for the withdrawal of all US and Coalition
forces from Afghanistan; a political settlement resulting
from intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations between
the Taliban and an inclusive negotiating team of
Afghans; and a permanent and comprehensive
ceasefire.31
The 3-page declaration outlines the commitments taken
by the US and Afghan governments. The first part refers
to the existence of al-Qaeda and Daesh related terror
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
75
threat and the Afghan government’s commitment to not
support and cooperate with the terrorists. It also outlines
the US reaffirmation to support Afghan government
forces and institutions against internal and external
threats and its readiness to continue conducting counter-
terrorism operations in Afghanistan. The second part
calls out the US commitment to withdraw its forces on
conditions fixed in its agreement with the Taliban.
Additionally, the US commits to annually seek funds to
support Afghan forces’ sustenance against internal and
external threats. Washington has also committed to
facilitate both the Taliban and Afghan government to
build confidence by exchanging prisoners and create
conditions for a permanent ceasefire and a political
settlement of all outstanding issues through intra-Afghan
talks; and upon the inception of all-Afghan negotiations,
the US will start the procedure to remove sanctions
imposed on the Taliban. The third part discusses the
recognition of “this agreement” and related agreements
from the UNSC and the future of Afghanistan.
The text of the joint declaration is no less complex than
Washington’s overall Afghanistan strategy. It is
important to note that the US and Afghan government
are yet to “reach an agreement” on the 4-points
discussed above which provide the Afghan government
leverage to allow a longer stay of foreign forces in
Afghanistan. Additionally, the longer stay may also be
justified under the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)
signed between the US and Afghan government in
September 2014. The BSA, under which some 10,000
US troops can remain in Afghanistan, went into force on
January 1, 2015 and will remain in force until the end of
2024 and beyond unless it is terminated by either side
with two years’ notice.32
In its reaffirmation of
commitments to support Afghan security forces and
readiness to carry out counter-terrorism operations in the
Journal of Strategic Affairs
76
“declaration of commitment”, the US seems to be
making room and create justifications for some kind of
future presence in Afghanistan.
The Existing Challenges to the “Pursuit of Peace”
The current state of Afghan affairs and the overall
geopolitics in the region pose several challenges to the
pursuit of peace in the country and would be difficult to
accomplish in the absence of combined efforts of
regional and global actors.
Short Term Challenges: Internal Rifts and obstacles
for a Ceasefire
The signing of the Doha agreement coincided with the
announcement of the Afghan presidential election result
and the leadership conundrum in its aftermath.33
An
unprecedented creation of parallel government’s
occurred after Abdullah Abdullah rejected election
commission results declaring Ghani the victor.
Abdullah’s claims were based on allegations of
corruption, election meddling and fraudulent votes.34
This lack of agreement between the two sides, presents
both the US and Taliban with greater difficulties in
dealing with Afghan authorities on matters related to the
peace process. The situation deteriorated further when
both the Afghan strongmen refused to establish an
inclusive government, during US Secretary of State,
Mike Pompeo’s Kabul visit on March 23, 2020.35
Their
refusal led the US State Department to express great
disappointment as it threatened to cut $1 billion in
assistance to Afghanistan if the situation persists.
According to some reports, Pompeo also threatened the
Afghan leadership that President Trump would sanction
a complete troop pull-out if the Afghans fail to reach an
agreement on establishing an inclusive government.36
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
77
Due to the efforts made by some prominent Afghan
figures,37
and on account of the penalties imposed by the
US, Afghan leaders began to sort out their differences
and strike a power sharing deal. However, the charged
internal environment might continue to affect the
Afghan government’s ability to maintain inclusivity in
decision making. The power sharing agreement between
Ghani and Abdullah has yet to materialise38
and there are
serious reservations from prominent Afghan parties
regarding the establishment of an all-inclusive
negotiating team for expected all-Afghan talks.39
The
issues which are yet to be resolved, comprise the
inclusion of the Taliban into the national fold, which in
turn depends on greater cohesiveness among Afghans. In
other words, improved internal harmony is required for
Afghans to be able to deal with the Taliban
constructively. At the moment, however, their lack of
internal harmony has caused a significant delay in the
initiation of intra-Afghan talks. It might also affect all-
Afghan negotiations in the longer run, and delay a
comprehensive ceasefire. A permanent ceasefire is
critical for the materialisation of the Doha agreement
and achieving a negotiated and long lasting peace.
Without a comprehensive ceasefire, it is impossible for
Afghans to deliver their commitments and obligations
made in the “Doha Agreement” and the “Declaration of
Commitment”.
However, the uneven relations between the US and
Afghan government coupled with a lack of internal
harmony magnify the challenges to the peace process.
Initially, after the signing of the February 29, 2020,
agreement, President Ghani refused to release prisoners
and asked the Taliban to cut their ties with Pakistan.40
Interestingly, Ghani also remained critical to the US-
Taliban talks.41
However, due to increased Afghan
forces’ casualties and pressure from the international
Journal of Strategic Affairs
78
community, Ghani later on issued a decree for prisoners’
release.42
The “conditions-based” decree asked the
released Taliban inmates to commit that they would not
return to the war. It also stipulated a timeline for the
swap process contingent upon the Taliban conduct.
According to Ghani’s given plan, the government would
have released 1,500 inmates (100 per day) before the
commencement of the intra-Afghan talks. The Taliban
right away rejected Ghani’s plan saying that 5,000
prisoners should be released as a trust-building measure
before the commencement of intra-Afghan talks.43
The
insurgent group also rejected the condition that was
limiting released prisoners from participating in the fight
against the Afghan government in future.44
Although both the Afghan government and the Taliban
were able to initiate the prisoner swap with the
assistance of the US-facilitated discussions, the slow and
bumpy process has already affected the dates set for the
opening of all- inclusive Afghan negotiations. Before the
commencement of the prisoner release, a Taliban team
tasked with overseeing the process and verifying the
prisoner list had reportedly left Kabul over
disagreements with the Afghan government about the
process.45
The delay in the prisoner swap resulting from
Washington-Kabul disharmony outraged the Taliban,
aggravating the already volatile situation. The clashes
between the warring parties have serious repercussions
for the signed agreement, as up till now Washington has
been leading Afghan forces against the insurgents
especially by providing them with aerial support. Both
the US and the Taliban have recently been blaming each
other for violating the signed agreement but the US’ top
general in Afghanistan threatened the insurgent group of
retaliation and serious consequences if fighting
persists.46
The intensification and prolongation of
fighting between the Taliban and US-led Afghan
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
79
government forces will only give more space and time to
terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and make the
situation more difficult for Afghans to adhere to the
post-ceasefire obligations.
Medium Term Challenge: Rising Terror Threat and an
Ambiguous US Policy
According to the latest reports, the ISKP and al-Qaeda
have been making efforts to establish a caliphate in
Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province.47
In
late April 2020, the province’s governor informed the
media that the ISKP has joined al-Qaeda and is trying to
establish bases across many districts with an aim to
establish the Islamic Caliphate there. Meanwhile, a
Commander of the Afghan Army’s brigade in
Badakhshan communicated that many other terrorist
organisations including, the East Turkestan, and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have direct
links with the ISKP. The location of Badakhshan
province is a strategic one as it borders Pakistan, China
and Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan, hence making
it an easy access point for the outlawed extremist
organisations and individuals, and posing a threat to the
surrounding countries.
Since its inception in 2014-15, the ISKP has been
expanding in size receiving a direct influx of fighters and
patronage from Syria.48
The later inflow of defectors
from outlawed organisations of regional countries,
especially Central Asia and Pakistan, has further
strengthened the ISKP.49
Additionally, many hardcore
Afghan Taliban who opposed the idea of negotiations
with the US, have also joined the ISKP.50
With this
growing strength, the terrorist group has not only been
able to conduct large scale attacks in the heart of Kabul51
but is also able to maintain its strategic rivalry with the
Taliban across Afghanistan.52
Hence, with its direct
Journal of Strategic Affairs
80
confrontation with the Taliban inside Afghanistan and
being a national security threat for Pakistan, Russia,
China and Iran, the ISKP remains a key concern for
them.
Keeping this in view, all the regional powers have been
taking serious anti-terror measures. Moscow had not
only offered its services to the US-led Afghan forces53
but also established a growing anti-terror cooperation
with Pakistan, Iran and China.54
Since the recognition of
the Taliban insurgency, Russia has also played a crucial
part on the diplomatic front. These include the Moscow
Process, the significant quadrilateral grouping with the
US, China and Pakistan55
and hosting direct Taliban
meetings.56
Interestingly, Moscow’s recognition of the
Taliban and increased cooperation with regional powers
coincides with its fierce rivalry with Daesh in Syria,
signalling the presence of ISKP related terror threat
being the country’s core national security interest in
Afghanistan.
In the same manner, Daesh’s use of barbaric tactics
against minority religious groups especially Shia
Muslims and the terror group’s humiliation at the hands
of Iran in Iraq and Syria make the ISKP a proximate
threat for Iran. More importantly, Tehran’s participation
could be instrumental in dismantling the ISKP keeping
in view Iranian successes against the terrorist group in
the Middle East.
Similarly, Pakistan has also been successful in
dismantling the extremist organisations especially along
the country’s northwestern border with Afghanistan.
This became possible following the launch of the
National Action Plan and a revitalisation of its strategic
ties with Russia in 2014.57
By getting hold of much of
the militancy, Islamabad has been able to mainstream the
former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
81
and fenced majority of its 2430-kms-long border with
Afghanistan.58
However, the presence of the ISKP along
with the outlawed members of extremist organisations
like Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Jandullah,
and the existence of a small number of Daesh’s presence
in its own territory,59
make the ISKP a formidable threat
for Pakistan. Many of the defectors considered outlawed
in Pakistan managed to acquire top positions in the
ISKP60
and have planned and executed attacks inside
Pakistan.61
These outlawed terrorists under the shadow
of the ISKP also attacked Pakistani security forces and
labourers working on the border fencing.
Similarly, after recent reports about the East Turkestan,
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan having crucial
links with the ISKP and al-Qaeda, China’s threat
perception regarding Afghanistan has increased.
Therefore, Beijing has recently increased security check
posts along the mountainous border with Afghanistan,62
with the realisation that the threat could only diminish
and cease with efforts to hunt the ISKP and al-Qaeda
inside Afghanistan.63
Notwithstanding these developments, the US and the
Afghan government are yet to discuss a regional
mechanism to collectively treat this al-Qaeda-ISKP-led
terror threat in Afghanistan. Both Washington and Kabul
have been underestimating and downplaying the threat.
When Russia’s Special Presidential Envoy for
Afghanistan cautioned the US and Afghan officials
about the presence of at least ten thousand ISKP
terrorists in Afghanistan,64
the US and Afghan top
generals were certain that the numbers were not more
than three thousand.65
The presence of larger numbers of
ISKP fighters was confirmed later on when thousands of
terrorists were killed by the US-led Afghan government
forces and the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.66
Journal of Strategic Affairs
82
Additionally, many managed to flee and hundreds were
believed to have surrendered to Afghan authorities. The
claims about hundreds of ISKP terrorists surrendering to
Afghan authorities were repudiated by the Taliban with
serious charges that the government forces rescued ISKP
fighters who were under the Taliban siege.67
With the exception of India, the US continues to
discourage the role of regional countries in Afghanistan.
Ironically, New-Delhi does not perceive a direct threat
from terrorists in Afghanistan and has no direct access to
the country either. The US’ encouragement for India
assuming a greater role in Afghan affairs became
obvious once again during President Trump’s visit to the
country in February 2020.68
Earlier, in August 2017
Washington’s South Asia Strategy had emphasised a
greater role for India in Afghanistan.69
More recently, in
May 2020, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special
Representative to Afghanistan also reiterated the need
for a greater Indian engagement in Afghan affairs.70
Interestingly, there are claims that the US and Afghan
authorities have asked India to deploy its troops in
Afghanistan.71
Whether such a development would
exacerbate the problem further or become part of a
solution is not known. However, there is confusion
regarding the natural alignments of interests between
Daesh and other powers.
Although India has also declared Daesh a terror group,
keeping in view the prospects and the ability of the ISKP
to become a security threat to Pakistan and the Taliban,72
the group could become a strategic asset for New-
Delhi.73
Likewise, Daesh being a persistent threat to
Russia, Iran and China naturally becomes a shared
interest for both India and the US especially in
Afghanistan,74
even though Washington has also
outlawed the terrorist group. In the same manner, if the
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
83
Administration in Kabul remains unable to settle its
issues with the Taliban and the confrontation between
the two continues then the ISKP’s strategic rivalry with
the Taliban could also become an asset for the Afghan
government.75
Above all, New-Delhi’s uninterrupted strategic
engagement with Kabul and significant military
assistance against the Taliban creates hurdles in reaching
a ceasefire by prolonging the ongoing war and giving
terrorists time and space. Hence the US’ complicity with
India and its unwillingness to accept the involvement of
other regional powers in Afghanistan leaves little
prospects for a combined anti-terror endeavour in the
future. Such an arrangement could ultimately influence
the ability of Afghans to deliver on their key obligations
required for a complete withdrawal of foreign troops.
Great Power Competition: A Long-Term Challenge to
Afghanistan’s Economic Reconstruction
The complexities arising out of Washington’s
Afghanistan strategy and its biased approach towards
regional powers involved in the Afghan peace process
makes sense when we look at changing US policies in
the overall Asia Pacific region. Since 2005, the US has
been making serious efforts to increase its strategic
engagement with India. Washington has been assisting
New-Delhi in modernising its conventional forces and
has also bestowed special waivers to augment the
country’s nuclear programme with an aim to bring it at
par with China. Beijing’s containment does not seem to
be restricted to the strategic sphere alone. In fact, the
Indo-US alliance has been a threat for China’s geo-
economic plans.76
Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) intends to extend a number of mega infrastructure
projects to Afghanistan.77
However, the lack of
cooperation from both the US and India for China’s
Journal of Strategic Affairs
84
regional economic plans and non-recognition of its main
corridor could severely impact Afghanistan’s economic
reconstruction.78
In order to raise India to a ‘great power’ status, and in
order to reward the country for supporting its policies,
the US has not only renamed ‘Asia Pacific’ but also
given New-Delhi a leading role in its newly formed
‘Quad’.79
It is alarming as Russia has rejected the
renaming of Asia Pacific and formation of the Quad, and
pushes for a broad-based policy with other regional
powers.80
Such narrow US’ policies, by downplaying the
role and status of two of the largest Eurasian land
powers (Russia and China), increases the prospect for
confrontation. The overall confrontational great power
politics in the region present a major challenge for
Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction.
Interestingly, Moscow’s intention to connect its geo-
economic initiative of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU) with the BRI has implications for Afghanistan as
well.81
Being at the crossroad, the potential economic
spill over of the merger would certainly contribute to
Afghanistan’s prosperity. Additionally, Russia possesses
plans to extend mega infrastructure projects connecting
central and south Asia via Afghanistan.82
Hence, a stable
Afghanistan improves the prospects of a smooth
implementation of the mega geo-economic regional
plans which, in turn, hold implications for the country’s
economic reconstruction.
By and large, China and Russia have laid down their
comprehensive economic plans for the region. Being at
the crossroad, the full implementation and optimisation
of those mega projects are, in part, dependent on a stable
Afghanistan. The execution of regional economic plans
by spilling over its benefits to Afghanistan would allow
China and Russia to enhance its influence in the ‘heart of
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
85
Asia’. Looking at the recent US policies (National
Defence Strategy) and trends directed against Beijing
and Moscow, it seems very difficult that the US
establishment would leave any kind of vacuum in
Afghanistan to be filled by the former two.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that Washington’s general policy in the
wider Asia Pacific region is not compatible with its
decision to undertake a complete withdrawal from
Afghanistan, there has been a serious effort by the
Trump Administration towards bringing an end to the
US’ longest war. That, in part, is the result of the pledges
President Trump had made to get elected in his first
term. The White House and the US establishment have
been struggling to adjust their policies in the region
mainly because a complete drawdown of troops from
Afghanistan might ensure a second term for President
Trump. However it does not correspond with the overall
US’ policies in the region. Coupled with a bumpy
Washington-Kabul relationship, these policies have
further complicated the ongoing peace process.
The delay in all-Afghan talks and increased clashes
provide more leverage to several terrorist outfits. This
adds to the apprehension of regional powers and also
makes things difficult for Afghans to deliver their post-
ceasefire commitments i.e. eliminating terrorists
operating from Afghanistan. India seems to be the only
regional player enjoying the trust of both Washington
and Kabul. Also, the White House and Pentagon seem to
be on the same page along with the European partners
when it comes to India’s greater role in Afghanistan.
This also aligns with their general policy which
envisages New-Delhi’s central role in the “Indo-Pacific”
region. Regardless of the fact that such a narrow regional
approach does not resonate well with Russia, China and
Journal of Strategic Affairs
86
Pakistan, all the involved players for the sake of their
strategic and economic interests must continue their
efforts to grab this historical opportunity provided by the
Doha agreement to reach a politically settled peace in
Afghanistan.
Finally, Pakistan’s full support and assistance to the US-
led peace process and its ability to maintain smooth
relations and communication with both the US and the
Taliban remain instrumental to keeping the prospects of
a negotiated peace alive. Pakistan must use its good
relations with the US and the Taliban and also with
Russia, China and Iran to devise a mechanism acceptable
to all the players. Such a mechanism must ensure and
address “valid interests” of all players involved in the
Afghan endgame, including India.
Pakistan must also convince the US to allow Iran to play
a greater role in Afghanistan as the country maintains
good ties with all main Afghan players including
Abdullah, Ghani and the Taliban. Pakistan and Iran
could also play a crucial role in undoing the existing
bottlenecks and play a mediatory role during intra-
Afghan talks. On its part, Washington must also accept
and encourage the establishment of a joint Iran-Pakistan
mechanism to simultaneously work on the systematic
transfer of Afghan refugees and countering terrorism.
In conclusion, Islamabad must clearly communicate its
revised Afghanistan policy which seeks to reduce and
completely cut its dependence on Afghanistan, both on
the Taliban or in terms of geostrategic vulnerabilities.
This is evident in Islamabad’s efforts to fence the Pak-
Afghan border and neutralise militant religious
organisations on its soil. Based on evidence, the US
must also refrain from tagging Islamabad with India’s
“state sponsor of terror narrative”. More importantly,
Islamabad needs to demand the US to take note of
Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects
87
India’s claims of adjacent borders with Afghanistan.
Pakistan is also in a position to convince the US to
utilise the existing regional platform of Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to deal with future
challenges to Afghanistan especially in countering the
terror threat and reconstruction of the country. This
would enable all regional powers to communicate and
overcome the trust deficit in order to save Afghanistan
from another disastrous withdrawal scenario.
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Journal of Strategic Affairs
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