PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:

whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;

whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and

whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.

HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants

the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Prohibition granted.

Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority

Facts:

On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor.

Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plate numbers.

On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself “to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.”

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance.

Issue:

W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature?

Held:

No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating driver’s licenses for traffic violations within the said area.

To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of

revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (ISLACOM), petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (The Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts:

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.

The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago,

Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court.

Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.

Issues:

1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and

2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy.

Held:

Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

Constitutionality of the Circular

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.

Ruling:

Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular

telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.

Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the Court of Appeals on the civil cases are reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Evangelista vs Jarencio

68 SCRA 99Topic under:IV. Investigatory PowersD. Importance of administrative investigationsE. Executive power to investigate, source

Facts

: Evalengista, petitioner, is head of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and GovernmentOperations (PARGO) created by Executive Order No. 4, which, among others, provides:

“The agency is hereby vested with all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections

71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by

subpoena duces tecum

, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the

investigation.”

Respondent Manalastas (Asst. City Public Service Officer of Manila) was issued a

subpoena ad testificandum

commanding him to appear as witness at the office of the PARGO to testify in a certaininvestigation pending therein. Instead of obeying it, he filed a petition with the CFI of Manila forprohibition, certiorari and restraining order assailing its legality. Judge Jarencio issued a restrainingorder. Hence, this action.

Issue

: WON the PARGO enjoys the authority to issue subpoena in its conduct of fact-finding investigation

Held

: YES(1)

Agency is with authority to enforce subpoenas issued.

“Rightly, administrative agencies may enf

orcesubpoenas issued in the course of investigations, WON adjudication is involved, and WON probablecause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is enough that the investigation be for alawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove apending charge, but upon which to make one if discovered evidence so justifies. Because judicial poweris reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations, itdoes not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not

have and exercise powers of original inquiry”

(2)

Authority delegated by statute

. “The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not

dependent upon a case of controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicionthat the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigativeand accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it too may take steps toinform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.In sum, it may be stated that the subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is:(a) within the authority of the agency(b) the demand is not too indefinite

(c) the information is reasonable relevant”

(3)

Information sought reasonably relevant to the investigations

. “There is no doubt tha

t the fact-findinginvestigations being conducted by the PARGO upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials

of the City Govt of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the PARGO’s sphere of authority and

that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Manalastas of which he is claimed to be in

possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.”

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000)

FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The

Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.

The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.

3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing

RULING: Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable

the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the Department of Justice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request and the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property,

the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice

and hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1) and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and documents.

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective

extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process.

The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice and hearing are applicable in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. Nonobservance

of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, may claim the right

to appear therein and present their side.

Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:

a.When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).

b.Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, and the respondent is not prevented from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time (summary

distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)

c.Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

2. Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?

No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Section 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

3. WON there is any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights and the

provisions of the RP-US Extradition treaty

RULING: No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Kapunan, separate concurring opinion:

While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake if our government’s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage.