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US-ROKCOMBINED

0, OPERATIONS__ A KOREAN PERSPECTIVE

.4 j~; been uippxovi L ,i ~ I'" ) Feo : o;-le: L~ts

TAEK-HYUNG RHEE

A NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRSMONOGRAPH

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US-ROK CombinedOperations

A Korean Perspective

OTI!

DEC 14 1987

Stock #008-020-01074-0C Price: $2.00

US-ROK CombinedOperations

A Korean Perspective

by

Taek-Hyung RheeBrigadier General, Republic of Korea Army

International Senior FellowNational Defense University

1986

A National Security Affairs Monograph

National Defense University PressWashington, DC

National Defense University Press Publications

To increase general knowledge and informdiscussion, NDU Press publishes books on subjectsrelating to US national security.

Each year, in this effort, The National DefenseUniversity, through the Institute for NationalStrategic Studies, supports about two dozen SeniorFellows who engage in original research on nationalsecurity issues. NDU Press publishes the best of thisresearch.

In addition, the Press publishes especially timely ordistinquished writing on national security fromauthors outside the University, new editions of out-of-print defense classics, and books based onconferences concerning national security affairs.

Unless otherwise noted, NDU Press publicationsare not copyrighted and may be quoted or reprintedwithout permission. Please give full publicationcredit.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendationsexpressed or implied within are solely those of theauthor, and do not necessarily represent the views ofthe National Defense University, the Department ofDefense, any other US Government agency, or anyagency of the Republic of Korea.

First printing March 1986.

vi

r

CONTENTS

Foreword 0 ix

I. The Importance of Combined Operations * 1

2. Combined Operations and Combat on theKorean Peninsula * 9

Lessons of the Korean War of 1950-1953* 9Future Combat on the Korean Peninsula and

Effective Combined Operations 9 14

3. US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC)Posture 0 23

Weapons and Equipment * 23Differences in Tactics * 26Command and Control 0 30Organizational Employment of HQ, CFC • 43Staff Member Qualities 0 48

4. Conclusion: Improving US-ROK CombinedOperations e 49

Endnotes * 53

Bibliography * 57

The Author e 59

vii

FIGURES

1. Organization of the Combined Forces

Command 0 4

2. Map of Korea 0 17

3. Peacetime Command Relationships of the CFC * 34

4. CFC Command and Control Structure 0 38

TABLES

1. Comparison of North versus South Korean

Military Capabilities 9 5

2. Major Combat Weapons and Equipment 0 24

3. Organization and Operation of

Headquarters, CFC 0 45

viii

FOREWORD

Since World War II, an alliance with the UnitedStates has meant security for many nations. Ingeneral, the substantial US military contribution tothese alliances has meant that strategy, tactics,organization, and equipment tended to be dominatedby US preferences. Within the last decade, however, agrowing worldwide Soviet capability and increasedUS security commitments have forced a shift towardgreater sharing of both defense responsibility andmilitary capability between the United States and itsallies. In some cases, this shift has generated ormagnified differences between the United States andits friends.

In this monograph, Brigadier General Taek-Hyung Rhee, ROK Army and a National DefenseUniversity International Senior Fellow, details thedeficiencies of US-ROK combined operationsdoctrine. Combined operations are not givensufficient emphasis, he points out, in the war collegesof either nation, forcing officers and troops of bothcountries to acquire the vital principles of combinedoperations in an ad hoc fashion. General Rhee offers aframework for correcting doctrinal deficiencies andstrengthening deterrence on the Korean peninsula.

i (

ix

The National Defense University is pleased to publishthis Korean perspective of alliance burden sharingand combined operations in peace and war.

Richard D. LawrenceLieutenant General, US ArmyPresident, National Defense

University

US-ROK CombinedOperations

A Korean Perspective

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMBINEDOPERATIONS

This is a brief study of the United States-Republicof Korea Combined Forces Command's (CFC)posture for combat operations in a future war on theKorean peninsula. In the event of major militaryaction, the probability is very high that US forces willengage in combined operations in one form oranother. We cannot, therefore, stress too much theimportance of the combined operations of US-Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.

The choice of the US-ROK Combined ForcesCommand as a case study of problems associated witheffective combined operations is both interesting andsignificant. It provides a vehicle to stimulate thinkingabout general difficulties inherent in combinedoperations and a way to understand the uniqueproblems for such operations on the Koreanpeninsula-one of the two strategic pivotal areas onthe Eurasian land mass where US ground forces arestationed.

Ineffectiveness of combined operations in a futureconflict in the area could lead not only to discordbetween the US and South Korea but also to adisastrous outcome of the war. Such a result wouldseverely jolt the political and military leadership in theUnited States, since the senior US commander hasresponsibility for the defense of South Korea.

The purpose of this study, then, is to analyzeproblems associated with effective combinedoperations of the US-ROK Combined ForcesCommand, created on 7 November 1978 to assumeprimary responsibility for the defense of SouthKorea. This paper will briefly discuss problems

arising from the operations of the Korean War in the1950-1953 period, the distinctive factors that willpresumably affect combined operations in a futurewar on the Korean peninsula, the CFC's posturetoward such factors, and some proposals for solvingthe various problems.

In addition, the modern concept of "RSI"-rational-ization, standardization, and interoperability-willbe applied to measure the degree of integration ofallied forces into one operable system.' This conceptassumes that the higher the degree of interoperabil-ity, the greater will be the effectiveness of combinedoperations.

From a Korean point of view, combined operationsis not a new form of military operation. Historically,Korea has experienced combined operations severaltimes-with China in the 7th century, with theMongols in the 13th, with the Chinese Ming Dynastyin the 16th, and with the US in the 20th. Of these, the1950-53 experience is the most relevant, althoughKorean perceptions are also influenced by the earlierhistorical events. The Korean War was a modern warand the allied system formed during that conflict stillexists. The success of the United Nations Command's(UNC's) efforts to integrate various units intoeffective combat entities owed much to the commongoals and attitudes shared by all Allied participantsfrom combat line commands to logistical supportgroups to training functions.2

Since the inception of US-ROK Combined ForcesCommand in 1978, at least two forms of suchcooperation-the UNC and the CFC-have existed.The senior US military officer now wears at least fivedifferent hats: Commander in Chief of CombinedForces Command (CINCCFC); Commander in Chief,

2

United Nations Command (CINCUNC); Commanderin Chief, United States Forces Korea (CINCUSFK);Commander in Chief, Eighth United States Army(CINC EUSA); and CINC Ground ComponentCommand of CFC (Figure 1). This complexarrangement of command and control systems isconcentrated in the senior US military officer inKorea-the CINC.

Can the Combined Forces Command effectivelyand efficiently conduct combined operation, with thecurrent arrangement of interoperability in combat ina future war on the Korean peninsula?

Any future war on the Korean peninsula will be amodern war, characterized by an all-out surpriseattack from North Korea with few warning signspreceding the attack. Because North Korea hassuperior military capabilities (Table I), the warwill bea blitzkrieg characterized by shortness of duration,fast movement, and the shock of the enemy's attack.Such factors combined with the precision, vitality,and severity of combat may lead to chaos among thedefenders; the combined efforts of the enemy willsurely include commando-type attacks on the C3

system of friendly forces, strikes against civiliantargets, and the use of agent saboteurs. Combatreality may dictate that commanders and their troopsexert more effort in keeping contact with friendlyforces in order to prevent being separated orovercome by psychological shocks.

3

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Table 1. Comparison of North versus SouthKorean Military Capabilities

Souirce,: Air Fo~rce, MVagazitit% December 1983, pp.116-117. Reprinted by permission.

KOREA: DEMOCRATIC KOREA: REPUBLIC OFPEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (SOUTH)(NORTH) Poquiaton 394~'t0000 ne 0 onPopuat~On I800000 A" Force 3 YeeIs

IIr Strlc Army NftV 5 years Ar0Force 3-4 years Total armed forces 622 000

Total armed forces 784 500 GOI '982 won, 50 023 or' (6O 4'9 tr',Est U-s 194? won 35 280 On (Ste 766 bi Est do' eok 1962 won 3 7825 o 5 'S'3 brnEsi det cO '983 won 3 602 on *S1 916 b-, Gore growith 7 1% 1982,

$t wkon 094 ' 982 3 11 c-a'. 88 laol- Infia on 20 5- 0981,1 6%. '9821SI won 73' 13 09821

Am~y 700 0009 " rps Q Army 540 0002 arrrl a'" 3 Armry 6 corps -03rnot "It d'" 2 mect,,nfda-" each3 bass 3mechn' 3 not 3 lk'35 ,n .5recce Ons Id art coal5 .;ht de 210 ,nt doS fesch 3 mf egis I 'ecce IA 1k esg' onaI

Spe21 forces .100 000, 1 Corps "0 26 Odes I fl 3 ' ,,pdep Odes nO3Ae,4. An reccce 00 801on . go 2amnpf coo Ioa element soecai forces coo ni Caplta' Command

2 nhdep tk 5 ndep0 nf '8Qts 2 AAo art bodes250 arty bns 2 ss bnls wIn 12 Honest Jothn82 .. ,c bog 2 5.,m odes 3 HAWK 2 HVe Hercules ons5 oSs. one w111 54 FROG I army asaton bOe5 r.e coasng regis 1t3 bns) 1 200 M4-47-48 1,CI Al ,.81 000 M4-113. 577 350 F,81AFV 300 T3.4 2 2007T34 55- 62 175 Type-59 s.. 100 6614 ec 2 SW M-53 155mm Mi107 175mm SP gums5

FIT7 50 O'pe6? It tke 140 BA-64 armtar EI15 I60 o M4-101 tl5nm MIt 114 155mm ?owed Iss 115seco 1 000 BTR-A0S-0-0-t2 Ch' Type-53' on' 4towed Mt tO1 so 203mm how 130mm -.n 5 300

Arty 3 300 76-m 8"mm 100-m M 30 t22mm Ma6 mtm and 107mm mor 12 HonestJohtn oSS 8 76mmt30mm towed -no 800 SU 78 S U '00 -0gn 50 q~m A- guns LAWs4L 57mm 75mm 106mm122-m M L-20 152mm rm ttw 1100 2mm 120.m 1( 1TOW oroiw 66 Vulcans 20mm 40 40mm A^ gunsI80m- .nd 2 40mmI mot 2 000 t07mmn I22mm ''10 HAWK 100 Alk Herc4,0es SAM 14 0-2Aac 100t1o0- 200rhm and 240mm Mre, 54 FROG-5 lsss UH I 1 00 OH-6A 25 Hughes 500640 Defende, ml?'

AIK 1 500 8-10 82mm 9-11 107MM IcII 45mm 57mm TOW1 90 Scout h1e1Tyw52S 75mm -0 guns Al S@990' TrGw (On order 37 M-109A2 155mm sp how 1OWAT6w S~ng-

AD 8 000 23mm 37mm, 57mm 85mm and 100mm er56 OH 6A 25 Hugh"s 5000 he? w-tt TOW)towed ZSU-23-4 ZSU-57-2 59 0A guns SA 7 SAWs

%55f our5 Regul:r Army Reserin 1 400 OOC 23 orf dovscosfews 230 0D0 23 dee Icadrel 'cadre? Homelend een Defence Force 3 300 000

Ninny: 33 500 al4900ecmo s21 fb$ ( Sc W.4 ChR cose 3 loalI I US destroyers 7 Getr-n -thr 8 Harpoon sosm .2 w-In4 Nph ?r~gates (2 may be n- voorse Asouaefne III hot) 2 Soiner. 2 Fletchr

Is Sos, roc?,. wit?' Styx SSW. a80.-1 10 Kome, 8 flgatecs I Ulsen wit?'8 Harpoon 7 US 0 Ruddetrom 632 18r90 patrol craft 2 Sos Tres '550O 1 3 So-rwa 6 C" LaerencoCroshey

N~io 8 t'.erchtsog 3 US Auk coroelleg15t rACcl 20 Sosl MD-IV 23 Ch' 1'S Shrenghare1 i l~cimeI wt'soc 9wft?'StrrdefdI8 PSMM k SO I US

Sfrecio., 1 4 Ctiodo 4 K-48 64 C?'ioO 36 Chong-Jin Asfmen,110I 2 K,$1 th? 2 LEocet182 reCIII 80 Sos 14 Otterofr 64 P 6 12 P--,1 '02 19 a us Cape large patrol craft

Sonpo ts twn' 6 An J. 72 Ku Song S,oug 28 comic, Dai'Al craft 6CPsICFW:OCI 13S~wsr1198ilf30 comic, patrol craft 10 es-SosCM 4 20mec gun 4 40-fi; 9 Sch'olboy I It

9 '" 't5 LCM 75 ho4mpo, landing craft 8 MSC 6 294 c oastal mtoesweeoers I mneswft.ng2 cocci defence is regt ct? Semler -n 69-,tee SM 4 ' boat

I 30m. guns 24 US and009 Shups (as 'O's. 6 '

RESsE-rs 40000 eases Chrn?'. C?'eiu Inchon Mokpo PukovongPohang9 Pcun

Baes Wonsan Nampo250

5

KOREA: DEMOCRATIC KOREA: REPUBLIC OFPEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (SOUTH)(NORTH)Air ForcA 51 000 some 740 combat arcalt3 It bbr sqns with 70 11-28 Selesn t20000;13FGASqns 1 lth 20Su 7 9Ih some 29OMG 15 17

2dvs Ihde

3 ,th some 100 MG 19 05 . 4 M. LVIP7 a12 nterceptof slns wo1 160 MG-21 some 00 MG 19 iOn order I sub 7 coettes 20 to; ,l7 lyoes 'STpIS ;ncl 250 An-2 10 An.24 5 Ii 14 4 1 18 I T 1 54 Harpoon 5SM 40 LVTP 7 ;He' ncl 40 M 4 20 M.-8Tra ners rcl 20 Yak 11 70 Yak 1A I00 M-G SUTI l-', 60000

19UTI -21U I-28 30 CJ-f6M AA-2 Atoll Air Force 33 00 some 450 combat ac 10 combat he,SAMD 5 112 On 40 btySI w-th 250 SA-2 some SA3 n 7 combat 2 tp .ngs40 sItes '8 -cA Sqns 14 wIh 250 F 5A8 E F 4 -tn, 70 F 86 6

A 10Forces Abroad faen 300 Madagascar 100 Uganda 40 4 -0 sqns wth 70 F 40 E

Z-mbbwe 130 , ,C.;5 sqn lth 13 OV 10G some A 37recce son ath 10 R F 5A

Par-4ffl ery Forces securoy forcesanOborderguards _oswsns Iw,r20S 2A F t wIlt h0Hough5s00MD38000 llrker Farmers Youth IRed Guard cVilr hcamItl ' 7W 000 some w1th small arms some A arty 1 A hel sqn wth 6 UH IH 20 UH tBM

StDI Sonstsb iOC 54 16C I23J K 2HS 748 6C I3OHAe'o Command.,

Tr aners nO 0 T-280 40 T 33A 14 1 37C 20 T.41D 35F 5B 63 F SF

_M SOdewnde, Sparrow(Onorder 30F 16A 6F '6B 36 F 5E 30 F SF61 4 rrrs

AIM 90 Slew,oer 'AM Maverck -,M

Para M,ary Forces Cu;;;an Detence Coros ito age 5014 400 000, Stodent Momelano Detence Cors'Schools) 8 820 000 Coaslouad 25 small ca, 9Hughes 500D hel

One way of solving the problems ofinteroperability-that is, the problems associatedwith dissimilarly equipped forces-in the past was iouse the "trial-and-error" method, which requiresextended periods of time. LTC Hixson and Dr.Cooling make this point clear in their study ofcombined operations:

Historically, the problems ofinteroperability have been solved-when they have been solved at all-primarily through 'trial and error'during the actual conduct ofoperations over an extended period ot tine.This is a costly process, in terms of men,materials, and time: they may belacking in future wars.

3

If there will be insufficient time to solve theproblems of interoperability within the CFC during,combat in future wars, what should we do inpreacetime to prepare for the exigencies of blitzkriegcombat? One suggestion is to make command andstaff aware of the existence of various problems.Doing so will allow commanders to make plans fortheir solution, to maintain a spirit of mutual respect,and to develop compatibility in organization,doctrine, and equipment. But this solution won'twork unless the commanders where commonnational interests and common political and strategicobjectives; lack of this interaction always impairsoptimum effectiveness of any combined operations.

7

2. COMBINED OPERATIONSAND COMBAT ON THE

KOREAN PENINSULA

Lessons of the Korean War of 1950-1953

In addition to the ROK forces, the troops of sixteennations under the command and control of the UnitedNations Command (UNC) participated in variouscombined operations against combined Communistforces of the Moscow-Peking-Pyongyang axis. Due tothe multiplicity of national forces operating withinthe UNC, the problems of allied interoperabilityranged widely from minor cultural differences tomajor disagreements on tactics and doctrine. Suchdifficulties often resulted in insufficient cooperationand ineffective combined operations. Although theUNC quickly recognized the problems inherent in thediverse origins of its troops, it had to rely largely onthe trial-and-error method to integrate these forcesinto a single unified command system.Unfortunately, it had no effective doctrine for dealingwith combined operations.

During the integration process, almost all of thenon-American troops had to be carefully trained andreoriented by the UNC to ensure compatability withUNC (US) doctrine. At the initial stage, the UNCassumed that standardization of weapons andammunition, along with language commonality,would provide the basic framework for alliedinteroperability. Only after actual integration of non--US/ROK troops had taken place did the UNC begin torealize that other profound problems existed. Theseincluded the attitudes and views of commanders andsoldiers, mutual misunderstandings, cultural and

9

religious disparities, and geographical/climaticdifferences. 4 The combat readiness of UNC troopsdepended largely on familiarization training offeredby UNC, or their organization, equipment, andweaponry and on their ability to integrate USdoctrine, procedure, and operating methods withtheir own. When the UNC employed these troops incombat, it also had to consider the personality andlinguistic ability of the commanders in addition tosuch factors as unit strength, equipment, training,combat experience, leadership quality, limitations onemployment imposed by higher headquarters,availability of reserves, and positioning of UN unitsrelative to other forces on the front line.5

Developed through trial and error, US methods toturn UN units into one homogeneous body in combatincluded:

(1) attaining organizational uniformity throughfitting UN units to US organizational structures inaccordance with US TO & E 7-14 (Infantry Battalion)or 7-95 (Infantry Battalion Separated);

(2) standardizing equipment by providing USweapons and equipment;

(3) simplifying command and control by attachingsmall UN units to larger US units-i.e., subordinatingUN units to the US command and control system;

(4) obtaining qualitative uniformity throughfamiliarization training offered by the UN ReceptionCenter (UNRC) and by parent US units(8 and 6weeks' training respectively)-i.e., familiarizationwith US weapons, equipment, doctrine, and tactics;

10

(5) facilitating inter-allied communications byusing dual lines of liaison-one from USorganizations to UN units, the other from UN unitsto US units-by using English as a common language,and by providing US signal corps teams to UN units;and

(6) providing logistic systems that could supportunits other than US units-such as ROK units andBritish Commonwealth units. Petroleum, oils, andlubricants (POL) constituted a major supplyrequirement in this respect. In short, the US providedall logistic support to UN units.,,

Despite the great US effort to improve theeffectiveness of combined operations under a singlecommand and control system, there remained anumber of unsolved problems such as tacticaldifferences, language barriers, differences ofweapons and equipment, diversity of troop morale,and variation in combat support capabilities. Inaddition, problems often developed between UN andROK commanders because of negative attitudesfostered by language difficulty and an absence offrequent and candid communications.

7

Though these problems were not always minor,combined operations, operations involving US andROK units, of the UNC during the Korean War areoften evaluated as having been successful. GeneralMacArthur's speedy recognition of the necessity foran integrated operations policy quickened theformulation of an adequate forces integrationprocess. The protraction of the conflict provided thetime needed for the UNC to replace the trial-and-error method with integration, whereas the cold warpsychology prevailing among the UNC membersaided in the development of common objectives and

11

attitudes toward the war. Though the nationalaspirations of South Korea for the reunification ofthe country had once served as a barrier to theobjectives of the UNC to conclude a truce and hadcaused major political discord, in the end all UNmembers but the Indians maintained at least onecommon objective: to defend South Korea againstCommunist invasion.

Probably the most important factor that enabledthe UNC to conduct effective combined operationswas the strong willingness and advanced militarycapabilities of the US. The US demonstrated a firmcommitment to the survival of South Korea to bothher allies and her enemies. Massive US troopemployment and US logistics supported almost everyUN unit except those of the ROK and the BritishCommonwealth. Such efforts attested to thedurability of the US commitment and encouraged theallied forces to fight in unison against their commonenemies.

The success of the UNC's combined operationsdoes not always seem so brilliant, however, whenseen from the South Korean point of view. Had theUS been more willing to use the South's potential tomobilize forces and provide arms for these forces touse, as she had with UN units, or had the UScontinued to share common objectives with SouthKorea throughout the war, there would be now, atleast, no direct threat from the North to Seoul-thestrategic heart of the South. Even if the UN forceshad failed to reunify the country completely, the CFCwould enjoy a better strategic position in contendingwith a future military conflict on the Koreanpeninsula.

12

During the Korean War, the UNC had often been inconflict with the South Korean government aboutthe strategic and military objectives of the war andabout other relevant issues. The president of SouthKorea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, believed that the war wasbasically civil; that the primary goal was to attainnational unification; and that success or failure was amatter of life or death to the nation. Any retreat ofUN troops was, therefore, regarded as a strategicdefeat. South Korea also believed that she must havethe right to restore civil order in the liberated areaswith the use of UN troops and that North KoreanPOWs should be released.8 The UNC, on the otherhand, seemed to believe that the war was aninternational conflict in which the primary goal wasto restore the pre-war status quo. In addition, UNCbelieved that civil order in the liberated area should berestored by direct control of the UNC; and thatPresident Rhee's action, releasing the POWs, wasvery harmful to the attainment of the UNC's warobjectives. The basic reason for thismisunderstanding was the lack of candid, frequent,and direct communications between the parties at thenational command level. Because of ignorance, someUS military personnel derided oriental culture anddistrusted oriental people, as did a few US diplomatswho served as unilateral messengers rather than asbilateral communicators. They forced their views (orWashington's views) on the South Koreangovernment instead of trying to understand SouthKorean perspectives. Dr. Rhee often had to rely on hispersonal US advisors in order to express his views toWashington."

13

Future Combat on the Korean Peninsulaand Effective Combined Operations

If war occurs again on the Korean peninsula, it willprobably differ from the War of 1950-1953 for severalreasons. Even if it remains a limited, regional militaryaction, neither the ideological coherence of the cold-war era nor the material incentives offered by the UScan be expected to entice participation by other UNmembers. In all probability, only the US will sendadditional ground forces along with substantialcombat support units. As it is now, North Koreanmilitary ventures continue to be under constraintsimposed by the reluctant support of China and theSoviets. But once a war occurs and is recognized as afait accompli, the Soviets and China will activelysupport North Korea.

In addition, even though South Korean society isnow more Westernized than ever before, theConfucian and Buddhist traditions of South Koreawill be a major cultural and religious factor withwhich US soldiers and commanders should befamiliarized. Special attention should also be given tothe great differences between South and NorthKorean society. The perspectives of South and NorthKoreans have changed so greatly that South Korea nolonger enjoys the kind of popular support in theNorth that had earlier enabled South Koreanintelligence agencies to collect informationeffectively.I 0 During the Korean War, many in theNorth helped the South Korean Army because theyfelt that the two Koreas comprised the same nationand because they admired the democratic SouthKorean regime. Today, however, second generationNortherners have accepted the legitimacy of theNorth Korean government and are thus unlikely to beeither friendly or supportive in a future conflict.

14

Unlike the early 1950s, urbanization in the capitalzone of South Korea, accompanied by its economicdevelopment, makes it imperative to defend Seoul atall costs, despite the fact that its proximity to thefront line makes it impossible to trade space with timein a conventional way to absorb the shocks of enemyattack. Seoul has now about one quarter of the totalnational population and functions as the political,economic, and cultural center of the nation. Anabundance of manpower in the capital zone willpromote defense efforts, though the complexity ofthe urban structure necessitates special measures forcivil order and urban fighting.

Allegedly, military factors favor of North Korea.These include geography, topography and climate,and military capabilities. Geographically, NorthKorea enjoys proximity to China and the SovietUnion. Lines of Communication (LOCs) from Chinaand the Soviet Union are short and secure, while theLOCs from the United States to South Korea are longand open to an enemy's sea attack (Figure 2).

Topographically, Korea is a mountainouspeninsula. Her mountain backbone, the TaibackMountains, runs alongside the east coast. From thisgroup, numbers of other mountains run westward inparallel until they reach the west coast. Most of therivers, therefore, run westward. Though thesemountains and rivers usually provide good naturalobstacles to troop maneuvers, the western half of thepeninsula has relatively low mountain slopes andnumerous well-developed plains that provide goodspaces for massive mechanized troop maneuvers.But, unlike the past war, allied forces cannot enjoy atopographical advantage at the initial stage of a futureconflict, since the defense of Seoul becomes a criticaltask. The terrain between Seoul and the DMZ is

15

relatively favorable to a North Korean offensive.Although small mountains in the space betweenSeoul and the DMZ may be used as strong points forthe defense of the capital zone, terrain north of Seoulis advantageous for attackers from the north. Most ofthe southward approaches from the DMZ aredirected toward Seoul, whereas northwardapproaches from the DMZ are scattered. Of the fiveapproaches from the DMZ to Seoul, three (theMusnan, Dongduchon, and Cholwon corridors) areavailable for combined operations of large scaleformations of infantry, armor, and artillery.

16

The Korean Peninsula

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17

The tactical and strategic doctrine of the NorthKorean People's Army (NKPA) is built on the keyconcepts of combined-arms offensive operations,mobility, flexibility, and the integration ofconventional and unconventional warfare. TheNKPA doctrine stresses that decisive results areobtained only through offensive operations.Firepower and maneuver are considered the basicmeans of achieving combat power in the offensive. Inemploying firepower, the NKPA tactics emphasizethe principles of mobility, surprise, mass, speed, andsecurity. Smoke, fire, and deception are used tosupport the offensive. In addition, the North Koreansare capable of employing chemical, biological, andradiological agents. NKPA doctrine on the threeobjectives of an offensive-destruction of enemyforces, seizure and control of territory, anddestruction of the enemy's will to fight-stresses thedestruction of the enemy force. The destruction orreduction of the enemy force is considered moreimportant than the acquisition and control of keyterrain.

The NKPA is capable of all basic military attackformations but considers envelopment as the bestform of maneuver. As in Soviet military tactics, theNorth Koreans favor penetration tactics in a narrowfront to achieve an envelopment. Their penetrationtactics favor infiltration to a greater extent than anyothers. II

Although preparedness in the military posture ofthe ROK and US alliance is far better than it was, thebalance of military capabilities favors North Korea, asit did in the pre-Korean War period. The NKPA isnumerically superior to the ROK and US allied forcesin firepower and maneuverability as well as in air andnaval power, if tactical nuclear weapons are not

18

considered. Some of the quantitative superiority ofthe NKPA capabilities will, of course, be offset by thequalitative superiority of the ROK-US forcescapabilities, especially in the area of combat aircraft.Because of the numerical advantage of weapons andequipment of the NKPA, however, its superiorityover ROK and US forces will not be easily offsetwithout quantitative improvement of ROK and USmilitary capabilities.

Since there is a strategic imbalance between Southand North Korean military capabilities, North Koreaprefers to achieve the rapid overthrow of the SouthKorean government by seizing Seoul. This objectivecan be attained by an all-out surprise attack,combined with conventional and unconventionalwarfare. All offensive efforts of the NKPA will centeron an early occupation of Seoul by destroying majorROK-US defense forces to the north of the capitalzone. Main attack forces of the NKPA will advancealong one of the three major approaches from theDMZ to Seoul. They will conduct combined armsoperations on a formidable scale using artillery,rockets, tanks, and infantry. These will be supportedby air strikes and commando-type attacks on C3facilities of ROK and US forces and assisted bysecondary attack forces advancing via otherapproaches. The NKPA will be able to concentrateperhaps about one-third of its tank and artilleryinventory on the main offensive area. In the worstcase for the defenders, such a capability may meanthat the NKPA's main offensive forces will be able toconcentrate more than 200 tanks in one echelon ofattack waves. 13

Concurrent with offensive efforts of the NKPA'smechanized forces to the north of the capital zone onthe western front, an assisting effort of light infantry

19

will probably be exerted on the eastern front topursue vulnerabilities in the South Korean defenseposture.

While the NKPA conducts its front line attack, itsair forces, its commando forces, its naval forces, andits sabotage agents would probably concentrate theirefforts to destroy major strategic targets in the SouthKorean rear area. During the initial stage of a surpriseattack, such targets would include C' facilities, anti-air missile systems, aircraft and airfields, majorharbor facilities, munition and POL stocks, andtransportation networks. 14

Because of the greater accuracy of targeting,greater destructive power, and longer and fastermobility of the current weapons system that will beemployed on a large scale by both enemy and friendlyforces, combat in a future war on the Koreanpeninsula will be characterized by severity offighting, massive firepower, and the shock of fastmaneuvers. Better-coordinated defense efforts,which will be required in any future war, will havelittle time to be developed once hostilities start. Troopunits will frequently be in uncoordinated combatsituations as they become completely separated fromother friendly forces, having been shocked by theoverwhelming firepower and fast penetration ofenemy forces.is

In sum, the nature of a future war and the probablecharacteristics of combat in that war seem to dictatethe following efforts to improve the effectiveness ofcombined operations:

(1) Because of the speed of combat in the futureand because of the short time provided for thedefense of the capital zone, there will be no time for

20

allied forces to use the trial-and-error method toimprove interoperabilities. Every effort to improvethe effectiveness of combined operations should bemade during peacetime, prior to the outbreak ofhostilities.

(2) Because of the necessity of close cooperation,the US-ROK allies should have common institutionalprocesses at a higher level than the CFC to set andadjust views on the war on a day-to-day basis. Suchporcesses would allow for candid, frequent, and directcommunications, thus reducing misunderstandings.

(3) Because of the probable structure of alliedforces, the ROK Army will provide the bulk of theground force, buttressed by some US ground combatand combat support forces. The other UN forcesmight not take a significant combat role but play,instead, a politically symbolic one. Because it isassumed that the war will be conducted exclusively onthe Korean peninsula, with which the ROK forces arealready familiar, major efforts for interoperabilityand familiarization should be exerted to prepare USforces in Korea and any war-time augmentationunits. Major efforts for organizationalinteroperability must be based on combat units of theROK Army or of the US Second Infantry Division inKorea.

(4) Because combat units of the ROK Army willcomprise the major ground force, under CFCoperational control (OPCON), all efforts to improvethe effectiveness of combined operations throughenhancing interoperability should be focusedprimarily on these combat units. This effort shouldinclude improvements in weapons, equipment,doctrine, training, organization, and C.

21

(5) because of the probable combat reality in afuture war, the command and control system shouldbe simplified in order to establish a relativelyinvulnerable communications system, even if thecommunication system for command and control isduplicated.

(6) Because of the need for early warning and forcombined operations, combined intelligence efforts-collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminatingintelligence-should be in the CFC to overcomedifficulties in gathering information from the closedsociety of North Korea.

22

3. US-ROK COMBINED FORCESCOMMAND POSTURE

By and large, the posture of the US-ROK CFCforces seems well fitted to the general character of theKorean situation. However, the following factors-which could undermine the effectiveness of combinedoperations-should be given close attention by themilitary planners of the United States and SouthKorea.

Weapons and Equipment

Weapons and equipment of allied forces in Koreavary in sophistication, ranging from old, conventionalsmall arms-M-1 rifles-to technologically advancedweapons-precision guided missiles (PGMs). Thevariety of weapons and equipment may necessitateseveral different efforts-logistical services, efficienttactical use and standardization-for successfulcombined operations.

Standardization of the weapons and equipment ofallied forces is always a difficult task, one that usuallyrequires extensive logistical modifications overprolonged time spans. In general, interoperability ofthe US-ROK CFC OPCON units, weapons, andequipment is relatively high because the ROK forcesare armed largely with US weapons and equipment.

In the process of improving interoperability of theCFC's forces through standardization of weaponsand equipment, differences in the phasing-in ofnewer equipment seems to be a major problem. ROKforces are armed largely with outmoded US weaponsand equipment which are no longer familiar to USforces (see Table 2). Even though the South Korean

23

economy and industrial capabilities have grownduring the last decade, South Korea has had to investvery selectively in efforts to improve US-madeconventional weapons. Thus the number ofindigenous Korean weapons, even if developed underUS technological assistance, is minimal. On the otherhand, South Korea has successfully developedindigenous equipment -individual instruments,radios, telephones, some combat vehicles-that isinterchangeable in civil and military use.

Table 2. Major Combat Weapons and Equipmentiv

Used by Used by Used byUS and ROK forces US forcesROK alone aloneforces inKorea

Artillery O-511111, %1 R [., 103C 5rInI gun15 5 n am, (erlikon175inni,

8" 1iO)%',Vulcan,

I Oomii RL

l'( Al iaovk, Nike, Htarpoon StingcrROCKE F Red-Eye, S IS R OL kit

Sideivinder, (Nike

T() on ert)Htonemt John

Aircraft F-1-)8E. "l8n \ I0

t%%art init,'

Armor %I-48 8 R)KI I Woo2 -47

24

To avoid problems inherent in a non-standardizedweapons system, South Korea chose co-production,with US technological assistance, of some USweapons in selected areas. Because of cost, co-production has been chosen in some areas in whichUS production was being phased out.

While co-production and technological cooperationis contributing to a standardization of weaponssystems, a more integrated logistics posture of theUS-ROK CFC could further enhance theinteroperability of CFC forces in combat. BecauseROK forces are armed mainly with outmoded USweapons systems, available wartime consumption ofmunitions, parts, and their replacements will dependupon peacetime stocks in US inventories and wartimeproduction in US defense industries.

Detailed planning of the logistics roles to beperformed by the US and ROK forces must assumethe need for interoperability of equipment.Furthermore, the pre-positioning of spare parts andmunitions-like that which occurred in the case ofWar Reserve Stock for Allies (WRSA)--is vital to thesuccessful repulsion of an invasion by North Korea.

Tactics of US and ROK Forces

Although South Korean tactics originated fromand developed in parallel with US military doctrine,there are significant differences. The reasons forthese differences vary. US tactics have developedfrom US military tradition, available weapons,military philosophy, and anticipated security threats.Traditionally, US doctrine views massive attrition ofwar materials to be tolerable-in the past, domesticindustries have massively produced war materials--while consumption of manpower, especially as the

25

result of casualties, is considered to be intolerable. Inthe US view, a war on the Korean peninsula would bea tactical, not a life-or-death, situation.

In contrast, Korea has neither abundant warmaterials nor enough space in which to fight whiletrading space for time. Thus loss of weapons andequipment is often regarded as more intolerable thanloss of manpower. And losing even a foot of territoryis often regarded as seriously as losing the war. Inshort, the war itself, if it occurs on the Koreanpeninsula, is a life-or-death situation for Koreans.

Thus the military organization, unit capabilities,military philosophy, and weapons of the Koreanforces have developed unique aspects, even thoughmuch has originated from the US doctrine of givinggreater weight to the human factor.

Differences in Tactics

US military doctrine and tactics are developed tomeet various contingencies outside of CONUS,especially for a war on Europe, while South Koreantactics have been developed to meet only the NorthKorean threat " There are, in fact, a number of areasin whith US and South Korean forces use differenttactics. These include conventional offensive anddefensive tactics, airborne and airmobile tactics,amphibious operations, counter-intelligenceoperations, and guerrilla warfare.

-. o'i,,t,,uiO to,,- I Whereas ROK forc es provideequal emphasis on the seitire and retention of keyterrain (or enermv grou nd) and on the dest ru t ion ofenemy fortes and their will to fight (as traditionalClausewit/ians do), US doctrinal emphasis i, orientedtoward destruction of the enemy forte In addition,US units, oriented toward fast maneuver operations,

2v

may move in battle by armored vehicles andhelicopters, whereas most ROK units, althoughmechanized divisions do exist, consist of lightinfantry and will basically move on foot in battle andby truck to battle, while under the protection offriendly forces.

Because of ROK force improvement programs,some ROK infantry divisions have been reorganizedon a rectangular rather than a triangular basis,increasing division size from three to four battalions.Thus a fourth battalian can be used for rear security,if circumstances dictate. The US division in Korea, onthe other hand, has no such e\tra regiment orbattalion available for rear security. In addition, USforces have no doctrine corresponding to the Koreantactics for mountain attack.

Lt,,,',Ym,;a1 Dooi~sc: The ROK defensive tactics aredoctrinally the same as those of the US The Armycategorizes defense tactics as either active or passive;such categories obtained before line defense, areadefense or position defense, and mobile defense.

Because the defense of Seoul is, so , ritical, SouthKorea adopted a forward defense strategy, one thatdoes not allow trading space for time--a viewtraditional in the active defense doctrine of the US.The forward defense strategy is not, however, basedon a single defense option. Rather, it mi\es severaldefense tactics, including position defense at strongpoints, multi-line defense, which will consist of areadefense, and mobile defense of some critical cornmbatforces in reserve.

As a part of an active defense under the forwarddefense strategy, efforts to extend defense spatenorth of the current front line through a counter-

27

offensive or a pre-emptive counter-offensive areregarded as valuable options.

Airborne and Airminbile Tactics: Most differencesbetween the airborne tactics of the US and ROKforces revolve around command and controlprocedures. Since South Korea has no air transportcapabilities for heavy vehicles and arms, airmobileunits have no armored vehicles. In airmobile tactics,the ROK seldom uses more than a reinforcedbattalion, while the US engages on a division scale.Because airmobile capabilities are greatly limited, theROK has not significantly developed airmobiletactics.

A mpibiois Tact ics: ROK forces have no major assetsin amphibious vessels; consequently, they have notsignificantly developed indigenous amphibioustactics. If circumstances dictate, they might usemobilized civilian junks, in which case, amphibioustactics would be primitive. Except for transportcapabilities, however, ROK amphibious tactics arealmost the same as those of the US. No significantdifference exists.

Prolt',,s in Combined iOperations: Differences in US and

South Korean ground tactics could cause unnecessaryloss of life in a renewed conflict. Misunderstanding ofthe friendly force's operational processes in combatcould easily lead to confusion or misjudgment on thepart of combat commanders to such a degree thatallied forces might unwittingly be fighting oneanother.

Yet to reorient one nation's tactics to that of theother seems inefficient, costly, and unnecessary.Efforts to offset or complement vulnerabilities due totactical differences must be made. To prevent

28

confusion or misjudgment of the friendly force'scombat activities, allied forces must maintain closecommunications. Liaison personnel and commandersin this communication channel should be aware oftactical differences between friendly forces. To useallied force's capabilities effectively, its tactics shouldbe given close attention when high commandsallocate missions and tasks. It is conceivable, forinstance, that units oriented to static defense tacticsand counter-infiltration tactics might be deployed inforward positions, while units oriented to active ormobile defense tactics might be operated in reservepositions.

Another way to reduce errors caused by tacticaldifferences is to swap sub-units between US andROK parent commands. Doing so would provideparent unit commanders an oportunity to use avariety of tactical capabilities and orientations andthus to reduce the chances of confusion ormisunderstanding.,, The experience of suchswitching during the Korean War was mixed; therewere some successes and some failures. The lessonslearned during this period, however, can providesome insight into making this solution workable.

In fact, combined operations have been effective,especially since the Team Spirit exercises began in1976. Held each spring, Team Spirit, as Vreelandpoints out, has given commanders the chance topractice on the terrain where hostilities will actuallytake place. Team Spirit 81 involved US forces from allover the world and included a joint US-ROK marineamphibious assault and a practice emergency landingof fighter-bombers and cargo planes on the Seoul-Pusan expressway. Such operations have tangiblevalue in reflecting the US commitment and abilty toaid in South Korean defense.20

29

Command and Control

The command and control system of the alliedforces in Korea is so complicated that the senior USmilitary officer could not rely on any single commandsystem in exercising command over allied forces. USforces in Korea, UNC units, and ROK forces are nottotally integrated into any one, combined commandsystem.

There are two combined commands-the UnitedNations Command (UNC) and the ROK-USCombined Forces Command (CFC)-which could, intheory, exercise command and control of all alliedforces. In addition, there are a number of othercommand organs through which each UNC nationexercises control of its own forces. These include theROK Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefsof Staff, the Headquarters of each service, and thespecial forces, through which South Korea exercisescommand control and conducts operational controlfor counter-infiltration operations, and theHeadquarters of USFK and EUSA, through which asenior US military officer exercises command oroperational control over US forces in Korea. (SeeFigure 1.)

Developymt'i of tit, CFC: It was in mid-1976, around thetime when some of the voices of the Third World inthe United Nations were pressing for the dissolutionof the United Nations Command, that the UnitedStates and the Republic of Korea agreed to establish aROK/US combined command system. In previousyears, the problems of ROK inexperience inexercising command and control over their ownforces were pointed out as a major strategic weaknessof the ROK military posture. At the time when theUnited States adopted a policy of withdrawing its

30

forces from South Korea in accordance with strategicadjustments dictated by the Nixon Doctrine,operational control over ROK forces had beenexclusively exercised by a senior US officer throughthe UNC for over a quarter of a century. Suddenly, itappeared that the ROK would, in reality, be leftalmost entirely on its own.

It was some time after the President of the UnitedStates decided to withdraw more of the remaining USground forces from South Korea that the UnitedStates and South Korea arrived at a decision to have aROK/US combined-forces command. Unlike theUNC command system, which had no prescribedrelationship with the relevant ROK commandchannel, the CFC's command system was arranged soas to function as the vital link between the ROK andthe US command channels and to have clearly definedrelationships. The CFC was officially inaugurated on7 November 1Q78 in accordance with StrategicDirective No. 1, issued by the ROK;US lilitarvCommittee on 28 July 1Q78.

CFC's Alissio li: The stated purpose of the CFC is todissuade North Korea from renewal of a war byfirmly expressing the strong combined wills of theROK and the US to employ their military forces todefend South Korea, if deterrence fails. Designed toreplace the UNC, whose functions might behampered by the Third World politics in the UN, theCFC gave South Korea a way to participate in theexercise of OPCON over its own forces.

As described in CFC Pamhlct ,o 1,21 the missionand function of the CFC is clear:

a. The mission of CFC is to deter hostile actsof external aggression against the ROK by acombined military effort of the United States of

31

America and the Republic and, in the eventdeterrence fails, to defeat an external armedattack against the Republic.

b. To accomplish this mission, CFCperforms the following functions:

(1) Receives strategic direction and itsmission from the Military Committee.

(2) Exercises operational control over allforces assigned or attached to the command inprosecution of assigned missions.

(3) Makes recommendations to the MilitaryCommittee concerning military requirementsand other functions aligned with assignedmissions.

(4i Plans and conducts joint and combined

exercises of those forces assigned or attached tovalidate operational combat readiness.

(51 Plans for the emnployment and support ofthose for(e(s assigned, attached, or designatedfor assignment in contingencies.

(b) Provides intelligence support for theexecution of assigned missions and coordinate,combined intelligence a tivities in Korea toinclude collection of information on the enemy's

conventional and unconventional warfarecapabilities, preparation and dissemination ofcombined intelligence production, andcontinuous monitoring of indicators of attack.

(7) Makes recommendations fordeveloping, equipping, and supporting assignedand attached military forces.

32

(8) Complies with armistice affairsdirectives of the Commander in Chief, UnitedNations Command (CINCUNC).

(9) Supports CINCUNC (with combatforces, if necessary) in response to armisticeviolations by the opposing side.

(10) Researches, analyzes and developsstrategic and tactical concepts.

Command Relationships of CFC: The CFC is basicallyresponsible to the US/ROK Military Committee,which is co-chaired by the US and ROK chairmen ofthe JCS. Members of the Military Committee are, inaddition to the chairmen, the JCS of both countries,US CINCPAC, CINCCFC, and one designated ROKofficer. Military Committee meetings have twodifferent sessions: a plenary session withparticipation by all members is usually held on anannual basis in conjunction with the annual ROK-USSecurity Consultative Meeting; a permanent sessioncan be held during the periods between plenarysessions at the request of either country. In theabsence of the Chairman, JCS, of the United States,CINCCFC or the senior US military officer in Koreamay act in his stead. (See Fig. 3.)

The function of the ROK/US Military Committeeis to issue appropriate strategic guidance to the CFCfor the defense of South Korea. The MilitaryCommittee compiles defense guidance and policiesthat are ratified at defense ministerial meetings.ROK/US defense ministers' meetings are to , heldannually or any time one is required. In view of theneed to adhere to common views in a war, defenseministerial meetings and Military Committeemeetings are highly valuable for effective functioningof the CFC.

33

ROK NATIONAL COMMAND USNATIONAL COMMAND

AUTHORITY AUTHORITY

MINISTER NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY

( ISECURTY CONSULTATIVE MEETIN

I I JOINT CHIEFS OF T "b -- ONT° 'F FSA

ccI PLNR EMNNMILITARY COMMITTEE MEETING

ccj

SESSION SESSION OC

HO EVC l c E CFC PACOM

[I O K C O M B

AT FORC

ES]

NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES ' "

DEFENSE POLICY GUIDANCESTRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND DIRECTIVES

OPERATIONAL CONTROL -OC-oC

COMMAND AND CONTROL EXCEPT OPCON - CC-0

COUNTER-INFILTRATION OPCOM ----

Figure 3. Peacetime Command Relationshipsof the CFC

34

Defense ministerial meetings may deal with theoverall defense posture of both nations as well as withissues related to overall deterrence or to preparationsfor and conduct of a war. Complying separately withthe directions of their national command authority,defense ministers may provide general defenseguidelines to the Military Committee, which will thentransform them into strategic directive, that will becarried out by the CFC.

There is, however, no organization to work outday-to-day problems for the Military Committee orthe defense ministers to consider. An ad hoccommittee at the working level is usually formed toprepare for and to follow up on the meetings of theministers and Military Committee. Moreover, therehas been no common institutional process tocoordinate diplomatic views. Since the lessons fromthe Korean War show that political discord caused bya lack of candid and frequent diplomaticcommunications could have resulted in disastrousrelations between allies, failure to establish aninstitutionalized procedure on the foreign ministerialside is lamentable.

Complexity of Command and Control: The command andcontrol systems of the allied forces in Korea arearranged in such a way that the UNC's basicpeacetime function is to maintain the terms of theArmistice Agreement, whereas the CFC is oriented topreparing for the military invasion of the ROK. Therelationship between the CFC and the UNC,however, is a cooperative and supportive one. TheCFC is expected to comply with UNC orders tomaintain the terms of the Armistice Agreement andto provide support for UNC efforts if it is requested todo so.

35

In essence, the command and control systems of theallied forces in Korea are arranged in such a way thatthe senior US military officer in Korea is responsibleto the US National Command Authority (NCA) forkeeping the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Atthe same time, he is responsible for the defense ofSouth Korea to both the US and ROK NCAs througha combined command and control channel.

Not all the authorities of command and control are,however, exercised by CINCCFC. The Minister ofNational Defense, ROK, possesses the authority ofcommand and control over all South Korean forces,although operational control over major combatforces is mandated to CINCCFC. The Joint Chiefs ofStaff, Republic of Korea, also assumes the authorityof operational control for counter-infiltrationoperations over all South Korean units in rear areas,over Home Land Reserve Forces, and over policetroops.

Although CINCCFC has authority for operationalcontrol over major South Korean combat units, hehas no authority for operational control over UScombat units in Korea, except in peacetime for twoalert fighters. If he wants to exercise command andcontrol over USFK and UN units, he must rely oneither the good auspices of CINCUSFK orCINCUNC. It is only when the United Statesestablishes Defense Condition III or II that CINCCFCcan assume operational control over some US combatunits in Korea.

Command relationship of the CFC with the JCSand the Ministry of National defense, South Korea, isan awkward one. JCS/MND, South Kcrea, canprovide guidance or directives for defense policy andstrategy to CINCCFC only with the agreement of US

36

counterparts at the Military Committee meeting or atthe Security Consultative meeting of the defenseministers. CINCCFC, as a member of the plenarysession and as a co-chairman of the permanentsession of the Military Committee meeting, can, ofcourse, participate in formulating strategic guidanceor directives, although this is theoretically a functionof the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both nations. (See Fig.4.)

The relationship between the CFC and theHeadquarters of the ROK services is, however, acooperative and supportive one. The CFC exercisesOPCON over major combat units that are undercommand and control without operational control ofthe ROK chiefs of staff.

The complexity of command and control systemsnow existing in Korea can be summarized as follows:

(1) CINCUNC exercises operational control overUN units and some US and ROK units, whose missionis to ensure the enforcement of the terms of theArmistice Agreement.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, ROK, exerciseoperational control over ROK units for counter-infiltration operations in rear areas, over Home LandReserve Forces, and over police units.

(3) The Minister of National Defense and the Chiefof Staff of each service exercise command control, butnot operational control, over major combat units thatare assigned to CINCCFC. They exercise operationalcontrol over some ROK units that are not mandatedto CINCCFC.

37

DFNESECRETARYt INISTER NATIONAL DEFENS E

COMMAND AND CONTROL CCC-

OPERATIONAL CONTROL (PEACET IME) or o-''

OPERATIONAL CONTROL )WARTIME) -'OCW-Cw--COMMAND WITHOUT OPERATIONAL CONTROL

E----

OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR COUNTER-INFILTRATION - C:,-

Figure 4. CFC Command and Control Structure

38

(4) CINCUSFK exercises command and operationalcontrol over all US forces in Korea except for twoalert fighters, which are under CINCCFC'soperational control.

(5) CINCCFC exercises operational control (notcommand control) over major combat units of ROK

forces and two alert fighter squadrons of US forces.He may assume authority for operational control

over US combat units when the United States NCAdeclares certain defense conditions. CINCCFC isauthorized to respond to the requests of CINCUNCfor keeping the Armistice Agreement orof JCS/MNDfor counter-infiltration operations in peacetime.JCS/MND and the Chiefs of Staffs of each service ofthe ROK Forces may provide rear area security inconnection with frontal operations of the CFC.

Prtblems: It goes without saying that a single unifiedcommand system is the most effective way to conductcombined operations. It is practically impossible,however, to integrate all the allied forces into onecommand system, whether it be the UNC or the CFC.The UNC has not been authorized to integrate non-UN units-the ROK Forces-and the ROK has notbeen willing to bestow OPCON authority on theUNC, because there is no channel of communicationsbetween the UNC and the ROK national commandauthority. On the other hand, the CFC has noauthority for operational control over UN units,because the CFC is basically designed for thecombined operations of US and ROK forces. Thecurrent dual command and control systems seem,however, an acceptable arrangement to carry outpeacekeeping tasks while maintaining a structurecapable of conducting combat operations.

39

The inconsistency between the peacekeepingmission of the UNC and the war-fighting tasks of theCFC seems to pose an odd problem for the effectivecombined operations of allied forces. Actually, mostROK and US units assigned to peacekeeping taskswhile under UNC control will be engaged in combattasks during wartime under the CFC's operationalcontrol. Continuity of the function of Commander-in-Chief can actually exist, because the senior USofficer can assume authority over the CINC's ofUNC, CFC, and USFK. He may utilize either UNCunits, CFC units, or USFK units in accordance withthe appropriate command system of each. Unitswould be controlled through different commandstaffs, however, when they shift from peacekeepingduties to combat operations.

Unfortunately, there is no staff organization to linkthe many functions of these various commands. TheUS senior officer has sole authority to link thesecommand systems. A major problem in our currentcommand system, then, is the fact that one man isburdened with too many tasks in too manycommands!

Although most of these organizational problemsoriginated from the complexity of internationalpolitics, they were promoted to some degree bydifferences in US and ROK attitudes toward thedefense of South Korea. South Korea wants to defendher territory, without any hesitation and at all cost;US and UN members, on the other hand, prefer tohave more options with regard to renewed hostilitieson the Korean peninsula.

This difference of attitudes is well expressed in thecurrent arrangement of the CFC operational controlsystem. No single US unit is assigned to the OPCON

40

of CINCCFC in peacetime, while most combat unitsof the ROK forces are assigned to the CFC.

This arrangement poses a problem for CINCCFCin his efforts to improve the interoperability ofcombined forces in peacetime. Because as he controlsno single US unit in peacetime, he has no real powerto impose his concept of effective combinedoperations upon US units. Theoretically, he does havethe authority to recommend actions to enhance theinteroperability capabilities of US units, since many ofthem will be under his OPCON in wartime. Ofcourse, he may be able to suggest ways to improve theinteroperability of US units, not as CINCCFC but asCINCUSFK or as the Senior US Military Officer; buthis authority in this case lies only in recommendingmatters relating solely to US forces, not to theinteroperability of US units in combined operations.CINCUSFK is not authorized to deal with thecombined operations of the CFC. In practice,however, he may exercise his several commandfunctions at his convenience. But, in theory, he has nostructured way to improve the interoperability of USunits; ironically, he has authority to recommendproper actions for improvement of interoperability ofthe ROK units that are under his operationalcontrol.If the theoretical limit to CINCCFC's authority isadhered to, then the only way CINCCFC couldimprove the effectiveness of combined operationswould be to develop recommended doctrine for theemployment of US and ROK forces in combinedoperations.

The basic problem seems to stem from a lack ofbalance in the current make-up of CFC OPCONunits, a problem which may cause future discordbetween the United States and South Korea. SouthKorea may continue to distrust the reliability of the

41

US defense commitment, even though she feelssatisfied with the symbolic political gesture of the USCINCCFC's ability to conduct effective combinedoperations may, however, depend upon whether theUnited States can assuage South Korean doubtsabout US intentions regarding the attachment of UScombat units to the CFC. Recent developmentsbetween the US and South Korea seem to havecleared up South Korean doubts, at least at thepolitical and symbolic levels.

Possible Solutions: No single method seems to bepolitically viable to solve the problems caused by thecomplexity of the current command and controlsystems. Several possible solutions should, however,be given close attention:

(1) The procedures for command and controltransfer from one command to another-forinstance, from UNC to CFC-should be defined. TheOPCON over UN units that would activelyparticipate in war-fighting should be preplanned,even though the plan itself may remain a conceptualone. The UNC's role in war-fighting as opposed to theCFC's role should be clearly delineated.

(2) If it is impractical to release the senior USmilitary officer from his various commands so that hemight concentrate his efforts on one unifiedcommand, he should have special staffs who willassist him by conducting continuous liaison with hisvarious commands.

(3) US forces in Korea should be under the OPCONof CINCCFC in peacetime. Such an arrangementwould give him practical authority to enhance theinteroperability of US units in peacetime. If it isimpossible to assign US units to CINCCFC, the role

42

of the ROK Deputy-CINCCFC and of other ROKstaff members within the CFC Headquarters shouldbe enhanced so that South Koreans feel that they areparticipants in OPCON exercises conductedprimarily with their own forces.

(4) Techniques for the effective use of differently-oriented units should be studied and developed inorder to ensure effective combined operations.Previous combined exercises and individual studieshave pointed out the need for such techniques, butprogress remains at an embryonic stage. To date,there are no field manuals for CFC's reference.

Organizational Employment of theHeadquarters, CFC

The basic principle for staffing the CFC is to makecross-national assignments to chiefs or deputy chiefsin one section. This method allows for efficient day-to-day communications between US and ROKofficers within the CFC. To communicate effectivelywith other command groups, most US staff membersof Headquarters, CFC, should also be assigned toother staff jobs at the headquarters A othercommands. Such dual assignments would helpcommunication with Pacific Command WA( Oand JCS, thus contributing to the improvedeffectiveness of combined operations.

There seems to be no critical problem in the currentmethod of staff assignments to HQ, CFC. Cross-national assignment of US and ROK officers and dualassignment of US officers to CFC and USFK would,however, enhance mutual understanding and wouldimprove the weakness of the current commandarrangement.

43

Most South Korean staff members are assigned aschiefs at combat support sections (Table 3), despitethe fact that South Korean forces have little capabilityin this area. Most US staff members, on the otherhand, are assigned as chiefs at command andoperational control sections, even though the US hasnot assigned its combat units to the CFC in peacetime.Such assignment procedures may cause difficulties inthe future, although no problem has surfaced up tonow.

In staffing the CFC, additional consideraton shouldbe given to the military capabilities of both nationalforces. As a start, one major position of command andoperational control-perhaps the planning oroperations section-should be allocated to a SouthKorean officer, and one or more US officers should beassigned as chiefs at combat support sections. Suchchanges would reduce potential tension arising fromthe employment of troops of differing nationalities.

In addition to changes in staffing procedures, thereare two other significant considerations about themake-up of the CFC Headquarters; these involve theroles of the chiefs of staff and of the CINC himself.The major functions of command and staff devolveupon CINCCFC and the Chief of Staff, CFC, who areof the same nationality. Despite the latter'ssignificant function as chief of staff, CFC, he wears,as CINCCFC does, five hats: Deputy-CINCUNC,Deputy-CINCUSFK, CINC USAFK, Commander AirComponent Command, CFC, and Chief of Staff,Ground Component Command, CFC. In contrast tothe role of Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff,CFC, who is a South Korean, has no defined functionother than that of merely carrying out the directionsof his US superior. In short, the allocation of missionsand mandate of authority within the headquarters

44

Q) Q)~ (W J

LI..U)L nU n00U

6-

nU)(f ) 0 0Cf 0 0 0~ff 0~f o~D D D D 4 : 4

0

*0

C~~ CCO

-j 1 0 0 ;; E u

E .4 '. *.1 ' ~ L

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00

o) u E L -

45C

organization leaves much to be desired from theKorea point of view. Most central functions and staffposts are assigned to US military officers, no matterhow heavy the burdens they bear from various otherjobs they hold. The Chief of Staff, CFC, for example,a US Air Force Lieutenant General is to assume theposition of Chief of Staff, Ground ComponentCommand, CFC (see Figure 4). Such an assignment isvirtually incomprehensible to South Koreans, whosecriticism focuses on the qualifications of an air forceofficer to command ground forces operations.

It is also instructive that Deputy-CINCCFC ofNATO has been accorded significant authority andresponsibility. He is authorized to supervise facilityplans, ECM, standardization of equipment, technicalmanuals, sea and coastal control facilities,performance of C31, and mine warfare; to review,adjust and control wartime missions and tasks ofunits; and to coordinate subordinate units in carryingout missions and tasks.z2 But, unlike CINCCFCNATO, the CINCCFC assumes almost everyresponsibility. His Korean Deputy-Commander,however, is deprived of responsibilities of anycomparable importance except to act for his superiorin his absence.

In view of the burdens of overlapping dutiesassigned to the CINC and Chief of Staff, CFC,delegation or tasking of authority and responsibilityto their deputies should be taken at the earliestpossible date. First, Deputy-CINCCFC should beused to promote allied interoperability by giving himseveral roles now performed by the CINC alone. Thischange would release the CINC from some of theburden of his duties. Second, the functions of theChief of Staff should be shared with his deputy.Third, the Chief of Staff should be released from the

46

burdens of multiple, overlapping functions, especiallythose of Chicf of Staff, Ground ComponentCommand, CF,' , a iposition that should be given to aSouth Korean Army officer familiar with thedoctrine, tactics, and training of major CFC OPCONunits-ROK Ground Forces.

Staff Member Qualities

US officers fill the posts of chief at various staffsect uns of the CFC. They have relatively greatauthority given them by the US and show flexibilityand ease in their staff work through dual assignment.The CINCCFC, having recognized the importance ofa competent staff, selects highly qualified US officersand provides them with the appropriate educationprior to their assignment to the CFC; contactturnovers are established so that the new officers canbecome familiar with their jobs before assuming theirresponsiblities. The management of the careers ofCFC staff members has also been given priority overothers; as a result, all US officers assigned to the CFCshow self-confidence and are proud of being selected.

US CFC staff members have a relatively strongerprofessional and academic background than other USofficers and ROK staff members. In general, theyhave greater knowledge of and more experience withcombined work Their careers are well managed inaccordant e with their specialities. South Korean staffmembers it (I(, in the other hand, have littleexperienLe with kombined work as well as disruptedcareers In th,,ir pekialities. Instead of earlyassignment to the ([ R, an early transfer to otherunits is wommon, resulting in a vacuum in theirformer(- [ staft fun, tion. Moreover, they wastetime and effort in iorreching English while processing

47

their staff work. Because English is not their nativetongue, the language barrier seems to cause themgreat psychological stress.

In considering the current English proficiency ofSouth Korean officers and the wartime requirementsof liaison officers, South Korean forces should exertgreater effort to improve their officers' qualificationsfor combined operations as well as their Englishproficiency. The CFC should continue to providelanguage training practice to South Korean staffmembers.

48

.. ....

4. CONCLUSION: IMPROVINGUS-ROK COMBINED

OPERATIONS

In order to improve the interoperability of units,endless effort seems necessary if one attempts toachieve it only through standardization of unitcapability-weapons system, doctrine, tactics, andtheir organization. Unfortunately, there is a deep gapbetween US and ROK forces in their current status ofarmaments, military tradition, and socio-economicbackground.

In addition, it seems inefficient to reorient SouthKorean tactics to those of the US, because SouthKorean forces have different arms and tasks.Moreover, the mixture of different tactics would posedifficulties to an enemy in coping with them just as itdoes friendly forces. It seems more reasonable to finda solution for problems of standardization in betterdoctrine and techniques for combined operationsrather than in uniformity of unit capabilities.

Rationalization does not mean either theAmericanization or the Koreanization of the system'soperation. It should, however, result in greatereffectiveness and efficiency. As opposed to theenormous budget support needed for standardizingof unit capabilities, rationalizing of system operationsprobably needs more conceptual work and relativelyless budgetary funding. Standardization mayenhance the integrity of units in a combined forcesystem as it increases their interoperability. Butrationalization of the combined force system willincrease effectiveness of combined operationswithout improving the interoperability of units. Each

49

unit may retain its own characteristics inorganization, tactics, doctrine, and logistical support,but each will be able to demonstrate coordinatedcombat capabilities if the combined force system isrationalized.

Because of the characteristics of a possible futurewar and of the combined forces' posture on theKorean peninsula, actions for rationalization ofsystem operations seem necessary to ensure theeffectiveness of combined operations. These actionsinclude:

(1) developing doctrine and techniques of combinedoperations using units that have less interoperability;

(2) institutionalizing a routine political reviewprocess to compare views on the war on a day-to-dayworking basis;

(3) defining properly the wartime function of UNCand the peacetime function of CFC in order to ensureconsistency of command and control and thetransition of units from peacetime to wartime status;

(4) simplifying the command and control procedurefor US forces in Korea, perhaps by integrating theminto the combined force system in peacetime;

(5) allocating mission and tasks in accordance withmilitary capabilities in such areas as combatcapabilities, combat support capabilities, and logistics(a realistic logistical posture is significant in view ofthe South Korean weapons system, of which theavailability of munitions and parts will be dependentupon the availability of US support);

50

(6) sharing the centralized authority of commandand staff functions with the appropriate nationalassistants in the Headquarters of CFC; and

(7) providing proper training for Korean officers incombined operations procedures and in the use of theEnglish language.

In summary, operations of the Combined ForcesCommand in Korea must be improved. While US andSouth Korean combined operations often suffer fromdiffering objectives and doctrine (occasionallyaggravated by cultural bias) the North Korean threathas remained vigorous and convincing.Compounding the problem of meeting that threat isthe fact that since the Korean War of 1950-1955, ourintelligence capability-especially in the area ofhuman intelligence-has decreased as North Koreansociety has become more indoctrinated andintransigent. Thus, a major outbreak of hostilitiesmay afford little or no warning. Certainly there willbe no time to reorganize, to streamline commandstructures, or to insure responsiveness of command.A heavy North Korean attack could conceivably reachSeoul while UNC/CFC commanders try to sort outresponsibilities and reorganize as necessary. Ofcourse the price of failure to make requiredadjustments before hostilities begin would beterrible-more so since it is a price that is avoidable.These recommendations are by no means allinclusive; however, as we work towardrationalization, standardization, and interoperabilityin one area, we will see applications in others.Eventually, streamlined, responsive command willbecome the foundation of our thinking about combaton the Korean peninsula. The result will be ahardened, effective deterrent, a truly combat-readyCombined Forces Command.

51

ENDNOTES

1. USAF 34-2:Standardization (Rationalization,Standardization, and Interoperabilityl, 15 May 1979. Fordefinitions and implications for this study, see JohnHixson and Benjamin F. Cooling, Combined Operations inPeace and War (Carlisle Barracks: US Military HistoryInstitute, 1982); William Fox, Inter-Allied CooperationDuring Combat Operations, History of the Korean War, 3Vols. (Tokyo: Headquarters, Far East Command,Military History Section, 1952); and James M.Simpson, Wartime Interoperability Problems Posed byDifferences in South Korean and United States Army Tactics, AThesis for MA, (Fort Leaventhworth: Command andGeneral Staff College, 1980). Also of interest are thefollowing definitions from US Joint Chiefs of StaffPublication 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Militaryand Associated Terms (Washington, DC: USGovernment Printing Office, 1 April 1984):

rationalization-Any action that increases the

effectiveness of allied forces through moreefficient or effective use of defense resourcescommitted to the alliance. Rationalizationincludes consolidation, reassignment of nationalpriorities to higher allied needs, standardization,specialization, mutual support or improvedinteroperability, and greater cooperation.Rationalization applies to both weaponsRationalization applies to both weaponss and non-weapons military matters.

standardization-The process by which theDepartment of Defense achieves the closestpractible cooperation among the Services andDefense agencies for the most efficient use ofresearch, development, and productionresources, and agrees to adopt on the broadestpossible basis the use of: a. common or

53

compatible operational, administrative, and

logistic procedures; b. common or compatibletechnical procedures and criteria; c. common,compatible, or interchangeable supplies,components, weapons, or equipment; a.d d.common or compatible tactical doctrine withcorresponding organizational compatibility.

interotperalbility-The ability of systems, units orforces to provide services to and accept servicesfrom other systems, units or forces and to usethe services so exchanged to enable them tooperate effectively together.

2. Fox, Intr-Alliwd Cooperatitln. vol. 3, pp. 182-1Q3, and Hixson

and Cooling,Cmbilmid (1,ratiins, pp. 2b5-272.

3. Hixson and Cooling, Combined Opcrattop. p. 349.

4. Fox, Infer-Allicd Coopleration, pp. 40-09, and Hixson and

Cooling, Cotined Opcrati n, pp. 2o5-272.

5. Ibid.

b. Ibid., pp. 236-272.

7. Ibid., pp. 243-251; for the lack of candid communication

between US diplomatic people/UNC and the Koreangovernment, see Franchska Rhee, Diarwcs Durig the Korean

War series in ]oong-Ang llo (Daily Newspaper, June 1983-March 1984); to promote understanding of US governmentin Korean situation, President of Republic of Korea,Syngman Rhee, often had to -ely on his personal friendswho stayed in America-see Robert T. Oliber, 5hiigtmaftRihee and American It',hiemt', in Korea I442 -1 o)cO. (Seoul:Panmun Book, 19783).

8. Ibid.

q. Ibid.

54

10. Simpson, VWartipne biteropt'raliit,' Pro/'leppi, pp. 10-15;Thomas A. Marks, "North and South Korean GB3," Militar,'hitelligonce., vol. 7, No. 4, October- December 1981, pp. 18-24,reproduced for use in the sources of the National DefenseUniversity, Northeast Asia and US Interests, (Washington,DC: National War College, 1984), p., 18-19.

11. Simpson, Wartm btin Inrperalnlitti Problem'., pp. 15-20; 2ndUS Infantry Division, No)rtl Koreani kilitart, Foirits, DCON4 '02 F L0ECq, , pp. q-29; R (9K A rimy, North1/ Korean Recarclr:

A aueM aterisl (Chin hae: Army College, 1078).

12. For military balance, see Marks, .\,oth andpith KLoreanOlB.

13. Ibid, pp. 18-20; Simpson, W\a rtimte bitcrtilerallilitiirolpp. 10-15; the number of tanks here is my calculation,which is based On North Korean tactics and availableapproaches. It is not confirmed by any official intelligenceestimate.

14. Ma rks, No)rth anid 5otith Korean?, ( )B.pp. 18-24; Simpson,PWarttn binter,,peralbiliti, Prtllilit'mn . pp. 10-15.

15. This is a presumption about a conventional war in thefuture. For a nuclear war, see A. A. Sidorenko, I'l()tfoisizu,trans. under auspices of US Air Force (Moscow:1070; Washington. D)C: GPO, 1Q75), and tl1 ;tttcQl,Doctrinet,,Hearing before the Committee on ForeignRelations, United States Senate, 07th Congress, [December14, 1Q82 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1Q83).

10. Marks, No~rthi and Solah Ko)rean ( 43, p. I1Q.

17. Simpson, Va rtt I Ptteroiptrai ilitt Prolemts, pp. 28-45;Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It CouldFight and Win a Nuclear War," Cottm,etari,vol. o4, No. I(July I1Q77), pp. 2 1-34.

18. Simpson, W'apit itei Itterope1rabitytt Prollencpi, pp. 48-127; USArmy FMX 3 1- 1v1: (.otpitter-Giiirrilla ()porattonP (Washington

55

DC: GPO, 1970); FM 3 1-100: Armored and Mechanized DivisionOperations(Baltimore: US Army Adjutant GeneralPublication Center, 1978); PT t,-1: Principles of JointAmphibious Operations,(Fort Leavenworth: CGSC, 1977);FM, 100-5: Operations,(Baltimore: 1976); ROK Army,Advanced Materials for Airborne Operations, Airmobile Operations,

Amphibious and Counter-Amphibious Operations, andCounter-Unconventional Warfare Operations (Chinhae: Army College,1978); Division Attack, Division Defense: FM 3 1-1 v-2, CounterInfiltration Operation(Seoul: GPO, 1978); and FM 100-10,Combat Service Support (Seoul: GPO, 1977).

19. Simpson, Wartime Interoperability Problemspp. 128-146.

20. Nina Vreeland, South Korea: A Country Stud , Foreign AreaStudies (Washington, DC: The American University, July1981), p. 239.

21. ROK-US Combined Forces Command Pamphlet Number '00-

1,19 April 1982.

22. Ibid.

56

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clough, Ralph. Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role ofUS Forces. Washington: Brookings Institute, 1976.

Clark, Weslery K. Military Continy, ency Operation: TheLessons of Political- Military Coordination. FortLeavenworth: US Army Command and General StaffCollege, 1975.

Committee of Defense Policy Analysis. Northeast AsianSecurity 1N77, with focus on the Koreani Peninsiula. Tokyo:1977.

Hixson, John, and Benjamin F. Cooling. CombinedOperations in Peace and War. Carlisle Barracks: US ArmyMilitary History Institute, 1982.

Institute for International Strategy Studies. MilitaruBalance 1984-85, reprinted in Air Force, March, 1Q84.

ROK Army. Airborne amt Co utier-,Airborne Operations.Chinhae: Army College, 1978.

ROK Army. Amphibious atd Couiter-AirbourieOperations. Chinhae: Army College, 1978.

ROK Army. Division Offense. Chinhae: Army College,1983.

ROK Army. Cou ter- U ncoti veti tional Warfare Operation.Chinhae: Army College, 1983.

Sidorenko, A. A. The Offensive, Soviet Tactics.Translated under auspices of US Air Force.

Moscow: 1970; Washington, DC: GPO, 1975.

57

Staff Study Mission to Japan and Korea, July 23 -August 15, 1981, Report to the Committee onForeign Affairs, US House of Representatives.United States Relations with Japan and Korea: SecurityIssues. Washington, DC: GPO, May 1982.

US Second Infantry Division. North KoreanMilitary Forces. DCOM 4702F, 1983.

US Army. FM 34-71, North Korean M'lilitary Forces.Fort Huachuca: US Army Intelligence Center andSchool, 1979.

US Army. FM 7 1- 100: Armored and MechanizedDivision Operations. Baltimore: US Army AdjutantGeneral Publications Center, 1978.

US Army. FM 100-5, Operations. Baltimore: USArmy Adjutant General Publications Center,1976.

US Army. FM 100- 1 0: Coinbat Service Support.Washington: US Government Printing Office,1976.

US Army. PT t-I Principles of Joint AmphibiousOperations. Fort Leavenworth: US ArmyCommand & General Staff College, 1977.

US Army. PT 57-1: Joint Airborne Training. FortLeavenworth: US Army Command & GeneralStaff College, 1978.

58

THE AUTHOR

Brigadier General Taek-Hyung Rhee

researched and wrote this study in 1983-84

during his assignment as an International Senior

Fellow at the National Defense University,

Washington, DC. Prior to his year in the United

States, Brigadier General Rhee served in a series

of senior command and staff positions in the

Republic of Korea Army, culminating in 1982-83

with command of the Artillery Regiment of the

1st Infantry Division. He also served in liaison

positions with the Joint United States Military

Assistance Group in Korea. After returning to

the Republic of Korea he was promoted to

Brigadier General and became Deputy

Commander of the 6th Infantry Division at the

demilitarized zone. Currently, he is

Commandant, Reserve Officer Training Corps,

Seoul National University.

Brigadier General Rhee, a graduate of the

Korean Military Academy and the Korean Army

War College, holds an MA from Yun Sei

University.

59

US-ROK Combined Operations:

A Korean Perspective

Composition by the Visual Communicationsand Printing Division, National Defense University,

with text and display lines in Andover.

Cover mechanical and page layout prepared by Laszlo Bodrogi.Figure illustrations prepared by Nancy Glover.

Special Credits

The NDU Press advisory readers were Charles Nolanand Alfred Wilhelm.

Al Grieshaber and George Maerz edited themanuscript.

Lora Conk and Carolyn Valentine were the editorialclerks.

'or sale I y the. Swlierlnt,,ndent of l wunit , U.S. (overnment Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402

el

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

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