AD A122 878 CREW ROLES IN MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS(U) RAND CORP I/#SANTA MONICA CA B LEINWEBER MAR 82 RAND/P-6745

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CREW ROLES IN MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS

David Leinweber

March 1982

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The Rand Paper Series

Papers are issued by The Rand Corporation as a service to its professional staff.Their purpose is to facilitate the exchange of ideas among those who share theauthor's research interests; Papers are not reports prepared in fulfillment ofRand's contracts or grants. Views expressed in a Paper are the author's own, andare not necessarily shared by Rand or its research sponsors.

The Rand CorporationSanta Monica, California 90406

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\/I. INTRODUCTION

We e now in *e mi (t cif a wide ranging debate on the role of the

military in space. This issue has begun to attract substantial

attention not only in the defense community, but from Congress, the

executive branch, and the public as well.

In simple terms, the debate centers on the question of the degree

of involvement of space systems in our future military operations. The

military uses of space to date, as described in Refs. 1 through 3, have

been largely in support of terrestrial military functions,

communications, navigation, reconnaissance and surveillance. The

systems have been passive and without capability of initiating hostile

actions. There are those both in and out of the military establishment

who bevle<e (perhaps for different reasons) that no further expansion in

the military use of space beyond the current support missions is called

for. Some take this position out of a general opposition to the

"militarization" of space, others feel that space systems are far too

vulnerable to be relied on for important military purposes.

Another group would contend that, in keeping with technological

changes, it is both necessary and prudent to expand the military

capacity for operations in space by taking on new missions and expanding

existing roles. This increase in capacity might include space defense

systems to protect U.S. space assets and counter hostile actions. In

this situation, space systems would still be a supporting, rather than a

central, element in the nation's military posture. It has become

apparent from Soviet activitieq that, at minimum, the USSR has

incorporated these notions in its policy for military space activity.

Other policies proposed for the military use of space are more

aggressive.

Military space activities would be limited to earth orbit only in

the early stages of a determined effort to expand the strategic role of

space. As often cited in plans for civilian space colonization and

industrialization, the earth-moon system contains two points of stable

equilibrium (known as L-4 and L-5), which are natural locations for the

economical conduct of large-scale military and civilian space

activities. These points will be of critical importance if the United

States and USSR develop the capability to conduct space operations

beyond the confines of low and geostationary earth orbits.

A concerted effort to establish military superiority by control of

the "high ground" in space would require subsantial revision of the

treaties now governing space activities. The national security

consequences of today's decisions on the military role of space will

affect international relations for years to come. They should be made

in a reasoned and deliberate fashion, rather than by default or by

haphazard attempts to apply both manned and unmanned space techniques

in an uncoordinated way.

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II. ROLES OF CREWS

For any outcome of the military space debate, we will still face

the question of the appropriate degree of involvement for crews in the

development, support, and operation of military space systems. These

questions arise whether these systems are unarmed observation and

support platforms or powerful weapons.

Soviet attitudes on these matters are in some ways clearer than our

own. The extended six-month Salyut missions would have been impossible

without the repairs, both scheduled and unscheduled, made by the crews.

During the life of the Salyut spacecraft, major modifications were made

to the life support systems, communication systems, and other

components, including the manual release of a large dish antenna that

had not deployed successfully on its own.

Arguments can be made that the Soviets' more backward technology,

particularly in areas of information processing, forces them to use

crews in space, while American systems can rely on superior computing.

In fact, tho Soviet experiences as reported confirm what we have seen in

our own program (e.g., the emergency repair of Skylab and the

reconfiguration of Apollo 13), that the most illuminating episodes of

crew utility in space have not been of the "the computer could have done

it" variety. The rapid advance in American electronic technology will

not eliminate useful roles for military crews in space.

The tasks best suited for crews are first those which can be

conducted ln relatively safe environments. They should be nonrepetitive

and relatively complex, requiring degrees of physical dexterity,

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perceptual acuity, learning ability, intuitive decisionmaking, attention

to detail, and an ability to deal with a wide range of contingency

applications requiring the use of mechanical or electrical procedures.

Some tasks are best left for machines: those which are repetitive

or rigidly defined, such as beam fabrication; those in acutely hostile

environments, e.g., those requiring long exposures to radiation or

subject to hostile military action; those in very remote locations, such

as translunar space; and those requiring only routine and predictable

mechanical and electrical manipulaticns.

We do know that in some ways astronauts are at a disadvantage.

Many assembly tasks, such as bolting together components, are far more

tiring in space due to the lack of gravity and limited mobility of

suited crew members. While on earth many physical forces are provided

by the friction between our feet and the ground, in space much greater

muscular effort must be expended, for instance, just to stand still and

turn a screw driver. As seen in Fig. 1, mobility limits are restrictive

but not prohibitive, and many designs for individual work modules to

attach directly to a spacecraft and hold the crew member in place have

been proposed. These would allow mechanical work to be performed with

far greater efficiency.

For some tasks, any mechanical disadvantage is outweighed by the

perceptual and cognitive abilities of human crew members to notice

unexpected and subtle phenomena.

A dramatic illustration of this important aspect of manned space

activity occurred when astronauts on board Skylab noticed unexpected

eddy current phenomena in the sea currents below. Their findings are

important both for the military application of minimization of submarine

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observables and the interpretat ion of sonar t triis The pot entia I

value of oceanographic data gathered by trained observers in developiiig

an understanding of these eddy currents is sufficiently high that the

Office of Naval Research has planned a seven-shuttle flight program to

study the effects. The experiment, Project Nereus, is described in Retf.

4. Previous instances in which crews in space have made significant

contributions to oceanographic science are documented in Refs. 5 and o.

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Il1. TYPES OF CREW INVOLVE'IENT

Space systems can be "manned" to different deg;rees. While we are

used to thinking of a manned system as one in which the crew plays a

central and continuing role, such as the Apollo missions or the shuttle

program, there are in fact different degrees of crew involvement in

systems that could properly be called manned.

Consider three categories of crew involvement. First, experimental

research and development activities to develop new space systems.

Second, the service, support, and maintenance of spacecraft by means of

periodic crew visits of varying durations, and third, the active

operation and participation by crews in ongoing manned space activity on

continuously populated space platforms.

The Marshall Space Flight Center has characterized the interactions

between crews and space systems which apply in all three contexts.

These characterizations are seen in Table 1. They cover a wide range of

activities, ranging from simple experimental setup to manned satellite

and subsatellite operations.

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Table 1

MAN/SYSTEM INTERACTION DEFINITIONS

Man/System Interaction Definition

Experiment setup, Crewman physically moves equipment/experimentdirection from stowage to operation location, configures

support systems (pre and post), and returnsequipment to stowage after experiment comple-tion.

Experiment start/stop Crewman initiates and terminates experimentoperations.

Monitoring at C&D Monitoring experiment/payload status at dis-

panel play panel in orbiter (PSS) or Spacelabmodule; minimal crew activity.

Experiment control, Crewman mechanically or electronically con-

direct trols experiment directly (adjust, selectmodes, identify/acquire targets, react to

data, etc.); crewman and experiment are in

the same physical location.

Experiment control, Crewman electronically controls experimentsremote indirectly; crewman and experiment are phys-

ically separated.

Direct experiment In situ observation of experiment progress;

observation crewman and experiment are in the same phys-ical location.

Remote experiment Observation of an experiment physicallyobservation located away from crewman (i.e., crewman in

orbiter, experiment on pallet); observationeither through viewing port/window or TV

system.

Housekeeping Crewman performs activities such as film ortape changing, store/dispose of throwawayitems, general cleanup, etc.

Maintenance Unscheduled or scheduled repair or service

activities performed directly (shirtsleeve),remotely (shirtsleeve with manipulator orfree flying teleoperator), or EVA.

SOURCE: Marshall Space Flight Center Manned System Specifications.

rI

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Table I -- continued

Man/System Tnteraction Definition

Calibrate instrumenta- Crewman performs procedures (direct or remote)tion to calibrate or recalibrate instrument prior

to or after experiment data taken.

Data reduction/analysis Crewman reviews experiment data and determinesnext experiment functions based on that data;redirects emphasis of experiment as necessary.

Remote pallet Display/align/retract booms or antennas onoperations pallet mounted equipment; activities controlled

from orbiter or spacelab module.

Free flying Checkout, deploy, track, operate (precise on-teleoperator (FFTO) orbit control from FFTO panel), and retrieve;operations TV system observation utilized to perform

remote tasks.

Subsatellite opera- Checkout, deploy, track, operate (majority oftions control from ground; on-orbit, control from

PSS), and retrieve; observation through windowor TV system

4,

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IV. ROLES OF CREWS IN SPACE EXPERIMENTATION

Development of a new space system can be a long and sometimes

frustrating process. Thirteen test launches were required to bring the

early Discoverer reconnaissance spacecraft to even a shaky operational

status. A multitude of tiny oversights and minor failures, such as

circuit breaker trips, fuses blowing, or neglect of a "remove before

flight" tag which could be remedied with five minutes of in astionaut

time, have cost hundreds of millions of dollars in lost spacecraft arid

space experiments.

The coming generation of space experiments, i.e., those carried on

a shuttle sortie mission and returned to earth following a test, tries

to avoid many of these problems by having crew members, the payload

specialists, available for such contingency actions as well as normal

operations. In addition, substantial cost reductions may be realized.

Equipment can be refurbished and refined for use in subsequent

experiments, and much common equipment, such as power supplies,

communications, dita handling, cooling, and pointing apparatus could be

used by several different experiments. Other savings arise since the

availability of an intelligent crew to deal with contingencies places

less demanding requirements on the experimental designers.

There may be some initial cost increases for payloads not designed

for the shuttle since reengineering may be required. Common support

equipment for space research must be designed, procured, rated, and

installed on the shuttle. The personnel to operate the experiments must

be selected and trained. These initial buy-in costs may he seen by some

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experimenters as int roducing unacceptable delays if programs already

delayed by the extentded shutt 1e developmont program, but when amortized

over a large numb, of experiments conducted over the lifetime of the

shuttle fleet, we should ultimately expect to see a greater degree of

technical productivity in the cost efficiency of space experiments. An

Aerospace CorporaLion Jhlart showing estimates of cost savings by use of

manned sortie missions as opposed to individual free flying satellites

for three Air Force space test program experiments is shown in Fig. 2.

The physical configuration of an experiment designed for a sortie

mission is seen in Fig. 3. This sho%.ws the Space Infrared Experiment in

which an infrared telescope is mounted on a pallet in the shuttle bay

and the payload specialist operates the bore sight and sensor control

equipment from the shuttle aft flight deck.

There are other factors that would tend to lower costs of manned

experiments. The intelligence of the human operator who can reconfigure

the experiment or make use of spare parts reduces the need for redundant

hardware and complex computer programs. A payload specialist, possibly

the scientist who designed the experiment or 3 well trained crew member,

can direc-t the experiment and data collection. This would include real

time examination, so that post-flight data reduction costs could be

reduced and the probability of making all of the desired observations

would be increased. These factors could occasionally make the

difference between a fully successful experiment and an experiment which

must be reflown in order to acquire data which were missed.

Experimentation and system development on space shuttle sortie

missions have limitations as well as advantages. The most significant

is the limit on the duration of the test to the maximum shuttle

50 -

Talon

,' Tea Gold;30Teal Ruby+

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30- uby Gol

10 A Hirin BM ID 1

01#' FAR UV

0 10 20 30 40 50 0Free flyer -sl, 1978 $ million

Fig. 2 - 1978 Space Test Program cost estimates of sortie (pallet)missions compared with free flyers. Economies arise from useof shuttle payload support equipment and repeated use of

modified experimental apparatus in a series of tests

, ~~~ ~~..... . ..

* infrared measurements of spacetargets, backgrounds

e Reconfiguration studied byORI for space division - 1979

(a) SIRE configuration in the orbiter payload bay

-2.

SORUSIGHT DISPLAY PANEL SENSOR LINE INTENSITY DISPLAY PANELWITH ALPHANUMERIC INPUT

(b) SIRE payload specialist displays aft flight deck

'A

1c) SIRE equipmeirn configuration on shuttle parts

Fig. 3 - Spame infrared experiment-SIRE

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20-to-30-day mission. Other difficulties include the effects

of both chemical and electromagnetic contamination from the shuttle

environment, and the power and communications constraints imposed by the

shuttle's payload provisions.

These limits have been the motivation for the design of autonomous

space experimental platforms, such as the Science and Applications

Support platform (SASP), discussed in a subsequent section.

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V. CREW MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE SPACECRAFT

I

For many missions it is possible to envision a spacecraft that

would operate autonomously without a crew for long periods. Service and

maintenance would be performed during a manned visit scheduled on a

regular preventive basis, or as required by indications of failing or

failed components on the spacecraft. If the satellite were in a shuttle-

accessible orbit or could be brought into one for service, the crew

would have the option of repair in orbit or recovering the satellite and

returning it to eairth for more extensive reworking.

The absence of a crew on a permanent basis from a spacecraft has

certain benefits. Spacecraft sensors themselves can be made larger, and

the vibration induced by crew motion will not degrade the quality of the

observations. More power will be available for primary mission

functions. A fully manned design was considered for the NASA Large

Space Telescope but was deemed inappropriate, in part because the

motions of the crew members would substantially degrade the pointing

accuracy of the apparatus.

We can compare the design of hypothetical manned and unmanned space

systems to perform the same mission. Let us assume the lifetime of the

program is 15 years and the estimated mean time between failures on the

satellite is three years. The manned support option would be to launch

a single satellite with manned repair or recovery, scheduled nominally

every three years, though conducted on an as-needed basis in order to

realize the benefits of extended satellite lifetimes. The unmanned

option would be to procure five satellites in a block and launch as they

4A. . , * i ifi _ i i III l-.

161

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are required on expendable launch vehicles. For purposes of this

comparison, let us assume a cost of $40 million per EIV lduih, $180

million per manned recovery/refurbishment mission, and $240 million per

satellite. The nominal 15 year program cost based on fixed three-year

satellite lifetimes would then be $1 billion for the manned program and

$1.4 billion for the unmanned. Both program costs will vary with the

mean satellite lifetime if recovery and refurbishment missions or new

launches are deferred when the satellite in place continues to operate

satisfactorily.

The detailed cost comparison of the two programis is strongly

sensitive to the assumptions regarding the cost of the individual

components. However, an illustrative calculation using these figu-es is

presented here. We continue to assume a 15 year program duration, three

year nominal expected satellite lifetime, $40 million per ELV launch,

$180 per manned recovery refurbishment operation, and $240 million

procurement cost per satellite. The program cost now depends on the

satellite lifetime L as shown below, where the square brackets indicate

the greatest integer function.

Manned program cost = $280M + [(15/L)-l*l$180M

= $14001 + I(15-5L)/L]*$280N1 for L-<3

Unmanned program cost

= $1240M + f(15/I,)-1*$40M1 for ,>3

These equations are graphed in Fig. 4, which shows the dependency

of the total program cost on mean satellite lifetime. If the 15 year

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115.0 Unrnanned operation withmultiple satelite-_ -- -------.,-- - - - - -- -

o w0 _I One litllite with manned rec oveir

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0 1 J0 36 9 12 15

Mean satellite lifetime (years)

Fig. 4 -Cost comparison of hypothetical manned and unmanned satellitesystems discussed in the text

program lifetime assumption is rigidly adhered to, the manned program

dominates the unmanned program over all satellite lifetimes, since

recovery operations are less costly than new satellites and only

relatively small savings are realized by eliminating ELV launches. In

fact, it is unlikely that the unmanned program would continue in the way

shown in this chart for lifetimes less than three years. In the face of

multiple early failures the satellites would be extensively evaluated

and redesigned rather than replicated and relaunched repeatedly. There

are many other difficulties with this sort of cost comparison;

reasonable alternative programs are not included, and the results are

very sensitive to initial assumptions.

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The manned and unmanned systems can be compared in dimensions other

than cost. First, in versatility. A single satellite system with

manned servicing would require recovery, refitting, and replacement to

substantially modify the satellite. The cost of this kind of activity

would be much higher than that incurred in modifying a satellite already

in production. The other side of this issue is that long satellite

lifetimes with adequate performance result in substantial savings ($180

million per cancelled manned service mission compared to only a $40

million savings per cancelled ELV launch in the previous example). In

the case of short satellite lifetimes, the schedule of manned service

missions can be accelerated. If short lifetimes persist despite efforts

to improve reliability, the conventional program would continue only

with larger increased costs for valuable payloads such as the one

discussed here.

In the manned program, the possibility of accidents in which the

crew inadvertently damages the satellite will always exist. This will

not occur in a conventional program. A major advantage offsetting this

risk is the far simpler recovery from certain electromechanical

accidents in a manned program.

A single catastrophic event destroying the satellite will require

termination of the single satellite manned program, while an accelerated

launch schedule can allow the conventional program to proceed as long as

satellites remain in inventory or production.

The collateral opportunities in the manned program include the

experimental test of the utility of crews in space, which we have been

waiting for, but exclude the possibility of multiple satellite

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observations. The conventional program does nothing to further resolve

the questions of human space capabilities, but if satellite lifetimes

are extended and multiple platforms placed in space at the same time,

additional observation opportunities can arise.

Another risk in the manned program is that the satellite may become

unserviceable, or fail catastrophically during a service visit, in the

worst case causing the loss of the crew and shuttle as well as itself.

In the conventional satellite program only the loss of equipment,

satellites, and ELVs can occur.

Irrespective of the parti,,ular numbers involved, it is clear that

certain very expensive satellites using fuel, film, and other

consuiaables, both for today's passive or tomorrow's active military

functions, could benefit from manned servicing. This would be even more

so in the case of orbiting space weapons systems requiring a large

number of platforms arranged in orbits such that multiple visits could

be accomplished in a single shuttle mission.

[%

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VI. MANNED SPACE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PLATFORMS

The discussion of experimentation on shuttle sortie missions

earlier in this paper noted the limitations as well as the advantages of

sortie R&D activities, particularly the 20-to-50-day limit on mission)

duration, imposed by use of the shuttle as the experimental plattorm.

To circumvent these limits, NASA has undertaken detailed studies of

systems to support manned space Research, Development, Testing and

Evaluation (RDT&E). This system is called the Science and Applications

Space Platform (SASP) and is described in Ref. 7. SASP is a proposed

shuttle cargo to be placed in orbit as a long-term base for large

payloads. Crew involvement levels could include setup and maintenance,

or extended operation from a habitat module. The SASP would be similar

to the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) in that it stays in low

orbit and is serviced by shuttle flights over a period of years. But

unlike the LDEF it would provide support functions to experiments in 3

manner compatible with the sortie. Electric power, computer support,

data services, stabilization, and heat radiation could all be handled by

centralized systems. The central computer would operate the platform,

and individual experiments could operate under the control of smaller

dedicated computers.

NASA's study concluded that major improvements in low earth orbit

payload accommodations could be provided over the sortie mode with

minimal payload conversion. Experiments would benefit from longer

flight duration, an environment without chemical and electromagnetic

contamination from the shuttle, greater heat dissipation and power,

greater viewing freedom, and lower cost per day of flight.

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There would also be reductions in the load on NASA support systems,

such as the TDRSS and the shuttle itself. The SASP package of resources

available for payloads would free the experimenters from having to

provide their own solar arrays, antennas, radios, recorders. etc., and

thus would be an economical alternative to a series of smaller free-

flying spacecraft.

Illustrations comparing the two proposed designs for the first-

and second-order Science Application Support Platforms and the shuttle

cargo bay sortie are shown in Fig. 5.

Neither of the designs shown include a long-term crew habitation

module, as would be required for a resumption cf manned space activity

as was conducted in the American Skylab and Soviet Salyut programs.

Crew involvement on an unmanned SASP would be limited to initialization,

maintenance, and equipment change-outs during brief visits.

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VII. ACTIVE CREW OPERATION JF CONTINUOUSLY MANNED FACILITIES

An orbiting space station, long envisioned by writers of science

fiction, is now viewed as a potentially valuable asset in the

development, deployment, operation, maintenance, and recovery of both

military and commercial spacecraft, as well as the conduct of space

operations. Space station concepts range from the modest, such as the

manned habitation module attached to an SASP as described earlier,

through a full-blown multiport structure capable of accommodating large

crews involved in the construction and service of large space systems.

The only currently funded manned experimental program to provide a

Skylab-like environment is the ESA Spacelab (Ref. 8), itself a sortie

mission payload. It has the same duration, power, and heat limitations

imposed on other payloads. Spacelab, as seen in Fig. 6a, is a modular

system consisting of various manned modules and unmanned equipment

pallets installed in the shuttle bay.

The detailed illustration in Fig. 6b shows the major features of

Spacelab. A tunnel connects Spacelab to the lower crew area in the

shuttle. In some configurations, Spacelab has its own airlock, allowing

specialists to service or operate external equipment without interfering

with cabin activities on the orbiter.

As commodious as the Spacelab accommodations may be, they are short-

term facilities, limited to a few weeks of continuous use at a time. In

a recent study (Ref. 9), the Aerospace Corporation has examined the

possibility of an independent Spacelab, modified to support a crew of

three for 90 days. Their design proposal (see Fig. 7a) is based on the

SLong module configurationLong module t 3m pallet configuration

j Long module 6m pallet configuration4 Short module + 6m pallet configurations Short module t 9m pallet configuration

6 9m pallet configuration12m pallet configuration Besides these basic configurations, other arrangements15m pallet configuration of modules and pallets are possible

1~ ~ 0 1,, 1 I-SOURCE. ref. 8

Fig. 6a- Spacelab basic configurations

Tunnel2Viewport

3Optical WindowModuleAirlock

6Pallets

Experiment Segment6Core Segment

4 Orbiter Attach Fittings10Utility interface

'10 Igloo (for' pallets only)

SOURCE: ref. 8

Fig. 6b - Spacelab main e;.,ternal features

Fabric enclosure Fbrls

TMS Saea

cradle

Teleoperatormaneuvering

system

Remotemanipulator

system

SOURCE: . f9

Fig. 7a -Shuttle Independent Spacelab with shirtsleeve service module

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use of current or planned hardware elements--the 25 kilowatt solar power

module is under development by NASA for extended STS and SASP operation,

the Remote Manipulator System arm has, of this writing, been flown on

two shuttle missions, and the reboost module and other support equipment

are based on Skylab designs.

The shirtsleeve satellite service area is composed of Spacelab

pallets enclosed in a new pressurized fiberglass fabric enclosure. The

original Spacelab long habitation module is exteiided by an additional

segment to accommodate the crew and equipment that would otherwise be

carried on the orbiter. Layout of the habitation module is shown in

Fig. 7b.

A major new component is the Teleoperator Maneuvering System (TMS),

a remotely controlled vehicle designed to travel as far as GEO to extend

the range of manned satellite serviceability, This is one of a number

of proposals for such reusable transfer vehicles; others are discussed

in a later section.

The launch configuration for ail Independent Spacelab on a single

Shuttle Derivative Launch Vehicle is seen in Fig. 7c. Shuttle launch

would require two separate missions, one to carry the habitation module,

another for the power system, with assembly by docking in orbit.

Development cost for an Independent Spacelab is estimated at S2

billion, though such preliminary estimates must be regarded with some

caution.

The facility would make good use of existing components and thus

allow a relatively modest investment to substantially expand the planned

U.S. crew presence in space. Evaluation of the services provided and

.. . . . .. , . . .. .. .. .... .. .. ..- J

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Personalstorage

Airlock 02an N

n Command /x".dcking console

W.C.-adapterPallet controld c i g, ,racks

Service.r Shower Powermomodule

modul15 ftPartitioned

Command 'odjconsole Tabl prep I

Storage -

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SOURCE: ref. 9

Fig. 7b - Spacelab habitation moduleTop view

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experimental results of a small facility such as this could form the

basis for a decision on more elaborate platforms, such as the Space

Operations Center (SOC).

The Space Operations Center is a less modest undertaking of

potential military importance (Ref. 10). This is a NASA concept which

could evolve from a small initial configuration to a full-blown high-

volume satellite construction and service facility, serving a wide range

of military and civilian missions. One evolutionary path for the SOC is

seen in Fig. 8, while Fig. 9 details the full reference configuration.

Much more needs to be known about the relative economies and

abilities of crews performing construction and heavy maintenance tasks

in space before one can reach an informed decision on whether to

initiate such a program and which design should be pursued. We have

very limited experience with crews performing tasks in space. It is

important that we begin our experimentation soon to determine what is

feasible and desirable in this area.

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/ ODSRS SATELLITE CONSTRUCTION

UNDER CONSTRUCTION MOBILE

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OTV HANGER D "ODUL12 PLS

LOGISTICS MODULES

PROPELLANT

(2 P L C SS E R V IC E M O D U L E

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Fig. 9- A NASA concept for the Space Operation Center (SOC). This is a large configuration,with extensive facilities for satellite construction and servicing. It is unlikely that a

Space Transportation System consisting of just four shuttles could support theconstruction of such a base, or the level of space activity required to justifyit. A single SDLV launch could place the components in orbit, replacing

at least five shuttle missions

33 -

VIVI. AIAANCED) D)EPLOYMENT CONCEP'rS

The space operations that have been proposed for the remainder of

this century are principally in low earth orbit or at geostationary

altitudes. Looking further into the future it is reasonable to ask

whether we will confine our activities to LEO and GEO. The answe r givenl

by many futurists is Lnat we will not be confined to these locations in

space, our domain will expand to encompass the earth-moon system.

In addition to the earth and moon there are five points of interest

in the earth-moon systems. These ire the LaGrangian points (known as

I,-I through L-5), where the gravit.t ional forces exerted by the two

bodies are such that an object at one of thcse points will remain at

that point. Of the five point-, shown in Fig. 10, only two (L-4 and

L-5) are stable, i.e., slight perturbations in the position of an object

result in restorative forces which tend to maintain the equilibrium.

The others are of less interest, since a spacev platform trying to

maintain position at L-1, L-2, or L-3 would require substantial energy

expenditures just to maintain its position.

Stine, in Ref. 2, discusses the military importance of L-4 and L-5.

Each of these( points s situated at the top of a pair of gravitational

"wells," one going down toward the earth and the other toward the moon,

as shown in Fig. 11. A platform placed at L-4 or L-5 has considerable

strategi(c import~aice in the earth-moon system since gravity assists the

transfer of mass to the earth or moon and resists any effort to transfer

mass to the equilibrium point from the earth or moon. This is a case

k .... .

- 14-

+L-4

(-EARTH

I

,AT L-_ .MOON*_'

+ - L + + L 2P ' -- /

GEOSYNGHRONOUS ORBIT

+L-3

SCALEI00,0 Mls =SOURCE: ref. 2

Fig. 10- LaGrangian points in the earth-moon system

where the "high ground" analogies of some military space pltninrs Are,4

quite appropriate.

It should be noted, however, that occupation ot the 1,-4 atd 1,-5

"high ground" offers no additional protection from dirocted energy

devices.

The use of these points for any purpose, military or civilian, is

many years away. Decisions regarding them will be made in political and

technological contexts that differ greatly from today's circumstalces.

... . . •. . il E. . - ..

GRAVtTY WILL DIAGRAM OF THE EAOTH-UOON SYSTEM

LUNAR ORBIT

DITHOSTANCE FROM LENTl-

SOURCE: ref. 2

Fig. 11 - Gravitational well diagram of the earth-moon system(not to scale)

- 3b -

IX. ANNED MILITARY SPACE VEIl ICLES

While illustrations of space stations often show one or two space

shuttles parked nearby, actual operations i I I require the development

of a different kind of vehicle, designed for nse only in space, and not

intended to cross the atmospheric barrier. Such a vehicle Would be

lighter, smaller, and far less expensive than the shuttle, which must

operate in space and in air, two very different environments.

The primary reason to develop a space-only vehicle is that the

shuttle will be needed for its space launch missions, and will not be

available to any great extent for ongoing orbital operations. The need

for the vehicle arises as well from the orbital limitations of the

shuttle, which can reach only as high as b00 miles, whereas many

military payloads orbit at altitudes far beyond, and almost all

commercial payloads ( desirable as cost sharers for any manned space

operation) are in geosynchronous orbit.

The Teleoperator Maneuvering System (T.S), en in Fig. 0a attached

to the Independent Spacelab, is one such vehicle, envisioned as an

unmanned robot. Another utility vehicle for manned operations, proposed

by Bud Redding of the Stanford Research Institute, is seen in Fig. 12.

Orbital transfer vehicles are essential for a mature operation in

space. Support and additional propulsion modules could be added

external to the vehicle, since it would never be required to fly through

the atmosphere and no streamlining would be necessary. It could be

operated in a manned or autonomous mode as deemed appropriate for the

mission. A known minor component replacement for a satellite in

_3 i-

Fig. 12 -The High Performance Space Plane is a proposal by the Stanford ResearchInstitute for a reusable general purpose space vehicle. Auxiliary fuel and

payloads are carried outside the vehicle. The exterior modulesare jettisoned, leaving a conical reentry vehicle, which is

recovered by parachute drop

geosynchronous orb i t woti Id ck taI i i Iy niot (-,i I I for hi i ngi rig a

large and potent i II d' I i cate sat eI iit e down i nto Ilow eairl 11)h ri t A

crow memnber woul1d be sent to do the Job as a "bouo cal1 1 An

undiagnosed failure on at nearby satf.] i It would justi fy a recovery

miss ion.

The transfer you i ci would need some means of deal inri with

satel11i tes spinning out of tonLrol1 Th is is an area of c.ons ide rab 1e

uice rt a int y, but it is clear ridat di re . pe rsonial act ion by crow memberis

-38

would be unwise. G3rapplin zg sys tvins or nots operated by remnote

teleoperators would be more appropriate.

X . ANTHtER APO!RO!ACH!

Much o I the p reced ing di sctlssion Ii ,1 beeii 1i:1sed on the impl Ic it

assufmpt ioI that it is IIse vIu aInl e(Iiomic .2l to )la1:(- creows iii space to

perform co l t, x fIIIIct ions. 'I' is llay W.' I I be t he case ill peacet ime-, but

dtring a period )I host i I iti es the use of an SflU or similar base may

well be den ied even though the nat ion's mi I i tary need for spice

operat ions would be subs tant ia I I y iic reised. There are proposals for

hardened silo launc.hers to pla<e small ayloads in space, but this does

not allow for the flexibilitv ind idiptability of manned operations.

Thus, aiother approach to the military use of space is that of quick

turnaround, single-stage to orbit, Reuhable Aerodynamic Space Vehicles

(RASV) . Ohne such vehicle is seen in Fig. 13. This is a Boeing concept

for a RASV using space shuttle main engines in a wet uing airframe

holding the cryogenic fuels. With slight upgrading in the SSNIE thrust

rating, such a vehicle could place payloads of over 30,000 lb in 28.5

degree orbits and over 15.000 lb in 100 mile polar orbits with takeoff

turnaround times measured in hours. This design is actually reminiscent

of the original proposals for the shuttle, which were based oi similar

advanced materials technology. The metal exterior of the craft would

eliminate the turnaround delays associated with tile maintenance as

found in the shuttle, and other systems would also benefit irom shuttle

experience.

-40-

0C

cr -o

c z

a'

-41-

X-. CONCLUSIONS

An examination of the future military roles of crews in space has

aspects of a problem embedded in a dilemma. We have yet to define our

military space goals or impose limitations. Organizations to carry out

required training and development activities have not yet fully emerged.

What is needed today above all else is a commitment to explore the

possibilities, to experiment, and to acquire a sound knowledge base on

which to make an informed judgment on the future military role of men in

space.

iI

- 43

REFERENCES

1. Klass, Philip J., Secret Sentries in Space, Random House, New York,1971.

2. Stine, G. Harvey, Confrontation in Space, Prentice-Hall, EnglewoodCliffs, New Jersey, 1981.

3. SIPRI Yearbook 1977, World Armaments and Dis-irmament, MIT Press,Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977.

4. Project Nereus--Executive Summary, Scripps Institution ofOceanography, ONR West Special Publication No. 81-1, February 1981.

5. Visual Observations of th Ocean, by R. Stevenson, L. P. Carter, S.1. Van der Haar, and R. 0. Stone, in Skylab Exploes the Earth,NASA, 1976.

b. Antipodal Seas, by R. Stevenson, Apollo-Soyus Test Program SummaryScience Report, NASA Special Publication SP-412, Vol. 2, 1979.

7. Conceptual Design stu y: Science and Applications Space Platform(SASP) Final Briefiig. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Huntington Beach,California, MDC 69300, October 1980.

8. Spacelab Users Manual, European Space Agency Document No. DP/ST(79),July 1979.

9. Baker, J. C., T. A. Cortes, and E. B. Mayfield, IndependentSpacelab, The Aerospace Corporation Report No. TOR-0082(2071-05)-1,January 1982.

10. Space Operations Center System Analysis, Midterm Briefin&, BoeingAerospace Company, Seattle, Washington, D180-26209-1, December 1980.

aoa . .,

1 House, New York,

-Hall, Englewood

nt, MIT Press,A

Lion of Ai1, February 1981.

L. P. Carter, S.s the Earth,

Program Summary IM)1. 2, 1979.

Space PlatformLtington Bea.ch,

nt No. DP/ST(79),

ependent0 08 2 (2071-05)-I,

iefin , Boeing1, December 1980.

a IlIAD