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FOREIGN FF IRS

Vol. 36 A PR IL 1958 No . 3

THE ILLUSION OF DISENGAGEMENT

By Dean Acheson

'HE other day I was re-reading Clarence Day's wise anddelightful book, "This Simian World," and came acrossthe paragraph remarking on what unpromising entran ts in

the struggle for supremacy on this planet the lemurs might haveseemed many millions of years ago. "Those frowzy, unlovelyhordes of apes and monkeys," he wrote, "were so completelylacking in signs of kingship; they were so flighty, too, in theirways, and had so little purpose, and so much love for absurd andidle chatter, th at they would have struck u s . . . as unlikely mate-rial. Such traits, we should have reminded ourselves, persist.

They are not easily left behind, even after long stages; and theyform a terrible obstacle to all high advancement."

It does seem to be true th at , in our day , only in a sort of cycli-cal way do free societies retain an understanding of their ownexperience, and hold to the purposes which it has inspired. Is thisbecause some echo of those early traits still persists, or becausethe inevitable hardening of the arteries of each generation bringson some failure of memory, or for still other reawjns?

Certainly moods change as memories, once fearful, becomedimmed, as new anxieties arise, and as present exertions becomeincreasingly dist^teful. The bitter teachings of 1914-1918, andthe determination they fired, had quite disappeared by 1938, tobe replaced by ideas of neutralism, withdrawal from conflict,"America First." After these, in turn, were swept away by thedevastation of ano ther world war and by a display of world lead-ership entailing vast national effort, another 20 years has endedby bringing back the old yearnings and errors under a new nam e."Disengagem ent," it is called now; but it is the same futile—and



FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Soon after we had awakened from the daze of the SecondWorld W ar, it became clear to us th a t our protected adolescenceas a great Power was over. The empires which had spawned us,

whose capital had developed us, whose balance of power hadgiven us security, either disappeared in the two world wars orpassed to more minor roles. We were face to face with the respon-sibility of adult national life in the most critical situation imagin-able. A world which for a centu ry had had an integral life of sortswas split into three segments. One—the Soviet-Communist seg-ment, militarily unequalled, except in nuclear power in whichit was weak, was held together by an ideological and economic

system supported by force. Another—containing the vast popula-tions of Asia, the Middle East, and North and West Africa—^wasleft in confusion and turmoil at the end of the war; and, in addi-tion, either had newly gained national independence or was de-manding it from rulers gravely weakened. To these people hadcome also expectations of an improving life to a degree neverbefore imagined and, perhaps, unfulfillable.

The third segment was what was left of the old world order—

roughly Europe and the Western Hemisphere, The second andthird segments had certain important common characteristics.The y were not in the Soviet power system. B ut various and largeparts of them could, under some conditions, be added to it.

In this situation, as it appeared not long after the end of theSecond World War, the task of what has since come to be calledthe Atlantic Community, that is, the states of Western Europeand the Western Hemisphere, was to bring about and maintainwith increasing strength and vitality a non-Communist worldsystem. Within this system, not only the states mentioned, butthose in the second segment as well, should, if the system wasworkable and working, be able to pursue their national ends intheir own way.

This effort required, at the beginning, a great deal of recon-struction, particularly in Europe. The only state strong enoughto furnish the leadership in this effort was the United States.Both its government and its people responded vigorously to the

press of necessity. The steps which were taken are well knownand need not be recalled here. The important thing is that they



TH E ILLUSION OF DISENGAG EM ENT 373

nations in Asia and Africa which were just coming to the pointwhere they were free to pursue their national destinies undirectedfrom the outside.

Since the war, therefore, the foreign policy of th e U nited Stateshas become, by necessity^ a positive and activist one. It has beenone of attempting to draw together, through various groupings,that Western area which must be the center of a free and openworld system, and of taking the leading part in providing it withmilitary security, and with a developing economy in which tradecould grow and industrial prod uctivity could be developed, bothin areas which were already industrially advanced and thosewhich were at the threshold. At the same time it was an essential

part of this policy to produce the maximum degree of cohesionthroughout the whole non-Communist area, through politicalpolicies which would make for integration and strength ratherthan for exploitation.

Various aspects of this effort—the military, the economic, thepolitical—I have attem pted to describe in some detail elsewhere. Ihave there pointed out the interdependence of the W estern H emi-sphere and Western Europe; how the power factors involved

make it essential that this part of the world shall stand firmlyunited; how, without the American connection, it is impossibleto maintain independent national life in Western Europe; andhow, without W estern Europe, the power factors would turn dis-astrously against the United States.

Broadly speaking, these conceptions have for the past decadeor more had wide acceptance both in this country and throughoutthe Western world. They have been successful beyond the dreamof those who first advocated them. They are beginning to bear

the most valuable fruit.Recently, efforts have been relaxed. Our military security and

much of our prestige resting upon it have been impaired, thoughnot so far that vigorous action cannot make the necessary re-pair. But, throughout the world, as I indicated at the beginningof this article, voices are being raised to ask whether it is neces-sary to continue facing the hazards of the military situation,to continue bearing the expense of making vital and progressive

the economic life of the whole free world; whether coexistencewith the Communist system cannot be bought at a cheaper price



374 FOR EIGN AFFAIRS

reputation and justly entitled to a respectful hearing, that thisis possible, his words have a powerful impact.

Mr. Kennan's views are not new to him. They do not spring

from a fresh analysis of the current situation. He has held andexpressed these views for a t least a decade. The effect which theyhave had currently makes us realize anew that the receptiongiven to the expression of ideas depends upon the mood of thehearers. This reception may have little to do with the truth ofthe ideas expressed; it has a great deal to do with their power,Mr. Kennan has told people what they want to hear, though notbecause they want to hear it. What is it that he has said?

The ideas are almost as vague as the style is seductive. Thethoughts are expressed as musings, wonderings, questionings, sug-gestions. Bu t what comes out of it is about th is: First, the re is theidea of disengagement in Europe. By this is meant mutual with-drawal of American, British and Canadian, as well as Russian,forces from somewhere. This somewhere first appears to be Eastand West Germany; then the "heart of Europe;" again, the Con-tinent; and sometimes, from the general ethos of the discussion,it appears to be all overseas areas.

The second idea is the neutralization of Germany. The thirdis that there should be no nuclear weapons in Europe. And thefourth is that throughout Asia and Africa, in what are called the"uncom mitted areas," there is little "to be done . . . except to re-lax;" that "It is perfectly natural that Russia . . . should haveher place and her voice there too;" that "our generation in theWest" has no "obligation vis-a-vis the underdeveloped parts ofthe world," and, anyw ay, there is no "absolute value attached to

rapid econcanic development. W hy all the u rgency?" If any soundschemes for development are presented, we should support them ,**when they arise;" but, only on the condition that they tell usfirst "how you propose to assure that if we give you this aid itwill not be interpreted among your people as a sign of weaknessand fear on our part, or of a desire to dominate you." If Asianand African states should find in this grudging, meager and hu-miliating policy no opportunity to push their economic develop-

ment within the non-Communist system, and should turn toCommunist methods and Communist help, we should accept



TH E ILLUSION OF DISENGA GEM ENT 375

or more. It is an assertion that the struggle naught availeth;that it is dangerous, unwise and unproductive. It is a withdrawalfrom positive and active leadership in the creation of a workablesystem of states. It is a conception, blended of monasticism and

the diplomacy of earlier centuries, by which the United Stateswould artfully manoeuvre its way between and around forceswithout attempting to direct or control them.

If we attempt to analyze these suggestions, the problemswhich they create prom ptly emerge. First, let us consider the ideathat something called disengagement can be brought about byremoving American, British, Canadian and Russian troops fromsome area in Europe. W ha t disengagement does this bring about?

Very little , as one sees if one pauses to consider the realities. Com-pare the confrontation which takes place between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union in Germany with that which occursalong the DEW line—that system of early warning stationswhich stretches from Alaska, across the Arctic regions and farout into the A tlantic. Here there are daily contacts on a thousandradarscopes, and doubtless the same is true on the other side ofthe screen. Some of these blips on the radar are actual aircraft;sometimes atmospheric conditions produce them. But they rep-resent a contact which no action in Germany can disengage.There is confrontation in every part of the world where the areaof the open and free world system may be reduced by Soviet mil-itary, economic or political penetration. No action in Germanywill produce disengagement here. The word is a mere conception,which confuses and does not represent any reality.

So, let us turn from it to consider something more capable ofdelineation. For instance, exactly wh at is the exten t of the m utual

withdrawal about which we are asked to negotiate? The answerto this question does not depend upon penetrating the vaguenessof Mr. Kennan's language. For there can be little doubt, I be-lieve, th a t, once a withdrawal begins, it will be complete, so far asUnited Sta tes, British and Canadian troops are concerned. All theforces, foreign and domestic, will combine to bring this about.As the withdrawal makes the military position weaker, ourforces will be less desired wherever they may remain. If with-

drawal is represented as advantageous for Germans, it wouldseem equally advantageous to Frenchmen. Icelanders, Moroc-



376 FO RE IGN AFFA IRS

general demand. The New Statesman shows us how the matteris now being presented to a small section of British opinion andhow it could bemuse a still larger one in th at co un try:

Yet the missile agreement is one of the most extraordinary and completesurrenders of sovereignty ever to be made by one country for tbe exclusivebenefit of another. For the missiles are not intended to defend Britain; onthe contrary, they decisively increase its vulnerability. Their prime purposeis to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet ICBM onslaught on America duringthe crucial three-year period which must elapse before America possessesI C B M s herself. The sole beneficiary will be America.^

We should not deceive ourselves. After disengagement, wewould soon find ourselves discussing complete withdrawal fromall European areas and, ve ry possibly, from bases in the Far Eastand N ear Ea st as welL Indeed, M r. K hrushchev h as twice servedwarning , once in Berlin in 1957 and again in Ja nuar y of 1958, th atthe sort of withdrawal which he is talking about is withdrawalfrom all overseas bases. Th is would cut the striking power of thefree world by at least a half and, perhaps, until our missile pro-gram accelerates, by much m ore.

We must think of what we purchase for this vast price. What

would R ussian withdrawal from Germany or the heart of Europeamount to? Is it possible to believe that the Soviet Government,whatever it may say or whatever agreement it may sign, would,or could, contemplate withdrawing its forces behind, say, theRiver Bug, and keeping them there? A nd, by forces, I m ean effec-tive Russian physical power, by whatever name called. It is hardto see, after the events in Poland and H ung ary, whatever the R us-sian Government might wish, how it could possibly undertake

so hazardous a course. For, if its physical force were perm anen tlyremoved from Eastern Europe, who can believe that even one ofthe Communist regimes would survive? Therefore, whereverSoviet forces might be garrisoned, the expectation and threat oftheir return must continue to be ever present (at most it wouldrequire from 12 to 18 hours) if Russia is to main tain the powerwhich it has insisted upon as recently as the Hungarian uprising.

At tWs point in ou r discussion we m ust examine the conception

of the neutralization of Germany; and then bring together theconsequences of withdrawal and neutralization. It is necessary,



TH E ILLUSION OF DISEN GA GEM ENT 377

upon its military forces and its military alignment. In otherwords, its national life will be conducted under far greate r limita-tions than those in which other sovereign people live. The possi-

bility that any such situation could endure seems to me quitefantastic.W hatever Germans might initiaiiy think they would be willing

to do, there is no precedent in history for, nor does there seemto me to be any possibility of, the successful insulation of alarge and vital country situated, as Germany is, between twopower systems and with am bitions and purposes of its own. Con-stant strain would undermine the sanctions of neutralization.The final result would be determined by the relative strength ofthe pressures from the two sides. As I have already suggested,the pressure would all be from the Russian side. For, there wouldbe no Power in Europe capable of opposing Russian will afterthe departure of the United States from the Continent and theacceptance of a broad missile-free area. Then, it would not belong, I fear, before there would be an accommodation of somesort or another between an abandoned Germany and the greatPower to the E ast. Under this accommodation, a sort of new Rib-

bentrop-MoIotov agreement, the rest of the free world would befaced with what has twice been so intolerable as to provoke worldwar—the unification of the European land mass (this time theEurasian land mass) und er a Power hostile to national independ-ence and individual freedom.

But, without this withdrawal of forces and the neutralizationof Germany, M r. Kennan sees "little hope for any removal of th edivision of Germany at all—nor, by the same token, of the re-

moval of the division of E urope." Na tura lly enough, these wordshave found a strong echo in Germany. But it is a fading one, asGermans ponder the conditions which would flow from unificationby withdrawal and neutralization, and see the end of the besthopes of the German people. Two weak states—East and WestGermany—jockeying for position in a sort of no-man's land,could raise the East-West "tensions" to a point compared towhich anything we have yet experienced would seem mild indeed.In all this West Berlin would, of course, be the first victim. It

would be a wholly inadequate judgment upon those whosena'ivete and weakness produced this result that they should share



378 FO RE IGN AFFAIRS

and, like them, should sit in supine impotence while more gallantmen suffered. The best hope for German unification I shall men-tion shortly.

Turning to Eastern Europe, Mr. Kennan sees those countries,without the withdrawal of Russian troops, caught between thedilemma of constant revolutions, bloodily suppressed, and theacknowledgment of Soviet domination. This view seems to mefounded on nothing but its assertion. I cannot for the life of mesee how the movement toward a greater degree of national iden-tity in Eastern Europe is furthered by removing from the Con-tinent the only Power capable of opposing the Soviet Union.

Nor do I see th a t the facts bear out M r. Kennan's gloomy pre-dictions. For instance, if the experience of 1956 had producedonly the development in Poland or if the Hungarians had actedwith as much restraint, it would have been plain to all that theattraction of the power of the West, of the possibilities which itssystem opens to all, was proving very strong indeed—strongereven than the secret police and Soviet occupation troops. Thefact that in Hungary the reaction was pushed to the point where

the Russians felt it necessary to suppress it with force proves onlythat it was handled unwisely.So, as we think about the matter, we must wonder whether

there is anything we can purchase "one-half so precious as thegoods" we sell. We are told not to worry about this; that, eventhough it seems quite unlikely that the Russians would carry outany withdrawal, nevertheless, it is good propaganda to make theoffer and cause them to refuse it. This seems to me profoundly

false. In the first place, it treats international negotiations asthough all the figures on the chessboard were made of wood orivory; whereas, in fact, we are dealing with living people, subjectto all the emotions of mankind. If I were a European and had tolive through two or three years of American negotiations aboutwithdrawing from the Continent, I think that very early in thegame I would discount America's remaining and would prepareto face a new situation. F urthe rmore , to believe tha t the Russianscan be put in the position of refusing to evacuate Europe under-

rates their skill in negotiation. They would simply, as they havealready done, continue to raise the price. And it would be we and




abandon the efforts of a decade, which are bringing closer to reali-zation the hopes of Western Europe, of Gtermany, and of EasternEurope as well. From the low point of 1946-1947 the economic,social and political health and strength of Western Europe—of

which West Germany has become an integral and vital part—have grown greatly. Their pull on Eastern Europe continues tomount. To continue this the American connection is essential.The success of the movem ent toward uni ty in the west of Europeis no longer in doubt. Only the rate of progress is undecided. TheCoal and Steel Community, Euratom, the Common Markethave been accepted, A common currency and political communityare on the way.

All of this is threatened by the call to retrea t. I t will not do tosay that a united Germany, made militarily impotent and neu-tralized, can play an effective pa rt in bringing to fruition a unitedand vigorous European community. The slightest puff of realityblows this wishful fancy away. The jockejrings and tensions ofthe two parts of Germany, the unopposable threat of Russianpower, the bribes which can be dangled before Germany by theSoviet Union in the form of bou ndary rectifications and economic

opportunities— these alone are enough to put an end to hope of aunited and strong Europe, invigorated by Germany.For those who believe that Eastern Europe would welcome

American and Russian troop withdrawals as the beginning ofliberation, I suggest a quiet sampling of candid Polish opinion.I venture to predict th at what they would find is a horror at beingabandoned by the West and left between the Soviet Union anda Germany similarly abandoned, to which the offer of anotherpartition of Poland might be irresistible.

But, if one looks at the o ther side of the m edal, what a differentface it bears A strong, united Europe could have the men and theresources—along with British and United States contingents—to deal by conventional forces with invasion by conventionalforces, particularly as the Eastern European satellites are becom-ing a danger, and not an asset, to Soviet m ilitary power. Th is, ifpressed, gives real mutuality of benefit to a negotiated reductionin forces. It makes possible, too , a time when nuclear forces would

no longer have to be relied on as a substitute for conventionalforces, and with it a real opportunity to negotiate this threat



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ble pull upon Eas t Germ any and Eastern Europe. This would, inturn, have its effect upon the demands of the Russian people ontheir government. With a rise in the standards of living in the

Soviet Union, and as some broader participation in the directionof affairs was made essential by their very magnitude and com-plexity, the Russian need for the forced communication and ironcontrol of Eastern Europe would diminish. Then negotiationslooking toward a united Germany, under honorable and healingconditions, and toward the return of real national identity to thecountries of Eastern Europe, while preserving also the interestsof the Russian people in the ir own security and welfare, could forthe first time be meaningful and show the buds of hope. This hasbeen the goal of Western policy for the past decade.

It would be self-delusion to close our eyes to the difficultieswhich lie before us along this road. Some we have created our-selves. Our military strategy, with its sole reliance on massiveretaliation, and a budgetary policy which has neglected eventh a t, have caused us a loss of relative m ilitary power and of pres-tige. Some of our political policies have weakened our alliances.Our allies, too , are having their troubles. In w hat are perhaps the

two closest of them, we could wish (as they u ndo ubtedly do, too)that both the present and the immediate future held greaterpromise for the development of strength and popular attitudesmore attuned to reality. We all share together the common prob-lem of devising a military policy for NATO which will avoidmaking the proposed defense seem as fearsome as the potentialenemy's threat, and which will be a real deterrent because it isa credible one.

I have suggested elsewhere that this is possible. Briefly, theway is to crea te a situation in fact which equals the political pur-pose of the North Atlantic Treaty—that is, a situation where inorder for the Soviet Union to attack, or coerce, Europe it wouldhave to attack, or coerce, the United States as well. This^ if weall use a fair degree of intelligence about our defenses, the SovietUnion could be deterred from doing. What is required is a short-range effort which does not preclude a sustained effort toward awiser long-range goal. The short-range effort would be to provideNATO with such effective nuclear power that the Soviet Union




made too dangerous. The longer-range purpose would be to de-velop adequate conventional forces in Europe, with British andAmerican participation, to make mutua lly desirable a real reduc-tion and equalization of both Soviet and NATO forces and a con-trolled elimination of nuclear material for military use.

I quite understand that all of this is difficult. But I believealso that "the mode by which the inevitable comes to pass iseffort."

Finally, Mr. Kennan's discussion of the uncommitted coun-tries of Asia and Africa seems to me to disclose a complete lackof understanding of the forces which are at work there. In thefirst place, he would like to tell them, as Thoreau would have

done, that the whole march of industrial civilization since thebeginning of the nineteenth century has been a mistake; thatthey must be patient about increasing their standard of living;that they must curb the mad rate at which they reproduce; thatwe have no sense of guilt or obligation to them because we arein a position to help their economic development as our own washelped. But when they have any sound plans, we will considerthem on terms which they cannot accept. This means that we

find nothing to our interest in their industrialization; and thatthey are in reality ward heelers who threaten one political sidewith desertion to the other unless they receive a handout or asinecure.

Nothing could be further from the truth. These governmentsare faced with a demand, just as are the Government of theUnited State s and the Government of the Soviet Union, th at con-ditions shall exist under which a rising standard of living is pos-

sible. The conditions in these countries vary from those which arestill deep in an agricultural stage to those which have begunindustrialization and are ready, once capital is available, to pushit speedily forward. Governments cannot stay in power unlessthey respond to the demands of those who will keep them there.Even the oligarchs in the Kremlin are under pressure, which theycannot altogether refuse, to expand the standard of living inRussia.

There are two ways in which the governments of the undevel-oped countries can bring about conditions which their peoples



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forced savings, and industrial equipment from Russia, paid forby the export of raw materials. T'he other involves the mainten-ance, and perhaps a steady expansion, of the standard of living,

the maintenance of systems of government in which there is aconsiderable area of freedom, the import of capital from WesternEurope and North America, and the repayment of these loansover a considerable period of time by participation in the expand-ing trade of an open economic system. To say that economicdevelopment has nothing whatever to do with political alignmentis a fallacy of the gravest sort. It is, of course, true that economicaid cannot force, cannot ensure, a political alignment from anycountry. B ut it is certain th a t, without it, a different alignmentwill take place.

May I conclude by repeating that the new isolationism whichwe have been discussing, and the reception it has received, isgravely disturbing, not only because it is utterly fallacious, butbecause the harde r course which it calls on us to forego has beenso successful. If one compares the non-Communist segments ofthe world today with w hat they were 12 years ago, one sees enor-mous progress. If one compares, as we have tried to do here, thepull of a vigorous free system, held together by the jo int effortsof at least some of its members to provide military security, eco-nomic power and political leadership, one sees how strong it isand what effect it has had. If one considers the changes whichhave already occurred within the Soviet Union, one can see thetime approaching when adjustments in Eastern Europe are pos-sible, when military forces can be reduced, and when the menaceof nuclear destruction will be greatly diminished, if not removed.

Surely, there are dangers, and grea t dangers, bu t w ith good sensewe can live through these. We will not make them less by weak-ening ourselves, des troying th e confidence of our allies, and refus-ing to help those people who are willing to work to some extent,at least within the system which we and our allies, together, havecreated and can make ever more vigorous and appealing.



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